The Immaterial self : a defence of the cartesian dualist conception of the mind

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dc.contributor.authorFoster, John
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-27T10:23:50Z
dc.date.available2015-10-27T10:23:50Z
dc.date.issued1991
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11071/4086
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherRoutledge Taylor and Francis Groupen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of minden_US
dc.subjectDualismen_US
dc.subjectMind and bodyen_US
dc.subjectDescartes, Renéen_US
dc.titleThe Immaterial self : a defence of the cartesian dualist conception of the minden_US
dc.typeBooken_US
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