SU+ @ Strathmore University Library Electronic Theses and Dissertations This work is availed for free and open access by Strathmore University Library. It has been accepted for digital distribution by an authorized administrator of SU+ @Strathmore University. For more information, please contact library@strathmore.edu 2020 Coordination in multi agency response to International Terrorism in Kenya: a comparison of Dusit D2 and West Gate terror attacks. Musoma, Albert Lusiola School of Humanities and Social Sciences Strathmore University Recommended Citation Musoma, A. L. (2020). Coordination in multi-agency response to international terrorism in Kenya: A comparison of Dusit d2 and Westgate terror attacks [Thesis, Strathmore University]. http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12063 Follow this and additional works at: http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12063 https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/ https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/ http://hdl.handle.net/11071/2474 mailto:library@strathmore.edu http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12063 http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12063 COORDINATION IN MULTI AGENCY RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN KENYA: A COMPARISON OF DUSIT D2 AND WESTGATE TERROR ATTACKS MUSOMA ALBERT LUSIOLA 119115 SUPERVISOR PROF. MUNENE MACHARIA A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy, Intelligence and Security of Strathmore University November, 2020 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation may be published without proper acknowledgement of the author. DECLARATION iii DEDICATION To my love and life’s partner- Pauline- I say Asanti. Tiffany, Brynt and Dylan-your ever present energy keeps me a day younger I love y’all. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I acknowledge the help the Almighty God has accorded me so far. I thank my sponsors for trusting in me and sponsoring me. I thank the Kenya Defence Forces for nominating me for this noble course. I also thank my supervisor for his guidance and sincere support. I also take note of the invaluable support of my classmates and colleagues who have encouraged me along the way. I can’t complete this acknowledgement by not thanking Prof Mwagiru and Lieutenant General Humprey Njoroge. Lastly, I thank my family for always being there for me, their moral support in this research journey had made me come this far. v TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION.......................................................................................................... ii DEDICATION.............................................................................................................iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ v LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... x LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... xi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... xii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ xv CHAPTER ONE .......................................................................................................... 1 1.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Background of the Study ......................................................................................... 3 1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ......................................................................... 5 1.4 Research Objectives ................................................................................................. 7 1.4.1 General Objective ................................................................................................. 7 1.4.2. Specific Objectives .............................................................................................. 7 1.5 Literature Review..................................................................................................... 7 1.5.1 International Terrorism ......................................................................................... 8 1.5.2 Structural and Legal Frameworks Guiding Multi-Agency Operations on Countering Terrorism................................................................................................... 12 1.5.3 Strategic Multi-Agency Policies on Coordination in Response to Terrorism and the Success ................................................................................................................... 20 1.6 Gaps in the Literature Review ............................................................................... 25 1.7 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................. 25 1.8 Study Justification and Significance ...................................................................... 26 vi 1.8.1 Academic Justification and significance ............................................................. 26 1.8.2 Policy Justification and significance ................................................................... 26 1.9 Theoretical Framework .......................................................................................... 27 1.10 Research Methodology ........................................................................................ 30 1.10.1 Research Design................................................................................................ 31 1.10.2 Target population and Sample size ................................................................... 31 1.10.3 Validity and Reliability ..................................................................................... 32 1.10.4 Data Collection ................................................................................................. 32 1.10.5 Data Analysis and Data Presentation ................................................................ 33 1.10.6 Legal and Ethical Considerations ..................................................................... 33 1.11 Chapter Outline .................................................................................................... 33 CHAPTER TWO ....................................................................................................... 35 RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL TO AFRICA ...................................................................................................................... 35 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 35 2.2 International Responses to Terrorism .................................................................... 35 2.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 46 CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................... 47 RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN KENYA ...................... 47 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 47 3.2 A Preview of Responses to International Terrorism in Kenya .............................. 47 3.3 Response to International Terrorism in Kenya according to Questionnaires ........ 50 3.3.1 Response Rate ..................................................................................................... 50 3.3.2 Demographic Information ................................................................................... 51 3.3.2.1 Operation Units of Respondents ...................................................................... 51 vii 3.3.2.2 Duration of Service in Security Forces ............................................................ 52 3.3.2.3 Level of Education ............................................................................................. 52 3.3.3 Findings from Questionnaires ............................................................................. 54 3.3.3.1 Existence of Policies to Fine-tune Multiagency Coordination ........................ 54 3.3.3.2 Policies Guided by the UNSC Resolutions ...................................................... 55 3.3.3.3 Policies for Synchronizing the Operations of Various Primary Responders ... 57 3.3.3.4 Clear Policies in Kenya for Enhancing the Involvement of the Military in Supporting the Police ................................................................................................... 58 3.3.4 Findings from the Open-Ended Questions and Interviews ................................. 59 3.3.5 Hypothesis Testing.............................................................................................. 60 3.4 Structural and Legal Frameworks Guiding Multi-Agency Operations on Countering Terrorism in Kenya ................................................................................... 60 3.4.1 Laws on the Use of Legal Instruments of Violence ............................................ 60 3.4.1.2 Efforts to Unify the Measures Taken to Prevent, Punish and Combat Terrorism in Kenya ....................................................................................................................... 62 3.4.1.3 Legal Frameworks on Media Coverage during Terror Attacks ....................... 63 3.4.1.4 Clear Understanding of the Terror Financing Act and Anti-Money Laundering Act ................................................................................................................................ 64 3.4.1.5 Kenya Enjoys Support from International Security Frameworks .................... 65 3.4.1.6 Kenya as Part of International Counterterrorism Efforts ................................. 67 3.4.1.7 Multi-Lateral Training Institutes...................................................................... 68 3.4.2 Findings from the Open-Ended Questions and Interviews ................................. 69 3.4.3 Hypothesis Testing.............................................................................................. 69 3.5 Multi-Agency Laws, Policies, Doctrines, and Strategies Regarding Terror Response Coordination ................................................................................................ 70 viii 3.5.1 Findings from Questionnaires ............................................................................. 70 3.5.1.1 Border Security, Technical Surveillance and Enhanced ICT counterterrorism Capabilities .................................................................................................................. 70 3.5.1.2 Poor Sharing of Intelligence on Terrorism among the Various Security Agencies ....................................................................................................................... 71 3.5.1.3 Poor Coordination of Efforts Aimed at Checking Terror Group Financing .... 72 3.5.1.4 Disconnect in the Operationalization of Frameworks on Synchronization of Response to Terrorism ................................................................................................. 73 3.5.1.5 Exchange Programs and Sponsored Course Abroad ....................................... 74 3.5.1.6 Kenya Faces Challenges Related to Uneven Capacities .................................. 75 3.5.1.6 Lack of a Common Curriculum, Doctrine and Modus Operandi .................... 76 3.5.1.7 Poor Arming of Intelligence Teams ................................................................. 77 3.5.1.8 Corruption Defeats Multiagency Response ..................................................... 78 3.5.1.9 Enhanced Capacities to Respond to Terrorism through Multi-Country-Multi- Agencies ....................................................................................................................... 79 3.5.2 Findings from the Open-Ended Questions and Interviews ................................. 80 3.5.3 Hypothesis Testing.............................................................................................. 85 3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 85 CHAPTER FOUR ...................................................................................................... 92 COORDINATION IN RESPONSE TO THE WESTGATE AND DUSIT D2 TERROR ATTACKS ................................................................................................ 92 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 92 4.2 West Gate Attack ................................................................................................... 92 4.3 Dusit D2 Attack ..................................................................................................... 97 4.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 100 ix CHAPTER FIVE ..................................................................................................... 105 CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR BOTH DUSIT AND WESTGATE...................... 105 5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 105 5.2 The Westgate Shopping Mall and Dusit D2 Hotel Attacks ................................. 105 5.3 Failures at strategic level ..................................................................................... 111 5.4 Failure at Operational Level ................................................................................ 111 5.5 Critical Analysis on a 12-Point-Criteria .............................................................. 112 5.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 114 CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 118 6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 118 6.2 Summary .............................................................................................................. 118 6.2.1 Strategic Multi-Agency Policies on Coordination in Response to Terrorism in Kenya ......................................................................................................................... 118 6.2.2 Structural and Legal Frameworks Guiding Multi-Agency Operations on Countering Terrorism in Kenya ................................................................................. 120 6.2.3 Multi-Agency Laws, Policies, Doctrines and Strategies Regarding Terror Response Coordination .............................................................................................. 123 6.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 125 6.4 Recommendations ................................................................................................ 126 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 129 APPENDICES .......................................................................................................... 138 APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ........................................................................ 138 APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE .................................................................. 142 x LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1 Sample Size Categories ............................................................................... 32 Table 2.1 Response Rate .............................................................................................. 50 Table 3.1 Border Security, technical surveillance and enhanced ICT counterterrorism capabilities ................................................................................................................... 71 Table 3.2 Poor Sharing of Intelligence on Terrorism among the Various Security Agencies ....................................................................................................................... 72 Table 3.3 Poor Coordination of Efforts Aimed at Checking Terror Group Financing 73 Table 3.4 Disconnect in the Operationalization of Frameworks on Synchronization of Response to Terrorism ................................................................................................. 74 Table 3.5 Exchange Programs and Sponsored Course Abroad ................................... 75 Table 3.6 Kenya Faces Challenges Related to Uneven Capacities .............................. 76 Table 3.7 Lack of a Common Curriculum, Doctrine and Modus Operandi ................ 77 Table 3.8 Poor Arming of Intelligence Teams............................................................. 78 Table 3.9 Corruption Defeats Multiagency Response ................................................. 79 Table 3.10 Enhanced Capacities to Respond to Terrorism through Multi-Country- Multi-Agencies ............................................................................................................ 80 xi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.1 Operation Units of Respondents ................................................................. 51 Figure 3.2 Duration of Service in Security Forces ...................................................... 52 Figure 3.3 Level of Education ........................................................................................ 54 Figure 3.4 Existence of Policies to Fine-tune Multiagency Coordination .................... 55 Figure 3.5 Policies Guided by the UNSC Resolutions ................................................. 56 Figure 3.6 Policies for Synchronizing the Operations of Various Primary Responders ...................................................................................................................................... 58 Figure 3.7 Clear Policies in Kenya for Enhancing the Involvement of the Military in Supporting the Police ................................................................................................... 59 Figure 3.8 Laws on the Use of Legal Instruments of Violence ................................... 61 Figure 3.9 Efforts to Unify the Measures Taken To Prevent, Punish and Combat Terrorism in Kenya ...................................................................................................... 63 Figure 3.10 Legal Frameworks on Media Coverage during Terror Attacks ................ 64 Figure 3.11 Clear Understanding of the Terror Financing Act and Anti-Money Laundering Act ............................................................................................................ 65 Figure 3.12 Kenya Enjoys Support from International Security Frameworks ............ 66 Figure 3.13 Kenya as Part of International Counterterrorism Efforts ......................... 67 Figure 3.14 Multi-Lateral Training Institutes .............................................................. 68 xii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 9/11- September 11, 2003 Terror Attack on the USA AFRICOM- US Africa Command AG Attorney General AMISOM- African Mission in Somalia AMISOM- African Union Mission in Somalia AML- Anti-Money Laundering ATA- Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program ATPU- Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (Kenya) AU- African Mission CBRN- Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear CDF- Chief of Defence Forces CIMIC- Civil-Military Co-operation CJTF- HoA Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa CJTFHOA- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa CMAA- Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement CT- Counter-Terrorism CTC- Counter-Terrorism Committee CTED- Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate CTF- Counter-Terror Financing CTITF- Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force DG- Director General DMI- Directorate of Military Intelligence (The intelligence branch of KDF) DOD- Department of Defence xiii EUR- Euro FIU- Financial Intelligence Unit GSU- General Service Unit (Paramilitary wing of Kenya’s NPS) IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICT- Information Communications Technology IG- Inspector General IGAD- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization IPSTC- International Peace Support Training Center (Karen-Kenya) JAT- Joint Anti-Terrorism KDF- Kenya Defence Forces LRA- Lord’s Resistance Army MS- Mortality Salience NCTC- National Counter Terrorism Centre NGO- Non-Governmental Organization NIS- National Intelligence Service NPS- National Police Service NSAC- National Security Advisory Committee OAU Organization for African Union PFLP- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine POCA- Prevention of Organized Crime Act, 2010 POCAMLA- Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act POTA- Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 Recce- Reconnaissance Platoon of the GSU SAARC South Asian Association for Cooperation xiv SLAA- Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014 SoF- Special Operations Forces of the KDF SPSS- Statistical Package for the Social Sciences TIP- Terrorist Interdiction Program TMT- Terror Management Theory UK- United Kingdom UN- United Nations UNDP- United Nations Development Program UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC- United Nations Security Council US/USA- United States of America xv ABSTRACT Kenya has in the last decade been faced by a constant terror threat from al-Shabaab, ISIS and al Qaeda. This study sets out to assess responses to international terrorism in Kenya. It draws a comparison of the Dusit D2 and Westgate terror attacks. The study questions were as follows: Are there existing or lack thereof of multi-agency strategic policies on coordination in response to international terrorism in Kenya? Are there existing or lack thereof of structural and legal frameworks guiding multi-agency operations on countering international terrorism in Kenya? And what are the successes and failures borne out of having/not having multi-agency laws, policies, doctrines and strategies regarding terror response coordination? The study adopted mixed methods and exploratory research designs. The target population was all the members of the KDF SoFs, the NPS Recce squad, and ATPU Officers as well as policy level Military, Intelligence and Police Officers. The target population is estimated at 3400 personnel from which a sample of 97 was obtained. The used primary data collected from the respondents using mainly questionnaires and interviews as well as secondary data that was obtained from library-based research via books, e-books, journals, government publications, and published thesis, among other reputable academic publications. The data collected from questionnaires were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24. The findings were presented in descriptive statistics, tables, graphs, charts and inferential statistics. On its part, data from interviews were analyzed thematically based on the objectives so as to establish the key themes and trends from which findings, conclusions, and recommendations were drawn. The study findings make it manifest that strategic multi-agency policy on coordination in response to terrorism in Kenya enhances coordination in response to international terrorism. In this light, the level to which Kenyan security agents are guided by well formulated and clear policies in their response affects the quality of their coordination to international terrorism and vice versa. Additionally, the existence of structural and legal frameworks guiding multi-agency operations on countering terrorism in Kenya had led to effective response through standardizations of operation guidelines, better sharing of information, joint training and exchange of best practices among the various responders. This was evidenced in the Dusit D2 Attack in which synchronization of operations showed better response to the attack by the various operational and tactical teams as compared to the Westgate Attack. The study recommends that: the multiagency response teams should constantly review their operation guidelines and standard operating procedures so as to deal with the ever-changing sophistication in terrorist attacks; the government should put in place ways aimed at checking disparities in capabilities and equipment among various tactical and intelligence teams in Kenya for uniform response to terrorism; there is need for multinational frameworks for undertaking financing and creation of joint information infrastructure for security agencies so as to reign in on international terrorism in the East African Region; there is need for mobile-based applications to enhance real-time information sharing among intelligence and tactical teams on terrorism-related issues during operations; E-policing and rapport with the community should be enhanced so as to enhance sharing of information between police officers and the community on terrorism-related issues and There should also be measures aimed at regulating the use of social media in response to terrorism. 1 CHAPTER ONE 1.0 Introduction Territorial integrity and sovereignty are the core national interests that any state cannot afford to negotiate. Kenya has in the last decade been faced by a constant terror threat from al-Shabaab, ISIS and al Qaeda. All these threaten the very existence of Kenya by undermining its sovereignty. This translates to the country putting in facilities, programs, policies, laws, and institutions to prevent, protect, counter or neutralize the effects of such terror threats. According to McCauley and Moskalenko, terrorism is “a product of extremity of beliefs, behaviors, and feeling supporting perceived oppression or threat of the existence of a group.”1 Whereas many scholars the world over attribute terrorism to “divergence in political opinions and feelings of disorientation which leads to radicalization,” the main cause of terrorism has been religious extremism.2 Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations notes that the greatest causes of conflict in the postmodern world are the clash between western and non-western values (Islamic civilizations).3 This explains the prevalence of terrorism even in democratic countries. As a result, no meaningful response to terrorism devoid of addressing religious radicalization has been worth its salt.4 1 McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. Terrorism and political violence, 20(3), 415-433. 2 Weinberg, L.B., Eubank, W.L., & Francis, E.A. (2008). The cost of terrorism: The relationship between international terrorism and democratic governance. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(2), 257-270. 3 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. P.256 4 Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson, “What's So ‘Religious’ about ‘Religious Terrorism’?” Critical Studies on Terrorism 4, no. 3 (2011), 369–388. 2 Psychologically, terror attacks leave the victims with trauma, stress, depression among other negative psychological effects.5 Economically, terrorism keeps investors at bay, especially when meted on restaurants and shopping malls. In Kenya, terrorism has had very negative impacts on the tourism and service sectors.6 Mwagiru considers the economy to be one of the legs of the three-legged stool that forms the instruments of national power to which the Grand Strategy of any nation addresses itself to. Without it, the other two legs of Diplomacy and Military cannot function effectively7. Globally, hotels and shopping malls have often been subject to numerous terror attacks. This is exampled in the Easter holiday of 2019 attacks in Sri Lanka as well as other numerous places such as the USA, Britain, and France where hotels have suffered a barrage of terrorist attacks.8 Due to globalization, terror attacks attract a lot of international attention. This causes some artificial pressure for states to respond almost immediately to protect their image in the name of sovereignty. These quick responses at times act against the very intentions of the states by bringing out a picture of disjointed organs, different government voices, and blue on blue instances in some cases. Sometimes, states increase surveillance both physical and technical amongst the civilian population thereby creating the debate of human rights versus national security. Some countries tend to enforce curfews, round up certain segments of the population for profiling, 5 Waxman, Dov. "Living with Terror, Not Living in Terror: The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on Israeli Society." Perspectives on Terrorism5, no. 5/6 (2011): 4-26. 6 Aaron M. Hoffman, Dwaine H. A. Jengelley, Natasha T. Duncan, Melissa Buehler, and Meredith L. Rees, “How Does the Business of News Influence Terrorism Coverage? Evidence from The Washington Post and USA Today,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22 (2010): 576. 7 Makumi Mwagiru. Dimensions of the Grand Strategy: Essays on Theory, Practice, Institutions and Mechanisms. (Nairobi, Thirty Three Consortium Publications, 2016) 8 Rudolph, Christopher (2006) National Security and Immigration; Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945. California: Stanford University Press 3 random arrests and hard interrogations amongst other measures. Some states even conduct preemptive attacks on terrorist location often with high civilian casualty rates. 1.1 Background of the Study Hanhimaki quoting Rapoport in his four waves of terrorism terms the religious wave as the modern wave. To him, although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, the modern religious wave has become an extremely organized and complex enterprise9. Kenya has experienced five-decades of terror. The first documented terror was the January 1976 attempted shoot down of an Israeli passenger aircraft landing in from Embakasi Airport (currently Jomo Kenyatta International Airport). The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed responsibility. The flight number El-Al flight was shot at using surface-to-air missiles however, the terror attack failed.10 The second documented terror attack was on the 31st of December 1980. It was carried out by the same PFLP. The object of attack was the Israeli-owned Norfolk Hotel. The estimated death toll was 20 people who were celebrating the ushering of the New Year.11 The third documented attack which was the most devastating was the 1998 bombing of the USA embassy in Nairobi. The al Qaeda terror group claimed responsibility. They carried out a coordinated attack on the USA embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-salaam. 9 David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terror: International Dimensions and Consequences” in Hanhimäki, Jussi and Bernhard Blumenau, eds., An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western Experiences (London: Routledge, 2013) and “Reflections on the Third or New Left Wave: 17 Years Later”, in Alberto Martin Alvarez and Eduardo Re Tristan eds. Revolutionary Violence and the New Left (London: Routledge, 2017) 10 Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History since Independence, [London/New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012], p. 321 11 Edward Mogire & Kennedy Agade Mkutu, “Counterterrorism in Kenya,” in Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2011, p. 474. 4 The 2002 attack on Israeli-owned Hotel in Kikambala carried out by al Qaeda affiliates was the 4th documented terror attack in Kenya. It claimed the lives of 13 and caused an estimated 80 injuries.12 In the same year, the al- Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab targeted an Israeli chartered plane on its’ take off from Mombasa International Airport with a shoulder-launched missile. It is said that Faizul- one of the key figures in al- Shabaab- was the mastermind.13 The common trend in all these attacks is that Kenya was a soft and secondary target. The primary target was Israel, the USA, and the West. Kenya was a softer target due to security gaps and lapses as well as its proximity to Somalia.14 With the first-ever militarization of the Kenyan foreign policy and the eventual entry of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into Somalia in 2011, Kenya has evolved to become a primary target for terror groups, especially the al -Shabaab. The 2013 West gate shopping mall attack and the DusitD2 Hotel attack in January 2019 are the two major attacks where Kenya was a primary target with western interests being peripheral.15 In other cases, terrorists have been known to haul bombs into hotels and other crowded business areas so as to harm as many people as possible. Regrettably, no documented study has attempted to take stock of some of the measures put in place to respond to these attacks. 12 Deanne Criswell, “Preparing for a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks,” [17 th January 2018]. URL: https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/preparing-for-a-complex-coordinated- terrorist-attack/ Accessed: 14.04.18 13 David H. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,” in Journal of Conflict Studies, Nov., 2007, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 56. 14 Macharia Munene, “We Will Recover from Terrorist Attack,” Business Daily, [30 th September 2013]. 15 Asamba, M. (2019, 7th January). Anger, pain in the aftermath of Dusit attack. Standard Digital. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001309766/anger-pain-in-the-aftermath-of-dusit-attack- photos 5 This current study conceptualizes that governments have various responses to international terrorism which include normative, policy and strategic frameworks as well as institutional mechanisms for sharing information during terror operations by intelligence teams and obtaining and relaying information to the intelligence community by operational-tactical teams during terror attacks. The study hypothesizes that intelligence teams and operation units face numerous challenges in sharing intelligence products. However, no documented study has investigated this conceptualized relationship. It is in this context that this current study sets out to investigate the coordination in responses to international terrorism in Kenya. 1.2 Statement of the Research Problem Kenya has in the past 6 decades been affected by international terrorism. In the last two decades, Kenya has been a direct target of these terror attacks. Because of this, Kenya has adopted various ways to respond to these terror acts. Initially, Kenya responded in a silo bureaucratic manner where the military was the main responder as seen in the 1998 USA embassy bombing in Nairobi. In 2013, Kenya employed the 1st multi-agency approach to responding to international terrorism during the West-gate attack. In these responses, Kenya like many countries in the world has put in place many institutional, normative, and structural changes to deal with this menace of terrorism. It has adopted international resolutions, enacted national laws. National legal responses to coordination in response to terrorism include among others: “the enactment of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009 (POCAMLA); the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, 2010 (POCA); the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 (POTA), and Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 6 2014 (SLAA).”16 These amongst other multi-agency institutions have created the National Counter Terrorism Center, which was created by the SLAA; Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), and the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center all these are to synergize and consolidate the efforts to deal with terrorism in the country. With all these creations though, the Dusit D2 terror attack still happened. There was notably much improvement in the tactical response between the KDF special operation forces (SoF) and the recce teams from the NPS. There was also a greater improvement in the dissemination of information at strategic levels. However, there are several issues that need to be investigated and several questions to be answered in order to deal with the issue of coordination in response to terrorism at strategic and higher operational realms. For instance, the laws governing deployment, training and interoperability of various multi-agency actors, the policies, strategies, and doctrines underlying the coordination of information amongst various multi-agency teams and documentation of the successes and failures attached to the existence or lack of thereof of these laws and policies. This underlines the importance of this current study. 1.3 Research Questions 1. Are there existing or lack thereof of multi-agency strategic policies on coordination in response to international terrorism in Kenya? 2. Are there existing or lack thereof of structural and legal frameworks guiding multi-agency operations on countering international terrorism in Kenya? 16 http://frc.go.ke/downloads.html 7 3. What are the successes and failures borne out of having/not having multi- agency laws, policies, doctrines, and strategies regarding terror response coordination? 1.4 Research Objectives 1.4.1 General Objective To examine the coordination in responses to international terrorism in Kenya with a sharp focus on the comparison between the coordination in response during Dusit D2 and West Gate mall terror attacks. 1.4.2. Specific Objectives 1. To establish the existence or lack thereof of strategic multi-agency policies on coordination in response to terrorism in Kenya. 2. To examine the existing or lack thereof of structural and legal frameworks guiding multi-agency operations on countering terrorism in Kenya. 3. To investigate the success and failures borne out of having/not having multi-agency laws, policies, doctrines, and strategies regarding terror response coordination. 1.5 Literature Review This section presents the literature reviewed. The literature starts with definitions of terrorism. This is followed by a review of relevant literature which is done in line with the study variables namely strategic multi-agency policies on coordination in response to terrorism, structural and legal frameworks guiding multi-agency operations on countering terrorism and the success and failures borne out of having/not having 8 multi-agency laws, policies, doctrines, and strategies regarding terror response coordination. 1.5.1 International Terrorism Steven Best and Anthony J. Nocella in “Terrorists or Freedom Fighters”, define terrorism as “the intentional use of physical violence directed against innocent persons - human and/or nonhuman animals - to advance the religious, ideological, political, or economic purposes of an individual, organization corporation, or state government.”17 Best and Nocella not only cover the five factors in defining terrorism but also bring in an important perspective of the economic objective. This is very common, especially in interest-based terrorist groups. What is questionable about this definition is the non-human animals. They instead would have focused on property destruction. Boaz Ganor, in “Terrorism: No Prohibition without Definition” defines terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence against civilians in order to attain political, ideological, or religious aims.”18 Boaz's perspective of terrorism reduces terror activities to only civilians. This contrasts with Best and Nocella who are mainly focused on property destruction without bringing without bring in other dimensions of terrorism and its perpetuators. This means that if terrorists overrun a military barrack or unleashed violence on police or another terror group’s operating base, then that will not constitute terrorism. Two key positives from this definition are that Boaz refrains from mentioning who the subject is in terrorism. This is important since it leaves it 17 Best, Steven, and Anthony J. Nocella. 2004. Terrorists or freedom fighters?: reflections on the liberation of animals. New York: Lantern Books. 18 Menon, Sundaresh. 2014. «International Terrorism and Human Rights». Asian Journal of International Law, 4 (1): 1–33. doi:10.1017/S2044251313000337. 9 open to include even states who unleash violence on their own population. Also, he refrains from the use of the word “unlawful”. This is because governments have used their legal instruments of violence to terrorize their citizens. Yonah Alexander in “Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries” considers terrorism as “the threat and use of both psychological and physical force in violation of international law by state and sub-state agencies for strategic and political goals.” Yonah’s definition tends to go beyond a statist perspective by bringing in the international law perspective which was not focused by Best and Nocella as well as Boaz Ganor. He also adds the psychological factor to his definition. This is very important since the key aim of terrorism is not the loss of lives or destruction of property but creating fear. Helen Duffy in “The War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law” holds the view that after the September 11 (9/11) attacks on the twin towers and the pentagon, there has been an increased drive in unifying the measures taken to prevent, punish and combat international terrorism.19 Various legal measures including the United Nations Security Council Resolutions have mushroomed imposing a variety of measures that states can undertake to prevent and suppress terrorism. Duffy questions the understanding of terrorism. She believes it’s not a concept that can be universalized in definition and condemnation. Walter Laqueur, in “The Age of Terrorism,” says that acts of terrorism constitute “the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are 19 Antonio Pastor Palomar (2007) Helen Duffy: The “War on Terror” and the Framework of International Law, Democracy and Security, 3:2, 247-248, DOI: 10.1080/17419160601017776 https://doi.org/10.1080/17419160601017776 10 targeted. Walter doesn’t consider terrorism to be a threat of the use of force.”20 He looks at it just as the use of force. He also doesn’t believe that the main aim of terrorism is any non-political objective. This, however, has been deemed otherwise by several terror attacks like 9/11 and East Africa’s USA embassy bombings. Lastly, to him, it only qualifies to be terrorism if innocent humans are targeted. This means killings militaries or other terrorists will not qualify to be terrorism yet there exists non-state to non-state terrorism. The definition espoused by Walter Laqueur sharply contrasts that from most of the other scholars cited who see terrorism as having negative effects on human and non-human targets. Christian Walter, “Defining Terrorism in National and International Law,” considers “the League of Nations’ 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism” as the first attempt to multilaterally define terrorism. The League considered terrorism to include “all criminal acts against a state with the intention of instilling terror in the minds of particular persons.”21 This definition has still stood the taste of time, especially for statists. However, it tends to focus on the state to state terrorism and non-state to state terrorism. This definition is important since it creates a context under which multi-agency operations on countering terrorism can be undertaken. It lays an important foundation for understanding international terrorism in the country. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which is the main organ of the united nation charged with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security 20 Christopher Wall (2019) The last great historian: Walter Laqueur and political violence, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 30:1, 255- 262, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1560640 21 Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol29/iss1/3 11 defines terrorism as “all acts that have motivations of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, and religious terrorism.” This definition is unique since it’s not only holistic but also modern. David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” is one of the most influential and widely debated theories in the field of terrorism studies.22 The 9/11 terror attack on the USA made Rapoport create a theoretical framework for describing and grouping what he called “the waves of modern terrorism.” These waves, he names as “anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism.” To Rapoport, each of these waves is distinct and lasted a generation. He says that they all are inspired by ideology. Rapport creates a distinct and expanded understanding of terrorism by underlining the key motivations of international terrorism. The anarchist wave was in the 19th Century. It was first characterized by Russian anarchists.23 Later, it spread to Western Europe, the Balkans, and Asia. The anti- colonial wave was the second wave. Its ideology was nationalism.24 This led to the fight for independence from foreign rule. The new left wave or the socialism wave is the third wave. Its ideology was European and American left-wingers who considered themselves as the vanguards for the Third World masses against the imperialism of Americans and Britons.25 The last wave he called the religious wave. It started in the 1970s. Originally, its ideology was Islam but has since spread to other religions.26 In examining global terrorism trends, LaFree, Gary, and Laura Dugan in "Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism" posit that the early 1990s period was the peak 22 David C. Rapoport, "Modern Terror: The Four Waves," in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2004), 46-73. 23 Ibid 24 Ibid 25 Ibid 26 Ibid 12 of global terrorism.27 He noted that this trend significantly dropped in the years leading to 9/11. The 9/11 to him gave a lot of other terrorist groups the impetus to take on governments and armies. It led to a great power diffusion since concepts like air superiority and inflicting mass casualty were considered to be preserves of the state. In the 1970s, Western Europe was the epicenter of international terrorism. The 1980s the Latin American region faced their fair share of the cake. The later decade saw the Middle East and Persian Gulf region bearing the greatest brand of terror-related activities. La Free notes that the results of terror activities in Western Europe have been lesser deaths per attack compared to the Middle East/Persian Gulf. A large number of terrorist attacks are characterized by the use of commonly available unsophisticated weapons e.g. the improvised explosive devices, low fatalities, and low levels of planning.28 1.5.2 Structural and Legal Frameworks Guiding Multi-Agency Operations on Countering Terrorism Westby, Jody R. "Countering terrorism with cybersecurity" notes the importance of information and communication technologies ICT as a key enabling factor to terrorism.29 He says that this is even compounded further by difficulty in governments to track and trace cyber communications. ICT being transnational, “there are no common global-standardized processes and procedures for the tracking and investigation of cybercrimes, and the inadequate or ineffective information sharing 27 Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan (2007) Introducing the Global Terrorism Database, Terrorism and Political Violence, 19:2, 181- 204, DOI: 10.1080/09546550701246817 28 ibid 29 Jody R. Westby, “Countering Terrorism with Cyber Security,” paper for the 36th Session of World Federation of Scientists, International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies (18–26 August 2006, Erice, Italy). 13 systems between the public and private sectors.”30 Westby notes that although there have been massive developments in tracking and tracing capabilities globally, governments have shown a lack of goodwill in enacting laws and coming up with policies to fine-tune and operationalize these procedures. The post 9/11 period saw governments tightening border security, heightened technical surveillance and enhanced their ICT counterterrorism capabilities. Westby underlines the importance of interventions across the cyberspace which has been an important component of counterterrorism measures as shown Raneta and others. 31 Raneta, Lawson Mack, and Michael J. Kelly in “Equal Justice in the Balance: America's Legal Responses to the Emerging Terrorist Threat” assert that in responding to terror acts, governments have put in place several legal measures to combat it.32 In the USA, the September 11 terrorist attacks have brought into light various legal instruments among them are “the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Transport Security Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act among others. All these are aimed at reinforcing border security.” He further adds that the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act is a key response law.33 Haque, M. Shamsul. "Government Responses to Terrorism: Critical Views of Their Impacts on People and Public Administration." Focuses on the measures put in place by Western countries in responding to terror acts. They assert that “such states have 30 Ibid 31 Renata Lawson Mack and Michael J.Kelly, Equal Justice in the Balance: America's Legal Response to the Emerging Terrorist Threat. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, June 2004, 264 pp., hardback, ISBN: 0-472-11394-1 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid 14 strengthened and expanded antiterrorist laws since September 11.34 For instance, the European Commission adopted the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2001).” These frameworks amongst other things define terrorism. This is key to ensuring that during the response, all actors have a common understanding of the phenomenon. The framework also dictates the penalties and sanctions to be meted on various groups or individuals. It goes ahead to explain “the extradition procedures and means of exchanging information to be followed by the member states of the European Union (CEC 2001).”35 Haque paints a clear picture on how policy and legal frameworks can be leveraged to deal with international terrorism. A country focus shows that Canada enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001), which “prescribes measures to define and designate terrorist groups and activities, prosecute and punish terrorists, facilitate the use of electronic surveillance, and allow the arrest and detention of suspected terrorists.” The Britons, on the other hand, adopted “the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001).” The Australian government on their part introduced amongst other amendments to their already existing security and anti- terrorism laws, “the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act (2002) and Border Security Legislation Amendment Act (2002).” Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty- Five Year Balance Sheet” categorizes counter-terrorism responses into two: “the criminal justice model and war model.” In the criminal justice model, terrorism is dealt with like a crime. This means the police, prosecution units, judiciary amongst 34 Haque, M. Shamsul (2002). "Government Responses to Terrorism: Critical Views of Their Impact on People and Public Administration." Public Administration Review, Vol.62, No.5, pp.98-108. 35 Ibid 15 other judicial systems are the key players. Primary responders in this model are the police and affiliated units (e.g. GSU, ATPU, RECCE Company of GSU in Kenya).36 The Second is the war model. In this response model, terrorism is considered as an act of war. Thus, the main response is the military. The primary responders are usually military elite units e.g. special operations forces, air retaliatory attacks, air responses, infantry occupations among other military campaigns.37 There is emerging a modern model that merges these two. The police are involved in arrests, detentions, interrogations and prosecutions whereas the military supports the police in track and trace processes as well as responding to actual terror activities.38 D. Carmichael, “Of Beasts, Gods and Civilized Men: The Justification of Terrorism and of Counterterrorist Measures” looks at state response from a strategic perspective. To him, the state must respond swiftly but in observance of human rights. He gives an example of hostages and says that, as the state responds, it must consider the safety of hostages even though the very terrorists have the ability to kill them. He continues to assert that, if states will respond without observance of human rights, then the states will be as savage as the terrorists themselves. Schmid, “Countering Terrorism in the Netherlands” opines that, the greatest dilemma governments have in responding to terror events is the balance between how much information to release to the media vis-a-vis trying to observe operation security.39 Negative media coverage aids terrorists a lot. In the Westgate terror attack, the Kenyan media amplified their coverage to such an extent that they aided the al 36 Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid. Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet. In: Alex P. Schmid (Eds.). Western Responses to Terrorism. Special issue of Terrorism and Political Violence, 4: 4 Winter 1992, 322–323. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid 39 Alex P. Schmid (1992) Countering terrorism in the Netherlands, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4:4, 77- 109, DOI: 10.1080/09546559208427175 https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559208427175 16 Shabaab to get information that aided the terrorist inside the mall to know what was going on outside. Also, too much media coverage tends to give the terrorists the oxygen they need. It aids them in recruitment, funding, networking, raising stakes for validity and negotiations. On the contrary, if the government denies media basic information, it leads to speculation thus discrediting the government. Imposing a ban on media could even lead to legal tussles since it infringes on some of the constitutional rights of both the media houses and the citizens who have a right to be informed.40 Spanish Organic Law No.8 empowers judges to close down media houses which are support terrorism.41 Article 129a, Section 3 of the German Penal Law “prohibits the advertising of terrorist manifestos and propaganda.”42 Kenya has an open clause towards what media can cover during terror attacks. The Kenyan law only talks of responsible coverage which leaves it open for the media house to define what is responsible and what is not.43 This shows a glaring vacuum on how to ensure such responsibility; which can have negative ramifications on national security. H. Durmaz, et al. “Understanding and Responding to Terrorism,” gives two principals that should be considered when focusing on legal policing issues in the fight against terror. These are “societal protection (including culture, people, and property) and ensuring human rights and the rule of law.” To do this effectively, we must have a common definition of terrorism. They say that what’s more important is what laws 40 Ibid 41 https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/spain/615890/organic-law-8-2015%252c-of-july-22%252c-modifying-the- system-of-protection-of-children-and-adolescents.html 42 Criminal Code in the version published on 13 November 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 3322), as last amended by Article 2 of the Act of 19 June 2019 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 844) 43 https://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/en/mck/images/Downloads/A-handbook-on-reporting-terrorism.pdf https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/spain/615890/organic-law-8-2015%252c-of-july-22%252c-modifying-the-system-of-protection-of-children-and-adolescents.html https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/spain/615890/organic-law-8-2015%252c-of-july-22%252c-modifying-the-system-of-protection-of-children-and-adolescents.html https://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/en/mck/images/Downloads/A-handbook-on-reporting-terrorism.pdf 17 states put in place to protect the two principles. They call these preventive measures. They break them down into; criminal investigation measures, terrorist investigations, penalties, punishments meted, the net effect of the outcomes of these punishments.44 Pedahzur, Ami “The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism the Literature of Counterterrorism” analyses the war model, the criminal-justice model, and the reconciliatory model of terrorism. To him, the war model regards terrorism as “an act of warfare based on revolution.” The criminal-justice model sees terrorism as “a criminal act, whereas the reconciliatory model sees it as a political problem. To Pedahzur, these are the modes with which states can respond to terrorism.”45 The war model has the military as the primary responder with the aim of crushing the terror groups. The criminal justice model puts the police agencies as main responders with the judiciary facilitating the police actions in terms of convictions and penalties. The reconciliatory use policy, diplomacy, and politics to negotiate terrorism with a focus on its root causes. Ami goes ahead to assert that these 3 models co-exist and can be mixed at some stage. As the police as arresting and interrogating terrorists, the military could bomb their training bases as diplomats and politicians negotiate deals.46 Jeanne K. Giraldo, and Harold A. Trinkunas “Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective,” note that the greatest steppingstone to terrorism is financing. If governments can successfully choke terror group financing, 44 Durmaz, H. , Seinc, B. , Yayala, A. S. , & Ekici, S. (eds.), Understanding and responding to terrorism (pp. 11–16). Amsterdam: IOS Press 45 Pedahzur, Am`i; Perliger, Arie (2009). Jewish terrorism in Israel. Columbia University Press. p. 196. ISBN 978-0-231-15446-8. 46 Ibid https://archive.org/details/jewishterrorismi0000peda/page/196 https://archive.org/details/jewishterrorismi0000peda/page/196 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-231-15446-8 18 then they can defeat terrorists.47 However, to do this successfully, government departments like Defence, Intelligence, Police, treasury, banks, and the private sector must synergize and coordinate their efforts to choke the financial supply lines of the terrorists. The post-September 11, 2001 attack brought into light a lot of studies about the financing of terrorist groups. Governments have come up with new policies to deal with financing. In Kenya, the government has enacted the terror financing act, anti-money laundering act, and it has also adopted several international treaties like “the international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism (1999), Security Council resolution 1373-2001.”48 Richelson, Jeffrey, and Michael L. Evans, “Terrorism and U.S. Policy” observe that there were a series of international antiterrorist conventions that had emerged before the 9/11 terror attack. This included “the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Aircraft in 1971, the Convention against the Taking of Hostages in 1979, the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in 1997, and the Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism in 1999.”49 In the USA alone, the government came up with various acts and documents. Some include “Managing Terrorist Incidents (1982), National Program for Combating Terrorism (1986), U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (1995), and Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy (2001).”50 47 Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A Trinkunas. Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007. 48 https://www.ira.go.ke/images/updates/ANTI-MONEY-LAUNDERING--CFT-TRAINING.pdf 49 Kelly R. Cusick, Thwarting Ideological Terrorism: Are We Brave Enough to Maintain Civil Liberties in the Face of Terrorist Induced Trauma, 35 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 55 (2003) 50 Ibid https://www.ira.go.ke/images/updates/ANTI-MONEY-LAUNDERING--CFT-TRAINING.pdf 19 Beckam James, “Comparative legal approaches to homeland security and anti- terrorism” notes that “the Patriot Act amended 12 other acts and regulations ranging from laws on money laundering to telemarketing and consumer fraud acts in the United States.”51 This was in response to the September 11 bombings. In Germany in 2002, the government implemented the Law for fighting international terrorism. This led to the modification of several security statutes.52 In contrast, the Spanish government, even after the Madrid train bombings, did not implement any legislation that explicitly addressed the threat of international terrorism. It instead focused on legislating laws that “increased the maximum punishment for terrorist crimes.”53 Beckam considers “Legislative responses to international terrorism to consist of a combination of new laws and amendments to existing laws.” 54 Ali A. Mazrui, “Afro-Arab Crossfire: Between the Flames of Terrorism and the Force of Pax-Americana,” asserts that the greatest victims who bear the brunt of anti- America terrorism are the Middle East and Africa.55 However, he says that the difference between the two is that the Middle East has been terrorized by the American government efforts in ‘war against terrorism’. Africa has been a retaliatory punching bag for terrorists when they are unable to retaliate against America's homeland or its strong allies. Mazrui borrows from Rapoport's “Four Waves of International Terrorism” and asserts that Africa and the Middle East were both subjected to imperialism forcing them to 51 Beckman, James. 2016. Comparative legal approaches to homeland security and anti-terrorism. London: Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315573090. 52 Paul Wilkinson. International terrorism, the changing threat and EU responses. Institute for security studies. Eu, Paris. October 2005. No 84. Chaillot paper. 53 Ibid 54 Op cit 50 55 Mazrui, A. 2002. Afro-Arab Crossfire between the flames of Terrorism and the force of pax-Americana. Published by: DPMF (A.A.) 20 react in an attempt to shrug off the oppressors. This was considered as an act of terror by the west. Mazrui finalizes by saying that the middle easterners have a keen memory of the atrocities of the west and have fiercely guarded their culture, values, and traditions against western hegemonic tendencies of pushing western cultures down other nations’ throats. He says that Africa has a short memory and myopic vision that irrespective of the western atrocities from the colonial times, they still are puppets of the west and thus have been made victims of the western ideology of “the war on terror”. Macharia Munene, “The Challenge of al Shabaab,” gives a dichotomy of the challenges of al Shabaab justification of their jihad in Kenya.56 The first threat of jihad is the physical threat and destruction of property. This is mainly as a consequence of their military guerrilla operations in Kenya or on Kenyan soldiers in Somalia under the general umbrella of AMISOM. Munene considers the second challenge to be the psychological threat to the minds of the people, and to their socio- cultural and economic way of life. This threat has an even bigger impact than the first since it has a medical connotation to it. 1.5.3 Strategic Multi-Agency Policies on Coordination in Response to Terrorism and the Success Francis Kipkurui Arap Sang's, "Kenya", focuses on the relationship between the Kenyans National Police Service (NPS) and the international and transnational agencies that fight against crimes and terrorism.57 To Sang, cooperation from an 56 Macharia Munene, “The Challenge of al Shabaab. Africa Review, FEB 17 2012 http://news.africareview.com/AfricaAt 57 Francis Kipkurui Arap Sang's, "Kenya", International police cooperation: a world perspective / edited by Daniel J. Koenig and Dilip K. Das. 24 Nov 2015 21 international arena happens at two stages. The first is the conceptual stage. This is the stage where ideas and policies are formulated, the agenda is set and consultations happen. The second stage is the implementation phase that deals with the operationalization of the blueprints and ideas. At this stage, countries will train together, standardize their policies, legislate laws and sign treaties that deal with common issues e.g. extradition, sharing of intelligence, forming multiagency task forces, creating combined and joint centers of operations and intelligence among other areas. The KDF, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and, NPS as well other agencies mandated to deal with terror have benefitted greatly from these initiatives. Multi- lateral training institutes e.g. the international peace support training center (IPSTC) in Karen have massive courses on terrorism and related areas. Other arrangements have included exchange programs and sponsored courses abroad for security agencies. Sang notes that Kenya has signed extradition treaties with several countries which is a positive move towards fighting crime including terrorism.58 However, he says that at times bureaucratic procedures and political goodwill have in the past affected the execution of such treaties. Sang also notes that the uneven standards in terms of training, equipment, technology, and know-how between the various responders to terror have a significant impact on the success or failure rate of such responses. The lack of a common curriculum, doctrine and modus operandi between various response teams tends to kill the multi-agency idea. Criminals have also been seen to be heavily 58 Ibid 22 armed. On various occasions, the al-Shabaab terrorists have flushed police out of their posts or even overran military defensive positions like el- Adde attack. Macharia Munene, “Reflections on Kenya’s National and Security Interests,” notes that each country has a national interest in the categories of core or primary interest and peripheral or secondary national interest. Primary national interests are those that are not negotiable.59 That a country is willing to use all its instruments of national power including the instrument of the last resort-the military- to defend them. Secondary national interests are important too, but a country could prefer suing the first two instruments of national power i.e. diplomacy and economy to defend them. Munene warns that Kenya should guard her national interests jealously and not trade them in exchange for super-power pleasing. He actually urges Kenya to use her leadership influence in the region to project her ‘national interests’ especially in her core environment which has for a long time been a hostile operating environment. With a focus on terrorism, Munene notes how the porous Kenya-Somalia border has seen an influx of illegal and untaxed goods into Kenya whose proceed have aided the al-Shabaab terror group. Rabasa, Angel. "Countering Terrorism in East Africa." Notes that “The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA)” is one of the combined multi-country- multi-agency task force that is dealing with terrorism-related cases.60 Their strategic objectives are “to foster a regional perspective on security problems, build littoral capabilities, and support the African Union and United Nations peacekeeping 59 Macharia Munene Reflections on Kenya’s national and security interests Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa Vol. 3 No. 1 2011 60 Angel Rabasa. Radical Islam in East Africa. Copyright Date: 2009. Edition: 1. Published by: RAND Corporation. Pages 84-180 23 operations in its Area of Responsibility.” They have helped to come up with a joint logistical plan to help lift and support Ugandan troops in the AMISOM. They are also helping the entire East African region, building the counterterrorism capabilities of regional states. This, however, happens with a major input of the states themselves with the CJTFHOA providing technical support and training. Rabasa says that they had conducted counterterrorism training in Yemen. They have helped to build their Coast Guard to deal with pirate issues that are a cash cow for terrorists through the demand of ransoms. They have also provided military training to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Djibouti especially in the special operations realm. Kenyan and Djibouti navies have been major beneficiaries. As other past and current counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns show, “civil affairs operations can be critical in gaining the support of the population against terrorist elements.”61 Makumi Mwagiru, “Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region,” urges for more expanded philosophical thoughts amongst policymakers and decision-makers on security.62 He says that the traditional militaristic perspective of security narrows national security into a tunnel vision of only 3 or 4 main organs or agencies to deal with. In view of the 1994 UNDP paper on human security, Mwagiru opines that it is vital for states to expand their view of security to have a peripheral and not a tunnel approach. In his other article on globalization, he asserts that factors like the end of the cold war, globalization, and the 9/11 incidence have shifted the philosophy of security from statist to expanded perspective. It has challenged the concept of 61 Ibid 62 Mwagiru Makumi. "Towards a Sub-Regional Security Architecture in the IGAD ."; n: East African Journal of Human Rights and Democracy Vol. 3. University of Nairobi; 2004 https://profiles.uonbi.ac.ke/mwagirumakumi/publications/towards-sub-regional-security-architecture-igad 24 sovereignty. It has introduced power diffusion by showing that non-state actors can acquire capabilities previously enjoyed by states likeability to cause mass casualty and having air superiority. Globalization and modern threats e.g. terrorism have opened borders. They have reduced states to only acting within certain frameworks e.g. foreign policies, domestic policies and supranational platforms like the UN and AU. 63 Peter Kagwanja's “Counter-Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New Security Frontiers, Old Strategies,” looks at the various measures employed by African governments in countering terrorism. He classifies these measures into 4 main groups. The first group includes those measures taken to deal with “liberation movements, guerrillas, bandits, criminal gangs, cattle rustlers, pirates and vigilantes that are not categorized as terrorists.” The second measures include the counterterrorism strategies employed by states to ensure national security is enhanced for regime survival. The third is hard measures taken by states to combat and confront the menace of terrorism. He, however, notes that these hard strategies that are heavily militaristic end up infringing on the human rights of individuals. The last group of measures is ‘Soft’ policies that are aimed at nabbing terrorism in the bud. This is done through policies dealing with poverty eradication, illiteracy, unemployment … that could be effective in countering radicalization and violent extremism. Kagwanja urges efforts to improve coordination in all levels as well as the strengthening of laws and the security sector.64 63 Mwagiru Makumi. "Globalisation and African Foreign Relations: Historical and Intellectual Antecedents’ .". 2008. 64Peter Kagwanja (2006) Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old Strategies, African Security Review, 15:3, 72-86, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2006.9627608 https://profiles.uonbi.ac.ke/mwagirumakumi/publications/globalisation-and-african-foreign-relations-historical-and-intellectual-a https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2006.9627608 25 1.6 Gaps in the Literature Review From the literature reviewed, it is evident that there are knowledge gaps concerning the existence of a strategic multi-agency policy on coordination in response to terrorism in Kenya. There also seems not to exist a clear structural and legal framework guiding multi-agency operations on countering terrorism in Kenya. the laws and policies in place seem to be addressing independent areas like money laundering, counter-terrorism among other areas. In this regard, it is not possible to determine the efficacy of the responses undertaken by security officials during periods of terror attacks without studies such as this current one. Although some scholars have studied the responses undertaken by security forces in Kenya, most of the existent studies do not focus on laws and policies as well as strategies and doctrines specifically in regard to coordination in response during Westgate mall and Dusit D2 terror attacks. This underlines the importance of this study. 1.7 Hypotheses H0 The lack of existence of a strategic multi-agency policy on coordination in response to terrorism in Kenya leads to poor coordination in response to international terrorism. H1 The existence of structural and legal frameworks guiding multi-agency operations on countering terrorism in Kenya has led to an effective response. H2 Multi-agency laws, policies, doctrines, and strategies regarding terror response coordination have led to an effective response to international terrorism 26 1.8 Study Justification and Significance This study sought to address the coordination in responses to international terrorism. It narrows down to Westgate mall and Dusit D2 deter attacks. It focuses on the establishment of the existence or lack thereof of a strategic multi-agency policy on coordination in response to terrorism in Kenya. It also examines the existing or lack thereof of structural and legal frameworks guiding multi-agency operations on countering terrorism in Kenya. It also investigates the successes and failures borne out of having/not having multi-agency laws, policies, doctrines, and strategies regarding terror response coordination. 1.8.1 Academic Justification and significance The study aims to contribute towards knowledge on responses to international terrorism in Kenya. It could help other researchers with insight into areas such as the influence of strategic multi-agency policies on coordination of response to terrorism in Kenya as well as the influence of structural and legal frameworks guiding multi- agency operations on countering terrorism. The findings could also be pivotal in highlighting the importance of multi-agency laws, policies, doctrines, and strategies regarding terror response coordination. This could prompt follow up studies on ways of boosting coordination of multiagency responses to international terrorism in the larger East African region as well as other parts of Africa in the wake of the rise and rise of armed insurgent groups. 1.8.2 Policy Justification and significance The findings of the study will help government security agents put in place measures aimed at enhancing the capacity of security agents to protect business premises 27 against terror attacks. The findings obtained could enable intelligence teams and tactical units to put in place the requisite strategies aimed at averting terror attacks in the country. 1.9 Theoretical Framework This thesis entered the debate of coordination in response to international terrorism via the Terror Management Theory (TMT) as proposed by Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon posits that they, being mortal beings, thrive by existential illusions or perceptions.65 The fictions regarding existence can be pivotal in coping with the main existential factors or concerns: identity, death, freedom and social connections.66 They give people a sense of purpose and meaning in the world despite science telling them that they are simply material beings with a short lifespan in an indifferent world and constituent of a species that will in no time be probably extinct. Death is inevitable. As human beings, their identities and meanings are mainly cultural constructions that do not last for eons of years. Mostly, their desired relationships are mainly limited and people are “unable to realize the inner life of another being or reliably expect another person to their desires above theirs.” They work hard to be free but at the same time remain prisoners of their cultural upbringing and mainly keen on adhering to others’ rules for survival.67 In the event of too much freedom, it leads to anxiety and stress and they mostly fail to know what they can do with it. 65 J. Greenberg, T. Pyszczynski, and S. Solomon, ‘the causes and consequences of a need for self- esteem: A terror management theory.’ In R.F. Baumeister (ed.), Public Self and Private Self, New York: Springer-Verlag (1986). 66 R. Prinz, ‘Terror Management Theory: What role do Cultural World Views play in the cause and prevention of terrorism?’ München: GRIN Verlag GmbH. (2011). 67 J. Greenberg, T. Pyszczynski, and S. Solomon (1986). 28 Out of the five existential concerns aforementioned, focus is on death since it happens to be the crucial focus of TMT since people are constantly focusing on how to cope with this inevitable challenge and has at the same time initiated various hypotheses and research findings. The theory starts off with the simple connotation that all beings are biologically predisposed to desire longer lives and also intelligent enough to note that at one point “they will die and it may as a result of various reasons or causes;”68 terrorism as in the case of this current study. Therefore, in light of this predicament, how can they function without being anxious perpetually? According to the TMT, “they do so by perceiving themselves as enduring beings in a permanent and meaningful universe of symbols rather than the characterization: as just material living organisms in an indifferent world destined only to stop existing upon demise or death.” Since birth, people are socialized into a global perception by their culture that informs them that they are superior and important beings in a meaningful world. People possess souls and the possibility of living after they are gone and part of entities that outlive them such as countries and family lines. They have identities that will live beyond their physical deaths in their achievements and the seemingly perpetual marks they have made in the world such as children, memorials, artistic creations and milestones in science, business, among others.69 Consequently, people work with their innate anxiety under wraps so long as they are convinced that they are enduring, crucial players in a relevant and permanent world. However, terrorism threatens this perceived sense of being able to endure. 68 R. Prinz (2011). 69 T. Pyszczynski, J. Greenberg, S. Koole and S. Solomon, Experimental existential psychology: Coping with the facts of life. In S. Fiske, D. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology. London: John Wiley and Sons (2010). 29 Whenever people are not searching for survival or pleasurable encounters, they spend most their time “trying to buttress their claims of significance and legacy in the symbolic reality they psychologically call home or inhabit.”70 In the event that such a perception is threatened, “people tend to feel worried and fight against such threats to reassert their value together with the groups that they relate and reinforce their belief in the meaningful universe in which they believe.” Various hypotheses have been formulated under TMT. These have been supported by over 400 studies the world over. Several studies guided by TMT converge on 3 main points that reinforce the theory. First, it is regarded as the mortality salience (MS) hypothesis.71 In this case, world perceptions and self-worth save human beings from “anxiety concerning mortality, then the reminders of one’s mortal nature must instigate attempts to strengthen one’s value and that of other groups (self-esteem striving), and faith in an orderly, stable perception of the social realm and one’s self.” For instance, concerning self-esteem striving once mortality is rendered salient, people basing their self-worth on championing ability do so more boldly. This regard, people oppose those who put their beliefs to question. They also rise against any other group or country that criticizes or attacks their homeland or their allies. This explains why nations rise against terror organizations. It also explains why nations strengthen their capacity to deal with terror groups because they challenge their dedication to live at least for as long as possible. Within the context of this study, this explains the essence of multiagency cooperation in the fight against international terrorism in the country. 70 Ibid. 71 C. Campbell and J.J. Ma, ‘Looking Forward, Looking Back: Drawing on the Past to Shape the Future of Marketing: Proceedings of the 2013 World Marketing Congress.’ Cham: Springer International Publishing (2016). 30 A basic terror management function of the worldviews is to give “an orderly, structured and articulated perception of reality and oneself that enables the possibility of being a crucial player in a meaningful existence.” Hence, MS must inspire human beings to “desire their cognitions to fit together, for them [people] and events to be reliable, for a just world, for a meaningful art and for the self to become an enduring entity, connected from the past to the future.”72 The theory also led to the deduction that people tend to react or respond to reminders of their demise with two different sets of defenses or preparedness. This explains why country put in place elaborate plans aimed at averting security risk vulnerabilities. In order to ensure that mortal threats through terrorism are eliminated, security agencies are put in place. These agencies are elaborately equipped to deal with terror threats that could possibly result in death. This underlines the essence of international responses to terrorism in Kenya. It also explains why elaborate legal and policy frameworks are instituted to deal with the challenges related to international terrorism in the country. 1.10 Research Methodology This section presents the methods that were employed by this study to address the objectives and answer the research questions. The study sought to investigate the coordination in response to international terrorism with a keen focus on Westgate and Dusit D2. It then in its subsequent sections details the research design, study target population, sampling procedures, data collection techniques, and the data analysis 72 Ibid. 31 techniques. The study was carried out in Nairobi Kenya, which houses the key population and sample of the study. 1.10.1 Research Design The study adopted mixed methods and exploratory research designs. According to Streb73, exploratory research designs fit well where there are limited or fewer studies, important for obtaining background information about a given topic and is flexible, able to address a variety of research questions. According to Creswel74 “mixed- method research employs both qualitative and quantitative research designs to complement each other by overcoming the weaknesses of each other.” 1.10.2 Target population and Sample size The target population was all the members of the KDF SoFs, the NPS Recce Squad, and ATPU Officers as well as policy level military and police officers. The target population is estimated at 3400 personnel. The sample size for this study was obtained from a sampling formula by Yamane75; Where, n= the sample size N = the size of the population e= the error of 10% The calculation from a population of 3400 was 97. 73 Streb, 372-373. 74 Creswell, John W. (2014). Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 75 Yamane, Taro. "Statistics: An introductory analysis." (1973). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_W._Creswell https://books.google.com/books?id=PViMtOnJ1LcC&printsec https://books.google.com/books?id=PViMtOnJ1LcC&printsec https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thousand_Oaks https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAGE_Publishing 32 Therefore, a sample of 97 respondents was chosen from the various security agencies as indicated in Table 1 below. Table 1.1 Sample Size Categories Operations Teams Population Size Sample Size Sampling Technique KDF SoF terror-related 2000 50 Purposive Sampling NPS Recce terror- related 400 12 Purposive Sampling ATPU Officers 800 25 Purposive Sampling Policy Level Officers 200 10 Purposive Sampling TOTAL 3400 97 Source: Researcher, 2018 1.10.3 Validity and Reliability Validity is key in making sure that “the instrument measures what is intended to measure.”76 To ensure this, the data collection instruments were submitted for expert review. Reliability, on the other hand, ensures consistency, dependability or trustworthiness in measurements of the desired study variables. To aid this, the researcher employed a test-retest technique to guaranty it. 1.10.4 Data Collection This study employed primary as well as secondary data collection techniques. Primary data was collected from the respondents using mainly questionnaires and interviews. 76 Kothari, B. L. (2007). Research Methodology: Tools and Techniques. ABD Publishers. 33 On its part, secondary data was obtained from library-based research via books, e- books, journals, government publications, and published thesis, among other reputable academic publications. 1.10.5 Data Analysis and Data Presentation The data collected from questionnaires were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24. The findings were presented in descriptive statistics, tables, graphs, charts and inferential statistics. On its part, data from interviews were analyzed thematically based on the objectives so as to establish the key themes and trends from which findings, conclusions, and recommendations were drawn. 1.10.6 Legal and Ethical Considerations The study was conducted cognisant of the rights of the respondents during data collection. Participation in the study was voluntary. The privacy of all those involved in the studies has been guaranteed. 1.11 Chapter Outline This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one introduces a background to the study area, providing an overview of coordination in responses to international terrorism. It details the statement of the problem to the study, the study objectives, hypotheses, justification of the study, review of related literature, theoretical review and research methodology. Chapter two focuses on international responses to terrorism. 34 Chapter three examines the international responses to terrorism through a comparison of the responses at the Westgate Shopping Mall and the Dusit D2 Attacks in Kenya. Chapter four presents the findings from primary data sources –questionnaires and interview guides. The final chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study. 35 CHAPTER TWO RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL TO AFRICA 2.1 Introduction This chapter presents as broad analysis of international responses to terrorism. This is done from global to local perspectives. It looks at the responses undertaken by international organizations, states and partnerships between states. The nature of assistance given-hard and soft- is also identified. 2.2 International Responses to Terrorism In international politics, the fight against the threat of terrorism is a top priority. Since 9/11, most countries have taken clear sands on terrorism. Although China faces its own share of terror attacks, it has been slow in making official its stand on the war on terrorism. Due to this vague approach to counterterrorism, the country has faced demands, both domestically and internationally, to overtly confirm its stand on terrorism. Based on its understanding of the terrorism threat, China defines terrorism as “any proposition or activity - that, by means of violence, sabotage or threat, generates social panic, undermines public security, infringes on personal and property rights, and menaces government organs and international organizations - with the aim to realize certain political and ideological purposes.” Although the country officially condemns all forms of international terrorism, its efforts to counter it have been wanting. 36 Though the United States has deployed troops overseas to fight terrorist pockets, China has a rather different approach. Its non-interventionist foreign policy means that it does not deploy troops to fight against terrorism overseas. Though it has a robust domestic infrastructure to combat terrorism through the anti-terrorism law,1 its international approach shows that there is no consensus on the war against terrorism among the two international economic and military powers. Regarding China, this has been blamed on its “double standards” in combating international terror. China has tried to absolve itself by positing that it focuses on addressing with the “root causes” and the “symptoms” of terrorism. Though not actively involved in the field, China points out that it fights against terrorism through “technological aid and intelligence sharing” in support of the affected countries. As such, it argues that its positions aligns with “the United Nations Global Counter-terrorism Strategy, under the resolutions and annexed plan of action- A/RES/60/288, A/RES/62/272 and A/RES/64/297.”2 Counter terrorism strategy focused on military option is proving futile in the long run. The Muslim world has rejected modernization and wants recognition of its way of life and leadership. Western intervention in Middle East is seen as a legitimate cause for terrorism by militant groups for the support the West renders to dictatorial regimes and failure to uphold human rights and democracy in the region. Indeed, the West post 9/11 experienced the worse form of violent attacks on its people, cities and interests in spite of the global war on terror. The politics of fear has polarized public 1 China’s Response to Counter-Terrorism under the BRICS Framework. BRICS International Forum. 28 January 2016 2 Ibid. 37 opinion and societies; creating dangerous levels of hatred and stereotyping gradually turning into dehumanization.3 Response to the threat of terrorism has presently entailed use of social media platforms. Twitter for example has often been identified as a crucial facilitator as well as a deterrent to terrorism. It has been used by terrorist organization to advance their nefarious goals of gaining international visibility. Conversely, it has been used to create patterns of terrorist organizations through “intelligent data mining, visualization, and filtering methods.” Decision makers have used this data to make pertinent counterterrorism decisions.4 Terrorism, both domestic and international, has divergent effects on individuals. Based on the sociopolitical environment at home, attackers are viewed differently by governments and individuals. One consideration is who the groups are affiliated with- allies or enemies of the responders. In this regard, those who respond do so based on their cultural, social, political and individual psychologies. This show that responses to terrorist attacks are based on appropriately layered responses.5 In the 70s and 80s for example, the Austrian Government respondent to international terrorism in three different ways. This included: the gradual expansion of security 3 Amnah Khalid Rashid, Mohamed Sofwan Ahmed Adhil “A Constructivist Response to Islamophobia and Counter Terrorism.” A Journal of multi-disciplinary research, vol1 no 1 (sept 2017). P.1-15. On https://www.academia.edu/37314461/A 4 Marc Cheong and Vincent C. S. Lee, ‘A microblogging-based approach to terrorism informatics: Exploration and chronicling civilian sentiment and response to terrorism events via Twitter’’ pringer Science + Business Media, LLC. 13 (29 September 2010). 45–59. 10.1007/s10796-010-9273-x 5 Francis A. Beer, Alice F. Healy, and Lyle E. Bourne Jr. “After Boston: Terrorism and Response” in e- ir.info. http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/13/after-boston-terrorism-and-response/ 38 forces, international cooperation in the security arena and foreign policy initiatives for purposes of terrorism prevention in the Middle East.6 INTERPOL, being a large organization plays an important role in coordination of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) counter-measures by providing a well-coordinated system facilitating faster and more effective response to CBRN crimes and terrorism. INTERPOL’s response mechanisms are a strong framework for terrorism investigation and deterrence. Despite its real-time contribution to the effective functioning of national law enforcement structures, INTERPOL, as an organization, still has operational gaps which leave some space for vulnerabilities in counter-CBRN measures, prevention, deterrence and response.7 When it comes to translational and international terrorism it is very hard to combat it on isolated national level. INTERPOL relies on “its wide international network, over 190 countries, to facilitate detection and response to terror threats, undertake the prosecution of terrorism cases and check trafficking of CBRN materials.” Intelligence sharing is essential to identify routes, ways and circumstances related to the traffic of dangerous materials and agents. For an effective and timely communication there are so called “best practices” that boost cooperation of the individual member-states on a global level.8 6 Freischaffender, Historiker, ‘An Austrian approach: the response to international terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s,’JIPSS, Vol.6, NR.1 (2012): 139-157. 7 Angelina, Harutyunyan. “CBRN Terrorism: Response Mechanisms of INTERPOL” Cranfield Defence and Security 8 Pellerdi, Rezso; Berek, Tamas (2009): Redefining the CBRN Risk Assessment, Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Budapest: Miklos Zrinyi National Defence University), 159–172, p. 160. 39 Sociologist Frank Furedi reports that those who studied interviews of persons after the terror events found that “injured and disabled persons were not run over by panicking crowds or left behind helpless.” On the contrary those who were hurt or disabled had been carefully assisted and taken calmly to emergency service personnel. Likewise, in the first moments of the 9/11 attack the evacuation o