SU+ @ Strathmore University Library Electronic Theses and Dissertations This work is availed for free and open access by Strathmore University Library. It has been accepted for digital distribution by an authorized administrator of SU+ @Strathmore University. For more information, please contact library@strathmore.edu 2020 The Strategic aspects of Kenya’s Maritime Security (2008-2020). Charo, Alfred Mwango School of Humanities and Social Sciences Strathmore University Recommended Citation Charo, A. M. (2020). The Strategic aspects of Kenya’s Maritime Security (2008-2020) [Thesis, Strathmore University]. http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12038 Follow this and additional works at: http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12038 https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/ https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/ http://hdl.handle.net/11071/2474 mailto:library@strathmore.edu http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12038 http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12038 THE STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF KENYA’S MARITIME SECURITY (2008-2020) Alfred Mwango Charo PF NO: 119110 A research dissertation submitted to the faculty of School of Humanities and Social Sciences in partial fulfilment for the award of Master of Arts in Diplomacy, Intelligence and Security The School of Humanities and Social Science Strathmore University Nairobi, Kenya 2020 This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation may be published without proper acknowledgement of the author. ii DECLARATION AND APPROVAL PAGE I declare that this work has not been previously submitted and approved for the award of a master’s degree by this or other University. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no materials previously submitted or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself © No part of this thesis may be reproduced without the permission of the author and Strathmore University Alfred Mwango Charo 2020 APPROVAL This dissertation of Alfred Mwango Charo was reviewed and approved by: Prof. Robert Mudida (Supervisor) Strathmore Business School Strathmore University [Signature] Dr. Magdalene Dimba Dean, the School of Humanities and Social Science Strathmore University Dr. Bernard Shibwabo, Director of School of Graduate Studies, iii Strathmore University iv DEDICATION I dedicate this work to my family, colleagues, and lecturers for their persistent support. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost I thank the Almighty God for His love and protection that has enabled me to undertake this project successfully, despite of the persistent and intense programme at the Strathmore University School of Humanities and Social Science. Secondly, I thank my family for their continuous support and encouragement all through the time of this project that engendered my perpetual absence. Thirdly, I would like to thank my Supervisor, Prof. Robert Mudida, for his insightful guidance that was very encouraging, pivotal and timely in bringing this project to fruition. Finally, I would also like to acknowledge with gratitude the cooperation and support extended to me by Strathmore University School of Humanities and Social Science fraternity. Last, but not least, I acknowledge the support and encouragement of my classmates as I undertook this work. vi ABSTRACT The prospects and aspirations in Kenya’s maritime domain are today facing complex and highly dynamic traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats that portend a direct consequence to Kenya’s national security. The threats of terrorism and the upsurge of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean region led to the Kenyan government’s reaction to the maritime asymmetric threats. These reactions became the onset of Kenya’s significant engagement in maritime security issues. The adopted maritime responses were reactive in posture, which engendered the establishment and restructuring of several maritime security organizations and training to deal with the threats manifestation in Kenya’s maritime domain. However, the implementation of these maritime security frameworks and responses continue to face challenges, making them tend to be not so much effective in dealing with the maritime threats in Kenya’s maritime jurisdiction. This study responded to three research questions: Firstly, is how effective and capable are the current maritime security organizations and frameworks able to deal with the maritime security threats? Secondly, is how are the policies and strategies shaping the maritime threats in Kenya? Thirdly, is how best can the problem be addressed? Primary data was collected through key informant interviews with academics, maritime security experts and government officials; both retired and serving. Secondary data was also sourced from relevant publications and media reports. The data obtained were analyzed using content and thematic analysis techniques. The findings disclosed that numerous maritime security agencies in Kenya that faced several challenges; multifaceted transitional maritime threats, duplication of roles, limited resources, absence of common SOPs and limited cooperation among the maritime security agencies, which hindered the execution of their respective mandates. The study also came up with recommendations on how best the challenges could be addressed to effectively enhance maritime security in Kenya. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION AND APPROVAL PAGE............................................................. ii DEDICATION............................................................................................................. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................ v ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ 1 LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... 6 LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... 8 ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS ......................................................................... 8 CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................ 11 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 11 1.1 Background of the problem ................................................................................... 11 1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ....................................................................... 15 1.3 The Objectives of the Study ................................................................................... 16 1.4 Research Questions ................................................................................................ 16 1.5 Justification of the Study ....................................................................................... 16 Academic Justification ........................................................................................ 16 Policy Justification .............................................................................................. 17 1.6 Literature Review................................................................................................... 17 Maritime Security ............................................................................................... 18 Maritime Security Strategies............................................................................... 22 The perspective of National Maritime Security .................................................. 24 Research Gaps ..................................................................................................... 28 1.7 Theoretical Framework .......................................................................................... 29 1.8 Dependent and Independent Variables .................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 2 The hypotheses of the Study ............................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 1.9 Research Design and Methodology ....................................................................... 36 1.9.1 Research design .................................................................................................. 36 1.9.2 Study Site ............................................................................................................ 36 1.9.3 Target Population ................................................................................................ 37 1.9.4 Sampling Population ........................................................................................... 37 1.9.5 Description of research instruments.................................................................... 40 1.9.6 Data collection procedures .................................................................................. 40 1.9.7 Reliability and Validity ....................................................................................... 40 1.9.8 Data analysis procedures..................................................................................... 40 1.9.9 Ethical Consideration .......................................................................................... 40 1.10 Chapter / Study Outline ....................................................................................... 41 CHAPTER TWO ....................................................................................................... 43 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KENYA’S MARITIME SECURITY ........ 43 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 43 2.2 The National Interests Concept in National Security ............................................ 43 2.3 Leadership and Political Will: A Framework for Analysis of Kenya’s Maritime Security ........................................................................................................................ 49 2.3.1 The Pre-Independence Leadership ...................................................................... 52 2.3.2 President Jomo Kenyatta’s Regime .................................................................... 56 2.3.3 President Daniel Moi’s Regime .......................................................................... 60 2.3.4 President Mwai Kibaki’s Regime ....................................................................... 65 2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 71 CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................... 71 3 THE STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF KENYA’S MARITIME SECURITY (2008- 2020) ............................................................................................................................ 71 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 71 3.2 Conceptualizing Maritime Security ....................................................................... 71 3.3 Contextualizing the National Maritime Security Strategy……………………………...71 3.3 Kenya Maritime Jurisdiction.................................................................................. 76 3.4 Threat Manifestation and Vulnerability in Kenya’s Maritime Domain ................. 79 3.5 Transnational Maritime Crimes ............................................................................. 81 3.5.1 Piracy .................................................................................................................. 81 3.5.2 Maritime Terrorism ............................................................................................. 83 3.5.3 Illicit Traffics ...................................................................................................... 84 3.5.4 Kenya Somalia Maritime Border Dispute........................................................... 86 3.5.5 Illegal Unreported Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) ................................................ 87 3.5.6 Marine Environment ........................................................................................... 89 3.6 The Maritime Security Frameworks ...................................................................... 90 3.6.1 Global Maritime Security Initiatives .................................................................. 90 3.6.2 Regional Maritime Security Initiatives ............................................................... 94 3.6.3 The Western Indian Ocean Region ..................................................................... 94 3.7 National Security Response and Frameworks ....................................................... 95 3.7.1. Accession to Relevant International Convention ............................................... 96 3.7.2 Naval Actions...................................................................................................... 96 3.7.3. The Blue Economy Initiatives ........................................................................... 98 3.7.4 The Kenya Maritime Authority ........................................................................ 104 3.7.5 The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) ............................................... 104 3.7.6. County Governments Initiatives ...................................................................... 104 4 3.7.7 Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) .............................................................. 105 3.8 Challenges in Kenya Maritime Security Frameworks ......................................... 107 3.8.1 The Absence of a Maritime Security Strategy .................................................. 107 3.8.2 Over Dependency on International and Regional Maritime Security Initiatives .................................................................................................................................... 108 3.8.3 Expansive Coastline .......................................................................................... 109 3.8.4 The Duplication of Roles among the Maritime Security Agency ..................... 110 3.8.5 Ad hoc Multiagency Approach ......................................................................... 111 3.8.6 Funding ............................................................................................................. 111 CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................... 113 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .................................................... 113 4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 113 4.2 Response Rate ...................................................................................................... 113 4.3 The Capacity and Capabilities of Maritime Security Organizations ................... 114 4.3.1 The Capacity and Capability of Kenya’s Maritime Security Organisations ..... 114 4.4 Existing Policies and Strategies Shaping the Maritime Threats in Kenya ........... 135 4.4.1 Policymakers Appreciation of the Maritime Space .......................................... 135 4.4.2 Sea blindness ..................................................................................................... 137 4.4.3 Best Approaches to Enhance Kenya’s Maritime Security ................................ 139 4.4.4 Multiagency approach towards Maritime Security Engagement ...................... 146 4.5 Research-Based Policy Options towards Enhancing Maritime Security ............. 145 4.5.1 Capacity Enhancement Policy Options ............................................................. 145 4.5.2 Most Critical Maritime Security Strategic Gaps ............................................... 146 4.6 Hypothesis Testing............................................................................................... 147 4.7 Discussion of Findings ......................................................................................... 148 5 4.7.1 Capabilities of Maritime Security Organizations ............................................. 148 4.7.2 Existing Policies and Strategies Shaping Maritime Threats in Kenya ............. 150 4.7.3 Research-Based Policy Options for Enhancing Maritime Security .................. 152 4.8 Limitations of the Study....................................................................................... 153 CHAPTER FIVE ..................................................................................................... 158 FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................. 158 5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 158 5.2 Summary of the Findings ..................................................................................... 158 5.3 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 156 5.4 Recommendations ................................................................................................ 156 5.5 Recommendations for Further Study ................................................................... 158 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. APPENDICES .......................................................................................................... 166 APPENDIX I INTERVIEW GUIDE ..................................................................... 166 6 LIST OF TABLES Table I: Study of Target Population ............................................................................. 37 Table II Study of Target Population .......................................................................... 114 7 LIST OF FIGURES Figure I. The organization Structure of the Coast Guard Function ............................. 26 Figure II. Implement the Maritime Security strategy .................................................. 27 Figure III. Yetkin’s Application of Porter’s Five Forces to the Maritime Security Environment ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure IV. Independent and Dependent Variable in the Maritime Domain ......... Error! Bookmark not defined. 8 ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area AIMS Africa’s Integrated Maritime Security Strategy AIS Automatic Identification System APSA African Peace and Security Architecture AU African Union BCOCC Border Control and Operations Coordination Committee BMC Border Management Committee BMU Beach Management Units CAP Chapter CG Coast Guard CRIMARIO Critical Maritime Route Indian Ocean DCI Directorate of Criminal Investigation DCoC Djibouti Code of Conduct DWF Distant Water Fishing ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EEZ Economic Exclusive Zone FAC Fast Patrol Crafts GDP Gross Domestic Product HOA Horn of Africa HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IMO International Maritime Organisation IOR Indian Ocean Region IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 9 ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security IUUF Illegal Unreported Unregulated Fishing JOC Joint Operation Centre KCGS Kenya Coast Guard Service KDF Kenya Defence Forces KES Kenya Shillings KFS Kenya Forestry Service KII Key Informant Interviews KMA Kenya Maritime Authority KMFRI Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute KMPU Kenya Maritime Police Unit KN Kenya Navy KPA Kenya Ports Authority KRA Kenya Revenue Authority KWS Kenya Wildlife Services LAPSSET Lamu Port South Sudan and Ethiopia LCL Landing Craft Logistics MASE Maritime Security Programme MDA Maritime Domain Awareness NEMA National Environment Management Authority NGO Non-Governmental Organisations NMC National Maritime Conference NSC National Security Council NIS National Intelligence Services OAU Organization of African Unity 10 OPV Offshore Patrol Vessel POE Point of Entry PMC Private Military Companies REC Regional Economic Community SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SLOCs Sea Lines of Communications SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea SOPs Standing Operating Procedures STCW Standard Training Certification and Watch keeping TEDS Turtle Excluder Devices UNCLOS United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea UNDP United Nations Development Program UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes UNSC United Nations Security Council USD United States Dollar WWF World Wildlife Fund 11 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background of the problem Oceans, much of which are global commons under no State's jurisdiction, offer all nations, a network of sea-lanes that are of global interest and integral to the national security and economic development. The increase in maritime consciousness has prompted states to innovate numerous maritime security architecture to enhance their maritime security, which is often invisible safeguard to the contemporary way of life.1 Noticeable attention and efforts have been put on the blue economy concept, which maritime security is key in supporting in a very significant and multiple ways.2 Bueger, states that maritime security has no universal consensus over its definition, but it is a term that draws attention to novel challenges by rallying support to tackle maritime issues.3 In considering the ramification that arises from 'bad order at sea' and its impacts on both developed and developing countries, whom all depend upon secure shipping lanes,4then aspects of innovative diplomacy, the commitment by leaders and increased legal authority need to suffice at all levels when states undertake maritime security.5 The terrorist attack of 2001 (9/11) in the United States, led to maritime security gaining unprecedented attention from the United States’ National Security Council (NSC). The directives by president George W Bush in 2004; Homeland Security 1 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Trends in African Maritime Security, Spotlight March 15, 2019 2 Michelle Voyer, Clive Schofield, Kamal Azmi, Robin Warner, Alistair McIlgorm & Genevieve Quirk, “Maritime Security and the Blue Economy: intersections and interdependencies in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Volume 14, NO. 1, 28–48, 2018, pp.43-44 3 Christian Bueger, “What is Maritime Security?” Marine Policy 53 pp.159-164, 2015, p.159 4 Francois Vreÿ, “African Maritime Security: a time for good order at sea,” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, Volume 2, NO.4, 121-132, 2010, .p.121 5 Captain Brian Wilson, “Responding to Asymmetric Threats in the Maritime Domain: Diplomacy, Law and Naval Operations, Maritime Affairs,” Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, Volume 5, NO.2, 68-85, 2010, p.69 12 Presidential Directive – 13 (HSPD-13) and National Security Presidential Directive – 41 (NSPD-41), created a cooperative framework needed to support Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) by formulating a United States National Strategy for Maritime Security.6 The amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, led to the adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS code), which became the most far-reaching maritime security framework approved by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).7 ISPS code became the most recognised instrument that enhanced cooperation and implementation of maritime security responses that enshrined exhaustive security-related necessities for shipping companies, port authorities, and governments. The surge in reported piracy incidents created an interest in having situational overviews that display both the location of all shipping and the probable location of suspected pirates. The institutionalization of cooperative security frameworks that encompass numerous state and non-state actors became a necessity to deal with the scourge of piracy. The 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (2050 AIMS), the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), and the Maritime Security Programme (MASE) became key instruments of wide-scale security projects in the region.8 Today African states are positioning themselves to benefit from the exploitation of marine resources by articulating and implementing strategies on continental, regional and national levels. The invention of the African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050) and African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development in Africa/the 6 Kathleen Hicks and Andrew Metrick, “Maritime Domain Awareness: Today and Tomorrow,” in Contested Seas MDA in the Northern Europe, chapter 2, (Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield 2018) p.13 7 IMO maritime security policy, Background paper, EEF.IO/3/08, Vienna, 28- 29 January 2008 8 Hamad B Hamad, “Maritime Security Concerns of the East African Community (EAC),” Western Indian Ocean Journal of Marine Science, Volume 15, Issue 2, 75-92, 2016, p.75 13 Lomé Charter of 2016; set out clear maritime strategies that aim at pushing African countries in having a blue economy mind-set and also facilitate the strengthening of maritime security cooperation.9 Kenya's development of two strategic documents; Kenya Foreign Policy 2014 and Kenya Defense Policy of 2017 placed Kenya at a strategic position towards its pursuit of national security. The Defense Policy acknowledged the enormous potential of the Indian Ocean and the imperative of maritime security to Kenya’s blue economy prospects. It identifies maritime interest as; Maritime Trade and Shipping, Ports and the offshore maritime economic resources.10 However, with limited maritime policies and absence of a maritime security policy, Kenya’s engagement in maritime security is fashioned in an ad hoc and reactive posture.11 Kenya, which relays on the international and regional maritime security strategies and projects to fill the existing vacuum of maritime security response, still lacks a long term and holistic maritime security policy and strategy. In most of the issues that have arisen in the maritime domain, the government has responded and addressed the issues on a case by case basis. However, the formation of the Presidential Blue Economy Task Force in 2017 increased Kenya's stakes and prospects in the maritime domain. It has become an important committee that has enhanced international, regional, national and local interventions; aimed at addressing the limited infrastructure, capacity to assure maritime security and prioritize the sustainable use of ocean resources. The strategic aspect of maritime security is an indisputable reality for Kenya’s social-economic development and human security. Human security, which 9 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “The Process of National Maritime Security Strategy Development in Africa” (2016), pp.1-12 10 GoK, Defence White Paper 2017.pp.15-21. 11 Hamad, “Maritime Security Concerns,”p.80 14 encompasses physical security, social, cultural, economic, and psychological well- being, and always concerns non-military threats, which are key in enhancing the safety of societies, groups, and individuals.12 Its actualization comes with a development perspective that comes through improving sustainable exploitation of maritime resources which to a greater extent has a direct impact on the economy of the state. The core challenge in maritime governance towards achieving the objective associated with maritime security is the coordination of the different governmental agencies towards implementing policies at sea and those societal actors that use the sea.13The launch of Kenya Coast Guard Service in 2018 to augment the existing maritime security agencies, added to the existing challenges in the maritime environment, where maritime security agencies foster independent operational and tactical planning that has led to existing conflict and duplication of roles. Kenya’s national security depends on the secure use of the Indian Ocean. The absence of national maritime security strategy in Kenya has engendered persistent uncoordinated and unintegrated reactive maritime security responses that have enhanced maritime vulnerabilities and wastage of resources. This has prompted ineffective exploitation of the marine resources and all aspects relating to the use of the ocean, which has correspondingly aggravated the dismal situation ashore. Impacts that will continue to be felt due to the challenges that Kenya continues to face in the enforcement of law and order in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). 12 Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security, Volume. 26, No. 2 pp. 87-102, 2001, pp.93-96 13 Christian Bueger, “Approaches to maritime governance: Coordination instruments in Seychelles and Kenya,” SAFE SEAS, 2017 15 1.2 Statement of the Research Problem The period between 2008 and 2020, Kenya experienced multiple maritime security threats. Piracy alone led to a significant reduction in cruise liner visits to Kenyan waters from 35 in 2008 to zero visits in 2012, costing Kenya’s economy, approximately US$400 and US$15 million per annum on shipping and cruise liner tourism respectively.14 However, with the decline in piracy attacks since 2012, Kenya continues to experience an increase in transnational multifaceted maritime threats. The persistent manifestation of these maritime threats had the government embrace emerging international and regional maritime security frameworks, which prompted the restructuring of Kenya's maritime security agencies to fit in with the dynamic operational environment. Kenya responded by setting up the Kenya Coast Guard Service (KCGS) in 2018 to enhance maritime governance as a centralized maritime law-enforcement agency. However, Kenya continue to experience maritime security threats. Today, Kenya has several institutions/agencies tasked with enhancing maritime security, but still, the problems and challenges continue to persevere at the expense of Kenya’s national security. Indeed the reactive responses vividly observable within the maritime sector, seems to be a factor that exacerbates these maritime problems. The study examined and analysed the maritime security practice in Kenya, challenges facing the maritime space, the existing legal framework, the existing institutional frameworks, policies, and strategies that guided the execution of maritime security. It responded to the following main question, why is Kenya maritime domain experiencing all these maritime security problems despite government intervations? 14 Alex Benkenstein, “Prospects for Kenyan Blue Economy,” Southern African Institute of International Affairs, Policy Insight 62, July 2018. 16 1.3 The Objectives of the Study The overall objective is to critically examine the challenges in Kenya’s maritime security dispensation and see into it how best the challenges can be addressed to enhance effective maritime governance. The sub-objectives are to: 1. To examine and analyse the capacities and capabilities of Kenya’s maritime security organizations? 2. To examine and analyse how the existing policies and strategies shape the maritime threats in Kenya. 3. To proffer research-based policy recommendations on how best the problem can be addressed. 1.4 The Research Questions This study is interested in responding to these three sub-research questions; 1. How effective and capable are current Kenya’s maritime security organizations and frameworks able to deal with maritime security threats? 2. How are policies and strategies shaping the maritime threats in Kenya? 3. How best can the problem be addressed? 1.5 Justification of the Study Academic Justification This study will contribute to debates on issues of maritime security strategies, with the perspectives of a developing state. It will bring out an understanding of Kenya’s maritime security strategies and how maritime security has been conceptualized and implemented since Kenya became an independent state. This will be highlighted by 17 how the maritime security in Kenya is organised and executed, in line with the policy and strategic guidelines. It is a study that has been inspired by the lack of maritime security strategies among most African states. Policy Justification The study notes that since the pattern of explicit commitments to secure Kenya offshore assets is a rather recent manifestation, the frameworks in place that identify commonalities and disagreements are key in driving the agenda of maritime security dispensation. Therefore this study aims to contribute to policies that will be influential in providing guidance and action-oriented strategies among the government agencies, private and local communities for effective maritime security at all levels of governance. The African maritime domain is increasingly gaining strategic importance implying that governments cannot afford to ignore the maritime domain or even display institutional incapacity. The insight gained in this study will, therefore, help shape new policy direction. It is on this perspective that Kenya needs to formulate a “Vision of the Oceans” around which a maritime security strategy can be developed. 1.6 Literature Review The literature review is organized into four sections related to the study. The first section will be the review of studies that focus on how maritime security has been conceptualized over time and space and provide a theoretical perspective of how best the maritime security issues can be approached, the second section dwelt into understanding the conceptualization of maritime security strategies, the third sections 18 look as the empirical perspectives of maritime security strategies of France, India, and Africa, and fourth sections highlight the research gap. Maritime Security Maritime security has over the years transformed and evolved from the narrow perspective of national naval power projection by state naval actions to having a range of additional roles and functions related to contemporary non-conventional threats and the utilization of soft power instruments towards influencing the strategic operational environment.15The earlier maritime theories were conceived based on the realist perspective, which denotes the importance of states to compete for power by building a naval force that can rival other states naval capabilities and dominate the maritime space. The conception of maritime security by other scholars contend the presence of both traditional threats and non-traditional threats in the maritime domain. Mahan acknowledges the significance of the maritime sector in the theory of the sea and national strategy with the Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660- 1783, and the Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire, 1793- 1812, published in 1890 and 1892. He explains the evolution of power on land through the exploitation of the sea by recognizing the strategic significance of naval power in establishing command at sea as primary and equally important to the land strategy. His ideas about sea power were the dominance of the sea through naval superiority that was a necessity to the growth of national strength and prosperity, which was further enhanced by inter-connectedness, maritime commerce and geography configuration of the state. He noted that given the relationship between affluence and maritime 15 Sam Bateman, “India and Regional Security Activities,” in Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan, editors, India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (New York: Routledge 2016) pp.215-236 19 commerce, the sea is unavoidably the major dome of rivalry and confluent among nations seeking wealth and power.16 Corbett's theories of sea power favour Mahan's ideas of command at sea. While Mahan generally observed the command of the sea as an end in its own right, Corbett contended that it means nothing but the control of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs), regardless of whether for business or military purposes.17 In his theoretical treaties, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, he recognizes the utmost focal point of all the naval actions should all be concerned with accomplishing the national objectives of the state. Till makes a structured approach to the constituent elements of sea power that contradicts what Mahan and Corbett designate as a command at sea. His analysis of sea power concentrates on having good order at sea as central to the prosperity and security of all nations in the twenty-first century, especially with the emergence of an increasingly globalized world trading system. Till’s perspectives of good order at sea concern four attributes; the sea as its source of wealth, a medium for trade and communication, and a life-supporting system that faces risks and threats that impact its continued contribution to human development.18 Vreÿ approves Till’s assertions and concedes that the good order at sea approach is the acme of the importance and utility of safe and secure access to what the oceans offer states and the international community at large.19 Rahman agrees with Till's good order at sea but analyzes maritime security in non-traditional and non-strategic aspects. 16 Alfred Thayer Mahan 1660-1783, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 17 Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Classics of Sea Power Series. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 18 Geoffrey Till. Sea Power: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Chapter 11,( London: Routledge, 2009) 19 Francois Vreÿ, “African Maritime Security: a Time for Good Order at Sea,” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 2:4, 121-132, 2010, p.122. 20 He put his perspectives in a concept of five prisms that he identifies and affirm that the practical policy and operational responses by states to their maritime security, will need to incorporate aspects of more than one of these approaches - security of the sea itself, maritime border protection, military activities at sea, ocean governance and security regulation of the maritime transportation system.20 Klein assertions view maritime security as a cadre of activities - legislative, executive, judicial, military, and police actions, which are designed to respond to a collective need for order and protection from internal and external threats which to a great extent corresponds to Rahman approaches. Maritime security to her is rarely defined categorically and instead tends to have a context-specific meaning that tries to identify what is commonly perceived as existing or potential threats to maritime security and the steps that have been, or need to be, taken to address these threats.21 Bueger identifies maritime security as a complex matrix of interdependence among several concepts, such as sea power, marine safety, the blue economy, and human security.22 These identifications uphold Klein’s assertion that maritime security has no categorical definition. He agrees with Till, and argues that the main objective of maritime security remains good order at sea in allowing - uninterrupted maritime commerce, protecting maritime professionals and the prevention of collisions, sustainable exploitation of ocean-based resources by lawful actors, protection from environmental degradation and climatic changes, and broadly looks into the security of seafarers and the vulnerability of coastal populations to maritime threats.23 20 Chris Rahman, “A strategic perspective on alternative visions for good order and security at sea, with policy implications for New Zealand,” Concepts of Maritime Security Discussion paper no. 07/09 (New Zealand: The Centre for Strategic Studies Victoria University of Wellington, 2009) 21 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.11 22 Christian Bueger, “What is Maritime Security?” Marine Policy 53 pp.159-164, 2015, p.159 23 Ibid 21 Rao's concerns of maritime security diverge from not only concentrating on issues emanating at sea alone but need to perceive the maritime sector as a domain that only manifests the symptoms of problems that are interlinked to complex networks of states and non-state actor’s activities in the hinterland. He believes effective management of the coasts can only be achieved by adding civilian dimension to maritime security responsibilities through engaging the coastal communities by formulating an inclusive strategy that co-opts several stakeholders widely recognised by the onshore and offshore maritime agencies.24This he believed can further be enhanced by networking coastal communities and stakeholders into an integrated security regime to ensure a steady and secure maritime domain. Maritime security at its core is designed to provide a stable and secure environment in which economic development can occur. But the maritime domain itself has increasingly become a platform that offers the greatest scope of non-military maritime concerns which are compelling in nature and only warrant cooperation among the various regional and global power because most of the insecurity issues in the maritime domain transcend national borders.25The characteristics and dynamics of maritime threats make maritime security not to be conceptualized as a simple phenomenon that can be guaranteed by a single coastal state or group.26 All these theoretical conceptualizations still confirm that maritime security still exists as a contested concept whose emphasis is dependent on the state or region of the 24 P.V Rao, “Indian Ocean Maritime Security Cooperation: the Employment of Navies and other Maritime Forces,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region Volume. 6, No. 1, 129-137, 2010, p.137 25 Lee Cordner, “Rethinking maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Volume. 6, No.1, 67-85, 2010, pp.68-80 26 P.V. Rao, “Managing Africa's maritime domain: issues and challenges,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Volume.10, No.1, 113-118, 2014, p.114 22 world.27 It is also a broad and nebulous concept,28 whose approach makes it insufficient to prioritize threats due to its failure in elaborating how maritime threats are interlinked for the benefit of a universal concerted response to maritime issues. It is these concerns that make maritime security in the contemporary domain to be understood as a concept that involves the amalgamation of policies, regulations, measures, and execution of operations to secure the maritime domain.29 Maritime Security Strategies The traditional approaches to maritime security strategies; both theories and concepts have for a century been dominated by the work of Mahan and Corbett. The two subsequently move the strategic land-based ideas of Jomini and Clausewitz into the maritime domain, which both respectively used to conceptualize sea power in a domain of naval strategies. Mahan’s ideas of maritime strategy understood that naval strategy and tactics were a war-winning in their own right as they were centred on decisive battles as was with Jomini’s perspective of military strategies by land forces. Mahan’s concepts of maritime strategies were centred absolutely on the fleet and his ideas of sea power inferred on maintaining naval supremacy with an emphasis on having the largest and most powerful fleet that seek the enemy and destroy its navy and commercial fleet.30 Corbett, whose ideas lie at the heart of British maritime doctrine and strategic principles, refute Mahan’s ideas of sea power as one centred on naval strategy. He 27 Edwin Egede, “Maritime Security: Horn of Africa and Implementation of the 2050 AIM Strategy,” in Demessie Fantaye, editor, Maritime Insecurity Dilemmas amidst a new Scramble for the Horn? Horn of Africa Bulletin Volume 30 Issue 2, 2018), p.7 28 Joseph Busiega, “Harnessing Maritime Security and Resource Exploitation: Role of Maritime Diplomacy in Kenya” Research Project (Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2016), p.7 29 Basil Germond, “The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 54, pp. 137-142, 2015, pp.138-139 30 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power 23 defines maritime strategy as 'the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor'. His assertions which are in line with Clausewitz’s proclamations that military strategies are controlled by political objectives, believed that maritime strategy was a part of the wider national effort, which posits naval strategy as a part of the state’s maritime strategy that is inherently joint due to the unfeasible nature for naval actions to ever become decisive in war.31 Strachan approves Corbett's ideas that maritime strategy is not a 'military strategy'. He sees maritime strategy formulation as a complex undertaking that faces acute challenges in its definition. He further recognises the importance of the state's geographical disposition as alluded by both Mahan and Corbett because he found it as a crucial element in providing continuity to the formulated strategies by states. Strachan advocate that the objectives of a maritime strategy need to be explicit and easily understood because for him “if the web and woof of maritime strategy remain closer to policy than to traditional strategy, then this should be recognized for what it is, and not shoved under the carpet.”32 Hattendorf makes an assertion that conforms with both Corbett and Strachan's ideas by identifying maritime strategy as a section of a national grand strategy. He defines maritime strategy as "the direction of all aspects of national power that relates to a nation's interests at sea". He, however, insists that the definition of a maritime strategy is still a complex undertaking that is highly determined by history which alerts to different times, different outlooks, different ideas, different problems, different mindsets, different capabilities, different decision making structures and different technologies.33 31 Corbett, Some Principle of Maritime Strategy pp.13-14 32 Hew Strachan, “Maritime Strategy,” The RUSI Journal, Volume.152, No.1, 29-33, 2007, p.33 33 John Hattendorf, “What is a Maritime Strategy?” SOUNDINGS No.1 Sea Power Centre - Australia Department of Defence, 2013 24 Ahmad's understanding of maritime strategy is based on having the adopted strategy determine the development and management of the elements of sea power, while the naval strategy mainly deals primarily with one element i.e. the naval forces. His ideas which are in line with Hattendorf’s definition of maritime strategy denote that the relevant aspects of national power include both civil and military national maritime capabilities.34Sea power to him is greatly influenced by policies that include inter alia the economic, trade, energy, defence, and foreign policies. The objective of the maritime strategy is therefore meant to regulate all the elements of sea power despite the difference in means and ways among the states. It is of these concerns that undergird the core principles of maritime strategy which apply to all states with the maritime frontier in regardless of their size and challenges. It is prudent then for states to understand the problem and formulate a proper response that avoids unintended consequences that come with its wider concept of adopting strategic views of the interactive and holistic nature of risks in an increasingly globalized world.35The effectiveness of maritime security strategy will only be made possible by it being strategic, proactive, flexible, multidimensional, and possessing the capacity to integrate all plans and activities in the maritime environment in a global perspective. The Perspective of National Maritime Security The analysis of various national maritime security approaches takes into considerations the regional and global outlooks of the state’s maritime security. It will consider the maritime strategies employed by France, India and the African continent, which has emerged as a new dominant force towards pursuing the blue economy by rallying the African nations towards 34 Azhar Ahmad, “Maritime Power and Strategy,” NDU Journal, pp. 23-42, 2014, pp. 30-32 35 Lee Cordner, “Risk managing maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 10, No. 1, 46–66, 2014, p.48 25 exploiting the underutilized maritime resources. France is a concern because of the several regions it controls in different maritime spheres, whereas India has continued to project itself as a dominant and formidable force within the Indian Ocean region through continuous cooperative frameworks with African states and likely minded strategic partners. The France National Strategy for Security of Maritime Areas was formulated to assert France’s rights by assuming its rightful duties in ensuring free, safe and sustainable use of seas, through coherent and coordinated actions in line with its maritime power and economic developments through the seas. It affirms the maritime domain as a strategic area that is essential for its national security. The perspectives of this maritime security strategy are based on two concepts; ‘state action at sea’ and ‘coast guard functions’. It makes the two concepts very critical in ensuring all government’s efforts concentrate on controlling maritime areas, the safety of French nationals and their ships, fighting illegal trafficking at sea, defending economic interests, and promoting a safe international domain. This strategy is an extension of the Defense Policy and National Security Policy and hence does not concern with issues of military threats, but support the Defense Policy through intelligence. The main security concern in the maritime areas is to offer a coherent national inter-ministerial framework that will improve the fight against maritime insecurity issues that impact France's strategic interest and those of its partners in the short or medium terms. In strengthening the coherence of the Coast Guard functions, France has a Secretariat General for the sea, who works directly under the Prime Minister and who brings together the executive committee of the Coast Guard function under its chairmanship as depicted by the figure I. 26 Figure I. The organization Structure of the Coast Guard Function The strategy has a functional mechanism that ensures that it adapts to the dynamic operational environment by having laid down procedures in keeping up to date to the risks and threats. The steering group under the Secretariat General meet once in a year to make the necessary assessment of the strategy and any proposals made are presented by the Secretary-General every after five years to the national maritime conference and the executive committee of the CG functions before being submitted to the inter-ministerial committee for approval. After validation, the strategy, with the governmental priorities and action plan arising from it, will then be applied by each ministry and maritime zone. The implementation and updating of the strategy will require monitoring and regular updates to the assessment of maritime risks and threats as depicted by figure II. 27 Figure II. Implement the Maritime Security strategy The Indian maritime security strategy (2015) that aims at ensuring secure seas envisages a coordinated and cooperative set of actions, shaped and determined by the contemporary multifaceted and unpredictable challenges in the maritime domain. It bestows the Indian Navy as the prime maritime force, but the implementation of the strategy is undertaken by a broader framework that synergies comprehensive maritime actions with other stakeholders that have distinct roles and responsibility in maritime security. The Indian maritime strategy tenets are more confined to military concepts by encompassing diplomatic, constabulary and warfighting elements. It is, in effect, a combination of five constituent strategies that aim at accomplishing matching maritime security objectives - The strategy for deterrence, the strategy for conflict, Strategy for shaping a favourable and positive maritime environment, the strategy for coastal and offshore security and the strategy for maritime force and capability development. 28 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050, is a regional maritime strategy whose main concern is to foster affluence from Africa's oceans, seas, and inland waterways by developing a vibrant and prosperous maritime economy. It recognizes the common maritime challenges and opportunities among the member states that arise from the vast and potential Africa maritime domain. The strategy advance for a human-centred approach towards development as it sees it as a fundamental aspect of enhancing human security. It consists of principles that are all-encompassing, determined and coherent with the long-term multi-layered course of actions that are significant in generating and inculcating desirable political will that ensures successful implementation. The Strategy also stipulates a broader framework in providing protection and sustainability in the exploitation of Africa maritime domain for wealth creation by developing effective measures to address Africa's maritime challenges for sustainable development and competitiveness. With an increase in Africa's population, the strategy affirms that the preservation of Africa's marine environment is vital to growing its GDP, share of global and regional trade, competitiveness, long term growth, and employment. Research Gaps The literature review affirmed that maritime security has no universal definition and is an ‘essential’ contested concept that has scholars define maritime security in a specific context. These then make the conceptualization of maritime security strategies to denote a reality where failure to exercise control over the sea engenders maritime insecurity. The literature, however, does not come out clear on how best maritime security is to be approached. The research gap is; what is it that makes effective maritime 29 security? The maritime challenges faced within the maritime jurisdiction is what defines the state’s maritime security responses that need to be in line with the intended objectives pursued at the strategic level. However, the maritime space among states has a divergent uniqueness, thus making the posture of their respective maritime security to differ significantly. These concerns allude to the fact that the adoption of maritime security frameworks and instruments from other places may not effectively solve the problems impacting the state’s maritime domain. It then means that states will need to appreciate their strategic operational environment before coming up with the security measures that will ameliorate the vulnerabilities and overcome the maritime challenges. 1.7 Theoretical Framework This study is based on justifying the importance of maritime security strategy in a competitive operational environment. In doing so, it has adopted a theoretical framework that is drawn from Michael Porter’s Five Forces model that identify and analyse the five competitive forces that shape a corporate strategy by helping in determining the weakness and strengths within the industry's structures. The model identifies five undeniable forces that play a part in shaping the operational environment by measuring competition intensity, attractiveness and profitability of a market. The five forces used for this analysis are; the power of supplier, power of buyer, competition in the industry, the potential of new entrants into the industry and threat of substitute products. Porter’s five forces as a framework for analysing the company’s competitive environment, had Ugur Yetkin use the model as an investigative tool to comprehensively assess the post-modern navies. He uses this model to analyse the 30 maritime security environment even though the driving forces are diverse from that of the business industry. Yetkin maritime driving forces are depicted in fig III. Figure III. Yetkin’s Application of Porter’s Five Forces to the Maritime Security Environment. He argues that the increase in technological advancement, which has had a great influence on globalisation, have resulted in an increase in the information flow and sea traffic and hence needs a state to implement a maritime security strategy that has a global outlook rather than confined within the state’s territorial jurisdiction.36Yetkin asserts that the formulation of a maritime security strategy as a strategic initiative needs careful analysis of the problems affecting the maritime domain. It is crucial because it helps those that are engaged in strategic planning to come up with solutions to the problem by effectively understanding the dynamics of the operational environment. The choice of postmodern navies by Yetkin in this analysis comes with their dealing with asymmetrical threats, which demand formulation and implementation of a collaborative 36 Ugur Yetkin, “Revealing the Change in the Maritime Security Environment through Porter’s Five Forces Analysis,” Defence Studies Volume 13, No.4, 2013, 458-484, p.460. 31 maritime security framework that enhances a collective world outlook with an international orientation. The five forces help strategists to evaluate an operational environment by understanding its dynamics and know which force has a more profound effect on the industry. By understanding these forces, it enables one to understand the power that comes with each driving force and at the same time helps to identify the players that have a role in each of the forces. According to Yetkin, the power of suppliers in his analysis of the postmodern navies are the defence industries and the human capital, which both can determine how efficient the navy can accomplish the mission (product). The defence industry help to build the navy and also assist in enhancing its operational capabilities through a continuous supply of spares. In the cases of developing countries, with no defence industries in their country, they always depend on importation of spares from these defence industries to enable sustenance and serviceability of their seagoing vessels. In this kind of scenario, the defence industries end up becoming very powerful and as a result, they end up determining the efficiency of these countries' navies. The labour force power comes with the lack of readily available qualified professionals because many fear the intrinsic hardship and working conditions at sea, and with the presence of several numbers of jobs in the private sector, the majority tend to prefer working for the ashore establishment rather than go to work in the navy at sea. The power of the buyers in the maritime environment is dependent on the product (mission accomplished) by the navy. There are several possible buyers in the maritime domain; the domestic public, ship owners/ agents, the international public and the governments in the different regions. The citizens, who are the beneficiary of the maritime security provided by the navy, are certainly the first buyer. This is because of 32 their undeniable power to determine the budget allocated to the navy through their representative in the parliament. Even though they do not have any choice for the provider of maritime security, the ability to control the budget determines how efficient the navy can execute their role. In the postmodern navies, the global public is a powerful buyer as a result of media reporting and the invention of social media that made it possible for issues impacting the maritime domain to get the needed attention and response, by having the global public to push their powerful navies to take action. The actions taken are those that involve the protection of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) to ensure efficient flow of ships in the maritime threats infested areas. In undertaking these actions, the navies enhance the actions of other buyers; ship owners and ship agents through confidence building to continue with their shipping operations. Shipowners and the agents’ actions mostly end up determining the cost of shipping, if they opt to change the route as a way of avoiding the high risks area in the maritime domain as was evident with the upsurge of piracy, where their actions led to an unprecedented increase of the insurance premium. Yetkin argues that governments in the different regions have weak buying power and hence they cannot determine response rendered by the international community, which in this they lack the power of choice and they are made to accept the assistance under the terms of the stronger state. Rivalry among existing competitors, especially with that of other navies, will always determine how maritime security of the state will be implemented by the navy. The contemporary domain has seen an increase in asymmetric threats that are paradigmatic, sticky, transboundary and interdependent, hence demand collaboration among the navies that are engaged in eliminating these non-traditional threats. This result in a positive-sum competition, a condition where navies do not see each other as enemies but allies. However, the navies may choose to cooperate in case of a common 33 global threat but again end up engaging in a zero-sum competition in other areas where they tend to see each other as enemies. In this regard, countries should understand their strategic operational environment, especially the nature of naval competition within the region before they conceptualize their maritime security strategy. The threat of entry among the navies determines how a country analyse the operational environment and the dynamics therein. Navies always take into consideration how other navies and the international actors will react before coming up with a maritime security strategy. However, the expansion and the outlook of the navy are dependent on the national policies, which is the main determinant of the kind of force that will be used to respond to a certain incident. The capital requirement needed to support the type of navy a country want will also play a great deal on the type of maritime security strategy it will adopt. A county may opt for land-based airpower, anti- ship missiles on land or deploy naval vessels to take defensive roles, but depending on what it chooses, it will need to align with the national policies which determine the strategic option that will be adopted by the navy in overcoming the challenges brought about by the maritime threats. The threat of substitutes comes when other security agencies have also the capabilities to provide maritime security. However, the protection of maritime interest in a country is a primary role of the navy, which is directly related to the sovereignty and the survival of the state. Maritime security being the only product that the navy can deliver to the domestic public, many contemporary challenges and threats keep on impacting how the navy accomplish its mission. The contemporary maritime security challenges have had the postmodern navies to incorporate the army and air force to deliver maritime security product. However, in most cases, they are limited in terms of their operations at sea and hence makes it a necessity to always have the navy platforms 34 present. The private military security forces did provide a substitute during the time of piracy, however, the binding laws at sea and other challenges, led to the ineffective execution of maritime security. Dealing with threats on land before they impact the sea seem to be a good option that needs the economic, political and social measures to be put in place by all actors involved instead of over-reliance on the naval operations. Yetkin argues that in the maritime domain, complements are factors that need to be evaluated with already existing factors. The army and air force may be a weak substitute, but they can be effectively used as complementary factors to enhance the navy capabilities. The air force can deploy maritime patrols, while the army helps with setting a coastal defence and anti-ship cruise missile ashore. This complementarity makes the contribution of the army and air force to maritime operations pose a high- level entry barrier to adversaries in the modern navy mission. Other military services, government organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) while posing as a substitute, as part of peaceful solutions, they have vital complements to the postmodern navy's mission, while appropriate actions by other governmental agencies can be taken to bolster stability in the region. Military planners while determining long term maritime strategy, they need to find a way to decrease the buyer and supplier powers, to adopt a positive-sum game and overcome the entry barriers in coming up with a competitive strategy that is pragmatic to the strategic operational environment of the state. 1.8 Dependent and Independent Variables Bueger definition of maritime security as a complex matrix of interdependence with other concepts, such as sea power, marine safety, the blue economy, and human security has been adopted to depict maritime security as a dependent variable and maritime 35 security strategy as the independent variable. From the literature review, this definition is inclusive of all that concern the traditional and non-traditional maritime security. Maritime security strategy in the context of maritime security becomes the fundamental element in enhancing the aspects of harmonization, planning and coordination among the maritime security agencies. Undermining maritime security strategy will directly impact on the execution of maritime security among the numerous stakeholders, which will have consequently impact on the core dimensions of maritime security - national security, maritime environment, economic development and human security.37 Figure IV. Independent and Dependent Variable in the Maritime Domain The hypotheses of the Study 1. The effectiveness of maritime security is a function of implementing a strategic and pragmatic maritime security strategy. 2. The containment of the maritime security threats is a function of implementing a strategic and pragmatic maritime security strategy. 37 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, “Beyond Sea blindness: a New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies,” International Affairs 93: 6 (2017) 1293–1311, pp-1299-1300. 36 1.9 Research Design and Methodology 1.9.1 Research Design This study espoused exploratory research design. These kinds of studies are usually carried out for purposes of establishing patterns and ideas on a study subject. They are not preoccupied with testing hypotheses. Rather, they aim at establishing the hypothesis themselves. Exploratory studies thus establish insights about a subject area for purposes of creating a picture on possible research directions. Once the research issue is understood, exploratory studies go the extra mile to establish the best methods to use in data collection. In this regard, data can be collected from secondary sources through desk-review of extant literature. Data can also be collected from primary sources using interviews and focus group discussions. The findings can be used to explain the extent of the problem.38 The researcher can then suggest the possible cause of action and make possible recommendations. In critically examining the challenges in Kenya’s maritime security dispensation and establishing how best the challenges can be addressed to enhance effective maritime governance, this was deemed the best design. 1.9.2 Study Site The study took place along the Kenyan coastline, Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu. It focused on Kenya’s Indian Ocean jurisdiction, covering at least the major maritime governing agencies, policymakers, implementers, and all the stakeholders concerned with maritime security and policy formulation. 38 Bueger and Edmunds, “Beyond Sea blindness” 37 1.9.3 Target Population The target population were key stakeholders in maritime security. While the unit of analysis was stakeholders in maritime security, the units of observation were the Kenya Coast Guard Service, Kenya Maritime Authority, Kenya Defence Forces (Kenya Navy), Sea fearers, Kenya Ports Authority, Ministry of Tourism, Dock Workers Union, National Intelligence Service, Fisheries Department, Ministry of Foreign Affair, Kenya Revenue Authority, Kenya Forestry Service, and others stakeholders. From these, the 260 senior and middle-level officers from these agencies will be targeted as shown in Table I. Table I: Study of Target Population Department target Targeted Number Kenya Coast Guard Service 20 Kenya Maritime Authority 10 Kenya Defence Forces (Kenya Navy) 40 Sea Fearers 10 Kenya Ports Authority 16 Dock Workers Union 12 National Intelligence Service 20 Kenya Wildlife Service 20 Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute 16 Kenya Revenue Authority 12 Fisheries department 12 Ministry of Foreign Affair 8 National Environmental Management Authority 12 Kenya Forestry Department 12 Others 40 Total 260 1.9.4 Sampling Population This section presents the sample size determination and sampling technique. 1. Sample Size Determination The study sampled 10% of participants in each category of the target population. The sample size of 10% is guided by Kasomo who said that a sample size of 10% is 38 representative of the study population.39 When applied to each category of the target population, the sample size as presented in Table 2 will thus be 26, because the concerns of the study was mainly on the strategic aspects of Kenya’s maritime security and desired to collect data from only those key people holding strategic positions in the targeted departments. Table 2: Sample Size Department target Target Population (N) Sample Size (N= N*10%) Kenya Coast Guard Service 20 2 Kenya Maritime Authority 10 1 Kenya Defence Forces (Kenya Navy) 40 4 Sea Fearers 10 1 Kenya Ports Authority 16 2 Dock Workers Union 12 1 National Intelligence Service 20 2 Kenya Wildlife Service 20 2 Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute 16 2 Kenya Revenue Authority 12 1 Fisheries department 12 1 Ministry of Foreign Affair 8 1 National Environmental Management Authority 12 1 Kenya Forestry Department 12 1 Others 40 4 Total 260 26 2. Sampling Technique The study utilized two sampling techniques: proportionate stratified and snowballing sampling techniques. In this regard, the study participants were sampled proportionately (10%) from each stratum (Targeted Department). Besides, the study used the snowballing technique to sample the study participants based on their work, 39 D. Kasomo, Research Methods, Egerton University Press, Egerton (2006). 39 knowledge and experience in the field of maritime security and involvement in the repositioning of the blue economy matters. 1.9.5 Description of Research Instruments The study used Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) in data collection. These were qualitative in-depth interviews with people who know what was going on in the community or researcher's area of interest. It involved the collection of information personally from the sources that include a wide range of people from different sectors, who held critical positions in their departments. The KIIs contained questions pegged to the study objectives namely: to assess the capacities and capabilities of Kenya's maritime security organisations, examine the existing policy frameworks and strategies, and provide research-based policy recommendations on how best the country could rein in on marine security vulnerabilities to leverage the benefits associated with the Ocean. Follow-up questions were included so as prod further and obtain extra information from the interviews. The interview protocol used in this study is presented in Appendix I. Secondary data was collected from published research projects, policies and strategies. This helped to capture what had already been done on maritime security from a global, regional, and national and up to the local level, with information gathered helping to create a deeper understanding on the maritime domain security which is critical in informing policies and strategies. 1.9.6 Data Collection Procedures Before carrying out the KIIs, appointments were made with the respondents through phone calls and emails where necessary. The interviews were conducted through telephone calls and in-person where circumstances allowed. The responses were written 40 down with attention taken to ensure that as much information is collected as possible. Secondary data sources were obtained using internet searches as well as from the institutions targeted. 1.9.7 Reliability and Validity The KII guides were pretested to 5 officers from the agencies targeted. However, they were not included in the final study. The ease with which the respondents were able to respond to the questions presented to them was assessed and all the ambiguous questions were identified and adjusted accordingly to make it easy to comprehend. The guidance of the supervisor was also sought and his input was used to improve the study questions. 1.9.8 Data Analysis Procedures The collected data was sorted and analysed using the content analysis technique. Content analysis is a form of qualitative research and method of analysing written, verbal or visual communication messages.40 In this regard, the findings obtained was described in prose and the meanings arising highlighted and presented in verbatim. The emerging findings were then derived and analyzed against the existing body of knowledge. 1.9.9 Ethical Considerations Within the process of undertaking this study, the researcher ensured the confidentiality of all the participants. The psychological, as well as the physical safety of each respondent, was also ensured. The participants were required to give their consent 40 Haradhan Mohajan, Qualitative Research Methodology in Social Sciences and Related Subjects, Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People, Vol-7, Issue 01, 2018, pp. 23-48. p.15 41 before participation in the study. Also, all interaction and relationships encountered during the study were conducted professionally and in an ethical manner. The intended purpose of all information collected was also well explained to the respondents before data collection. 1.10 Chapter / Study Outline The study is organized around five chapters that seek to explore the following: Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study This Chapter outlines the problem statement of the study, the research questions, and justification of the study, the literature review, the theoretical framework and the supposed hypotheses of this study. The aforementioned components of chapter one give the background that shapes chapters two, three, four and five. Chapter 2: Historical Analysis of Kenya’s Maritime Security Pre-colonial – 2007. This chapter outlines the historical analysis of Kenya's maritime security. It discusses the factors that underpin the maritime security approach in Kenya from a historical perspective. It specifically examines and analyses Kenya’s maritime security approach transformation, from the pre-independence period to 2007. Chapter 3: The Strategic Aspects of Kenya’s Maritime Security (2008 - 2020). This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses, synergies and contradictions of existing maritime security frameworks and responses in Kenya’s maritime space. It aims at identifying the components of a distinct Kenya’s approach towards enhancing its maritime security. 42 Chapter 4: Research Findings and Discussion This chapter presents the findings obtained from the field. This is done in line with the study objectives. The chapter concludes with a section on the discussion. In this regard, the study findings are analysed against the literature reviewed. Chapter 5: Conclusion & Recommendation This Chapter concludes and recommends based on the major findings, in regards to the objectives and the hypotheses of the study. It acts as the final and ultimate verdict on the issues addressed in the research which met the core objectives of this study; evaluating the extent to which each task was met. 43 CHAPTER TWO HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KENYA’S MARITIME SECURITY 2.1 Introduction In post-colonial Kenya, land-based security challenges have continued to dominate the political and military agenda. This is evident with the continuous increase in the resourcing of the land forces that has resulted in the neglect of the challenges and opportunities presented by the ocean spaces. In conformity with the overtly bureaucratic approaches to governance, the concerns of inadequate and reactive policies and strategies towards Kenya's national security, have led to adverse exploitation of the maritime space by states and a non-state actor. These developments, coupled with other regional and international factors, have influenced the adoption of ad hoc national security policies and strategies by the leadership in confinement with what they subjectively perceive and coin as national interests. This chapter outline identifies the leadership variable as the most critical element for a ‘new’ state that is finding its foothold in the international system, by considering those in charge of the government as rational actors with different personality and worldviews. This chapter is a historical analysis of Kenya’s maritime security, from the pre-independence period to 2007, with key emphasis on how maritime security has been perceived during this period under review. 2.2 The National Interests Concept in National Security The perception of national interest connotes a political slogan that purports to persuade national support to government policies and actions.1 It is on this basis that the concerns 1 Chris Rahman, “A strategic perspective on alternative visions for good order and security at sea, with policy implications for New Zealand,”p.7 44 of the national interest can be linked to issues of national security and has Mwagiru conceive the relationship of national interest and national security as that of twins.2 This then confirms the assertion that national interests are what define the contours of the national security policy, and upon which they provide the conceptual framework that guides the decision making process at all levels of security indulgence – strategic, operational and tactical levels. Realism theory assumptions make an analysis that denotes the international system as anarchic, and on whose basis of interaction is centred on self-interest; defined and pursued in terms of power. The Realists hence, perceive national security concerns, as those that pertain to the state's survival in the anarchic external environment. They assert that the pursuit of self-interest does not advocate for any moral principles, but all concerns by the state should only ensure survival in the strategic operational environment. Morgenthau’s classical realism puts survival at the heart of human nature and assumes human being as leaders of states to have inherent ‘will power’ that engenders competition for power.3 The pursuit for power according to Morgenthau is to effect a balance of power with a rival that is occasioned by anarchy in the international system. Waltz's Theory of International Politics denounces the inherently aggressive nature of human nature realism asserted by Morgenthau. Waltz posits that state survival is only influenced by the structure of the international system and hence makes the state’s only aim to be that of survival. Waltz a proponent of defensive realism affirms that the international system structure is what creates incentives for the state to gain 2 Makumi Mwagiru, “The Twins of National Interest and National Security” in Mwakumi Mwagiru, author, The Three Anthems and Other Essays Volume.1 (Nairobi: Three Legs Consortium, 2015), pp.48- 54 3 Politics among Nations as cited in John Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” (New York; London: W. W Norton & Company, 2001), p.18 45 power at their rivals' expense, which is mainly for defensive purposes and not to threaten other states. However, Mearsheimer argues that as much as the structure of the international system determines the behaviour of the state, he believes that states always seek power for offensive use by exploiting available opportunities when the benefit outweighs the costs.4 The fall of the Berlin wall had the narrow conception of security as a "synonym for power"5 challenged by Constructivist’s broadening and widening of the security agenda. Their conceptualization of security was meant to address both traditional and non-traditional security threats that had confounded the whole concept of national security in a new security milieu. The broadening of security concept increased the security sectors – Political, Economic, Environmental, Societal and Military, 6and the widening led to an individual identified as the referent object of security. This then contends that issues could be argued and considered as matters of security even if they did not threaten the state's security.7 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1994 report on human development, further infuses the concerns of Human Security to the whole concept of national security, hence impacting the Realist connotation of national interests. Human Security concepts perceived an individual as one that is on the receiving end of all security practices by the state, hence the need to guarantee the security of the individual.8 The need for safety and security to distributive justice, one’s culture, 4 John Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” (New York; London: W. W Norton & Company, 2001), p.21 5 Barry Buzan, “People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era” (New York; London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.8. 6 Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, International Affairs” (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 431-451, 1991, p.433 7 Hough P, “Understanding Global Security” 2nd ed, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2008), p. 20 8 Rita Floyd, “Human Security and the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move” Human Security Journal, Volume 5, pp. 38-49, 2007, p. 40 46 identity, belongingness, self-esteem and self-actualization and freedom affirm the significance of population to state’s configuration.9 This then means the population, which is one of the fundamental components of a state, informs why considering Human Security is key to state survival and which needs the national security to consider the importance of both the domestic and the external environment. The changes in the operational environment hence portend the need for the national security policy to ensure a close functional relationship among the three instruments of power for purpose of enhancing security to the state's national interest from both internal and external threats.10 This functional relationship is a key aspect of influencing and enhancing cooperation among states, which the Liberalist consider as a very important trait in securing states' national interests. The building of a strong relationship with other countries, to the Liberalist, connotes an aspect that ensures the cost of going to war become an expensive adventure. The United Nations, which is both a state and non-state actor, has rendered cooperation among states very critical and its strategic aspect is to ensure peace and security in the international system. It is now a norm for a state to ensure that the conceptualization of their national security policy, and the aspects they consider as national interests, abide by the international law and the country's Constitution. These render the conception of national interest a legal concern, which needs to be validated by law. Indeed the operationalization of national security policy can only be realized by well-defined national interest. The Realist school of thought that has dominated the concerns of a state, perceived state's utmost concerns to be those that endeavour to ensure survival in the 9 Burton J, “Conflict: Resolution and Prevention,” as cited in H. B. Danesh, “Human Needs Theory, Conflict, and Peace” The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Daniel J. Christie 2012. 10 Makumi Mwagiru, “Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and National Security in Kenya” in Makumi Mwagiru, Author, The Three Anthems and Other Essays,(Nairobi, The Three Leg Consortium 2015) pp.5-10 47 strategic operational environment, which has consistently remained volatile and unpredictable. The concerns for survival are what most states pursued after independence and the need to ensure sovereignty had classical Realist views become attractive to the majority of the leaders in the post-independence era as it guided state’s behaviour in an uncertain and unpredictable international security environment. The concerns of national interests are what states use to establish objectives that stand to be served as the goals for policy and strategy.11 This affirms security as a policy objective and states must conceptualize and formulate a national security policy, which is a crucial and strategic pointer to the type and kind of national interests it seeks to pursue. However, the greatest challenge that encounters the concept of national interest, is the difficulty in defining and agreeing on the type of interests to be pursued. It is without a doubt that national interests have no universal definition,12 and in most countries, they are identified depending on the dominant political culture in a country. The concerns of national survival hence render the national interest concept central to national politics,13 which Alexander Wendt challenged this conception by asserting that national interests pursued by states do not have an objective fact about the strategic operational environment, but a certain social meaning given by states. Indeed the national security concept has national interests; the basis and the start point of its definition and pointer to the kind of goals a country pursues in the unpredictable operational environment. These then mean that the national security policy and strategy, are the handmaiden of the national interests, which they intend to 11 Alan G. Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. editor, The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy. (Strategic Studies Institute, 2010) p.3 12 Makumi Mwagiru, “National Interests: Framework for Analysis” in Makumi Mwagiru and Kigen Morumbasi, Editors, Dimensions of Grand Strategy, essays on theory, practice, institutions and mechanism in Kenya (Nairobi, Thirty Three Consortium, 2016), p.9 13 Makumi Mwagiru, “National Interests: Framework for Analysis” p.13 48 secure and promote within the means and ways at the disposal of the state. It is the national interests that connote the aspirations of the state, which are undergirded by the national values that tend to be critical in providing the legal, moral and philosophical basis of the state's actions.14 According to Morgenthau, the idea of the national interest, in general, resembles the constitution of a state.15 It concentrates on the commitments of its people and its government in that state. It is based on the concept of self-help and anarchy, which state is the primary actor. As a concern, it entails two factors; rational demand and demands by the operational environment, 16and on whose basis they get considered as either eternal or perpetual national interests. Eternal interest being those that transient time and regimes and perpetual interests as those that are promoted by states when they interact in the operational environment;17 for which they are all conceptualized based on the state's desire for survival. The need for a state to survive has therefore led to concerns of security described as ‘essentially contested concept’, but on whose basis it should not be considered by states as a reason not to conceptualize and formulate their security approach.18 However, as a concept with no common understanding, Arnold Wolfers termed it as an 'ambiguous symbol' that has a potential for misunderstanding when used without any specific concern.19It is then imperative that states need to develop their national security concepts that will broadly outline their security policies and strategies. 14 Makumi Mwagiru, “Beyond False Strategizing: The Constitutional Basis of Grand Strategy in Kenya” in Humphrey Njoroge and Makumi Mwagiru, editors, Grand Strategy in Kenya Vol 1: Concepts, Contexts, Process and Ethics (Nairobi: Three Leg Consortium, 2019) p.36 15 Hans Morgenthau, “Politics among Nations” (New York; Alfred A Knoff, 1948) 16 Ken Kiyono (1969) A Study on the Concept of The National Interest of Hans J. Morgenthau: as The Standard of American Foreign Policy 49(3), pp.1-20, p.2. http://hdl.handle.net/10069/27783 17 Makumi Mwagiru, “The Twins of National Interest and National Security” pp.48-54 18 David Baldwin, “The concept of Security” Review of International Studies 23, pp. 5-26, 1997, p.12 19 Arnold Wolfers, "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4, 1952, pp. 481-502. 49 2.3 Leadership and Political Will: A Framework for Analysis of Kenya’s Maritime Security The Indian Ocean is a time tested highway that has seen the Kenyan coast become a crossroads of the Indian Ocean trade networks. It has seen an intermingle of the cultures of southern Arabia, Persian Gulf, India, European and the African mainland through trade that enhanced the sharing of values and ideas. It was a region which the European saw as a route to India and had them establish coastal bases for sustainability.20 In foreign policy, the levels of analysis are considered to be very crucial in understanding the decisions and actions of the state. The concerns of individual, state and system level of analysis are what make it possible to understand the foreign policy decisions of a state. The variable of leadership stands out because states are not simply 'black boxes' seeking to survive and prosper in an anarchic system. They are a configuration of individuals and groups interests who project the interests into the operational environment through a particular kind of government. Kenya like most of the young democracies has always had much of their policy decisions determined by the leadership rather than an objective-based analysis of the national interests.21 The leadership variable, which is complemented by the aspect of political will, for this analysis, denotes a concept that concern a leader who envision an outcome that will serve the country's national interest and goes ahead to use his political authority to influence other actors to share their belief by seconding his determination. The concerns of leadership and political will perspectives towards the maritime security in the Indian Ocean has been crucial since the pre-independence period, but the approaches 20 Nazifa Rashid, “British colonialism in East-Africa during nineteenth-century” IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp. 8-11, 2014, p.8 21 Francis Ogolla, "The Determinants of Kenya's National Security Policy since Independence" A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award of the Degree of Masters of Arts in International Studies, University of Nairobi, June 2014, p.36. 50 articulated towards it have differed due to the concerns of national interests of each regime in power. The nature of threats to national interests determined how national security was conceived by each regime, but the maritime domain still stood as the most neglected area among the Kenyan leaders despite the shared understanding of the vast economic potential of the maritime domain, but never translate into their calculus. Leaders of states mostly express their political will in speeches, policies and legislations, and for which they tend to indicate their intentions and motivations.22However, the real test suffices in their appropriation and consistent actions towards these intentions. These are what makes good leadership necessity in making a formidable political will, which comes in handy in ensuring the leader takes actions that will go into having these actions credited as strong and appropriate. Fundamentally, leadership dotted with instrumental competence and political will is critical for the state's survival. Maritime security which is inherently part of national security concerns a variety of complex and probable issues that finds leadership and political will as crucial elements in developing capacity in a state. The development of maritime security capacity will always require a very proactive and pragmatic leader with a resolute political will. This will assertively engender actions that respond to opportunities that will pursue to exploit the maritime domain as an important and strategic space as to the land context.23By perceiving the maritime space as one of the key spheres of state’s security, the leader will then push for the formulation and implementation of policies and strategies to enhance the nexus between continental and maritime domains. 22 Thean Potgieter, “Leadership and political will crucial for maritime security in E. Africa” in Thomas Mandrup, Francois Vrey, Editors, Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences (AFRICAN SUN MeDIA, 2015), p. 245 23 Anthony Ammeter et al, “Toward a Political Theory of Leadership” The Leadership Quarterly 13, 751–796, 2002, p.760 51 Leadership and political will in the prefix of maritime security will then remain central and responsible in undertaking collective and coordinated actions that ensure that the national security policy formulated do respond to threats experienced by the state on the trilogy of ideas, physical base, and institution.24However, both demands individualized construal’s of strategic situations to enhance one’s vision. It is through one’s experiences, values, personalities and other human factors that would ensure the development and orchestrating of diplomatic and military engagement all through the levels of leadership structure and chain of decision making.25 The strategic culture in leaders signifies the ideals that help in developing the way of thinking of a leader about what is important in group collective cognition that will transit across time and space.26 Principally, leadership and polit