Governing the commons through customary law systems of water governance
Date
2014
Authors
Gachenga, Elizabeth
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
CEESP and IUCN
Abstract
The resilience of customary law systems of natural resource governance in many parts of the
world lends credence to Ostrom’s theory on the governance of commons. Ostrom argued that
resource users who enjoy relative autonomy in the design of rules for governing and managing
common-pool resources, frequently achieve better economic (as well as more equitable)
outcomes than when experts do this for them.2 In support of this theory and acknowledging
that most common pool resource governance regimes are based on a customary law system,
Bosselman has sought to demonstrate a link between customary law systems and positive
outcomes for sustainable development.3 Using a case study of the customary law system of
water governance of the Marakwet community of Kenya, this paper tests and builds on the
design principles and tools developed by Ostrom, to study normative institutions in a dynamic
environment.4 The paper proposes an analytical framework that helps identify the features that
strengthen customary institutions and ensure their adaptability and resource sustainability. This
exercise illustrates the parallels between commons governance and customary law governance
of natural resources.
Description
Peer reviewed article
Keywords
Customary law systems, Water governance, Natural resource management, Marakwet, Commons, common pool resources, Law, natural resource governance, irrigation system, sustainability, sustainable development, Property, Water