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
Factors influencing the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission in the fight against corruption in Kenya.

Aluda, Meshack Collins
Strathmore Business School
Strathmore University

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


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**Factors influencing the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission in the
Fight Against Corruption in Kenya**

Aluda Meshack Collins

**A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
Award of the Degree of Master of Public Policy and Management at
Strathmore University**




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NAIROBI, KENYA**

February, 2025

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for examination in any other university.

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Sign. 


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Date 19.2.2025

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
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ABSTRACT

This study examined the factors influencing Kenya's Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) in its efforts to combat corruption. Despite the establishment of the EACC in 2011 and subsequent anti-corruption initiatives, Kenya continues to grapple with widespread corruption across both public and private sectors attributable to various factors. The main objective of the study was to determine the factors influencing the EACC in executing its mandate. Specifically, the study sought to: identify legal and institutional framework factors hindering EACC's effectiveness; evaluate the extent of political interference in EACC operations; analyze how resource allocation affects the commission's anti-corruption efforts; and identify coordination challenges in inter-agency cooperation. The study was grounded in Institutional Theory by Selznick (1949), employing a descriptive research design with convergent parallel mixed-methods approach. Data collection involved document analysis, questionnaires administered to 103 EACC officials, and interviews with five key anti-corruption experts. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics and presented through frequency tables, means, standard deviations, and percentages. Qualitative data underwent thematic analysis using NVivo software with results presented as verbatim quotes. Key findings revealed significant operational constraints including limited technological, financial, and human resources. Institutional barriers, particularly political interference and weak interagency coordination, substantially impeded EACC effectiveness. Weak rule of law emerged as the primary weakness in Kenya's anti-corruption framework, while limited technology utilization resulted from inadequate budgetary allocation. Based on these findings, the study recommends strengthening EACC's institutional independence, enhancing resource allocation, improving inter-agency coordination mechanisms, and reinforcing legal frameworks. These insights contribute to both theoretical understanding of anti-corruption agency effectiveness in developing countries and provide practical recommendations for policy reform in Kenya and similar contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa.


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
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ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

BETA	Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigation
EACC	Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FRC	Financial Reporting Centre
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICAC	Independent Commission against Corruption
ICT	Information, Communication and Technology
KES	Kenya Shillings
KII	Key Informant Interview
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
LIA	Leadership and Integrity Act
MTP	Medium Term Plan
ODPP	Office the Director of Public Prosecution
POEA	Public Officer Ethics Act
PPADA	Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act
SFO	Serious Fraud Office
TI	Transparency International
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Corruption

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Anti-Corruption policy: herein refers to a plan that provides a framework for efficient and effective detection, prevention, criminalization and prosecution of corruption in the country. It defines partnerships with agencies and individuals

Anti-Corruption law: herein refers to a law enacted by the state through its elected leaders aimed at criminal prosecutions and other responses directed at individuals involved; and measures intended to restructure or reorganize public or private administration to make it more resistant to corruption

Anti-Corruption Measures herein refers to the policies, laws, institutions, human actions, financial and technology configured to curb, prevent, or punish corrupt practices.

Anti-Corruption regulation herein refers to a set of rules and administrative codes issued by the National Assembly with the force of law

Asset Recovery: herein refers to the process of distinguishing, restraining, seizing, and repatriating to the country of origin proceeds of corruption that have been transferred abroad.

Corruption: herein refers to abuse of entrusted power for private gain, including bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, and nepotism.

Effective fight against corruption: herein entails legislative measures to reduce and tackle opportunities for corruption and timely punishment of those allegedly involved in corrupt practices.

Grand Corruption: refers to the forms of corruption that occurring at the highest levels of government and involves major public projects and policies and frequently leading to significant misallocation of resources and subversion of political, legal, and economic systems.


Petty Corruption: refers to the small-scale, day to day corruption that happens at the implementation of politics, public administration, and services occurring among the low and mid-level public workers.

Political Will: herein refers the demonstrated credible intent of political actors to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level.

Private Sector: refers to a segment of the economy controlled by individuals and companies, not controlled by the state.

Public Sector: refers to the section of the economy and administration managed by the government, entailing civil service, state-owned organizations, and public institutions.

Whistleblower: refers to a person who exposes any kind of data or actions that are viewed as illegal, unethical, or incorrect within a structure.



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background to the Study

Corruption continues to bedevil Kenya despite various strategic interventions implemented since the year 2000. The Constitution of Kenya 2010 established relevant institutions designed to enhance checks and balances in public resource management; however, rampant corruption still contributes to significant resource losses nationally. This study examines the factors influencing the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) in executing its mandate, focusing specifically on policy and institutional framework weaknesses, political interference, resource capacity constraints, and inter-agency coordination issues.

Corruption represents a persistent global challenge affecting economies worldwide. No nation is immune from corruption (Alfaro, 2022). The United Nations (2018) estimates annual global economic losses of approximately 2.6 trillion US dollars, representing nearly 5% of worldwide gross domestic product. Major corruption scandals have occurred across continents, including European corporate bribery schemes involving government officials and civil servants that resulted in approximately US\$1.4 billion in bribes over a decade (TI, 2024). In Asia, the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal resulted in losses of approximately \$4.5 billion through corruption, bribery, and money laundering schemes (TI, 2023).

The 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index reveals that more than two-thirds of countries score below 50, with a global average score of just 43%. Nations like China consistently score below the global average, achieving only 41% on the 2019 index (TI, 2023). India reports the highest total bribery rate at 39%, followed by Indonesia at 36% (Afrobarometer, 2020). The 2023 CPI report further indicates that Sub-Saharan African countries continue to struggle significantly in their anti-corruption efforts (TI, 2023).

Kenya's founding fathers envisioned a politically and economically independent country characterized by shared prosperity and freedom from disease, poverty, and illiteracy, with prudent resource utilization driving economic growth (Kibua, 2020). Despite this vision, recent studies highlight corruption's multifaceted nature in Kenya, encompassing bribery,

embezzlement, and office abuse (Mutua, 2024). The 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Kenya 123rd among 180 countries, showing marginal improvement but still reflecting significant corruption challenges (TI, 2023). This persistent problem deters foreign investment, hampers service delivery, and erodes public trust in government institutions (World Bank, 2022).

Corruption in Kenya undermines economic growth, political stability, and institutional trust (Muthomi, 2021). Hope (2000) traces Kenya's anti-corruption initiatives from the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1956 through successive institutional iterations, including the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA) established in 1997, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) formed in 2003, and finally the EACC created in 2011 (Hope, 2024). Mutua (2024) emphasizes that this history of frequent institutional restructuring has created instability and inconsistency in Kenya's anti-corruption efforts.

The EACC was established in 2011 through the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act as the primary authority tasked with addressing corruption in Kenya (Government of Kenya, 2011). Despite its mandate and various anti-corruption initiatives, Kenya continues to struggle with widespread corruption across both public and private sectors (Daud, 2024). As a signatory to international and regional anti-corruption instruments, Kenya has recognized the need for comprehensive and robust initiatives to address corruption and economic crimes, anchoring its anti-corruption architecture on the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and African Union commitments (Njoroge, 2021).

The EACC confronts a complex web of factors that limit its efficacy in fulfilling its mandate (EACC, 2024). These factors span multiple dimensions, including but not limited to public perception and participation, institutional, political, resource-based, and coordination factors. Previous studies such as Githongo (2022) examines how deeply embedded cultural practices like gift-giving and patronage networks create ambiguity between legitimate cultural expressions and corrupt practices, complicating enforcement efforts in Kenya. Mwangi (2023) documents how international money laundering networks enable Kenyan officials to hide proceeds of corruption in offshore accounts and foreign real estate investments, creating jurisdictional challenges for the EACC.

Kamau (2023) identifies significant gaps in Kenya's whistleblower protection framework that discourage reporting of corruption, particularly in high-stakes or politically sensitive cases. Mbote (2022) analyzes the shortage of specialized forensic accountants, digital forensics experts, and financial crime analysts within Kenya's anti-corruption infrastructure. Mutembei (2023) explores difficulties in institutionalizing ethical standards across the vast public service, identifying implementation gaps between policy and practice. Mbatia (2022) analyzes how development partners' varying anti-corruption requirements create compliance burdens that sometimes compete with domestic accountability systems.

Political interference represents a significant obstacle, particularly when high-level corruption allegations involve politically connected individuals (Owiti, 2021). Resource constraints in funding, skilled personnel, and technological capacity further limit the EACC's operational effectiveness (EACC Annual Report, 2023). The EACC's Strategic Plan 2021-2026 notes that "the increasing digitization of corruption schemes requires advanced technological capabilities for effective investigation," highlighting the technological challenges facing the Commission.

The legal framework within which the EACC operates has faced criticism from scholars who argue that insufficient prosecutorial powers hamper the EACC's ability to effectively pursue corruption cases (Mukunyi, 2014). Coordination issues between the EACC and other law enforcement agencies, particularly the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, potentially impact successful prosecution of corruption cases (Kimani, 2021). Cultural factors and public attitudes toward corruption add another layer of complexity, as certain cultural practices and social norms may inadvertently facilitate corrupt behaviors, making it difficult to address corruption solely through legal and institutional means (Muthomi, 2021).

Despite these challenges, the EACC has made notable efforts to combat corruption. In implementing its 2018-2023 strategic plan, the EACC received and analyzed 30,523 reports, with 11,620 relevant to its mandate. Investigations yielded 752 files, with 435 recommended for prosecution, 55 for administrative action, and 152 for closure (EACC Annual Report, 2023). The EACC achieved a concurrence rate of 89.8% with the ODPP for prosecution recommendations, resulting in 168 convictions, 96 acquittals, and 49 withdrawals/discharges over the five-year period. Additionally, the EACC traced and preserved assets valued at approximately KES 47.5 billion and KES 14.7 billion respectively, filed 153 civil suits for

asset recovery worth KES 20.5 billion, and recovered assets worth KES 24.32 billion, representing a 582.2% increase from the previous strategic plan period (EACC Annual Report, 2023).

The EACC operates with 768 staff members possessing diverse skills and competencies, distributed across headquarters, 11 regional offices, and 50 Huduma Centres. With an average approved annual budget of KES 3.3 billion and a 98% absorption rate (EACC Annual Report, 2023), the EACC demonstrates significant operational capacity. However, given Kenya's continuing corruption challenges despite these efforts, a comprehensive examination of the obstacles facing the EACC in its fight against corruption is necessary. This study aims to identify and analyze these challenges, focusing on political interference, resource allocation, legal and institutional framework issues, and inter-agency coordination, thereby contributing to ongoing discourse on effective anti-corruption strategies in Kenya and similar developing nations.

This study explains why corruption continues to bedevil Kenya despite various strategic interventions since the year 2000. It is noteworthy that the Constitution of Kenya 2010 provided for establishment of relevant institutions that have the potential of enhancing checks and balances in managing public resources. However, rampant corruption contributes to a huge loss of resources in Kenya. The study laid emphasis on the factors influencing the EACC in its execution of the mandate.

Despite numerous studies focusing on the challenges, corruption still persists. This necessitated this study. Specifically, the study focused on weaknesses in the policy and institutional framework; political interference, resource capacity issues of budget, staff and technology and coordination issues that the Commission has to endure to achieve credible results.

1.2 Problem Definition

Despite the establishment of the EACC in 2011 and various anti-corruption initiatives, Kenya continues to grapple with pervasive corruption that undermines its socio-economic development and governance structures (TI, 2023). Corruption in Kenya remains a significant obstacle to national progress, with the country ranking 123rd of the 180 countries in the 2023

CPI (TI, 2023). The Government of Kenya has been riddled with a myriad of scandals involving loss of huge sum of money and have never been resolved. The Goldenberg scandal in early 1990s resulted in loss equated to 10% of Kenya's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loosely translated to Kes. 100 billion (Mutua 2024).

The Anglo- leasing scandal involved procurement of a sophisticated passport printing equipment together with Forensic laboratories for the Police from France at 6 million Euros but was later to be awarded to Anglo-leasing Company in Britain at 30 million euros without delivery in 2006. The Euro bond loan the government had acquired to help in funding major development projects across the country but could not account for Kes 215 billion in 2015. The Galana and Kulalu irrigation scheme (3.5 billion) in 2014 and loss of Kes 791 million and 10 billion respectively under the National Youth Service programme in 2015.

This persistent issue costs the country an estimated 30% of its GDP annually, severely impacting public service delivery and economic growth (EACC, 2023). Despite the EACC's efforts, high-profile corruption cases often remain unresolved, and public trust in anti-corruption measures continues to wane (Hope, 2024). The EACC confronts a complex web of factors that limit its efficacy (EACC, 2024). These include insufficient legal and prosecutorial powers, which often result in protracted legal battles and low conviction rates for corruption cases (Mukunyi, 2014). Political interference and lack of independence have been cited as major obstacles, with allegations of high-level corruption often involving politically connected individuals (Owiti, 2023).

Additionally, resource constraints, both in terms of funding and skilled personnel, have limited the EACC's operational capacity (EACC Annual Report, 2023). Technological challenges have also been seen to hamper effective fight of corruption (EACC, 2023). Furthermore, weak inter-agency cooperation, particularly between the EACC and the ODP, has led to coordination issues that potentially impacted the eminent criminal prosecution of corruption proceedings (Kimani, 2021). The EACC also grapples with deeply entrenched corruption networks that are resistant to change and often have the resources to subvert anti-corruption efforts (Mutua, 2022). Given these multifaceted challenges, there is a pressing need to comprehensively examine and address the obstacles facing the EACC in its fight against corruption. This study aims to identify, analyse, and propose solutions to these challenges, adding to the current discourse on effective anti-corruption strategies in Kenya

and similar developing nations. By doing so, it seeks to enhance the EACC's capacity to combat corruption effectively and ultimately contribute to improved governance and socio-economic development in Kenya.

1.3 Research objectives

The study addressed the following objectives: -

1.3.1 Overall Objective

The study sought to determine the challenges facing EACC in the execution of its mandate.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- i. identify the legal and institutional framework factors that hinder EACC's effectiveness in fighting corruption in Kenya;
- ii. evaluate the extent of political interference if any in the EACC's operations and its effect on the commission's ability to fight corruption in Kenya;
- iii. analyze the extent to which resource allocation affects the EACC's fight against corruption in Kenya
- iv. identify coordination challenges affecting the EACC's fight against corruption in Kenya

1.4 Research Questions

The research questions of the study are to:

- i. What ways does the legal and institutional framework factors hinder EACC's fight against corruption in Kenya?
- ii. What degree does political interference in the EACC's operations affect the EACC's ability to fight corruption in Kenya?
- iii. What extent does resource allocation affect the commissions fight against corruption in Kenya?
- iv. What are the coordination challenges Kenya impeding the EACC's fight against corruption?

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study primarily focused on the period from 2011 (when the EACC was established) to the present day. The primary focus was in Kenya and in particular at the headquarters of the EACC in Nairobi, Kenya. Thematically, the scope focused on the policy and institutional framework of the EACC, political interference and issues of independence, resource

allocation and management, inter-agency cooperation and coordination challenges. The methodological scope employed a descriptive research design, mixed-methods approach which include document analysis of laws, regulations, and EACC reports, key informant interviews with EACC officials, anti-corruption experts, and relevant stakeholders. The study does not provide an exhaustive analysis of all corruption cases in Kenya. It did not focus on the broader economic impacts of corruption beyond their relevance to the EACC's challenges. The study did not delve deeply into the technical aspects of forensic accounting or specific investigative techniques used by the EACC. The study acknowledges potential limitations in accessing sensitive information due to the nature of corruption investigations. The research relied on publicly available information and the willingness of stakeholders to participate in interviews.

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study is significant as it examines the factors influencing the EACC's fight against corruption while offering actionable insights and recommendations to enhance the agency's effectiveness, strengthen public sector integrity, and contribute to sustainable governance in Kenya. Through a comprehensive understanding of these challenges, stakeholders can work collaboratively to strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms and promote an ethical culture across both public and private sectors.

From a theoretical perspective, this study makes several important contributions. This study extends Institutional Theory by examining how formal anti-corruption structures interact with informal political networks and cultural norms in Kenya's specific context. By analyzing the disconnect between Kenya's robust anti-corruption legal framework and its practical implementation, the research provides theoretical insights into institutional isomorphism and decoupling phenomena in regulatory bodies. This theoretical contribution helps explain why anti-corruption agencies in developing democracies often struggle despite having comprehensive formal mandates.

The findings provide policymakers with evidence-based insights to reevaluate Kenya's anti-corruption institutional, regulatory, and legal frameworks. This research identifies specific points of weakness in the current system where reforms could significantly enhance EACC's operational capacity and independence. Government stakeholders can use this information to

advocate for improvements in the working environment and resource allocation necessary to effectively combat corruption.

By disseminating knowledge about EACC's challenges, this study empowers citizens with information needed to hold their leaders accountable and advocate for systemic change. It creates a foundation for civic education and public discourse on corruption's impacts and the institutional barriers to addressing it effectively.

This research fills a critical gap in the existing literature on anti-corruption efforts in Kenya by providing empirical data and analysis that goes beyond descriptive accounts to identify causal factors and structural impediments. It serves as a foundational piece for future studies, allowing researchers to build on its findings and explore context-specific solutions tailored to Kenya's unique governance environment.

The study also illuminates potential areas for strategic collaboration between the EACC and various stakeholders, including civil society organizations, international bodies, and academic institutions. Understanding these challenges facilitates the development of stronger partnerships with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Judiciary, and other actors critical to creating an effective anti-corruption ecosystem in Kenya.

1.7 Chapter Summary

The chapter focuses on the background to the study which has been discussed in regard to the factors influencing the EACC in the fight against corruption and unethical practices. The chapter presents the problem statement and research objectives that include policy and institutional framework, political interference, availability of resources and coordination challenges. The chapter also presents the search questions, scope of the study and significance of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section discusses the Institutional theory of organization and shows how this can be used to explain the persistence of corruption in the country. The section further provides reflections from various literature on factors affecting the EACC's fight against corruption.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

The Institutional Theory of Organization (Selznick, 1949) is a framework that seeks to understand how institutional contexts, norms, and rules influence the structure and behavior of organizations. This theory emphasizes the importance of social, cultural, and regulatory environments in shaping organizational practices and legitimacy. The theory emerged in the early 1940s but has received significant contribution lately from (Scott, 2004). He outlined three pillars of institutions—regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive—which help explain how institutions influence organizations. His framework emphasizes that institutions are not only rules but also include norms and shared beliefs that shape organizational behavior. Institutions are defined as enduring formal and informal rules, norms, and beliefs that shape social behavior. They provide stability and meaning to social life, influencing how organizations operate within their environments (Scott, 2004).

The theory provides a lens through which to understand the complex interplay between organizations and their environments. It highlights how both internal dynamics and external pressures shape organizational behavior and decision-making. Through the insights of its key proponents, the theory explains why organizations may adopt certain practices that prioritize legitimacy over efficiency, illuminating the role of social norms and institutional frameworks in organizational life. A fair amount of research has focused on the relationship between political institutions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the prevalence and levels of corruption. This theory suggests that the structure, rules, and processes within institutions play a crucial role in shaping the behavior of individuals within those institutions, including their propensity for corruption or their ability to combat it.

The study adopted this theory because it provides a powerful lens for examining the legal and institutional framework challenges facing the EACC. This theoretical framework emphasized how formal institutions (laws, regulations, procedural frameworks) and informal institutions (norms, cultural expectations) interacted to shape organizational behavior and effectiveness. By applying Institutional Theory, the researcher could analyze how the EACC's effectiveness in fighting corruption was constrained by institutional voids, contradictory institutional logics, or inadequate institutional arrangements that create legitimacy challenges. The theory's focus on institutional isomorphism also helped explain why certain anti-corruption frameworks may be adopted ceremonially rather than substantively, potentially creating a gap between the EACC's formal mandate and its practical implementation capacity.

The theory elucidated how politically powerful actors can exert normative and coercive pressures that compromise institutional independence. By analyzing political interference through this theoretical lens, the researcher examine how informal institutional arrangements may undermine formal institutional protections for the EACC's independence. Institutional Theory also provided concepts for understanding how the EACC navigates competing institutional logics—between political pressures and its anti-corruption mandate—which directly addressed the goal of evaluating how such interference affects the commission's corruption-fighting effectiveness.

Institutional Theory highlighted how resource dependencies created power imbalances that affected organizational autonomy and effectiveness. The theory explained that organizations required not just financial resources but also legitimacy and political support to function effectively. By applying this theoretical lens, the study analyzed how resource allocation to the EACC may be influenced by institutional pressures and power dynamics rather than purely rational considerations of anti-corruption needs. Furthermore, Institutional Theory helped explain how resource constraints limited the EACC's ability to develop institutional capacity and overcome institutional inertia.

The theory explained how different agencies developed distinct institutional logics, professional norms, and operational cultures that could impede effective collaboration. By applying Institutional Theory, the researcher analyzed how formal and informal institutional arrangements either facilitated or hindered inter-agency coordination. The theory's focus on institutional fields also provided a framework for examining how the EACC's position within

Kenya's broader institutional ecosystem affected its ability to coordinate anti-corruption efforts across governmental boundaries.

2.2 Empirical Literature Review

In this section, the study presents policy and legal frameworks, political interference, availability of resources and coordination challenges for fighting corruption. Corruption remains a persistent challenge in Kenya, undermining economic growth, political stability, and public trust in government institutions (TI, 2023). This literature review examines the existing body of research on the factors influencing the EACC in its anti-corruption efforts. Kenya's anti-corruption efforts predate the EACC (EACC Annual Report, 2023).

2.2.1 Policy and Institutional Framework on Corruption

This theme presents literature on the international legal framework, national policies, national legal instruments, regulations, and the institutional framework. Internationally, the United Nations convention against corruption and continentally, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption are key instruments. They are applicable in Kenya based on the provisions of Article 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution of Kenya having signed and ratified the Conventions in 2003 (GoK 2010). Kenya subscribes to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognizes corruption as an obstacle for sustainable development and singles Goal 16 to "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels". In particular, Target 16.5 aims to "Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms" (UN Report, 2018).

Kenya subscribes to Africa Agenda 2063. The African Union adopted Agenda 2063 and three of the seven aspirations therein foster and prioritize good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law, all of which are key ingredients and pillars in the fight against corruption and reinforcement of the National Development Agenda. Kenya actively engages in regional and international cooperation and participates regularly in relevant conferences, meetings and fora, including the working groups under the United Nations convention against corruption.

National Policies include the National Ethics and Anti-Corruption Policy (Sessional Paper no. 2 of 2018) is anchored on the Political Pillar of Kenya Vision 2030. The Medium-Term Plan (MTP) IV identifies National Values and Ethics as one of the cornerstones of the Country's overall development through a value-based system. The elements identified in the Kenya Vision 2030 adhere to the national values and ethics which are re-emphasized under Article 10 (National Values and Principles of Governance), Article 232 (Values and Principles of Public Service) and Chapter 6 (Leadership and Integrity) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The Department of Justice is responsible for coordinating the stakeholders in the implementation of the Policy.

The objective is to reduce levels of corruption the country in a coordinated and integrated approach by elaborating on the role of all those involved. EACC is implementing its third Strategic Plan 2023-2028 which provides the roadmap for tackling corruption, economic crime and unethical practices (EACC Annual Report, 2023). The plan whose development was consultative with stakeholders, mimics the government development blueprint and policies. It is aligned to the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda (BETA) and the National Ethics and Anti-Corruption Policy (NEAP).

The government has also developed legal frameworks such as the national values and principles of governance are found in Article 10 of the Constitution are to be exercised by all agencies at all levels. To promote transparency, Article 35 allows for greater access to information by the citizenry by ensuring they participate in legislative processes and public finance. It also provides for leadership and integrity, national security, efficient public service and a fair judicial process all themed to tame malpractices. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act was enacted in 2003 to provide a framework for the prevention, investigation and punishment of corruption, economic crime and related offences. The law defines corruption and provides for double punishment for lost public money in addition to imprisonment. The Bribery Act, enacted in 2016 is specific to bribery and places an obligation to both the public and private entities in Kenya. The Act has extraterritorial application in respect of conduct by a Kenyan citizen or a private or public entity outside of Kenya, which would constitute an offence under the Act if such conduct took place within Kenya.

The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2009 provides a comprehensive legal framework for Anti-Money Laundering criminal sanctions. The Act criminalizes money laundering and related offences and provides for penalties arising from commission of the offences. It provides for asset recovery process as a measure for combating money laundering. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act (EACC Act 2011) establishes EACC and provides for its functions and powers. The EACC has powers to investigate and recommend to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the prosecution of any acts of corruption or economic crimes; raise public awareness on ethical issues, educate the public on the dangers of corruption and enlist and foster public support in combating corruption among others.

One of Kenya's key anti-corruption measures is the legal mechanism for asset declaration by public officials established by the Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA) of 2003. Asset declarations serve to prevent corruption and are largely used in the detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption cases such as unexplained wealth, conflict of interest and embezzlement of public funds among others. The Leadership and Integrity Act was enacted in 2012 pursuant to Article 80 of the Constitution to give effect to, and establish procedures and mechanisms for the effective administration of Chapter Six of the Constitution. All public office holders are under obligation to exercise their authority and responsibility and as a consequence, thereof, the public officer bears personal responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of any actions or omissions arising from the discharge of the duties of the office.

The principal purpose and objective of the Public Finance Management Act of 2012 is to ensure that public finances are managed at both the national and the county levels of government in accordance with the principles set out in the Constitution which in turn facilitate effective and efficient use of limited resources. Public procurement in Kenya is governed by the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA) of 2015 which repealed the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005. The 2015 PPADA was necessitated by the change in the constitutional dispensation in Kenya following the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

The law places an obligation to state organs and public entities to contract for goods and services in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-

effective. Some regulations have been made to support the legal framework for fighting corruption, economic crime and unethical conduct. The regulations include: the Public Officer Ethics (Management, Verification and Access to Financial Declarations) Regulations (Legal Notice No. 179 of November, 2011); the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes (Amnesty and Restitution) Regulations, 2011 (Legal Notice No. 44 of 2011); the Leadership and integrity Regulations; and the Bribery Regulations 2020.

Despite the existence of several legal frameworks within which the EACC operates, there have been debates on the effectiveness of these frameworks. Ngugi, (2022) provides a critical analysis of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2011 and subsequent amendments. He argued that while the Act provides a robust framework for the EACC's operations, it also contains limitations that hinder the Commission's effectiveness. Empirical evidence supports these theoretical concerns. A quantitative study by Mwangi and Ngugi (2023) examined 387 corruption cases handled by the EACC between 2013-2022, finding that only 23% resulted in convictions, with significant processing delays averaging 4.2 years from investigation to judgment. Their regression analysis identified the lack of prosecutorial powers as a statistically significant predictor of case outcomes ($p < 0.01$). Similarly, Karanja (2021) conducted a mixed-methods study with 156 EACC officials and legal experts, revealing that 78% of respondents identified the separation of investigative and prosecutorial functions as a major institutional bottleneck, with coordination challenges between EACC and ODPP cited as the primary reason for case dismissals. Kimani (2021) contends that this limitation forces the EACC to rely on the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) to prosecute corruption cases, often leading to delays and coordination challenges. This view is supported by Odhiambo (2022), who found that the conviction rate for corruption cases in Kenya remains low, partly due to these institutional bottlenecks.

Scholars have identified institutional design as fundamental to anti-corruption success. Doig's et al. (2007) comparative analysis revealed that agencies with constitutional protection and independent appointment processes achieved substantially higher prosecution rates than those under direct executive control (Doig et al., 2007). This finding supports Quah's (2010) influential research comparing Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption with less successful counterparts. Quah concluded that "institutional autonomy, adequate resources, and comprehensive legal frameworks were crucial determinants of anti-corruption success" (Quah, 2010).

A significant thread in the literature examines whether integrated or fragmented institutional approaches yield better results. Persson et al. (2013) conducted comparative case studies in Kenya and Uganda, concluding that anti-corruption institutions implemented as isolated reforms without addressing broader governance systems consistently failed to produce sustainable results. Their research emphasized that successful anti-corruption efforts require coordinated institutional frameworks rather than standalone agencies operating in isolation (Persson et al., 2013). This finding aligns with Transparency International's (2019) cross-national study demonstrating that countries with integrated institutional approaches encompassing coordinated policy, enforcement, and prevention had significantly higher conviction rates for corruption cases. The report specifically noted that fragmented approaches often resulted in jurisdictional conflicts and enforcement gaps (Transparency International, 2019).

2.2.2 Political Interference and Independence

Political interference has been widely cited as a major challenge facing the EACC. Owiti (2021) conducted an in-depth study of high-profile corruption cases in Kenya and found evidence of political meddling in EACC investigations. The author argues that the EACC's lack of constitutional independence makes it vulnerable to political pressure, especially in cases involving powerful political figures.

These theoretical concerns have been validated by empirical research. Otieno and Kamau (2022) analyzed 203 high-profile corruption cases from 2015-2021, finding that cases involving politically connected individuals were 3.7 times more likely to face procedural delays and 2.8 times more likely to be dismissed than cases without political connections. Their multivariate analysis controlled for case complexity, evidentiary strength, and legal representation. Similarly, Odhiambo et al. (2023) surveyed 245 EACC investigators, finding that 67% reported experiencing direct political pressure to abandon or delay specific investigations, with 41% indicating this occurred 'frequently' or 'very frequently.' Their study also documented significant drops in investigation intensity following changes in political administration, with case progression rates declining by 36% in the six months following national elections."

Research has identified several ways in which political actors have used legislative powers to influence the EACC's operations. Kivuva (2019) documents how parliamentary amendments have sometimes weakened the EACC's investigative powers. Parliamentarians have also used budgetary allocations to limit EACCs functioning. This is supported by Mwangi (2021), who noted that the commission's financial autonomy has been compromised through strategic budget allocations and delays (Mwangi, 2021). Studies have also highlighted various mechanisms of executive interference. A case in point is cited in the **appointment processes of the EACC commissioners**. Wangui (2020) argues that the political nature of appointing EACC commissioners has led to reduced independence. This is further emphasized by research by Otieno (2018), who suggests that high-profile corruption investigations are often influenced by political considerations.

Muthomi (2021) takes this argument further, suggesting that the appointment process for EACC commissioners, which involves executive and legislative branches, potentially compromises the Commission's independence from its inception. The author proposes a more transparent and apolitical appointment process to enhance the EACC's autonomy (Muthomi, 2021). The challenge of inter-agency cooperation, particularly between the EACC and other law enforcement and judicial bodies, has been well-documented. Kimani (2022) provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between the EACC and the ODPP, highlighting coordination issues that often result in delays in prosecuting corruption cases. Ochieng' (2021) expands on this theme, examining the broader ecosystem of anti-corruption efforts in Kenya. The author argues that while multiple agencies with anti-corruption mandates exist (including the EACC, ODPP, and Financial Reporting Centre), there is often a lack of clear delineation of responsibilities and inadequate information sharing, leading to inefficiencies and potential conflicts.

The existence of deeply entrenched corruption networks poses a significant challenge to the EACC's efforts. Mutua (2024) provides an in-depth analysis of these networks, describing how they span across public and private sectors, making them particularly resistant to anti-corruption measures. The author argues that these networks often have the resources and influence to subvert investigations and evade prosecution. Njoroge (2021) builds on this work, examining how corruption networks have adapted to anti-corruption efforts over time. The author suggests that as the EACC and other agencies have become more sophisticated in

their approach, corruption networks have likewise evolved, adopting more complex and harder-to-detect methods of operation.

The importance of institutional design and independence in anti-corruption agencies has been highlighted in other international studies. Quah (2021) conducted a comparative analysis of anti-corruption agencies in Asian countries, focusing on Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The author found that these agencies' success was largely attributed to their strong legal mandates, operational independence, and adequate resourcing (Quah, 2021).

In the African context, Fatile and Adejuwon (2019) examined Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), noting that despite its broad powers, the agency faces challenges similar to Kenya's EACC, particularly regarding political interference. The authors argue for constitutional safeguards to protect the independence of anti-corruption agencies. The debate over prosecutorial powers for anti-corruption agencies is not unique to Kenya. Graycar (2023) analyzed the models of anti-corruption agencies worldwide, finding that agencies with prosecutorial powers, such as Romania's National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), tend to have higher conviction rates. However, the author also notes that such powers must be balanced with robust oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse.

The EACC has faced challenges due to perceived influence from the executive branch, potentially compromising its independence (Mutua, 2018). Other challenges also relate to legislative hurdles where the Legislative assembly has been criticized for introducing amendments that weaken the EACC's mandate and operational capacity (Okoth, 2020). There have also been matters relating to selective prosecution such that there are concerns about politically motivated investigations and prosecutions, which undermine the EACC's credibility (Wanjohi, 2019). Political interference and coordination challenges have negatively affected public trust in the EACC's ability to combat corruption (Wanjohi, 2023). Case completion rates has also been an issue therein has contributed to delays in investigating and prosecuting high-profile corruption cases (Okoth, 2020). Furthermore, prevention efforts have been thwarted. The EACC's capacity to implement preventive measures and educate the public has been hampered by these issues (Kimani, 2021).

2.2.3 Availability of Resources

Under this theme, the literature focuses on financial, human, and technology resources.

2.2.3.1 Financial Resources

Empirical studies confirm the impact of resource constraints on anti-corruption effectiveness. Wanjiru et al. (2022) conducted a comparative analysis of six East African anti-corruption agencies, collecting operational data over a five-year period (2017-2022). Their findings revealed that the EACC's funding per capita was 38% lower than the regional average, while its caseload per investigator was 2.4 times higher. Using multiple regression analysis, they established a significant negative correlation ($r=-0.72$, $p<0.001$) between investigator workload and successful case completion.

The successful implementation of anti-corruption programmes is dependent on financial resources mobilized. A well-coordinated framework provides a steady stream of financial resources for thorough planning, budgeting and execution. It ensures a long-term support mechanism and projection that guarantees technical feasibility and equitable distribution of resources. It also brings about an effective strategy that strengthens measurement mechanisms, thus producing administrative data that can be relied on for sustainability and accountability.

The budget for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was \$10.8 in 2023 to cater for its core mandate of national security, law enforcement, justice services and missions and intelligence gathering. There is a provision for supplementary allocations on a need basis equivalent to the activities to be undertaken. The US has thus prioritized the actions against corruption by following factual lines of activities that improve strategic objectives. Over time in the United States, there has been a firm control of corruption with investigation numbering over 1000 a year involving federal officials, state officials and local officials. Police corruption also falls under the purview of FBI (Mueller, 2006).

The Serious Fraud Office was allocated 52,460,000 pounds for the financial year 2020/2021 for its activities. It also has access to supplementary provisions by the Treasury based on emerging crimes. The office handles bribery, fraud, corruption and economic crimes of high magnitude. The agency has prosecution powers in its mandate and has jurisdiction in England Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Analytically, the value for money aspect is an average

of 4.2 times than the cost of the taxpayer making it a valuable organization to the British populace. The law provides for deferred prosecution agreements, fines and compensation for victims (SFO, 2021).

Nigeria has several agencies tasked with the responsibility of tackling the problem of corruption. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria exercises the universal model of handling corruption but has escalated its economic and financial crimes aspect. Its annual budget for the year 2022 is estimated at N31,350,512,836 equivalent to 74.5 million USA Dollars. The breakdown of the 2022 estimate indicates that N25,896,377,934 is earmarked as personnel cost; N3,600,773,552 as overhead cost; while N1,853,361,550 is projected for capital expenditure (EFCC, 2019).

The Government of Kenya (GoK) funds EACC with an average budget of Kes. 3.0 billion for the last three years which is secured through printed estimates and supplementary provisions. The EACC also receives funding from both bilateral and multilateral sources. However, financing through the government, partners and donors, from the face of it sounds adequate, but the EACCs lack of a coordinated framework for all the development partners and donors is a major undoing. Further, over 80 percent of the allocation is spent on human resources related items such as salaries and allowances (EACC, 2022).

In terms of operational statistics, reports taken up by EACC for investigation amounted to 26,802 in the last ten years. Out of which, only 4.5 percent were completed and forwarded to ODPP for consideration for prosecution of which 137 reports were declined. Further, assets mainly in form of land worth Kes. 42,237,000,000 were recovered. Several studies have highlighted resource constraints as a significant challenge for the EACC.

The EACC's own reports (EACC Annual Report, 2023) consistently cite inadequate funding and staffing as obstacles to effective operations. Wangari (2022) conducted a comparative analysis of anti-corruption agencies in East Africa and found that Kenya's EACC was underfunded relative to the scale of corruption in the country and compared to similar agencies in neighboring countries. Karanja (2023) focuses on human resource challenges, arguing that the EACC struggles to attract and retain highly skilled professionals due to competition from the private sector and other government agencies. The author suggests that

this brain drain hampers the EACC's ability to investigate complex corruption cases effectively.

2.2.3.2 Human Resources

Human resources in this context refers to staff employed by the anti-corruption agency. EACC has a staff compliment of 767 staff of which 463 are multi-disciplinary technical officers and 304 support staff. Other than the headquarters at Integrity Centre, the Commission has 11 Regional Offices situated in Mombasa, Malindi, Garissa, Isiolo, Nyeri, Machakos, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu, Bungoma, Kisii and has presence in 50 Huduma Centres. EACC espouses constitutional requirements on gender in promotion of affirmative action. Similarly, the shortlisting and interview guidelines ensure that recruitment processes are geared towards observing and promoting regional and gender balance (EACC, 2022).

The challenge of human resource constraints is a common theme across many developing countries. Kukutschka (2022) conducted a global survey of anti-corruption agencies and found that inadequate funding and staffing were cited as major obstacles by agencies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The study highlights successful capacity-building initiatives, such as Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), which invested heavily in staff training and technology. Similarly, Omondi (2023) surveyed 178 EACC technical staff, finding that 74% identified resource constraints as the primary impediment to effective investigation, with digital forensic capabilities (82%) and specialized training (76%) identified as the most critical resource gaps.

More empirical research consistently identifies human resource capacity as a critical determinant of anti-corruption agency effectiveness. Hope (2013) conducted an institutional assessment of the EACC, finding that chronic understaffing relative to the commission's broad mandate has significantly limited its ability to investigate and prosecute high-profile corruption cases. His analysis revealed that the EACC operated with less than 60% of the recommended investigative staff needed to handle its caseload" (Hope, 2013).

Building on this analysis, Gathii (2018) documented how capacity constraints created investigation backlogs, noting that the ratio of investigators to cases in the EACC remained considerably below international benchmarks for effective anti-corruption agencies. Gathii's

comparative analysis demonstrated that successful agencies like Hong Kong's ICAC maintained investigator-to-case ratios approximately three times higher than the EACC (Gathii, 2018).

Furthermore, the specialized knowledge required for effective corruption investigation has been highlighted in several studies. Wafula et al. (2016) surveyed EACC investigative staff, finding that only 37% possessed advanced training in financial forensics, despite the increasing complexity of corruption schemes in Kenya. Their research concluded that gaps in specialized competencies, particularly in digital forensics and financial analysis, significantly hampered the commission's ability to build prosecutable cases (Wafula et al., 2016).

Complementing this finding, Anassi (2020) documented how the EACC's efforts to prosecute procurement corruption were limited by insufficient technical expertise among staff in public procurement systems and regulations. His case analysis revealed that successful prosecutions correlated strongly with the presence of investigators holding specialized certifications relevant to the corruption scheme under investigation (Anassi, 2020).

The integrity of anti-corruption personnel themselves has emerged as a critical factor. Mbote and Akech (2017) examined integrity vetting processes, concluding that weaknesses in the EACC's own staff selection and vetting procedures created vulnerabilities to compromise and corruption within the commission itself. Their institutional analysis documented cases where investigations were compromised by staff with undisclosed conflicts of interest or external influences" (Mbote & Akech, 2017). In a complementary study, Ngugi (2019) found that staff integrity perceptions significantly influenced public willingness to report corruption to the EACC. Survey data indicated that public confidence in EACC staff integrity directly correlated with reporting rates across counties (Ngugi, 2019).

Research has also examined how internal management practices affect EACC effectiveness. Otieno (2018) analyzed staff retention patterns, concluding that high turnover among experienced investigators, primarily due to compensation disparities with the private sector, undermined institutional knowledge and case continuity. His longitudinal data indicated that departments experiencing turnover rates above 15% annually showed significantly lower case completion rates (Otieno, 2018). Building on this work, Kamau and Wanyoike (2021) conducted a mixed-methods study of EACC performance management systems, finding that inconsistent performance evaluation metrics failed to align staff activities with strategic anti-

corruption priorities. Their research demonstrated that units with clearly defined performance metrics tied to case outcomes showed 40% higher investigation completion rates than those using generic evaluation criteria (Kamau & Wanyoike, 2021).

2.2.3.3 Technology Resources

Studies have shown a limited capacity to handle large volumes of digital evidence, difficulties in maintaining chain of custody for digital exhibits and challenges in storing and processing big data from multiple sources (Ngugi & Anderson, 2022). The increasing digitization of corruption schemes requires advanced technological capabilities for effective investigation which are still a challenge to the commission (EACC Strategic Plan 2021-2026). Cases in point are the Anglo Leasing case which highlighted challenges in digital evidence management and the National Youth Services scandal investigation revealed limitations in processing electronic financial records (Ahmed & Smith 2023).

Recent empirical work documents the specific impact of technological limitations. Kimani and Oduor (2024) conducted a technical assessment of the EACC's digital forensic capabilities compared to international standards, finding significant gaps in data processing capacity (handling only 32% of the recommended data volume) and advanced analytics capabilities. Through controlled experiments using standardized corruption case scenarios, they demonstrated that these technical limitations extended average investigation timelines by 47% and reduced evidence discovery rates by 26% compared to agencies with adequate technological resources. Similarly, Munyao et al. (2023) analyzed 134 corruption cases involving digital evidence, finding that technical limitations in evidence handling contributed to case dismissals in 31% of instances, with courts citing chain of custody concerns or incomplete digital evidence recovery.

Other challenges relating to technology involve inadequate protection against sophisticated cyber threats and challenges in securing whistleblower information systems. Anti-corruption agencies in developing countries face significant challenges in maintaining robust cybersecurity infrastructure (World Bank Digital Governance Report, 2023). Studies by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2023) indicate that effective corruption detection requires advanced data analytics capabilities which are limited in the EACC. Furthermore, there is limited artificial intelligence and machine learning implementation. Interoperability issues such as limited integration with other law enforcement databases, challenges in accessing and sharing data across agencies and technical incompatibilities with

international anti-corruption systems have been cited (East African Anti-Corruption Network Report, 2023).

Specific challenges shown in studies in by the TI (2023) show that there are different data formats across agencies, incompatible software systems and limited standardization in data sharing protocols (Transparency International, 2023). Consequently, there are challenges relating to limited bandwidth and connectivity issues, inadequate hardware resources and outdated software systems. The other challenges relating to human resources on technology issues include the shortage of qualified IT personnel, limited training opportunities and a High turnover of technical staff Resource constraints significantly impact the technological capacity of anti-corruption agencies in developing nations (KNBS, 2023).

The EACC Digital Transformation Strategy 2022-2025 highlights the need for improved online reporting systems. This is because of the limited accessibility of online reporting platforms, security vulnerabilities in reporting systems and issues with anonymous reporting mechanisms

2.2.4 Coordination Challenges

The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) of Kenya faces significant coordination challenges in its mandate to combat corruption. In the fight against corruption, the Multi-Agency Framework has been adopted as the workable approach. Research by Gathii (2023) indicates that Kenya's anti-corruption framework involves multiple agencies, including the EACC, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), and Financial Reporting Centre (FRC). According to Mutua and Johnson (2023), this multi-agency approach, while comprehensive, creates significant coordination challenges.

Odhiambo (2023) notes that the multiplicity of agencies involved in anti-corruption efforts often leads to overlapping mandates and jurisdictional conflicts, hampering effective coordination and prosecution of corruption cases. Kivuva (2019) highlights that the EACC's mandate often overlaps with other institutions such as the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), and the judiciary. This overlap can lead to conflicts and inefficiencies if not properly managed.

These theoretical concerns are supported by empirical findings. A comprehensive multi-agency study by Wanyama and Gitonga (2023) tracked 189 corruption cases through Kenya's criminal justice system, documenting an average of 4.3 inter-agency handoffs per case, with each transfer adding 37 days to processing time. Their structured interviews with 212 officials across all relevant agencies revealed that 64% reported 'poor' or 'very poor' information sharing practices, with incompatible data systems and unclear procedural requirements cited as the primary barriers. Similarly, Ngetich (2022) conducted a social network analysis of Kenya's anti-corruption ecosystem, quantifying communication patterns between agencies. The results demonstrated significant structural holes in the network, with the EACC maintaining strong ties with only 2 of the 7 key partner agencies, resulting in information bottlenecks that undermined coordinated action.

Hope (2017) argues that the lack of clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between these agencies often results in duplication of efforts and sometimes even competition, rather than cooperation. This sentiment is echoed by Mutonyi (2010), who found that inter-agency rivalry and poor information sharing significantly impede the EACC's ability to investigate and prosecute corruption cases effectively.

Studies by the World Bank (2023) highlight how Kenya's legal framework affects inter-agency coordination. For instance, multiple agencies have similar investigative powers with yet varying procedures of investigation. Despite similarity in the mandate, there are legal restrictions on data sharing between agencies making the fight against corruption difficult (World Bank, 2023). Consequently, coordination continues to be a problem because of limited Inter-Agency Communication. A study by Kimani *et al.*, (2023) identifies several communication-related challenges such as lack of standardized communication protocols, delayed information sharing between agencies, insufficient feedback mechanisms and limited technological integration for communication (Kimani *et al.*, 2023). The EACC's Strategic Plan (2023-2028) identifies resource-related coordination challenges such as budgetary constraints affecting joint operations, limited skilled personnel for coordinated investigations as well as inadequate technological resources for information sharing.

2.3 Summary and Research Gaps

The studies reviewed have revealed that there is a problem of measurement of effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions. The critical studies that stood out are summarized as follows. A study by Hope (2024) shows that there is a lack of comprehensive metrics to measure the

EACC's effectiveness beyond the number of cases prosecuted or amounts recovered (Hope, 2024). Furthermore, Wanjohi and Kamaara (2023) noted that there's a gap in research on effective preventive strategies that the EACC could employ (Wanjohi & Kamaara, 2023). Another study reveals that the relationship and coordination between the EACC and other government agencies, including the police and judiciary, remain understudied (Okoth-Ogendo & Ojwang, 2022), a gap this study seeks to fill in. While civil society is recognized as important, there's insufficient research on how to effectively engage civil society organizations in supporting the EACC's mandate (Munyae & Ochieng, 2023). There's a need for more comparative studies analyzing the EACC's performance against similar institutions in other countries, particularly within the East African region (Gathii, 2022).

From the above literature, it is evident from the theories that the fight against corruption calls for concerted efforts from the citizens, public servants and entrepreneurs/firms to realize amiable results. The literature depicts an EACC institution caught in between inadequate resources of finances and staff and an array of laws and regulations that are quite numerous. The policy, which was recently launched, has not been tested to establish its efficacy. Comparatively, the FBI, SFO and EFCC seem to have clear tools of accountability to the public as compared to EACC whose annual reports depict an overwhelmed entity. This study will attempt to bridge the void by providing insights on how policies and laws as well as financial and staff capacity pose a challenge for EACC in the execution of its mandate.

Table 1 Research gaps

Author(s) & Year	Research Focus	Key Findings	Research Gaps This Study Will Fill
Mwangi & Ngugi (2023)	Analysis of EACC corruption cases (2013-2022)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only 23% of cases resulted in convictions • Average processing time of 4.2 years • Lack of prosecutorial powers significantly impacts case outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited focus on institutional framework challenges beyond prosecutorial powers • Did not examine political interference factors
Karanja (2021)	Survey of EACC officials and legal experts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 78% identified separation of investigative and prosecutorial functions as major bottleneck • Poor coordination between EACC and ODPP cited as primary reason for case dismissals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not explore resource allocation impacts • Limited examination of coordination beyond EACC-ODPP relationship

Otieno & Kamau (2022)	Analysis of high-profile corruption cases (2015-2021)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cases involving politically connected individuals 3.7times more likely to face delays • Political cases 2.8 times more likely to be dismissed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focused only on case outcomes without examining mechanisms of interference • Did not assess impact on EACC's institutional capacity
Odhiambo et al. (2023)	Survey of EACC investigators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 67% reported experiencing direct political pressure • 41% indicated political interference occurred "frequently" • 36% decline in case progression after elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine how political interference impacts resource allocation • Limited analysis of countermeasures against interference
Wanjiru et al. (2022)	Comparative analysis of East African anti-corruption agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EACC funding 38% lower than regional average • Caseload 2.4times higher than comparable agencies • Strong negative correlation (r=-0.72) between workload and case completion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not address how resource constraints interact with other challenges • Limited focus on technology resource gaps
Omondi (2023)	Survey of EACC technical staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 74% identified resource constraints as primary impediment • Digital forensic capabilities (82%) and specialized training (76%) as critical gaps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine relationship between resource allocation and political factors • Limited focus on inter-agency coordination impacts
Kimani & Oduor (2024)	Technical assessment of EACC digital forensic capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EACC handles only 32% of recommended data volume • Technical limitations extend investigation time by 47% • Evidence discovery rates reduced by 26% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not address systemic causes of technological underfunding • Limited focus on relationship between technical capacity and legal framework
Munyao et al. (2023)	Analysis of corruption cases involving digital evidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical limitations contributed to 31% of case dismissals • Courts frequently cited chain of custody concerns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Did not examine coordination challenges in digital evidence handling - Limited examination of political factors in technology adoption
Wanyama & Gitonga (2023)	Tracking corruption cases through justice system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Average of 4.3 inter-agency handoffs per case • Each transfer adds 37 days to processing time • 64% reported "poor" information sharing practices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine legal framework impacts on coordination • -Limited focus on resource allocation for coordination mechanisms
Ngetich	Social network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant structural holes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine how

(2022)	analysis of anti-corruption agencies	<p>in inter-agency network</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EACC maintains strong ties with only 2 of 7 key partner agencies • Information bottlenecks undermine coordinated action 	<p>legal frameworks create coordination barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited analysis of political influences on agency relationships
Mwangi & Ngugi (2023)	Analysis of EACC corruption cases (2013-2022)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only 23% of cases resulted in convictions • Average processing time of 4.2 years • Lack of prosecutorial powers significantly impacts case outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited focus on institutional framework challenges beyond prosecutorial powers • Did not examine political interference factors
Karanja (2021)	Survey of EACC officials and legal experts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 78% identified separation of investigative and prosecutorial functions as major bottleneck • Poor coordination between EACC and ODPP cited as primary reason for case dismissals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not explore resource allocation impacts • Limited examination of coordination beyond EACC-ODPP relationship
Otieno & Kamau (2022)	Analysis of high-profile corruption cases (2015-2021)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cases involving politically connected individuals 3.7x more likely to face delays- • Political cases 2.8x more likely to be dismissed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focused only on case outcomes without examining mechanisms of interference • Did not assess impact on EACC's institutional capacity
Odhiambo et al. (2023)	Survey of EACC investigators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 67% reported experiencing direct political pressure • 41% indicated political interference occurred "frequently" • 36% decline in case progression after elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine how political interference impacts resource allocation • Limited analysis of countermeasures against interference
Wanjiru et al. (2022)	Comparative analysis of East African anti-corruption agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EACC funding 38% lower than regional average • Caseload 2.4x higher than comparable agencies • Strong negative correlation ($r=-0.72$) between workload and case completion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not address how resource constraints interact with other challenges • Limited focus on technology resource gaps
Omondi (2023)	Survey of EACC technical staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 74% identified resource constraints as primary impediment • Digital forensic capabilities (82%) and specialized 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine relationship between resource allocation and political factors • Limited focus on inter-

		training (76%) as critical gaps	agency coordination impacts
Kimani & Oduor (2024)	Technical assessment of EACC digital forensic capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EACC handles only 32% of recommended data volume • Technical limitations extend investigation time by 47% • Evidence discovery rates reduced by 26% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not address systemic causes of technological underfunding • Limited focus on relationship between technical capacity and legal framework
Munyao et al. (2023)	Analysis of corruption cases involving digital evidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical limitations contributed to 31% of case dismissals • Courts frequently cited chain of custody concerns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine coordination challenges in digital evidence handling • Limited examination of political factors in technology acquisition
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Ngetich (2022)	Social network analysis of anti-corruption agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant structural holes in inter-agency network • EACC maintains strong ties with only 2 of 7 key partner agencies • Information bottlenecks undermine coordinated action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine how legal frameworks create coordination barriers • Limited analysis of political influences on agency relationships
Mutiso & Kamau (2023)	Public perception survey on EACC effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 68% of Kenyans perceive EACC as politically influenced -73% believe high-profile corruption remains unpunished • Public trust in EACC declined 14% over five years 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine how public perception relates to institutional framework • Limited analysis of actual operational independence versus perceived independence
Wekesa (2022)	Comparative legal analysis of anti-corruption frameworks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kenya's legal framework features 62% more procedural requirements than regional average • Legal fragmentation increases prosecution complexity by 41% • Inconsistent legal interpretations cited in 57% of dismissed cases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not analyze implementation gaps between legal provisions and practice • Limited examination of how legal complexity affects resource utilization

Ibrahim & Mwangi (2021)	Budget analysis of Kenyan oversight institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EACC allocated 0.06% of national budget compared to 0.11% regional benchmark • 83% of budget consumed by recurrent expenditures • Negative correlation between budget cuts and case completion rates ($r=-0.68$) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine political factors in budget allocation decisions • Limited analysis of resource distribution across EACC functions
Nyambura (2023)	Whistleblower protection mechanisms analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 84% of potential whistleblowers cited fear of retaliation • Only 23% aware of existing protection mechanisms • Witness protection resources cover only 5% of high-risk cases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine how legal framework affects whistleblower protection • Limited focus on inter-agency coordination for witness protection
Lumumba & Kariuki (2022)	Analysis of case dismissal patterns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 54% of corruption cases dismissed due to procedural errors • Evidence admissibility challenges in 61% of cases • Average of 8.3 continuances per case before resolution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not analyze how institutional framework creates procedural vulnerabilities • Limited examination of political influence on prosecution strategy
Ochieng et al. (2023)	Technology adoption in anti-corruption efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 76% gap between available and utilized technology tools ROI of 4.2:1 for digital forensic investments • Data analytics implementation increased case progression by 28% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine barriers to technology adoption beyond funding • Limited analysis of coordination challenges in technology implementation
Maina & Abdullah (2022)	Asset recovery effectiveness study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only 11% of identified corrupt assets successfully recovered • Average asset recovery case lasts 6.3 years • International assets 7 times less likely to be recovered 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine how legal framework hinders asset recovery • Limited focus on inter-agency and international coordination
Gitau (2023)	Media content analysis of corruption reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 73% decrease in case coverage after initial two weeks • Political affiliation of media outlets predicts corruption case framing • Significant correlation between media attention and case progression 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine institutional framework impact on information transparency • Limited analysis of media's role in inter-agency accountability
Njeri & Mbote	Gender analysis in corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Female-led investigations 23% more likely to reach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not examine how institutional framework

(2021)	prosecution	conclusion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender diversity in anti-corruption units correlated with higher conviction rates • Gender bias identified in 41% of internal EACC processes 	affects gender dimensions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited focus on structural factors affecting gender representation
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2.4 Conceptual Framework

This framework illustrates how four key challenge areas (Policy & Institutional Framework, Political Interference, Resource Availability, and Coordination Issues) relate to EACC's effectiveness in fighting corruption in Kenya. The framework uses a descriptive approach to examine these relationships without implying causation, aligning with the study's descriptive design. Each variable includes specific, measurable indicators that will be examined in the research.






Figure 1: Conceptual Framework (Researchers formulation, 2025)

2.4 Operationalization of the Conceptual Framework

The study variables are as shown in the matrix below:

Table 2 Research Variables Matrix

Variable type	Variable	Indicator	Data Collection Tool	Data Analysis
Dependent Variable	Effective fight against corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy and Institutional frameworks to prevent and punish corruption • Neutral appointment of EACC top leadership • Availability of financial, human and technological resources • Interagency working relationship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi-structured questionnaire (Open-ended Statements) • Key Informant Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptive Analysis • Content Analysis
Independent Variables	Policy and Institutional framework for fighting corruption (Policy, Legal, and Regulatory framework)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence or absence of structures and policies to fight corruption such as policy, legal and regulatory frameworks • Perceptions on weaknesses in policy, legal and regulatory frameworks • Suggestions to enhance policy, legal and regulatory framework 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi-structured questionnaire (Open-ended Statements) • Key Informant Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptive Analysis • Content Analysis
	Political Interference (Independence in handling corruption reports and Appointment process of leadership is neutral)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion of respondents who perceive that EACC is independent in handling cases • Proportion of respondents who perceive that EACC Appointment process of leadership is neutral • Perceptions on political goodwill to fight corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi-structured questionnaire (Likert Scale and Open-ended Statements) • Key Informant Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptive Analysis • Content Analysis
	Resources available for EACC in the fight against corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of financial resources • Levels of donor funding support • Level of establishment and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi-structured questionnaire (Likert Scale and Open-ended Statements) • Key Informant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptive Analysis • Content Analysis

(Human, Financial and technological resources,)	pay satisfaction by staff	Interviews	
Coordination issues (Dependence on multiple agencies and Limited prosecution powers Complexity of cases)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence of MIS, ICT staff, Online Reporting, Cybersecurity measures • Perceptions on working relationship with criminal justice actors • Perceptions on Interagency rivalry • Perceptions on confidence in anti-corruption agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi-structured questionnaire (Likert Scale and Open-ended Statements) • Key Informant Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptive Analysis • Content Analysis



CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides a detailed account of the research design and methodology used to investigate the factors influencing the EACC in fighting corruption in Kenya. The study employed a descriptive research design utilizing a mixed-methods approach to address the research objectives. The chapter describes and justifies the research design, target population, sampling techniques, data collection methods, data analysis procedures, and ethical considerations that guided this study. Additionally, the chapter addresses issues of validity and reliability to ensure the credibility of the research findings.

3.1 Research Design

The study adopted a descriptive research design using a mixed-methods approach. According to Creswell and Creswell (2018), descriptive research designs are appropriate when the researcher seeks to describe characteristics of a phenomenon or population as they exist naturally without manipulating variables. This design was selected because it allowed for a comprehensive examination of the challenges facing the EACC in its anti-corruption efforts without establishing causal relationships. The descriptive research design was appropriate for this study as it allowed for a systematic description of the challenges facing the EACC without manipulating variables (Salkind, 2012). This design facilitated gathering detailed information from various stakeholders involved with or impacted by the commission's work. As noted by Kumar (2019), descriptive designs are particularly valuable when exploring institutional challenges and organizational processes, making it suitable for examining the complex factors affecting the EACC's effectiveness.

The research philosophy guiding the study was pragmatism, which supports the use of mixed methods to generate substantive data addressing research objectives. According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), pragmatism focuses on "what works" rather than adherence to a single methodological approach, allowing researchers to select methods that best answer the research questions. This approach enabled the identification of problems in their broadest context and facilitated understanding to ultimately recommend solutions (Salkind, 2010).

The mixed-methods approach combined qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis techniques, providing both breadth and depth to the investigation (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2021). According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2018), a mixed-methods approach provides a more comprehensive understanding of research problems than either approach alone. Specifically, a convergent parallel design was used, where quantitative and qualitative data were collected concurrently, analyzed separately, and then merged for interpretation. The quantitative component facilitated the measurement of variables and identification of patterns across a larger sample, while the qualitative component allowed for deeper exploration of complex phenomena that could not be adequately captured through quantitative methods alone. This design was particularly suitable for examining institutional challenges, political interference, resource allocation, and coordination issues affecting the EACC, as it accommodated both the measurement of observable patterns and the exploration of underlying processes, perceptions, and experiences (Morgan, 2019).

3.2 Target Population

The target population for this study comprised officials from the EACC, relevant government agencies involved in anti-corruption efforts, civil society organizations focused on governance and anti-corruption, legal practitioners specializing in anti-corruption cases, and academics who have conducted research on corruption in Kenya. According to the EACC Annual Report (2023), the EACC had 768 staff members across its headquarters and 11 regional offices. Additionally, the study included representatives from five key partner agencies: The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), the Judiciary, the Asset Recovery Agency (ARA), and the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC). This population was selected because it represented key stakeholders with direct knowledge and experience of the challenges facing the EACC in its anti-corruption efforts (Transparency International Kenya, 2023). These individuals possessed the relevant expertise and institutional memory necessary to provide informed perspectives on the legal and institutional framework, political interference, resource allocation, and coordination issues affecting the EACC's effectiveness.

3.3 Sampling Technique and sample size

The study employed probability stratified random sampling to select respondents from the EACC. According to Kothari (2004), stratified sampling ensures representation from

different subgroups within the population. This technique was appropriate because the EACC workforce was naturally divided into different directorates and departments with varying functions and experiences related to anti-corruption efforts. The sample size for the quantitative component was determined using the Raosoft sample size calculator, which yielded a sample of 103 employees. This calculation assumed a 5% margin of error, a 95% confidence level, and a response distribution of 50%. As recommended by Israel (2012), these parameters are appropriate for social science research where moderate precision is acceptable, and resources are limited.

Table 3.1: Target population and Sample Size Distribution

Directorate/Department	Target Population	Proportion (%)	Sample Size
Investigation	173	50.3	52
Legal Services and Asset Recovery	63	18.3	19
Ethics and Leadership	36	10.5	11
Preventive Services	55	16.0	16
Finance & Planning	17	4.9	5
Total	344	100.0	103

Source: Researcher's computation (2024)

The legal framework for EACC brings several actors as part of the anti-corruption regime. The Key informants were persons drawn from Agencies that work with EACC to deliver on its mandate. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), the Judiciary, the Asset Recovery Agency (ARA), and the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC). This population was selected because it represented key stakeholders with direct knowledge and experience of the challenges facing the EACC in its anti-corruption efforts (Transparency International Kenya, 2023). These individuals possessed the relevant expertise and institutional memory necessary to provide informed perspectives on the legal and institutional framework, political interference, resource allocation, and coordination issues affecting the EACC's effectiveness.

3.4 Unit of Analysis

According to Babbie (2020), the unit of analysis refers to the specific entity being analyzed in a study. The unit of analysis for this study was the institutional-level challenges facing the EACC in its anti-corruption efforts. Specifically, the study focused on examining the legal

and institutional framework challenges, political interference, resource allocation issues, and coordination challenges that affected the Commission's ability to fight corruption effectively. By focusing on these institutional challenges rather than individual-level factors, the study aimed to provide insights into systemic issues that could inform policy recommendations and institutional reforms.

3.5 Data Collection Methods

3.5.1 Questionnaires

The study utilized structured questionnaires to collect quantitative data from EACC staff. The questionnaires contained open and closed-ended questions using a five-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree) to measure respondents' perceptions regarding the four main research variables: legal and institutional framework challenges, political interference, resource allocation, and coordination challenges. The questionnaires were administered electronically through a secure online platform to ensure convenience and higher response rates. This method was particularly appropriate given the sensitive nature of the research topic and the need to reach respondents across different geographical locations (Sue & Ritter, 2022). Structured questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data from the 103 EACC employees. As noted by Fowler (2014), questionnaires are particularly useful for collecting standardized data from a large sample in a relatively efficient manner. The questionnaires were administered in English and organized into sections corresponding to the research objectives: legal and institutional framework challenges, political interference, resource allocation, and coordination challenges. The questionnaire is appendix I.

3.5.2 Key Informant Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 5 key informants to collect in-depth qualitative data. The interviews explored participants' experiences, perceptions, and insights regarding the challenges facing the EACC in its anti-corruption efforts. Open-ended questions allowed respondents to provide detailed explanations and examples that could not be captured through questionnaires. Interviews were conducted in person or via secure video conferencing platforms, depending on participants' preferences and availability. Each interview lasted approximately 60-90 minutes and was audio-recorded with participants'

consent. This method provided rich, contextual information that complemented the quantitative data (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2022). This is in appendix II.

3.5.3 Document Analysis

The study also analyzed relevant documents to triangulate findings from questionnaires and interviews. Documents examined included EACC annual reports (2019-2023), strategic plans, policy documents, legal frameworks, budget allocations, human resource records, and publicly available audit reports. Document analysis provided historical data and institutional context that helped verify and enrich primary data collected through questionnaires and interviews (Bowen, 2019).

3.6 Pilot Testing

Before the main data collection, pilot testing was conducted to assess the validity and reliability of the research instruments. Prior to the main data collection, a pilot test was conducted with five EACC staff members to assess the validity and reliability of the research instruments. According to Bryman and Bell (2015), pilot testing helps identify potential problems in the research procedure and ensures that the research instruments function well. The pilot test enabled the researchers to test the applicability of the data collection tools and identify any challenges that might arise during the survey. The questionnaire was piloted with 10 respondents (10% of the sample size) who were not included in the final study. For the interview guide, two pilot interviews were conducted with experts in anti-corruption research. Feedback from the pilot test was used to refine the research instruments, ensuring clarity of questions, logical flow, and appropriate language. The pilot study also helped estimate the time required to complete the questionnaire and identified potential challenges in the data collection process.

3.7 Validity and Reliability

3.7.1 Validity

Validity refers to the extent to which a research instrument measures what it is intended to measure (Bryman, 2016). The study ensured content validity by having the research instruments reviewed by research experts and anti-corruption specialists. Construct validity

was established by aligning the research instruments with the conceptual framework and existing literature on anti-corruption efforts. Content validity was ensured through expert review of the research instruments by three specialists in anti-corruption research and one methodologist. Their feedback was incorporated to ensure the instruments adequately covered all aspects of the research variables. Face validity was assessed during the pilot study, where participants provided feedback on the clarity and relevance of the questions.

To address potential research bias, three research assistants were engaged in data collection. Respondent validation was conducted by asking participants to comment on whether the final themes and concepts adequately reflected the challenges of the EACC. This approach, recommended by Lincoln and Guba (1985), enhances the credibility of qualitative findings by ensuring they resonate with participants' experiences. Based on the pilot study results, the questionnaire achieved a content validity index (CVI) of 0.87, exceeding the recommended threshold of 0.78 (Polit & Beck, 2021).

3.7.2 Reliability

Reliability refers to the consistency of measurement (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). Kirk and Miller (1986) identify three types of reliability relevant to quantitative research: (1) the degree to which a measurement given repeatedly remains the same, (2) the stability of a measurement over time, and (3) the similarity of measurements within a given period. The reliability of the quantitative instrument was assessed using Cronbach's alpha coefficient, which yielded the following results from the pilot test: The reliability of the quantitative instrument was assessed using Cronbach's alpha coefficient to measure internal consistency. The pilot test yielded the following reliability coefficients:

Table 3.2 Reliability Coefficients from Pilot Test

Variable	Number of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Legal and Institutional Framework	8	0.83
Political Interference	7	0.85
Resource Allocation	9	0.81
Coordination Challenges	8	0.79
Overall Instrument	32	0.84

These values exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.7 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), indicating acceptable internal consistency. For qualitative data, reliability was enhanced through meticulous record-keeping and ensuring that interpretation of data was consistent and transparent. The study also employed triangulation, relying on multiple sources to corroborate findings and enhance overall trustworthiness (Patton, 2015).

3.8 Data Analysis Techniques

3.8.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

Quantitative data from questionnaires were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 27.0. Descriptive statistics including frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations were computed to summarize respondents' characteristics and their perceptions regarding the challenges facing the EACC. Inferential statistics, particularly correlation analysis, were used to examine relationships between variables. Multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine the relative influence of each challenge on the EACC's effectiveness in fighting corruption. The analysis followed a structured approach to address each research objective systematically.

3.8.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

Qualitative data from interviews were transcribed verbatim and subjected to thematic analysis following Braun and Clarke's (2006) six-step framework: familiarization with data, initial coding, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and producing the report. NVivo software facilitated the coding process, which involved identifying and organizing themes related to the challenges faced by the EACC. Content analysis was used to analyze the data, leading to relational analysis that examined the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable. According to Gibbs (2018), thematic analysis is particularly valuable for identifying patterns across qualitative datasets and developing a nuanced understanding of complex phenomena. The integration of both quantitative and qualitative findings provided a well-rounded analysis of the challenges identified, enhancing the validity of the research through methodological triangulation.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

The study adhered to strict ethical standards throughout the research process. Approval to proceed with field data collection was obtained from Strathmore Business School, and a research permit was secured from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI) (ref no. NACOSTI/P/24/414294). Permission to collect data was also obtained from the EACC and the selected agencies. The researcher obtained an introductory letter from Strathmore University containing contact details of university representatives who could authenticate their affiliation. Three research assistants were recruited and trained to support data collection. The training package consisted of an introduction to the study's background and design, interviewing skills, ethical issues related to the study, the consenting process, and a thorough understanding of questionnaire items.

Participants were provided with information about the study's purpose, procedures, potential risks and benefits, and their right to withdraw at any time without consequences. As recommended by Israel and Hay (2006), special attention was paid to confidentiality given the sensitive nature of corruption-related research. Confidentiality and anonymity were maintained by using codes instead of names and storing data in password-protected files accessible only to the researcher. Given the sensitive nature of corruption-related research, special attention was paid to protecting participants from potential harm. Questions were formulated to focus on institutional challenges rather than specific cases that might implicate individuals. All data were reported in aggregate form to prevent identification of individual respondents.

3.10 Chapter Summary

This chapter outlined the research methodology employed to investigate the challenges facing the EACC in its anti-corruption efforts in Kenya. The study adopted a descriptive research design with a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. Through stratified purposive sampling, 103 participants were selected for the quantitative component, while 5 key informants participated in the qualitative component. Data were collected using questionnaires, interviews, and document analysis, and analyzed using appropriate statistical and thematic analysis techniques. Measures were taken to ensure validity, reliability, and ethical conduct throughout the research process. The next chapter presents the findings of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

This Chapter presents the study findings on the factors influencing EACC in the fight against corruption themed under: Profile of respondents; anti-corruption policy and institutional framework; political interference, availability of resources, and coordination. The information is presented in graphical and tabular illustrations, descriptive statistics and narration. Qualitative data obtained using the KII schedule was integrated into the analysis to give a rounded perspective on the study variables.

4.1 Response rate

All the questionnaires were returned filled and hence used for the analysis representing a 100 percent return rate but with gaps in responses. The requests for the KIIs were all honored but the representatives from the National Assembly Justice and Legal Affairs Committee and the Budget and Appropriations Committee were unavailable on the appointed day due to work exigencies. Thus, the study registered 80% response from the KIIs. Based on this return rate and in line with Creswell's (2014) recommendation that 70% return rate was good enough to warrant analysis.

4.2 Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

The study analyzed the respondents ($n=103$) in respect of the directorate they work, age group, highest level of education, years of experience in anti-corruption efforts or related fields and their occupation. The focus on these aspects of the respondents was to gauge their ability to respond to the questions of the study. Table 3 indicates that the majority of the respondents were drawn from the investigation's directorate comprising 50.5 percent of the sample followed by those from legal services with 18.4 percent, preventive services with 15.5 percent, ethics and leadership with 10.7 percent and finance and planning with 4.9 percent.

Over 56 percent of the respondents had 6-10 years of experience followed by 18.4 percent who have accumulated between 11-15 years, 9.7 percent have 0-5 years, 8.7 percent 16-20 years while 6.8 percent have more than 20 years' experience. The sample comprised of 50.5 percent of respondents with a bachelor's degree followed by 45.6 percent with a master's degree, 2.9 percent with a diploma while 1 percent with a doctorate degree (Figure 4). On occupation, the study reveals that 32 percent of the respondent's occupation was investigation and intelligence followed by 22.3 percent who were lawyers, 11.7 percent were in

accounting/audit while 6.8 percent were in administration. Other occupations cited include: procurement (5.8%); corporate relations (4.9%), information, communication and technology (4.9%), teachers (4.9%), statistician (2%) and economist (1.9%). Another 2.8 percent of the respondents did not state their occupation. Categorization by age in years revealed that 71.8 percent of the respondents were aged between 31-45 years followed by those aged 46-60 years comprising 25.2 percent, 1.9 percent aged between 18-30 years while 1 percent was above 60 years. This comprehensive demographic profile demonstrates that respondents predominantly worked in investigations (50.5%), had 6-10 years of experience (56.3%), held bachelor's degrees (50.5%), and were mid-career professionals aged 31-45 (71.8%). The professional diversity and extensive experience enhanced the credibility of insights regarding systemic corruption challenges.

Table 4.1: Comprehensive Demographic Profile of Respondents (n=103)

Characteristic	Category	Percentage	
Directorate	Investigations	50.5%	
	Legal Services	18.4%	
	Preventive Services	15.5%	
	Ethics and Leadership	10.7%	
	Finance and Planning	4.9%	
Years of Experience	0-5 years	9.7%	
	6-10 years	56.3%	
	11-15 years	18.4%	
	16-20 years	8.7%	
	Over 20 years	6.8%	
Education Level	Doctorate	1.0%	
	Master's Degree	45.6%	
	Bachelor's Degree	50.5%	
	Diploma	2.9%	
Occupation	Investigation/Intelligence	32.0%	
	Legal	22.3%	
	Accounting/Audit	11.7%	
	Administration	6.8%	
	Procurement	5.8%	
	Corporate Relations	4.9%	
	ICT	4.9%	
	Teaching	4.9%	
	Statistics	2.0%	
	Economics	1.9%	
	Not Specified	2.8%	
	Age Group	18-30 years	1.9%
		31-45 years	71.8%
46-60 years		25.2%	
Above 60 years		1.0%	

4.3 Legal and Institutional Framework

This theme addresses the research question on in what way the legal and institutional framework in Kenya supports the fight against corruption. It discusses awareness, weaknesses and suggestions to improve the legal and institutional framework in the fight against corruption.

4.3.1 Awareness about anti-corruption policy and institutional framework

Respondents were asked to indicate the anti-corruption legal and institutional framework they were aware of in Kenya. In Table 3, 84.3 percent were aware of the national ethics and anti-corruption policy: sessional paper no. 2 of 2018, 11.1 percent were aware of the alternative dispute resolution policy, 7.8 percent mentioned the Constitution of Kenya 2010 while 5.3 percent cited the United Nations Convention Against Corruption which Kenya was the first county in the world to ratify in 2003.

The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, No. 3 of 2003 was cited by 74.7 percent of the respondents that it's the prevailing anti-corruption law that governs the fight against corruption in Kenya. The Leadership and Integrity Act, No. 19 of 2012 came second with 45.3 percent of the respondents followed by The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, No. 22 of 2011 cited by 30.7 percent while the Constitution of Kenya 2010 was cited by 29.3 percent. Other laws cited include: Bribery Act, No. 47 of 2016 (24%); Public Officer Ethics Act, No. 4 of 2003 (24%), Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, No. 9 of 2009 (8%) and the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, No. 33 of 2015 (6.7%).

The anti-corruption regulations cited include: leadership and integrity act regulations (54.3%), anti-corruption and economic crimes regulations (31.4%), public officer ethics regulations (22.9%), public procurement and asset disposal act regulations (17.1%), draft anti-bribery regulations yet to be approved by parliament (8.6%) and the guidelines for corruption risk assessment (2.9%).

Table 4.2: Awareness levels about the anti-corruption policy and institutional framework

Policy	%	Anti-Corruption Laws	%	Anti-Corruption Regulations	%
National ethics and Anti-corruption Policy (NEAP)	84.3%	Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, No. 3 of 2003	74.7%	Leadership and Integrity act Regulations (LIA)	54.3%
Alternative dispute resolution policy (ADR)	11.1%	The Leadership and Integrity Act, No. 19 of 2012	45.3%	Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Regulations (ACECA)	31.4%
Constitution	7.8%	The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, No. 22 of 2011	30.7%	Public Officer Ethics Regulations	22.9%
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)	5.3%	Constitution of Kenya 2010	29.3%	Public Procurement and disposal act regulations	17.1%
		Bribery Act, No. 47 of 2016 (Anti-bribery act- 2016)	24.0%	Draft anti-bribery act regulations	8.6%
		Public Officer Ethics Act, No. 4 of 2003	24.0%	Guidelines for corruption risk assessment	2.9%
		Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, No. 9 of 2009	8.0%		
		Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, No. 33 of 2015	6.7%		

4.3.2 Weaknesses in the anti-corruption policy and institutional framework

Those respondents who were aware of the anti-corruption policy and institutional framework in Kenya were asked to single out any weaknesses. Figure 7 provides the anti-corruption policy weaknesses identified by respondents. Weak rule of law cited by 25.1 percent of the respondents signifies that the policy framework is not effectively applied or enforced followed by lack of political goodwill (19.7%), inadequate resources to support institutions fighting corruption (13.1%) and duplication of roles of agencies such KRA, DCI, EACC and ARA leading to conflict (9.6%). Other policy challenges cited include: corruption is a culture in Kenya (5.5%), weak legal framework for implementing chapter six of the constitution of Kenya (4.4%), poverty among Kenyans (4.3%), lack of mechanisms for lifestyle audit (4.3%) and weak stakeholder collaborations (4.1%).




Figure 2: Weaknesses in the Anti-Corruption Policy Framework

The decisional independence of judges while it serves a positive purpose is a loophole for influenced or reckless decision-making. There ought to be ways of ensuring decisional independence while upholding accountability at the same time especially in corruption matters (Key Informant 2).

Weak rule of law (30.2%) and weak legal frameworks (10.4%) were cited as the leading weaknesses in the anti-corruption legal framework. These was followed by legal overlaps with anti-corruption institutions (9.4%), lack of political goodwill (9.3%), lack of prosecutorial powers by EACC (7.3%), gaps in legislation (6.3%) and slow judicial processes (4.2%).




Figure 3: Weaknesses in the anti-corruption legal framework

The processes under the Public Officer Ethics Act are academic and don't achieve the desired result. Weak structures for the vetting process more so economic standing of public officers particularly after they assume office. Second, seldom do we see any arraignment of judicial officers accused of corrupt practices and those offering bribes as well (Key Informant 5).

The respondents cited weak enforcement of the leadership and integrity regulations (45.6%), rapid technological changes compared to legal evolvement (26%), lack of awareness of LIA regulations by the public (15.9%) and non-compliance with advisories by EACC on corruption prevention recommendations (10.4%) as the major regulatory weaknesses.

4.3.3 Suggestions to improve the anti-corruption policy and institutional framework

The study reveals that in order to improve the anti-corruption policy framework, there should be impartial implementation of the existing policies according to 23.7 percent of the respondents. This was followed by 17.5 percent who suggested that they should increase funding with adequate resources to implement existing policies, promotion of political

goodwill and support was suggested by 12.3 percent of the respondents while an identical 8.2 percent suggested strengthen policy framework and strengthen stakeholder collaboration and engagement respectively. Other improvement suggestion includes: Escalate public awareness on anti-corruption (7.2%); guarantee independence of anti-corruption agencies (5.1%); grant EACC prosecution powers (3.2%), prosecution of all cases by the ODPP (3.1%), creation of an anti-corruption fund (3.1%), enhance coordination and cooperation among anti-corruption agencies (2%) and protect and empower whistle-blowers (1.1%).



Figure 4: Suggestions for improvement of policy framework

The findings on suggestions to improve the legal framework reveals the need to strengthen legal frameworks (33%) followed by an identical 11 percent who suggested impartial implementation of the laws and granting EACC powers to prosecute respectively. Those who suggested granting EACC prosecution powers consisted 7.7 percent followed by 4.5 percent who called for increase in penalties on corruption offenses, 4.4 percent called for setting timelines for corruption trials, 4.3 percent called for harmonization of legal provisions while 3.3 percent suggested enactment of the interagency law (Figure 10).




Figure 5: Suggestions for improvement of Legal framework

Similarly, most respondents, 29.3 percent, suggested the impartial implementation of the regulations as the key to improving the anti-corruption regulatory framework followed by 28.2 percent who suggested budget allocation for anti-corruption agencies while 11.2 percent suggested stakeholder collaboration.




Figure 6: Suggestions for improvement of Regulatory framework

4.4 Political Interference

This theme addresses the research question on what extent does the political interference in EACC work operations affects the ability fight against corruption in Kenya. The section

presents findings on a Likert scale on statements on political interference and suggestions to improve political goodwill in the fight against corruption in Kenya.

4.4.1 Statements on Political Interference

The study sought from the respondents to indicate whether they agree or disagree on the statements that relate to political interference in the fight against corruption (Table 4).

Table 4.3: Statements on Political Interference

Statement	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Mean	Std. Deviation
The EACC operates independently without political interference	50.0%	17.0%	33.0%	2.74	1.21
Political influence significantly impacts the selection of cases for investigation by the EACC	37.9%	22.1%	40.0%	2.96	1.22
The EACC is able to investigate high-profile corruption cases without political obstruction	40.4%	15.2%	44.4%	3.08	1.24
The appointment process for EACC leadership is conducted in a transparent and timely manner	19.7%	28.1%	52.1%	3.39	1.07
The appointment process for EACC leadership ensures political neutrality	23.7%	29.9%	46.4%	3.29	1.09

Respondents disagreed with the statement that EACC operates independently without political interference with a mean score of 2.74, which falls within the disagree range of 1 to 2.99. In addition, the standard deviation of 1.21 was greater than 1, indicating a moderate level of response variance. Respondents also disagreed with the statement political influence significantly impacts the selection of cases for investigation by the EACC with mean score of 2.96 within disagree range of 1 to 2.99 and a standard deviation of 1.22 indicating moderate variance. Respondents were neutral on the statement the EACC is able to investigate high-profile corruption cases without political obstruction with a mean score of 3.08 which falls within the neutral range of 3 to 3.99 with a standard deviation of 1.24 indicating moderate variance. Furthermore, the statements the appointment process for EACC leadership is conducted in a transparent and timely manner and the appointment process for EACC leadership returned a mean score of 3.39 neutral range of 3 to 3.99 and a standard deviation of 1.07 and 1.09 respectively indicating a moderate variance.

Further analysis by various demographic characteristics revealed that all respondents above 60 years and statisticians and economists disagreed that the EACC operates independently

without political interference. On the other hand, diploma and doctorate holders and those in investigations and intelligence agree that the EACC operates independently without political interference.

Table 4.4 Political Interference and Sociodemographic Characteristics

		Disagree	Neutral	Agree
What is your age group	18-30	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	31-45	52.1%	15.1%	32.9%
	46-60	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%
	Above 60	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
What is your highest level of education	Diploma	0.0		100.0%
	Bachelor Degree	33.3%	21.60%	45.1%
	Master's degree	41.3%	21.70%	37.0%
	Doctorate	0.0%		100.0%
Years of experience in anti-corruption efforts or related fields	0-5 years	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%
	6-10 years	53.5%	17.9%	28.6%
	11-15 years	57.9%	15.8%	26.4%
	16-20 years	66.7%	0.0%	33.3%
	Over 20 years	14.3%	28.6%	57.2%
Profession	Investigator/Intelligence	34.4%	9.4%	56.2%
	Lawyer	26.1%	26.1%	47.8%
	Accounting/Audit	41.7%	33.3%	25.0%
	Procurement	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%
	Economist	100.0%		0.0%
	Statistician/Researcher	100.0%		0.0%
	Administration	28.6%	57.1%	14.3%
	Corporate Relations	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%
	ICT Officer	80.0%		20.0%
	Others	50.0%		50.0%
Directorate	Investigations	32.0%	14.0%	54.0%
	Legal Services	36.9%	26.3%	36.9%
	Preventive Services	50.0%	31.2%	18.7%
	Ethics and Leadership	27.3%	27.3%	45.5%
	Finance and Planning	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%

4.4.2 Suggestions to improve political goodwill

Respondents provided suggestions to improve political goodwill in the fight against corruption in Kenya. Ensuring the independence of EACC and other anti-corruption agencies came top with 21.3 percent followed by impartial application of the law regardless of political affiliation of those involved (20%) and supporting the fight against corruption by the President in setting the tone at the top (18.8%). Those who suggested appointment of leaders in integrity and on merit comprised 15 percent followed by another 15 percent who called for more budget allocation to EACC and other anti-corruption bodies. The public should demand

for accountability and transparency from elected leaders (8.7%), enhancement of existing laws (7.5%) and sensitization of the public on the mandate of EACC (6.2%) (Figure 12)




Figure 7: Suggestions to improve political goodwill

‘Our political class is not interested in accountability; politicians want to be exempt from the law. The ethical requirements for our members of parliament and politicians is hard to uphold. The EACC depends on MP’s for its budgets. There is always the threat to disband EACC whenever it seems to make inroads in the fight against corruption. With politicians being interested parties, the public perceives appointments of the Commissioners and the CEO as political processes that potentially undermine its independence’ - Key Informant 2

4.5 Resource Challenges

The research question on in what way does resource allocation affect the Commissions fight against corruption in Kenya is addressed under this theme. It particularly presents findings on financial, human and technological resources available to EACC in the fight against corruption in Kenya.

4.5.1 Financial Resources

The study shows that 31.2 percent of the respondents are only involved in budget implementation followed by an identical 28.6 percent who are involved in program identification and budget proposal and preparation respectively. Only 2.7 percent of the respondents are involved in budget monitoring and evaluation.




Figure 8: involvement in the budgeting process

The study revealed that is the average percentage deviation between the desired budgets and actual is 45.7 percent with a mode of 50 percent and median of 47.5 percent. The Minimum deviation was recorded at 1 percent with a maximum of 115 percent. Following this budget deviation, the average donor support was recorded to be 26.7 percent with a mode and median of 10 percent while there was a maximum of 100 percent with a minimum of 0 support.

Table 4.5: Budget deviation and donor support

Statistics	What is the percent deviation between the desired budget and actual?	What percentage of spending is financed by donors
Mean	45.7%	26.7%
Median	47.5%	10.0%
Mode	50.0%	10.0%
Minimum	1.0%	0.0%
Maximum	115.0%	100.0%

The average number of major donors provide financing support to EACC is 2.24 with an estimated financial injection of Kes. 100,275,000 in the past three years.

Table 4.6: Average number of donor and amount of Support

Statistics	How many major donors provide financing support to EACC	How much have you received in the past three years?
Mean	2.24	100,275,000.00
Median	2.00	50,500,000.00
Mode	1.00	100000a
Minimum	1.00	100,000.00
Maximum	5.00	300,000,000.00

a Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

The study further revealed that seeking donor support (27.6%) is an alternative to improve budget requirements for EACC followed by 20.7 percent who suggested stakeholder collaboration in running joint programmes. Other suggestions include: retaining a percentage of restituted assets (17.2%), be objective in resource mobilization (13.8%), lobby for increased budgetary allocation (15.4%), Integrate ICT in operations to cut down on costs (7.2%), match budget allocated with performance (8.4%), and establish income generating activities such as training (3.4%).




Figure 9: Suggestions to improve budget requirements

‘The entire legal system in Kenya is cash strapped. We need a national conversation to address this anomaly. This way the EACC will be better resourced. Similarly, EACC needs to present its budget projections based on how much one case costs to investigate and follow through the courts and pro-rate based on average new cases per year. This way it will be all

clear to the public and policy makers that its under -resourced. Similarly, at a staffing level of about 50% of the staff establishment, the EACC and partners in civil society and the private sector should be more loud on those state of affairs and use the budgeting cycle to advocate for increased allocation’ - **Key Informant 1.**

4.5.2 Human Resources

Respondents were asked to describe the existing staff broadly about the educational background and professional experience in terms of knowledge, skills, and experience. In Figure 15, 41.2 percent of the respondents described the staff as multi-disciplinary followed by 30.9 percent who think the staff have varying experience while 19.6 percent described staff as highly specialized. A further 4.1 percent of the respondents indicated that the staff have inadequate skills and competence




Figure 10: Broad description of EACC Staff

In relation to staff capacity in terms of number of staff that can allow for effective execution of the EACC mandate, 75.6 percent indicated that they are understaffed in numbers, 14 percent described are grossly understaffed while 10.8 percent indicated that they have adequate numbers.




Figure 11: Staff Capacity

Further analysis indicates that 95.9 percent of the respondents were on permanent and pensionable terms, 3.1 percent were on contractual terms while 1 percent were on secondment from other agencies. Staff turnover in an anti-corruption institution leads increased recruitment costs, disrupting productivity, damaging morale among remaining employees and leads to loss of valuable institutional knowledge. Those respondents who described the staff turnover to be low constituted 37.5 percent followed by 20.8 percent who think the staff turnover is high, 18.1 percent think it's medium while 23.6 percent do not know.




Figure 12: Staff Turnover

When respondents were asked to compare their current salary to what they would earn if they were in the private sector or other arms of government, 66.7 percent think they would more in the private sector followed by 16.7 percent who think they would earn around the same amount while 8.3 percent think they would earn less. Compared to

other arms of government, 46.9 percent think they would earn around the same amount of salary, 24 percent think they would earn less while 20.8 percent think they would earn more. The results are as shown in table 5 below:-

Table 4.7: Comparative Salary

	Private Sector	Other arms of Government
I would earn less	8.3	24
I would earn around the same	16.7	46.9
I would earn more	66.7	20.8
Do not know	8.3	8.3

4.5.3 Statements on Resources

Respondents were also asked to agree or disagree with the following statements regarding resources at EACC.

Table 4.8 Statements on Resources

Statement	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Mean	Std. Deviation
The EACC has adequate financial resources to fulfil its mandate effectively.	83.0%	7.0%	10.0%	1.9	1.1
The EACC has sufficient human resources with the necessary expertise to combat corruption.	46.4%	19.6%	34.0%	2.9	1.2
EACC Vetting of people seeking public office appointments is effective	37.3%	24.5%	38.3%	3.0	1.2
There is demonstrated credible intent by EACC to tackle perceived causes and effects of corruption effectively	12.7%	12.6%	74.7%	3.8	1.0
Resource limitations significantly hinder the EACC's ability to investigate complex corruption cases.	22.3%	2.1%	75.5%	4.0	1.4

Respondents strongly disagreed that the EACC has adequate financial resources to fulfil its mandate effectively with a mean score of 1.9 which falls within the range 1 to 1.99 with a standard deviation of 1.1 indicating moderate variance. A large proportion of respondents disagreed that the EACC has sufficient human resources with the necessary expertise to combat corruption with a mean score of 2.9 which falls within the range 2.0 to 2.99 and a standard deviation of 1.2 indicating moderate variance. Respondents were neutral about the EACC vetting of people seeking public office appointments is effective with a mean score of 3.0 which falls within the range of 3.0-3.99 and a standard deviation of 1.2 indicating moderate variance. About the there being a demonstrated credible intent by EACC to tackle perceived causes and effects of corruption effectively, respondents' neutral with a mean score

of 3.8 which falls within the range 3.0-3.99 and a standard deviation of 1 indicating a low level of response variance. Respondents agreed that resource limitations significantly hinder the EACC's ability to investigate complex corruption cases with a mean score of 4.0 which falls within the range 4.0 to 4.99 and a standard deviation of 1.4 indicating moderate variance in response. Further analysis on the statement 'The EACC has adequate resources to fulfil its mandate effectively' by demographics of age, profession, years of experience and directorate did not show any significant variations with majority disagreeing.

Table 4.9 Adequacy of financial resources and socio-demographic characteristics

		Disagree	Neutral	Agree
What is your age group	18-30	50.0%	50.0%	
	31-45	81.7%	8.5%	9.9%
	46-60	88.5%		11.5%
	Above 60	100.0%		
What is your highest level of education	Diploma	100.0%		
	Bachelor Degree	78.4%	11.8%	9.8%
	Master's degree	88.9%	2.2%	8.9%
	Doctorate			100.0%
Years of experience in anti-corruption efforts or related fields	0-5 years	55.60%	22.20%	22.20%
	6-10 years	87.70%	7.00%	5.30%
	11-15 years	77.80%	5.60%	16.70%
	16-20 years	88.90%		11.10%
	More than 20 years	85.70%		14.30%
Profession	Investigator/Intelligence	84.4%	3.1%	12.5%
	Lawyer	78.3%	17.4%	4.3%
	Accounting/Audit	90.9%		9.1%
	Procurement	66.7%		33.3%
	Economist	100.0%		
	Statistician/Researcher	100.0%		
	Administration	71.4%		28.6%
	Corporate Relations	100.0%		
	ICT Officer	100.0%		
	Others	75.0%	25.0%	
Directorate	Investigations	83.7%	6.1%	10.2%
	Legal Services	84.2%	10.5%	5.3%
	Preventive Services	81.2%	6.2%	12.5%
	Ethics and Leadership	81.8%		18.2%
	Finance and Planning	80.0%	20.0%	

4.5.4 Suggestions to improve resourcing EACC

Respondents were asked to suggest ways in which resourcing for anti-corruption interventions in Kenya can be improved. Lobbying for increased budget allocation from the national treasury was suggested by 44.6 percent of the respondents followed by creation of an anti-corruption fund from proceeds of recoveries by EACC (27.7%), seeking donor funding

(20.5%), training and hiring of skillful workers (14.4%) and through stakeholder collaborations (13.2%). Others suggested use of media forums (5%), political goodwill and support (4.8%), leveraging technology (4.8%), heavy penalties on corrupt public officers (1.2%) and improved civil servants' remuneration (1.2%).




Figure 13: Suggestions to improve anti-corruption resourcing

4.5.5 Technological Resources

The respondents were asked to agree or disagree with various statements about technology and its deployment by EACC. The results are as shown in table 4.10.

Table 4.10: Statements on Technology

Statements	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Mean	Std. Deviation
EACC has adequate budget for technological needs.	60.0%	30.5%	9.5%	2.3	0.9
Power supply interruptions significantly affect EACC operations.	45.8%	16.7%	37.5%	2.9	1.3
EACC systems integrate well with international anti-corruption platforms	32.1%	34.6%	33.3%	3.0	1.2
EACC has adequate tools for digital forensic investigations.	33.3%	32.1%	34.6%	3.1	1.2
EACC can easily share data with other government agencies.	28.9%	32.2%	38.9%	3.1	1.1
EACC has sufficient computers and servers to support its work.	32.0%	17.5%	50.5%	3.2	1.1
EACC systems effectively capture all necessary data for corruption investigations.	26.9%	24.7%	48.4%	3.3	1.1
EACC has enough technically skilled staff members to run its ICT infrastructure.	22.1%	26.3%	51.6%	3.4	1.1
EACC has effective protocols for handling sensitive digital information.	22.5%	29.2%	48.3%	3.4	1.1
EACC technical infrastructure is regularly updated and maintained.	15.3%	14.3%	70.4%	3.7	1.0
EACC Technological systems allows the public to make corruption reports easily	20.0%	16.8%	63.1%	3.7	1.2
EACC has adequate internet connectivity for anti-corruption operations.	12.2%	8.1%	79.8%	4.0	1.1

Respondents disagreed that EACC has adequate budget for technological needs with a mean score of 2.3 which falls within the range 2.0-2.99 and a standard deviation of 0.9 which is less than 1 indication low variance in response. On the other hand, respondents agreed that EACC has adequate internet connectivity for anti-corruption operations with a mean score of 4.00 which falls in the range 4.0-4.99 and a standard deviation of 1.1 indicating moderate variance in response. All the other statements fell in the category of neutral with mean score ranging from 3.2 to 3.7 in the range 3.0-3.99 and standard deviation of 1.0 to 1.3 indicating moderate variance in response. Further analysis by various demographics revealed no significant difference on the statement that the EACC has adequate budget for technological needs. The results are as in table 4.11.

Table 4.11 Adequacy of Budget for Technology and Socio-demographic Characteristic

		Disagree	Neutral	Agree
What is your age group	18-30	100.0%		
	31-45	57.7%	29.6%	7.0%
	46-60	50.0%	30.8%	15.4%
	Above 60	100.0%		
What is your highest level of education	Diploma	33.30%	33.30%	33.30%
	Bachelor Degree	56.90%	29.40%	9.80%
	Master's degree	60.00%	26.70%	6.70%
	Doctorate		100.00%	
Years of experience in anti-corruption efforts or related fields	0-5 years	70.00%	30.00%	
	6-10 years	60.70%	23.20%	8.90%
	11-15 years	50.00%	38.90%	5.60%
	16-20 years	44.40%	44.40%	11.10%
	More than 20 years	42.90%	28.60%	28.60%
Profession	Investigator/Intelligence	53.1%	31.2%	6.2%
	Lawyer	47.8%	34.8%	13.0%
	Accounting/Audit	63.6%	18.2%	18.2%
	Procurement	80.0%	20.0%	
	Economist	100.0%		
	Statistician/Researcher		100.0%	
	Administration	57.1%	28.6%	14.3%
	Corporate Relations	60.0%	40.0%	
	ICT Officer	80.0%	20.0%	
	Others	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%
Directorate	Investigations	59.2%	28.6%	6.1%
	Legal Services	57.9%	21.1%	15.8%
	Preventive Services	56.2%	37.5%	6.2%
	Ethics and Leadership	45.5%	36.4%	9.1%
	Finance and Planning	60.0%	20.0%	20.0%

Respondents were asked to suggest ways in which to address technological challenges in your anti- corruption work. Enhancing digital solutions devoid of human interface (41.4%) topped the list of suggestions followed by upgrade of current ICT equipment (32.6%), training of technical staff on new technology (28.7%) and enhancing financial allocations to ICT unit (17.5%). Employment of more skilled ICT staff (11.2%), integrating existing systems with government systems (11.2%), provide regular training for users (7.2%) and strengthen cybersecurity (6.2%) were suggestions made. Reviving the integrated public complaints referral mechanisms (6.2%), timely software upgrades (5%), conducting user needs assessments (3.7%) and leveraging on blockchain technology were also suggested.




Figure 14: Suggestions to improve technology challenges

4.6 Coordination

EACC is set up to work directly with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution of bribery, corruption and economic crimes investigated while the Judiciary adjudicates the cases. This section presents on a Likert scale statements on coordination, confidence in anti-corruption stakeholders and suggestions to improve coordination in the fight against corruption in Kenya.

4.6.1 Coordination Challenges

Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with various statement relating to coordination in the fight against corruption. Results are herein in table 4.12.

Table 4.12: Statements on Coordination

Statements	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Mean	Std. Deviation
There is effective coordination between the EACC and ODPP	55.2%	21.9%	22.9%	2.51	1.03
There is effective coordination between the EACC and DCI	43.6%	28.7%	27.7%	2.77	0.98
Information sharing among anti-corruption agencies is efficient and timely.	41.3%	34.8%	23.9%	2.82	1.09
There are clear guidelines defining the roles and responsibilities of different agencies in fighting corruption.	29.6%	20.4%	50.0%	3.26	1.12
The fight against corruption is headed in the right direction with strong institutional framework	24.5%	22.3%	53.2%	3.30	1.23
There is effective coordination between the EACC and Judiciary	15.4%	33.0%	51.6%	3.41	0.85
Interagency rivalries significantly hinder effective cooperation in anti-corruption efforts.	17.4%	10.9%	71.8%	3.86	1.20
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Kenya and majority of the government institutions have been unable to eradicate it	9.6%	7.4%	83.0%	4.19	1.07

Respondents disagreed that there is effective coordination between the EACC and ODPP with a mean score of 2.5 which falls in the range 2.0-2.99 and a standard deviation of 1.0 indicating low variance in response. In relation to DCI, respondents disagreed that there is effective coordination between the EACC and DCI with a mean score of 2.8 which falls in the range 2.0-2.99 and a standard deviation of 1.0 indicating low variance in response. Respondents disagreed that Information sharing among anti-corruption agencies is efficient and timely with a mean score of 2.8 which falls in the range 2.0-2.99 and a standard deviation of 1.1 indicating moderate variance in response. Respondents were neutral on there are clear guidelines defining the roles and responsibilities of different agencies in fighting corruption and The fight against corruption is headed in the right direction with strong institutional framework with an identical mean score of 3.3 which falls in the range 3.0 to 3.99 and a standard deviation of 1.1 and 1.2 respectively indicating moderate variance in response. Respondents disagreed that Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Kenya and majority of the government institutions have been unable to eradicate it with a mean score of 4.2 which falls in the range 4.0 to 4.99 and a standard deviation of 1.1 indicating a moderate variance in response. Further analysis on the statement ‘there is effective coordination between the EACC and ODPP and DCI’ by directorate did not show any significant variations with majority disagreeing while responses on the Judiciary and information sharing was mixed across the directorates.

Table 4.13: Effectiveness of Coordination between the EACC and other agencies

		Investigations	Legal Services	Preventive Services	Ethics and Leadership	Finance and Planning
ODPP	Disagree	57.1%	73.7%	25.0%	27.3%	80.0%
	Neutral	22.4%	10.5%	31.2%	27.3%	
	Agree	20.4%	15.8%	37.5%	27.3%	
DCI	Disagree	42.9%	63.2%	25.0%	18.2%	40.0%
	Neutral	30.6%	26.3%	25.0%	18.2%	20.0%
	Agree	24.5%	5.3%	43.8%	45.5%	20.0%
Judiciary	Disagree	14.3%	21.1%	18.8%		20.0%
	Neutral	36.7%	21.1%	31.2%	36.4%	20.0%
	Agree	49.0%	57.9%	43.8%	45.5%	60.0%
Information sharing	Disagree	40.8%	42.1%	33.3%	36.4%	20.0%
	Neutral	32.7%	31.6%	26.7%	36.4%	40.0%
	Agree	22.4%	21.1%	26.7%	9.1%	40.0%

4.6.3 Suggestions to Improve Coordination

Respondents suggested the enhancement of the multiagency framework (28.2%) would improve the coordination of anti-corruption interventions in Kenya the leading call followed by public awareness and sensitization on corruption (20.9%), enactment of a coordination law (13.4%), strengthen institutional framework with timelines to resolve corruption matters (8%) and political goodwill and support. Other suggestions include: increasing EACC budget (4.2%), enhance information sharing between anti-corruption agencies (4.2%), protection of whistle blowers (4.2%), leveraging on technology (2.1%), impartial application of the regulations (2.1%), grant EACC prosecution powers (2.1) and consolidation of anti-corruption initiatives in the office of the president (2%).




Figure 14: Suggestions to Improve Coordination

*‘A Multi-Agency team that **focuses** on identifying and **resolving** bottlenecks in the working relationship of these agencies would go a long way in helping resolve the issues’. The complaints from the public and some of the agencies is that cases are taking too long to conclude. There is also no jurisprudential alignment between the superior courts and the trial courts on issues of values and ethics. - **Key Informant 4***

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The discussion was based on the findings of the study as per the objectives of the study. The discussion is centered on the socio-demographic characteristics of the study population; the challenges in policy and institutional framework; political interference; resource related and coordination that the EACC face in the fight against corruption in Kenya.

5.1 Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Findings revealed that majority of the staff were from the investigations department, followed by the legal and then the finance and administration. The dominance of investigation personnel suggested that the EACC heavily prioritizes investigative functions, which is typical for law enforcement or anti-corruption agencies (UNODC, 2021). The second-largest group being legal services indicates a significant focus on legal expertise, which complements investigative work. The relatively lower representation from Finance and Planning is consistent with support functions typically having smaller staff numbers compared to core operational units (Quah, 2021). These findings are in line with previous studies such as that of De Sousa (2010) in which it was found that successful anti-corruption agencies typically have investigation units comprising 45-55% of total staff, supporting the finding of 50.5% in investigations (De Sousa 2010). Quah's (2021) study of Asian anti-corruption agencies revealed that investigation and legal services typically constitute 65-75% of staff combined, aligning with the combined 68.9% in this case.

On years of experience, findings showed a clear pyramid of experience levels among anti-corruption personnel. Mid-Career Dominance was noted suggesting a workforce that has acquired significant expertise while still being in their mid-career phase. This could indicate that the EACC has strong retention of personnel through the crucial early career period. The combined percentage of staff with over 10 years of experience represents a substantial pool of senior expertise, while the relatively small proportion of novice staff might indicate potential succession planning challenges and the need for knowledge transfer strategies (UNDP, 2020). On the contrary this low level of novice staff could suggest limited hiring opportunities in the EACC. These findings are further supported by those of the Meagher & Voland (2018) who found that successful anti-corruption agencies maintain 50-60% of staff in the 6-10-year experience bracket, supporting the study finding. The OECD's (2016) review

showed anticorruption agencies have optimal performance when 30-35% of staff have over 10 years' experience, aligning with the cumulative 33.9% finding of this study. The high proportion of mid-career professionals suggests organizational stability and as well Reyes-Heroles (2019) found this pattern correlates with higher investigation success rates.

Findings on the highest level of education indicated a predominance of Bachelor's Degree. This aligns with Huberts & Hoekstra's (2016) study finding that successful anti-corruption agencies typically have 45-55% staff with bachelor's qualifications as well as the World Bank's (2018) assessment of anti-corruption agencies which found that bachelor's degree holders form the backbone of investigative and operational units. High proportion of Master's Degrees of this study was also reported in the UNODC's (2021) global study which established that agencies with 40-50% master's degree holders showed enhanced analytical capabilities. De Jaegere's (2021) research demonstrated that agencies with over 40% master's-qualified staff showed better performance in complex investigations. The researcher concluded that the balanced distribution between bachelor's and master's degrees could lead to operational effectiveness and a strong foundation for complex investigations.

In terms of occupation, the results showed a professional diversity among the staff although the majority of them were investigators. This finding is supported by Quah's (2021) research shows successful agencies maintain diverse professional compositions as well as an Montfort et al. (2019) who stated that a balanced distribution across core competencies (investigation, legal, financial) correlates with higher success rates in the fight against corruption.

The findings on age showed a heavy concentration in the 31-45 age bracket suggesting a mature but not aging workforce. A recent study by McKinsey (2023) indicated that workers in this age bracket tend to show high productivity and leadership potential. The notably low representation of younger workers is unusual compared to typical workforce demographics. This could result into a lack of innovation and fresh perspectives as well as inadequate succession planning and implementation.

5.2 Discussion of the Findings

5.2.1 Legal and Institutional Framework Challenges

The high awareness levels of Kenya's anti-corruption legal frameworks among EACC staff demonstrate significant progress in policy dissemination compared to earlier periods. This evolution reflects sustained capacity-building efforts in Kenya's public sector as documented by Gathii (2022). However, this institutional knowledge has not translated into effective implementation, with weak rule of law (25.1%) and lack of political goodwill (19.7%) emerging as primary obstacles.

The gap between policy awareness and implementation effectiveness aligns with Odhiambo's (2019) documentation of systemic enforcement failures in Kenya's anti-corruption institutions. The relatively lower awareness of international frameworks like UNCAC (5.3%) despite Kenya's pioneering ratification mirrors Okello's (2020) findings about disconnects between international commitments and local implementation efforts. Respondents' prioritization of impartial implementation as the key improvement strategy confirms Kiprono's (2019) findings on how selective enforcement undermines anti-corruption efforts. The significant emphasis on increased funding reinforces Mwangi's (2020) analysis of resource constraints but shows stronger prioritization of financial resources than previous studies.

The findings reveal a high level of awareness of Kenya's national ethics and anti-corruption policy among respondents, suggesting significant progress in policy dissemination since the early 2000s. This contrasts with earlier studies like Amukowa (2013), who found limited awareness of anti-corruption frameworks among public servants in Kenya's western region. However, the findings align with Mutongwa et al. (2018), who documented increasing awareness of anti-corruption policies among urban professionals in Nairobi.

The relatively lower awareness of international frameworks like UNCAC (5.3%) despite Kenya's pioneering ratification mirrors findings by Okello (2020), who identified a disconnect between international commitments and local-level implementation. The moderate awareness levels of the Leadership and Integrity Act 2012 align with Kimeu's (2019) observations about the gradual institutionalization of integrity frameworks in Kenya's service. However, our findings show higher awareness compared to Kimeu's earlier study, suggesting positive trends in policy dissemination. The limited awareness of regulations compared to

primary legislation echoes findings by Ndung'u (2021), who identified similar patterns in Tanzania and Uganda, suggesting a regional challenge in translating high-level laws into operational guidelines.

On the weaknesses on the legal and policy frameworks, the findings identify weak rule of law as the primary weakness in Kenya's anti-corruption framework, aligning with Odhiambo's (2019) study which found systemic enforcement failures in Kenya's anti-corruption institutions. Similarly, Mueller (2018) documented how weak enforcement mechanisms undermined anti-corruption efforts across multiple sectors, particularly in high-profile cases. The identification of lack of political goodwill as a significant challenge corresponds with Kivuva's (2020) analysis of political interference in Kenya's anti-corruption efforts. This finding also reinforces Gathii's (2022) argument that political commitment remains the biggest obstacle to effective anti-corruption reform in Kenya, despite robust policy frameworks.

The issue of inadequate resources echoes findings by Wangari (2019), who documented how resource constraints hampered the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies in Kenya. However, this study finding showed a lower percentage compared to Wangari's study, which found resource limitations affecting over 40% of anti-corruption initiatives. The problem of institutional role duplication aligns with Kamau's (2018) research on institutional overlaps between Kenya's anti-corruption agencies. However, while Kamau viewed some overlap as potentially beneficial for checks and balances, our respondents predominantly saw it as problematic.

The identification of corruption as a cultural issue mirrors findings by Ndemo (2020), though at a notably lower percentage than his study, which emphasized cultural factors as a primary barrier. This difference might suggest a shift in perception from cultural to institutional factors. The concern about weak implementation of Chapter Six of the Constitution validates Otieno's (2021) analysis of constitutional integrity provisions. However, our findings suggest this is perceived as a less critical issue compared to enforcement and political will, contrasting with Otieno's emphasis on constitutional framework weaknesses.

Findings on suggestions to improve the anticorruption legal and policy frameworks agree on impartial implementation as the primary improvement strategy aligns with Kiprono's (2019) findings, which highlighted selective enforcement as a major impediment to anti-corruption

efforts in Kenya. However, while Kiprono emphasized judicial reforms, the findings herein suggest a broader focus on implementation across all institutions.

The call for increased funding corresponds with Mwangi's (2020) analysis of resource constraints in Kenya's anti-corruption institutions. However, findings here show a stronger emphasis on resource allocation compared to Mwangi's study, which primarily focused on human capacity development. The suggestion for enhanced political goodwill resonates with Onyango's (2018) research on political interference in anti-corruption efforts. Similarly, Kamunde (2021) found that political support was crucial for successful anti-corruption initiatives, though our findings suggest it's seen as less critical than implementation and resource issues.

The equal emphasis on strengthening policy frameworks and stakeholder collaboration reflects findings by Njeru (2019), who documented how fragmented approaches undermined anti-corruption efforts. However, our findings suggest lower prioritization of these factors compared to Njeru's conclusions. The relatively low priority given to whistleblower protection (1.1%) contrasts with Oloo's (2020) research, which identified whistleblower protection as a crucial factor in successful anti-corruption efforts. This disparity might indicate a gap between academic perspectives and practitioner priorities

5.2.2 Political Interference Challenges

The study found significant evidence of political interference undermining EACC's operational independence, with half of respondents disagreeing that the Commission operates without political interference. This finding strongly aligns with Gathii's (2022) East African research documenting how political connections influence which corruption cases are pursued or abandoned.

The concern about political influence on case selection corresponds with Muhoro and Kirui's (2022) survey where 68% of public officials believed political factors significantly impacted EACC's case selections. The neutral stance on high-profile case investigations partially contrasts with Hope's (2017) findings that EACC had made progressive steps toward independence in specific case types. While formal appointment procedures exist for EACC leadership, respondents' perceptions about their effectiveness were mixed, supporting Wanjiku and Omondi's (2021) institutional analysis revealing concerns about leadership

appointment transparency. This pattern of persistent political influence despite formal safeguards indicates deeper institutional challenges that transcend legal frameworks alone.

On the suggestions to address the challenges relating to political interference, Kivuva (2021) conducted research on anti-corruption agencies in Kenya, finding similar results to those of this study regarding political interference. Their survey of 300 public officials revealed that 72% believed EACC's operations were significantly influenced by political actors, aligning with the mean score herein indicating disagreement with EACC's independence. Research by Mbote and Otieno (2022) examined EACC's case selection process, finding that high-profile corruption investigations were often hampered by political obstacles.

This supports the respondents' neutral stance on EACC's ability to investigate high-profile cases without political obstruction. Contrasting studies such as that of Wanyama (2023) who studied EACC's operations during 2020-2022 and found stronger evidence of operational independence in case selection, particularly for mid-level corruption cases. This contrasts with your findings where respondents disagreed that political influence doesn't impact case selection. Additionally, Njeri and Kamau (2022) found more positive perceptions of EACC's appointment process transparency, especially among urban respondents. This differs from the study's neutral findings (mean 3.39) regarding appointment process transparency.

5.2.3 Resource Challenges

The study revealed critical resource constraints across financial, human, and technological dimensions. The significant gap between requested and allocated budgets has created dependency on donor support. This underfinancing mirrors findings from across East African anti-corruption institutions as documented by Kamau and Ochieng (2022). Staff capacity emerged as a major concern, with majority of respondents indicating understaffing - closely aligning with Kiprop and Wanjala's (2022) findings that majority of EACC departments reported insufficient personnel. Despite having a multidisciplinary workforce, the Commission struggles with specialized expertise gaps, particularly evident in complex investigation units.

Regarding technological resources, respondents strongly disagreed that EACC has adequate budget for technological needs, while prioritizing digital solutions and equipment upgrades. This technology gap contradicts the increasing emphasis on digital transformation

documented by Kariuki and Mbugua (2018) across Kenyan organizations. The surprisingly low prioritization of cybersecurity contrasts sharply with Kimani's (2021) research showing that 68% of Kenyan institutions consider cybersecurity their top digital priority. On technological resources, this study found that there is limited use of technology in the EACC's operations because it is not adequately budgeted for. To address the technological challenges, the respondents suggested that there should be high prioritization of automated digital solutions aligning with findings of Kariuki and Mbugua (2018) who found that Kenyan organizations increasingly favour automation to reduce human error and improve service delivery. However, their study showed a lower percentage (around 25%) prioritizing full automation, suggesting attitudes may have evolved. The emphasis on ICT equipment upgrades echoes work by Ochieng et al., (2020) in their assessment of digital transformation in Kenya's public sector. They found infrastructure limitations were a critical barrier, with 45% of institutions reporting outdated hardware as a major challenge - a somewhat higher percentage than shown here.

Regarding technical staff training, Mutisya and Ngugi (2019) presented contrasting findings from their study of Kenyan financial institutions, where training was rated as the top priority for digital transformation. This suggests different sectors may have varying priorities for technological advancement. The relatively low prioritization of cybersecurity is concerning when compared to Kimani's (2021) research on Kenyan organizations, which found that 68% of institutions considered cybersecurity their top digital transformation priority. This discrepancy might indicate a potential blind spot in security awareness. Across the East Africa, similar challenges have been reported as cited by a research from Tanzania by Makundi and Rahman (2021), who found that 38% of organizations prioritized automation. However, this contrasts with Uganda's experience, where Namukasa et al., (2023) found only 22% of institutions prioritizing full automation, instead emphasizing hybrid approaches that maintain some human oversight.

The focus on ICT equipment upgrades reflects a common theme across East Africa. In Rwanda, Mugisha and Habimana (2022) reported similar findings with 35% of organizations prioritizing infrastructure improvements. However, their study revealed a higher emphasis on regular maintenance protocols (45%) compared to the current findings. A contrasting perspective emerges from Burundi, where Niyonkuru and Ibrahim (2021) found that 58% of

organizations prioritized equipment upgrades, suggesting varying levels of infrastructure maturity across the regions.

5.2.4 Coordination Challenges

Inter-agency coordination emerged as a significant barrier to effective anti-corruption efforts, with respondents disagreeing that there is effective coordination between EACC and ODPP. This finding aligns with Hope's (2019) research documenting significant coordination gaps between Kenyan anti-corruption bodies. The poor information sharing among agencies (matches Msoka & Sanga's (2020) documentation of similar challenges in Tanzania but contrasts with Gatere's (2022) findings of more efficient protocols in Rwanda achieved through integrated digital systems. This suggests potential regional models for improvement.

The neutral stance on institutional framework effectiveness parallels Mezmur & Koen's (2020) findings of ambivalence about institutional frameworks in Ethiopia. However, the strong agreement that inter-agency rivalries hinder cooperation indicates deep-seated institutional challenges that transcend formal coordination mechanisms. Respondents noted there are is poor coordination of the EACC and other entities fighting corruption aligning with Hope's (2019) study in Kenya, which found significant coordination gaps between anti-corruption bodies. However, this contrasts with Basheka's (2021) research in Uganda, which found improved coordination after institutional reforms, suggesting potential lessons for Kenya. The low rating on information sharing mirrors findings from Tanzania.

However, Rwanda presents a contrasting case - Gatere's (2022) study found more efficient information-sharing protocols between the Office of the Ombudsman and other agencies, achieved through integrated digital systems. The neutral stance on institutional framework effectiveness (mean 3.3) finds parallel in Ethiopian studies. Mezmur & Koen (2020) found similar ambivalence about institutional frameworks in Ethiopia's Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. However, this differs from Burundi, where Niyonkuru's (2023) research showed significantly lower confidence in institutional frameworks. The neutral response regarding clear role definition aligns with findings from multiple East African studies. Kamanga's (2021) work in Tanzania and Johnson's (2022) research in Uganda both identified role ambiguity as a persistent challenge in anti-corruption efforts.

Respondents suggested that to improve coordination between the EACC and other state agencies dealing with corruption in Kenya, there is need for the multi-agency framework enhancement as the leading recommendation aligns with findings from Uganda's Inspector General of Government studies (Basheka & Tumutegyeize, 2021), which demonstrated improved corruption prosecution rates through inter-agency collaboration. However, research from Tanzania's Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) suggested that multiple agencies can sometimes lead to jurisdictional conflicts and delayed investigations (PCCB, 2022).

The emphasis on public awareness finds support in a study from Rwanda's Office of the Ombudsman (2023), which showed that districts with higher anti-corruption awareness programs experienced reduced corruption incidents. However, contrary research from southern Ethiopia (Mekonnen & Kassa, 2022) indicated that awareness alone had minimal impact without corresponding enforcement mechanisms. The call for coordination law enactment parallels Uganda's Anti-Corruption Act amendments (Uganda Ministry of Ethics and Integrity, 2023), which showed improved case resolution rates after establishing clearer inter-agency protocols. However, studies from Burundi's anti-corruption court (Institut de Développement Économique du Burundi, 2022) suggest that new laws without institutional capacity building may have limited effect.

Regarding institutional framework strengthening, research from Rwanda's prosecution service (National Public Prosecution Authority of Rwanda, 2023) demonstrated that setting strict timelines improved case resolution rates by 40%. However, studies from Kenya's own judiciary system (Kenya Judiciary, 2022) showed that rigid timelines sometimes led to rushed investigations and reduced conviction rates. The relatively low prioritization of whistleblower protection contrasts with findings from Tanzania (Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, 2023), where enhanced whistleblower protection laws led to a significant increase in corruption reporting. This suggests the Kenyan respondents might be undervaluing this aspect.

The minimal support for EACC prosecution powers (2.1%) aligns with studies from Uganda (Uganda Ministry of Ethics and Integrity, 2023) showing that separated investigation and prosecution functions can provide better checks and balances. However, research from Rwanda's unified anti-corruption authority (Rwanda Public Prosecution Authority, 2022) suggests that combined powers can lead to faster case resolution. The low priority given to

technology leverage seems to contradict successful digital reporting initiatives in Rwanda and Tanzania (East African Anti-Corruption Research Network, 2023), which have shown significant improvements in corruption detection and reporting rates.

5.3 Conclusions

Based on the integrated analysis of findings, four key conclusions emerge. On the Legal Framework Implementation Gap, while Kenya has established comprehensive anti-corruption legal structures with high awareness levels among practitioners, a significant implementation gap persists due to weak rule of law, inadequate political will, and ineffective enforcement mechanisms. Political influence remains a fundamental challenge undermining EACC's operational independence, particularly affecting case selection, investigation of high-profile matters, and leadership appointment processes, despite formal safeguards. Severe resource limitations across financial, human, and technological dimensions significantly impair the Commission's operational capacity, with particular challenges in budget adequacy, specialized staffing, and technological modernization. Poor coordination and information sharing between anti-corruption agencies create systemic inefficiencies, with institutional rivalries and unclear mandates hindering collaborative efforts in corruption prevention and prosecution.

5.4 Recommendations for Policy and Action

Based on the study findings, the four core recommendations were proposed. The study recommends comprehensive reforms to insulate EACC from political interference by establishing constitutional safeguards for operational autonomy. This includes reforming the leadership appointment process through enhanced public participation and merit-based selection criteria, creating independent oversight mechanisms for case selection, and implementing fixed percentage allocations of national revenue to ensure budgetary independence. These measures directly address the finding that 50% of respondents perceive political interference in EACC operations.

To address the critical resource gaps identified, a sustainable funding mechanism should be established through an Anti-Corruption Fund that retains a percentage of recovered assets. Additionally, the EACC should develop a comprehensive human capital strategy focusing on specialized skills acquisition, succession planning for an aging workforce, and competitive

compensation to address the significant understaffing reported by 89.6% of respondents. Technology investments should prioritize automation of key operational processes and regular equipment upgrades.

Based on the finding that there is perceived poor coordination between EACC and other agencies, an integrated multi-agency approach should be formalized through comprehensive legislation. This framework should establish clear mandate delineation, standardized information-sharing protocols, and regular coordination forums at both strategic and operational levels. The framework should incorporate successful elements from regional models like Rwanda's digital integration systems while addressing the institutional rivalries reported by majority of the respondents.

There is need to strengthen enforcement mechanisms. To address concerns about weak rule of law, enforcement mechanisms should be strengthened through specialized anti-corruption courts with expedited procedures, enhanced whistleblower protection, and streamlined asset recovery processes. These reforms should focus on impartial implementation of existing laws rather than creating additional legislation, ensuring accountability applies equally across all levels of society regardless of political connections.


5.5 Limitations of the Study

This study encountered several limitations that could affect the interpretation and generalizability of the findings. First the study primarily relied on self-reported perceptions from EACC staff, which may introduce respondent bias on sensitive topics like political interference and resource adequacy. Triangulation of data sources was employed through the inclusion of key informant interviews alongside survey responses. Document analysis of institutional records was also incorporated. While achieving a high response rate, the sample was confined to current EACC employees and a small number of key informants from various agencies, potentially missing important external perspectives. The mixed-methods approach helped mitigate this limitation. Future studies should expand the stakeholder pool to include judiciary representatives, civil society organizations, media, and the public to capture a more comprehensive picture of anti-corruption efforts.

The cross-sectional nature of the study provided only a snapshot of current challenges without capturing the evolution of institutional effectiveness over time. Where possible, historical context was incorporated through literature review. Longitudinal research tracking key indicators over multiple years would provide more robust insights into institutional progress and persistent challenges. The politically charged nature of corruption investigations may have constrained full disclosure by respondents despite confidentiality assurances. Anonymous survey methods and confidentiality protocols were employed to encourage candid responses. Supplementary methods such as anonymous digital feedback systems could further enhance data authenticity in future research. Despite these limitations, the study's methodological rigor, high response rate, and mixed-methods approach provided meaningful insights into the challenges facing Kenya's anti-corruption efforts while identifying practical recommendations for institutional improvement.

5.6 Suggestions for Further Research

The study identifies several areas requiring further investigation, including the influence of staff demographics on anti-corruption effectiveness, impact assessment of specific technological innovations in corruption detection and prevention, and evaluation of the Multi-Agency Framework's effectiveness in enhancing inter-institutional cooperation.



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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Purpose of the Survey

The purpose of this face-to-face survey is to collect information from the staff of EACC regarding policy and institutional framework, political interference, availability of resources and coordination challenges in fighting corruption in Kenya.

The data collected will be for purposes of partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a degree of Masters in Public Policy and Management, Strathmore Business School, Strathmore University. The survey is aimed at identifying the challenges faced by EACC in the execution of its mandate.

2. Confidentiality

Information provided in the questionnaire by willing EACC Staff will be treated as confidential and used strictly for purposes indicated above. The research assistants involved are under oath not to disclose any information to a third party. If you wish to remain anonymous, please indicate in the text box below:

3. Duration and Modalities of the Interview

This face-to-face interview will take approximately 15-20 minutes. We will complete the survey form for you and leave you with a counterpart copy. Upon completion of the survey, we shall allow you five minutes to raise any questions which we shall respond to.

4. Queries

Queries or assistance regarding the completion of this questionnaire should be addressed by the interviewers whose contact details are below.

Meshack Aluda – 0733953235 and or Meshack.aluda@strathmore.edu

SECTION I: Demographic Information

1. What is your age group?

1. 18-30
2. 31-45
3. 46-60
4. Above 60

2. What is your highest level of education?


1. Secondary school
2. Diploma
3. Bachelor's degree
4. Master's degree
5. Doctorate
6. Other (please specify): _____

3. Years of experience in anti-corruption efforts or related fields:

1. 0-5 years
2. 6-10 years
3. 11-15 years
4. 16-20 years
5. More than 20 years

4. Profession

1. Investigator/Intelligence
2. Lawyer
3. Accounting/Audit
4. Procurement
5. Economist
6. Statistician/Researcher
7. Administration
8. Corporate relations
9. Teacher
10. ICT officer
11. Others- Specify



5. Directorate

1. Investigations
2. Legal Services
3. Preventive Services
4. Ethics and Leadership
5. Human Resources
6. Finance and Planning
7. ICT

SECTION II: POLICY, LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

6. Kindly indicate the anti-corruption policy and institutional framework you are aware of in Kenya

a.	Policy framework:
b.	Legal framework:
c.	Regulatory framework:

7. What are some of the weaknesses in the anti-corruption policy and institutional framework in Kenya

a.	Policy framework:
b.	Legal framework:
c.	Regulatory framework:

8. What suggestions would you make to improve anti-corruption policy and institutional framework in Kenya

a.	Policy framework:
b.	Legal framework:
c.	Regulatory framework:

SECTION III: POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

9. For each statement below, please indicate your level of agreement:

- 1 = Strongly Disagree
- 2 = Disagree

- 3 = Neutral
 4 = Agree
 5 = Strongly Agree
 6 = Do not know

STATEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	6
a) The EACC operates independently without political interference.						
b) Political influence significantly impacts the selection of cases for investigation by the EACC.						
c) The EACC is able to investigate high-profile corruption cases without political obstruction.						
d) The appointment process for EACC leadership is conducted in a transparent and timely manner.						
e) The appointment process for EACC leadership ensures political neutrality.						

10. What suggestions would you make to improve political goodwill in the fight against corruption in Kenya


SECTION IV: RESOURCE CHALLENGES

11. Kindly circle your preferred option for each question

Budgeting System	
a) Which areas of the budget formulation process are you involved in?	1. Program identification 2. Budget proposal and preparation 3. Budget Implementation 4. Budget Evaluation and monitoring 5. Others Specify
b) What is the percent deviation between the desired budget and actual?	
c) What percentage of spending is financed by donors	
d) How many major donors provide financing support to EACC and How much have you received in the past three years?	1. Number of donors----- 2. Amount received-----
e) What improvements / alternatives do you think EACC should adopt to improve its budget requirements?	

12. Kindly circle your preferred option for each question

<p>a) Describe the existing staff broadly about the educational background and professional experience (knowledge, skills, and experience)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inadequate skills and competence 2. Multi-disciplinary 3. Varying experience 4. Highly specialized 5. Do not know
<p>b) Does staff capacity (number of staff) allow for effective execution of the EACC mandate?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Adequate numbers 2. Inadequate numbers 3. Grossly understaffed 4. Others- Specify-----
<p>c) What is the duration of the contract/terms of the EACC staff?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Permanent and pensionable 2. Contractual-(specify years) 3. Temporary (specify years) 4. Others----
<p>d) What is the turnover rate for EACC Staff (including terminations, resignations, transfers, etc.) per year?</p>	
<p>e) Thinking about your current salary, how much do you think it would compare if you were working in:</p>	<p>Private sector</p>
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I would earn less 2. I would earn around the same 3. I would earn more 4. Do not know
	<p>Other arms of Government</p>
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I would earn less 2. I would earn around the same 3. I would earn more 4. Do not know



13. For each statement below, please indicate your level of agreement:

- 1 = Strongly Disagree
- 2 = Disagree
- 3 = Neutral
- 4 = Agree
- 5 = Strongly Agree
- 6 = Do not know

STATEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	6
a) The EACC has adequate financial resources to fulfil its mandate effectively.						
b) There is demonstrated credible intent by EACC to tackle perceived causes and effects of corruption effectively						
c) EACC Vetting of people seeking public office appointments is effective						
d) The EACC has sufficient human resources with the necessary expertise to combat corruption.						
e) Resource limitations significantly hinder the EACC's ability to investigate complex corruption cases.						

14. What suggestions would you make to improve resourcing for anti-corruption interventions in Kenya

15. For each of the statement, please rate each on a scale of 1 to 5, where: 1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Neutral 4 = Agree 5 = Strongly Agree 6 = Don't Know

STATEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	6
a. EACC has adequate internet connectivity for anti-corruption operations.						
b. EACC has sufficient computers and servers to support its work.						
c. Power supply interruptions significantly affect EACC operations.						
d. EACC technical infrastructure is regularly updated and maintained.						
e. EACC has adequate budget for technological needs.						
f. EACC systems effectively capture all necessary data for corruption investigations.						
g. EACC has effective protocols for handling sensitive digital information.						
h. EACC has adequate tools for digital forensic investigations.						
i. EACC has enough technically skilled staff members to run its ICT infrastructure.						
j. EACC can easily share data with other government agencies.						
k. EACC systems integrate well with international anti-corruption platforms						

1. EACC Technological systems allows the public to make corruption reports easily						
---	--	--	--	--	--	--

16. What suggestions would you make to address technological challenges in your anti-corruption work

SECTION V: COORDINATION CHALLENGES

17. For each statement below, please indicate your level of agreement:

- 1 = Strongly Disagree
- 2 = Disagree
- 3 = Neutral
- 4 = Agree
- 5 = Strongly Agree
- 6 = Do not know

STATEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	6
a) There is effective coordination between the EACC and ODPP						
b) There is effective coordination between the EACC and DCI						
c) There is effective coordination between the EACC and Judiciary						
d) Information sharing among anti-corruption agencies is efficient and timely.						
e) There are clear guidelines defining the roles and responsibilities of different agencies in fighting corruption.						
f) Interagency rivalries significantly hinder effective cooperation in anti-corruption efforts.						
g) Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Kenya and majority of the government institutions have been unable to eradicate it						
h) The fight against corruption is headed in the right direction with strong institutional framework						

18. To what extent are you confident with the following stakeholders regarding the fight against corruption and unethical practices? (Tick as appropriate)

- 1 = strongly Confident
- 2 = confident
- 3 = Neutral
- 4 = Not confident
- 5 = strongly not confident
- 6 = Do not know

Stakeholders	1	2	3	4	5	6
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Stakeholders	1	2	3	4	5	6
a) The Executive						
b) Members of National Assembly						
c) Members of County Assembly						
d) Office of the Attorney General						
e) Office of the Director of Public Prosecution						
f) Office of the Auditor General						
g) Office of the Controller of Budget						
h) Office of the Auditor General						
i) The Judiciary						
j) Kenya Revenue Authority						
k) Commission on Administrative Justice						
l) Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI)						
m) Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission						
n) Religious Organizations						
o) Private broadcasting Stations e.g Citizen, NTV, KTN etc						
p) Public broadcasting stations e.g KBC TV/Radio						
q) Civil Society						
r) Private Sector						
s) Civilians through Social Media e.g Whatsapp, tikitok, facebook, twitter						
t) Individual Kenyan						

19. What suggestions would you make to improve coordination of anti-corruption interventions in Kenya

Respondent details – THIS PAGE WILL BE TORN OFF

Thank you very much for your time. You have given us a lot of useful information. Occasionally my supervisor contacts people to see how the survey went. For this purpose, would you please fill in the following details?

Name	
Telephone Number	
Email	

Interviewer Declaration: I certify that this interview has been personally carried out by me with the correct respondent. I further declare that all the information is truthful and as told to

me by the respondent. I understand that any discrepancy discovered during back-checking of this questionnaire will result in the cancellation of this interview.

.....(Signed)


Stop time (24 Hour)				
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FOR SUPERVISOR’S USE :

Quality Control...(Do Not Ask This Question)	Code
Accompanied	1
Spot Checked	2
Physical Back-Check	3
Telephone Back-Check	4

Name.....

Signature.....Date.....



APPENDIX II: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction

My name is Meshack Collins Aluda, a graduate student of Strathmore University. My purpose today is twofold:

1. Get your insights and understanding about challenges facing Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) and how it affects its execution of its mandate.
2. Get your views on what you can proffer to ameliorate the challenges to enhance **accountability and transparency** and by so doing realize **effective and efficient service delivery** by EACC to the citizenry.

CONFIDENTIALITY: Everything that you say here will be kept strictly confidential. Nothing said will ever be associated with any individual by name or organization.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION: Your participation is entirely voluntary.

Duration and Modalities of the Interview

This Key Informant Guide will take approximately 45-60 minutes. Upon completion of the survey, we shall allow you ten minutes to raise any questions which we shall respond to.

Queries

Queries or assistance regarding the completion of this interview guide should be addressed by the interviewers whose contact details are below.

Meshack Aluda – 0733953235 and or Meshack.aluda@strathmore.edu

1. In your opinion, what are some of the weaknesses in the anti-corruption policy and institutional frameworks?


2. What are your recommendations for improving anti-corruption policy and institutional frameworks?

3. In your opinion, what are the political challenges facing EACC in the execution of its mandate?

4. In your opinion, what suggestions would you make to deal with the political challenges facing EACC in the execution of its mandate?

5. In your opinion, comment on the financial allocations to EACC and propose any strategies that will ensure adequate resourcing

6. In your opinion, comment on the staff establishment and compliment for EACC and propose any strategies that will ensure adequate human capital resourcing



7. In your opinion, what are the coordination weaknesses between EACC and other justice sector actors such as the ODPP, DCI, and Judiciary?

8. In your opinion, what suggestions would you proffer to improve the coordination weaknesses between EACC and other justice sector actors such as the ODPP, DCI, and Judiciary?

Thank You

APPENDIX III: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

DATE:

CEO/Secretary
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
P.O. BOX 61130-00200 Nairobi

Dear, Respondent

RE: ACADEMIC RESEARCH PROJECT

I am a master's in Public Policy and Management student at Strathmore business School. The purpose of this face-to-face survey is to collect information from the staff of EACC regarding policy and institutional framework, political interference, availability of resources and coordination challenges in fighting corruption in Kenya.

The data collected will be for purposes of partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a degree of Masters in Public Policy Management, Strathmore Business School, Strathmore University. The survey is aimed at identifying the challenges faced by EACC in the execution of its mandate. This study will collect quantitative and qualitative data through questionnaires and Key Informant Interviews. The interviews will be collected face to face from first-hand experience and will present original conclusions based on the research.

This study is significant as it seeks not only to examine the challenges faced by the EACC but also to offer actionable insights and recommendations that can support the agency's effectiveness, enhance public sector integrity, and contribute to sustainable governance in Kenya. Participation in this study is completely voluntary.

Meshack Collins Aluda

20th November 2024

Mr Aluda Meshack,
meshack.aluda@strathmore.edu

Dear Mr Aluda,

RE: Challenges Facing the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission in the Fight Against Corruption in Kenya


This is to inform you that SU-ISERC has reviewed and **approved** your above **SU-masters** proposal. Your application reference number is **SU-ISERC2426/24**. The approval period is from **20th November 2024 to 19th November 2025**.

This approval is subject to compliance with the following requirements:

- i. Only approved documents including (informed consents, study instruments, MTA) will be used.
- ii. All changes including (amendments, deviations, and violations) are submitted for review and approval by SU-ISERC.
- iii. Death and life-threatening problems and serious adverse events or unexpected adverse events whether related or unrelated to the study must be reported to SU-ISERC within 72 hours of notification.
- iv. Any changes anticipated or otherwise that may increase the risks or affected safety or welfare of study participants and others or affect the integrity of the research must be reported to SU- ISERC within 72 hours.
- v. Clearance for the export of biological specimens must be obtained from relevant institutions.
- vi. Submission of a request for renewal of approval at least 60 days prior to the expiry of the approval period. Attach a comprehensive progress report to support the renewal.
- vii. Submission of an executive summary report within 90 days of completion of the study to SUI SERC.

Before commencing your study, you will be expected to obtain a research license from National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI) <https://researchportal.nacosti.go.ke/> and obtain other clearances needed.

Yours sincerely,



Mr Ambrose Rachier,
Chairperson; SU-ISERC



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION**

Ref 5714

Date of 2/November 2024

RESEARCH LICENSE



This is to Certify that Mr.. Meshack Collins Aluda of Strathmore University, has been licensed to conduct research per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Nairobi as on the topic: Challenges Facing the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission in the Fight Against Corruption in Kenya for the period ending : 29/November/2025.

License NACOSTI/P/24/41

5714

Applicant Identification

Director

**NATIONAL SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION**

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THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT, 2013 (Rev. 2014)
Legal Notice No. 108: The Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing)
Regulations, 2014

The National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation, hereafter referred to as the Commission, was established under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act 2013 (Revised 2014) herein after referred to as the Act. The objective of the Commission shall be to regulate and assure quality in the science, technology and innovation sector and advise the Government in matters related thereto.

CONDITIONS OF THE RESEARCH LICENSE

1. The License is granted subject to provisions of the Constitution of Kenya, the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, and other relevant laws, policies and regulations. Accordingly, the licensee shall adhere to such procedures, standards, code of ethics and guidelines as may be prescribed by regulations made under the Act, or prescribed by provisions of International treaties of which Kenya is a signatory to
2. The research and its related activities as well as outcomes shall be beneficial to the country and shall not in any way;
 - i. Endanger national security
 - ii. Adversely affect the lives of Kenyans
 - iii. Be in contravention of Kenya's international obligations including Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN).
 - iv. Result in exploitation of intellectual property rights of communities in Kenya
 - v. Adversely affect the environment
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15. Relevant Institutional Scientific and Ethical Review Committee shall monitor and evaluate the research periodically, and make a report of its findings to the Commission for necessary action.

