



Strathmore
UNIVERSITY

Strathmore University
SU+ @ Strathmore
University Library

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

2019

The Philosophy of hope through photography in Kenya: interpretation of Henri Cartier-Bresson's Gaze under the existentialism of Gabriel Marcel

Ismael M. Sanchez
School of Humanities and Social Sciences (SHSS)
Strathmore University

Follow this and additional works at <https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/handle/11071/10162>

Recommended Citation

Sanchez, I. M. (2019). *The Philosophy of hope through photography in Kenya: Interpretation of Henri Cartier-Bresson's Gaze under the existentialism of Gabriel Marcel* [Thesis, Strathmore University]. <https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/handle/11071/10162>

This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by DSpace @Strathmore University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DSpace @Strathmore University. For more information, please contact librarian@strathmore.edu

**The Philosophy of Hope
Through Photography in Kenya**

**Interpretation of Henri Cartier-Bresson's Gaze
Under the Existentialism of Gabriel Marcel**

Ismael Martínez Sánchez

*Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of
Masters of Applied Philosophy and Ethics at Strathmore University*

**School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Strathmore University
Nairobi, Kenya**

June, 2019

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

DECLARATION

Declaration

I declare that this work has not been previously submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the dissertation contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the dissertation itself.

© No part of this dissertation may be reproduced without the permission of the author and Strathmore University.

Ismael Martínez Sánchez



4th June 2019

Approval

The dissertation of Ismael Martínez Sánchez was reviewed and approved by the following:

Dr John Branya,
Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Strathmore University

Prof. Christina Gichure,
Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Strathmore University

Prof. Ruth Kiraka,
Dean, School of Graduate Studies,
Strathmore University

ABSTRACT

Today, many Western media impose a simplifying view of photographic reality by narrating African daily life under negative *clichés* that are perpetuated in time (poverty, famine, corruption, etc.) or recently, it is enough to look at the visual coverage and repercussions of the Al Shabaab DusitD2 Hotel attack on the pages of the *New York Times* (De Freitas, 2015, January 15).

That is why, in a globalized culture, Kenyans are asking themselves if there are any positive models or roles of their own that go beyond this one '*aesthetics of despair*'. So, the question in this dissertation is: Can Western agency and media photography promote a broader view of reality and bring hope to new generations of Kenyans?

To answer this question, we have done an analysis of the characteristics of Cartier-Bresson's photographic work under the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. Both authors were French and intellectuals at the beginning of the 20th century: Henri Cartier-Bresson is considered the father of modern photojournalism and one of the pioneers of humanist photography; Marcel is a philosopher who considers hope the motor in existential life (because he considers that man is not a being thrown into the world).

Thus, this dissertation offers a framework on what photography is, and what hope consists of. We study both fields, specifically, in Henri Cartier-Bresson and in Gabriel Marcel; and conclude with a symbiosis between the four characteristics of photography in Cartier-Bresson with the four notes of the philosophy of hope seen in Gabriel Marcel.

Finally, since aesthetics is always a reflection of ethics, we consider the different types of '*photographic gazes*' of a photojournalist (gaze of resignation, acceptance or redemption) to propose a gaze of hope that overcomes African stereotypes by proposing new paths to Kenyan society. This look is only possible through virtue in technical excellence and professional ethics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION _____	ii
ABSTRACT _____	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS _____	vii
DEDICATION _____	viii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION _____	1
1.1) Framework _____	1
1.2) Background to the dissertation _____	1
1.3) Problem Statement _____	5
1.4) Research Aim _____	5
1.5) Research Objectives _____	5
1.6) Research Questions _____	5
1.7) Scope and limitations of the study _____	6
1.8) Significance of the study _____	6
1.9) Definitions of key terms _____	6
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW _____	8
2.1) Theoretical background _____	8
2.2) Hope _____	9
2.2.1) On the nature of hope _____	9
a) On the tragic meaning of Greek life _____	10
b) On the transcendent sense of hope _____	12
c) The darkening of transcendental hope _____	16
2.2.2) On the nature of hope in Gabriel Marcel according to several authors _____	21
2.2.3) Summary _____	23
2.3) Photography _____	24
2.3.1) On the nature of photography _____	24
a) Truth and photographed representation _____	25
b) Photography and intentionality _____	28
c) The technical and ethical dimension _____	29
2.3.2) On the nature of photography at Cartier-Bresson according to several authors _____	32
2.3.3) Summary _____	35
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY _____	37
3.1) The heuristic method _____	37
3.2) Rules, principles and strategies of the heuristic method _____	37

CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS _____	40
4.1) Gabriel Marcel and the ethical characteristics of hope _____	40
4.1.1) Biography _____	40
4.1.2) Hope in Gabriel Marcel _____	42
a) Definition of hope _____	42
b) Hope and being _____	43
c) On hope and time _____	44
4.1.3) Characteristics of hope in Gabriel Marcel _____	44
a) The incarnation of man _____	45
b) Roaming. Man is a being in time _____	46
c) Personal inner and openness to overcome time _____	47
d) Intersubjectivity like existential security of the man _____	49
4.2) Henri Cartier-Bresson and the positive characteristics of his photograph _____	50
4.2.1) Biography _____	50
4.2.2) Photography at Henri Cartier-Bresson _____	52
4.2.3) The characteristics of photography at Henri Cartier-Bresson _____	54
a) To live is to communicate a photographic intentionality _____	54
b) The decisive moment _____	55
c) Good image composition means recognizing the order of reality _____	57
d) The centrality of the person in the image _____	58
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION _____	59
5.1) What is the correspondence between the characteristics of Marcel's philosophy and Cartier-Bresson's photographs? _____	59
5.1.1) The incarnation in Marcel & Communication at Cartier-Bresson _____	59
5.1.2) Man's itinerancy in Marcel & Capturing the decisive moment in Cartier-Bresson _____	60
5.1.3) Personal inner in Marcel & Recognition of order in Cartier-Bresson _____	62
5.1.4) The intersubjectivity of others in Marcel & The person at Cartier-Bresson _____	63
5.1.5) Conclusions _____	64
CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS _____	66
6.1) The photographic hope of the photojournalist in Kenya _____	66
6.1.1) The photojournalist works on the basis of the Kenyan reality he finds _____	66
6.1.2) The photojournalist works according to the interests of the agency _____	68
6.1.3) The photojournalist works according to his own acquired photographic gaze _____	72
a) Outlook of resignation _____	74
b) Acceptance outlook _____	76
c) Outlook of redemption _____	77
6.1.4) Conclusions on the photojournalist _____	79
6.2) Photographic hope in potential African photographers _____	81
6.2.1) Learning to look: visual literacy _____	82
6.2.2) Acquiring a glimpse of hope: workshops _____	82
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION _____	84
7.1) On personal and social ethics in the photojournalist _____	84
7.2) In the voyage of life _____	85
7.3) Modern individualism _____	85
REFERENCES _____	88

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

- Figure 4.1. *Boys running into the surf at Lake Tanganyika, 1930.* P. 51
- Figure 4.2. *Scanno, Abruzzo, Italy, 1953.* P. 55
- Figure 4.3. *Behind the Gare St Lazare, Paris, France, 1932.* P. 56
- Figure 4.4. *Island of Siphnos, Cyclades, Greece, 1961.* P. 57
- Figure 4.5. *Sunday on the Banks of the Marne, France, 1938.* P. 58

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank the professors and friends
of Strathmore University
for the conversations and patient time.

Wherever you are,
many thanks to Gabriel Marcel and Cartier-Bresson
for helping me shape a look at the others.

During this Master
they strengthened my human faith
in every man and woman I photographed
working as a photojournalist
with *refugees* in Calabria
nomads in Turkana,
indigenous people in the Amazon,
untouchables in India and
persecuted in the war in Syria.

I never thought the ideas
that I read and learned then
they could become
an incarnated and experiential reflection
about the dramas that passed by me
while walking *in status viatoris* in those countries.

My thanks and my best lyrics also go to Dr. John Branya
for his affable good humor after times of war.

DEDICATION

To my parents Santiago and Magdalena, from my African heart,
for living their lives on hope.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1) Framework

This dissertation of the philosophy of hope through photography is structured as follows: In *chapter two* we are going to carry out a general study of literature review gathering the diverse opinions expressed throughout history on the nature of the philosophy of hope and the nature of photography. In *chapter three* we explain the methodological research used for this topic.

Later, *chapter four* reflects a presentation of research findings addressing, on the one hand, the characteristics of the philosophy of hope in Gabriel Marcel and, on the other hand, the characteristics of photography in Cartier-Bresson.

In *chapter five* we focus the discussion on an attempt to symbiosis the characteristics between the two authors. That is, an interpretation of Cartier-Bresson's gaze under the existentialism of Gabriel Marcel seeking to discover '*a glimpse of hope*'.

Chapter six focuses on recommendations for getting this glimpse of hope both in photojournalists working in Kenya and for potential photographers. In the case of photojournalists, we analyze both: their circumstances in Kenyan reality, as well as their work in a news agency and the different ways of seeing the world behind the camera. From a look that a photographer may have (which we will call) of resignation, to another look of acceptance and – to another final – of redemption before the world he portrays. In the case of potential photographers, we focus on how to learn to look and how to have a hopeful look.

Finally, *chapter seven* closes this dissertation with three brief conclusions.

1.2) Background to the dissertation

As a photojournalist, I try to create optimism and hope with my work because without hope it is difficult to live. Also it is important to know the influence of images and messages in the media that shape public opinion about Africa, in general, and Kenya in particular.

The Western media not only create a limited version of reality but also a biased view to readers and viewers by repeating scenarios with texts and images about African worlds. These modes of saying (textual or visual) are repeatedly used towards global public opinion: arguing in an intentional direction and increasing with repetition stereotypes about African institutions, population groups or countries.

The Western Media portrays the reality of the African continent with images of the drama of Ebola, malaria, AIDS, destitution, war, crime and corruption. Tragedies that are exposed together with occasionally some *green shoots* of African development (called by some *Afro-future*).

Generally, we can see that a certain *visual evilness* prevails over the *black continent*, a collective and euro-centric imaginary that seldom responds to plural African social reality. It is generally accepted that this interpretation was initiated especially by Joseph Conrad's iconography of his novel *The Heart in Darkness* (Conrad, 1899) and the philosophical stigma of German idealism headed by Hegel, who considered Africans as primitive beings... "*In Africa we find what has been called the 'age of innocence', in which man is supposed to live according to God and nature. In this state, man is not yet conscious of himself..., this primitive natural state is actually a state of animality*" (Hegel, 2001, p. 172).

As the late Kenyan writer Binyavanga Wainaina wrote ironically (2005), "*never have a picture of a well-adjusted African on the cover of your book, or in it, unless that African has won the Nobel Prize. An AK-47, prominent ribs, naked breasts: use these. If you must include an African, make sure you get one in Masai or Zulu or Dogon dress [...] And sunsets, the African sunset is a must. It is always big and red. There is always a big sky. [...] When writing about the plight of flora and fauna, make sure you mention that Africa is overpopulated. When your main character is in a desert or jungle living with indigenous peoples (anybody short) it is okay to mention that Africa has been severely depopulated by Aids and War (use caps). [...] Always end your book with Nelson Mandela saying something about rainbows or renaissances. Because you care*".

It seems that Wainaina's narrative and visual councils have not fallen on deaf ears, as there are beginning to be specialized publications and permanent journalists who approach different African cultures with other perspectives. Thus, according to the opinion of the documentary filmmaker and director of the magazine *Altair* Pere Ortin, *"we must escape from the narrative prison of the colonial mentality, lose the privilege of discourse and change the grammar that dominates the production of almost all the narratives of the Western media"*. According to Ortin, *"the images of certain international journalism, based on the multiple forms of human pain and suffering, are a sample of the clichés and misunderstandings that journalism inherits, without discussing them, from colonial ethnology. As they are easily recognizable by the average viewer, they are also potentially viral. That is why it is important for journalism to flee from pornomics"*, says Ortin (Carrión, 2019).

Also according to the journalist resident in Ivory Coast Gemma Parellada, *"stories that traditional media want to publish, even the newest and alternative media, are linked to drama. I wouldn't just say conflicts, because conflicts have to be covered. But it's not so much what as how the continent is treated and how these conflicts are dealt with. We stay in the more superficial versions, in that simplified story of heroes and villains: in Africa we have Mandelas and we have Pistorius. We have Joseph Kony, the rebel leaders, these terrible cannibalistic militiamen or the superheroes. It is as if there is nothing else between these extremes, as if there are no entrepreneurs, intellectuals, academics, artists... 98 percent of societies. We eliminated a large part of the continent from the narrative and that is a very clear way of violating the reality of the African continent"* (Parellada, 2019).

So, in other words, if this kind of narrative about one's African identity is created by Western media defining, how does this affect Kenyans? What happens when a Kenyan-African travels outside? The answer is that one is judged by the Western media stereotypes rather than for what one truly is. Is it possible to offer a different or complementary Africa identity to the tragedy usually represented in the visual media? Or can it only be represented as a humanitarian drama and pornography of the continent?

In this case, we consider that an extension of Kenyan photographic themes should be shown beyond the visual *clichés* offered by the national and international media. We believe that showing a greater number of positive realities and facts, photography can give a more hopeful identity to the Kenyan youth.

Why Cartier-Bresson and Gabriel Marcel?

We decide to study the figure of Cartier-Bresson because he is probably the most important photojournalist of the 20th century and the one who has influenced most other photographers.

Coincidentally, Cartier-Bresson found the beginning of his photographic career in 1929 during a journey through Africa with the image that – according to him – “*is the only one that has influenced me. In 1932, I saw a photograph of Martin Munkácsi in Tanganyika of three African children playing with a wave and I must say that the same photograph was the spark that set fire to the fireworks. Suddenly I understood that photography can fix eternity in a moment [...] I couldn't believe it. Such a thing could be captured with the camera. Damn it, I took my camera and went out into the street*” (Pogrebin, 2007).

Cartier-Bresson, enlightened by this visual reflection will try to capture the daily *decisive moments* of human life. He established a new way of looking and created new images of the world of the twentieth century that until then had not been documented in the history of photography. Cartier-Bresson will also be one of the fathers of what will later be called *humanist photography*. In other words, a type of photography that puts people at the center of the photographer, new after the disaster of the two world wars. In a way, this movement is based on humanism, surrealism and the ideologies of the beginning of the century, including existentialism as a search for meaning in the world.

Finally, I decide to interpret photography with Gabriel Marcel's philosophical approach to the virtue of hope for several reasons. Gabriel Marcel is also French and a contemporary of Cartier-Bresson. As well as being a philosopher and a writer, Marcel worked as a journalist and was editor of the *Plon* publishing house in Paris. Therefore, his work is better related to artistic and photographic temperaments. Also because his

philosophy is based on a holistic vision of man. Marcel brings a positive existentialism that enhances hope unlike other existentialist philosophers of negation, who understand that the world as meaningless (such as Jean Paul Sartre or Albert Camus).

We could have chosen classical philosophy following the Thomistic tradition represented, among others, by Josef Pieper, but we prefer to approach Cartier-Bresson's photography from a less structured and more vitalist point of view.

1.3) Problem Statement

Whether the ethical elements of hope could be related to the photography of Cartier-Bresson.

1.4) Research Aim

As a photojournalist, I want to see whether is possible to combine Gabriel Marcel's existential ethics of hope with the new way of looking at the world introduced by the photography of Cartier-Bresson. In order to find the elements that could make it possible to show how photographers could enhance the virtue of hope in Kenyan youth rather than the dramatic visual stereotypes held by the Western media on Kenya (and Africa).

1.5) Research Objectives

1. To know the ethical characteristics of hope in Gabriel Marcel.
2. To know the positive characteristics of humanist photography in Cartier-Bresson.
3. To see if it is possible to make a correspondence between the ethical characteristics of hope according to Gabriel Marcel and the photography of Cartier-Bresson.

1.6) Research Questions

1. What are the characteristics of the ethics of hope in Gabriel Marcel?
2. What are the positive characteristics of humanist photography in Cartier-Bresson?
3. What is the correspondence between the ethical characteristics of hope in Gabriel Marcel's philosophy and Cartier-Bresson's photography?

1.7) Scope and limitations of the study

The study is limited to research on hope according to Gabriel Marcel's philosophy and its application to Cartier-Bresson's photography using a heuristic method.

1.8) Significance of the study

This work will be valuable to show Western media (especially photography agencies such as *AP*, *AFP*, *Reuters*, *EFE* and photographic digital stores as *Getty Images*) that there is also a wider and more everyday photographic bet that combines a more plural and hopeful vision of Africa – and Kenya in particular – avoiding the continuous negative stereotyped repetition of the continent and its protagonists. It will also teach that it is possible to show positive identification roles in and for Kenyan who learn through photography in the educational system.

1.9) Definitions of key terms

Hope. It is a virtue by which we are presented as possible what we desire in the advancement of man over time. For Gabriel Marcel, hope is a virtue that requires a prior understanding of the existential meaning of the person in the world. For him hope is a mystery because it transcends every particular object. It is not a '*I hope that*' but a '*I hope*' as a response to a trial, to a situation of captivity that is characterized by the impossibility "*of accessing a certain lived fullness*" (Urabayen, 2001, p. 158).

Photography. According to Cartier-Bresson "*photography is putting the head, the eye and the heart in the same spotlight: the viewfinder*" (Cartier-Bresson, 2016, p. 11). "*Photography is the recognition in reality of a rhythm of surface, lines and values; all the camera has to do is print the decision of the eye on the film. A photo is seen in its entirety, at once as a picture; its composition is a simultaneous coalition, the organic coordination of visual elements. It is not composed free of charge and it is not possible to separate the background from the form. Photography is a new plastic art, where one works in movement, in a kind of presentiment in life*" (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, p. 15).

Humanist photography. After the two world wars, a photographic movement arises that wishes to highlight the figure of the human being, as an attempt to dignify and revalue the dignity of the person. Thus, the person constitutes the center of the photographer's image and concerns. These humanist concerns rank from a photograph that desires to capture the poetry of everyday life to a social photography oriented towards political

activism. The French photographers Henri Cartier-Bresson, Robert Doisneau and Willy Ronis are considered to be the founders of this movement which, later on, from 1967 was called *Concerned Photography* within photojournalism (although it was also extended to creative photography in general, especially among photographers born in Europe and North America).

International news agencies: they are journalistic organizations that collect news (texts, images, videos) from their correspondents in different places of their geographical area. These contents are immediately transmitted to the central office, where, after processing the information, they send it, as quickly as possible, to their clients (radios, newspapers, magazines, television stations or portals), known as subscribers.

In short, the agencies solve the need of the media and the public for a fast and complete informative coverage about an international event. "*For agencies the measure of their influence is the number of media that feed on their services, while credibility is the basis of national and international expansion and the foundation of their business*" (Muro, 2016, cap. 2).

Stereotype: simplified perception of the reality of a fact, person or thing that seeks to justify a certain behaviour in relation to a certain pre-judgment. Stereotypes are mental simplifications to achieve a situation of dominion over what is perceived. Media and agencies play an important role in the creation, repetition and maintenance of these pre-judgments, since information demands celerity and these *clichés* (textual or visual) are assumed and disseminated aprioristically without any reflection.

Pornomisery: is a concept that comes from Colombian cinema made in the 1970s and that is applied – by extension – to other narratives, such as the Media. Originally and still today, it expresses cinema that used poverty and human misery to make money and gain international recognition.

The term '*pornomisery*' was created by film director Luis Puenzo to criticize excesses in the representation of the marginality of Latin America cinema. Today it is also called '*aesthetics of hunger*'. In short, it is a spectacularization of poverty and marginality in the face of the opposite and neo-colonial discourse that highlights the exoticism of a specific country or culture (León, p. 77).

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, let us carry out a general study of literature review gathering the diverse opinions expressed throughout history on the nature of the philosophy of hope and the nature of photography.

2.1) Theoretical background

In this dissertation we are going to make an approximation from the realistic philosophy to the existentialist philosophy of Gabriel Marcel and to the photography of Cartier-Bresson.

On the one hand, this realistic philosophy is the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition that defines hope as a human virtue. Virtue acquired through the struggle to acquire it as a habit, in '*status viatoris*', as Josef Pieper understands it (Pieper, 2010). For Saint Thomas Aquinas, hope is also a virtue "*that resides in the will*" (Summa Theologiae, II-II q. 18 a. 1) and that leads the person to deal with God the Creator.

On the other hand, realistic philosophy follows the Platonic-Aristotelian distinction of *the unity of human actions* between '*poiesis*' (Platón, El Banquete Vol III) and '*fronesis*' (Aristoteles, Ética a Nicómaco I 142 a) between the technical and the ethical.

We will see how Gabriel Marcel perceives this unity of the technical together with the ethical. That is to say, action for being. The technical actions of my freedom can only be understood from the previous question of my existence: *who am I?*

Gabriel Marcel considers that life is a mystery, not a problem. The person's being must be directed towards the hope that there is a creator who awaits us and is the way to achieve happiness. For Marcel – philosopher and playwright – life and art are good if they help us to improve our being. In this sense, art is also a means to understand the transcendental meaning of my existence and to help us improve as people on the road to happiness, because beauty brings us closer to asking ourselves about being. In short (Urabayen, 2001), Marcel considers that philosophy serves man when it is a philosophy of hope in the Self. For Marcel means understanding: My own incarnation, my personal intimacy, my itinerancy in the world and my intersubjectivity with others.

These four pillars will help us to consider and analyze them in the photographic work of another contemporary of Marcel, universal Frenchman and father of photojournalism: Cartier-Bresson.

Henri Cartier-Bresson, founder of the *Magnum Pictures agency*, has been considered one of the three most influential photographers in history. Some have defined him as *the eye of the century* for his work on humanist photography on five continents. On the other hand, although Cartier-Bresson was not a philosopher with a theoretical body, he wrote a small work entitled *The Decisive Moment in Photographing the Natural* (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, p. 13). This work has had a great impact on photographic history and will also serve as a reference for this comparative study with Marcel. Finally, we will try to offer some conclusions about the parallelism between the two creators.

In order to answer the questions posed, we will now define the concepts of hope, and the hope in Gabriel Marcel. We will do the same with the nature of photography, and the photography in Cartier-Bresson.

2.2) Hope

We will now look at 'the nature of hope' in three sections in order to understand the historical framework of this virtue in the history of philosophy that influenced even Gabriel Marcel. Subsequently, we will see in particular 'the nature of hope in Gabriel Marcel' according to the studies of several authors.

2.2.1) On the nature of hope

Influenced by a Christian cultural environment one might think that to ask hope is to ask a religious question. But to speak of it is not necessarily to ask a religious question. It is, without a doubt, an essentially philosophical question.

Of the three great questions that Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) considered that philosophy had to answer, one of them is the question of hope. The first is: "*What can I know?*" The second: "*What should I do?*" And the third: "*What can I expect?*" (Kant, 2013). In other words, the sciences of gnoseology and ethics would be the answers to the first two questions. For the third question Kant does not establish an answer, but

we can intuit that to speak of hope means to ask oneself about eschatology within the limits of reason. That is to say, hope supposes asking oneself the last questions.

In short, hope means speaking of the man who is moving along the path of life. And, likewise, living in time implies asking what I can expect on this path. In other words, if the path has or lacks a meaning for man's life, as hope precisely proposes, which is an *'expectation about something or someone'*.

We shall now look at three chapters related to hope in the history of philosophical ideas: the tragic meaning of the Greeks, the transcendental openness to Christianity and the denial of hope in God in modernity.

In each of these three stages hope is considered different according to the consideration of the concept of time and the meaning of time itself, since the three ideas of hope, time and the meaning of time are intimately related.

a) On the tragic meaning of Greek life

We owe the relevant contributions to the history of ideas to the Greeks, because it was the Greeks who discovered rationality in nature.

Until the 7th century BC, the Greeks lived the tragic fate imposed by the gods of Olympus, who inexorably marked the existential mission. In ancient times, every man – like Achilles or Ulysses – had a destiny to face. So as such, there is no hope in classical Greek antiquity, for there was only the destiny commanded by Olympus.

From the 7th century B.C., pre-Socratic philosophers began to look for the last logical foundation of reality, because they discovered that nature has an orderly structure that it is possible to discover. Thus it is considered that philosophy was born with the Presocratics in Greece when this logos, reason, replaces myth. Therefore, the world has a meaning, a *logos*: it is no longer the absurd world without meaning under the destiny of the tyranny of gods and Greek myths. As Corazón (2001, p. 47) points out for the pre-Socratic *"rationality was inherent in reality. And reality has consistency in it, not from now on in strange or supernatural forces"* of the Greek myths.

Thus, Anaximander of Miletus (610-545 BC) will consider that the first principle or 'arje' of the nature of all material things is the 'apeiron'. And the 'apeiron' is condemned to change, mutation and destruction in order to re-emerge cyclically again and again. In the same tune we find Heraclitus (540-480 BC), for whom the first principle of life is a fire that is in continuous motion. Everything flows, 'panta rhei', expressed in its well-known fragment (Heráclito, 1903, p. 503): "*In the same rivers we enter and we do not enter, [for] we are and we are no longer [the same]*".

In addition to seeking those first principles of reality submitted to the becoming, the Greeks also observe the cyclical changes of nature (with the seasons, the rains, the stars). This will determine a circular vision of time, an eternal return of life that is in continuous movement with beings that are born, grow and die and regenerate again: the universe is a continuous becoming.

For Aristotle (384-322 BC), as he develops *Nicomachean Ethics*, man must move in time in the search for perfection towards the good of the 'areté' (virtue), developing his own human nature. In this sense, man's hope is like a natural anticipation of the possible to come, but the stagirite understands that man towards good must overcome fear in the movement of time. "*There must still be some hope of salvation to fight for. And one sign of this is that fear causes us to deliberate, while no one deliberates over desperate things*" (Retórica, 1383 to 5). That is to say, where there is human hope it will be because there is fear and we must wait only for what is feasible.

On the other hand, Aristotle observes the evolution of human life by comparing natural hope in the different stages of life: "*[Young people] most of the time live full of hope, since hope concerns the future, while remembrance concerns the past: young people have much future and little past; and it is certainly not proper of the first day to remember nothing, but to expect everything. For the same reason that has just been said, they are also easy to deceive (since they are easily filled with hope), they have the most courageous spirit*" (Ética a Nicómaco, III, 3, 1389 to 18-27). On the other hand, the old "*live more for remembrance than for hope, because they have little left of life and, on the other hand, much lived and, for their part, hope resides in the future, while remembrance settles in the past,*" Aristotle points out (ibid, III, 3, 1390 to 7-8).

According to the Epicureans, man's nature consists in reaching a serene expectation or ataraxy (absence of disturbance) between the life of the body and that of the soul. The man concentrated on himself is for pleasure, avoiding the fear of the gods of Olympus. The poet Horatio (65-27 BC), points out that the meaning of life is to enjoy the present *carpe diem*: "*Be prudent, drink good wine and reduce long hopes to the short space of existence. As we speak, the envied hour flees. Seize the day, do not trust in tomorrow*" (Odas, I, 11, 8).

On the other hand, the Stoics faced the fatality of the world, accepting the principle of resignation in the face of pain and suffering in life through the firmness of the will. For Marcus Aurelius (121-180): "*In the universe change; in life firmness*" (Meditaciones, 1,16). For this reason, Seneca (4-65) considers that "*the greatest hindrance of life is the expectation of tomorrow and the loss of today*" (La brevedad de la vida, 9). In short, Stoicism considers hope more of a vain passion than as a virtue to be attained.

In summary, in the world of the Greeks time is considered circular, in continuous movement and in eternal return. As such, there is a simple human hope in the face of the fatalism of the tragic destiny of life. A life that we must fight against the hopelessness of fear (Aristotle), enjoy it in pleasure (epicureans) or resign ourselves to the inevitable (stoics).

b) On the transcendent sense of hope

With the advent of Christ into the world, it introduces a transcendent sense into history where God is Alpha and Omega, beginning and end. Thus, one passes from a circular conception of the Greeks to a linear conception of time and history, from the beginning of the creation of the world to the Last Judgment. The simply natural and fatalistic hope of the Greeks now becomes a theological virtue with Christianity, for God reveals to man that hope consists in setting out with virtue and grace to embrace his creator. Time on earth becomes – can become – a path with meaning. According to Augustine of Hippo (354-430), it is a pilgrimage from *the city of men* on earth to *the City of God* in heaven (La ciudad de Dios, 2017).

This paradigm shift in the sense of time and history implies that a human being now has a personal biography that begins and ends. Moreover, time also has a double

dimension when Augustine asks in his autobiography the *Confessions*: “*What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; but if I want to explain it to the one who asks me, I don't know. What I do say without hesitation is that I know that if nothing happened, there would be no time past; and if nothing happened, there would be no future time; and if nothing existed, there would be no present time [...] I measure time, I know it; but I do not measure the future, which is not yet; I do not measure the present, which does not extend into any space; nor do I measure the past which no longer exists. What, then, do I measure?*” (XI, XIV, 17-33). And he replied: “*In you, my soul, I measure the times. In you, I repeat, I measure the times. The affection that is produced in you by things that happen, and which, even when they have happened, remain*” (XI, XXVII, 36).

That is to say, the saint of Hippo considers ‘time’ with a double perspective: time has an objective chronological dimension, but also a subjective dimension, because it is measured in function of the impact that some actions of life imprint on our life. Human beings have different perceptions of time – slow or fast, suffering or joyful, with nostalgia or hatred – depending on the different experiences. So, “*although St. Augustine does not expressly develop, it follows that what allows us to live in time is that we are incarnate spirits. Therefore, there is only time where there is an incarnate spirit*” (Isler, 2008, p. 198).

Tomas de Aquino (1225-1274) uses *fides et ratio* (man revealed as ‘*imago Dei*’ and the contributions of Aristotelian rationality) to analyze the virtue of hope in *Summa Theologiae*. Aquinas explains that the meaning of man’s life is to love: “*to love is to desire good from someone*” (*Summa Theologiae*, 1-2, q. 26, a. 4, c). And hope is defined as the desire impressed by God in the heart of every man to attain the highest good of God. Let us go in parts. St. Thomas says:

a) “*Hope is virtue, for it makes man’s action good, and conforms to the right rule [in natural reason and to God himself]. The hope of which we speak is a habit*” (*Summa Theologiae*, II-II q. 17 a.1).

b) The subject of hope is the will to seek God. “*Hope resides in the higher [intellectual] appetite, called the will*” (*Summa Theologiae*, II-II q. 18 a. 1).

c) The object of hope is to reach the creator. “*Is eternal bliss the object of hope? The proper and principal object of hope is eternal bliss. The hope that we try to reach God by relying on his help in order to obtain the expected good,*” Aquinas points out (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 2).

d) Four conditions of the object of true hope: “*First, let it be good; for, properly speaking, there is no hope but good. Second, let it be future, for hope does not refer to the present good already possessed. And in this hope is distinguished from joy, which refers to the present good. Thirdly, it must be an arduous thing that is achieved with difficulty, for it is not said that someone expects a minimum thing when it is in his power to obtain it immediately. [...] Fourth, that this arduous object be possible to obtain, for no one expects what is absolutely unattainable. And in this hope is distinguished from despair*” (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 40, a. 1, a). We will see how these four points relate to the existential characteristics in Gabriel Marcel.

e) Finally, for Aquinas, the relationship between the virtues of loving God (charity) and seeking God (hope) consists in the fact that “*charity sufficiently perfects the will as to the act of loving; but another virtue is required to perfect it in the act of waiting*” (Summa Theologiae, II-II q. 18 a. 1 ad. 2).

A follower of Thomism, Josef Pieper (1904-1997), will develop hope in his work *Las virtudes fundamentales* by making an interesting contribution between man in ‘*status viatoris*’ and man in ‘*status comprehensoris*’ (2010, p. 358).

“*Viator means the one who is on the way, and ‘status viatoris’, the state of being who is on the way. The opposite concept corresponding to the ‘status viatoris’ is the ‘status comprehensoris’. The one who has captured, achieved, reached, is no longer viator, but comprehensor [...] To be on the way, to be viator, means to walk towards happiness; to have reached, to be comprehensor, means to possess happiness. With the word happiness, however, one understands first of all the objective fullness in the order of being. And this fullness is the beatific vision of God’* – for this reason, Pieper points out that – “*The sense of the ‘status viatoris’ is the status comprehensor*” (ibid, p. 361). We will see later on this idea in the work of Gabriel Marcel in dealing with open time and closed time (‘*the time to be*’ and ‘*the time to have*’ in Marcel’s words).

Man, logically, has the possibility – being free – of not following the good impressed in his nature, despairing or not living the virtue of hope, which Pieper defines as the “*ultimum potentiae, the maximum to which man can aspire, that is, the fullness of human power*” (ibid, p. 361).

Pieper also notes the distinction between natural and supernatural hope. “*Natural hope arises from man’s youthful energy and is exhausted with it*” (ibid, p. 376) while hope is, first and foremost, a theological virtue, “*for hope is either a theological virtue or it is not at all a virtue. It is a virtue only because of what it is a theological virtue*” (ibid, p. 365) because God has revealed to man that he is his Father and that the son can meet him on the earthly pilgrimage.

Thus, while “*every hope tells us: ‘it will end well, it will have a good end’; Supernatural hope assures us: the man who is really in God’s grace will end in an infinitely better way than he could hope for; this man’s end will be nothing less than Eternal Life*” (ibid, p. 26).

Moreover, paradoxically Pieper reminds us of the idea that with the passing of the years, natural human hopes diminish and interest in life is lost. “*As man declines, natural hope tires, for it becomes heavy. And yet in supernatural hope – anchored in God – the opposite happens: not only is it not linked to natural youth, but it bases a much more essential youth. It gives man a ‘not yet’ that completely triumphs over the decline of the natural energies of hope. It gives man ‘so much future’ that the past of the longest and richest life appears, on the contrary, as ‘little past’*” (ibid, p. 376).

Pieper also points to the error of atheistic existentialist philosophy “*which considers human existence as ‘being for death’ [...] by conceiving the existence of man as essentially ‘at the root of his temporal being’ (Heidegger). And he does not realize the true nature of his object*” (ibid, p. 362). That is to say, the existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre considers time as *an end* in itself and not as *a means* to satisfy the fullness of man with a possible God Creator Father, who as such does not exist for them.

For Pieper, the man who in ‘*status viatoris*’ experiences being essentially a creature, the “*being who is not yet*” of his own existence, cannot fall into despair, “*for the*

meaning of created existence is not nothing, but being, that is, truth” (ibid, p. 365). Man wants to know – as Aristotle intuited – and the truth revealed later is this: we are *‘imago Dei’*.

Well, perhaps we can still consider that transcendental existential hope is something abstract or ethereal, and not something real as Marcel will consider it. To what could we resemble it after what was said in Aquinas and Pieper?

According to the poet and convert Charles Peguy (1873-1914) hope is like a child. *“Hope - in the midst of its two elder sisters, faith and charity gives the sensation of allowing oneself to be dragged along like a child who had no strength to walk.... But in reality it is hope that makes the other two walk [as it is the child who makes the parents walk]. And it is it that makes the whole world walk, because in truth [as the parents] one only works for the children and the two greatest of faith and charity advance thanks to the little one”* (Lorda, 2013, p. 136). It is this child – the virtue of theological hope – that encourages man to walk in his life.

In short, Christianity brings a full existential sense, which the Greeks had lacked. According to Augustine, Aquinas and Pieper, hope is no longer a simple natural waiting in a tragic world with gods on Olympus. Hope is now a supernatural virtue that reminds man that we are called to live as children in search of God the Creator Father.

c) The darkening of transcendental hope

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) initiated the anthropological turn of the *cogito ergo sum* that culminated in the 18th century Enlightenment. Now, the autonomy of the person is defended towards any transcendental reference in the sense of life and hope will now be an autonomous hope in man, without any transcendental reference (as Aquinas and the medieval Scholastica had proposed). The enlightened must find the true man, who belongs to Hellenic culture, the culmination of the perfect man.

Thus Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) deals with the subject of hope, turning to the Greek myth of Pandora which – like Eve in the Judeo-Christian religion – represents the perdition of humanity. Pandora was the first woman created by the god Zeus to punish Prometheus, who had given fire to men. Until then the world had lived in

harmony but Pandora opened the amphora that contained the evils and liberated all the misfortunes, letting the evils flood the earth. According to the myth, Zeus asked Pandora to seal the vessel again. By the time Pandora closed the amphora, the only thing she already had inside was hope, so humans did not receive it. From this myth comes the expression *'open Pandora's box'* and *'hope is the last thing to be lost'*.

According to Nietzsche, since then human beings have kept the amphora and we live thinking of the wonder of hope kept when, in reality, this amphora only contained the evils. In other words, Nietzsche's criticism of his contemporaries with regard to hope is the fact that men become passive in the face of reality and only yearn for stored dreams, forgetting the real action in this world. The Christian hope that is *"a morality of slaves"* (Nietzsche, 1973, p. 163) longs for a God who has died and *"hope is the worst of evils because it prolongs the torment of men"* (Nietzsche, 1986, p. 80).

On the other hand, transcendental hope must be replaced by the idea of progress. Scientific reason is the only reason that will allow us to live in *"the best of possible worlds"* (Leibniz, 1875, p. 606), according to the theodicy of the German thinker. But, as we know, hope in this perennial progress of Humanity – where man was simply a being thrown into the world of existentialism – led to the negative monsters of reason: such as nuclear war and the concentration camps of the 20th century, confirming the thesis that if reason is autonomous, *"if God does not exist, everything is permitted"* (Dostoevski, 2000, p. 941).

"All of us have witnessed how progress can turn into terrible progress in evil. If technical progress does not correspond to progress in the ethical formation of man, with the growth of the inner man, it is not progress but a threat to man and to the world" (Vatican, 1965, pt. 22).

Paradoxically it was also Friedrich Nietzsche who pointed out that *"he who has something to live for, is able to bear any how"* (1988, p. 116). And as psychiatrist Viktor Frankl (1905-1997) noted about his stay in Auschwitz: *"There is much wisdom in Nietzsche when he points to that phrase. Woe to him who saw no meaning in his life, no goal, no intentionality and, therefore, no purpose in living it. That one was lost [in the concentration camp]. And I would dare to say that there is nothing in the world*

capable of helping us survive, even in the worst conditions, such as knowing that life has meaning” (Frankl, 1962, p. 168).

For Viktor Frankl it is only possible to have hope when there is a meaning to life. And a sense of life when there is hope. But where does it come from that there is or must be followed a sense of life?

Philosopher CS Lewis points out that man is like a fleet of ships to a destination (1996, p. 87) and American philosopher Peter Kreeft (1989, p. 9) comments that *“they must know why the fleet is at sea in the first place. What is their mission, their destination? This is the question of the summum bonum, and no modern philosophers except the existentialists seem even to be interested in this, the greatest of all questions” [...]* And concludes Kreeft: *“I think I know why modern philosophers dare not raise this greatest of questions: because they have no answer to it. It is a hole so big that only the courage of an existentialist or the faith of a theist can fill it” (ibid, p. 9).*

In other words, it is precisely the theists and existentialists (among them Marcel in his own way and whom we will study) who attempt to answer the basic question considered in modernity by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976): *“Why is there anything rather than nothing?” (1942, p. 22).* I mean, why I’m here. According to the German thinker and rector of Freiburg, *“Many men never encounter this question, if by encounter we mean not merely to hear and read about it as an interrogative formulation but to ask the question, that is, to bring it about, to raise it, to feel its inevitability. And yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more than once, by the hidden power of this question, even if he is not aware of what is happening to him. The question looms in moments of great despair [...] It is present in moments of rejoicing, upon us in boredom [...] This the question ‘Why is there anything rather than nothing?’ may be asked expressly, or, unrecognized as a question, it may merely pass through our lives like a brief gust of wind” (Heidegger cited in Kreeft, 1989, p. 9).*

On the other hand, among the theists we can consider the comment of the German theologian Joseph Ratzinger in pointing out that *“if the world had no meaning, we [men] could not create it either. Men can perform actions that mean something within a practical framework, but never give meaning to a life. Meaning exists or does not*

exist. People do not invent, but find,” adds Ratzinger (2005, p. 171). That is to say, man does not create, he cannot give himself his own instruction manual. In other words, the designed one could not give himself his own rules. The designed implies a previous external designer who gives the instruction manual to what has been created.

From this perspective, the magisterium of the Church has no sense of life, as if it had a key to the vehicle of pilgrims traveling from *the city of men* to *the city of God*. No. What Aquinas and Pieper’s human/Christian philosophy recalls, along with the so-called Church tradition, is even more radical and natural. The encyclical *Gaudium et spes* puts it this way: *“In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience when necessary speaks to his heart: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged. Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God”* (Vatican, 1965, pt. 16).

Therefore, Ratzinger points out, *“what the Church says is that meaning is not a human product, but given by God”* (2005, p. 171). In other words: the rules of navigation, the meaning of life is inscribed in man’s own heart by a Creator God. And each man can discover the meaning of his own biography by listening to the inner voice of the conscience imprinted on his heart. Man is *‘imago Dei’*, and thanks to his creator he can find a horizon of his life to the existential itinerary. A note: to discover this awareness is a matter; to live virtue and to have hope is another matter. But as we already announced with Nietzsche: *“He who has a why to live can bear almost any how.”*

In other words, the only thing the Church can do is to defend the conscience printed with the instruction manual of human nature, but it will never give rules or an existential meaning to man. As John Henry Newman (1801-1890) pointed out, the obligation of theists in the Church is to defend conscience. *“If any Pope spoke against conscience, in the true sense of the word, he would be committing a suicidal act. That Pope would be cutting the grass under his feet. His authentic mission is to proclaim the moral Law and to protect and strengthen that Light [of conscience] which enlightened every man who came into the world. The Pope’s theoretical authority, as well as his power in practice, is based on the Law of Conscience and its sacredness”* (ibid, p. 76).

And Newman concluded: “*And if I am forced to speak of religion in an after-dinner toast, I will gladly drink ‘For the Pope’. But first ‘For the conscience!’, then ‘For the Pope!’*” (Newman, 1996, p. 82).

According to the philosopher and anthropologist René Girard (1923-2015), in today’s world – which has blinded the *transcendence* of the hope *etsi Deus non daretur* (as if god did not exist) – there is the risk of going back centuries to the fatalism of the Greeks. “*We should ask the question about the importance of religion in a completely different way than the media do today. In the view of the mass media, religion is conceived as a thought alien to human nature, something that comes as a constriction, something that can be harmful to health. Religion damages man like smoke. But this discourse omits the fact that religion is part of human nature, it is consubstantial to human nature to have religious beliefs, and as such it must have an anthropological and social purpose, and we must ask ourselves what it means to live in a world in which religion is pretended to be dispensed with*”. And Girard asks himself: “*Is this not a danger, in particular the danger of the unleashing of violence? [...] if our world is a world in which tragedy is returning, if we begin to see this tragedy as a religious tragedy, then there is hope; if instead we consider it a Greek tragedy, then it is over*” (Girard, 2011, p. 44). Avoiding a return to Greek tragedy and fatalism, recovering a hope with transcendent meaning, is something that we will see in Gabriel Marcel.

In short, we end this epigraph by answering the first question asked at the beginning of this chapter by Kant: “*What can we expect today? And what can we not expect? Above all, we must note that cumulative progress is only possible in the material [...] On the other hand, in the realm of ethical conscience and moral decision, there is no similar possibility of increase. In other words, it is not science that redeems man. Man is redeemed by love. We need to have hopes – larger or smaller – that keep us going day by day. But without the great hope, which has to surpass everything else, those are not enough. This great hope can only be God*”, says the Encyclical *Gaudium et spes* (1965, pt. 24-31).

In short, man discovers who he is and what he is in conscience. I am an incarnated man (Marcel, 1964), a spirit in the time (Polo, 1991). But – according to Marcel – I am son of God first of all. And it is only by following our printed conscience of children of

God that we can love and have true hope. And as Blaise Pascal points out in his *Penseés*: “I would rather make a mistake by believing in a God who does not exist than make a mistake by not believing in a God who exists. For if there is nothing afterwards, obviously I will never know it when I sink into eternal nothingness; but if there is something, if there is Someone, I will have to account for my attitude of rejection” (2008, p. 277). In other words, man’s itinerancy is hope in love while we love others, for “at the end of life we will be examined for love”. And as Marcel points out about hope “to love a person is to tell him: you will not die” (1964, p. 472).

2.2.2) On the nature of hope in Gabriel Marcel according to several authors

Having analyzed the evolution of the concept of hope in the history of philosophy, let us now look very briefly at a synthesis of the particular characteristics of hope in Gabriel Marcel, according to eleven authors of Marcel:

According to Julia Urabayen (2001), Marcel’s anthropology is neither a systematic nor a closed philosophical system. Not even his works present a classification or a list of conditions on existence. The different conditions of existence are born of Marcel’s reflection that the self is *living* in the Europe of scientism, *the belle epoque* or the world wars. Thus, in his works, Marcel exposes a deepening of *the existential security* of the person from a double method: from the access to beings (according to ontology and the investigation of metaphysical conditions) and from the perspective of beings (from the phenomenological analysis). For Marcel, access to being is made from the access of specific beings.

According to the professor of Navarre, the metaphysical conditions of man that characterize the existence of Gabriel Marcel’s hope are the encounter with: “*one’s own personal incarnation, itinerancy in the world, the discovery of my intimacy and intersubjectivity with others*” (Urabayen, 2001, p. 259). These are going to be the four essential characteristics that we are going to develop in our essay and for the application to Cartier-Bresson’s photographic work.

On the other hand, for Marcel, hope is active, not passive. This would consist in affirming that there is a mysterious principle at the heart of being that is in collusion with me, with my own incarnation and existence. Hope is a knowledge beyond non-

knowledge. It is a gift and a mystery, since it is a knowledge granted that would be a grace, but that cannot be understood in any way as a conquest (Several, 1995).

For this reason, Jolin and McCormick (1973) in *Tragic Wisdom and Beyond* point out that this active hope is a will not only for us, but is a gift that is exposed for others. There can be hope not only through one us and for ourselves, but in open service to men.

John G. Messerly is interested in that function of existential hope in time, that is, itinerancy. Hope needs to be tested in despair. The first guarantees fidelity by overcoming despair and gives us the strength to grow continually. Thus, although existential analysis highlights that the basis of hope is found in a situation that invites 'to despair', hope will consist in overcoming despair (Messerly, 2014).

Jill Graper Hernandez argues that hope can be understood existentially on the basis of what it means to be human, without naive optimism. According to this author from the University of Texas, the hope offered to us by Gabriel Marcel is not optimism, but the creation of ways for us to flourish personally in our intimacy, pointing out that poverty or absolute dependence on technology are real life evils that can stifle our hope (Graper Hernandez, 2011).

The philosopher Josef Pieper also stresses that the answer cannot be man's presumption or despair. This is in '*status viatoris*' and the meaning of existence cannot be nothing, but to reach the being of existence, that is to say, the truth about its meaning in the world, the '*status comprehensoris*'. Pieper tries to answer from this perspective to the heideggerian question of "*Why is there anything rather than nothing? and am I something between two nothingness?*" (Heidegger, 1942, p. 22)]. The man on the road with his intimacy discovers that hope is towards love for others and for God, origin, '*imago Dei*' (Pieper, 2010, p. 359).

Godfrey analyzes the thesis that the French philosopher found in 1942 as the best formulation of hope that supposes a hope: "*I hope in you for a being in us*" (Godfrey J.J., 1987, p. 103). Existence and hope would be united hand in hand, since both are ontologically related, as Ricour helped to concretize in his encounters with Marcel.

For Simone Plourde, suffering presents itself as an order that we must overcome in order to keep our being. This author points out that love – beyond death – is the place for hope against all *hope in us*. An idea that as we know Marcel expressed in *Homo Viator* in the famous sentence of loving is to point out that “*you will not die*” (Plourde, 2005, p. 575).

According to Cañas, Marcel’s first encounters with Sartre show the Christian origins that both had in their works with a Christian anthropological formation. According to this author, Marcel continued to live on hope, while Sartre abandoned himself. In short, Cañas maintains that Sartre chose the absurd when he pointed out that ‘*hell is others*’... whereas for Marcel people have open relations of intersubjectivity. However, this article concludes that we cannot fall into the topic ‘*Marcel believer*’ and ‘*Sartre atheist*’ (Cañas, 2005, p. 392).

Time is currently an empty space, without hope, for the Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han unlike Marcel. According to the Korean author, in post-modernity, narrative time – articulated and sustained by a sense – has given way to an atomized time, where all moments are equal to each other, since there is no sense that allows us to distinguish or prioritize them. The short term banishes the long term, thus favoring the predominance of a fragmented present, empty of duration, which is reduced to current peaks. It is an accelerated time, but without direction. In other words, there is no hope. (Byung-Chul Han, 2015, p. 13).

2.2.3) Summary

According to these authors, a philosophy of existence in hope is based on these four points: the incarnation, in time, the development of one’s own personal intimacy; and dealing with others. For Gabriel Marcel, each person must ask himself about his existential meaning in the world in a viator state.

Man must understand that hope is fragile, humble, and must be asked to fight against despair. The weapon to conquer is to love. To love the other is to live with hope; it is to be able to say “*you will not die*” in us (Plourde, 2005, p. 575). In short, these Marcelian ideas, we will try to apply them analogically to Cartier-Bresson’s photography.

Finally, we can point out that Gabriel Marcel completes with other words – but with the same background – the ethical importance of human development that was already announced and defended by the Greek-Christian humanist tradition. This tradition pointed out that *we* of Marcel in *the social nature* of the man pointed out by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

For both Aristotelian-Thomist ethics and for Marcel, man must develop through the virtue of his own nature, in his incarnation, in time itinerancy towards his own end – of his '*imago Dei*' intimacy – in order to attain happiness in others and their creator.

2.3) Photography

After studying hope, we are now going to see in three sections 'the nature of photography' in general, in order to understand the professional framework in which the photographer Cartier-Bresson moved. Later, in the next chapter, we will see particularly 'the nature of photography in Cartier-Bresson' according to the perception of several authors.

2.3.1) On the nature of photography

The word *photography* comes from the Greek *to write with light*. The light is in a concrete time in a concrete moment. We could say that light and time are the two essential raw materials for taking photographs.

The photographic medium was born with the aura of capturing objective reality in 1838 in Paris. Since then this art has multiplied exponentially: today photography has become ubiquitous and we have cameras that capture everything. Nothing escapes the voracity of the vigilant gaze of the Orwellian Big Brother who wants to equal the all-seeing eye of God. Even in 1932 the writer Màrius Gifreda (p. 28) predicted that "*there will come a day when the Zeiss lens will surpass the Zeus eye, which sees everything... but from too high up*".

Let us now analyze three points about the nature of photography: a) truth and photographed representation; b) photography and intentionality, and c) the technical and ethical dimension of photography.

a) Truth and photographed representation

The question of the nature of photography makes us place the distinction between reality and representation.

In *Plato's Republic* (s. V BC), the arts try to capture the reality of the sensitive world, which is a copy of the world of ideas. "*For Plato, the idea of art is a betrayal of the idea, because the sensitive object is still a copy of his idea. In reality, the artist copies a copy of the idea, not the real idea,*" says Alexander Nehamas (2004), professor of philosophy at Princeton University. Criticism is simple.

From this perspective, by making a copy of the copy, photographers today would simulate a fiction for Plato. As we know, the disciple of Socrates did not trust either poets or artists for the education of youth (and probably would not trust photographers today...) since none knows how to distinguish between the reality of the sensitive world and the ideas of the intelligible world. Only philosophers are able to make this distinction and to guide youth.

With the invention of photography in 1838, photography was conceived to represent the same reality in a scientific and positivist era. The image is the captured reality. The function of the camera was to faithfully reflect reality and, nevertheless, we can the phrase attributed to Mark Twain about the deception: "*There are three types of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics,*" because something similar about statistics happens with the camera. When we think of the camera as the notary of the truth about reality, the camera lies, although many people think that the camera does not lie, and that all photography is always evidence of the true identity of something or someone. Let's look at an example.

The first photograph taken by Daguerre in 1838 in Paris is a panoramic view of the Boulebard du Teple Street, of which two shots of the same location are preserved on the same day:

- 1) In the first shot only a few buildings appear through a window.
- 2) A second shot shows the same buildings but with a shoeshine boy and a client at work. What happens in these two shots to avoid capturing the hustle and bustle of life, the wagons, the markets and the crooks of nineteenth-century Paris?

The answer is obvious: at that moment, given the sensitivity of the camera, an exposure of at least fifteen minutes was required to fix someone mobile between the buildings.

With such a long time, any person or object in motion vanished, as it appears in the first shot. But we know from the second shot that a shoeshine boy and his client were used as occasional extras to stay that necessary time in the street and be able to be represented in the image.

This episode about the two shots adds two reflections to the history of photography: the use of the camera fails in its attempt to capture living reality; only by deceiving can a certain truth be reached. In other words, historical truth does not coincide with the perceived truth photographed.

Therefore, although the raw material of photography is reality, the images *are not* reality itself, but *an interpretation* of reality made by the photographer. For the philosopher and documentary filmmaker José Manuel Navia “*photography is a language that speaks to us of the world, but in no case is it a reliable copy of reality. Photography belongs to the world, but it is not the same world. In other words, the only reality of photography is the photograph itself [itself: on paper or screen]*” (Navia, 2010, p. 337).

In this sense we can also say that “*photography is – before anything else – a way of looking. It is not the look itself*”, has pointed out the writer and essayist Susan Sontag (1996, p. 213). This means that when we go to see the exhibition of a photographer – for example that of the British photographer Martin Parr of Magnum Pictures – we are not going to see the reality of England, but England seen under the eyes of the photographer Martin Parr. The important thing is not reality, but how Martin Parr sees reality. This is the point.

Similarly, it happens with painting. For art critic E. H. Gombrich (2013, p. 119): “*I do not ask myself how we see the world, but how we see the paintings... But curiously we see a painting as if it were the world*”. For Gombrich, the perception of images must be something different from our perception of reality.

Critic Jon Fontcuberta points out that appearances have also replaced truth in the representation of Judas' kiss to Christ. In the Passion scene, photographic realism hides treason in a kiss. The appearance of the kiss to Christ seems to be one of love, but the intention is to give it to the Romans. This is also the drama in photography.

In short, once again, the true reality is different from the truth perceived and represented. *"It was not until the advent of digital technology that not only the specialists, but also the profane, the general public in short, discovered the inevitable manipulation that operates in the process of any photographic image. Perhaps we are witnessing the death of photography. Following the biblical simile one could speak more properly of his crucifixion. Because in this case, too, it is a painful but indispensable requirement for a resurrection. In the mystery of redemption, Judas' kiss was a fully justified gesture that opened the door to salvation. We are not sure whether the 'new photograph', the post-photography, saves or condemns the old photograph, but it certainly places us in a convenient position to x-ray the world in which we are"* (Fontcuberta, 2010, p. 10).

Therefore, we must be careful not to fall into the trap of photography as a public notary of reality (which is and has been the greatest trick of photography since its birth in the nineteenth century as a way of documenting society), when photographers such as Atget walked the Parisian boulevards trying to make *a scientific inventory* of the streets, markets and places of leisure.

In short, although photography was initially perceived *as a document*, we have tried to show that photography lies. Photography does not capture the same reality, nor does it capture, nor can it capture the essence of being and being in the world, but only the appearances of the world. That is to say, with photography we can only represent, but not show the truth in all its extension.

So, it is impossible to apply the phrase of the Spanish poet Antonio Machado (2003, p. 54) to photography about the search for truth when he says: *"Your truth? No, the truth and come with me to seek it. Yours, keep it"*.

No. We cannot apply Machado's truth to the truth photographed, because we are not seeing the *'veritas'*, we are representing the perceived truth, not the ontological truth. And the truth perceived is different for each photographer and – even though the raw material of reality is the same – it can be perceived from different points of view depending on the background, the person or the vital circumstances of the photographer. In other words, we can say that so many men, so many *looks*, so many photographers. That is to say, the truth is polyhedral. The truth photographed has several accesses. We can also say that there are *different glances* in everyday life on the same fact. What is important – once again – is not simply reality, but how the photographer sees reality.

Making an analogy, we point to journalist Peter Seewald's question to Pope Joseph Ratzinger: "*How many ways are there to reach God [the sum truth]? As many as men,*" answered Ratzinger (1996, p. 37). So, how many ways are there to get the reality? As many as photographers.

As Etienne Gilson points out in *Painting and Reality* (2000, p. 105), the work of the artist (or the photographer, although many photographers do not consider themselves artists) is a creative work, insofar as the work involves "*defining a being [of reality], putting it aside, abstracting it and producing it*". Also, the good of art for Gilson does not consist in trying to tell the truth, nor in promoting moral perfection, but in pursuing the good of the perfection of the created work (in this case, the image photographed as such), which lies in reaching the fullness of *its own identity*, through beauty.

b) Photography and intentionality

For the critic and semiologist Roland Barthes, photography is a promise. For Barthes, every image remains when the person dies and, consequently, "*photography says of something that has been*" (1990, p. 149). This would mean that "*if we photograph it is to attach ourselves to the instants of life, in such a way that we forget that death exists,*" according to some critic Fontcuberta (2010, p. 22).

On the other hand, a different conception is that of the photographer Siegfried Kracauer (2008), who affirms that "*photography destroys when it portrays... and the traits of men are only conserved in their history: the human being is not the one who appears*

[simply] in his photograph, but the sum of that which can be extracted from him [and which we do not see in the photograph]" (p. 137).

Paradoxically, beyond the content of opposing ideas, another debate is now centered on technique and not on the ends of nature.

There are more and more new cameras on the market with higher resolution and quality in a savage 'technological Darwinism'. And it is true that, although without a camera one cannot photograph, the camera has no freedom. The camera *is not a living being*. The camera does not have a *weltanschauung*. Only the man behind the photographic body can give an intentionality, a sense to the perceived reality.

That is why, as the father of nature photography, Ansel Adams, points out: "*the most important component of a camera is the 30 cm behind it*". The most important thing is not the camera, nor the brand, but the eye. And the best team bears the signature of neither *Canon*, nor *Nikon*, nor *Leica*, but the photographer's gaze when he checks the human condition with the help of the knowledge of Socrates or Shakespeare. Because if the lens is not going to replace our gaze, we need to shape our gaze to *give meaning* to the world.

Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa (2010) is pessimistic: "*The screen will frivolize and banalize culture extraordinarily [...] Stupidity has also been massively supported by cutting-edge technology. If anything can defend us from this phenomenon of frivolization, it is reading Tolstoy, Victor Hugo, Joyce, Don Quixote*".

As José Manuel Navia says, to give meaning to the world, "*in our hands is not to contribute to that click, click, click... easy, crazy and universal that is filling the world with photos to use and throw away (and many times not even to use). It is in our hands to resist that banalization, the Tolstoy, Joyce and photographic Cervantes turning to consolation*" (2010, p. 337).

c) *The technical and ethical dimension*

Every human action must always be considered from a double perspective as we know from the Aristotelian distinction in *Nicomachean Ethics*. On the one hand, we can

measure *the technical quality of the work itself 'poiesis'* (Plato, The banquet, Vol III). On the other hand, *the ethical dimension of that work 'frónesis'* (Aristotle, NE 1142 a), which asks me if the technical action I perform makes me a better or a worse person following the laws of my human nature.

In addition to technical rationality, Aquino considers in the *Summa Theologiae* that every human being possesses this practical ethical rationality, imprinted in our heart. We know that "*this rationality of the one who must make a decision is called practical wisdom or prudence*" (Summa Theologiae II-II, 94, 1, 3).

The virtue of prudence considers the laws and general principles always in function of a particular action to which the person submits to his conscience. For Aristotle, in *Nicomachean Ethics*, human actions implied living the moral virtues and especially prudence, for "*it is not possible to be good in the true sense without prudence, nor to be prudent without moral virtue*" (Ética a Nicómaco, 6, 13).

Perhaps this seems abstract. Let us see an example. Hitler was a great military strategist and Stalin a great expansionist of his ideas. And yet both were a great disaster for the history of humanity, which certifies that one can have a good '*teckne*' but a lousy '*ethos*'. Therefore, the two types of rationality are always necessary in professional action: instrumental technical rationality and practical ethical rationality. Moreover, there cannot simply be technical actions (on the one hand) or actions or simply ethical actions (on the other). Nor, from a photographic point of view, should we ask ourselves: *Should photography be ethical?* To ask this question would already be an unethical question.

In short, the photographer must also seek technical and practical perfection. His images must show technical quality and the moral good photographed should reflect the dignity of the human condition. This photograph that I take is it technically well done and does what I have photographed and the intention sought help me to perfect myself as a photographer and a person?

Before going any further, perhaps some may consider that we are being utopian or that we are talking about '*moralistic concepts*' and not about relevant dimensions that affect

any professional field, including photography. As the sociologist on post-industrial society Alain Touraine points out “*Evil and good exist. Good is what allows man to live in a human way. That means to be respected, not to be humiliated, to be recognized as equal in rights regardless of whether one is a Peruvian peasant or a Nobel Prize in Physics [...] It is a good act that defends my capacity to act in a reflexive way. Not because of my social status, but as an individual bearer of a universal subject*” (Touraine, 2010).

The Israeli writer Amos Oz also teaches that the categories of good and evil exist. “*Evil has an unmistakable smell. Just as it is enormously difficult to define the truth, but very easy to detect a lie, sometimes it can be difficult to define good, but evil gives off an unmistakable smell; any child knows what pain is. Therefore, every time we deliberately cause another person pain, we know what we are doing. We are doing evil. Goethe’s Faust indelibly reminds us that the devil is not impersonal, but personal. That the devil puts each individual to the test [...] [But] individual good and evil are not privative of any religion. They don’t have to be religious terms. The decision to cause harm or not to cause harm is a choice we encounter several times a day. Naturally, sometimes we can be wrong. Now, even when we make the wrong decision, we know what we are doing. We know the difference between good and evil, between causing pain and curing it, between Goethe and Goebbels. Between Weimar and Buchenwald. Between individual responsibility and collective bad taste*” (2005, p. 16).

As in all arts, the representation of good and evil is an active issue among photographers. And sometimes, because the only raw material of photography is reality, it has been said that *evil is very photogenic also because good is invisible*.

But having said this, let us not deceive ourselves in a double sense: first, because the consequences of evil or of the representation of evil per se are never innocuous or attractive. And second: because if the photographic expression is accused of not exhibiting force in the beauty of good, it is not simply because evil is more attractive, but because, sometimes, it is difficult or one does not know how to reflect good with exigency, force and identity.

Thus, as Simone Veil points out: “*Imaginary evil is [conceived as] romantic, varied;*

real evil, [however] sad monotonous, desert, tedious. [On the other hand] The imaginary good is [portrayed] boring; [however] the real good is always new, wonderful intoxicating. [...] It does not escape this alternative unless, by force of art, it passes from the side of reality, something that only genius can do" (1994, p. 111). This is the relevant point: how to offer a good or a photograph that expresses the good in an attractive way without seeming naive? How to show the force of good in modernity?

In short, as we shall see in some of Cartier-Bresson's works, capturing photographic aesthetic reality in an attractive way requires a threefold characteristic. 1) execute the work technically well; 2) execute the work ethically well and 3) grasp the '*punctum*' to represent its appearance with strength, beauty and intensity.

2.3.2) On the nature of photography at Cartier-Bresson according to several authors

Having already analyzed the nature of photography in general, we will now see a synthesis on the characteristics of Cartier-Bresson photography in particular in eleven authors very briefly:

Fotografiar al natural. El instante decisivo is a small autobiographical book, where the photographer Cartier-Bresson exposes some reflections on his life and work in the search for the decisive moment. "*The writer has the time to reflect before the word is formed, before putting it on paper; [...] For us, what disappears, disappears forever; hence our anguish; we cannot remake our report once we are back in the hotel*" (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, p. 20).

This search for the precise moment to capture the '*decisive moment of action*' also implies that Cartier-Bresson sought an intentionality in his work: "*to understand that photography can fix eternity in a moment*". In addition to precision, a certain pleasure is necessary for Cartier-Bresson. "*I am obsessed with only one thing: visual pleasure. My greatest satisfaction is geometry, i.e. structures, which implies a structure*" (Cartier-Bresson, 1973).

In *La visión fotográfica*, Eduardo Momeñe, photographer and essayist, stresses the importance of training to develop one's own visual anthropology in order to discover the photographic vocation and understand whether we essentially want to be a new Cartier-Bresson (a street photojournalist). Moreover, as the camera is a means, not an end, Momeñe argues that we must discover our *weltanschauung*, since the intentionality and sense of the world only has the man behind the camera, since the camera does not have a sense of the world (Momeñe, 1990, p. 120).

La cámara de Pandora. La fotografía después de la fotografía deals with the change of technological paradigm and the refounding of photography after its invention in 1839. For the international photographer and Professor of Audio-visual Communication Joan Fontcuberta there is a rethinking of the values that made photography construct the modern gaze, especially also due to the influence of Cartier-Bresson. According to Fontcuberta, an image is today a banal act in modern society, while for Cartier-Bresson it was a moment to fix the history of a moment. Fontcuberta believes, among other aspects, that today photographs are no longer *documents* as Cartier-Bresson argued, but *diversions* (Fontcuberta, 2010, p. 28).

In this same sense, in *Vida líquida*, the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman warns that we are moving in a liquid society where there is no longer a capacity for eternal duration of bonds and things, but there is a current consumerism of using and throwing away. Perhaps that humanistic photography by Cartier-Bresson that seeks to document the human soul is unthinkable. The image is today a simple *divertimento* or a personal exhibition from emancipation and individuality to be socially accepted (Bauman, 2005, p. 109).

Sobre fotografía. In this work, Susan Sontag proposes a series of reflections around several photographers, among them, Cartier-Bresson. Sontag looks at contexts (wars, streets, factories, etc.), intentions (capturing everyday life, stopping time, representing identity, etc.) and photographic results (homesick, compilations, etc.) trying to reconstruct reflections so that readers can draw their own conclusions about what photography consists of. A relevant point is that – according to her – the photographic nature today revolves around that *divertimento* and not on a *documentation's fact*.

Paradoxically, this divertimento makes us prefer *the representation of the event* through images, rather than *the realization* of the event itself. That is to say, the appearance of the event before the existence of the event (Sontang, 1996, p. 216).

Imágenes, palabras, signos. Sobre arte y filosofía. The Spanish philosopher Fernando Inciarte points out that the path taken by contemporary art has consisted of simplification since Cezanne. This simplification of modern art consists of getting rid of everything that is not essential. As Sontang also says, Inciarte points to the “*elimination of reality*” (2004, p. 21), where the world is no longer of interest, but only the representation of the world through screens and images. For this author, reality continues to be progressively replaced by the representation of the image. Thanks to Cartier-Bresson’s great impact, we can also say that we know not only *the reality of the world* but also *the reality of the world represented* with Cartier-Bresson’s eyes.

Deepening in this idea *Sobre la eterna y feliz confusión alrededor de la fotografía*, philosopher and photographer José Manuel Navia (2010) warns about photographic nature and confusing misunderstandings. Navia points out that, although it has been interpreted that the photographic mission began trying to scientifically reflect reality, photography does not capture the same reality, but the appearance of reality.

In other words, photography belongs to the world, but it is not in itself the world. The images are not the same reality, but an interpretation, a representation of reality made by a photographer (Navia, 2010, p. 340). So when we look at Cartier-Bresson’s iconographic photos, we do not see reality, but reality interpreted with Cartier-Bresson’s eyes.

Also in *Cómo leer una fotografía*, Ian Jeffrey – photography editor, critic and professor at Goldsmith College, University of London – warns of this confusion. Jeffrey argues that it is not the story itself. It is the history of humanity seen or perceived through the eyes of photographers (Jeffrey, p. 7). In addition, Jeffrey also notes that Cartier-Bresson was aware that the photojournalism practiced in the 1930s was decadent, coupled with the fact that art grew in a philosophical environment, so Cartier-Bresson decided to make other less banal images that constituted a kind of meta-narrative or poetic art (Jeffrey, 2009, p. 154).

Mirar. For the art critic and the Austrian photographer John Berger (2001), the eye of the camera and the eye of the artist speak to us of the hidden meaning of the everyday gaze in order to discover *the decisive moment* of Cartier-Bresson or to go beyond the apparent action of reality. Thus, according to Berger, we contemplate landscapes, animals or people, and sometimes we are unaware of reconsidering the concepts of hidden truth, perceived truth, and portrayed truth.

La cámara lúcida (Barthes, 1990) is one of the most influential books of photographic philosophy throughout the 20th century. Following the death of his mother, Roland Barthes develops his idea of photography as an imprint of reality. For him photography and death are two indissoluble themes.

Barthes considers that the essence of photography – what differentiates it from cinema and others media – is what he calls ‘*noema*’: what is photographed is eternalized in the photograph taken. Photography eternalizes reality (as Cartier-Bresson intended by fixing the decisive moment).

At the same time, Barthes (1990) also distinguishes two elements in each photograph: a) the ‘*studium*’ (which has to do with the photographer’s culture and taste); b) and the ‘*punctum*’ or sparkle that would be that which makes something of reality stand out like a flash to be captured as a photograph.

From this perspective, Barthes considers that there is a type of photography that, although it possesses the ‘*studium*’, is completely devoid of a ‘*punctum*’, a sparkle that attracts or hurts the viewer, because there is a propensity to capture everything, without considering what is unique or relevant in reality. This is what he calls trivial photography (Barthes, 1990, p. 64-66). Cartier-Bresson offers that ‘*punctum*’ in the theory of *the decisive moment* that he photographed in documenting the five continents.

2.3.3) Summary

According to the literature review the main ideas of Cartier-Bresson are as follows in this chapter: Cartier-Bresson’s photography is born with an *intention*: to capture the decisive moment. This intentionality and sense of the world can only be captured by the photographer behind the camera, not by the camera itself.

On the other hand, Cartier-Bresson wishes to represent photographic reality as the search for '*a visual pleasure*', which is related to beauty. The beauty of Cartier-Bresson's images is precisely the '*punctum*' and the '*studium*', which differentiate Cartier-Bresson's images from any other mediocre photo captured by any of us according to Roland Barthes.

Other authors – such as Bauman and Fontcuberta – point out that photography today is pure amusement in '*liquid society*', where paradoxically one lives more for the photo itself than to enjoy an event. Therefore, according to authors such as Inciarte and Sontang, it is not the world that interests us, but the representation of the world. The truth represented about the real truth, partly in line with Cartier-Bresson, but without its aesthetic depth.

Nevertheless, the application of his philosophy of photography has not been linked to any human virtue directly, which is why I have done this research. Now, let us see the method used in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this dissertation we use a realistic philosophy in the interpretation of reality, with a comparative literature and a heuristic methodology in the social sciences.

3.1) The heuristic method

Heuristics, in Greek to *find and invent*, is a scientific method that consists according to Horst Müller (2012) in finding a solution for something that does not have an algorithmic result, that is to say, that is not mathematical, as for example a hypothesis about some study in the social sciences.

In this dissertation, we have the hypothesis based on the observation that there are negative photographic stereotypes about African reality by agencies and Western Media. Stereotypes that are perpetuated in time, so we wonder if it will be possible to visually portray Kenya (or African reality) with other types of images with a broader view and also hope about reality.

So thinking of a possible solution for this hypothesis, supposes, as heuristics points out, to think creatively to see if it is possible to find a solution when facing this hypothesis.

3.2) Rules, principles and strategies of the heuristic method

According to Müller (2012) the heuristic method uses rules, principles and strategies to find the solution to the problem posed. Let's go by parts:

1) For Müller the heuristic rules help to find, above all, the means to solve the problem.

In this sense, one of the most used heuristic rules is to separate '*what is given*' from '*what is sought*'. In this case, as we have said before, we have worked analyzing the number of images of the photographic agencies. We see that a negative image of Kenya and of African reality is mostly diffused in the images ('*what has been given*'). The idea of this dissertation is to see if another type of photograph can be found and if it can be a photograph of hope ('*what is sought*').

Another heuristic rule is also to reformulate the problem which, following our dissertation, has materialized in: is it possible to find another photograph and one of hope that more reliably shows African reality and everyday life without stereotypes of misery or exoticism?

2) According to Müller, the heuristic principles are suggestions to find the idea to a solution, determining a possible way. Within these principles the analogy stands out.

At this point, for example, the analogy in this dissertation has served us, among others, for two relevant ideas.

On the one hand we have applied the analogy of similarity (partly equal and partly different) to the philosophy of hope proposed by Gabriel Marcel in relation to the characteristics of photography in Cartier-Bresson (chapter five).

On the other hand, we have also used analogy when we speak of the different types of gaze (chapter six one), since the ways of looking at reality are related analogously to the distinction established by the French theologian Jacques Philippe (Inner Freedom, 2003, p. 31) when he describes the three types of inner freedom that a person can configure with his life: freedom of rebellion, freedom of resignation, or freedom of acceptance. In our thesis (chapter six one), we establish that it is possible sometimes to find a look of resignation in the long professional walk, but also – analogously to the teachings of Phillippe – it is possible a look of acceptance and a look of redemption in each photographer.

3) Finally, there are heuristic strategies according to Müller. That is how to organize the process of solving the problem addressed. In his opinion there are strategies: '*work backwards*': first we examine what we are *looking for* in order to arrive at what has been given; and '*work forwards*': from what has been *given* we make reflections that should lead us to the solution of the problem: the hypothesis.

In this dissertation we have essentially used the strategy '*work forwards*': we start from *the given* (stereotypes) to make reflections on photography and the hope in Gabriel Marcel that help us find a solution to the problem of the hypothesis of the statement.

This heuristic strategy has required us to study *'forward'* by reviewing the history of philosophy and photography in general (chapter two); and the life and work of Gabriel Marcel and Cartier-Bresson, respectively (chapter four).

To study Gabriel Marcel, we have essentially used the study of Julia Urabayen (2001). The anthropological thought of Gabriel Marcel, at the same time as we have read directly his works *El misterio del ser* (1964), *Homo Viator* (2005) and *En camino hacia qué despertar* (2012). Cartier-Bresson, as a photographer, has only one work written, although with great repercussions *On the decisive moment* (1952) in *Fotografiar del natural* (2016). Ideas that he repeats similarly in the two interviews of Sheila Turner carried out in 1971 and re-edited by The New York Times (2013). At the same time, these Sheila Turner interviews were edited in video format under the same name in 1973 by the International Center of Photography (ICP).

Studying and systematizing the characteristics of both authors in their philosophy and photography has allowed us to deduce and construct a symbiosis in the discussion (chapter five) establishing *'a look of hope'* from a theoretical-practical perspective according to Marcel's existentialism and Cartier-Bresson's photographic eye.

Finally, we provide some recommendations (chapter six) to get this *'look of hope'* considering the vital situation of photojournalists, agencies and the Kenyan photographic reality.

We close this dissertation (chapter seven) using the metaphor of the fleet of ships of the British writer CS Lewis, who with other words (but in full syntony with Marcel and Cartier-Bresson) considers that personal ethics will always be linked to social ethics in coexistence in order to love or portray others. Once again, the reflection on the human condition confirms that man remains a social being by nature.

CHAPTER FOUR PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

After analyzing hope and photography in general, in this chapter we will look specifically at: life, philosophy and characteristics in Gabriel Marcel; and life, photography and characteristics in Cartier-Bresson. That is to say, in these two chapters we answer the first and second research questions of this dissertation.

4.1) Gabriel Marcel and the ethical characteristics of hope

4.1.1) Biography

The case of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) is particular as a thinker, because his philosophy was for life and life was for his philosophy. For Marcel, philosophy is a reflection that starts from life and returns to life.

We cannot understand his philosophy without his life and the fact that Gabriel lost his mother at the age of three and was the only child of a family. His father, a wealthy man, remarried his wife's sister to give a home to little Marcel, who will enjoy an excellent education (although he will also be influenced by the rigid and unemotional character of his new mother). These circumstances and other factors – such as a special sensitivity with good musical skills – made Marcel *“a brilliant but unhappy student. He hated the school system, based on competition for the most outstanding position, and was exhausted by the excessive demands of his father, who repeated to him that ‘he could not be the second’”* (Urabayen, 2001, p. 3).

In his youth he was interested in studying Philosophy in the Soborna, but the teachings he received there with neo-kantianism did not seem to him to be satisfactory – according to his biographers – and he went to the College of France, to receive training from Bergson and encouraged by philosophical idealism. In 1910, at the age of 21, he obtained the Aggregation exam that facilitated his teaching.

However, *“he hardly devoted himself to teaching. He did not agree with the school system and considered that the education of philosophy should be based on a personal relationship and not on an academic one”* (ibid, p. 4).

Later, Marcel worked on the front lines of the first war with the Red Cross, as a non-combatant soldier and information liaison. He was in charge of bringing news to families about soldiers who died, were captured or disappeared in action. This made him *'an existential thinker'* – as he relates in his letters – and highlighted the falsity of the idealistic philosophy, because behind it, there are hidden abstract concepts that forget the concrete beings who suffer and die.

At the end of the war he married Jacqueline Boegner in 1919, a Protestant of religion, who brought him a rich family life that he had lacked. Ten years later, Marcel converted to Catholicism thanks to the influence of other Catholic friends and intellectuals. Paradoxically, says one of his scholars, although *"Marcel had grown in an agnostic household where his father did not allow religious conversations to take place, Marcel was an atheist until he converted to Catholicism in 1929. And Brendan Sweetman states: 'It is interesting to note, but not surprising, that his conversion did not significantly change his philosophy, although he inevitably came to explore the nature of the transcendent more fully in his works'"* (Sweetman, 2011 cited in Loudiy, 2018, p. 304).

Thus Marcel dedicated himself to transcendental depth by composing dramatic works, which truly became a reality with the arrival of a new World War II. Once the war was over, his wife also converted to Catholicism before dying in 1947. From then on, Marcel would travel and give lectures until his death in Paris (1973).

After these brief biographical notes, it is not surprising that one intuitively feels the personality of someone who always went beyond what was foreseen and whose essential question in life was: *"Who am I? Why not say that the answer to the question, 'who am I', is my life in its totality?"* (Marcel, 1964, p. 132).

In other words, if my being is my life, it means understanding that – for Marcel – philosophy is a system of a deepening of the human condition, not a construction for intellectual life: *"the self (person) is the body, with its wounds and sorrows, experiences and mystery"* (Marcel, 1970, p. 22). In summary, Marcel's anthropology is based on an existential knowledge of the beings in each being.

Thus, Marcel asks himself the question *'What is essential and what is accidental in life?'* responding also to the Heideggerian formulation: *"Why am I something and not nothing?"* and *"Am I something between two nothingness?"* (Heidegger, 1942, p. 22), Marcel *"considers that the question about being includes the question about the being who asks the question,"* since access to being is made through beings, through the life of beings (Urabayen, 2001, p. 27).

On the other hand, Marcel has gone down in the history of philosophy by making a valuable contribution between problem and mystery. *"This refers to the distinction which is central to me and which appears in the whole of my writings: the distinction between the mysterious and the problematic. The problem is something we encounter, something that cuts us off. It is in its entirety before me. On the contrary, mystery is something where I find myself, whose essence is therefore not to be before me"* (Marcel, Diary. Être et Avoir, 22 October 1932, p. 144). In this sense, for Marcel, *man is not a problem, man is a mystery.* Whereas a problem is in front of me and it is something external that can be reduced in order to dominate it. However, the mystery is within me, and I cannot leave my being to understand it and reduce it (Urabayen, 2001, p. 27).

For Marcel, man is a human mystery and not a problem to be solved. At the same time it is a mystery because *"I cannot say everything about a being (a person). I can never say the whole being, the heart 'of what is' can never be said"*. This also means that man's being *"cannot be expressed by human language, because human language objectifies and uses abstract concepts that are inadequate to express the concreteness and individuality of the human being"* (Urabayen, 2001, p. 27).

4.1.2) Hope in Gabriel Marcel

a) Definition of hope

For the French philosopher, all human beings have experienced hope but, according to Marcel, its nature is very difficult to define. As we saw about being, hope is also a mystery and not a problem. *"Hope is a mystery because, according to Marcel, it transcends every particular object. It is not a 'I hope that' but a 'I hope'"*. For this reason, Marcel proposed to carry out an existential analysis of it, without defining it, because he considered that *"the only way to understand what hope is was to have*

recourse to the experience of the affirmation 'I hope' [...] This is lived as a response to a trial, to a situation of captivity that is characterized by the impossibility 'of accessing a certain lived fullness'" (Urabayen, 2001, p. 158). That is to say, the existential analysis highlights that the basis of hope is found in a situation that invites 'to despair' and that, precisely, hope consists in overcoming despair.

b) Hope and being

Both go hand in hand for Marcel. A man who walks is a man who hopes to reach a goal; and conversely, a man who waits is a man who walks, who goes towards something or someone. [We have explained this by narrating the evolution of the concept of hope in the history of the philosophy and its relationship with time and the sense of time (cf. Ref. 2.2.1 *On the nature of hope*)].

"*Hope is what makes walking not a simple mistake*" Ricoeur suggested to him in 1968 during a meeting with Marcel. This means (as Ricoeur commented) that "*we must place being and hope on the same ontological side. We will also understand this link if we understand the profound unity of hope and itinerancy*" (Urabayen, 2001, p. 154). Hope, together with itinerancy, is the driving force behind the journey of the travelling man.

Parallely, about that pilgrim in the land Marcel speaks of, Pieper establishes a relevant distinction in *Las virtudes fundamentales* (Pieper, 2010, p. 359). This work is an implicit dialogue with Heidegger, whom he has in mind. For Pieper the man until his death is in "*'status viatoris', the state of the being that is on the way, opposite to the 'status comprehensoris' of the one who has grasped, achieved, reached [already the way]. To be on the road, to be viator, means to walk towards happiness; while, to be comprehensor, means to possess happiness*" (ibid).

His conclusion is clear: the meaning of the 'status viatoris' is for the 'status comprehensoris': "*Human existence is temporary only as 'status viatoris', which is the 'not yet' of the creature who knows that it includes the possibility of the 'turn to nothingness', of a choice of freedom but which should be overcome by the definitive fixation of being and the aspiration to the fullness of being. Furthermore, to be a creature means 'to be held within nothingness' (Heidegger); but, moreover, to be a creature means to be grounded in the absolute being and to be easily oriented toward*

the being: toward one's own being and toward the divine being at the same time" (Pieper, 2010, p. 364).

c) *On hope and time*

Marcel expresses this idea of Pieper in a similar way by making another comparison. "*Hope is related to itinerancy and "presupposes an 'open time' as opposed to the 'closed time' of the contracted soul"* (Urabayen, 2001, p. 159). If man places himself in the point of view of the experience already constituted, time cannot bring him anything new. This is how despair arises, which is the consciousness of closed time or of time as a prison. However, "*hope presents itself as making its way through time, where the closed man is the tense and impatient man, while the open man is the man able to take his time*" (ibid).

In short, to wait is, according to Marcel, to live in hope and to overcome the despair of fear, fear and anguish. Hope is a liberation, but it is a gift reserved for a few. "*Deep down, hope coincides with life itself as long as life is taken as something sacred, as a divine gift*" (ibid, p. 159).

Hence, for Marcel, hope depends and does not depend on man; "*it presents itself as offered and yet it is in man's power to accept it: 'the gift is a call to which we must respond'*" (ibid, p. 159). That is why Marcel asked himself: "*Is it not possible for hope to be another name for the need for transcendence, or for it to be this same need, inasmuch as it is the secret springboard of the itinerant man? Hope is a life and a life overflowing, in no sense a life withdrawn into itself*" (ibid).

4.1.3) Characteristics of hope in Gabriel Marcel

After a quick introduction, let us now delve deeper into the four essential characteristics offered by the hope of Gabriel Marcel.

According to Julia Urabayen in *El pensamiento antropológico de Gabriel Marcel*, Marcel's anthropology is neither a systematic nor a closed philosophical system. Not even his plays and writings present a classification or a list of conditions on existence. As we have indicated, Marcel reflects from his own existential experience of the self in Europe at the beginning and middle of the twentieth century. And he studies the

existence of men from a double method: access to beings (from ontology and the investigation of metaphysical conditions) and the perspective of beings (from phenomenological analysis).

The metaphysical conditions of man for Marcel according to Urabayen (2001, p. 32) are four: *incarnation*, *itinerancy*, *intimacy* and *intersubjectivity*. As we saw, for Aquinas (*Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 40, a. 1, a) there are also four: *arduous* and *possible future well*.

Thus, we could make a correlation between the conditions of the true hope of both: that it be a good (the incarnation in Marcel); that it be a future (the itinerancy in Marcel); that it be an arduous thing (the discovery of intimacy according to Marcel) and that it be possible to achieve (life in God and in others according to Marcel).

Let us look at Marcel's notes on hope in according to Urabayen (2001):

a) *The incarnation of man*

For Marcel, the security of existence is based on the incarnation of man. Philosophy requires an existential experience at its starting point and the experience cannot be that of the Cartesian '*thinking cogito*', or the '*idea*' of being in Hegel, but the incarnation is an existential experience which for Marcel is a security and not simply a thinking certainty. In other words, access to the question of being is made from incarnate beings.

For Marcel "there are no men without bodies and ties to the world in which he lives. (Urabayen, 2001, p. 32). As we said, "*The self (person) is the body, with its wounds and sorrows, experiences and mystery*" (Marcel, 1970, p. 22). Man is an incarnate being who is accountable for his own talents. But it is necessary to awaken to life, to leave the state of inertia or routine in which men inhabit if one wishes to live.

On the one hand, the example of the book taken to the film *Awakenings*, based on a real fact of the neurologist Oliver Sacks, when a sick person wakes up in the Hospital after spending more than 10 years in a vegetative state, serves as an example. In the face of the miracle, the conscious and awake patient calls his doctor on the telephone:

"We have to remind everyone. How wonderful it is...", says the sick man.

"And what's wonderful?" He asks, the doctor.

"Read the newspaper. There is only bad news" (costs the cured patient). *"People have forgotten what... life is... People have forgotten the 'miracle of being alive'. They need someone to tell them. They need someone to remind them what they have and what they can lose. They need to be told about living. The gift of life. Of the freedom to live,"* concludes the sick person awake after 10 years in a vegetative state" (Abbott, 1990, Awakenings).

b) *Roaming. Man is a being in time*

For Marcel, time is not denial, but openness, *"time does not reside in the experience of finitude, but in the experience of participating in being for eternity,"* says Urabayen. *"For Marcel, as for the risen sick person in Awakenings, life is a gift and the conception of time is the affirmation of the distinction between the being of man and the different ways of living in time: as an open time – or time of being – and as a closed time – or time of having –. The central deficiency of the 'existential philosophies of anguish' consists, in my opinion, in ignoring in a completely arbitrary way a fundamental experience that I would gladly call the gaudium essendi"* (Urabayen, 2001, p. 32).

As we know, the existentialists of the mid-twentieth century such as Sartre, Camus or Heidegger taught that man was a being thrown into death and nothingness, as the writer Ernest Hemingway wrote in 1933 with his famous *Our Father*: *"Our nada who art in nada, nada be thy name thy kingdom nada thy will be nada in nada as it is in nada. Give us this nada our daily nada and nada us our nada as we nada our nadas and nada us not into nada but deliver us from nada; pues nada. Hail nothing full of nothing, nothing is with thee"* (Hemingway, 1933, p. 18).

"To say it clearly: in a line of Freudian thought, [for these, existentialists] to die is truly to be undone, while for me it is to be fulfilled," says Marcel (Marcel, 2012, p. 59). Nor can the answer be despair according to Pieper (Urabayen, 2001, p. 365), for *"the meaning of created existence is not nothing, but being, that is, truth. The only answer that corresponds to the real situation of human existence is hope, because in it man is understood and affirmed first and foremost as a created being, as a creature of God"*.

Even so, Marcel insists, hope needs to be tested in despair. The two go hand in hand, as if they were two sides of the same coin. In the complexity of modern life, it is difficult to avoid the despair and anguish of man in '*status viatoris*' but, as the theologian Urs Von Balthasar points out: "*Man must enjoy in his finiteness the infinite light of God. The edges of his existence, the before and the after, are not illuminated. You must not count on them, for as Ecclesiasticus (41, 3-4) says: 'Do not be afraid of death; it is your destiny. In the world of the dead the duration of life does not count'*" (Von Balthasar, 1960, p. 36). In other words, there is only light for this life. No longer for the past, nor for the future only light for the present.

In short, Marcel considers life as an open time, as a gift, a *Gaudium essendi*, in '*status viatoris*', as opposed to closed time, in '*status comprehensoris*' in Pieper's words.

c) *Personal inner and openness to overcome time*

Marcel adds that man must recognize his own personal intimacy in his incarnated existential self. The first knowledge is *this incarnate self* where one discovers that the person is '*imago Dei*'. Thus, if man has a sacred character, man is a personal being who must establish a relationship between his own freedom and transcendence with the creator. Thus, man's mission is to discover '*Gaudium essendi*', which will spare him the anguish of time.

In short, this means beginning a process of sensitive and permanent awareness in the world. First, an intimacy with oneself in the consciousness. Then with the world and with God. Thus, as he points out in *Homo Viator*, hope is "*essentially the availability of a soul deeply committed to an experience of communion*" (Marcel, 2005, p. 20). That is, a communion with God in my existential self.

Today we have perceived difficulties and conditions in recognizing our personal identity. For example, in totalitarian states. The words of the former Czech president Václav Havel (1990, p. 40), who asked himself where is the true root of the power of man against communism? Where is finally the power of those who had no power?

According to the former Czech president, opposition to a totalitarian system such as communism is '*life in truth*' against regime's lies: "*Sometimes you need to get to the*

bottom of misery in order to understand the truth. And the only point from which it can start is from the concrete man". This is why the real opposition lies on "a totally different level, the level of human consciousness, the 'existential level'". And Havel continues by pointing out that "this existential level is a power that is not based on the strength of a group, but operates in the gloom of the space of each man" (1990, p. 40).

Another temptation in modern life is a liquid life without time. In the society of 'haste' one can fall into a routine, robotic life. If the *compass* is replaced by the *clock*, one can fall into dehumanization without direction, without north.

Where are we going, why do we run, for whom do I work, to whom do I offer my life? The intimacy of the consciousness is related to the fact of being aware of presentism: here I am in the world.

According to the bestseller Spanish writer and philosopher of the of presentism Pablo D'Ors, it is about discovering '*the life behind life*' in order to discover the meaning of my life in '*my*' conscience: "*I had had so many experiences throughout my life that I had reached a point where, without fear of exaggerating, I can say that I did not know well or who I was: I had travelled to many countries; I had read thousands of books; I had an agenda with many contacts and I had fallen in love with more women than I could remember. Like many of my contemporaries, I was convinced that the more experiences I had and the more intense they were, the sooner and better I would become a person in fullness*" (D'Ors, 2017, p. 13).

"Today I know that this is not the case: the amount of experiences and their intensity only serve to stun us. Living too many experiences is usually harmful. I do not believe that man is made for quantity, but for quality. Experiences, if you live to collect them, shake us up, offer us utopian horizons, get us drunk and confused. The human soul is the food and the rhythm of what is offered to it is slow" [...] (ibid, p. 13).

"In the tempest of experiences we prefer waves: it gives us the impression of life, when the truth is that they are not life, but only vivacity. All our experiences tend to compete with life, and almost always succeed in displacing or even nullifying it. True life is behind what we call life" (ibid, p. 13).

“It has taken me four decades to understand that man begins to live in the life that stops dreaming about himself. We begin to bear fruit when we stop building castles in the air. That there is nothing that does not have its strain the reality. This is, in essence, what meditation teaches. Because we normally live dispersed, that is to say, outside of ourselves. Meditation concentrates us, brings us back home, teaches us to live with our being” (ibid, p. 20).

d) Intersubjectivity like existential security of the man

The level of communion with other beings is what Gabriel Marcel calls intersubjectivity. For Marcel the fundamental forms of intersubjectivity are the personal encounter with another man, the family, the human community and the personal encounter with God.

As we said in one of the previous points, the French philosopher (2005, p. 20) pointed out that hope *“is an experience of communion”* [...] explaining that *“there is no hope except at the level of the ‘we’, of the agape, and not at the level of a solitary I who would become obnubilate with his individual ends”*. In this sense, Marcel points out his adherence to the words of the Spanish poet Antonio Machado when he wrote: *“pay attention: a solitary heart is not a heart”* (2003, pt. LXVI).

Fadoua Loudiy considers that *“Marcel’s philosophical disagreement with Sartre and effort to dissociate his work from ‘existentialism’ concerned the meaning of autonomy”*. According to Loudiy, *“For Sartre, autonomy refers to the individual’s freedom to make decisions based on independence from others. Marcel, however, conceived of autonomy as embedded in our relationships and engagement with others, based on openness to others, as we are ‘incarnate beings’”* (2018, p. 305).

I mean, hope is for the other. And such was the desire for hope that Marcel pointed out that *“I am not concerned about my own death, but about the death of the loved one”* (2012, p. 129) but even so he considered that the hope of *“loving a person is to tell him: you will not die”* (1964, p. 472). Love can with death.

On the other hand, fleeing from Sartre’s existentialist individualism, Marcel would also agree with the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor in his *Malaise of Modernity* (1994,

64) when Taylor points out that “*discovering my identity for myself does not mean that I elaborate it in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue. My own entity depends crucially on my dialogical relationship with others,*” for “*the most egocentric and narcissistic forms of contemporary culture are manifestly inadequate. And forms that opt for self-realization without considering the demands of our ties with others destroy the conditions for realizing authenticity itself*” (ibid, p. 71).

We can apply to Marcel the words pronounced by Andrei Tarkovsky (1932-1986), precisely to *Sculpting in time*, when the Russian filmmaker and director of photography – as if it were a vital need of each artist – pointed out that “*in all my works I have endeavored to establish bonds of union that unite people (leaving aside merely material interests). Ties of union which, for example, unite me to humanity and link all of us to what surrounds us. I must emphatically feel my spiritual continuity and the fact that I am not by chance in this world*” (Tarkovsky, 1986, p. 217).

In summary, we have analyzed in this last chapter—together with reflections and works by other authors—the four characteristics of Marcel’s philosophy: 1) The incarnation of man, 2) in time, 3) he must discover his own intimacy, 4) in order to be able to open up to others. Let us now move on to Cartier-Bresson’s study, specifically life, photography and the relevant notes in this photographer, considered *the eye of the twentieth century*.

4.2) Henri Cartier-Bresson and the positive characteristics of his photograph

4.2.1) Biography

The French photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson (1908-2004) did not argue in eschatological debates about photography. However, he brought to the history of photographic-nature his vision of the decisive moment, “*to understand that photography can fix eternity in a moment*” (Pogrebin, 2007). This implies that Cartier-Bresson has an intentionality in his photography, which consists of valuing a relevant fact among a succession of facts of a reality.

Moreover, for the French photographer, photography must take into account the beauty of the composition “*of a certain visual pleasure*” that reflects the human condition (Cartier-Bresson, 2013).

Cartier-Bresson was born into a well-to-do French family at the beginning of the century, without economic concerns, interested in art. “*When I was very young, I liked the life of adventure and I knew only one thing: that I was strongly appalled by the idea of working in the family textile business. I was 5 or 6 when he died, and I had always been dreaming about painting. And my father said, ‘Well, all right.’ He was nice enough not to force me into the business*” (Cartier-Bresson, 2013). The young Cartier-Bresson decided to be a painter seduced by the surrealism and impressionism of the time in Paris. After finishing his painting studies in 1927-1928 he discovered the strength of photography through its relationship with painting. In 1932, the young Henri Cartier-Bresson, saw the Munkácsi photograph *Three Boys at Lake Tanganyika*, taken on a beach in Liberia.




Figure 4.1. *Boys running into the surf at Lake Tanganyika, ca. 1930* © Martin Munkácsi.

Henri Cartier-Bresson – as we have said before – noted that “*for me this photograph was the spark that ignited my enthusiasm. I saw that photograph and I must say that the same photograph was the spark that set fire to the fireworks. Suddenly I understood that photography can fix eternity in a moment [...] I couldn't believe it. Such a thing could be captured with the camera. Damn it, I took my camera and went out into the street*” (Pogrebin, 2007). Since then, “*the (camera) Leica, became the extension of my eye*” (Cartier-Bresson, 2016, p. 16).

4.2.2) Photography at Henri Cartier-Bresson

After this event – like Paul of Tarsus fallen from his horse – Henri Cartier-Bresson will devote himself body and soul to photography. “*Photography as I conceive it, well, it's a drawing immediate sketch done with intuition and you can't correct it. If you have to correct it, it's the next picture. But life is very fluid. Well, sometimes the pictures disappear and there's nothing you can do. You can't tell the person, 'Oh, please smile again. Do that gesture again.' Life is once, forever*” (Cartier-Bresson, 2013).

Impressed by action and the passage of time, Cartier-Bresson writes *The decisive moment* (1952), a small autobiographical essay that will decisively influence the history of 20th century photography. In this work – also edited as a documentary by the International Center for Photography (NYC) – Cartier-Bresson exposes this famous photographic theory of capturing ‘*the decisive moment*’. For Cartier-Bresson, photographing means shooting at the right time, neither before nor after. It means being patient, “*like an animal on its prey*” (Capa, 1973).

“*What I am desperately looking for is the unique photo, which is enough for itself because of its rigor (without pretending to do art, psychology, psychoanalysis or sociology). An image that is enough of itself for its intensity, and whose subject exceeds the simple anecdote. Therefore, the difference between a good photograph and a bad photograph is a matter of millimeters. A small difference, but essential*” (ibid, 1973).

Cartier-Bresson did not consider himself a photojournalist. Although paradoxically is considered one of the fathers of photojournalism, “*I am not a journalist. That's accidental, anecdotic. If I go to a place, I try to get a photo that concretizes a situation that has everything: a strong relationship of forms and background*” (ibid, 1973).

And Cartier-Bresson complains that *“some journalists are wonderful writers and others are just putting facts one after the other. And facts are not interesting. It’s a point of view on facts which is important”* (Cartier-Bresson, 2013). *“Through facts, however, we can reach an understanding of the laws that govern them, and be better able to select the essential ones which communicate reality”* (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 20).

Intensity, evocation, stories. *“In the photograph there must be evocation. Like some stories of Chejov or Maupassant, there have to be little stories in those images. Photographs that have an inner world within them”* (Capa, 1973). It is appreciated that Cartier-Bresson is interested in how to read an image *“and the photographs I care about are those that can be looked at for more than two minutes, which is extremely long. Photographs that you can look at over and over again are not many”* (ibid, 1973).

A certain aesthetic taste is also necessary for photography. *“I am obsessed by one thing, the visual pleasure. The greatest joy for me is geometry; that means a structure. You can’t go shooting for structure, for shapes, for patterns and all this, but it is a sensuous pleasure, an intellectual pleasure, at the same time to have everything in the right place. It’s a recognition of an order which is in front of you”* (Cartier-Bresson, 2013).

Also, it is necessary to take care of the composition. *“Composition must be one of our constant preoccupations, but at the moment of shooting it can stem only from our intuition, for we are out to capture the fugitive moment, and all the interrelationships involved are on the move. In applying the Golden Rule, the only pair of compasses at the photographer’s disposal is his own pair of eyes”* (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 34).

For Cartier-Bresson to live is to communicate as a photographer the search for the decisive moment. *“The writer has time to reflect [...]. But for photographers, what has gone is gone forever. From that fact stem the anxieties and strength of our profession. We cannot do our story over again once we’ve got back to the hotel”* (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 16).

“If a photograph is to communicate its subject in all its intensity, the relationship of form must be rigorously established. Photography implies the recognition of a rhythm

in the world of real things. What the eye does is to find and focus on the particular subject within the mass of reality; what the camera does is simply to register upon film the decision made by the eye. We look at and perceive a photograph, as we do a painting, in its entirety and all in one glance. In a photograph, composition is the result of a simultaneous coalition, the organic coordination of elements seen by the eye. One does not add composition as though it were an afterthought superimposed on the basic subject material, since it is impossible to separate content from form. Composition must have its own inevitability about it” (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 30).

As can be seen, what is important is not the camera, but the eye, the intentionality and the background behind the 30 centimeters behind the camera: the personality of the photographer. (Various aspects that we have already mentioned in the previous chapters on the nature of photography, cf. 2.3.1).

Finally, we can also point out his fascination with reportages and portraits. He captured the world in different themes such as social tensions or conflicts in the five continents (India, Spain, Benin, Soviet Union), and he has been considered *the eye of the twentieth century*. In these trips, we cannot forget that its thread was always the person and acts of men, so Cartier-Bresson is considered one of the fathers of humanistic photography where the person is the center of photographic life. “*Honestly, the hardest thing for me is the portrait. It’s like a question mark you put on someone trying to say: what is the meaning of this face?*” (Capa, 1973).

4.2.3) The characteristics of photography at Henri Cartier-Bresson

In short, the characteristics of photography according to Cartier-Bresson are:

a) To live is to communicate a photographic intentionality

Cartier-Bresson defines photography as “*putting the eye, head and heart in the same spotlight: the viewfinder*” (Cartier-Bresson, 2016, p. 11). This definition presupposes already understanding photography as something intentional (as Aristotle already defended over all human actions). That is, composing a photograph involves using intellectual and volitional abilities to do so with a certain intention, beyond the simple technical question of shooting the button (because no good photographer shoots for the sake of shooting). In short: Cartier-Bresson’s

photographic definition reveals that the French photographer has a holistic view of the human being. “To me, photography is the simultaneous recognition, in a fraction of a second, of the significance of an event as well as of a precise organization of forms which give that event its proper expression” (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 58).



Figure 4.2. Scanno, Abruzzo, Italy 1953 © Henri Cartier-Bresson

b) The decisive moment

As we have seen, Cartier-Bresson influenced the history of photographic art with the publication of *The Decisive Moment* (1952), in order to fix the eternity of an action in its due moment, neither before nor after. This can be seen in the following image (*Behind the Gare St Lazare, Paris, France 1932*) when – for a brief thousandths of a second – the mirror effect of the shadow of the man jumping over the puddle is

produced, just before the person falling breaks the duplication of his body in the water. For this reason, it is the photographer's merit to stop exactly that *when* in order to try to catch that decisive moment, which implies that the photographer is on alert to look at the world with new and precise eyes.

However, Cartier-Bresson points out doubts about how to look at the world in order to take a good photograph, since *"I'm not sure that this is radically new"*. And he notes: *"There are no new ideas [of seeing] the world. There is only one new order of things in the world. Everything is new. Every minute is new and that requires re-examining things: life changes all the time. The world is created and falls apart every minute. You have to be present when there is a change because there is a moment of tension"* (Capa, 1973).




Figure 4.3. *Behind the Gare St Lazare, Paris, France 1932* © Henri Cartier-Bresson

c) *Good image composition means recognizing the order of reality*

Cartier-Bresson's images confirm the '*punctum*' and '*studium*' mentioned above by the critic Roland Barthes. There is a decisive moment ('*punctum*') that makes photography different from others as a result of observing reality ('*studium*'). Cartier-Bresson considers that capturing the decisive moment must also be ordered the composition of the image in order to achieve "*the visual poetry. I'm obsessed by one thing, the visual pleasure. The greatest joy for me is geometry. It is to have everything in the right place. It's a recognition of an order which is in front of you*" (Cartier-Bresson, 2013).

And he points out "*that's why photography is important, in a way, because at the same time that it's a great pleasure getting the geometry together, it goes quite far in a testimony of our world. I enjoy shooting a picture. Being present. It's a way of saying, 'Yes!' [...] Even if it's something you hate. 'Yes!' It's an affirmation*" (Cartier-Bresson, 2013). Waiting for the decisive moment implies discarding because – as we said – "*some journalists are wonderful writers and others are just putting facts one after the other. But facts are not interesting. It's a point of view on facts which is important*" (Cartier-Bresson, 2013). "*Through facts, however, we can reach an understanding of the laws that govern them*" (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 20). Here, the fact in which the girl runs with the geometric composition in the streets.



Figure 4.4. Island of Siphnos, Cyclades, Greece 1961 © Henri Cartier-Bresson

d) The centrality of the person in the image

The school of humanist photography places man at the center of the photographic scene and aims to show the daily life he wishes to recover after the world war, as in that image of a Sunday on the banks of the Seine de Cartier-Bresson.

“The camera enables us to keep a sort of visual chronicle. For me, it is my diary. We photo-reporters are people who supply information to a world in a hurry, a world weighted down with preoccupations, prone to cacophony, and full of beings with a hunger for information and needing the companionship of images. We photographers, in the course of taking pictures, inevitably make a judgment on what we see, and that implies a great responsibility” (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 50).



Figure 4.5. Sunday on the Banks of the Marne, France 1938 ©Henri Cartier-Bresson

In short, the four characteristics of Cartier-Bresson mean that photographing consists of living by putting *“the head, the eye and the heart in the same spotlight: the viewfinder”* (Cartier-Bresson, 2016, p. 11):

- 1) Wishing to communicate a photographic intentionality.
- 2) The composition of the scene in order to recognize the order of reality.
- 3) Waiting for the decisive instant.
- 4) Where the person is usually the center of reference.

CHAPTER FIVE DISCUSSION

After answering the first and second research questions (on hope and photography in Gabriel Marcel and in Cartier-Bresson), we will now attempt to analyze the third point outlined in this research question in the next chapter. This is the symbiosis between the philosopher and the photographer.

5.1) What is the correspondence between the characteristics of Marcel's philosophy and Cartier-Bresson's photographs?

Gabriel Marcel and Cartier-Bresson are well-known authors in philosophy and photography. This study is an attempt to apply Marcelian philosophy to Bressonian photography. None of the authors mentioned so far has reflected this perspective of the consideration of a philosophy of hope in Cartier-Bresson's photography. This is where this dissertation has its originality.

5.1.1) The incarnation in Marcel & Communication at Cartier-Bresson

'*Who am I?*' For Gabriel Marcel, to understand one's own incarnation is to try to understand the existential meaning of one's own man. Marcel tries to answer Heidegger's question "*Why am I something and not nothing?*" (Heidegger, 1942, p. 22). Marcel answers that question as follows: "*And why not say that the answer to the question, 'who am I', is my life in its totality?*" (Marcel, 1964, p. 130). That is, my being is my own incarnation. And my existential security is based on the incarnation of man as '*imago Dei*'.

However, Cartier-Bresson did not go so far as to pose directly – at least in his writings or public audiovisuals – a sense of existence or of transcendental existence. He simply lives existence, shaping the life he observes. "*The world is created and falls apart every minute. Death is present everywhere since we are born and the tragic meaning of life is a very beautiful thing because there are always two poles [life and death] and one cannot exist without the other. And it is these tensions that always move me*" (Capa, 1973).

For Cartier-Bresson there is a dialogue between life and the artist, because "*I believe that, through the act of living, the discovery of oneself is made concurrently with the*

discovery of the world around us, which can mold us, but which can also be affected by us. A balance must be established between these two worlds: the one inside us and the one outside us. As the result of a constant reciprocal process, both these worlds come to form a single one. And it is this world that we must communicate” (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 57).

Cartier-Bresson was asked by a photojournalist: “*Where do you place yourself in there? I have no idea—impulsive. I am extremely impulsive. Terribly. It’s really a pain in the neck for my friends and family. I’m a bunch of nerves. But I take advantage of it in photography. I never think. I set, quick! I hit!*” (Cartier-Bresson, 2013). We can say that Cartier-Bresson does not know who I am, but what I’m here for. In positive terms, the incarnation of Marcel’s man in Cartier-Bresson would be the incarnation of man in a painter-photographer.

Conclusion. Gabriel Marcel has a transcendental vision. Henri Cartier-Bresson moves without it, living is a fact in itself, for the capture of reality without a reason to explain the world. This does not mean that Cartier-Bresson does not have human whys – in his own way – about the good of humanity; but his are not supernatural whys. For Henri Cartier-Bresson, life is simply a matter of fact, merely pragmatic, aesthetic and communicative.

5.1.2) Man’s itinerancy in time in Marcel & Capturing the decisive moment in Cartier-Bresson

For Gabriel Marcel “*time does not reside in the experience of finitude. Life is a gift and the conception of time is the affirmation of the different ways of living in time: as an open time – or time of being – and as a closed time – or time of having –*” (Urabayen, 2011, 32). Marcel proposes a time as an opportunity to discover its essence in ‘*status comprehensoris*’, that is, open to what may become in the future, trying to discover an opportunity to know who he is and to gain hope in the face of the threat of existential anguish.

For Cartier-Bresson, his work consists in capturing *the various decisive moments* within time, without wondering whether the decisive images are ethically good or bad. We do not know if Cartier-Bresson wondered if, in addition to being a good technical

and aesthetic photographer, those images made him a better person. It is true that the images reflected by Cartier-Bresson are photographs that, from their composition and content, try to see the world because, as we have already pointed out in Cartier-Bresson *“what I am desperately looking for is the single photo which is enough for itself because of its rigor (without pretending to do art, psychology, psychoanalysis or sociology). An image whose theme exceeds the simple anecdote”* (Capa, 1973).

But this does not indicate whether Cartier-Bresson was in *‘status comprehensoris’*, that is, open to an ethic of hope of what may become the future, trying to discover a transcendental opportunity before his era after the world wars, with the rise of ideologies and the division of the world into blocks.

On the other hand, we can say that both artists were reflective people, concerned with opening up and capturing the world. As good humanists, Gabriel Marcel and Cartier-Bresson perceive that what is important is not speed, but depth in order to grasp the depth of the human condition. And although we may think that Cartier-Bresson is interested in capturing the decisive moment, this fleeting nature of time is precisely about defining the relevant action among a succession of events. Something that can define what is portrayed, neither before nor after.

And this sense of Cartier-Bresson’s human depth is also appreciated in the consideration of time when it was said that *“I have travelled a good deal, though I don’t really know how to travel. I like to take my time about it, leaving between one country and the next an interval in which to digest what I’ve seen. Once I had arrived in a new country, I feel almost like settling down there, so as to live on proper terms with the country. I could never be a globetrotter”* (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 8) *“I hate tourism! I like to live in a place! I don’t like to go for a short time. Rodin said, ‘What is made with time, time respect’”* (Cartier-Bresson, 2013).

Conclusion. We can say that somehow Marcel and Cartier-Bresson come to recover the old philosophical debate between Parmenides and Heraclitus in Ancient Greece resolved by Aristotle. While Marcel is a supporter of life in being, Cartier-Bresson is a follower of Heraclitus’s ideas of *‘panta rhei’*, where nothing remains in reality as we see when he points out that *“everything is new. Every minute is new, and this requires*

a re-examination of things: life changes continually. The world is created and falls apart every minute” (Capa, 1973).

If Cartier-Bresson’s photography consists in capturing the fleeting instants of time always in motion, the same capturing of those decisive moments – as he says – “*to fix eternity*” (Pogrebin, 2007), it is somehow the attempt to capture – as Aristotle would say – the essence of the accidental that is always present in every change.

5.1.3) Personal inner in Marcel & Recognition of order in Cartier-Bresson

Marcel’s third existential security is the knowledge of his intimacy and openness as a response to overcome time. That is to say, for Gabriel Marcel it is a question of recognizing that man is ‘*imago Dei*’. From this perception Marcel understands that man has a sacred character, and that there is a personal being who establishes a relationship between his own freedom and transcendence.

However, as we have already noted at Cartier-Bresson: “*I’m obsessed by one thing, the visual pleasure. The greatest joy for me is geometry; that means a structure. You can’t go shooting for structure, for shapes, for patterns and all this, but it is a sensuous pleasure, an intellectual pleasure, at the same time to have everything in the right place. It’s a recognition of an order which is in front of you*” (Cartier-Bresson, 2013). All in all, “*poetry is the essence of everything, and it’s through deep contact with reality and living fully that you reach poetry*” (Cartier-Bresson, 2013).

Conclusion: It is interesting to see how while Marcel directly understands that man is ‘*imago Dei*’, Cartier-Bresson understands that there is “*the visual pleasure, a recognition of an order which is in front of you*” (ibid).

We could maintain a double interpretation for Cartier-Bresson: either point out that the photographer has become a demiurge (who from himself gives meaning and orders the world) or understand that Cartier-Bresson has discovered (without knowing it) the fourth way of God’s existence announced by Thomas Aquinas that the ordained needs an ordering person. In such a case, Cartier-Bresson would approach Marcel’s belief that there is a creator and, in such a case, that man is a child of that God. For Gabriel Marcel this could be another sign of hope in Cartier-Bresson’s photograph.

5.1.4) The intersubjectivity of others in Marcel & The person at Cartier-Bresson

For Marcel the fundamental forms of intersubjectivity are the personal encounter with another man, the family, the human community and the personal encounter with God. For his part, Marcel highlighted these forms of intersubjectivity from the positive aspect, “*although he did not forget the negative experiences of loneliness and despair, nor did he deny their importance, nor did he consider them to be fundamental human experiences*” (Urabayen, 2011, p. 33).

In *El Ser y tener* (1965) Marcel makes this distinction between what is external and what is internal to the person, in what men *do* and in what men *are*. Marcel insisted that man was losing his sense of identity because of the industrialization of the time, so that men lived in a *world of appearances* because human beings are considered more for what they had than for what they really were essentially. Faced with such a situation, the philosophers of the world are called to become the defenders of the human.

In this sense, Cartier-Bresson’s photographs ooze – predominantly – the positive meaning of human life after the disasters of the world wars. His reports and portraits focus on providing enough background context to understand the situation of people. Cartier-Bresson pointed out that he admired war photographer Robert Capa and that “*the influence of Capa went beyond his lifetime. He was on the same wavelength with everybody socially. He was not impressed by queens. He was impressed by everybody as a human being. He was facing them front. I liked Capa for that very much*” (Cartier-Bresson, 1973).

Look at the other one. Cartier-Bresson is also one of the founders of humanist photography and, as such, “*I like to take a photograph of the person in his environment*” (Capa, 1973). Like Marcel, it is of special interest to capture the essence of each man and woman in the photograph represented. “*But the most difficult thing for me is not street photography. It’s a portrait. It’s like a question mark you put on someone trying to say: what is the meaning of that face?*” (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 47).

Cartier-Bresson spends enough time with the portrait. “*Whereas with Ezra Pound, I stood in front of him for maybe an hour and a half in utter silence. We were looking at*

each other in the eye. He was rubbing his fingers. I took maybe altogether one good photograph, four other possible, and two which were not interesting. That makes about six pictures in an hour and a half. And no embarrassment on either side” (Capa, 1973).

On the one hand, capturing people who develop actions in the world implies that Cartier-Bresson needs a degree of relationship and interactivity with the people he portrays. For Gabriel Marcel this would be another sign of the intersubjectivity of hope in Cartier-Bresson. That is, to have hope in others, because Cartier-Bresson is interested in discovering the photographic point of what he captures, in diving beyond appearances looking for a “*sharpness avoiding that the presence, the artifice of the camera, kills the human truth*” in front of him (Cartier-Bresson, 1973).

5.1.5) Conclusions

There is a ‘*walk in existence*’ for Gabriel Marcel which is a ‘*catching movement*’ for Cartier-Bresson. While there is a ‘*I hope*’ in Gabriel Marcel, ‘*I hope something happens*’ in Cartier-Bresson.

Gabriel Marcel also wondered if his artistic life made him a better person. For Marcel, artistic life is an ethical life that translates into developing the four elements of the philosophy of hope that makes him wonder about his own incarnation, his itinerancy, his intimacy and intersubjectivity. However, Henri Cartier-Bresson put all his effort into enjoying the visual pleasure of composition and in search of the decisive moment, developing an incredible artistic capacity to recognize the order of beauty. And although he did not know a supernatural vision of hope, Cartier-Bresson recognized and admired in front of his camera ‘*the order of things*’. Perhaps his photography lacked a sense of transcendence, but it allows the viewer to reach the natural beauty of the order created through his work, and therefore, seeing the creation represented in Cartier-Bresson’s photography, the viewer may wonder about his own personal existence.

In short, we can conclude this chapter that Gabriel Marcel’s hope has to be photographically: incarnate: photography is a means to expose the hope of bodies; itinerancy: which requires ‘*sculpting in time*’ (Tarkovsky, 1986) the ‘*punctum*’ before a selection of various moving events; 3) intersubjectivity: which can be shown in the

various human relationships that people lend to each other; 4) and intimacy: where photography reflects the essence of the portrayed.

Other secondary characteristics of hope for Marcel are: the active character of hope, which can be reflected by photographically capturing more actions than reactions; the increase in hope (in the face of the hopelessness that emerges) can be shown photographically in people overcoming crises, struggles and poverty. Finally, hope has a meaning in life beyond death, which photography can capture in moments of transit, funerals and burial.

In this essay on Marcelian hope, we have attempted to teach that the future is a waiting in expectation that flees both from excess by presumption and from defect with anguish. Hopeful realism anchored in the '*imago Dei*' that flees from '*naive optimism*' of those who think they live in the best of all possible worlds, nor from the '*pessimistic agorist*' who fears that this is true. A realism in the hope of Marcel love with the humanist gaze of Cartier-Bresson.

CHAPTER SIX RECOMMENDATIONS

Having analyzed this hypothesis of hopeful photography as a theoretical-practical framework between Henri Cartier-Bresson and Gabriel Marcel, we will see in this chapter: 1) whether this hopeful look at the work of the photojournalist in Kenya is possible and, subsequently, 2) whether it is also possible to create it for any potential citizen interested in African photography.

6.1) The photographic hope of the photojournalist in Kenya

Let us first see if it is possible this hopeful look at the work of the photojournalist in Kenya.

As a photojournalist I want to find some elements to show how we photographers can improve the virtue of hope and also bring other positive photographic models, instead of hackneyed dramatic visual stereotypes that – without exception – mostly flood the news agencies of Kenya (and Africa).

In order to do so, we will quickly question three factors that are related: 1) the Kenyan reality, 2) the work for the news agencies and 3) the photojournalist covering the news.

6.1.1) The photojournalist works on the basis of the Kenyan reality he finds

This trait about reality is associated with intersubjectivity with others in Gabriel Marcel and the importance of person-centered photography in Cartier-Bresson.

What is the reality or part of the Kenyan reality? Kenyan reality is rich, young and complex, with many lights and many shadows, but not unique or in the same trend. At least, broader than that reflected by international Media and agencies, with a plural reality and in constant change.

Thus, according to Trading Economics (2019) Kenya is one the most developed countries in East Africa. Currently, at the end of 2018, DGP has 5.9 percent growth. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (including coffee and tea cultivation) is the largest sector of the economy and accounts for about 22 percent. Manufacturing is the second largest sector and represents around 11 percent of the GDP. Other major sectors

include: Real Estate (about 8 percent of total GDP), Wholesale and Retail Trade (around 7 percent), Transport and Storage (around 7 percent), Education (about 7 percent), Financial and Insurance Activity (around 6 percent) and Construction (around 5 percent).

Out of a population of more than 46 million, 75 percent of Kenya's population is under 30 years of age and about 20 percent of the country is between the ages of 15 and 24 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2017, April 19).

Beyond these generic data, we can see *lights* in infrastructure and investments. For example, Kenya has developed in recent years a high level of basic structures such as a ring road around Nairobi or the Nairobi-Mombasa speed train. New skyscrapers and shopping centers are also recognized, with the establishment of European companies (*Carrefour*, *Decathlon*, etc.) and Chinese investment in public works by the Government, such as the new headquarters of parliamentary offices. On the other hand, many international companies maintain their headquarters in Kenya as a gateway to Africa, including the United Nations headquarters with the UN-Habitat Programme or the Open Environment Programme. (In this sense Kenya is a pioneering country in the fight to eradicate plastic). Another field where the economy stands out is tea and coffee, along with floriculture in the export of roses to Europe. In addition, Kenya has developed extensive agreements with China (Reuters, 2019) and other countries such as the USA.

In technology, Kenya is a reference as a pioneer for making payments, sending and receiving money through the mobile phone M-PESA. Also headquarter of IT companies in Africa are established in Nairobi and multinationals such as Google, Microsoft and others appear on university campuses in the country looking for job talents.

However, the most pressing *shadows* can be observed precisely in education – together with poverty and corruption – because despite the increase in the number of students and the change of curricula to start primary school earlier, education is still not universal, with a *funnel system* that gives priority to the best students. Only the best students with the best grades on national examinations can enter secondary school and

university. Thus, according to the latest data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2017, April 19), in 2016 there were 10.3 million children enrolled in primary school, of whom 2.7 million reached secondary school. Finally, only 564,507 students had access to the University (that is, 5.47 percent of every 100 students in the country).

This means that the hope of education for the majority ends at the end of primary school. Then, with 13 years, without the possibility of advancing in education, life becomes survival. With hardly any basic training, young people find difficult prospects, urged to seek life in order to get *incomes* in order to survive. As the World Bank (2016) points out “*There is a mismatch between the aspirations that any young person has and the opportunities available to them. Most Kenyan youth have high hopes, but there is an education system that suffers from problems of access, quality and relevance.*”

But if the lack of education is one of the country’s main shortcomings, we can also find examples of motivation in these same difficulties. Examples of hope are reflected annually in the results of the national KCPE and KCSE examinations. Success stories, such as Gloria Odhiambo (Njeru, 2018), a 13-year-old student from the Kibera slum who wakes up every day at 2 a.m. to read and study by candlelight in the tiny room she shares with her father, a cleaner. Gloria has one of the highest scores in Kenya on primary exams... but the international media shows very little of this kind of achievement, more focused on the hopelessness surrounding life in Kibera slum.

In short, beyond this macroeconomic and microeconomic data, life is fertile in Kenyan everyday life. It is rich country in stories, with a variety of information. These small buttons can be used by international media to discover areas of reality that are less frequented by them. Real examples that could serve to give a better and more complete understanding of the struggles and hopes of daily life: intense traffic, people in *matatu* or in UBER on the way to work, etc. Contexts of contrasts and transformations of a nation beyond the repeated stereotypes of misery and exoticism.

6.1.2) The photojournalist works according to the interests of the agency

(This feature of the agency’s informative follow-up can be associated with Gabriel Marcel’s time roaming and capturing “the decisive moments” at Cartier-Bresson).

Since we live in a globalized world – where any event has international relevance due to the economic or geopolitical repercussion on third parties – we briefly study the international photographic agencies. In 2016, the Swiss Propaganda Research Centre released a report that begins with the following quote in its introduction:

“What we see written in a newspaper or magazine about another country, how do those media know? The answer may come as a surprise: ‘The main source of information is the news agencies. These, which operate almost anonymously, are in a way the key to world events. So what are these agencies called, how do they work, and who finances them? If you think you are well informed about what is going on in the East and West, you should know how to answer this question’” (Höhne, 1977, p. 11).

Almost half a century later the paradigm seems almost the same and agencies wrap up the world of data and facts. Today mainly, the three major international agencies are *AP*, *AFP* and *Reuters*. Companies also in Kenya. According to the report of the Swiss Research Centre on Propaganda and the websites of these media offer information about them. Thus:

1. *American Associated Press (AP)*, headquartered in New York and founded in 1846, has about 4,000 employees worldwide, 265 locations (including Nairobi) and is used by some 12,000 international media, reaching more than half of the world’s population daily. For example, 2,000 stories are edited daily and its photo service sends one million images and 50,000 videos each year. (<https://www.ap.org>).

2. *Agence France-Presse (AFP)*, a French agency based in Paris and founded in 1835, has about 4,000 employees, with 200 offices in 150 countries (including Kenya) sending more than 3,000 daily news and photos to media around the world. It offers more than 20,000 contents every day. (<https://www.afp.com>).

3. *Reuters*, a British agency founded in London in 1851, is privately owned and employs 2,500 people, 600 photojournalists and 200 offices worldwide (including Nairobi). *Reuters* was acquired in 2008 by Canadian businessman Thomson and became *Thomson Reuters*. In recent years it has specialized in economic information

and markets. Reuters broadcasts news in the world's twelve major languages. (<https://www.reuters.com>).

In addition, the big television companies and newspapers with correspondents in Kenya (*BBC, CNN, The New York Times, The Guardian*, etc.) together with the three big agencies and other smaller ones such as the Spanish *Efe*, the German *DPA* or the American supplier of stock images *Getty Images*, are the international loudspeakers from Nairobi to the world.

“The logic of exclusion begins when a territory – region, nation or community of interest – lacks structures and organizations to articulate, take advantage of and export the information it produces. It has its roots in mechanisms of domination by the great powers and has always been perceived as an instrument of power [...] The north-south axis is an economic but also an informative dependence [...] Very few countries have a recognized instrument to tell, in their own way, the reality of the world” (Muro, 2006, chap. 1). A reality of the world that is told by the American *AP*, the British *Reuters* or the French *AFP*. As Mark Twain said, *“There are only two forces that can carry light to all the corners of the globe... the sun in the heavens and the Associated Press down here”*.

Therefore, the light of these communication agencies still today builds the daily narrative about the identity of the *Kenya brand* abroad. Thus, when a news story about Kenya can be considered *‘international in scope’*, the news agencies in Nairobi are entrusted with the mission of covering the news in order to forward it to the national subscribed media of each country. According to the Swiss Propaganda Research Centre (2016), *“the national media receive news from agencies and often limit themselves to copying and translating the reports of the major AP, Reuters, or AFP agencies”* coming from Kenya.

“In fact, not only the text, but also the images, sound and video recordings that we encounter in our media every day, are mostly from the very same agencies. What the uninitiated audience might think of as contributions from their local newspaper or TV station, are actually copied reports from New York (AP), London (Reuters) and Paris (AFP)” (Swiss Propaganda Research, 2016).

In short, the same contents are discreetly spread throughout the global village and thanks to the international agencies a *surprising similarity* is created in the informative angle of the news about any country, such as Kenya. Thus, from Stockholm to Lagos, from Moscow to Tokyo, from Sao Paulo to Delhi, international media information is standardized by these agencies. Therefore, obviously, if the vision of a country by the agencies is stereotyped or simplified, it will also be reproduced globally.

On the one hand, each international agency in Nairobi will treat Kenyan news according to the '*agenda setting*' established by the headquarters according to their national information criteria and economic, ideological, cultural, geo-strategic interests, etc.

On the other hand, this is natural: each company has its own objectives and corporate culture depending on the country of origin and the agencies pursue different objectives depending on the relations between Kenya and the readers and listeners of that third country, which receives the news (or the omission of news about Kenya).

All this is understandable. What should not be admissible is a continually utilitarian approach to information, both in the selection of news concealment and the systematic repetition of others to create or perpetuate *clichés* of cultural, economic or ideological dominance over a country. In this sense, it is enough to cite the recent terrorist attack by Al Shabab on DusitD2 and the Kenyan citizens' criticism of the *New York Times*' double information standard between the Kenyan victims of the attack and the American victims of 9/11 terrorism from the photographic point of view in the pages of the main paper of New York (De Freitas, 2015, January 15).

Although the reality is complex, if we make a broad study of the information that each agency transmits through its channels, it would seem that certain countries or topics were assigned by previous stereotypes depending on the interests created by each international corporation about a country. Messages that permeate public opinion and the subconscious of each reader-spectator.

Thus, as an example, it would suffice to ask each foreigner: what ideas or visual impressions does he associate with his conscience when we mention the word 'Kenya'?

The collective imaginary received is corruption, tribalism, slums, nepotism, poverty and terrorism of Al-Shabab. That is pornomiser. At the same time, at the other extreme we find scenes of safaris, beaches, wild animals, adventure. That is exoticism.

In any case, the photojournalist should look at things differently so as not to fall into the stereotypes of African *clichés*. This is a subject that we will develop in the following chapters.

6.1.3) The photojournalist works according to his own acquired photographic gaze

(This feature could be associated with the background that each photographer has. That is, their own incarnation and intimacy in words of Gabriel Marcel, and in the communication of a recognition of the external order to Cartier-Bresson).

In addition to working on a specific Kenyan reality and for an agency (with a corporate culture of their own) each photojournalist has a look of their own, fruit of their temperament, character, encouragement, family, experiences and other backgrounds.

However, it can be said that – with all that baggage – the photojournalist faces the reality in front of him: in this case, working as a photojournalist in Kenyan life.

So we have two raw materials in itself: the photojournalist himself and reality itself. And as essayist Susan Sontag (2015, p. 240) has pointed out, “*photography is – before anything else – a way of looking. It is not the look itself*”. And we point out that it is not the same reality either; they are both: a way of looking (of the photographer) at the world (Kenya) where he lives; a *professional* way of situating oneself before the *real* (in this place and under these concrete circumstances following Gabriel Marcel).

And this is a key point. In other words, what is important is not simply reality (in itself), but how the photojournalist sees reality. Because each photojournalist has his or her own gaze on the world, a *weltanschauung* or an intentionality, which makes him or her different from the rest of photojournalists.

Therefore, two notes each photojournalist has his own look at Kenyan reality. To these is added the third point: intentionality. A photojournalist also becomes the reality he wants or seeks according to the good/evil to which each one aspires.

In other words, we enter into the difficult working relationship between the company and the photojournalist in terms of the selection of daily topics to be covered which – as we have said in the previous chapter – are practically given by the editors and the agency's own agenda setting.

Perhaps the photojournalist in an agency cannot select almost anything of what he likes in many occasions, but we already know that life is not always what you want. In addition to the planned themes, each photojournalist should develop his or her talents simultaneously – both in the subjects they like, as well as in those they don't – as long as the coverage respects the professional ethics and dignity of the people portrayed.

In spite of everything, the human choices that we take as photojournalists are relevant in an agency. They are not innocuous or should be taken at random, but every action in photographic creation dignifies or vulgarizes us, because there is always one last intentionality. Therefore, there are no aseptic images or aseptic themes, because there is always a final objective for which to make or reject a photographic coverage (even the lack of intentionality is in itself an intentionality).

In the latter case, when the photojournalist does not always agree with the news agency, he will know how to seek the orientation of an approach and a minimum space of freedom on the proposed subject to offer his own photographic perspective. The human relations of a company should be collaborative between employees and superiors. The latter should combine the development of the agency with the development of the worker's talents.

Finally, agencies or the public should not consider the photographer a go-between. In other words, for a reader to be able to demand the right to truthful, free and responsible information, the photojournalist must first be able to work freely and responsibly by taking charge of his or her own professional acts.

In short, in the necessary triple relationship of *'reality-agency-photojournalist'* we can find in the subject of the camera three types of gazes in front of the world: *'gaze of resignation'*; a second *'gaze of acceptance'*, and a superior gaze that we will call a *'gaze of redemption'*, which in the end is the photograph of Marcel's considered hope in Cartier-Bresson.

a) Outlook of resignation

The word that defines a photographer's professional life in the face of *a world of contrasts* can be *'bewilderment'*. Usually, the journalist or photojournalist is a person with a lively critical thought, able to mix through his work with all social classes: from a politician, to a development worker, a religious leader or a poor slammer.

In this way, the photographer can get to know the human condition in all its extension throughout his working life, discovering the contradictions and incoherencies of people and ideologies.

Coupled with the harsh reality of the profession (and other external causes such as precarious working conditions, professional instability, stress, exhaustion...), the danger may be for the photographer that if he criticizes people and ideologies it is not accompanied in parallel by a healthy inner criticism (that is: *'the world is bad, but how can I also improve the world that corresponds to me?'*) there is the frequent risk of falling into a pessimistic vision, of a comprehensive status before life. Thus it is frequent to observe photojournalists who turn their initial realistic gaze into a resigned and professional skeptical gaze with the passage of time.

As Pieper and Marcel have warned in this essay of hope, tiredness or the proof of momentary despair is not necessarily bad, but a natural process in human walking. However, the initial problem of despair can become a chronic situation when it settles to stay in the life of a journalist. We could say that the problem increases when some professionals jump from *initial skepticism* to more or less *permanent cynicism*.

And as the Polish photojournalist Ryszard Kapuściński points out: *"our profession cannot be exercised correctly by anyone who is cynical. It is necessary to differentiate: it is one thing to be skeptical, realistic, prudent. This is absolutely necessary, otherwise*

you couldn't do journalism. Something very different is to be cynical, an attitude incompatible with the profession of journalist. Cynicism is an inhuman attitude that automatically distances us from our profession, at least if one conceives it in a very serious way [...] In my life I have met hundreds of great, wonderful journalists who were very serious; in general very human persons" (2002, p. 53).

This is the idea. Kapuściński points out that cynicism supposes the negation of reality and that "*cynics are no good for this job*" (2002, p.53). We may become skeptical, but never cynical. To fall into cynicism would be to settle into Pieper's '*status comprehensoris*' of one who believes (falsely) that he already knows the whole reality and, in the end, is nothing more than a return to the profession (or life).

Because if we live in a '*status comprehensoris*' we stop growing internally, also as professionals. We will be in a '*closed time*' (of having) and not in an '*open time*' (of being) indicated by Marcel. And in '*status comprehensoris*' we close our eyes – and what is worse, our mind – to photographic reality and, consequently, fruit of tiredness or abandonment, the '*status comprehensoris*' will catch us repeating photographic *clichés*, because reality will have ceased to interest us.

The question then assails us: Should we photojournalists take a critical look at an unjust world? A critical look, yes. Should we exercise a photojournalism of denunciation? Yes, when that injustice cries out to heaven. The problem could be that we turn everything into '*a denunciation*' and, by repeating the denunciation, we swallow the portion of the poison, and become simple denouncers. Scalded over the years we can fall into despair and the violence of despair and as such, the only thing clear is that despair – if not overcome – is a dead end.

Paraphrasing Hannah Arendt, "*violence can always destroy power, but it is absolutely incapable of creating it*" (1970, p. 73). And this is the point. With eyes closed by the despair of cynicism it is impossible to create a photographic life that defends the dignity of the person. And yet this is the challenge of the photographer and the person. The experience of Marcel and Pieper tells us that "*the existential analysis shows that on the basis of hope one finds oneself in a situation that invites 'to despair' and that it is precisely this hope that consists in overcoming despair*" (Urabayen, p. 158). This is the

challenge of the photojournalist: to open one's eyes once again to the hope that cynicism may have blinded.

In short: 1) this look of resignation is a momentary or permanent closed time where there is hardly any hope. (Even less so if one falls into a state of cynicism). 2) On the other hand, we have to consider the temptation of hopelessness as something real that will come throughout our lives because it also forms part of human nature. 3) However, what is important is not hopelessness itself (or reality itself), but how we see reality and whether we face the problem of hopelessness as an opportunity to seek meaning again. 4) Therefore, it is necessary to know how to face despair. Because in the face of despair, one either grows or dies. 5) In short, the photographer will end up opting for a hope or hopelessness, for an open time (in '*status viatoris*') or a closed time (the '*status comprehensoris*') in his professional life.

b) Acceptance outlook

The second look also aims to improve society. We use the ideas of the American writer Flannery O'Connor (1925-1964) in defense of what we could call '*the really real*', because about photography and its spectators we can say the same as about literature: "*My readers are the people who believe that God is dead. At least those are the people for whom I am aware that I write*" (Fijo, 2004). "*Stories are strong, it is true, but they are strong because there is nothing stronger than Christian realism. The complete reality is the Incarnation and I know that no one believes in the Incarnation anymore,*" writes O'Connor in one of his letters (2014). Thus, O'Connor proposes a transcendental belief like Marcel. Each incarnate body – as Marcel said – can be redeemed by knowing its intimacy and destiny.

On the one hand, the photographic reality of the incarnated bodies must be shown without naivety. On the other hand, as we pointed out about the nature of photography with the Jewish writer Simone Weil: "*imaginary evil is [conceived as] romantic, varied; real evil is [however] sad monotonous, desert, tedious. [On the other hand] the imaginary good is [portrayed] boring; [however] the real good is always new, wonderful intoxicating [...] It does not escape this alternative unless, by force of art, it passes from the side of reality, something that only genius can do*" (1994, p. 111).

This is the relevant point: how to offer an incarnated good or a photograph that expresses the good in an attractive way without making it seem naive? How to show the force of the good in photographic modernity? Only geniuses or artists know how to do this.

In short, in this second look of acceptance, the photographer starts from a realistic sense of the world in '*status viatoris*', with open-mindedness and a certain human hope. This can be seen in quite a few works by Cartier-Bresson, of empathy with the others photographed, in open time where one wishes to trap the photographic reality. Or as the award-winning war photojournalist James Nachtwey points out, five times winner of the Robert Capa Gold Medal, twice photo of the year in the *World Press Photo*, twice *Bayeux Prize* for foreign correspondents, seven times winner of the *Magazine Photographer of the Year*, *Leica Prize*, Doctor Honoris Causa for Massachusetts School of the Arts...: "*What pushes me to follow and helps me overcome physical and emotional obstacles is to have faith in journalism. I think it has value in itself and the ability to transform situations and raise people's consciousness. Journalism is offering people something they read and see and something about whom and what to worry about. Something to take care of. I haven't seen the time or the moment to throw in the towel because I've shared moments with people who have literally lost everything: their homes, their families, their way of life, or their clothes. With people who have suffered on an epic scale and have not given up or given up. Being poor does not mean being hopeless. So if they didn't give up, if there was hope, humor and kindness in those places, what right do I have to give up?*" (Gaviria, 2015).

c) Outlook of redemption

What James Nachtwey is offering us is the third photographic gaze to understand the world: it is not simply about accepting the reality of my own incarnation, but trying to give it meaning, transforming it and redeeming it. Man is the only rational animal that can intentionally transform a reality. Let's do with a full professional life that begins in the photographic attempt to overcome *clichés* and stereotypes. "*To act slowly but good handwriting: doing things well it matters more than doing them*", teaches the Spanish poet Antonio Machado (2003, pt. XXIV). To think and to think again, to do things well. Not to live in inertia, because we are rational beings. It is the overcoming of the great photographers who have contributed a revisionism if to fall continuously in what

already seen. This can be seen in many of Cartier-Bresson's photos, or those of Robert Frank in his book *The Americans*, or in Dorothea Lange's iconic photos of the mother displaced in Farm Security Administration during the time of the American recession.

We can say that a photographer does not sell images: a photographer sells a look, his personal look. Because to photograph is *easy*; the difficult thing is to have a *contemplative look*. And looking means seeing with other eyes. In other words, as Marcel Proust is said about art: "*it's about looking at old objects with new eyes*".

This is precisely the best definition of a photojournalist in '*status viatoris*' as opposed to another in '*status comprehensoris*': "*trying to look at old objects every day with new eyes*". With this availability, the photographer, the writer or the journalist has an open attitude of expectation and surprise before the world that comes to meet him.

In this opening of the '*status viatoris*' it is possible not only to discover stereotypes but also to replace them. The stereotypes in the images can be assimilated to slogans and certain texts. In other words, "*the souls of both reside in continuous repetition. They are like a mantra that prevents us from thinking, only swallowing,*" said Czech playwright and former president Václav Havel: "*language, made sentences, slogans organize people's lives, appropriate people, are objects of worship and faith*" (1997, p.17).

Precisely because *clichés* prevent us from thinking, they demand to be rethought. Stereotypes are generic ideas ('*a catchphrase*' as Havel says). And faced with the generic, we remember and insist on the idea of Marcel, for whom existence is always personal, concrete incarnated in someone with intimacy and circumstances of his own. And what Marcel asks is to discover, to think about that personal intimacy of each one and of the other in order to avoid any generalization, which is an injustice, because it makes me treat others as disincarnated beings. For this reason, one should not allow oneself to be led by labels for the judgments of others.

Moreover, to discover what is concrete is to define a problem. It is already working on the problem. That's why we also have to work on them, because in order to eliminate some photographic stereotypes we must also replace them with other new photographic

visions, with new ideas, because the head works with the ideas and images it has. We cannot leave an empty head. The mind does not think in white, empty, but with ideas and images. We must replace old ideas with new ideas. Old images for new images. And for that we need to look at reality – as we have said – the same objects with new words.

In short, this redemptive gaze of the photojournalist can be defined as '*the culmination*' of the '*hopeful gaze*', the perfect symbiosis that brings together the characteristics of Cartier-Bresson with Marcel's existentialist philosophy.

There is a transforming desire in the moments when this hopeful or redemptive gaze appears (which is not always). Essentially when, in addition to accepting the world, there is a superior technical and ethical creative effort that grabs the '*punctum*' (Barthes, 1990) to represent its appearance with strength, beauty and intensity and, moreover, breaks the usual gaze (stereotypes about something or someone).

6.1.4) Conclusions on the photojournalist

We have widely considered the figure of the photojournalist versus the importance of reality and agency for several reasons:

1) Because freedom is always internal and does not depend on the external circumstances of reality or the agency for which a photojournalist works. Although both agency and reality can condition the photojournalist, they can never determine him until they take away his inner freedom and his ability to opt for hope or not.

2) Because the ethics of virtue corresponds to the concrete man (incarnated according to Marcel), who has the ethical path imprinted on his conscience. Faced with a deontological ethic or a utilitarian ethic that the Agencies propose, in the last case, the photojournalist always has ethics in virtue. Whether there are laws or not, the true rule is always impressed in the heart of the man who leads him to exercise the good of virtue, as Aquinas pointed out.

3) It is sometimes difficult to change the corporate culture of an agency or of Kenyan society. But what the photojournalist does do is change himself and work in

favor or not of hope. Maybe the photographer cannot change reality, but as a photojournalist he can change the way he faces the *'status viatoris'*: with or without hope. In short, to dissolve into nothingness or to become personally and professionally something in hope. *"To say it clearly: in a line of Freudian thought, to die is truly to be undone, while for me it is to be fulfilled,"* says Marcel (Marcel, 2012, p. 59).

4) The photographer must also seek technical and practical perfection. His images must seek excellence and the moral good photographed should reflect the dignity of the human condition. This photograph that I take: is it technically well done and does what I have photographed and the intention to perfect myself as a photographer and a person help me?

There must be a technical and ethical growth of the self as a photographer and as a person. If the professional is separated from the personal, the technique of ethics, there will be no *reasons* in the actions.

That is to say, it will be simple a devastating pragmatism, acting without direction: simply *making*. *"The scholastics said: 'Verum est ens', being is the truth. Later on, the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1688-1744) opposes this with another formula: 'Verum quia factum'; this means that the only thing we can recognize as true is what we ourselves have done. This formula marks the beginning of the authentic modern spirit"* (Ratzinger, 2016, p. 267).

Today it seems that only the life of certain media is understood as a saturation of technical production (*'poiesis'*). Technical quantity often beats informative quality. In the appearance and disappearance of news there comes a time when production seems to be the only way to go. This is a *'dead end'* for the photojournalist because, not only does he put his profession at risk, but a life without meaning, without direction and without questions. Then, there is a risk of breaking because the person, the photographer is unstructured – although he does not intuit it –.

In this sense we point out that there are not two people: the professional and the simple citizen. There is only one person. There is only one life with *unity of life* because the

actions are diverse, but the person is unique with the same will, the same intelligence and heart to act.

5) In short, from a practical point of view, this hopeful view of the photographer in Kenya can and must aspire to transform this African corner of the world. And this can be concretized in:

a) If we want to eliminate hackneyed stereotypes, we must offer other contents. Intelligence does not work empty: it must be replaced and updated by other ideas.

b) Looking at reality with new eyes is not an easy task. We remember that hundreds of times by millions of eyes this garden of the reality of the world has been crossed by expert photographers. For this reason, it is not easy to create new photographs or visions for old objects about violence, war, poverty, wealth, humanity, etc.

c) That photojournalists should be proactive looking for topics not previously reported under a positive approach. The idea is to offer another angle of the news giving the reader-spectator a crust that others do not offer. For example, in the Al Shabaab terrorist attack in Dusit D2 (Nairobi) a journalist can focus exclusively on the drama of photos of the victims (cf. *New York Times*), or also focus on other elements of solidarity that existed in the attack: help to the victims, blood donations, etc.

d) That capturing reality in an attractive way requires a triple characteristic: 1) execute the work technically well 2) execute the work ethically well and 3) grasp the '*punctum*' for represent the appearance with strength, beauty and intensity that can never be *naive*.

6.2) Photographic hope in potential African photographers

Let us see whether it is possible to create this redemptive hopeful gaze on any potential photographer in Kenya, especially among youth. For that, two points:

6.2.1) Learning to look: visual literacy

For centuries visual communication was relevant in the lives of men with the painting of images before the invention of writing. Also later – for example during the Middle Ages – European cathedrals offered a visual iconography to catechize believers. Today, just as we learn to write or learn to read, we must *'learn to look'* in the face of the uncontrolled *"fury of images"* (Fontcuberta, 2016). In a world of screens and visual impacts a *'visual literacy'* is needed, because – since we get up – our eyes spend their lives open, watching the scenes of the world.

So, it is necessary to know how to discriminate and to have our own control over the images that hit us. Having a critical attitude about what we see requires analyzing, understanding and even creating images about reality. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the ethical and aesthetic visual rules, having a critical thought before the photographs that try to dominate and abduct our external sense of sight.

In short, as Felten defends, we should acquire *'visual literacy'*, as we have for example other skills for numbers or texts. *"In this rapidly changing world, visual literacy, whether conceptualized as a distinct set of capacities or as part of a larger multimodal literacy, should be recognized among the fundamental goals of a liberal education. This review highlights four categories of resources essential for understanding visual literacy in higher education: (1) foundations; (2) visual cognition and perception; (3) visual design; and (4) teaching visual literacy"* (2008, p. 60).

For this reason, we recommend subjects of visual and cultural communication in the education of youth. An example is the book *Images for primary school. Aprender a mirar* by the Ministry of Public Education of Mexico (1998), with the idea of sensitizing children in art education through photographs with works of art from the country.

6.2.2) Acquiring a glimpse of hope: workshops

The creation of digital photography workshops can serve as a support to acquire a hopeful look at everyday life, as *Mwelu Foundation* (2007) does in Mathare's difficult slum. This foundation created twelve years ago by Julius Mwelu (a resident of the Mathare slum) who works with a group of 80 young people from the slum to develop

their potential through photography, film production and building life skills in the neighborhood under two different programs.

One program is for children up to the age of 17 and another is for young people up to the age of 25. In addition, according to their corporate website, they count on the local population to make a positive change within the slum community itself, giving hope and overcoming the cycle of poverty and violence in Mathare. As they point out on their website *Mwelu Foundation* (2007) “currently the organization has produced over 10 professional photographers who have worked in media houses, fashion/model and photo documentaries. The foundation has a wide range of photographer who offer free service in community reporting, event coverage and commercial works”.

Another example of influence and hope are the photography workshops with recognized professionals, such as photojournalist Gary Knight of *Canon*. The idea is to train enthusiastic local photographers to learn how to capture the reality of the country’s ordinary life: a good example for telling visual stories that break *clichés* (Canon, 2015). As you can see, the photographic ability with intentionality is easily assumed today even with the camera of a mobile phone.

But a camera is not enough. Since aesthetics is an expression of ethics, people will reflect the inner world they carry according to their own circumstances. Therefore, the more an ethic of personal virtue can be developed from primary education onwards, the more likely the potential photographer will be to express a hopeful conception of the world.

In other words, a photographer with hope is a potential seed that will require care of the earth, rain, a gardener, etc. That is to say, the family, the school, the environment...: love. Only a person can offer a *glimpse of hope* if, usually, he has received love, because one gives what one has.

In short, in order to create a look of hope, it will always be easier for a person, a young person, to have had a stable structured life in a positive atmosphere of family and affective growth in order to return that constructed look to society itself. Only those who have hope can give love.

CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSION

In this dissertation we have analyzed and attempted to answer the three research questions on 1) the characteristics of the ethics of hope in Gabriel Marcel 2) the distinctive notes in Cartier-Bresson's humanist photography, 3) the symbiosis between the two authors in a '*redemptive gaze*'. In addition, we have also seen if it is possible to show a hopeful photographic vision in Kenya for photographers and potential photographers.

To put it another way, these three questions can be found in the following literary explanation of man by the philosopher C.S. Lewis (1898-1963). Words pronounced during the Second World War, September 20, 1942 before the listeners of the *BBC*:

"There are two ways in which man spoils himself: the first has to do with individuals turning away from each other, deceiving or assaulting each other [...] The second has to do with things spoiling within an individual... You can get a pretty clear idea if you think of us as a fleet of ships sailing in perfect formation. The voyage will be a success only if, firstly, the ships do not collide with each other or cross paths and if, secondly, each ship is in good condition and its machines are working" (Lewis, 1996, p. 87).

On the one hand, Lewis is talking about the success of the mission of a fleet of boats if there is individual ethics (*if each boat is in good condition*) and, on the other hand, if there is social ethics (*if the boats do not collide with each other*).

7.1) On personal and social ethics in the photojournalist

Let's consider the ethics of photojournalists. We also establish that individual ethics can be equated with the ideas of Gabriel Marcel (knowledge of my existential intimacy) while social ethics could be equated with photography in Cartier-Bresson, who wishes to join others while portraying the world.

If man must prevent the boat from breaking down to sail, the person, the photojournalist must remain afloat in the face of the hopelessness of the torments of life, as we have explained with Gabriel Marcel (2001). For this: 1) the photojournalist must be

consistent with printed ethical principles and that anyone can discover in his heart, struggling to acquire an ethic of virtue that forges his character and develops his redemptive gaze through the coherence between his thought and his life; 2) Personal ethics also implies that the *photojournalist's boat* is checked in the consciousness workshop from time to time to find out its own vital condition.

Thus, by checking the boat in his own inspection, the photojournalist will be able to recognize his glance of hope in a moment of walking terrain. Then, the photographer will discover the phase of gaze of resignation, acceptance or redemption before the itinerancy in the sea of life. As we know, gazes can change in the face of different existential circumstances.

Although the individual has his or her own personal mission, personal ethics only have a place in an ethics in communion with other ships, in a mission. In Cartier-Bresson's photography it is the desire to reflect people at a decisive moment in time. This ethic involves approaching other ships – people – with human and technical delicacy with a two-way photographer-reality that always puts the dignity of the portrayed in front of it.

“But there is one thing we have not considered: to know where the fleet is heading. Because their journey could be a failure if their destination was New York and we arrived... in Calcutta” (Lewis, 1996, p. 87).

And as the philosopher Kreeft asks *“but third, and most important of all, the fleet of ships, they must know why the fleet is at sea in the first place. What is their mission, their destination?”* (1989).

7.2) In the voyage of life

On the fate of the ship on the journey of life, it is about answering the question, as Gabriel Marcel says, that I am on *“a path but... towards what awakening?”* (2012).

Mutatis mutandis, for the photojournalist could be these questions: what path do I take in my life? What do I do with my profession? What does my photojournalistic vocation mean? And then, where do I go? With what gaze?

In short, all these questions could be summed up in one idea for Marcel: if I do not know who I am and what I am here for, I will not know where I have to go, or with what gaze (whatever it is).

A nuance: photography or the photographic gaze cannot be the end in itself of a person or of a photojournalist. Photography – like any other profession – is a means to an end. The only essential end is love between the creature and the creator, as we have seen in Marcel. In short, following the natural inclination of the will inscribed in the person (*'voluntas ut natura'*) we can point out that – for Marcel – the primary and essential character of the meaning of my life as a creature would have as its *'final objective purpose'* the encounter with the creator (with the help of supernatural hope). And, on the other hand, my *'final subjective purpose'* will be professional human perfection through my redemptive photographic vocation (with the help of natural hope).

7.3) Modern individualism

At the final point of the dissertation we have studied whether photographers can offer hope in Kenya. In analogy with the words of CS Lewis we find that the British thinker makes a sharp observation:

“Perhaps you have noticed that modern people are almost always thinking about justice and harmony between individuals and forgetting the other two (about individual ethics and the mission of the journey). When a man says of something he wants to do ‘it can’t be bad, because it doesn’t hurt anyone’, he is only thinking of this first thing. He thinks that it does not matter how his boat is inside as long as it does not collide with the ship next door” [...] (Lewis, 1996, p. 87).

“Almost all people of all times have agreed in theory that human beings should be honest, kind and helpful to one another. But unless we progress in the order within each human being, we are deceiving ourselves. What is the point of teaching ships to maneuver to avoid collisions if they are really junk in such a bad state that they cannot be maneuvered at all? What is the point of outlining rules of social behavior on paper if we know that, in fact, our greed, our cowardice, our wrong character, and our vanity are going to prevent that we comply?” (ibid, p. 87).

"I do not want to say for a moment that we should not think, and think a lot, about improving our social and economic system. What I mean to say is that all those thoughts remain in storage waters unless we realize that nothing but the courage and generosity of individuals will make any system work properly. You cannot make men good by law. And without good men a good society is not possible" (ibid, p. 88).

In short, during the voyage by boat we find this aptitude of *modern individualism* criticized by CS Lewis, of which he wishes to live a supposed fragmentation between 'public life' and 'private life', thinking that the personal situation of the ship does not affect others. This fragmentation of life is the corruption towards individualism, which sooner or later evades its own responsibility. And while it denies itself in the personal transformation it demands from others the social transformation, as C.S. Lewis says (1996). As Aristotle pointed out (*Política*, Libro III, cap. IV), "*men are a social being by nature*". And as philosopher Taylor clarifies: "*Discovering my identity for myself does not mean that I make it in isolation but that I do my life through dialogue, partly open with others [...] My own entity depends crucially on my dialogical relationship with others*" (1994, p. 81). "*Because forms that opt for self-realization without considering the demands of our ties with others destroy the conditions for realizing authenticity itself*" (1994, p. 71).

Definitely, if man refuses contact with other ships and avoids giving the best of his talents, the photographer cannot transform the world. The gaze on others will be a distant gaze, when the first photographic principle is precisely the closeness to the object. "*If your photo is not good enough, you are not close enough*" (Capa, 2015).

We end these conclusions with the inscription on the bow of the Greek ships: "*The difficult thing is not to live, but to set a course*" (Labrada, 1998, p. 16). In this dissertation we have tried to navigate and set a course throughout the history of hope and photography. And we have seen with Marcel and Cartier-Bresson – along with other thinkers – that taking charge of the needs and hopes of Kenyans is only possible from a redemptive vision of photography learning to look, that is, precisely from the closeness of love, because as Jutta Burggraf (2010) points out in tune with Marcel: "*Only those who love the world will be able to transform it*". Also from a camera.

REFERENCES

- Abbott, E. (Producer), Sacks, O. (Screenwriter), Marshall, P. (Director). (1990). *Awakenings*. [Motion Picture]. United States: Columbia Pictures
- Arendt, H. (1970). *Sobre la violencia*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial
- Aristóteles (1999). *Metafísica*. Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes. Retrieved from: www.cervantesvirtual.com/nd/ark:/59851/bmczp411
- Aristóteles (1999). *Política*. Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes. Retrieved from <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/nd/ark:/59851/bmc3f4n2>
- Aristóteles (2002). *Retórica*. Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes. Retrieved from: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/nd/ark:/59851/bmcq23w7>
- Aristóteles (2012). *Ética a Nicómaco*. Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes. Retrieved from: www.cervantesvirtual.com/nd/ark:/59851/bmcbr917
- Aquinas, T. (1994). *Summa Theologiae*. Madrid: Editorial BAC
- Aurelio, M. (2005). *Meditaciones*. Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra
- Barthes, R. (1990). *La cámara lúcida, nota sobre la fotografía*. Barcelona: Paidós
- Bauman, Z. (2005). *Vida líquida*. Barcelona: Paidós
- Behrend, H. (2002). *I am like a movie star in my street: photographic self-creation in postcolonial Kenya*. In Werbner, R. (ed.), *Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa* (pp. 44-58). London: Zed Books. Retrieved from: https://books.google.co.ke/books?hl=es&lr=&id=DvwMhrYvDQ0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA44&dq=photography+kenya&ots=uZRviVBZHI&sig=n6kZmoj0eQep9GI018a3SRFwv3Q&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=photography%20kenya&f=false
- Berger, J. (2001). *Mirar*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili
- Burggraf, J. (2010, June 7). *Quien quiera influir en el mundo actual tiene que amarlo*. Interview to Jutta Burggraf. (Aceprensa). Retrieved from: <http://www.aceprensa.com/articulos/jutta-burggraf-quien-quiera-influir-en-el-mundo-actual-tiene-que-amarlo/>
- Byung-Chul, H. (2015). *El aroma del tiempo. Un ensayo filosófico sobre el arte de demorarse*. Barcelona: Herder
- Cañas, J. L. (2005). *Influencia de el primer Gabriel Marcel en el primer Jean Paul Sartre*. In Urabayen, J. (Ed.) *Revista Anuario Filosófico*, XXXVIII/2, *Acercamientos a la filosofía de Gabriel Marcel* (pp. 381-403). Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra
- Canon (2015). *Education in photography: teaching under African skies*. Retrieved February, 2015, from: http://cpn.canon-europe.com/content/interviews/gary_knight_african_workshop.do
- Capa, R. (2015). *Ligeramente desenfocado*. Madrid. La Fábrica

- Capa, C. (Coordinator). Turner, S. (Editor). (1973). *Cartier-Bresson: The decisive moment*. [Motion Picture]. United States: International Center of Photography (ICP)
- Cartier-Bresson, H. (1952). *El momento decisivo*. Retrieved from: https://digitalphoto1sva.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/cartierbresson_the-decisive-moment.pdf
- Cartier-Bresson, H. (2013, June, 20). *Living and looking*. Interview to Henri Cartier-Bresson in 1971, by Sheila Turner-Sheed for Scholastic Magazine. Retrieved from: <https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/henri-cartier-bresson-living-and-looking/>
- Cartier-Bresson, H. (2016). *Fotografiar del natural*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili
- Carrión, J. (2019). *¿Tiene sentido todavía el fotoperiodismo?* New York Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2019/02/17/fotoperiodismo-medios/>
- Conrad, J. (1899). *Heart of Darkness*. London: Penguin
- Corazón, R. (2001). *La verdad, un consenso posible*. Madrid: Rialp
- Cortés-Selva, L. (2018). *Comunicación visual*. Barcelona: Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
- D'Ors, P. (2017). *Biografía del silencio*. Madrid: Ediciones Siruela
- De Freytas-Tamura, K. (2019, January 15). *Shabab Claim Responsibility for Deadly Assault on Nairobi Hotel Office Complex*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/world/africa/nairobi-attack.html>
- Dostoievski, F. (2000). *Los hermanos Karamázov*. Madrid: Cátedra
- Felten, P. (2008). *Visual literacy. Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning*. V 40 N.6 (pp. 60-64). Washington DC: Heldref Publications
- Fontcuberta, J. (2010). *La cámara de Pandora. La fotografía después de la fotografía*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili
- Fontcuberta, J. (2016). *La furia de las imágenes. Notas sobre la postfotografía*. Barcelona: Galaxia Gutemberg
- Frankl, V. (1962). *El hombre en busca del sentido*. Barcelona: Editorial Herder
- Fijo, A. (2004, December 29). *El hábito de ser, de Flannery O'Connor*. Retrieved from: Aceprensa: <https://www.aceprensa.com/articulos/el-h-bitito-de-ser/>
- Gaviria, I. (2015, June 4). *James Nachtwey, la fotografía que despierta conciencias*. Retrieved from: <http://www.fronterad.com/index.php?q=james-nachtwey-fotografia-que-despierta-conciencias>
- Gifreda, M. (1930). *El ojo de Zeiss y el ojo de Zeus*. Barcelona: Mirador
- Gilson, E. (2000). *Pintura y realidad*. Pamplona: Eunsa
- Girard, R. & Vattimo, G. (2011). *¿Verdad o fe débil? Diálogo sobre el cristianismo y el relativismo*. Barcelona: Paidós
- Godfrey, J.J. (1987). *Gabriel Marcel: I Hope in Thee for Us*. In Godfrey J.J. (eds), *A Philosophy of Human Hope. Studies in Philosophy and Religion, Vol 9* (pp. 238). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff

- Gombrich, E. H. (2013). *Lo que nos cuentan las imágenes*. Barcelona: Elba Editorial
- Graepel Hernandez, J. (2011). *Gabriel Marcel's Ethics of Hope Evil, God and Virtue*. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing
- Havel, V. (1990). *El poder de los sin poder*. Salamanca: Ediciones Encuentro
- Havel, V. (1997). *Largo desolato y otras obras*. Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg
- Hegel, G.W.F. (2001). *Lecciones sobre la Filosofía de la Historia Universal*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial
- Heidegger, M. (1942). *What's Metaphysics*. Frankfurt: Wegmarken
- Hemingway, E. (1933). *A Clean, Well-Lighted Place*. New York: Scribner
- Heráclito (1903). *Los fragmentos presocráticos, volumen I*. Berlin: Weidmann.
- Hipona, A. (1997). *Confesiones*. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos
- Hipona, A. (2017). *La ciudad de Dios*. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos
- Höhne, H. (1977). *Informe sobre las agencias de noticias. Volumen 1: La situación en los mercados de noticias del mundo. Volumen 2: La historia de la noticia y sus distribuidores*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
- Horacio (2010). *Odas*. Barcelona: Editorial Gredos.
- Inciarte, F. (2004). *Imágenes, palabras, signos. Sobre Arte y filosofía*. Pamplona: Eunsa.
- Isler, C. (2008, June-December). *El tiempo en las confesiones de San Agustín*. In *Revista de Humanidades* (pp. 187-199). Santiago de Chile. Retrieved from: <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=321227236011>
- Jeffrey, I. (2009). *How to read photography*. Barcelona: Electa
- Jolin, S. & McCormick, P. (1973). *Tragic Wisdom and Beyond*. In John Wild (ed.) *Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press
- Kant, I. (2013). *Crítica de la razón pura*. Barcelona: Editorial Taurus
- Kapuściński, R. (2002). *Los cínicos no sirven para este oficio. Sobre el buen periodismo*. Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama.
- Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2017, April 17). *Economic Survey Highlights presented by Zachary Mwangui, Director General Kenya National Bureau of Statistics*. Retrieved from: <https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/11536/kenya-economic-survey-highlights-2017.pdf>
- Kenya (2019, May 1). *Trading Economics*. Retrieved from: <https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/gdp-growth-annual>
- Kracauer, S. (2008). *La fotografía en la fotografía y otros ensayos. El ornamento de la masa I*. Barcelona: Editorial Gedisa
- Kreeft, P. (1989). *Three Philosophies of life*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press
- Labrada, M.A. (1998). *Estética*. Pamplona: Eunsa
- Leibniz, G. W. (1875). *Die Philosophischen Schriften*. Berlin: Hildesheim

- León, C. (2005). *El cine de la marginalidad. Realismo sucio y violencia urbana*. Quito: Editorial Abya Yala
- Lewis, C. S. (1996). *Mero cristianismo*. Madrid: Rialp
- Lorda, J. L. (2013). *Virtudes. Experiencias humanas y cristianas*. Madrid: Rialp
- Loudiy, F. (2018). *Gabriel Marcel. Human inter-personal experience*. In *An Encyclopedia of Communication Ethics* (Chapter 60, pp. 304-308). Slippery Rock University. Retrieved from: https://www.academia.edu/38463826/Gabriel_Marcel_Human_Interpersonal_Experience
- Machado, A. (2003). *Proverbios y cantares*. Madrid: Ediciones El País
- Marcel, G. (1964). *El misterio del ser*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Suramericana
- Marcel, G. (1970). *Creative Fidelity*. New York: Noonday Press
- Marcel, G. (1995). *The Philosophy of Existentialism*. New York: Carol Publishing Group
- Marcel, G. (2005). *Homo Viator. Prolegómenos para una metafísica de la esperanza*. Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme
- Marcel, G. (2012). *En camino hacia qué despertar*. Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme
- Messerly, J. G. (2014, April 16). *Gabriel Marcel on Creativity and Hope*. Retrieved from: <https://reasonandmeaning.com/2014/04/16/marcel-on-hope/>
- Ministerio Educación de México (1998). *Imágenes para la escuela primaria. Aprender a mirar*. México DF: Secretaría de Educación Pública. Retrieved from: <https://en.calameo.com/read/001590999ef7a6a16d09e>
- Momeñe, E. (1990). *La visión fotográfica. Curso de fotografía para jóvenes fotógrafos*. Madrid: Afterfoto
- Müller, H. (2012). *Método heurístico*. Maracay: Instituto Universitario Politécnico. Retrieved from: <https:// analisisheurísticos.wordpress.com/metodo-heuristico/>
- Muro, I. (2006). *Globalización de la información y agencias de noticias: entre el negocio y el interés general*. Barcelona: Editorial Paidós
- Mwelu Foundation (2007). *Photography*. Retrieved September 14, 2017. Retrieved from: <http://www.mwelu.org/our-projects/photography-2/>
- Navia, J. M. (2010). *Acerca de la eterna (y feliz) confusión en torno a la fotografía*. Revista litoral N° 250 (pp. 337-343). Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43434394>
- Newman, J. H. (1996). *Carta al Duque de Norfolk*. Madrid: Rialp
- Nehamas, A; Sorabji, R.; McGinn, C. et al (Authors). Garcia, P. (Director), Tranquilo Producciones (Producer). (2004). *Great ideas of philosophy. Films for the Humanities & Sciences; 1 Aesthetics* [DVD] USA: Princetown University, NJ. Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eRNald10mk&t=695s>
- Nietzsche, F. (1988). *El ocaso de los ídolos*. Barcelona: Tusquets Editores
- Nietzsche, F. (1973). *Más allá del bien y del mal*. Londres: Penguin Books

- Nietzsche, F. (1986). *Humano, demasiado humano*. México DF: Editores Mexicanos Unidos. Retrieved from: <https://saudeglobaldotorg1.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/te1-nietzsche-humano.pdf>
- Njeru, L. (2018, November, 21). *Born to shine*. Daily Nation. Retrieved from: <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/education/The-431-mark-Gloria-Omondi-from-Nairobi-slum-who-beat-all-odds/2643604-4861102-f0eji/index.html>
- O'Connor, F. (2014, July 30). *El realismo cristiano de Flannery O'Connor*. Retrieved from: Acepresa: <https://www.acepresa.com/articles/el-realismo-cristiano-de-flannery-oconnor/>
- Oz, A. (2005, Octubre 1). *El mal tiene un olor inconfundible*. Discurso del Premio Goethe de Literatura 2015 en Frankfurt (Alemania). Retrieved from: www.elpais.com/diario/2005/10/01/babelia/1128123563_850215.html
- Parellada, G. (2019, May, 10). *No contarla bien es una forma de seguir dominando Africa*. Retrieved from: El Salto: https://www.elsaltodiario.com/colonialismo/entrevista-gemma-parellada-no-contarla-bien-forma-seguir-ejerciendo-dominacion-africa?fbclid=IwAR2ePZMtaDp0lhCy5O8qjnz1lyFgMLgrEypktM1hOcRube_Vc27duOTqNF8#comentarios
- Pascal, B. (2008). *Pensees*. Madrid: Editorial Cátedra
- Peffer, J. M. & Cameron, E.L (Eds.). (2013). *Portraiture and Photography in Africa. Series: African Expressive Cultures*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
- Peguy, C. (2014). *Le Porxhe su mystere de la deuxième vertu*. París: Pleiade
- Philippe, J. (2003). *La libertad interior*. Madrid: Rialp
- Pieper, J. (2010). *Las virtudes fundamentales*. Madrid: Rialp
- Platón. (2008). *El banquete*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos
- Plourde, S. (2005). *Gabriel Marcel and the Mystery of Suffering*. In Urabayen, J. (Ed.) *Revista Anuario Filosófico, XXXVIII/2, Acercamientos a la filosofía de Gabriel Marcel* (pp. 575-596). Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra
- Pogrebin, R. (2007, January, 14). *Art*. New York Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/14/arts/14weekahead.html>
- Polo, L. (1991). *Quién es el hombre. Un espíritu en el tiempo*. Madrid: Rialp
- Ratzinger, J. (1996). *La sal de la tierra*. Madrid: Editorial Palabra
- Ratzinger, J. (2005). *Dios y el mundo*. Barcelona: Galaxia Gutemberg
- Ratzinger, J. (2016). *Introducción al cristianismo*. Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme
- Reuters Nairobi (2018, November 2). *Kenya signs agricultural exports deal with China*. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/kenya-china-trade/kenya-signs-agricultural-exports-deal-with-china-idUSL8N1XK54V>
- Séneca (2013). *Sobre la brevedad de la vida*. Madrid: Editorial Antígona
- Sontang, S. (1996). *Sobre fotografía*. Barcelona: Alfaguara
- Sontang, S. (2010). *Ante el dolor de los demás*. Madrid: Ediciones Debolsillo

- Sontang, S. (2015). *Al mismo tiempo. Ensayos y conferencias*. Barcelona: Random House
- Sweetman, B. (2011). *Introduction*. In *A Gabriel Marcel Reader*. South Bend: Saint Augustine Press
- Swiss Propaganda Research. (2016, June 1). *The Propaganda Multiplier: How Global News Agencies and Western Media Report on Geopolitics*. Retrieved from: <https://www.globalresearch.ca/propaganda-multiplier-global-news-agencies-western-media-geopolitics/5670371>
- Tarkovski, A. (1986). *Esculpir en el tiempo*. Madrid: Rialp
- Taylor, C. (1994). *Ética de la autenticidad*. Barcelona: Paidós
- Touraine, A. (2010, June 14). *El bien y el mal existen*. Interview to Alain Touraine (El País). Retrieved from: www.elpais.com/cultura/2010/06/14/actualidad/1276466407_850215.html
- Urabayen, J. (2001). *El pensamiento antropológico de Gabriel Marcel*. Pamplona: Eunsa
- Vargas-Llosa, M. (2010, September 3). *Detrás de la crisis financiera hay una moral degradada por la codicia*. Interview to Mario Vargas Llosa. (Revista El Cultural). Retrieved from: www.elcultural.com/revista/letras/Mario-Vargas-Llosa-Detras-de-la-crisis-financiera-hay-una-moral-degradada-por-la-codicia-Y-esa-es-una-forma-terrible-de-incultura/27730
- Vatican. (1965, December 7). Encíclica *Gaudium et Spes*, Pablo VI. Retrieved from www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html
- Von Balthasar, U. (1960). *El cristiano y la angustia*. Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama
- Wainaina, B. (2005). *How to Write About Africa*. Retrieved from: <https://granta.com/how-to-write-about-africa/>
- Weil, S. (1994). *La gravedad y la gracia*. Santander: Editorial Trotta
- Weil, S. cited in D'Ors, P. (2017). *Biografía del silencio*. Madrid: Ediciones Siruela
- World Bank. (2016, May, 30). *Our Youth, our future: moving forward to address youth development in Kenya*. Retrieved from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUNITFESSD/Resources/Chapter6_Edited_MCMay30_.pdf
