Investigating constitutionalism and judicial independence in Liberia

Abstract

Judicial independence is the foundation of democratic governance and the rule of law. The Liberian Constitution provides structural safeguards for judicial independence, notably in Articles 71, 72, and 73, which address tenure, remuneration, and immunity. However, these safeguards are undermined by Articles 54 and 34(d), which grant the executive and legislative branches control over judicial appointments and budget allocations. This paper examines the extent to which these provisions compromise judicial autonomy and impartiality in Liberia. The research employs a doctrinal legal analysis, reviewing constitutional provisions, case law, and comparative frameworks from other jurisdictions. Additionally, institutional theory and the theory of good governance are applied to assess the impact of political interference on the judiciary’s effectiveness. Findings reveal that executive and legislative influence over judicial appointments and budgets creates vulnerabilities to political interference, eroding public trust in the judiciary. The lack of transparent and merit-based appointment processes further weakens judicial impartiality, while financial dependence on the legislature limits operational autonomy. These structural compromise the judiciary’s role as an independent arbiter of justice. With the use of comparative analysis, this study provides actionable recommendations for enhancing judicial independence in Liberia, ensuring fair governance and safeguarding human rights. This study underscores the urgent need for constitutional and institutional reforms to safeguard judicial autonomy in Liberia.