

STRATHMORE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
P. O. Box 59857-00200
TEL: 606155
NAIROBI.

ABSTRACT

The British Somaliland Protectorate to 1905.

by

A. M. Brockett
Lincoln College
Oxford.

1969

Strathmore University Library



59889

J
735
K57
1069

8

ABSTRACTThe British Somaliland Protectorate to 1905

Administrative histories have been written about most British possessions in Africa but not about the Somaliland Protectorate. A good general history of the Somalis has been produced by I.M. Lewis; R.L. Hess has written a fairly detailed history of the Italians in Somalia; T.E. Marston has covered British policy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden up to 1878; a number of books have appeared on Somali nationalism and boundaries; but no very detailed history of British Somaliland has been written. Primarily, the thesis aims to remedy part of this deficiency by giving a narrative history of British Somaliland up to 1905. This shows the protectorate to have been more significant in British foreign policy than is generally assumed; it also gives the background to present problems of Somali nationalism and it begins to outline the fascinating career of Sayyid Mohammed Abdulla Hassan, the 'Mad Mullah'. The thesis is based largely on British Government records: from 1870 to 1898 Foreign Office and India Office documents have been used; thereafter Foreign Office and War Office documents have been the basic source material; in addition, Cabinet papers and the private papers of British statesmen and officials have been used throughout. This approach is open to the criticism that it is outmoded and that it merely produces a history of British activities in Africa, yet it has been

followed in the belief that it is a step that cannot be omitted if there is, eventually, to be a more Somali-centric history. The thesis provides a framework on which a more balanced history can be built.

Inevitably such an approach produces a study of British colonial policy and Somaliland emerges as an example of reluctant imperialism. A constant theme in the history of this British possession is that few British statesmen had any desire to possess it; but they had even less desire to see any other power do so. Consequently, choosing the lesser evil, they found themselves burdened with an unattractive, troublesome protectorate. As a result the Somalis and their land suffered, for they experienced the disadvantages of colonisation, but few of its advantages. Much of the history of the protectorate concerns the attempt of the British authorities to exercise supremacy and control in Somaliland with a minimum of trouble and involvement and at the least possible cost.

The subject is introduced by an outline of what led to the British occupation of the Somali Coast in 1884. The capture of Aden in 1839 had seen the beginning of British interest in the area for Aden depended on the Somali Coast for its livestock supplies. It soon became a principle of British policy that the coast should be controlled by no potentially hostile power and that, ideally, it should remain independent. So long as no other powers showed any great interest in the area this

policy was easily workable but it became more difficult when the Suez Canal increased the importance of the Gulf of Aden and once the scramble for Africa had sharpened international competition. Under the expansionist rule of Khedive Ismail the Egyptians were the first to challenge Britain's paramountcy in the area. By 1875 they were established on the Somali Coast and the British found themselves forced to accept their occupation as a fait accompli. In fact, the Egyptians proved useful for while they did not seriously hinder Aden's supplies they served to keep the French and Italians off the coast. In 1884 the military and financial position of Egypt forced her to withdraw from the Somali Coast and there seemed to be nothing to stop other powers from taking her place. Under pressure from the Aden authorities Gladstone's Government approved a temporary British occupation of the Somali Coast to forestall France and Italy.

The progress from occupation to protectorate is then traced. Although the British were occupying the coast the French and Italians still wanted to control it as a step towards Ethiopia. The British soon found themselves in a diplomatic struggle to retain possession of the coast. In the process Britain sought international recognition of her position and the temporary occupation was transformed into a regular protectorate.

The nature of this protectorate is then examined. It was little more than a formality for keeping away rival powers. None of the obligations

of a protecting power were assumed and in fact the British did little more than occupy three coastal towns. Until 1898 the Indian Government was responsible for the Somali Coast, and under its control no money was spent on the protectorate and the administration was kept as simple as possible. Differences of opinion existed about the interior. The Indian Government emphasised that it was to be a coast protectorate and that the people of the interior were to govern themselves without British intervention. British officers on the spot disagreed with this policy, and the need to keep the inland trade routes open made a certain amount of interference in the interior, in the form of punitive expeditions, inevitable. These expeditions, on which little has been published, are described as well as the journeys of explorers and hunters.

Essentially, the interior remained unadministered but it was nonetheless regarded by the British as part of their protectorate. The thesis describes how, in the 1890's, Menelik of Ethiopia began to expand into the Somali lands and how Britain became concerned to preserve the integrity of her protectorate. As Italy claimed to exercise a protectorate over Ethiopia at this time a boundary between the British Somali sphere and the Italian Ethiopian sphere was defined in 1894. Two years later, however, the battle of Aduwa ended the pretence of Italian protection over Ethiopia and the British protectorate was left with a victorious, independent Menelik as its neighbour. As he was still bent

on expansion, as he would obviously pay no attention to the boundary agreed between Italy and Britain in 1894 and as Britain had shown sympathy towards his Italian enemies, it became imperative for the British to negotiate a new boundary with Menelik. The negotiations took place in 1897 and a new boundary was eventually defined in which both sides believed themselves to be making considerable concessions. Here the thesis is dealing with the background to modern boundary disputes and the reasons why Britain abandoned territory to Ethiopia are examined.

Before agreement was reached with Ethiopia, the danger of a clash with Menelik over Somaliland had alarmed the Indian Government into wondering whether they could not dispense with their African protectorate. At the same time, Lord Salisbury's upper Nile policy gave Somaliland a new value in his eyes. In 1898, therefore, Somaliland was transferred from a grateful Indian Government to direct British control. The Foreign Office became responsible for administration, the financial situation of the protectorate promised well, and it seemed as though Somaliland was to enjoy a period of more energetic and generous government.

The beginning of Foreign Office control under Lieut.-Col. J. Hayes Sadler is described. The Indian policy of restricting administration to the coastline was forgotten and Sadler began to advance British influence inland. This led to a clash of interests between Sadler and Sayyid Mohamed

Abdulla Hassan. The Sayyid's earlier history and his intentions are discussed. He was establishing himself as independent ruler of the interior, and, as neither he nor Sadler could properly appreciate the intentions of the other, hostility developed. The Sayyid determined to expel the British whom he regarded as intruders, while Sadler determined to suppress the Sayyid whom he considered to be a rebel. This led to a number of British military campaigns which squandered the resources of Somaliland and hindered its development.

The expeditions are considered at length. They have been written up in considerable detail, in a number of books including an official history, but this is the first time the confidential minutes, decisions and discussions of policy have been linked with an account of the operations. By referring to the contemporary press and parliamentary reports, and by examining the financial statistics of the campaigns, Somaliland is seen to have assumed considerable importance between 1900 and 1905. It has also been possible to evaluate the true role of the Italians and Ethiopians.

The first, small, British-officered Somali force was sent against the Sayyid in 1901 and drove him from the protectorate. His strength, however, was increasing, largely due to the ease with which he could obtain firearms from Djibouti and the Italian protectorate in north-east Somaliland. The British therefore found themselves committed to defending

those Somalis who had supported them against the Sayyid. When he re-entered the protectorate at the end of 1901 this led to a larger expedition which almost ended in a British disaster. The next expedition seemed essential to restore British prestige and protect the 'friendly' clans. Despite elaborate plans, separate brigades and troops from outside, the Sayyid was able to inflict a serious defeat on this third expedition in 1903. A fourth was therefore planned, to extricate the troops of the third expedition and to crush the Sayyid once and for all; thousands more troops were sent to Somaliland. This time the Sayyid was brought to battle early in 1904. His dervishes were defeated, but he himself fled and eventually took refuge in the Italian protectorate.

It was obviously impossible to capture the Sayyid and parliament was restive at the enormous cost of the expeditions. The thesis examines the choices of action before the Government in 1904. As the Sayyid's strength and prestige were supposed to have been irreparably broken by the final expedition it was decided to revert to the old policy of confining administration to the coast. The interior was to be abandoned and the clans armed and organised to defend themselves.

The attempt to implement this policy is then described. By early 1905 it had practically been abandoned for the Sayyid had recovered and built up his strength to the point where it was obvious that he would

re-enter the protectorate as soon as the British withdrew to the coast. Finally, the thesis deals with the success of the Italians in concluding peace between themselves and the British, and the Sayyid, in March 1905. This created favourable conditions for the British to abandon the interior and when, at the end of March 1905, the protectorate finally passed from Foreign Office to Colonial Office control, there was every intention of withdrawing to the coast. The thesis ends at this point, but it is argued that the policy of evacuating the interior was unworkable, for Britain was determined to allow no rival power there; this could not be ensured from the coast and it is claimed that the policy of withdrawal was merely an impractical attempt, dictated by economy, to put the clock back.

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
List of Sketch Maps	iv
List of Abbreviations	v
A Note on Place Names	vi
I Somaliland Before the Scramble	1
II The Egyptian Occupation	30
III Egypt Replaced	64
IV A British Protectorate	104
V An Indian Administration	145
VI An African Rival (1): Ethiopia Under Italian 'Protection'	201
VII An African Rival (2): Ethiopia Triumphant	245
VIII Sadler and the Mullah	287
IX 'Putting Down the Mullah'	320
X Manning's Expedition	350
XI The Big Battalions	386
XII Withdrawal	450
XIII Peace	505
Appendices:	
A. British Ministers Concerned with Somali Affairs 1870-1905	517

CONTENTS cont.Page

B. Viceroy and Governors-General of India 1870-1898	519
C. Governors of Bombay 1870-1898	520
D. Aden Residents 1839-1898	521
E. Officers Administering the British Protectorate in Somaliland 1884-1905	522
Bibliography	523

LIST OF SKETCH MAPS

	<u>Facing Page</u>
Clan Distribution in Northern Somaliland	5
To Illustrate chapters VI and VII	201
The First Expedition 1901: (i) Swayne's Advance	324
(ii) Samala and After	325
(iii) Punishing the Clans	326
(iv) Ferdiddin	328
The Second Expedition 1902: (i) April-September	343
(ii) October	345
The Third Expedition 1903: Main British and Ethiopian Movements	350
Egerton's Expedition 1903-04: (i) The First Phase	394
(ii) The Second Phase	405

Sketch Maps at the end:

Map no. 1	North-East Africa
Map no. 2	The Horn of Africa
Map no. 3	The Western Gulf of Aden

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following are some of the less common abbreviations which I have used, mainly in footnotes:

B.C.A.	British Central Africa
B.P.C.	Bombay Political Consultations
CAB	Cabinet Papers
C.A.R.	Central Africa Rifles
C.O.	Colonial Office
D.G.M.I.	Director-General of Military Intelligence
D.M.I.	Director of Military Intelligence
D.M.O.	Director of Military Operations
E.A.P.	East Africa Protectorate
<u>Eng.Hist.Rev.</u>	<u>English Historical Review</u>
E.S.P.	Sir Eric Swayne's Papers
Ext.	External
F.O.	Foreign Office
F.O.C.P.	Foreign Office Confidential Print
I.B.E.A. Co.	Imperial British East Africa Company
I.D.W.O.	Intelligence Division, War Office
I.O.	India Office
I.O./P&S Aden	Political and Secret Letters Received from Aden
I.O./P&S Bombay	Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received from Bombay
I.O./P&S Dept. Memo.	Political and Secret Department Memorandum
I.O./P&S India	Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received from India
I.O./P&S to India	Political and Secret Despatches to India
I.O./S.L.Aden	Secret Letters Received from Aden
I.O./S.L.India	Secret Letters and Enclosures from India
K.A.R.	King's African Rifles
£	Turkish pound
Mil.	Military
n.d.	no date
Pol.	Political
P.R.O.	Public Record Office
Rs.	Rupees
Sal.P.	Salisbury Papers
Sec.	Secret
S.N.O.	Senior Naval Officer

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS cont.

tel.	telegram
W.O.	War Office
W.O.L.	War Office Library

A NOTE ON PLACE NAMES

Wherever possible I have spelt place names as they are spelt in The Oxford Atlas (Oxford, 1963). For those names which do not appear in The Oxford Atlas I have tried to use the spelling which seems most common. Abyssinia and Ethiopia can cause confusion; in this thesis I have not treated them as interchangeable but have followed an interpretation of my own: Abyssinia I have used to describe the enlarged kingdom of Aksum as it expanded southwards from about the seventh century A.D. onwards; in the 1870's and 1880's I have used Abyssinia to describe the northern part of the kingdom which was ruled by Johannes, as distinct from the southern kingdom of Shoa ruled by Menelik; Ethiopia I have used to describe the united empire under Menelik from 1889 onwards.

CHAPTER I

SOMALILAND BEFORE THE SCRAMBLE

For most of their history the Somali people have ruled themselves but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been an interlude during which other powers have claimed to rule them. Among these powers was Britain whose Somaliland Protectorate, begun in 1884, proved to be one of her least successful imperial enterprises. Treated as a disagreeable but necessary encumbrance this Cinderella of the Empire had a sad history, marked by bloodshed, lack of progress, ever-changing policies and tight-fisted economy. The 'wind of change' provided a welcome opportunity for getting rid of the protectorate. Independence was granted on 26 June 1960, Somaliland left the Commonwealth, and five days later united with newly independent Somalia (which had been a United Nations trust territory administered by Italy) to become the Northern Regions of the Somali Republic. Yet British Somaliland was far from insignificant during its colonial history and at times it achieved an unwelcome prominence and notoriety. This thesis is an attempt to examine how it became a British protectorate, what the British Government thought about it once they had it, and how it was governed until 1905 when it was transferred to the Colonial Office.

The area of the British protectorate as defined in 1897 was 68,000 square miles, an area larger than England and Wales but smaller than England and Scotland. Its population was estimated at 300,000 in 1910 and

approximately 500,000 in 1960. The protectorate lay between 8° and 12° north of the equator, on the southern shores of the Gulf of Aden. The four hundred mile coastline had one good harbour, at Berbera, one poor harbour, at Zeila, and many small roadsteads where dhows, generally known as luggalows, could call. The coast itself is stony, sandy, hot and dessicated; the rainfall seldome exceeds four inches a year and the temperature ranges from 60° to 115° F.

Inland from the coast, to the south, is a range of magnificent mountains, running from the Harar plateau in the west to Cape Guardafui in the east; behind Zeila they are more than sixty miles from the sea, but eastwards, behind Las Koreh, the coastal plain is only fifteen miles wide. Behind the mountains, which in some places reach 6,000 feet, a plateau gradually descends in a southerly direction, over a distance varying from eighty to a hundred miles, down to a height of 3,000 feet, where the Haud begins. The plateau, where many of the Somali clans have their main wells, is much cooler than the coast, and in some places, such as the district around Hargeisa, the annual rainfall is twenty inches, though elsewhere it is barren and dry. Intersecting the plateau are several valleys running south-east to the Indian Ocean, the largest being the Nogal Valley; they are dry except for the spatewater they carry immediately after a rain-storm.

Whilst the plateau contains the main wells of the area, the best grazing is in the Haud which mostly lies south of what was the protectorate, in Ethiopia. This is an area of rolling grassland and thorn-bush

stretching over hundreds of miles, waterless except for seasonal pools of rainwater and a few oases, and merging into the Ogaden plains which continue south to the valleys of the Shibeli and Juba rivers.

Grazing and water are all-important, for the Somalis are a nomadic, pastoral people whose life centres around the camel and consists of an endless quest for water and pasturage. As well as camels the inhabitants of northern Somaliland possess sheep and goats, cattle and ponies, but it is the ownership of camels which gives a man prestige and wealth.

The age-old pattern of movement with the flocks and herds was dictated by the monsoons and rains. In October the north-east monsoon begins, bringing heavy coastal rains in December and January. This is the cooler period of the year, and it was the trading season; merchants' dhows came over from Arabia and India with the monsoon, and the people with their animals occupied the coastal plain and the plateau. In early April the north-east monsoon dies out, leaving the coast unpleasantly torrid. This ended the trading season. The people on the coast moved south with their stock, up on to the cooler plateau, and those who had been on the plateau moved south towards the Haud where the heavy rain was falling. The people stayed in these areas throughout the south-west monsoon, but by the time that ended in September the Haud was becoming too dry for stock; those who were on the Haud began to fall back on the wells of the plateau, displacing those who were there and

forcing them back down to the coast, where the north-east monsoon began again in October, and the cycle was complete.¹


In these circumstances conflict was inevitable and endemic. Conflicts over water or pasture between individuals easily developed into larger conflicts between lineage groups which dragged on with their entail of blood feuds, raids and camel thefts. This also was a part of the pattern of life, giving the land a reputation for harshness, which it richly deserved, and for disorganised savagery, which it did not.

The grim struggle for existence in an inhospitable land made the individual Somali fiercely independent, but at the same time he was bound in a remarkable political organisation, based on a system of kinship and agnatic descent. All who called themselves Somalis could trace their descent through the male line to a common ancestor, himself descended from the Prophet Mohamed, and within this all-embracing group each person could trace his ancestry back through a series of divisions such as his immediate lineage group and his clan, to one of six great clan-families. This system could command the individual's allegiance at any one of its levels. In one instance a man would support the cause

1. This description of the country and the nomadic pattern has been drawn from: I.M.Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (London, 1961), pp. 31-42; I.M.Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland (London, 1965), pp. 1-9; and Colonial Office, Somaliland - Report for the years 1958 and 1959 (London, 1960), pp. 11, 49-50.

To face page 5

CLAN DISTRIBUTION IN NORTHERN SOMALILAND



KEY

Boundary of British Somaliland


.....
Approximate Clan Borders

MILES
0 50 100

of his clan against another clan; in another he would side with his own lineage group against another lineage group within his clan.¹

Here we need only be concerned with three of the six clan-families, namely the Dir, the Ishaak and the Darod. From the observations of travellers, and from references in official reports and despatches, it appears that in northern Somaliland these clan-families occupied, in the second half of the nineteenth century, much the same areas as they do today, with the exception that they did not stretch quite so far south as now. The approximate areas within which each clan moved are shown on the map facing this page;² their relationships are shown in the simple genealogical tables which follow.³


Clan-family



1. This subject is fully dealt with by I.M. Lewis in A Pastoral Democracy and also in The Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 10-12.
2. The map is based on maps in: I.M. Lewis, Peoples of the Horn of Africa (London, 1955); Foreign Office Confidential Print (hereafter F.O.C.P.) no. 5243, memorandum by Capt. J.B. King (vice-consul, Zeila), 25 Sept. 1885, enclosed in E.H. Egerton (acting consul-general, Cairo) to Lord Salisbury (secretary of state for foreign affairs), no. 720, 7 Oct. 1885; and F.O.C.P. 6176, memorandum by Lieut.-Col. E.V. Stace (consul for the Somali Coast) 27 Sept. 1891, enclosed in Stace to Sir E. Baring (British consul-general, Egypt), 8 Oct. 1885.
3. These tables are intended to show the relationship of the various clans which occur in the narrative. They are by no means comprehensive and omit many clans and groups which live elsewhere in Somaliland. For more exact details see: I.M. Lewis, Peoples of the Horn of Africa, and J.A. Hunt, A General Survey of the Somaliland Protectorate, 1944-50 (London, 1951).


The Esa and Gadabursi controlled the important caravan route from Harar to Zeila, although both these towns were peopled by descendants of the Muslim states of the middle ages who were not Somalis. In the 1880's the Gadabursi did not live on the coast, although they had done earlier and were to do so later.

Clan-family



The whole of the Ishaak clan-family lived in northern Somaliland. Certain lineage groups of the Habr Awal controlled Berbera and through their hands passed much of the trade of the interior. The centre of the Habr Yunis clan was a group of wells known as Burao. The Habr Toljaala, reputedly the most lawless of the Ishaak, traded through their own small ports and handled most of the Dolbohanta produce.

Clan-family



The Darod were the largest Somali clan-family. Within the boundaries of the British protectorate were two Darod clans, the Warsangeli, many of whom were dhow-owners and sailors, and the Dolbohanta, a land-locked clan about which the outside world knew very little. The Mijertein were based in the north-east of the Horn, and apart from trading they acquired considerable wealth from plundering ships wrecked on their treacherous shores. The Ogaden consisted of numerous sub-clans ranged over a vast area from the southern boundaries of the British protectorate to the River Juba; those north of the River Shibeli sent their caravans of camels, tied nose to tail, to trade at Berbera.

The produce of Somaliland altered little over the centuries. Livestock, chiefly cattle, sheep and goats, was exported to Arabia, and Aden was the main customer. In addition there were hides and skins, ghee (clarified butter), ostrich feathers, ivory, rhinoceros horns, and gums for incense for which the land had long been famous; off the coast of Zeila there were pearl and sponge fisheries. Slaves were also exported; in the nineteenth century they were mainly Arussi, captured by the Ogaden from beyond the River Shibeli, and other Galla, highly prized as slaves, who were sent through Harar to Zeila and Tadjoura. In return for this produce, traders from Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and western India offered many types of cloth and metal, beads, dates and rice.¹

1. See: R.F. Burton, First Footsteps in East Africa ed. G. Waterfield (London, 1966), pp. 250 & 296; and T.E. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area 1800-1878 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1961), pp. 113-114.

The Somalis belong to the Eastern Cushitic group of the Afroasiatic language family but opinions differ as to their origins. For a long time the predominant theory was that the Somalis, who were either an independent Cushitic group or else a people resulting from a mixture of Galla natives and Arab colonisers, originally lived on the shores of the Gulf of Aden, and that in about the tenth century they began a southward movement, driving the Galla out of the Horn of Africa. This theory is supported by Somali tradition.¹ Another, and more recent theory, based on linguistic evidence and in harmony with early historical references, is that the Somalis emerged in the south-eastern highlands of Ethiopia, and that they moved north and east to the Gulf of Aden at an undetermined date long before the great northward move of the Galla in the sixteenth century.²

Historical references to the area as opposed to the people are more numerous. The Somali Coast may well have been the Land of Punt to which the kings of Egypt sent ships to collect incense, spices and ivory as early as 3,000 B.C.³ In the first millenium B.C. the highlands of northern Ethiopia were occupied by Semitic Sabaeans from Arabia and they eventually established the great kingdom of Aksum which became a Christian kingdom in the fourth century A.D.. There is evidence that about the time that Christianity reached Aksum its kings had conquered

-
1. See: I.M. Lewis, 'The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa' Journal of African History, i (1960), 213-230.
 2. See: H.S. Lewis, 'The Origins of the Galla and Somali', Journal of African History, vii (1966), 27-46.
 3. E. Ullendorff, The Ethiopians (London, 1960), p. 46.

the peoples of the incense-bearing plains in the south east.

Authorities differ as to whether this refers to an Aksumite conquest of Somaliland;¹ if it did it was not followed by any occupation.

In the seventh century Aksum ceased to be the predominant power on the Red Sea. The new Muslim Empire absorbed Arabia and conquered Egypt. The Red Sea became a Muslim channel and a string of Arab settlements was established on the African coast; in the Gulf of Aden, Zeila was the most important, and here Persian and Indian traders also settled.² With the Arabs came Islam which, with difficulty, began to replace 'the vigorous paganism of the Somalis';³ the spread of Islam was encouraged by slave-raiding 'as conversion was the easiest way of escaping this iniquitous recruitment'.⁴ Slave raids developed into permanent control of inland areas, and a number of small Muslim states grew up, the most important being Ifat, which lay east of Shoa and included the emirate of Adal with its capital, Zeila.

-
1. E.A.W. Budge, *A History of Ethiopia* (London, 1928), i, 237, and R. Pankhurst, *Travellers in Ethiopia* (London, 1965), pp. 7 & 141, claim that this refers to Somaliland, but Pankhurst's map on p. 4 shows the borders of Aksum as being far from Somaliland. A. Kammerer, *Essai sur l'Histoire Antique d'Abyssinie* (Paris, 1926), p. 58, says that it may refer to the Esa Somali territory or to that of the Arussi. M. Perham, *The Government of Ethiopia* (London, 1948), pp. 23-4, says that it need not refer to the Somali Coast. A.H.M. Jones and E. Monroe, *History of Ethiopia* (3rd impression, Oxford, 1955), p. 23, state that it refers to the Danakil.
 2. I.H. Lewis, 'The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa'.
 3. Ullendorff, *The Ethiopians*, p. 43.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

From the ninth to the sixteenth centuries there was intermittent warfare between these Muslim states and Abyssinia, as Aksum was now called. At the end of the ninth century Zeila came under Abyssinian control, though still retaining its Muslim character,¹ and as late as 977-8 A.D. Ibn Hawqal wrote that Zeila was possessed by Abyssinian Christians,² but by the end of the tenth century Abyssinia had lost Zeila.³

Meanwhile Arab traders, adventurers and refugees continued to arrive on the coast. In the ninth or tenth century a sheikh is said to have come from Arabia to north-east Somaliland, where he married a Somali woman and became the father of the Darod clan-family. In the twelfth century the founder of the Ishaak family, Sheikh Ishaak, is said to have landed near Mait which became his capital.⁴ In the thirteenth century Ifat reached the height of its power and Zeila and Berbera, consisting mainly of grass huts with few permanent buildings, were its two main ports;⁵ in the next century Ibn Battuta wrote of Zeila:

'The stench of the country is extreme, as is also its filth, from the stink of the fish and the blood of camels which are slaughtered in its streets.'⁶

-
1. Jones and Monroe, History of Ethiopia, p. 46
 2. Quoted in J.S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (London, 1952) pp. 51-2
 3. Ibid., p. 62
 4. I.M. Lewis, 'The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa', and A Pastoral Democracy, p. 131
 5. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, p. 60
 6. Quoted by Burton, First Footsteps... (1966 edn.), p. 73, and Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, p. 67.

In the early fourteenth century Ifat renewed the war but was unsuccessful and was forced to become tributary to Abyssinia.¹ At the end of the fourteenth century Sa'ad ad-Din II became sultan of Ifat and rebelled against Abyssinia. Once again Ifat was unsuccessful and in either 1402-3 or 1415² Zeila was captured by the Abyssinians, its inhabitants massacred, its mosques destroyed and allegedly replaced by churches, and Sa'ad ad-Din killed. The Abyssinian occupation of Zeila lasted twenty years.³

The Muslim state revived, not as Ifat, but as the Sultanate of Adal, with its wealthy capital at Zeila and several Muslim towns in the hinterland,⁴ and war was renewed with Abyssinia.⁵ New enemies appeared on the scene in the shape of the Portuguese. In 1498 Vasco da Gama reached India; the next year he bombarded Mogadiscio; the Portuguese began to penetrate the Red Sea. In order to protect this Muslim preserve from Christian infiltration the Egyptians captured Zeila in 1510, to use it as a base against the Portuguese,⁶ but they do not appear to have maintained their hold on it. 1516 was a black year for Adal. The Abyssinians under Negus Lebna Dengel, invaded Adal, killing

-
1. Budge, A History of Ethiopia, i, 289-298
 2. Budge gives the earlier date, Trimingham prefers the later.
 3. Budge, A History of Ethiopia, i, 300; Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, p. 74.
 4. I.M. Lewis, 'The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa'.
 5. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, p. 82.
 6. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 20.

war leader, and a Portuguese fleet captured and burnt Zeila¹; two years later Berbera suffered the same fate² and the harassed Adalites moved their capital from Zeila to Harar.

The Muslim cause was strengthened by the appearance of the Ottoman Turks, who defeated the Egyptian Mamluks in 1516, and succeeded them as the protectors of Islam in the Red Sea. Shortly afterwards a remarkable man, Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi, nicknamed Ahmed Gran (the 'left-handed'), made himself Imam of Adal and declared holy war against Christian Abyssinia. He began his campaign in 1527, and with his Somali³ and Danakil troops, and cannon from Arabia, penetrated to the heart of Abyssinia, won resounding victories and devastated the country and its churches for seventeen years. His armies reached as far north as Kassala and he ruled the coast from Zeila to Massawa. Of this Muslim invasion Professor Ullendorff wrote:

'The holocaust enveloped most parts of Ethiopia and brought in its train misery and murder, ruin and devastation. Much of the literary and intellectual heritage of Abyssinia was irretrievably lost, and the barbarism and brutality had an effect far transcending that age.'⁴

-
1. Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, p. 72, and Burton, First Footsteps... (1966 edn.), p. 74.
 2. I.M. Lewis, 'The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa'.
 3. The bulk of his Somali troops were Dard. See, I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, p. 26.
 4. Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, p. 73. See also: Budge, A History of Ethiopia, i, 326-336, ii, 337-340; Trimmingham, Islam in Ethiopia, pp. 84-91; and I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 25-7.

In 1541 Portuguese troops arrived to help the Abyssinians and Ahmed Gran enlisted Turkish contingents with firearms; eventually the Christian army triumphed in a great battle near Lake Tana in 1543, Ahmed Gran was killed and the Muslims retired on Harar. From then on Adal declined; in 1577, under the threat of the great Galla invasion, its capital was moved to Aussa in the Danakil deserts, where it was finally overthrown by the Danakil in the next century. Harar continued as an isolated and independent Muslim emirate until 1887¹. Meanwhile the Turks had occupied Massawa and Zeila in 1588 and closed the Red Sea against the Portuguese.

With the opening of the Cape route to the Indies the ancient route, by which goods from the east were sent to Aden where they were transhipped into smaller vessels and taken up the Red Sea to the Middle East and Europe, began to decline. The Gulf of Aden lost its importance for nearly three centuries. Between 1630 and 1633 the Turks withdrew from the Yemen and evacuated their garrisons from Massawa and Zeila. Zeila fell under the rule of the shariff of Mocha in the Yemen, who was himself subject to the imam of San'a², but east of Zeila the Somalis appear to have enjoyed complete independence.

-
1. I.M.Lewis, 'The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa', and Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, p. 76
 2. F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum on the Turkish Claim to Sovereignty over the Eastern Shores of the Red Sea and the whole of Arabia; and on the Egyptian Claim to the whole of the Western Shore of the same Sea, including the African Coast from Suez to Cape Guardafui' (1874), p. 2, and Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 24-7

The Dutch, British and French traded for Yemeni coffee at Mocha, and in 1799 a British expedition sent from India to dislodge Napoleon from Egypt, temporarily occupied the island of Perim, but it was not until 1802 that Europeans showed any interest in the Somali coast. In this year a private English expedition under Lord Mountnorris visited the Red Sea and one of its members, Henry Salt, was sent into Abyssinia from Massawa. While Salt was in Abyssinia, Mountnorris explored the coasts of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, visiting Mocha, Aden and Berbera. He discovered a very large annual market, or fair as it was called, at Berbera, and in 1808 he urged the British Government to occupy Aden in order to exploit the Trade of Berbera. Britain, however, was too occupied with Napoleon in Europe to be interested in the trade of Berbera, and his idea was not adopted.¹

In 1825 the northern Somali coast experienced its first official British action in the form of a blockade. A brig from Mauritius had been plundered near Berbera and two of its Lascars murdered. A sloop of the Indian Navy was sent to enforce a blockade which resulted in a treaty on 6 February 1827 by which the Habr Awal agreed to pay 15,000 Spanish dollars in compensation; the treaty also contained articles of friendship and commerce.²

1. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 33-6

2. F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum...', p.2; C.U.Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads (4th edn., Calcutta, 1909), xiii, 195-6; an original of the treaty is in P.R.O., Foreign Office Papers, Series 844, vol.1.

The treaty concluded, the sloop sailed away, for Britain still had no interest in occupying the Gulf of Aden. Within ten years, however, the situation was different. Since 1812 Mohamed Ali's Egyptian troops had been employed in the Arabian peninsula, first against the Wahabi, then against their own mutineers, and by 1835 against the Asiri, north of the Yemen. By 1837 the Egyptians controlled the length of the Red Sea Arabian coast and Lord Palmerston, the British foreign secretary, suspected Mohamed Ali of plans to capture the whole Arabian peninsula, thereby strengthening his hand in his quarrel with the sultan of Turkey, and endangering British Indian interests in the Persian Gulf. In August 1837 Palmerston warned Mohamed Ali against occupying any territory beyond the mouth of the Red Sea¹ and a month later the Government of Bombay mooted the idea of occupying Aden, partly to forestall Mohamed Ali, but also to provide a coal depot for the recently instituted steamer service from India up the Red Sea to Suez, to control piracy and to secure the coffee trade of the Yemen. On 16 January 1839 a naval and military force captured Aden from the sultan of Lahj and Britain became involved in the affairs of the Gulf of Aden.²

In January 1840 all danger of Egyptian activity in the Gulf of Aden disappeared as Mohamed Ali withdrew his troops from Arabia to defend

-
1. P.R.O., Foreign Office Papers, Series 78, vol. 3185, Palmerston to Campbell (Alexandria), no. 15, 4 Aug. 1837.
 2. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 43-73.

Alexandria, but a new threat appeared in the form of the French. Explorers from France had already made their way into Abyssinia and the kingdom of Shoa, south of Abyssinia, and in 1840 the Journal des Plats announced the formation of an expedition by a French mercantile firm to Zeila and Shoa.¹ The East India Company reacted promptly to this news and instructed the political agent at Aden to 'take such steps quietly as would secure for Great Britain a preference either in a Commercial, or a Political point of view, or both, amongst the inhabitants of that part of the African Coast which is opposite to Aden.'² Haines, the political agent, sent Capt. Moresby of the Indian Navy to execute these instructions saying that 'the settlement of any other European Commercial Agency or Military Station there would prove highly detrimental to British interest.'³

Moresby found Berbera under the control of a Habr Yunis Somali named Haji Shirmarke who had helped save some of the crew of the English brig in 1825, and who was 'a true and staunch friend of the English'.⁴ Shirmarke offered Moresby land for building forts and houses and was

-
1. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 121; G. Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismail (1833-1841), Roma and Le Caire), vol. 3, part ii, 175-7.
 2. India Office Library, Secret Letters Received from Aden (hereafter I.O./S.L.Aden), vol. 47, Secret Committee to Cmdr. S.B. Haines 2 July 1840, cited in Brig.-Gen. J.W. Schneider (Aden resident) to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874.
 3. India Office Library, Political and Secret Letters Received from Aden (hereafter I.O./P&S Aden), vol. 6, Haines to Moresby, 12 Aug. 1840 enclosed in Brig.-Gen. J. Blair (Aden resident) to Govt. of Bombay, no. 68/355, 23 Feb. 1885.
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Moresby to Haines, 24 Aug. 1840, enclosed in Blair to Govt. of Bombay, no. 68/355, 23 Feb. 1885.

ready to use his influence with the clans to make them conclude commercial treaties.¹ British interests in Berbera were obviously safe in the hands of such a man. Zeila, with its few stone houses and hundred huts,² was a different proposition, as it was entirely dependent on Mocha. In 1833 the Egyptians had captured Mocha, and when they withdrew in 1840 its government was farmed out to the unscrupulous Shariff Hussain; the shariff in turn leased Zeila to his commander-in-chief, Said Mohamed Bar, who sent a governor and troops to rule the port. Nothing was to be gained by negotiations at Zeila, so Moresby sailed on to the larger town of Tadjoura, which, like Zeila, thrived on the produce and slaves of the hinterland. Tadjoura claimed to be independent and was ruled by the Danakil sultan, so on 19 August 1840 Moresby concluded a treaty with him by which the island of Moucha was sold to Britain and the sultan agreed not to enter into any treaty with any other power that would be detrimental to British interests. There were also clauses guaranteeing the right of British subjects to trade at Tadjoura. In a second treaty on 27 August⁴ the sultan sold to Britain, for 200 dollars and a barrel of cannon powder, the island of Bab, a barren rock in the entrance of Gubbet Kharab; in due time formal possession was taken of Moucha and Bab by the hoisting of the British

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Moresby to Haines, 24 Aug. 1840, enclosed in Blair to Govt. of Bombay, no. 68/355, 23 Feb. 1885.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Haines to Moresby, 12 Aug. 1840, enclosed in Blair to Govt. of Bombay, no. 68/355, 23 Feb. 1885.
 3. E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn., London, 1909), i, 408; F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum...', pp. 9-10.
 4. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), i, 408.

flag to the accompaniment of 21-gun salutes.¹

Moresby sailed on to Mocha and on 3 September 1840 concluded a treaty with Said Mohamed Bar the proprietor of Zeila.² Like the Tadjoura treaty this provided that the governor of Zeila would not enter into any treaties with foreign powers; British commerce was guaranteed and the island of Aibat was made over to Britain. On 25 September a Hindu merchant was appointed British commercial agent at Tadjoura.³

This was the first attempt by Britain to exclude other powers from the southern shores of the Gulf of Aden. Any other European nation established there would have been able to counterbalance Aden's strategic position near the mouth of the Red Sea, to monopolise the trade with Abyssinia and Shoa, and to cut off Aden's supply of livestock. For these reasons it became a principle of policy in Aden that the Somali Coast should always be independent. This first attempt was successful, for when certain Frenchmen reached Berbera, Zeila and Tadjoura in the next year they had to admit that they had been forestalled by the English.⁴

In 1842 the shariff of Mocha subjected himself and his possessions,

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Lieut. Barker to Haines, n.d., enclosed in Blair to Bombay, no. 68/355, 23 Feb. 1885.
 2. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), i, 408-9; F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum...', p. 15; an original of the treaty is in F.O. 844/1.
 3. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 121; see also Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismail, vol. 3, part ii, 188-180.
 4. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 127, 129.

including Zeila, to the Porte; he was made Ottoman Pasha of Western Arabia, and Zeila theoretically returned to Turkey. On the spot, however, the situation was more complex, for in 1843 Haji Shirmarke from Berbera seized Zeila, imprisoned the shariff's garrison and offered to put the port under British protection; the Government of India rejected the offer on the grounds that Aden was merely a depot for coals and that any intervention in the affairs of the African coast would be expensive and unprofitable and might excite the jealousy of other European powers.¹ Shirmarke's object seems to have been to make himself ruler of the Somali Coast; finding that the British would not serve his purpose he apparently submitted, as governor of Zeila, to the Turks, who dismissed Shariff Hussain and occupied Mocha in 1849.² He intrigued with the Turks to get Berbera placed under the Turkish flag, but with no result.³

Shirmarke's departure from Berbera left that area without any organised authority and resulted in Britain's assuming the role of policeman there.⁴ The annual trade fair from October to April attracted thousands of people; in 1848 Lieut. Cruttenden from Aden wrote:

1. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 108-9.

2. Ibid., p. 149.

3. Ibid., p. 161; I.O./S.L. Aden/47, political agent, ^{Aden,} to Govt. of Bombay, 24 Dec. 1851 and 14 Feb. 1852, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874.

4. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 113-4.

During the height of the fair, Berbera is a perfect Babel, in confusion as in languages: no chief is acknowledged, and the customs of bygone days are the laws of the place. Disputes between the inland tribes daily arise, and are settled by the spear and dagger, Long strings of camels are arriving and departing day and night,....¹

Among the merchants were Hindus from India, and occasionally a ship was sent over from Aden to protect these British subjects, to prevent slaving or to punish acts of piracy. The most frequent cause of British interference lay in the quarrels between two lineage groups of the Habr Awal who disputed the ownership of Berbera; in 1845 this led to one group, the Ayal Yunis, deserting Berbera for the unsatisfactory roadstead of Bulhar and taking much of the trade with them. In 1847 the Esa slaughtered these unfortunate newcomers at Bulhar. All this tended to disrupt the supply of livestock to Aden and officers were often sent to the Somali Coast to try to settle the disputes.²

In 1885 the attack on Lt. Burton's³ expedition at Berbera led to a second British blockade of the Somali Coast. The object of the

-
1. Quoted by Burton, First Footsteps... (1966 edn.), p. 226
 2. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 144-8 & 161; I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1847; F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum...', p. 4.
 3. Burton, (later Sir) Richard Francis, K.C.M.G., 1821-1890; explorer and scholar; 1842 contrived to get himself sent down from Oxford and joined Indian Army; 1853 visited Mecca disguised as a Muslim; 1854 journey to Harar; 1857-9 expedition with Speke to Lake Tanganyika; 1860 journey to Salt Lake City; 1861 Consul at Fernando Po; 1865 Consul at Santos; 1869 Consul at Damascus; 1872 Consul at Trieste; wrote many books and translated 'The Arabian Nights'.

expedition was to explore the Somali country, to discover the sources of the Nile and to travel overland from Berbera to Zanzibar. Burton was to be accompanied by Lieutenants Speke¹ and Herne of the Indian Army and Lieut. Stroyan of the Indian Navy.

In October 1854 there were two preliminary explorations. Speke tried, and failed, to reach the Nogal Valley, and Burton, in the spirit of his renowned journey to Mecca became the first European to venture into Harar. Speke landed on the Warsangeli coast near Las Koreh, a village of nine mud and stone houses and thirty huts; this area had already been briefly explored by Lieut. Cruttenden in 1848,² but Speke penetrated nearly forty miles inland and entered the territory of the most northerly Dolbohanta before returning to the coast.³ Burton landed at Zeila which he described as being about the size of Suez, with a dozen large whitewashed stone houses and over two hundred huts. Haji Shirmarke ruled the town with an army of forty Arab mercenaries, armed with matchlock, sword and dagger, and was intent on conquering Harar and Berbera.⁴ Travelling through Gadabursi country Burton reached

-
1. Speke, John Hanning, 1827-1864; 1844 entered Indian Army; 1854 explored Warsangeli country; 1857-9 journey with Burton to Lake Tanganyika; 1858 discovered Lake Victoria; quarrelled with Burton; 1860 with Grant traced most of Nile from Lake Victoria to Khartoum.
 2. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 148.
 3. Burton, First Footsteps... (1966 edn.), p. 29; R.F. Burton, First Footsteps in East Africa (Memorial Edition, London, 1894), ii, 109-148; J.H. Speke, What led to the Discovery of the Source of the Nile (Edinburgh, 1864).
 4. Burton, First Footsteps... (1966 edn.), pp. 53, 58 & 295.

Harar and found that it was not the fanatical Muslim city it was reputed to be, but a commercial city drawing great wealth from the trade of Shoa and southern Abyssinia.¹ From Harar, Burton crossed the Harar Awal country to Berbera, 'a wretched clump of dirty mat-huts', reduced to a sixth of its former size by the petty internal feuds of the clans and lineage groups, aggravated by the intrigues of Haji Shirmarke. Despite its decadence Burton was impressed with the possibilities of Berbera and wrote:

'It was with astonishment that I reflected upon the impolicy of having preferred Aden to this place.... It is the meeting-place of commerce, has few rivals, and with half the sums lavished in Arabia upon engineer follies of stone and lime, the environs might at this time have been covered with houses, gardens, and trees.'²

In his official report Burton recommended establishing a commercial agency at Berbera under a political assistant from Aden and naming the spot Elphinstone after the governor of Bombay. The agency would guarantee Aden's supply of livestock and become a base for the prevention of the slave trade from Jidda to Mombasa; as slavery decreased commerce would revive and the ancient prosperity of the Somali Coast would be restored. He claimed that the Somalis would welcome the British:

'They admire our rule, respect our power, comprehend our forbearance,... and they evince a gentleness of disposition and a docility which offer fair hopes to civilization in this region of barbarism.'³

-
1. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 213.
 2. Burton, First Footsteps... (1966 edn.), pp. 228-9.
 3. Ibid., pp. 241-2; Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 213.

strategically, too, Burton saw Berbera as important:

'... Berberah is the true key of the Red Sea, the centre of the East African traffic, and the only safe place for shipping upon the western Erythrean shore, from Suez to Guardafui... this harbour has been coveted by many a foreign conqueror. Circumstances have thrown it as it were into our arms, and, if we refuse the chance, another and rival nation will not be so blind.'¹

In March 1855 the expedition assembled at Berbera, but got no further, for in the early hours of 19 April they were attacked by a section of the Habr Awal. Stroyan was murdered, Speke and Burton were wounded, but escaped to Aden. Robbery probably prompted the attack, though fear of British political intentions on the coast was not ruled out as a motive.² The Government of India were very critical of Burton's failure to take elementary measures of precaution at Berbera, and as a result he apparently lost favour with the Royal Geographical Society.³

The attack gave Burton an additional reason for advocating the occupation of Berbera, and he wrote:

'It is then evident that this people cannot be trusted without supervision, and equally certain that vessels are ever liable to be cast ashore in this part of the Red Sea.... Were one of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels cast by any accident

-
1. Burton, First Footsteps... (Memorial Edn.), i, xcxi, also quoted in 1966 edn. p. 33.
 2. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 214; Burton, First Footsteps..., (1966 edn.), pp. 260-284.
 3. Burton, First Footsteps..., (1966 edn.), p. ix.

upon this inhospitable shore, in the present state of affairs the lives of the passengers, and the cargo, would be placed in imminent peril.¹

The Aden resident, Brigadier Coghlan, actually suggested landing troops at Berbera, as well as imposing a blockade and demanding a heavy indemnity from the Habr Awal as punishment for the outrage.² Although Lord Elphinstone was not averse to Burton's proposal to establish an agency named after him, the Government of India were strongly opposed to the idea, and only sanctioned a blockade.³

The blockade of Berbera was begun in September 1855, and Coghlan, who had made treaties with the Habr Gerhajis and Habr Toljaala abolishing the export of slaves, urged on Bombay the appointment of a British agent at Berbera 'to prevent others from settling in such inconvenient proximity to Aden';⁴ his fears were increased by a rumour that the Turks intended to occupy Berbera when the British blockade ended, and as he was recommending the lifting of the blockade on the ground that the Habr Awal had been sufficiently punished, he suggested a treaty with Berbera, recognising its independence so as to exclude other powers, for otherwise:

-
1. Burton, First Footsteps... (1966 edn.), pp. 34-5 and Memorial edn., i, xxxii-xxxiii.
 2. Burton, First Footsteps... (1966 edn.), p. 264; Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 214.
 3. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, minute by Elphinstone, 27 Mar. 1855, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874; Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 214.
 4. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Coghlan to Govt. of Bombay, 8 Nov. 1855, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874.

'the rich stream of trade that flows through that outlet through (sic) British possessions, would be diverted; the slave trade would flourish; and troublesome entanglements ensue.'¹

The Government of India thought otherwise and would not agree to recognise the independence of the Somalis for:

'... though expressed in a subdued form, this is in fact a proposal to undertake the defence of Berbera, and the Somal, against all comers.' Whatever the policies of Turkey or France the Governor General deprecates a counter policy on the part of India, which shall burden its Government with the obligation to defend against France, or any other aggressor, a nook of Africa, at a distance of 1600 miles from its resources....'²

As the treaty with the Habr Awal of 7 November 1856 marking the end of the blockade merely guaranteed Britain's right to trade at Berbera, abolished the slave trade and gave Britain the right to send a resident to Berbera,³ and in October 1858 a buggalow carrying Turkish officers and guns was able to call at Berbera and claim that the inhabitants were already subject to the Sultan.⁴

The troublesome entanglements that Coghlan feared from Turkish rule over Berbera were illustrated by the course of events at Zeila. In 1855 the Turks deposed Haji Shirmarke and put in his place a Danakil,

1. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Coghlan to Govt. of Bombay, 20 May 1856, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874; Marston, *Britain's Imperial Role...*, p. 215.

2. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 10 June (? July) 1856, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874.

3. F.O.C.P. 3568, memorandum by E. Hertslet (Librarian, F.O.) on Turkish claims to sovereignty over the Somali territory, 14 July, 1870; Aitchison, *Treaties...* (4th edn.) xiii, 200-202.

4. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Coghlan to Govt. of Bombay, 2 Oct. 1858, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874.

Abu Bekr; Shirmarke retaliated by acts of piracy and even by a blockade of Zeila, and in 1857 he was restored to the governorship.¹ At this time France was reviving her activity in the area (causing Britain to occupy Perim in 1857), and the French consular agent at Aden, Lambert, began negotiating for the purchase of Obock. As he was crossing to Tadjoura in 1859 he met with his death; the authorities at Aden concluded that he had been accidentally shipwrecked and drowned, but the French accused Haji Shirmarke of murdering him. In 1860 a French warship arrived at Zeila, arrested Shirmarke, appointed Abu Bekr to be governor in his place, and took Shirmarke off to Hodeida to be tried for the murder of Lambert. The Turkish authorities refused to try him, and the wretched man died on board the French ship; Abu Bekr having been summarily appointed by the French, tended thereafter to favour French, as opposed to British, interests in Zeila and Tadjoura, which was now recognised as a dependency of Zeila.² France actually purchased Obock in 1862, but beyond hoisting her flag and taking a slight interest in Zeila, she did little to improve her position.³

-
1. F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum...', p. 17; Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 220; I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Govt. of Bombay to Coghlan, 19 Mar. 1856, Coghlan to Govt. of Bombay, 9 Apr. 1856 to 24 Apr. 1857, all cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874.
 2. F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum...', pp. 38-9; I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Coghlan to Govt. of Bombay, 12 Dec. 1857, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874; Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismaïl, vol. 3, part ii, 192-7.
 3. F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum...', p. 47; Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 363-4; H. Deschamps, Côte des Somalis (Paris, 1948), pp. 42-3; Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismaïl, vol. 3, part ii, 197-9, 204-5.

The 1860's were a period of decline for the Gulf of Aden; little prospered but the slave trade.¹ The Aden authorities continued to interfere in the affairs of Berbera and the coast to the east. In 1858 the Mijertein had looted a British ship and were bombarded as a punishment;² four years later fifteen British sailors shipwrecked on their shores were murdered, and two British warships were sent to extract an apology from the sultan and supervise the execution of several Mijertein on the beach.³ There were continual efforts to prevent slaving, and every year a ship from Aden stayed at Berbera throughout the fair, protecting British Indian traders and settling disputes. In 1863, however, the Indian Navy was abolished and a ship could no longer be spared for this annual duty,⁴ which was much regretted at Aden, for Abu Bekr and the Turks were trying to extend their authority along the coast east of Zeila, and tax the inhabitants of Dagarita. The Aden resident complained that this would only perpetuate the state of feud and disorder on the coast, and be 'utterly subversive of the improvement in the state of these wild people, which it is so much an object to introduce.'⁵

-
1. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 367-8
 2. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1874, précis of correspondence.
 3. F.O.C.P. 3568, memorandum by Hertslet, 14 July 1870.
 4. India Office Library, Secret Letters and Enclosures from India (hereafter I.O./S.L.India), Jan.-June 1870, memorandum by Col. Sir W.L.Merewether (late Aden resident), June 1869, enclosed in Govt. of India to Duke of Argyll (secretary of state for India), no. 104, 10 June 1870.
 5. F.O. 78/3186, Merewether to Govt. of Bombay, no. 130, 24 Feb. 1866, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 7 June 1866.

In 1867 an Egyptian warship visited Berbera and tried to induce the people to acknowledge Egyptian sovereignty¹ and in 1869 the Turkish flag was found flying at Berbera.² In order to counteract these encroachments and to make up for the absence of a warship, the Aden authorities revived Burton's idea of a British agent at Berbera. A native agent during the trading season was all that was required, for Berbera was not a permanent town but a collection of huts, almost deserted from June to October. If the Turks occupied Berbera, Russell, the Aden resident, feared they would extract all the money they could from the people, drive away the traders, and reduce it to a mere fishing village, thereby endangering Aden's trade and meat supply.³ Fearing that the native agent might get killed in the frequent quarrels of Berbera the Government of India would not sanction the proposal.

India was satisfied that Berbera was too remote to attract any serious attention from other European powers, and that Turkey was too feeble to establish her authority there; since the occupation of Aden

-
1. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, acting resident, Aden, to Govt. of Bombay, 24 Aug. 1867, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1894; I.O./S.L.Aden/45, Maj.-Gen. E.L. Russell, (Aden resident) to Govt. of Bombay, no. 74, 21 Apr. 1870; Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 375; Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismail, vol. 3, part ii, 171.
 2. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, report by Capt. Mockler to Aden resident, 26 Mar. 1869, cited in Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 216, 23 Dec. 1894; Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismail, vol. 3, part ii, 228.
 3. I.O./S.L.India/Jan.-June 1870, Russell to Govt. of Bombay, no. 319, 16 Dec. 1869, enclosed in Govt. of India to Argyll, no. 104, 10 June 1870.

Britain had managed to maintain the independence of the opposite shore by a few simple treaties, and any further involvement was held to be unnecessary. The situation changed suddenly: 'In one day, the Red Sea, economically a backwater of the Indian Ocean, became one of the main sea routes of the world.'¹ On 17 November 1869 the Suez Canal was opened. In January 1870 there were Prussian, Dutch, Spanish, French and Austrian warships at Aden.² The Gulf of Aden had been brought into the sphere of international politics.

1. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 385.

2. Ibid., p. 388.

CHAPTER II

THE EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION

In February 1870, an Egyptian corvette, the 'Khartoum' commanded by Jemali Pasha, arrived at Bulhar. The pasha paraded his troops with band playing and considerably impressed the Somalis; he then sailed on to Berbera. Russell, determined to keep the Somali Coast independent, sent one of his policemen, a Somali, Subedar Mohamed¹, to dissuade the people from selling their territory.² The efforts of this agent resulted in a large riot in Berbera on 15 March,³ so Russell sent a warship to protest against the Egyptian interference. The British ship arrived at Berbera to find the Egyptian flag flying from the mud fort, and the Egyptians busily engaged in distributing presents and settling local quarrels; Jemali Pasha claimed that the land already belonged to the sultan of Turkey and that he was there merely to prevent bloodshed between the clans and to restore trade.⁴ When the fair ended in April

-
1. This man went to Harar with Burton, who called him the 'Hammal' (porter). What purports to be a picture of him appears in First Footsteps..., and is embossed in gilt on the covers of the Memorial edition.
 2. I.O./S.L.Aden/45, Russell to Govt. of Bombay, no. 35, 11 Feb. 1870, no. 47, 25 Feb. 1870, and no. 51, 4 Mar. 1870.
 3. I.O./S.L.Aden/45, Russell to Govt. of Bombay, no. 58, 18 Mar. 1870.
 4. I.O./S.L.Aden/45, Russell to Jemali Pasha, 7 Apr. and 19 Apr. 1870, Jemali Pasha to Russell, 17 Apr. 1870, Russell to Govt. of Bombay, no. 74, 21 Apr. 1870, all enclosed in Russell to Argyll, no. 14/470, 25 Apr. 1870; I.O./S.L.India/Jan.-June 1870, Govt. of India to Argyll, no. 104, 10 June, 1870.

the 'Khartoum' sailed away, leaving Berbera almost deserted.

The Egyptian activity on the Somali Coast was a part of the expansionist policy being pursued by Khedive Ismail, a policy which sought to extend the frontiers of Egypt round Cape Guardafui into the Indian Ocean, and up the whole valley of the Nile to the equator;¹ it was further demonstrated at Assab, on the Red Sea, in July 1870, when Egyptian troops landed at a spot recently purchased by an Italian steamship company, and lowered the Italian flag.² Egypt laid claim to the African coast as far as Cape Guardafui on the grounds that it had always been Turkish, and that it was included in the provinces of Massawa and Suakin which were ceded to Egypt by firman on 27 May 1866.³

Russell denied the validity of the claim and asserted that the Somalis wished to keep their independence; he feared that Egyptian rule would ruin the Somali coast and stop Aden's livestock supply, and he urged that Britain should protest to Turkey or Egypt and insist on

-
1. For the Egyptian expansion in Africa and especially on the Somali Coast see: Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., p. 374 and onwards; M. Sabry, L'Empire Egyptienne sous Ismail et l'ingérence anglo-française (1863-1879) (Paris, 1933), pp. 375-429; and Douin's exhaustive Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismail, vol. 3, part ii, 227-240; 250-279, and vol. 3, part iii, 547-627, which gives the story in great detail.
 2. F.O.C.P. 2432, 'Memorandum...', p. 52.
 3. Ibid., p. 51; Sabry, L'Empire Egyptienne..., p. 389; and F.O. 78/3186, Chérif Pasha (Egyptian minister for foreign affairs) to Col. Stanton (British consul-general, Alexandria), 1 June 1870, enclosed in Stanton to Earl of Clarendon (secretary of state for foreign affairs), no. 60, 3 June 1870.

the independence of the Somalis.¹ The Government of India agreed that remonstrance should be made at government level, but warned Aden to avoid any further involvement with Egyptians or Turks on the spot.² The Foreign Office, however, was not satisfied that Britain was entitled to protest, saying: 'It may be convenient to Aden that the Turks should not hold sway in Berbera, but that would scarcely be a sufficient ground for disputing their right to do so,'³ and there the matter rested for several years.

The position remained undetermined on the Somali Coast. Aden continued to interfere: the Mijertein were blockaded in 1871 for murdering the steward of a British steamer, and the Warsangeli were made to pay reparation for robbery and piracy in 1873. At Berbera, however, the British were replaced as peacemakers by the Egyptians. Each trading season an Egyptian warship arrived, troops were landed, the Egyptian flag hoisted on shore, disputes settled and presents distributed. An Egyptian governor was appointed over the whole African coast from Suez to Guardafui. Again the Aden resident suggested to Bombay the wisdom of appointing a European agent at Berbera:

'I may perhaps be allowed to state that should the Egyptians be permitted to make arrangements with the Somalee tribes and to get these ports under their control Government must be prepared to meet very enhanced charges for provisioning this garrison and

-
1. I.O./S.L.Aden/45, Russell to Govt. of Bombay, no. 74, 21 Apr. 1870.
 2. I.O./S.L.India/Jan.-June 1870, Govt. of India to Argyll, no. 104, 10 June 1870.
 3. F.O. 78/3186, F.O. to I.O., 8 Aug. 1870.

to find a serious falling off in the trade of this Port....' wrote¹, but even this appeal to the financial consequences of inaction failed to move the Government of India.

On each annual visit the Egyptians became more involved in the affairs of Berbera. In 1873 they took hostages from the various lineage groups in an attempt to keep the peace on the trade routes and in Berbera, and when this failed they threatened to blockade Berbera, much to the alarm of the Aden resident, who saw his livestock supply at their mercy.² There were rumours of a permanent Egyptian garrison being sent, Reuters reported that the Egyptians were going to build and occupy a fort at Berbera,³ and they certainly investigated the possibility of rebuilding the ancient freshwater aqueduct; merchants were encouraged to settle and build substantial shops at Berbera under the promise of Egyptian protection, and expeditions were planned inland.⁴

Faced with this extension of Egyptian activity the authorities at Aden asked for instructions and the matter was referred to London. At the same time the question was raised in an entirely different quarter; the Khedive asked Britain to relinquish her sovereignty over the islands

-
1. I.O./S.L.Aden/46, Maj.Gen.Sir C.W.Tremenheere (Aden resident) to Govt. of Bombay, no. 55, 9 Mar. 1871.
 2. I.O./S.L.Aden/46, Capt.F.M.Hunter (assistant resident, Aden) to Schneider, 9 Oct. 1873, enclosed in Schneider to Argyll, no. 63/1044 22 Oct. 1873; Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 284, 26 Nov. 1873
 3. I.O./S.L.India/16, Govt. of India to Argyll, 21 Nov. 1873.
 4. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no, 50, 20 Mar. 1874.

Berbera and Aibat, claiming that their purchase in 1840 had been legal as they had all along been Turkish possessions; the Khedive said that if Britain withdrew from the islands in consequence of this argument, he would be able to persuade France to give up her claim to Madagascar on similar grounds.¹ The Foreign Office was not inclined to depart from its traditional view that the Somali Coast was independent,² but the ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, recommended relinquishing Turco-Egyptian sovereignty over the coast and islands for:

'... as long as the country is looked upon as belonging to Beiks (sic) who have the power of alienating it, there can be no security against a settlement being made by some rival Power,' but 'its recognition as part of the Egyptian territory would entitle Her Majesty's Government to call upon the Viceroy for a wholesome exercise of his authority especially as regards the suppression of the Slave Trade,....'³

The Foreign Office, however, still disliked the idea of ceding the islands; it was felt that relinquishing them to Egypt as a matter of course would weaken Britain's title to Aden, and be an embarrassment to refuting Egypt's claims to Berbera.⁴ The question of the islands was finally settled by the attitude of the Government of India, who strongly asserted the legality of their purchase and considered it highly important

F.O. 78/3187, H.C. Vivian (acting consul-general, Alexandria) to Earl Granville (secretary of state for foreign affairs), no. 45, 22 Sept. 1873.

F.O. 78/3187, memorandum by E. Hertslet, 20 Oct. 1873.

F.O. 78/3187, Elliot to Granville, no. 404, 13 Nov. 1873.

F.O. 78/3187, memorandum by T.H.S(Anderson), (1st class clerk, F.O.), 18 Jan. 1874, on Stanton to Granville, no. 2, 2 Jan. 1874.

to retain command of the Gulf of Tadjoura.¹

The matter of Moucha and Aibat was allowed to drop, and no answer was sent to the Khedive, but Egyptian activity at Berbera demanded a positive declaration of policy. The Foreign Office hesitated when conditionally acquiescing in Egyptian influence on the Somali coast provided Aden's supplies were guaranteed,² and a fear of what might happen to these supplies if Egypt ever became unfriendly to Britain.³ It was decided to lay the whole matter before Mr. Gladstone and the Cabinet, for as Lord Tenterden⁴ minuted: 'We ought to have some definite policy and adhere to it.'⁵

Before the question reached Gladstone, however, he had been replaced by Marashi (on 20 February 1874), and Lord Salisbury began to pursue a more aggressive line from the India Office, reviving Palmerston's policy of discouraging the spread of Egyptian power beyond the Bab el Mandeb⁶ - particularly unprofitable policy as the Egyptians were already beyond those straits. The Foreign Office saw the futility of a 'policy of barren protests and constant antagonism to the Egyptian Govt.,'⁷ and

-
1. I.C./S.L.India/17, Govt. of India to Marquis of Salisbury (secretary of state for India), no. 78, 1 May 1874.
 2. F.O. 78/3187, memorandum by Saunderson, 19 Jan. 1874.
 3. F.O. 78/3187, memorandum by J.E.B. Dashwood (senior clerk, F.O.), 29 Jan. 1874.
 4. Permanent under secretary of state, Foreign Office.
 5. F.O. 78/3187, minute, 31 Jan. 1874, on memorandum by Dashwood 29 Jan. 1874.
 6. F.O. 78/3187, I.O. to F.O., 7 Aug. 1874.
 7. F.O. 78/3187, I.O. to F.O., 7 Aug. 1874, minute by Tenterden, n.d.

secured some recognition of the Egyptian position that would safeguard Britain's interests. They were encouraged in this opinion by Maj.-Gen. Stanton, the consul-general at Alexandria, who wrote:

... the establishment on the Somali Coast of a regular administration capable of suppressing the inter tribal feuds which have hitherto prevented any extension of commerce in these regions, would appear to offer more serious guarantees of friendly relations with the British possessions at Aden than are now afforded by the existing Commercial Treaties with the Sheikhs of Berbera, Zeila and Tadjoura.'

He described India's fears that an Egyptian occupation would endanger Britain's supplies as 'chimerical' and claimed that far from hindering trade the Egyptians appeared to be developing it. Under the 'enlightened' policy of the Egyptian Government he forecast that export duties would be minimal, the slave trade diminished, trade protected and all other European powers excluded from the Somali Coast.¹

The matter was finally settled by a decision of Lord Northbrook's Government in India to accept the facts and recognise Egyptian authority over the Somali Coast for the sake of good relations with Egypt and Turkey and to prevent other European nations getting a foothold there.² The India Office, whilst accepting this change of policy, were still not prepared to admit the legality of Egypt's claims and were in favour of recognising them as a concession, an act of grace, in a convention with

-
1. F.O. 78/3187, Stanton to Earl of Derby (secretary of state for foreign affairs), no. 78, 15 Sept. 1874.
 2. I.O./S.L.India/19, Govt. of India to Salisbury, no. 184, 9 Oct. 1874.
 3. F.O. 78/3187, I.O. to F.O., 23 Mar. 1875.

... Egypt which would guarantee Aden's supplies, abolish the slave trade on the coast and include a formal undertaking that Egypt would not cede her sovereignty to any other power.¹ The alternative:

'to do the whole thing ourselves - to assume the protectorate of the Somali Coast - build lighthouses - keep out other civilized or semicivilized Govts. - coerce malefactors etc. etc.' was 'An effectual course - but costly; not likely to be adopted by the Govt. of India, - & still less likely to be perseveringly followed up.'²

Decisions in the India Office were not reached quickly, as letters had to be sent from London to Calcutta, thence to Bombay, thence to Aden, and then all the way back again, and while the question of whether to recognise Egyptian sovereignty dragged on, events did not stand still on the Somali Coast. In 1873 Redwan Pasha, in command of the annual visit to the coast, extended Egyptian influence eastwards by giving a flag to the Habr Toljaala of El Darad; in the next year he began to settle disputes at Karin.³ Most important, however, was his action in the autumn of 1874, when he closed Bulhar so as to divert all trade to Berbera, where he gave Arab merchants a monopoly for exporting ghee and restricted the export of sheep. The price of ghee at Aden doubled and

-
1. F.O. 78/3188, I.O. to F.O., 23 Mar. 1875.
 2. I.O./S.L.India/19, Govt. of India to Salisbury, no. 184, 9 Oct. 1874, minute by Sir H. Bartle Frere (vice-president of the India Council), 6 Nov. 1874.
 3. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Hunter to Schneider, 21 Nov. 1874, enclosed in Schneider to Salisbury, no. 41/854, 23 Nov. 1874; Aden News Report, no. 45, 3 Dec. 1874.

merchants had to begin ordering it from Bombay.¹ This constituted interference with Aden's essential food supplies and an infraction of the treaties of 1827, 1840 and 1856 which guaranteed freedom of trade; it seemed quite possible that the restrictions might be extended to Al Barad and Karin. The Aden Resident, Brig. Schneider, sent his assistant, Capt. Hunter,² to Berbera to protest, but without result, for Hedwan claimed to be acting on higher orders;³ at the same time Schneider telegraphed the news of the closure of Bulhar to London, and the consul-general at Alexandria was instructed to protest strongly and ask for the restrictions to be immediately removed.⁴ The Khedive and his ministers denied all knowledge of the closure of Bulhar, and any wish to interfere with trade, and promised to send McKillop Pasha (an ex-officer of the Royal Navy) to make an enquiry.⁵

The closure of Bulhar also annoyed certain of the Habr Awal lineage groups who had been accustomed to trade there, and they began to plunder

-
1. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Aden News Report no. 42, 11 Nov. 1874; Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 202, 23 Nov. 1874; Aden News Report no. 44 27 Nov. 1874.
 2. Hunter, Frederick Mercer (later Lieut.-Col., C.B.); 1861 joined Indian Army; 1871 Bombay Political Dept., and assistant political resident, Aden; 1881 first consul for the Somali Coast; later political agent and consul for the Somali Coast; 1889-1895 political agent in Cutch, Kolhapur, S. Maratha country and Mahi Kantha; died 1898.
 3. I.O./S.L.Aden/47, Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 202, 23 Nov. 1874.
 4. F.O. 78/3187, Derby to Stanton, 26 Nov. 1874.
 5. F.O. 78/3187, Stanton to Derby, no. 115, 26 Dec. 1874; F.O. 78/3188, Stanton to Derby, no. 6, 14 Jan. 1875.

Arabs making for Berbera. The Egyptians were unable to enforce their authority over the Somalis beyond the range of their ships' guns, and the flow of trade into Berbera diminished.¹ Schneider wrote in February:

'The Somali country has not been so disturbed as at present for years, & in my opinion it is entirely to be attributed to Redwan Bey's act in having closed Bulhar as a place of Export.'²

McKillop reached Berbera in February 1875, arranged a peace with the aggrieved clans and undertook that they would be perfectly free to use Bulhar in the next trading season. He reported that Redwan had never ordered the closure of Bulhar but that the clans had simply deserted it for the better harbour at Berbera, a conclusion which seems to have been at variance with the facts,³ and which did little to reassure Schneider about the security of supplies for Aden, which now had a population of 25,000 and an ever-increasing number of ships calling for provisions.⁴

Further trouble arose from an act of piracy committed against an Aden ship by some Habr Toljaala residents of El Darad. When called upon to make restitution by the Aden authorities they admitted the crime but refused to pay, declaring they were Egyptian subjects.⁵ Schneider

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/2, Aden News Reports, no. 2, 13 Jan. 1875, no. 3, 20 Jan. 1875, and no. 6, 11 Feb. 1875.
 2. F.O. 78/3188, Schneider to Stanton, no. 140, 22 Feb. 1875, enclosed in Stanton to Derby, no. 43, 18 Mar. 1875.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/2, Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 26, 24 Feb. 1875; no. 55, 6 Apr. 1875.
 4. F.O. 78/3188, Schneider to Stanton, no. 140, 22 Feb. 1875, enclosed in Stanton to Derby, no. 43, 18 Mar. 1875.
 5. I.O./P&S Aden/2, Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 4, 6 Jan. 1875.

feared that if these men were allowed to escape punishment by pleading Egyptian protection there would be a complete breakdown of order on the Somali Coast, and he telegraphed for permission to bombard El Darad and give the offenders a stern lesson.¹ The matter was complicated because the Egyptian flag flew at El Darad, and for this reason neither the Government of India, nor the Foreign Office, were prepared to sanction a bombardment; yet they were unable to protest to Egypt because they had not recognised the Egyptian claims to sovereignty over the coast.² It was this quandary which finally persuaded the India Office that the sensible course was to recognise Egyptian suzerainty, thereby establishing some responsible authority over the coast.³ Meanwhile at Aden a dhow from El Darad had been impounded and the pirates were forced to make reparation.⁴

In view of the Egyptian expansion towards Cape Guardafui, Britain decided to secure Socotra, an island which appeared to have strategic value as it dominated the African approaches to the Gulf of Aden.⁵ On 25 January 1876 the Aden resident concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Zishn, who undertook never to part with the island, except to Britain.⁶

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/2, Schneider tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 5 Jan. 1875.
 2. I.O., Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received from India (hereafter I.O./P&S India), vol. 1, Govt. of India to Salisbury, no. 10 Pol., 15 Jan. 1875; F.O. 78/3188, I.O. to F.O., 3 Feb. 1875, minute by Tenterden, 17 Feb. 1875.
 3. F.O. 78/3188, I.O. to F.O., 23 Mar. 1875.
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/2, Schneider to Salisbury, no. 24, 12 Apr. 1875.
 5. I.O., Political and Secret Despatches to India (hereafter I.O./P&S to India), vol. 1, Salisbury to Govt. of India, no. 12 Sec., 23 Apr. 1875.
 6. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 475-7

the machinery for working out the terms of the convention, in May 1875, until it was signed by the Khedive's foreign minister in its final form in September 1877, it underwent many alterations.

In the beginning the Foreign Office proposed that one of the conditions in the convention should be a Turkish disclaimer of sovereignty over the Arab tribes near Aden, a matter which had recently been causing friction with the Porte, but this stipulation was soon dropped when the ambassador at Constantinople said that the renunciation could never be obtained.¹ On his recommendation also, it was decided to recognise not the sovereignty of the Khedive over the Somali Coast, but the sovereignty of the Sultan and the hereditary administration of the Khedive. Another early proposal was that Britain should surrender the islands of Moucha, Aibat and Bab to Turkey, provided that France relinquished her claim to Obock;² but this was dropped when it became clear that France had no intention of ceding Obock;³ and if the cession of Obock was to be a sine qua non, preliminary to British recognition of Turkish sovereignty, Tenterden felt 'probably we may have to wait till Doomsday to get the matter of the Coast jurisdiction settled.'⁴ Delay in concluding the convention was undesirable, for all the time Egyptian de facto authority on the coast was increasing, making British recognition

-
1. F.O. 78/3188, Elliot to Tenterden, private, 19 July 1875.
 2. F.O. 78/3188, Derby to Stanton, no. 63, 10 Nov. 1875.
 3. F.O. 78/3188, Stanton to Derby, no. 162, 11 Dec. 1875; minute 23 Dec. 1875 by Tenterden on Stanton to Derby, no. 161, 9 Dec. 1875.
 4. F.O. 78/3188, Tenterden to Elliot, private, 23 Dec. 1875.

...less of a favour; and it was essential to make the recognition a act of grace in order to secure from Egypt favourable conditions for Aden's trade and other interests on the Somali Coast.

One of the main conditions in the convention was that Zeila, Tadjoura, Berbera, Bulhar and the other ports coming under Egypt should be declared free ports, and that no monopolies should be allowed there, so as to prevent a repetition of the events at Bulhar of 1874-5. In fact a repetition did occur in the trading season of 1875-6, and strengthened Britain's determination to obtain an assurance that trade would be unhindered. In September 1875 McKillop returned to the Somali Coast and refused to re-open Bulhar as Zeila and Berbera had so many more advantages.¹ The reasoning was correct, but the fact remained that some of the lineage groups preferred Bulhar and would not use the other ports; consequently Aden's trade again suffered. Britain protested and persuaded the Khedive to order the re-opening of Bulhar, but the necessary instructions did not reach Berbera until the end of the trading season in March 1876.²

The British consul-general in Alexandria told the Khedive that:

'It was of vital importance to the welfare and comfort of the British Possession at Aden that the Ports on this Coast should continue to be open marts from whence Aden can obtain as heretofore a constant and unrestricted supply of live stock, provisions and other necessities.'³

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/2, Schneider to Salisbury, no. 51, 18 Sept. 1875.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/3, Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 59, 14 Mar. 1876.
 3. F.O. 78/3189, Stanton to Derby, no. 127, 7 Apr. 1876.

The Khedive and his ministers agreed to declare Berbera and Bulhar free and open ports, but wished to collect customs dues at Zeila and Tadjoura to set off against the £15,000 annual tribute to Turkey.¹ As Aden depended little on these two ports Britain acquiesced, and accordingly the Khedive gave formal undertakings that Berbera and Bulhar would be free ports and that customs duties would not exceed those at Zeila and Tadjoura.² It was also arranged that lighthouse and port dues at Berbera should not exceed those levied at Aden.³

These assurances secured Britain's main interests, but she also demanded that Egypt should establish order along the coast so as to prevent piracy, prohibit absolutely the export of slaves and attempt to stamp out the slave trade in the interior. The Khedive tried to bargain over this condition, claiming that he could not prohibit either the coastal or interior slave trade unless his rule was recognised over the whole Somali country as far south as the River Juba.⁴ Ismail had already attempted to extend his authority that far south by means of a filibustering expedition under McKillop, who left Berbera in October 1875 and seized Brava and Chisimaio, towns under the sovereignty of the sultan of Zanzibar. The sultan's flag was hauled down and his troops

-
1. F.O. 78/3189, C.A.Cookson (acting consul-general, Alexandria) to Derby, no. 237, 8 Aug. 1876.
 2. F.O. 78/3189, H.C.Vivian (consul-general, Alexandria) to Derby, no. 43, 2 Dec. 1876; Vivian tel. to Derby, 9 Mar. 1877.
 3. F.O. 78/3189, Vivian to Derby, no. 255, 13 Aug. 1877.
 4. F.O. 78/3189, Cookson to Derby, no. 237, 8 Aug. 1876.

...d. The object of the expedition was to open up a line of communications and trade with the African lakes and the Egyptian posts on the southern Nile. Although Britain favoured the establishment of British rule over the Indian Ocean coast, and was keen to see a trade route opened from the lakes, she was bound to side with the sultan of Zanzibar and brought strong pressure to bear on the Khedive, who climbed down and ordered McKillop to withdraw.¹

When Ismail renewed his claim to the coast as far as the River Juba, therefore, the British Government were not disposed to regard it favourably; they looked upon McKillop's expedition as 'an unprovoked aggression on the Territories of a friend and ally,'² regarded the Khedive's claim as 'absurd,'³ and refused to recognise Egyptian sovereignty over the sultan of Zanzibar's territory. The Khedive replied that he saw no benefit in entering into an agreement which might involve him in the responsibility for suppressing the slave trade without any corresponding advantage for Egypt,⁴ but Britain met this with a threat to abandon the negotiations and regard the Somalis as independent.⁵ The Khedive yielded

See: Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismail, vol. 3, part iii, 629-697; Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 484-6; Sabry L'Empire Egyptienne..., pp. 396-8; R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-90 (London, 1939), pp. 271-299; W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York, 1935), i, 102-3; R. Oliver and G. Mathew, History of East Africa (Oxford), i(1963), pp. 358-9.

F.O. 78/3189, minute by W.H. Wylde (senior clerk, F.O.), 19 Aug. 1876, on Cookson to Derby, no. 237, 8 Aug. 1876.

Minute by Tenterden, 23 Aug. 1876, on above.

F.O. 78/3189, Vivian to Derby, no. 43, 2 Dec. 1876.

F.O. 78/3189, I.O. to F.O., 27 Jan. 1877; Derby to Vivian, no. 10, 8 Feb. 1877; Vivian to Derby, no. 41, 21 Feb. 1877.

and agreed to a convention in which Britain would recognise his jurisdiction as far as Guardafui,¹ but a fortnight later he asked if this could be extended to Ras Hafun, ninety miles south, where there was a reasonably sheltered harbour.² Ras Hafun was clearly outside the sultan of Zanzibar's sovereignty, and so Britain agreed to acknowledge Egyptian rule over the coast to this point on condition that ships of the Royal Navy should have the right to arrest slave-trading boats in Egyptian territorial waters on the Somali Coast.

The Somali Coast Convention was signed by the Egyptian minister for foreign affairs and the British consul-general on 7 September 1877. Britain recognised the Khedive's jurisdiction under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte, over the Somali Coast as far as Ras Hafun. The Khedive guaranteed that Berbera and Bulhar would be free ports, and that at all other ports import dues should not exceed 5% and export dues 1%; he promised Britain 'most favoured nation' treatment, and undertook that none of the territory would ever be ceded to any foreign power. Britain was given the right to appoint consular agents on the coast. The Khedive promised to suppress the slave trade and keep order as far as Berbera, and to endeavour to do so between Berbera and Ras Hafun. The final clause stated that the agreement should come into operation as soon as the sultan of Turkey gave a formal assurance that none of the

1. F.O. 78/3189, Vivian to Derby, no. 41, 21 Feb. 1877.

2. F.O. 78/3189, Vivian to Derby, no. 47, 4 Mar. 1877.

territory thus recognised as Egyptian would be ceded on any pretence whatever to any foreign power.¹

At the time the convention was signed, Turkey was at war with Russia, but after the Congress of Berlin had, for a while, settled the Eastern Question, Salisbury (now foreign secretary) sent the Turkish Government a copy of the convention, pointing out that it was favourable to Turkish interests, recognising, as it did, the Sultan's sovereignty, and asked for the Sultan's declaration necessary to bring the convention into force.² Salisbury was anxious for the convention to take effect as it was 'our only security against other European Powers obtaining a footing opposite Aden.'³

Whilst Britain had hitherto admitted Turkish sovereignty over the coast as far south as Zeila, Turkey now claimed that the Somali Coast to Ras Hafun had always unquestionably belonged to the Sultan,⁴ and ordered the new Khedive (Tewfik Pasha) officially to take possession of the coast between Zeila and Ras Hafun in the name of the Sultan⁵ so as to exclude other powers. This order embarrassed Tewfik whose finances

-
1. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 615-6; F.O. 78/3189, Vivian to Derby, no. 246, 4 Aug. 1877.
 2. F.O. 78/3190, Salisbury to Sir A.H. Layard (ambassador at Constantinople), no. 1224, 10 Oct. 1878.
 3. F.O. 78/3190, minute by Salisbury, 30 May 1879, on minute by H.S.C. Jervoise (assistant clerk, F.O.), 27 May 1879.
 4. F.O. 78/3190, Layard to Salisbury, no. 525, 21 June 1879.
 5. F.O. 78/3191, Layard tel. to Salisbury, no. 529, 7 July 1879.

were in no position to allow of an expedition in 1879, so he temporised and replied that the Egyptians had hoisted the Turkish flag on the coast some years previously.¹

In the Foreign Office Sanderson² minuted that the Turkish claim to sovereignty over the Somali Coast had 'about as much foundation as the claim of the Kings of England to be called Kings of France' and that Britain's object in arranging the convention was not to establish direct Turkish rule over the coast but to recognise it as a portion of Egyptian territory on condition that neither the Khedive nor the Sultan should ever cede any part of it.³ Eventually the Porte drafted a firman conferring on the Khedive the territory between Zeila and Ras Hafun, in return for the power to levy tribute for this concession in the hope of squeezing something out of Egypt if ever the Somali Coast became profitable. It was proposed to add an assurance to Britain that none of the territory should be alienated.⁴

From October 1879 onwards, Sir Austen Layard, the British ambassador

-
1. F.O. 78/3191, F.C. Lascelles (acting consul-general, Alexandria) to Salisbury, no. 511, 15 Sept. 1879.
 2. Sanderson, Thomas Henry (later 1st Baron Sanderson), G.C.B., K.C.M.G.; 1841-1923; 1859 entered Foreign Office; became private secretary to Earl of Derby and Earl Granville; 1894-1906 permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs.
 3. F.O. 78/3191, minute by Sanderson, 26 Aug. 1879, on I.O. to F.O., 20 Aug. 1879.
 4. F.O. 78/3191, E.B. Malet (agent & consul-general, Alexandria) tel. to Salisbury, no. 664, 25 Sept. 1879, no. 674, 29 Sept. 1879.

at Constantinople, waged a futile struggle with the Porte to get the firman officially issued; he was frequently promised that it was on the point of being signed by the Sultan, but nothing came of it. In December he was driven to write:

'I am almost in despair on account of the difficulty of getting matters settled here. The whole machine of the State is out of order - and its repair and reform are beyond the strength and capacity of any living Turkish Statesman.'¹

Salisbury, disturbed by Italian activity at Assab in 1880, continued to press for action by the Sultan, as did Granville who succeeded Salisbury at the Foreign Office in April 1880. At about this time Turkey suggested taking possession of the coast herself, but, as Sanderson wrote, 'This is, happily, not very probable under present circumstances.', and he added 'It would be entirely contrary to our objects. Turkish rule being quite ruinous under such circumstances to the locality administered.'²

The matter dragged on. In April 1882 Lord Dufferin, the new ambassador at Constantinople, reported that the Sultan had promised an answer within a week;³ eleven months later the secretary of the embassy reported that he was still waiting.⁴ The necessary firman never was issued. Layard wondered whether France and Russia had dissuaded the

-
1. Salisbury Papers (hereafter, Sal.P.), A/17/73, Layard to Salisbury, private, 17 Dec. 1879.
 2. F.O. 78/3193, memorandum by Sanderson, 1 May 1880.
 3. F.O. 78/3497, Dufferin to Granville, no. 289, 18 Apr. 1882.
 4. F.O.C.P. 4940, H. Wyndham (secretary of embassy, Constantinople) to Granville, no. 162, 19 Mar. 1883.

Sultan from signing it,¹ but it was probably due to a mixture of Turkish procrastination and suspicion of British motives. Lacking the Sultan's assurance the Somali Coast Convention never came into force, and Britain never formally recognised Turkish sovereignty or Egyptian jurisdiction over the territory, although British officials at Aden were ordered to deal with the Egyptians on the coast as the de facto existing authorities.²

In 1874 and 1875 the Egyptians had left a guard of Arab mercenaries in the fort at Berbera during the slack summer months,³ but when they returned in September 1875 it was to begin a permanent occupation. Redwan Pasha, the governor, supervised an ambitious development programme. A piped water supply was brought to the town, and an iron lighthouse, a jetty, a pier and customs houses were constructed. About half a mile west of the Somali huts he built the 'Shaab', the Egyptian official quarter, consisting of barracks, houses, a mosque and a hospital.⁴ A tax was levied on each hut erected in Berbera, and Somalis were forbidden to carry arms there.⁵ Disputes between the surrounding lineage groups were settled and the district was occupied by over 800 troops.⁶ An outpost

-
1. Sal.P., A/17/91, Layard to Salisbury, private, 11 Feb. 1880.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/4, Salisbury to Brig.-Gen.F.A.E.Loch (Aden Resident), no. 1, 31 Jan. 1878.
 3. Douin, *Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismail*, vol. 3, part ii, 279.
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/3, various Aden News Reports.
 5. I.O./P&S Aden/3, Capt.C.Wodehouse (H.M.S.Teazer) to Schneider, 15 Apr. 1876, enclosed in Capt.C.W.H.Sealy (assistant resident, Aden), to Govt. of Bombay, no. 90/587, 17 Apr. 1876; Aden News Report no. 28, 13 Sept. 1876.
 6. I.O./P&S Aden/3, Aden News Report no. 9, 1 Mar. 1876; Wodehouse to Schneider, 15 Apr. 1876, enclosed in Sealy to Govt. of Bombay, no. 90/587, 17 Apr. 1876.

was opened at Bulhar¹ although little was done to develop that port, and a postal steamship service was instituted between Aden, Berbera, Zeila and Tadjoura.²

An Egyptian historian, Mohammed Sabry, has written:

'Dès 1873, la ville de Berbera... commença à apprécier le règne de la paix égyptienne sur ces côtes inhospitalières....

Le gouverneur égyptien de Berbera avait ainsi réussi, en quelques années, à en faire un magnifique port qui faisait pâlir Aden,....

... sous l'influence bienfaisante de l'Egypte ces nomades pillards et querelleurs se transformaient peu à peu en sédentaires susceptibles de devenir par la suite des citoyens.'³

Sabry's book, however, is violently pro-Egyptian and must be treated cautiously; undoubtedly he exaggerated the benefits of Egyptian rule, but much of what he said was borne out in a report by Capt. Hunter who visited Berbera in 1880 and wrote:

'It should be honestly admitted that Egypt has done much for Berbera. That Port has been converted - from a mere creek, badly supplied with water, whose goods were embarked in the fair season under considerable difficulties, and which was always filled with a disorderly turbulent population in perpetual conflict with one another - into a secure harbour with a good light house and a fine pier, alongside which native craft can lie at all times of the tide. Water has been brought into the settlement in such abundance that the very desert is beginning to assume the appearance of a continental public garden. Fountains play in several directions, and the India rubber tree, sugarcane, cotton and other useful shrubs were growing - of course in isolated instances - yet luxuriously. The lawless Somal have been coerced into subjection, none are allowed to wear arms and they are as quiet in their demeanour as when residing at Aden and all this has been accomplished

1. I.O./P&S Aden/3, Aden News Report no. 8, 23 Feb. 1876.

2. I.O./P&S Aden/2, Aden News Report no. 47, 2 Dec. 1875.

3. Sabry, L'Empire Egyptienne..., pp. 392-3, 415-6.

without trade being more severely taxed than, as already noticed by a 2 per cent ad valorem duty.¹

There can be no doubt that in the first five years of their occupation the Egyptians did far more for the Somali Coast than the British were to do later in the first five years of their protectorate.

Consequent on the firman granting Zeila to the Khedive in 1875 Egyptian troops landed there and made it their base for an expedition to Harar which

'was governed in a barbarous fashion by Emir Ahmed, one of a family which had for long held dominion over the country. The fertility of Harrar excited the ambition of Ismail Pasha. It was annexed, and in 1874 (*sic*) the reigning Emir was put to death by Raouf Pasha, himself a bad specimen of a bad class.'²

Harar was occupied in November 1875; in the same month an Egyptian force under Munzinger Pasha which had landed at Tadjoura and was making for Shoa in order to co-operate with King Menelik against Abyssinia, was annihilated by the Danakil.³ At Harar, Raouf Pasha was surrounded and isolated by the Galla and large reinforcements had to be sent from Zeila to re-open his line of communications.⁴ Slowly Egyptian influence was extended beyond Harar; cultivation was encouraged, trade promoted and the route from Zeila improved and

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/4, Hunter to Maj.G.R.Goodfellow (acting resident, Aden), 19 Apr. 1880, enclosed in Goodfellow to Govt. of Bombay, no. 151/783, 17 May 1880.
 2. Cromer, Modern Egypt, ii, 51-2.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/2, Aden News Report no. 42, 29 Oct. 1875; memorandum by Schneider, November 1875, enclosed in Schneider to Salisbury, no. 72/1187, 27 Nov. 1875; Marston, Britain's Imperial Role..., pp. 482-3
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/3, various Aden News Reports.

with Berbera and Bulhar. The Somalis were resentful against the authority of the Egyptians who had to keep a large garrison there,¹ and in order to meet the expenses of occupation and administration Gordon suggested the levy of customs dues;² this was directly contrary to the convention and Britain objected to anything which would 'in any way endanger or impede the perfect freedom of intercourse between Aden and Berbera.'³ The Egyptians therefore resorted to a variety of other taxes on trade under such guises as dock and transit dues, an import tax on goods from the interior, fees for all manner of essential certificates, a health tax, light dues, grazing charges and passport fees. Traders were frequently fined, they were compelled to give the governor credit and were made to pay heavy house taxes. Although there were officially no customs duties the governor would not allow merchants to export skins unless they paid for the privilege, and salt could not be imported from Aden without payment of duty.⁴ Much of this taxation was levied on the instructions of Gordon, who was anxious to abolish the annual deficit and make Berbera self-supporting.⁵ Frequently, the duties were raised, and

1. I.O./P&S Aden/3, Goodfellow to Govt. of Bombay, no. 134, 3 June 1876.
2. F.O. 78/3190, Vivian to Salisbury, no. 261, 25 July 1878.
3. F.O. 78/3190, Salisbury to Vivian, no. 163, 29 Aug. 1878.
4. F.O. 78/3191, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 3 Dec. 1878, 11 Feb. 1879, 25 Mar. 1879, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 July 1879; F.O.C.P. 4099, Murjan Mohamed Safee (hon. British agent, Berbera) to Goodfellow, n.d., enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 29 Aug. 1879; F.O. 78/3192, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 18 July 1879, 3 Sept. 1879, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 6 Jan. 1880; Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 13 Oct. 1879, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 20 Mar. 1880; F.O. 78/3193, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 11 Mar. 1880, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 2 Oct. 1880.
5. F.O. 78/3191, memorandum by W.H.Wylde, 24 Oct. 1879; F.O. 78/3192, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 13 Oct. 1879, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 20 Mar. 1880.

the Aden authorities, beset with complaints from the traders, were continually asking the Bombay Government to protest. The British Government indignant at these infringements of the spirit of the 1877 convention, which they optimistically assumed would soon be ratified by the Sultan, relayed the protests to the Egyptian Government without result.

In May 1879, in order to keep himself informed, the Aden resident appointed a trader, Mr. Murjan Safee, to be honorary British agent at Berbera;¹ the experiment was not a success because, as a merchant, he was prejudiced against the Egyptian authorities. He abused his position and was dismissed after a year.² In his place Hunter, the first assistant resident at Aden was appointed, in March 1881, to be consul for the African coast between Tadjoura and Ras Hafun, with the duty of visiting the coast at intervals.³ Technically he came under the British agent and consul-general in Egypt, to whom he sent reports, but in practice he remained under the orders of the Aden resident.

Hunter was a fortunate choice, for although he had earlier written:

'Of late years some tribes have fallen into the hands of that daughter of the horse-leech, Egypt, and the Somal are likely

-
1. F.O. 78/3191, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 1 May 1879, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 July 1879.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/4, Hunter to Goodfellow, 19 Apr. 1880, enclosed in Goodfellow to Govt. of Bombay, no. 151/783, 17 May 1880.
 3. F.O. 78/3334, Granville to Hunter, no. 1, 17 Mar. 1881.

if matters proceed as they are now doing, to sink into obscurity like the skin of a dry-sucked orange.¹

he now realised that Egyptian influence at Berbera had not been entirely retrogressive, and that Egypt could not be made to forgo her attempts to make Berbera a paying concern. He proposed that all livestock and provisions - Aden's essential supplies - should be exported free of tax, but that regulated taxes on other items should be allowed;

'... it seems unnecessary to seek to restrain the Egyptian Government from reaping some benefit from its possessions in N.E. Africa, while at the same time looking to the Khedive to extend civilization and foster commerce in those regions.'

he wrote.² Hunter's reasonable views were partly encouraged by the knowledge that since the Egyptian occupation trade between Aden and Berbera had increased. The worst fears of the Aden authorities had failed to materialize.

Hunter's suggestion met with approval from the British Government, and in due time the governor of Berbera abolished all export duties on livestock and provisions.³ Hunter's relations with the governor, Abdul Rahman Bey, were cordial, and he persuaded him to remove other needless restrictions;⁴ when Abdul Rahman proposed closing Bulhar

-
1. F.M. Hunter, *A Grammar of the Somali Language* (Bombay, 1880) p. x.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/4, Hunter to Goodfellow, 19 Apr. 1880, enclosed in Goodfellow to Govt. of Bombay, no. 151/783, 17 May 1880.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Malet, no. 9, 10 Sept. 1881, enclosed in Loch to Hartington, no. 23/1354, 15 Sept. 1881.
 4. F.O.C.P. 4796, Hunter to Malet, no. 3, 22 Feb. 1882, enclosed in Cookson to Granville, no. 116, 6 Mar. 1882.

because it was so unhealthy and had such a dangerous harbour, Hunter saw the advantages, and instead of opposing the suggestion, supported and recommended it.¹ The interior continued very unsettled, but Abdul Rahman was an energetic man and did much to improve the safety of the trade routes; periodically however, they were still disrupted by quarrels between the clans.² In March 1882 Abdul Rahman was succeeded by Farhas Bey, who reopened Bulhar, to Hunter's regret,³ and re-imposed taxes on livestock.⁴

The more amicable relations with the Egyptian authorities established by Hunter bore fruit in 1882 when Britain invaded Egypt and defeated Arabi Pasha. The Aden authorities feared that the Egyptians on the Somali Coast might retaliate by cutting off Aden's supplies. The governor of Harar, Nadi Pasha, was a supporter, relative and past colleague of Arabi, and he attempted to enforce his authority over Berbera and Zeila. Both Abu Bekr in Zeila, and Farhas Bey in Berbera, however, resisted his demands, affirmed their friendship for Britain, allowed the export of livestock to continue and promised to protect

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Malet no. 7, 5 Sept. 1881, enclosed in Loch to Hartington, no. 22/1266, 6 Sept. 1881.
 2. F.O. 78/3193, Cmdr. Berners (H.M.S. Philomel) to Loch. 18 Nov. 1880, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 16 Dec. 1880; I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Malet, no. 7, 5 Sept. 1881, enclosed in Loch to Hartington, no. 22/1266, 6 Sept. 1881.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Malet, no. 10, 30 Mar. 1882, enclosed in Blair to Hartington, no. 16/508, 31 Mar. 1882.
 4. F.O.C.P. 4940, acting consul C.W.H. Sealy to Malet, 9 Jan. 1883, enclosed in Malet to Granville, no. 19, 17 Jan. 1883.

British subjects.¹

The Egyptians never extended their effective authority east of Berbera, and the Mijertein country remained, in practice, independent. The opening of the Suez Canal was followed by a great increase in the number of merchant ships using the Gulf of Aden, and a corresponding increase in the number of shipwrecks on the Mijertein coast. In the five years between 1872 and 1877 at least eight steamships were wrecked near Cape Guardafui or Ras Hafun.² Lives were lost, both in the actual shipwrecks and among the survivors ashore, and although the Mijertein had not molested any of the victims there was a constant fear, based on past experience, that they would prove treacherous; they certainly plundered the wrecks, and one estimate put the loss of property over this period at £2 million.³

The wreck of ships belonging to the British India line and Messageries Maritimes in 1877 caused Glasgow shipowners and the French and Indian Governments to press for a lighthouse on Cape Guardafui. The Khedive fancied the idea as a practical means of demonstrating his authority

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Blair tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 17 July 1882; Sealy to Malet, no. 31, 2 Aug. 1882; F.O.C.P. 4796, Sealy to Blair 23 Aug. 1882, enclosed in Malet to Granville, no. 604, 7 Sept. 1882.
 2. F.O. 78/3189, Bombay Chamber of Commerce to Trinity House, 21 Aug. 1877, Govt. of India to Salisbury, 18 Oct. 1877, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 6 Dec. 1877.
 3. F.O. 78/3189, R. Fleming (of Fleming & Co., Alexandria), to under-secretary of state, F.O., 11 Oct. 1877.

over the coast, and he proposed to name the lighthouse after Vivian, British consul-general at Alexandria.¹ Egyptian finances were in no state to provide the capital for building a lighthouse, but the British Government circularised the maritime powers² and found that they were willing to pay an extra toll at Suez to cover the cost of maintenance and construction. An Egyptian commission was sent to investigate the possibilities, and recommended a light just south of Guardafui. It also reported that the lighthouse would have to be protected from the Mijertein with a force of 525 men and four field guns.³ Such an occupation was more than the Egyptian Government could afford,⁴ and the project was shelved.

As Egypt's condition precluded the building of a lighthouse the next best course appeared to be an arrangement with the Mijertein to ensure that wrecks should not be plundered nor shipwrecked persons molested. When the leaders of the Mijertein had visited Aden in 1873 they had been well received, shown over the arsenal to impress them with British might and encouraged not to plunder wrecks;⁵ nevertheless, the plundering continued. After another serious wreck in 1879 the Aden resident, Brig.-Gen. Loch sent his assistant, Maj. Goodfellow, to the Mijertein coast, where he made a provisional agreement with the clan by which they

-
1. F.O. 78/3189, Vivian to Derby, no. 264, 17 Aug. 1877.
 2. F.O. 78/3189, Derby circular, 7 Dec. 1877.
 3. F.O. 78/3190, Vivian to Salisbury, no. 3 Commercial, 4 Feb. 1879.
 4. F.O. 78/3190, Vivian to Salisbury, no. 2 Commercial, 30 Jan. 1879.
 5. I.O./S.L.Aden/46, Schneider to Govt. of Bombay, no. 269, 3 Nov. 1873.

undertook to protect shipwrecked persons and guard wrecks from plunder in return for an annual stipend of 360 dollars. They also agreed to assist if ever a lighthouse was erected.¹

Although the British Government saw the wisdom of the agreement they were reluctant to ratify it and so give other powers a precedent for making agreements with the Somalis, who seemed ready to enter into relations with all comers.² Accordingly, Loch was instructed to make no more than a verbal arrangement with the Mijertein, but to continue the annual payment as long as they kept their part of the bargain.³ Loch protested that the Mijertein would take advantage of this to begin a process of systematic wrecking and plunder,⁴ and he persuaded the British Government to agree to its ratification.⁵ The Egyptian Government were informed of the agreement and were told that insofar as their territory was concerned it was merely a provisional arrangement pending effective Egyptian occupation of the coast; but Egypt was at this time (1880) busily trying to dislodge the Italians from Assab, and asked for the notification of the agreement to be withdrawn lest it be misrepresented and provide a precedent for similar agreements by Italy and other powers.⁶ Britain complied, withdrew the note but informed Egypt verbally that the

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/4, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, no. 129, April 1879.
 2. F.O. 78/3190, F.O. to I.O., 3 May 1879; I.O. to F.O., 16 May 1879.
 3. F.O. 78/3191, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 26 Aug. 1879, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 21 Nov. 1879.
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/4, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, no. 311, 3 Oct. 1879.
 5. I.O./P&S to India/6, Hartington to Govt. of India, no. 30 Sec., 16 July 1880.
 6. F.O. 78/3193, Cookson to Granville, no. 316, 6 Oct. 1880.

agreement would continue in force.¹

Both Britain and Egypt were satisfied with this arrangement, but when the ratified agreement was finally taken over to the Mijertein in 1883 Sultan Osman Mahmud would no longer agree to the lighthouse clause as he suspected it bound him to cede territory.² The agreement was taken back to Aden and modified, but it seemed fated, for when, in its final form it was sent to the Mijertein for signature, the Somali interpreter who took it across was himself shipwrecked, and the agreement was washed away. Eventually Capt. King,³ an assistant resident at Aden, took the agreement to Bender Merhagno, where it was signed by the sultan and all the Mijertein elders on 1 May 1884.⁴

The agreement with the Mijertein was necessary because Egypt had been unable to establish her authority that far east, and Britain wished to ensure the safety of her ships on the route from India. Where the Egyptians were established, as at Berbera and Bulhar, Britain was able to avoid the necessity of making treaties with the Somalis. By supporting the Egyptian occupation she had secured her vital trading and livestock interests without the inconvenient responsibilities and expenses

-
1. F.O. 78/3193, Malet to Granville, no. 342, 17 Nov. 1880.
 2. F.O.C.P. 4940, Sealy to Blair, 23 Feb. 1883, enclosed in Malet to Granville, no. 73, 9 Mar. 1883.
 3. King, James Stewart, later Major; 1868 joined Indian Army; 1883 sent to Aden on general duty; Dec. 1884, vice-consul Zeila; Jan. 1887 left Zeila, reverted to Bombay Staff Corps; 1892, retired.
 4. F.O. 78/3727, Blair to Govt. of Bombay, 21 Nov. 1883, 5 May 1884, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Sept. 1884.

and forced the Egyptian garrison to salute the Italian flag to atone for this 'insult'. In addition the Italians measured Berbera harbour and took steps to ingratiate themselves with the Somali inhabitants.¹ Later another Italian warship visited the Mijertein coast, although on leaving Aden its destination had been given out as China.² Nothing more came of these Italian activities, but the Aden authorities kept a jealous eye on them and sent a British warship round in the wake of the Italian vessels.

The presence of the Egyptians at Berbera and Zeila prevented Italy from getting a foothold there, and so the Italian Government, on the lookout for an opportunity to make a display of foreign policy and with an eye to the trade of Shoa and Abyssinia, turned to Assab. Although Egypt claimed jurisdiction, under Turkish sovereignty, over this territory on the shores of the Red Sea, there had been no Egyptian occupation and the effectual ruler of this deserted spot was the Danakil sultan of Raheita. In 1870 an agent of the Italian Rubattino steamship company had purchased land at Assab from the local chief; the intention was to use it as a coaling station, and for a while the Italian government had toyed with the idea of using it as a penal colony. The place was so inhospitable, however, that it was soon abandoned. Egyptian troops arrived later that year, hauled down the Italian flag

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/4, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, no. 208, 16 June 1879; F.O. 78/3191, Lascelles to Salisbury, no. 34 Slave Trade, 29 Aug. 1879.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/4, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, no. 207, 13 June 1879.

and departed. Assab lay virtually forgotten until November 1879 when Rubattino announced that he was going to develop it as a coaling and trading station under the protection of the Italian Government.¹

In January 1880 an Italian warship took Rubattino's agents to Assab and they began to establish a commercial station. Despite the warship, Italy insisted that there was no connection between Rubattino and the Government and that Assab would never be turned into a naval or military station.² Land was purchased from the Danakil sultan, buildings were put up and a pier built. The Italian Government drafted a set of regulations for the settlement³ and a civil commissioner was appointed who was, to all intents and purposes, governor.⁴ In 1881 the territory of Assab was placed under Italian protection⁵ and later this protection was extended to the sultan of Raheita and all his territory.⁶ Finally, in July 1882, the Italian Senate passed a Bill establishing an Italian colony at Assab under Italian sovereignty and Rubattino's

-
1. F.O.C.P. 4099, Sir A. Paget (British ambassador, Rome) to Salisbury, no. 443, 20 Nov. 1879; the story of the Italian occupation of Assab is told very fully in F. Fries, 'Anglo-Italian Relations, 1884-5, and the Italian occupation of Massawah' (Cambridge Univ. Ph.D. thesis 1939-40), pp. 67-96.
 2. Sal. P., A/11/23, Paget to Salisbury, private, 6 Jan. 1880.
 3. F.O. 78/3193, Granville to H.G. Macdonell (secretary of embassy, Rome), no. 470, 23 Aug. 1880.
 4. F.O. 78/3364, Loch to Hartington, 27 Jan. 1881, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 17 Feb. 1881; Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 8 Feb. 1881, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Mar. 1881.
 5. F.O. 78/3364, Malet tel. to Granville, no. 1, 7 Jan. 1881.
 6. F.O. 78/3366, Malet tel. to Granville, no. 113, 20 Dec. 1881.

The Italians have shuffled most amazingly. At first they said their Govt had nothing to do with the purchase, then that it was a mere commercial transaction that they were bound to protect, then that the Italian flag was hoisted not as an act of sovereignty but because the Rubattino Co. who had purchased the site was Italian, then that the sovereignty was doubtful, then that it had been ceded to the Co., then that it had become an Italian Commercial Station and now they contend that they have acquired the sovereignty & have a right to exercise police & all other rights....

The place is clearly intended as an assertion of Italian Power in the Red Sea & will very soon become a formidable station under one pretext or the other.¹

But he was fighting a losing battle. Lord Hartington at the India Office took the view that the matter was essentially a question for Egypt and Turkey to pursue,² and Lord Northbrook at the Admiralty destroyed another of Tenterden's arguments by writing:

'I have no fear of this establishment at Assab Bay, & though the Italians have been very shifty about it, I think it would better (sic) to leave them alone than to try & upset their arrangements.'³

The Liberal Government could not see the Italians at Assab to be the threat to British power that the Conservatives had considered them.⁴ Inquiries in parliament about what was going on were neatly sidetracked.⁵ Gladstone and Granville were prepared to tolerate an Italian commercial

-
1. F.O. 78/3193, memorandum by Tenterden, 11 June 1880.
 2. F.O. 78/3193, I.O. to F.O., 27 Oct. 1880.
 3. F.O. 78/3193, memorandum by Northbrook, 17(?) Dec. 1880.
 4. See: Ramm, 'Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power in the Red Sea, 1868-1885', Eng. Hist. Rev., lix (1944), 211-236.
 5. Hansard, 3rd series, 1882, cclxviii, 980 (20 Apr. 1882) and 1636 (28 Apr. 1882); cclxx, 1268-72 (15 June 1882) and 1423-5 (16 June 1882).

station at Assab, but they reaffirmed the view that sovereignty belonged to Turkey and jurisdiction to Egypt¹, and were unwilling to commit themselves to the extent of announcing that the Assab project had their moral support.² Italy continued to press for British recognition and eventually, to Tenterden's dismay,³ Granville agreed to recommend to Egypt the adoption of a convention with Italy which would recognise Italian ownership, jurisdiction and sovereignty at Assab, on condition that it would never be turned into a naval base.⁴ This convention was quite unacceptable to Egypt, which refused to alienate any of its territory whatsoever,⁵ and persuaded Turkey to adopt a similar attitude.⁶ The Egyptian position was rendered more intractable by the xenophobia of Arabi Pasha, and the Italians, exasperated by the failure of the Egyptians to punish the murderers of an Italian expedition from Assab which had been attacked at Beilul in June 1881, broke off negotiations with Egypt and went ahead with the process of transforming Assab into a full colony, leaving the Egyptians to evict.

-
1. F.O. 78/3364, Granville to de Ressa (Italian charge d'affairs), 26 Jan. 1881.
 2. F.O. 78/3364, cancelled draft, Granville to Menabrea, April 1881; F.O.C.P. 4627, Granville to Paget, no. 137A, 4 Apr. 1881.
 3. F.O. 78/3366, Tenterden to Pauncefoot, private, 18 Sept. 1881; minute by Tenterden, n.d., on Macdonell to Granville, no. 364, 23 Sept. 1881.
 4. F.O. 78/3366, Granville to Paget, no. 457A, 11 Nov. 1881.
 5. F.O. 78/3366, Malet to Granville, no. 353, 28 Nov. 1881; F.O. 78/3496, Malet to Granville, no. 144, 26 Mar. 1882.
 6. F.O.C.P. 4627, Dufferin to Granville, no. 1,100, 12 Dec. 1881; F.O. 78/3496, Dufferin tel. to Granville, no. 2, 6 Jan. 1882, and no. 5 (recorder), 10 Jan. 1882.

them if they dared.¹

Gladstone's Government were prepared to countenance an Italian settlement on the Red Sea because, at the most, it represented a strategic threat which the Liberals tended to discount; but the Somali Coast had an importance not only because of its strategic position, but also because of its relation to Aden. Liberal policy towards the Somali Coast was materially the same as that of the Conservatives. In December 1880, in an effort to reduce the heavy annual deficit caused by the occupation of Harar and the Somali Coast, Sir Auckland Colvin, one of the Egyptian controllers-general, suggested to the British Government that Egypt should abandon these possessions.² It was obvious, however, that if Egypt retired her place would be taken by Italy, France or even Shoa, and Aden would lose its dominant position in the area.³ This Lord Granville was not prepared to see, and he made Colvin give up his idea, although it meant further impoverishment for Egypt.⁴

One of the effects of the Italian occupation of Assab was to

-
1. F.O. 78/3497, Malet tel. to Granville, no. 77, 10 Apr. 1882; the story is also recorded in Parl. Papers 1882, lxxxii (627), 'Correspondence respecting Assab Bay.'
 2. F.O. 78/3193, Colvin to Malet, 7 Dec. 1880, enclosed in Malet to Granville, no. 356, 8 Dec. 1880.
 3. F.O. 78/3193, Malet to Granville, no. 356, 8 Dec. 1880.
 4. F.O. 78/3193, Granville to Malet, no. 303, 20 Dec. 1880.

stimulate French activity in the Gulf of Aden. In March 1880 a French ship visited the small village of Obock and marked out the limits of the territory purchased in 1862¹, but thereafter the initiative tended to be commercial rather than official. In September 1880 two French companies were formed to trade with Shoa through Obock², and in the same year a French merchant from Aden opened the first European store in Harar and sent Arthur Rimbaud, the down and out French poet, to manage it³. Early in 1881 it was reported that the appointment of a French consul at Zeila was imminent⁴, and Hunter's appointment as British consul on the Somali Coast was accelerated in order to precede the French and maintain British prestige⁵. Obock was not a success. In November 1880 the only French representative was a merchant living in a small cave⁶, and although more settlers were sent out later the original scheme ended in bankruptcy⁷. The Danakil murdered one of the leaders of the

-
1. F.O. 78/3192, Hunter to Loch, 24 Mar. 1880, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Apr. 1880.
 2. F.O. 78/3193, Goodfellow to Govt. of Bombay, 23 Sept. 1880, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 19 Oct. 1880; Starkie, Arthur Rimbaud in Abyssinia, pp. 36-40.
 3. Starkie, Arthur Rimbaud in Abyssinia, pp. 9, 13.
 4. F.O. 78/3364, Loch to Hartington, 27 Jan. 1881, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 17 Feb. 1881.
 5. F.O. 78/3364, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 8 Feb. 1881, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Mar. 1881.
 6. F.O. 78/3193, Cmdr. Berners (H.M.S. Philomel) to Loch, 18 Nov. 1880, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 16 Dec. 1880.
 7. F.O.C.P. 4796, Loch to Govt. of Bombay, 17 Feb. 1882, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 7 Mar. 1882; F.O.C.P., 4940, Blair to Govt. of Bombay, 11 Jan. 1883, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 8 Feb. 1883.

November 1882 it was reported that a French merchant named Soleillet had taken possession of the Bay of Tadjoura. This even gave rise to discussions in the House of Commons because of the possible threat to the route to India,¹ and in the India Office there were fears that France might establish herself at Tadjoura as easily as Italy had done at Assab.² In fact the report was exaggerated; the local sheikhs were eager to sell valueless tracts of desert to foreign merchants, and Soleillet had purchased some land at Sagallo, fourteen miles west of Tadjoura, from a sheikh who had scant claim to the ownership. Soleillet only intended to use it as a trading base, but Abu Bekr, who had a garrison of fifty men at Tadjoura, sent some soldiers to evict him. Ostensibly this move by Abu Bekr was to vindicate Egyptian sovereignty, but he was probably more concerned to prevent Europeans from establishing themselves so near his slave-trading port of Tadjoura.³

In London the Foreign Office feared that if Soleillet was able to make good his acquisition 'the French Govt. may be expected to come

-
1. Hansard, 3rd series, 1882, colxxv, 100-2 (27 Nov. 1882), and 216 (28 Nov. 1882).
 2. F.O. 78/3497, I.O. to F.O., 28 Nov. 1882.
 3. F.O. 78/3497, Blair tel. to Hartington, 26 Nov. 1882, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 28 Nov. 1882; memorandum by Hunter about Sagallo, 26 Nov. 1882, and Hunter to Malet, 27 Nov. 1882, both enclosed in Malet to Granville, no. 876, 7 Dec. 1882; Sealy to Hunter, 29 Nov. 1882, enclosed in Malet to Granville, no. 877, 7 Dec. 1882; F.O.C.P. 4940, Sealy to Malet, 31 Jan. 1883, enclosed in Malet to Granville, no. 43, 9 Feb. 1883; Starkie, Arthur Rimbaud in Abyssinia, pp. 41-6.

and the British Government were anxious to prevent any other nation acquiring territory from which it would be difficult to dislodge them.¹

Abu Bekr had stopped Soleillet from founding a commercial base at Agallo but although Egypt disputed the validity of the 1862 agreement nothing was done to remove the French merchants from Obock. The agreement, however, was not limited to Obock; it gave France a seventy mile coastline from Ras Dumeir to Ras Ali,² a coastline which flanked the western shore of the Bab el Mandeb and stretched nearly to Tadjoura. In October 1883 a French merchant lowered the Turkish flag on a hill not far from Obock and hoisted in its place the French tricolor;³ this was not allowed to pass unnoticed and the Egyptian authorities rehoisted the Turkish flag. At this point the French Government stepped in, took up the cause of its merchants and sent a warship to put up the French flag;⁴ the case was beginning to assume the same characteristics as Italian encroachments at Assab.

By the end of 1883 therefore, the French Government had made plain its interest in the Gulf of Tadjoura and the Italian Government had declared Assab to be a colony. Both these nations had settled on the

-
1. F.O.C.P. 4949, Granville tel. to Malet, no. 17, 14 May 1883.
 2. F.O. 78/3725, Sir Evelyn Baring (British agent & consul-general, Egypt) to Granville, no. 154, 9 Feb. 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3725, Baring to Granville, no. 468, 21 Oct. 1883.
 4. F.O. 78/3725, Baring to Granville, no. 5, 2 Jan. 1884.

forward to assert their sovereign rights'¹; a French occupation of the Gulf of Tadjoura would be far more serious than the Italian presence at Assab, especially as Britain's independent invasion of Egypt had shattered Anglo-French relations. Once again, therefore, Granville tried to get the Somali Coast convention ratified at Constantinople² and encouraged the Egyptian Government to enforce its rights over the coast, suggesting a permanent Egyptian occupation of Sagallo.³ The Egyptian Government had already taken steps in this direction and had sent reinforcements to Abu Bekr.⁴ Britain was given an undertaking that Egypt would spare no effort to prevent foreign powers establishing themselves on the coast and a small redoubt was built at Sagallo and occupied by Egyptian troops.⁵ At the same time there were official French attempts to claim land at Sheikh Said on the Arabian cape of the Bab el Mandeb, but the Turks refused to allow any French settlement there;⁶ and there was even a Spanish bid to purchase territory on the Red Sea which came to nothing.⁷ With the experience of Assab fresh in their

-
1. F.O. 78/3497, memorandum by F.L. Bertie (assistant clerk, F.O.), 'The French on the Somali Coast', 22 Dec. 1882.
 2. F.O. 78/3497, Granville to Wyndham, no. 723, 30 Dec. 1882.
 3. F.O. 78/3497, Granville to Dufferin (on a special mission to Egypt), no. 68, 30 Dec. 1882.
 4. F.O.C.P. 4940, Abu Bekr Pasha to Sealy, 27 Dec. 1882, enclosed in Malet to Granville, no. 11, 12 Jan. 1883.
 5. F.O.C.P. 4940, Dufferin to Granville, no. 19, 15 Jan. 1883; Moncrieff to Granville, no. 1 Africa, 25 Apr. 1883.
 6. See, e.g.: F.O.C.P. 4796, Wyndham to Granville, no. 374, 9 May 1882.
 7. F.O.C.P. 4940, Wyndham tel. to Granville, no. 52, 10 May 1883; F.O. 78/3857, Sir R.B. Morier (British envoy, Madrid) to Granville, no. 149, 28 Dec. 1884; Fries, thesis op.cit., pp. 149-151.

... in defiance of Egypt, both were aiming to develop the trade of
 ... and Abyssinia and both had chosen unsatisfactory sites which they
 wished to improve and extend. In such a situation Britain was more
 than ever concerned to support the Egyptian occupation of the Somali
 Coast, to prevent either Italy or France insinuating themselves there,
 for as a place of settlement and as a trading base the Somali Coast was
 superior to both Assab and Obock. Just when it was most in Britain's
 interests that Egypt should maintain a strong hold on the area, Egyptian
 power collapsed in the Sudan; Hicks Pasha was overwhelmed near El Obeid,
 and the extent to which Egypt had over-reached herself was revealed.
 ... was sent to evacuate Khartoum and the Royal Navy undertook the
 defence of Suakin against Osman Digna.

In Berbera Abdul Rahman had returned as governor, but his rule was
 less enlightened than it had been earlier. Hunter reported 'his
 methods are bully, bluster and squeeze, and as to his honesty, I can only
 suppose he is no worse than his fellows.'¹ The continued efforts to
 make Berbera pay, without incurring British displeasure by imposing
 customs dues on livestock, had aggravated the resentment felt against
 the Egyptian authorities, and Abdul Rahman's arbitrary and autocratic
 behaviour had made him detested by the people.² His severe treatment

1. F.O. 78/3725, Hunter to Baring, demi-official, 7 Apr. 1884,
 enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 438, 17 Apr. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3725, F.L. James to Baring, 21 Apr. 1884, enclosed in
 E.H. Egerton (acting consul-general, Cairo) to Granville,
 no. 466, 26 Apr. 1884.

certain lineage groups in connection with caravan raids had admitted them, and the British explorer F.L. James, who visited Berbera early in 1884, was impressed with the probability of an imminent rising by the Somalis and an attack on Berbera.¹ News of the Egyptian disasters in the Sudan had reached Berbera and the garrison was weak, being composed mainly of black troops from lower Egypt, whose ammunition was old and unreliable.² Although the isolation of the Somali Coast from the Sudan proper ruled out the possibility of the Somalis declaring for the Mahdi, Hunter thought that there was a real danger of their rising and expelling the Egyptians. The French were pressing their claim to Obock and had a warship in the area, and it seemed possible that the Italians might try to step in if the Egyptians were driven out.³ In February 1884 H.M.S. Sphinx was sent to protect Berbera and Zeila, but soon departed as the ports seemed to be in no imminent danger.⁴

It was becoming apparent, however, that not only could Egypt not afford to maintain her occupation of the Somali Coast, but that, as in the Sudan, she was incapable of maintaining control. The Egyptian Government itself recognised that it would have to reduce the garrisons,⁵

-
1. F.O. 78/3725, Hunter to Baring, 5 Apr. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 435, 17 Apr. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3725, Cmdr. Caffin (H.M.S. Sphinx) to Admiralty, 7 Feb. 1884, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 21 Feb. 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3725, Baring to Granville, no. 5, 2 Jan. 1884.
 4. F.O. 78/3725, Caffin to Admiralty, 7 Feb. 1884, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 21 Feb. 1884.
 5. F.O. 78/3725, Baring to Granville, no. 73, 17 Jan. 1884.

The Admiralty was unwilling to supplement them by keeping British ships permanently tied up at the coast ports; 'The incompetence of the Egyptian Governors and the uselessness of Egyptian troops render it necessary to make arrangements which will provide some further security' wrote Lord Northbrook, first lord of the Admiralty.¹

The Admiralty had an interest in excluding other powers from the Somali Coast because of its strategic value, and because it was a potential source of fresh meat for British forces in the Red Sea. The Government of India had a similar interest because of Aden's absolute dependence on the Somali Coast for supplies; in the year 1879-80 out of a total of 2,063 cattle and 93,441 sheep imported into Aden, 2,017 cattle and 92,790 sheep came from the Somali Coast and Tadjoura.² The Egyptian Government had an interest in withdrawing from the coast for financial reasons. All these interests came together in the person of Lord Northbrook, first lord of the Admiralty, past Viceroy of India, and cousin of Sir Evelyn Baring, British agent and consul-general in Cairo. Northbrook seems to have been the first person in the British Government to grasp the necessity for a British occupation. In January 1884 he approached the Viceroy of India's foreign secretary and found that he had no objection to a virtual British protectorate over the

-
1. P.R.O., Cabinet Papers, Series 37, vol. 12, no. 12, Cabinet memorandum by Northbrook, 8 Feb. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3725, memorandum, 'Egyptian Coast Territory South of the Red Sea', 9 Feb. 1884, by Admiralty Foreign Intelligence Committee.

Somali Coast.¹ In February he circulated his views to the Cabinet and also sent them to Baring. He thought that Egyptian sovereignty should be retained over Suakin and Massawa, that the former should have a British garrison and the latter a British governor under Egypt; south of Massawa Abyssinia should be allowed to occupy the coast; the Italians and French could be allowed to continue at Assab and Obock for 'I never was afraid of their settling on the Red Sea. We should knock the places about their ears in a war, unless they spend a fortune in fortifications. But we cannot let them command the supplies of Aden from the Somali Coast.'; and so a British consul should be appointed to Berbera, and a few companies of sepoy from Aden should garrison the Somali Coast ports at India's expense; Harar should be evacuated and returned to the old ruling family, and Abu Bekr the slave dealer should be cleared out of Zeila.² Baring fully agreed with Northbrook, and added:

'Abu Bekr, by the way, is a very wily and influential old gentleman - much of the Zebek type. If it be thought necessary to get rid of him some management - and also probably some sepoy - will be required.'³

French activity focussed attention on the area. French warships were not only visiting Obock, but also cruising in the Red Sea, erecting boundary pillars on Kamaran island, and, it was rumoured, trying to

-
1. Cromer Papers (hereafter cited by their P.R.O. reference: F.O. 635) vol. 4, no. 26, Northbrook to Baring, private, 25 Jan. 1884.
 2. CAB 37/12/12, Cabinet memorandum by Northbrook, 8 Feb. 1884; F.O. 635/4/31, Northbrook to Baring, private, 8 Feb. 1884; Fries, *thesis op. cit.*, pp. 104-115.
 3. F.O. 633/4/40, Baring to Northbrook, private, 24 Feb. 1884.

revive France's claim to Sheikh Said.¹ The dispute with Egypt about the extent of French territory at Obock dragged on; in March France threatened to land troops at Obock,² and the Foreign Office were blamed to discover that the 1862 agreement with the Danakil gave France rights to Gubbet Kharab, a land-locked basin that was thought to be a splendid anchorage.³ On 7 March the British Cabinet discussed 'the pretension of France to occupy Obok' and Gladstone reported to the queen:

'The impression of the Cabinet is that there is no conclusive objection to this project, considered in itself; but that if it were acceded to without further communication it might reach a geographical extent which would be inconvenient.'⁴

France apparently had little intention of confining herself to Obock; she was set on regaining her former influence in Egypt and the Red Sea. On 25 March the Journal des Débats called upon France to send a fleet to Massawa; in early April two British vessels had to be sent to Aden to counter the moves of French warships in the area,⁵ and in April France informed Egypt that she now claimed full sovereignty over Obock.⁶ Northbrook, however, still saw no harm in these activities so long as the Somali Coast was untouched, and Hartington at the War Office agreed

-
1. F.O. 78/3725, Hunter to Govt. of Bombay, 19 Jan. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 15 Feb. 1884; Blair to Govt. of Bombay, 30 Jan. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 21 Feb. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3725, Baring to Granville, no. 250, 3 Mar. 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3725, memorandum by Admiralty Foreign Intelligence Committee, 9 Feb. 1884; F.O. to I.O., 27 Feb. 1884; I.O. to F.O. 5 Mar. 1884, and minute thereon by Bertie, 5 Mar. 1884.
 4. F.R.O., Cabinet Papers, Series 41, vol. 18, no. 15, Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 7 Mar. 1884.
 5. F.O. 78/3725, Blair to Rear-Adm. Sir W. Hewett, 7 Apr. 1884, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 9 May 1884.
 6. F.O. 78/3725, Egerton tel. to Granville, no. 321, 22 Apr. 1884.

with him when he wrote:

'I hope we shall not be jealous of the French at Obokh or the Italians at Assab Bay - my feeling is adverse to our traditional policy of trying to prevent the establish~~men~~^t of any other powers in these wretched places - we have the best positions in the Red Sea & should rest contented.'

Towards the end of March 1884 the Egyptian Government finally decided to evacuate Harar. Whilst officially proposing to hold on to the Somali Coast ports they apparently hoped that Britain would take them over.² It was certainly difficult to see the justice of making Egypt maintain its costly occupation of the Somali Coast in order to keep other powers out simply for the benefit of Britain.³ Egypt wished Hunter to carry out the evacuation of Harar⁴ but he was unwilling to be made governor of the province and anyway the British Government were not prepared to let him go; they had no intention of bearing the responsibility for another Gordon.⁵ Hunter therefore arranged to direct the evacuation from Aden. He planned to withdraw the Egyptian officials and soldiers from Harar very slowly, and to reinstate a member of the old ruling family as independent Emir. He favoured placing the Emirate under the political jurisdiction of the Aden resident so that the Aden authorities could give advice and exercise a limited supervision

-
1. F.O. 78/3725, memorandum by Northbrook, 10 Apr. 1884.
 2. F.O.C.P. 5057, Baring tel. to Granville, no. 261, 29 Mar. 1884; F.O. 633/4/54, Baring to Northbrook, private, 31 Mar. 1884.
 3. F.O. 633/4/62, Northbrook to Baring, private, 11 Apr. 1884.
 4. F.O.C.P. 5057, Baring tel. to Granville, no. 261, 29 Mar. 1884.
 5. F.O. 78/3725, Baring to Granville, no. 435, 17 Apr. 1884; F.O.C.P. 5057, Granville tel. to Egerton, no. 205, 2 May, 1884.

over the affairs of Harar. As far as the Somali Coast ports were concerned Hunter's personal view was that they should be brought directly under British rule, but suspecting that this would not meet with the approval of the Liberal Government he proposed that while the object should be to establish Berbera and Zeila as independent ports, they should come temporarily under the control of the Aden resident until the danger of a French or Italian occupation was past;¹ and so arose the paradoxical idea of a British occupation of the Somali Coast in order to maintain its independence.

The India Office were alive to the importance of excluding other powers from the Somali Coast, but thought that this could be achieved successfully at Zeila and Tadjoura by allowing Turkey to replace the Egyptians, for these two ports had undoubtedly been in the Turkish Empire and they were far less important to Aden than Berbera or Bulhar. This left the coast east of Zeila to be guarded against France and Italy; as the Sultan had not ratified the Somali Coast convention Britain maintained that the territory had never been incorporated in the Turkish Empire,² and the India Office proposed that the treaties of 1827 and 1856 with the Somalis of Berbera should be renewed and extended to provide

-
1. F.O. 78/3725, Hunter to Baring, 5 Apr. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 435, 17 Apr. 1884; Hunter to Baring, demi-official, 7 Apr. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 438, 17 Apr. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3725, memorandum by Hertslet, on Sultan's rights over the Somali Coast, 24 May, 1884.

that they should never part with any of their territory to any other power. The India Office were also prepared to send a small force to Berbera as a temporary measure, but hoped that the treaties would make this unnecessary. Lord Granville, the foreign secretary, and Lord Ripon, the Viceroy of India, agreed with these plans and Sir James Fergusson, the governor of Bombay, reported, after a visit to Aden, that the Somalis would gladly see the British Government take direct charge of their country.¹

The authorities being in favour of action, the necessary instructions were framed to meet the situation that would be caused by the Egyptian evacuation. In Constantinople Lord Dufferin was to inform the Porte that if Turkey was:

'ready to take steps on the withdrawal of the Egyptians to maintain its authority over Tajourrah and Zeyla, Her Majesty's Government would be willing to recognise the authority of the Sultan over that part of the coast which is now under Egyptian jurisdiction as far as and including Zeyla, upon condition that the Slave Trade shall be suppressed, and that no part of the territory shall at any time be ceded to any foreign Power, and that no further duties shall be levied at those ports than are stipulated for in the Convention of 1877....'²

The Government of India drafted instructions for Hunter's mission which

-
1. F.O. 633/4/62, Northbrook to Baring, private, 11 Apr. 1884; F.O. 78/3725, I.O. to F.O., 8 May 1884, and minute thereon by Granville, n.d.; Govt. of India tel. to Earl of Kimberley (secretary of state for India), 10 May 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 May 1884; F.O. 78/3727, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 22 May 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Sept. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3725, Granville to Dufferin, no. 178, 29 May (? 11 June) 1884.

was to 'anticipate the contingency of local disturbances or any attempts at Foreign occupation, by entering into direct agreements with the Sheikhs of the local tribes.' They added:

'The port of Berbera has at all times been recognised as one of peculiar importance to Aden, and it is desirable that its evacuation by the Egyptian garrison should not lead to any disturbance. It may therefore become necessary to obtain the temporary co-operation of a small force from Aden, though Her Majesty's Government trusts that if proper arrangements are made with the Chiefs this may not be the case.'¹

Britain was therefore ready to take over Berbera temporarily, but the Egyptian Government, unable to bring itself to order the withdrawal, hesitated.² Lord Kimberley, the secretary of state for India, having reached the decision to take action on the Somali Coast, resented any delay, and wrote: 'I think the first practicable opportunity should be taken of removing the Egyptian garrison from Harrar. The rest will follow easily.' Northbrook, however, was more cautious:

'I believe the practical difficulty of the Egyptians evacuating Harrar is that they will very likely be killed by the inhabitants of the neighbourhood.

We must take care not to become responsible for such a catastrophe.'

he wrote.³

-
1. I.O./P&S India/41, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 18 June 1884, enclosed in Govt. of India to Kimberley, no. 103 Pol., 8 Aug. 1884.
 2. F.O.C.P. 5057, Egerton tel. to Granville, no. 333, 28 Apr. 1884; F.O. 78/3726, Egerton to Granville, no. 593, 2 June 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3726, minutes, by Kimberley, 29 June 1884, and Northbrook, 30 June 1884, on Egerton to Granville, no. 593, 2 June 1884; see also, I.O. to F.O., 17 June 1884.

While Britain was thus forced to wait Hunter had to watch the French and Italians stepping up their activity. Military operations in Madagascar and Tonkin gave France an increased interest in the Red Sea route, and therefore in Obock. In June 1884 Léonce Lagarde was appointed to be official commandant of Obock, he was given a small garrison and the Chamber of Deputies voted 82,000 fr. to meet the expenses of occupation.¹ Hoping to capture the trade of Tadjoura the French laid claim to the coast as far as Ras Ali. In May an Italian iron-clad visited Berbera and the captain entertained some Somalis on board.² In June an Italian gun-boat visited Zeila and by means of vague threats extracted compensation from Abu Bekr for some arbitrary proceedings of his.³

With France and Italy ... anchored hard by, waiting their opportunity' Hunter realised that treaties with the Somalis would be an insufficient guarantee, and he wrote:

'Unless Her Majesty's Government are prepared to give the Ayyal Ahmed and the Ayyal Yunus⁴ some substantial guarantee that they will protect Berbera against all comers, those tribes, if opportunity offered, might seek French or Italian support. Hence, however distasteful such a course may be to Her Majesty's Government the only safe way of arranging for

-
1. Deschamps, Côte des Somalis, p. 43; F.O. 78/3726, Lyons to Granville, no. 399, 6 July 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3726, Cmdr. Stopford (H.M.S. Arab) to Blair, 12 May 1884, enclosed in Egerton to Granville, no. 593, 2 June 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3726, Egerton to Granville, no. 641, 21 June 1884, no. 686, 7 July 1884.
 4. Lineage groups which controlled Berbera and Bulhar respectively.

the autonomy of the Somál will be by a temporary British occupation,.... It may be very confidently stated that if Zaila, Tajourra and Berbera be temporarily occupied by the British, the prosperity of these ports will be assured for a time at least, and the task of educating the Somál in self-government may not prove impossible. It seems a pity that a port, with the advantages and conveniences which Berbera now possesses, should be handed over without qualifying conditions to a horde of savages, who would allow the fine public works to fall into ruin and decay, besides quarrelling with their neighbours and even amongst themselves for supremacy. The withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons before adequate arrangements are made for the substitution of some sort of authority will only involve the Somál in civil war, put a stop to trade, and enable any foreign nation to step in at the invitation of one or other of the disputants

The Somál will be only too glad to accept British protection, and there need be no difficulty in making those ports pay their own expenses without increased taxation of trade.¹

The man on the spot, whose views would be turned into action in any crisis, was firmly convinced of the need for a British occupation; how honest he was in advocating a merely temporary occupation, and the education of the Somalis for self-government, it is not possible to say.

Hunter wished to keep the proposed Egyptian evacuation secret so as to avoid intrigue by France or Italy, and then to announce the withdrawal suddenly, ship the Berbera garrison off to Suez, and put in their place a British agent and a force of forty police constables. In this way other powers would be forestalled, the safety of the public buildings could be guaranteed and the orderly collection of customs dues continue so as to cover the cost of the British occupation. He stated that not

1. F.O.C.P. 5057, memorandum by Hunter, 5 June 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 24 June 1884.

only were the Somalis eager to become British subjects, but that they expected Britain to administer Berbera, and he proposed to continue the Egyptian system of paying elders or akils from the lineage groups.¹ Hunter's ideas had the influential support of Sir Evelyn Baring; and Kimberley's approval was obtained by Brig.-Gen. Blair, the Aden resident who was on leave in Britain; but Kimberley wished to move cautiously and avoid precipitate action.² At the beginning of July, however, the Bombay Gazette published, in its main column, practically the whole of Hunter's confidential instructions. The Government of India later denied any responsibility for this news leak, but responsibility mattered little: the Egyptian evacuation and Britain's intentions were no longer secret and Hunter reported that the French consul at Khartoum, who had recently returned from Harar, was recommending his Government to annex that province after the Egyptian evacuation.³ With French troopships bound for the Far East continually touching at Aden,

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. c/4, 5 July 1884; F.O. 78/3726, Govt. of Bombay tel. to Kimberley, 5 July 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 8 July 1884; F.O.C.P. 5057, Hunter to Sir J. Fergusson (governor of Bombay), demi-official, 28 June 1884 and 1 July 1884, and tel., 5 July 1884, all enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 23 July 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3726, memorandum by Baring, 5 July 1884, and minute by Kimberley, 7 July 1884; Kimberley's draft reply to tel. from Govt. of Bombay, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 8 July 1884.
 3. F.O.C.P. 5057, Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 9 July 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 10 July 1884; F.O. 78/3726, Stopford to Admiralty, 12 July 1884, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 1 Aug. 1884; I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. C/5, 15 July 1884; I.O./P&S India/42, Govt. of India to Kimberley, no. 38 Sec., 13 Oct. 1884.

Hunter decided delay would be dangerous. He sent H.M.S. Arab and H.M.S. Ranger to Berbera 'for the purpose of keeping Berbera independent, if possible, and British if not'¹ and extracted from a somewhat reluctant Lord Kimberley permission to make a treaty with the Somalis if absolutely necessary.²

This was all that Hunter needed and he sailed for Berbera immediately. He collected twenty-nine elders of the Habr Awal, paid them Rs. 1,400 (a fortnight earlier Hunter had said that he would avoid money presents as far as possible as 'the very sight of a dollar seems to upset the balance of the not naturally stable Somali mind.'³), and obtained their signatures to a treaty on 14 July 1884. The preamble to the agreement stated that as Egypt was about to evacuate the Somali territory the elders of the Habr Awal 'are desirous of entering into an Agreement with the British Government for the maintenance of our independence, the preservation of order, and other good and sufficient reasons;' and they undertook that they would never 'cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory presently inhabited by them, or being under their control.'

-
1. F.O. 78/3726, Stopford to Admiralty, 12 July 1884, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 1 Aug. 1884.
 2. F.O.C.P. 5057, Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 11 July 1884, and Kimberley tel. to Hunter, 11 July 1884, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 July 1884; F.O. 78/3726, Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 12 July 1884, and Kimberley tel. to Hunter, 12 July 1884, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 12 July 1884.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. C/4, 5 July 1884.

The Habr Awal agreed to allow British ships to trade at their ports, British subjects to travel unmolested through their lands, British agents to reside in their territory, and promised that the slave trade should cease for ever. The treaty was to come into force on the day the Egyptians left Berbera.¹ This flying visit took the Egyptian governor by surprise, but his 260 troops were no match for three British ships, and he acquiesced in Hunter's unorthodox proceedings. It was only on 18 July that Britain informed the Egyptian Government of Hunter's mission, and the Berbera authorities received their first official notification of it, with instructions to assist Hunter, a week after the agreement had been concluded.²

Hunter left a warship to protect Berbera, and returned to Aden from where he pressed for an early Egyptian evacuation. He had already selected a man to be British agent at Berbera, an extraordinarily bombastic character named Langton Prendergast Walsh,³ an official in the Indian Marine Postal Service who was at the time acting as an assistant resident.

-
1. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), i, 409; F.O. 78/3726, Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 13 July 1884 and 15 July 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 15 July 1884 and 16 July 1884 respectively; I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. C/5, 15 July 1884; the copy of the treaty ratified by the Viceroy of India is in F.O. 844/1.
 2. F.O. 78/3726, governor of Berbera to Nubar Pasha (Egyptian prime minister), 15 July 1884, enclosed in Egerton to Granville, no. 740, 26 July 1884; Granville to Egerton, no. 345, 17 July 1884; Gen. Sir E. Wood (Sirdar of Egyptian Army) tel. to Hunter, 21 July 1884, enclosed in Egerton to Granville, no. 770, 5 Aug. 1884.
 3. Walsh, Langton Prendergast (later C.I.E.), 1856-1927; 1873 became assistant mail officer in India; 1884, vice-consul, Berbera; 1887, vice-consul, Zeila; 1893, assistant-political resident, Belgaum; 1897, political superintendent, Sarantravi; 1901, assistant political agent, Kathiawar; 1901-3, political agent, Sarantravi.

at Aden.¹ On 4 August Walsh was sent to Berbera as British agent and vice-consul; for his personal safety he lived on board H.M.S. Ranger in the harbour.² The Egyptians, however, stayed on at Berbera, despite Hunter's eagerness to send them off; the Egyptian Government still hesitated, and objected to giving up the coast ports before the difficult and expensive evacuation of Harar was begun. As they were in no hurry to evacuate Harar, which apparently produced an annual financial surplus, events at Berbera hung fire.³

While Hunter was forcing the pace of events at Berbera, Sir Evelyn Baring was pressing the British Government to get on with the question of Zeila, and he suggested that Dufferin should now tell the Porte that Zeila and Tadjoura were about to be evacuated, invite Turkey to take over their administration herself and

'If a reply is not received in a reasonable time, say 10 days or a fortnight, I would warn the Porte that if they did not at once take over Tadjourrah and Zeila we should be obliged to arrange for the government of those places in other ways.'

If Turkey remained inactive then Zeila should be occupied by Britain.⁴

Accordingly on 17 July Dufferin was asked to put the British proposal

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. C/5, 15 July 1884.
 2. F.O.C.P. 5243, Hunter to Baring, 16 June 1885, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury (secretary of state for foreign affairs), no. 490, 25 June 1885; L.P. Walsh, Under the Flag and Somali Coast Stories (London, n.d., ? 1932), pp. 205, 211-3.
 3. F.O. 78/3726, Egerton to Granville, no. 726, 21 July 1884, no. 740, 26 July 1884; Egerton tel. to Hunter, 9 Aug. 1884, enclosed in Egerton to Granville, no. 791, 9 Aug. 1884.
 4. F.O. 78/3726, memorandum by Baring, 5 July 1884.

to the Porte, and the inevitable delay followed.¹

Once again it was Hunter who provided a reason for acting quickly. Towards the end of July he reported that a rupture was imminent between the Egyptians and the Esa Somalis who controlled the country between Harar and Zeila; if they were disaffected they would not only refuse to supply the transport camels necessary for the evacuation of Harar, but would also probably cut up the Egyptians as they withdrew. This news seriously alarmed the Foreign Office, but Hunter had a ready remedy; he advocated the immediate reinforcement of the Egyptian garrison at Zeila with British troops from Aden, thereby guaranteeing the safety of Harar's only outlet, overawing the Somalis and ensuring the safety of the route from Harar.² Just at this time Gladstone's Cabinet were in agonies of indecision about whether or not to rescue Gordon from Khartoum. A second evacuation crisis was highly undesirable, and Turkey was told that unless she took immediate steps to occupy Zeila Britain would be forced to send troops there herself.³ At the same time, however, Hunter was told that he could occupy Zeila 'without reference home if you consider step cannot safely be deferred.'⁴ As previously,

-
1. F.O. 78/3726, Granville to Dufferin, no. 218, 17 July 1884; F.O.C.P. 5057, Dufferin tel. to Granville, no. 36, 21 July 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3726, Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 30 July 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 30 July 1884; Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 31 July 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 31 July 1884, and minute thereon by Pauncefoot (permanent under-secretary, F.O.), 31 July 1884; I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. 1/H, 30 July 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3726, Granville to Dufferin, no. 259A, 1 Aug. 1884.
 4. F.O. 78/3726, F.O. to I.O., 1 Aug. 1884; Kimberley tel. to Hunter, 1 Aug. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Aug. 1884.

in the case of Berbera, Hunter was given freedom to act if he considered it absolutely necessary. The Liberal Government were reluctant to commit themselves to action on the Somali Coast and so they left the ultimate decision to Hunter; but both the India Office and the Foreign Office were aware of his personal views, and must have realised that their permission to act if absolutely necessary was tantamount to instructing him to go ahead. Hunter had an inbred distrust of Turkish rule; believing it would ruin the port he determined to forestall the Turks and prepared half a camel battery, fifty sabres of the Aden Troop (a body of Indian horse), and 150 Bombay Native Infantry to send over to Zeila. He asked Cairo, by telegraph, to send instructions to Abu Bekr to co-operate with him, and stated that he would leave for Zeila as soon as these instructions arrived.¹

The Porte still took no action, although apparently in favour of a Turkish occupation of Zeila and Tadjoura.² On 16 August instructions for Abu Bekr to co-operate were received in Aden and two days later the first British forces landed at Zeila. By 24 August the disembarkation was complete,³ Abu Bekr proved to be obliging, and the senior British

-
1. F.O. 78/3726, Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 2 Aug. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 2 Aug. 1884; Hunter tel. to Egerton, 7 Aug. 1884, enclosed in Egerton to Granville, no. 791, 9 Aug. 1884; I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. 3/z, 4 Aug. 1884.
 2. F.O.C.P. 5057, Dufferin tel. to Granville, no. 40, 8 Aug. 1884, no. 41, 13 Aug. 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3726, Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 16 Aug. 1884, 17 Aug. 1884, 24 Aug. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O. 16 Aug. 1884, 18 Aug. 1884 and 25 Aug. 1884 respectively.

officer took over command of the Egyptian troops.¹ Zeila's safety was now guaranteed, the route from Harar could be partially protected, and, what was probably Hunter's main object, he had got there before the Turks.² Granville felt that some communication ought to be made to 'the Turk' and so, four days after the first British troops had in fact landed, the Turkish ambassador in London was informed that Britain might find it necessary 'to take steps for the maintenance of order on that part also of the coast if the Turkish Government does not promptly undertake this duty.'³

Hunter had contrived to arrange an uneasy sort of dual control in both Berbera and Zeila; he now turned his energies to getting rid of the Egyptians as quickly as possible. The governor of Harar was extremely reluctant to withdraw and exaggerated the forces and money that would be necessary to conduct a safe evacuation, and the merchants of Harar complained to the Egyptian Government that withdrawal would mean anarchy and would bring ruin to themselves.⁴ This all helped to

-
1. F.O.C.P. 5057, Hunter's instructions to O.C. Zeila force, 17 Aug. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Sept. 1884.
 2. See F.O. 78/3727, Stopford to Admiralty, 18 Aug. 1884, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O. 2 Sept. 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3726, Hunter tel. to Kimberley, 16 Aug. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 16 Aug. 1884, and minute thereon by Granville, n.d.; Granville to Musurus Pasha (Turkish ambassador), 22 Aug. 1884.
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. 1/H, 30 July 1884; F.O. 78/3726, governor of Harar to Nubar Pasha, 3 Aug. 1884, enclosed in Egerton to Granville, no. 816, 20 Aug. 1884; F.O. 78/3727, governor of Harar to Nubar Pasha, 11 Aug. 1884, merchants of Harar to Nubar Pasha, 10 Aug. 1884, both enclosed in Egerton to Granville, no. 857, 4 Sept. 1884.

prevent the Egyptian Government from reaching a decision, until on 11 August Britain insisted that Egypt should stop vacillating and issue immediate orders for Hunter to carry out the evacuation;¹ a week later the Egyptian Government did so.² Meanwhile, on 25 August, the day after the occupation of Zeila was completed, Hunter received permission to withdraw the Berbera garrison as soon as he could.³ He chartered a British India steamer and on 3 October all the Egyptian troops and officials, numbering 700 adults, sailed away from Berbera.⁴ Walsh was now left in unfettered control and Hunter drafted instructions for him. He was to bear in mind that both Berbera and Bulhar

are independent, and owned by the Somalis. Your functions are those of an Administrator in a native State. You will arrange for the collection of the customs.... You will keep the peace of the ports, exercising the powers of a first-class magistrate.⁵

The international legal status of the British occupation of Berbera was vague. At the Berlin Conference it was ruled that any power thereafter taking possession of any territory on the coasts of Africa should notify the other signatory powers of the new possession or protectorate⁶ but the British take-over at Berbera occurred in October

-
1. F.O. 78/3726, Granville to Egerton, no. 377, 11 Aug. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3726, Nubar Pasha tel. to governor of Harar, 18 Aug. 1884, enclosed in Egerton to Granville, no. 816, 20 Aug. 1884.
 3. F.O. 78/3726, Kimberley tel. to Hunter, 25 Aug. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Aug. 1884.
 4. F.O.C.P. 5243, Hunter to Baring, 16 June 1885, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 490, 25 June 1885.
 5. F.O. 78/3727, Hunter to Walsh, 27 Sept. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 942, 10 Oct. 1884.
 6. S.E. Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference 1884-1885 (London, 1942), pp. 181-3, 190.

1884, and the ratification of this part of the Berlin Act did not take place until 31 January 1885. Notification of any protectorate over Berbera was not therefore necessary. Lord Kimberley had recognised several months earlier that Berbera would become a British protectorate, and had written:

'We may find it necessary to establish British jurisdiction over that part of the coast. Our present proceedings are in fact to establish a sort of protectorate over it.'¹

When a copy of Hunter's instructions to Walsh reached London, the India Office saw fit to inform Hunter that 'Bulhar and Berbera are under British protection, and that it is important that this protectorate should be distinctly asserted.'² Baring duly relayed these instructions to Hunter, who later took this to mark the beginning of the British protectorate.³ Such were the casual beginnings of the British protectorate over the Somalis. Furthermore, as Hunter had perhaps anticipated, everyone seemed to have forgotten that the occupation of Berbera was originally intended to be merely temporary. The situation was accepted, and a quarter of a century later Baring was able to write of the British take-over in the following words:

'Ismail Pasha was not content with extending Egyptian authority to the sources of the Nile. Pashadom, with its baneful accompaniments of misrule and oppression, stretched its tentacles

-
1. F.O. 78/3726, minute by Kimberley, 20 Aug. 1884, on loose minute by Pauncefote, 16 Aug. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/3727, I.O. to F.O., 7 Nov. 1884.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Baring to Hunter, no. 75, 6 Dec. 1884, enclosed in Blair to Kimberley, no. 62/B, 17 Dec. 1884; F.O.C.P. 5243, Hunter to Baring, 16 June 1885, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 490, 25 June 1885.

to the Somali coast and inland to the fertile province of Harrar. When the parent trunk rotted, the first of the branches to fall off was Berbera. It fell at the feet of the Queen of England.¹

Egyptian troops still remained at Harar, Zeila, Sagallo and Tadjoura. The Egyptian Government appointed Redwan Pasha, who had done so much to establish Egyptian authority in the area, to undertake the unpalatable duty of withdrawing the troops from Harar. On 12 October Lieut. Peyton, who had been acting as vice-consul at Zeila since the British occupation, set out for Harar with Redwan who was to become governor and who had instructions 'solely to occupy yourself with rapidly and satisfactorily marching the troops and followers to the coast.' Peyton, who was later joined by another officer from Aden, Maj. Heath, was to help the new Emir establish a system of government and to enlist the support of the surrounding Somali and Galla clans for the new ruler. Hunter had an interview with the principal men of the Esa and Gadabursi and made them promise not to hinder the evacuation. In this respect the British occupation of Zeila achieved its object, for the Esa and Gadabursi were constrained to good behaviour by the fear of having the port closed against them.² On 4 November 1884 the Zeila and Sagallo garrisons, numbering 191 Egyptian troops, sailed from Zeila.³ Abu Bekr was retired

1. Cromer, Modern Egypt, ii, 49.

2. F.O. 78/3727, Hunter to Redwan, 30 Sept. 1884, Hunter to Peyton, 9 Oct. 1884, both enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 957, 17 Oct. 1884; Hunter to Baring, 15 Oct. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 972, 23 Oct. 1884.

3. F.O.C.P. 5243, Hunter to Baring, 16 June 1885, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 490, 25 June 1885.

on pension, though he stayed on in Zeila, and Lieut. Kingsmill, R.N., who had succeeded Peyton as acting vice-consul and agent, took charge of the civil administration. The occupation of Zeila, however, differed from that of Berbera. Berbera had been completely evacuated by Egypt, and Britain had assumed a protectorate over the port; but at Zeila the Egyptian flag continued to fly and Abu Bekr, though in retirement, continued to be the nominal governor, for Britain was only occupying the town until Turkey should relieve her of the responsibility.¹

Britain had also suggested that Turkey should relieve the Egyptians at Tadjoura, where there was a garrison of forty-six men. Britain had little interest in this place, but France was obviously intent on taking it, and at the end of September hoisted her flag at Ras Ali, the limit of French territory, only three miles from Tadjoura.² The Egyptian garrison was unpopular with the Danakil, and by September the troops were forced to shut themselves up in the fort. Hunter must have seen this as another opportunity for intervention, for he asked whether the British Government wished him to take Tadjoura in hand.³ This time, however, he was told to leave it alone, mainly on the initiative of Baring, who had never seen any objection to a French occupation of

-
1. F.O. 78/3727, Granville tel. to Baring, no. 335, 7 Nov. 1884; F.O. 78/3728, Hunter to Blair, 22 Oct. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O. 12 Nov. 1884; F.O.C.P. 5057, Hunter to Kingsmill, 11 Nov. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O. (A), 5 Dec. 1884.
 2. F.O.C.P. 5057, Baring tel. to Granville, 30 Sept. 1884.
 3. F.O.C.P. 5057, Baring tel. to Granville, no. 605, 22 Sept. 1884.

Tadjoura. Lord Kimberley, who had earlier disliked the idea of handing it to France, now agreed with Baring.¹ In October French intentions became plain. The French agent in Cairo asked Baring how Britain would react to an occupation of Tadjoura, the French flag was hoisted at Sagallo as soon as the Egyptians had left, the commandant at Obock offered the Egyptian commander at Tadjoura 2,000 dollars to remove his garrison, and the French consul at Aden announced the annexation of Gubbet Kharab.² In November the Danakil cut off the water supply of the Tadjoura garrison, stopped their supplies and forced them to evacuate by dhow to Zeila. Within a week France had annexed Tadjoura under a salute of 21 guns and hoisted the tricolor.³

The British Government tacitly acquiesced, although the India Office were slightly uneasy and asked for British rights to be reasserted over the islands of Moucha and Aibat which had been purchased by Moresby in 1840. The vice-consul at Zeila visited the islands, hoisted the Union Jack and left men there for a month to guard the flagstaffs.⁴ The

1. F.O. 78/3726, memorandum by Baring, 5 July 1884, and minute thereon by Kimberley, 7 July 1884; F.O. 78/3727, I.O. to F.O., 27 Sept. 1884.
2. F.O. 78/3727, Baring to Granville, no. 929, 5 Oct. 1884, nos. 986 & 987, 28 Oct. 1884, no. 988, 29 Oct. 1884.
3. F.O.C.P. 5057, Baring tel. to Granville, no. 730, 25 Nov. 1884, no. 734, 26 Nov. 1884; F.O. 78/3857, Hewett to Admiralty, 19 Dec. 1884, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 9 Jan. 1885; Pries, thesis op. cit., pp. 153-5.
4. F.O. 78/3727, I.O. to F.O., 7 Nov. 1884; F.O. 78/3728, Blair to vice-consul, Zeila, 24 Nov. 1884, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 18 Dec. 1884; F.O.C.P. 5057, Baring tel. to Granville, no. 751, 6 Dec. 1884; F.O.C.P. 5149, Blair to Kimberley, 7 Jan. 1885, received at F.O., 4 Feb. 1885.

island of Bab had also been technically British since 1840, but no steps were taken to reassert British rights there as it absolutely commanded the entrance to Gubbet Kharab and any such action would have given unnecessary umbrage to France.¹

Although Britain accepted the occupation of Tadjoura, Turkey was not prepared to do so and remonstrated to France against what it considered to be a violation of Turkish territory.² The remonstrances left France unmoved. Britain had avoided similar protests over the occupation of Zeila by inviting Turkey to undertake the task herself and by making it clear that she would only stay there until Turkey relieved her.³ With Berbera, however, the case had been different. Turkey notified Britain that Berbera belonged to the Sultan, and in support of this contention cited the Somali Coast Convention of 1877;⁴ but Britain refused to admit the claim and replied that as the Sultan had never ratified the convention it had never come into force. The Foreign Office, so frequently frustrated in their attempts to get the convention ratified, must have taken delight in replying: 'The Government of the Queen cannot, therefore, admit the validity of any claim founded on the terms of a Convention which, through no fault of theirs, remained incomplete.'⁵

1. F.O. 78/3857, Blair to Kimberley, 19 Dec. 1884, enclosed in L.O. to F.O., 9 Jan. 1885; F.O. 78/3858, memorandum by Hertslet, 20 Feb. 1885.
2. F.O.C.P. 5057, Wyndham tel. to Granville, no. 54, 26 Nov. 1884.
3. F.O. 78/3728, Baring to Granville, no. 1043, 17 Nov. 1884; minute by Sanderson, n.d., on Baring to Granville, no. 1051, 18 Nov. 1884.
4. F.O. 78/3727, Musurus Pasha to Granville, 8 Sept. 1884.
5. F.O. 78/3727, Granville to Musurus Pasha, 3 Oct. 1884.

The last place to be evacuated was Harar. The first detachment of more than seven hundred people left from Zeila on 14 November 1884; Redwan Pasha and the last detachment left Zeila in June 1885. Altogether 8,359 people were safely brought down from Harar and shipped off to Egypt.¹ In view of the reluctance of the Egyptians to be withdrawn, and the unsettled state of the country, the success of the evacuation was a considerable achievement on the part of Redwan and Hunter. The Emir Abdullahi was set up as ruler of Harar, and before Peyton left he organised his troops, put his government and finances into working order, and arranged treaties of friendship between the Emir and the surrounding Galla and Somali clans.² Hunter had planned to make Britain a party to these treaties, but here he was definitely at variance with the views of the Liberal Government. Baring informed him that 'The Government do not wish to establish anything in the nature of a Protectorate over the inland tribes.'³ and the Foreign Office made it clear that there had never been any intention of establishing British supremacy over the Galla and the other clans of the interior.⁴

1. F.O. 78/3728, Baring to Granville, no. 1045, 17 Nov. 1884; F.O.C.P. 5149, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 329, 25 June 1885; F.O.C.P. 5243, Hunter to Baring, 16 June 1885, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 490, 25 June 1885; F.R. Wingate, Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan (London, 1891), pp. 152-4, gives a rather romantic account.
2. F.O. 78/3728, memorandum by Hunter, 12 Dec. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 1184, 29 Dec. 1884; I.O./P&S Aden/6, Hunter to Egerton, no. 144, 18 July 1885, enclosed in Brig.-Gen. A.C.F. Hogg (Aden resident) to Lord Randolph Churchill (secretary of state for India), no. 21/1342, 22 July 1885.
3. F.O. 78/3727, Baring tel. to Hunter, 25 Sept. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 909, 25 Sept. 1884.
4. F.O. 78/3727, P.O. to I.O., 7 Oct. 1884.

In January and February 1885 the Italians, fearful of French intervention, and with British encouragement, forced the Egyptians out of Beilul and occupied Massawa,¹ although here the Egyptians stayed on and the two flags flew side by side. So, by the middle of 1885, Egypt had abandoned all her possessions south of Massawa. The resulting vacuum had been filled by Italy, France, Britain and the Emir of Harar. On the Somali Coast, Britain, urged on by Hunter, had stepped in to maintain the vital interests of Aden by establishing a protectorate over Berbera and Bulhar and occupying Zeila; but she only controlled the ports; the lands and peoples lying to the south were of no concern to the Liberal Government.

1. F.O. 78/3728, Granville to Sir J.S. Lumley (British ambassador, Rome), no. 270, 22 Dec. 1884; F.O. 78/3857, Lumley to Granville, no. 2, 2 Jan. 1885; Baring tel. to Granville, no. 48, 28 Jan. 1885; F.O. to Admiralty, 30 Jan. 1885; Fries, thesis op.cit., pp. 118-9, 160, 164-187, 190.

CHAPTER IV

A BRITISH PROTECTORATE.

Britain's primary object on the Somali Coast was to exclude other powers and in 1884 this object was secured by the occupation of Berbera and Zeila. Yet, within three years this simple occupation of two ports had become a protectorate over more than 400 miles of coastline. In November 1884 the India Office had seen fit to announce that 'Bulhar and Berbera are under British protection,....'¹ but there seemed no need to accord the status of protectorate to the rest of the Somali Coast.

When, towards the end of 1884, Hunter began to suggest that the French, from their new base at Tadjoura, were trying to get footholds on the Somali Coast in the Zeila area, he thought it sufficient to arrange simple non-cession treaties with the Gadabursi and Esa.² Similarly, east of Berbera, other powers were excluded by two treaties which he made with the elders of the Habr Toljaala and Habr Gerhajis, in Aden, on 26 December 1884 and 13 January 1885 respectively. The treaties bound

-
1. See above, p. 97.
 2. F.O.C.P. 5057, Baring tel. to Granville, no. 757, 8 Dec. 1884; F.O. 78/3728, Granville to Baring, no. 490, 8 Dec. 1884; Baring to Granville, no. 1168, 23 Dec. 1884; F.O. 78/3857, Hunter to Baring, 5 Jan. 1885, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 42, 13 Jan. 1885; Blair to Kimberley, 7 Jan. 1885, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 31 Jan. 1885; Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), i, 409.

shall never to 'cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for
 cession, save to the British Government' any part of their territory.¹
 Together with the earlier Habi Awal Treaty they covered the whole coast
 from west of Zeila to the Warsangeli boundary at Ras Kalwein; in the
 words of the India Office, this coast had been

'so far as may be, secured from alienation to a foreign Power,
 and that thence to Ras Hafoun only the Warsangeli and Mijjerteyn
 Somalis remain to be dealt with.'²

For the time being, Hunter and the Aden resident considered this
 sufficient. No other power appeared to have designs on the Warsangeli
 or Mijjerteyn and so there was no hurry to 'deal with' them.³

On the western part of the coast, however, other powers did have
 designs. Italy and France were competing for predominance in Abyssinia
 and Shoa; Italy had a lead which she wished to consolidate by taking
 possession of Harar. Under Gladstone, British relations with Italy
 were cordial whereas relations with France were embittered by the
 continued British occupation of Egypt. Thus British and Italian
 interests came increasingly closer as their antagonism towards France
 developed, and a pattern was established which was to persist beyond the

-
1. F.O. 78/3857, Blair to Govt. of Bombay, 26 Dec. 1884 and 13 Jan. 1885, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 31 Jan. 1885; Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), i, 409.
 2. F.O. 78/3857, I.O. to F.O., 31 Jan. 1885.
 3. F.O. 78/3858, Blair tel. to Kimberley, 6 Feb. 1885, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 10 Feb. 1885.

close of the nineteenth century a pattern in which Britain acted throughout north-east Africa as the rival of France and the supporter of Italy. When Italy informed Britain in March 1885 that she was going to occupy Harar¹ Granville raised no objections.²

But Italy said that Harar would be useless unless she also had control of Zeila, which was occupied by Britain. Despite its importance to Aden neither the Indian Viceroy nor the Aden resident objected to losing Zeila,³ and the Liberal Government were ready to agree to the transfer so long as the customs dues remained unaltered and the Italians did not supply firearms to the Somalis.⁴ Zeila, however, was not theirs to give away. They still insisted that they were occupying the port on behalf of, and until relieved by, Turkey. Granville therefore informed the Porte that having waited so long to be relieved of Zeila Britain would no longer be responsible should another power step in, and he let the Italians know that they would not be opposed if they landed troops at Zeila.⁵

-
1. F.O. 78/3859, Count Nigra (Italian ambassador, London) to Granville, 30 Mar. 1885; Fries, thesis, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-4.
 2. F.O. 633/7/tel. 207, Baring tel. to Granville, private, 11 Apr. 1885; F.O. 78/3859, I.O. to F.O., 8 Apr. 1885; Granville to Nigra, 18 Apr. 1885.
 3. F.O. 78/3859, Viceroy tel. to Kimberley, 23 Apr. 1885, and Blair tel. to Kimberley, 25 Apr. 1885, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 Apr. 1885.
 4. F.O. 78/3859, I.O. to F.O., 8 Apr. 1885 and 27 Apr. 1885; see also Granville to Lumley, no. 121, 22 Apr. 1885.
 5. F.O. 78/3860, draft despatch, Granville to Lumley, no. 157, 21 May 1885.

The Liberals were therefore about to hand Zeila to the Italians who would then have occupied Harar. On 9 June 1885, however, Gladstone's government resigned. The new prime minister, Lord Salisbury, also took over the Foreign Office from where he had so strenuously opposed Italy's efforts at Assab five years earlier. Salisbury began with an open mind on the question of Zeila¹ but he could not be expected to part with it as willingly as his predecessors, and other factors increased his natural reluctance to leave the town. Hunter argued strongly against relinquishing Zeila. He thought that if it were in foreign hands Aden would have no alternative source of supply if ever Berbera were closed. Also, the Somalis south of Berbera would be open to foreign influence, able to obtain firearms and able to avoid any punitive measures enforced at Berbera. He felt that whoever held Berbera must also hold Zeila.² More succinctly, Lord Randolph Churchill, the new secretary of state for India, simply declared that Zeila should pass into the hands of no foreign power but Turkey.³ In any case, the moment was hardly opportune for handing Zeila to Italy for the town had become a bone of contention with France, and Britain was protesting about French interference there.⁴ Salisbury therefore decided to hold on to Zeila and Italy was effectually

-
1. F.O. 78/3860, Salisbury to Lumley, no. 202A, 30 July 1885.
 2. F.O. 78/3862, notes by Hunter on Zeila, 26 Aug. 1885; Egerton to Salisbury, no. 807, 23 Nov. 1885.
 3. F.O. 78/3862, I.O. to F.O., 17 Dec. 1885.
 4. F.O. 78/3971, Sir J. Walsam (British minister plenipotentiary, Paris) to Pauncefoot, private, 8 Jan. 1886.

carried from Harar; she had to content herself with hauling down the Egyptian flag at Massawa and taking complete control of that port on 1 December 1885.¹

The Emir of Harar retained his independence. His rule had little effect on the outside world until April 1886 when, besides capturing some Indian and Somali police, in British service, on the Zeila-Harar caravan route, he instigated the murder of all nine Italian members of an exploration party under Count Porro, near Gildessa.² There was much agitation in Italy for revenge and an Italian warship was sent to Zeila.³ This, however, was the limit of official Italian action for the Government realised that Porro had brought about the disaster by his own carelessness.⁴ Nevertheless, the Italian Government still had designs on Harar, Shoa and Abyssinia, and it was bitterly jealous of French activity on the Somali Coast, suspecting France of aiming at Harar. In September 1886 Italy again suggested that she might occupy Zeila.⁵ The Foreign Office were prepared partially to meet her wishes.⁶ Hunter, however, still

-
1. F.O. 78/3862, Egerton tel. to Salisbury, no. 493, 6 Dec. 1885.
 2. F.O. 78/3973, Capt. J.S. King (vice-consul, Zeila) to Hunter, 21 Apr. 1886, enclosed in Baring to Earl of Rosebery (secretary of state for foreign affairs), no. 181, 1 May 1886.
 3. F.O.C.P. 5331, Lumley to Rosebery, no. 130, 30 Apr. 1886.
 4. F.O.C.P. 5331, Lumley to Rosebery, no. 179, 16 June 1886.
 5. F.O.C.P. 5399, Earl of Iddesleigh (secretary of state for foreign affairs) to Lumley, no. 251, 24 Sept. 1886.
 6. F.O. 78/3974, Viscount Cross (secretary of state for India) tel. to Viceroy (Lord Dufferin), 29 Sept. 1886, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 2 Oct. 1886.

vigorouslly opposed the idea, claiming that it would disturb the whole of Somaliland, make the British position at Berbera untenable, irritate the French and alienate the Emir of Harar.¹ Similarly, the Bombay Government were reluctant to depart from their traditional policy of excluding other powers from the Somali Coast.² As Indian opinion was so strongly opposed to the idea Italy was not encouraged to pursue it any further.

France wanted Zeila because it had more possibilities than Tadjoura and offered an easier route to Harar; but if Salisbury was not prepared to have Italy in Zeila he was most certainly not prepared to see France there. The resulting diplomatic conflict between France and Britain over Zeila and its environs dominated the history of the Somali Coast until 1888. It was a dispute for the possession of Zeila, a dispute over the boundary between the French protectorate (announced in February 1885)³ and the British sphere, a dispute of personalities between the French and British representatives on the coast. It involved Abu Bekr who supported the French until he died in December 1885; it involved the hoisting of the British and French flags in disputed territory, contradictory treaties with the same groups of Somalis, visits from warships and threats of force. The dispute grew absurdly out of

-
1. F.O. 78/3974, memorandum by Hunter, 3 Oct. 1886, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 Oct. 1886.
 2. F.O. 78/4078, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 23 Dec. 1886, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Feb. 1887.
 3. F.O. 78/3858, Waddington (French ambassador, London) to Granville, 11 Feb. 1885.

...tion and resulted in the suspension of all negotiations between Britain and France for a few months in 1887.¹ Eventually a compromise was reached. Britain accepted France on the Somali Coast. In February 1888 notes were exchanged between the two powers defining a boundary from Loyada to Gildessa.¹ It cut through the Esa Somalis, partitioning them between Britain and France, storing up trouble for the future; it gave the French an uninhabited cape, Ras Djibouti, which they developed into a thriving modern port and the capital of their protectorate; but it settled the quarrel and it left Zeila in British hands.²

The Anglo-French agreement of 1888 also included a clause relating to Harar. In January 1887 Menelik of Shoa had captured the town and put the Emir to flight;³ Count Porro was also avenged for the Italian explorer, Count Antonelli, had accompanied Menelik on the expedition.⁴ France, Britain and Italy were all anxious to ingratiate themselves with the new ruler of Harar. The French sent agents and presents of arms,

-
1. F.O. 78/4165, Waddington to Salisbury (prime minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs), 2 Feb. 1888; Salisbury to Waddington, 9 Feb. 1888; Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 726-8; Parl. Papers 1894, xvi (103), 'France No. 1 (1894)'.
 2. For a much fuller description of the Anglo-French struggle see: A.M. Brockett, 'Anglo-French Rivalry on the Somali Coast in the 1880's', to be published in Hadith 2 (Nairobi, ? 1969), ed. B.A. Ogot.
 3. F.O. 78/4077, Hogg tel. to Baring, 23 Jan. 1887, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 53, 23 Jan. 1887.
 4. F.O. 78/4077, Lumley tel. to Salisbury, no. 11, 25 Jan. 1887.

and tried to persuade the Shoans to divert Harar's trade from Zeila to their ports.¹ The British exchanged friendly letters with Menelik and planned to send a mission to him, until they learnt that he had departed; he left the town in charge of a governor whose name was destined to become famous, Ras Makonnen, father of Emperor Haile Selassie. Hunter's subordinates thought it essential to counteract French influence in Harar, and Walsh urged that the town be occupied on the first sign of a French advance in that direction. Hunter, and the British and Indian Governments, however, were prepared to leave Harar to its fate.² It was of no interest to Aden and it was felt that no harm would come, even from a French occupation. British intervention was strictly forbidden; it was not worth running any risks for the insignificant advantages of an unimportant trade in hides and coffee.³ Italy, occupied behind Massawa with hostilities against King Johannes of Abyssinia, was much more concerned by French activities. She anxiously sought details of the Anglo-French negotiations about the Somali Coast

-
1. F.O. 78/4078, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 59, 10 Feb. 1887; F.O. 78/4079, Hunter to Baring, 5 Apr. 1887, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 226, 12 Apr. 1887; F.O. 78/4080, Hunter to Baring, demi-official, 11 May 1887, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 312, 18 May 1887; F.O. 78/4166, Lieut.-Col. E.V. Stace (political agent & consul, Somali Coast) memo. to Baring, 10 Mar. 1888, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 134, 22 Mar. 1888.
 2. F.O. 78/4081, memorandum by Hunter, 2 June 1887, enclosed in F.S. Clarke (British attaché, Cairo) to Salisbury, no. 359, 13 June 1887, and minutes thereon, 28 June 1887; see also the copy of the memorandum in I.O./P&S Aden/6, enclosed in Hunter to Cross, no. 11/1117, 5 June 1887.
 3. I.O./P&S India/51, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 6 July 1887, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 158 Sec., 3 Oct. 1887; F.O. 78/4083, I.O. to F.O., 3 Nov. 1887.

to make sure that they would not give France an advantage in the race for Harar¹ and she expressed alarm at the reports that France was intriguing with Makonnen for the transfer of Harar to French protection.²

Italy's fears were justified, for France was pursuing an active commercial policy towards Harar which must have had political undertones. In the boundary dispute with Britain she had insisted that the border be moved east of Ras Djibouti to give her free access to the Harar caravan route. Then, when the boundary agreement was about to be concluded, she suggested including a clause by which each Government undertook not to take Harar for itself and to use all its efforts to prevent any third power from establishing itself there.³ This was obviously aimed at Italy and would have committed Britain to an offensive and defensive agreement with France. Lord Salisbury would not commit himself to this and so, when the notes about the Somali Coast boundary were finally exchanged, both countries undertook not to annex Harar or place it under their protection while they reserved the right to oppose any other power which might attempt to do this.⁴ This meant that France could, and Britain need not, oppose an Italian advance on Harar.

-
1. F.O. 78/4079, Salisbury to J.G. Kennedy (secretary of embassy, Rome), no. 127, 21 Apr. 1887; F.O. 78/4080, Salisbury to Kennedy, no. 152, 7 May 1887.
 2. F.O. 78/4083, C.W.M. Sealy (acting consul, Somali Coast) to Baring, 22 Nov. 1887, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 544, 30 Nov. 1887.
 3. F.O. 78/4165, loose minute, unsigned, ? by Salisbury, 5 Jan. 1888.
 4. F.O. 78/4165, Waddington to Salisbury, 2 Feb. 1888.

The Anglo-French boundary dispute had also forced Britain to make the Somali Coast a protectorate. In 1884 and 1885 Britain had marked out for herself a sphere of influence from Gubbet Kharab to Ras Kalwein, and secured it by non-cession treaties. But France had no intention of respecting these treaties, nor was she bound to recognise the sphere of influence; under the Berlin Act the powers agreed to recognise protectorates and possessions, not spheres of influence. When, therefore, early in 1885, Britain wished to warn France off the Somali Coast, she found she could only do so by claiming a protectorate. Accordingly, on 24 April 1885, the French Government was informed that a British protectorate existed from Gubbet Kharab to Ras Kalwein.¹ The Somali Coast Protectorate had come into being.

At about the same time the Hamburg press carried an announcement that German agents had made a large acquisition of territory on the Somali Coast.² It was felt that it would be wise to notify all the signatory powers of the Berlin Act of the existence of the British protectorate;³ but when the Foreign Office began looking at the British treaties they discovered the ethereal nature of their protectorate. A protectorate was later defined as:

-
- 1. P.O. 78/3859, Cranville to Lyons, no. 398, 23 Apr. 1885; Lyons to Cranville, no. 280, 24 Apr. 1885.
 - 2. P.O. 78/3859, Sir E. Malet (British ambassador, Berlin) to Cranville, no. 170 Africa, 18 Apr. 1885.
 - 3. P.O. 78/3860, P.O. to I.O., 29 May 1885.

'a country which is not within the British dominions, but as regards its foreign relations is under the exclusive control of the King, so that its government cannot hold direct communication with any other foreign power, nor a foreign power with that government.'¹

Yet by its very nature a protectorate can only be concluded as a result of a bargain: the protégés give control over their foreign relations to the protector in return for the promise of protection from external aggression. Britain's treaties with the Somalis were all one-sided bargains: the Somalis had agreed not to give their territory to any other power, but there was no mention of British protection. The only evidence that Britain had a protectorate was the India Office pronouncement that 'Bulhar and Berbera are under British protection.' Such proof was hardly likely to satisfy the powers. A Foreign Office official asked: '... what have we to show as against foreign interference. In these times of grab that such a Protectorate exists...?' and Sir Julian Pauncefoot, the permanent under-secretary and legal specialist wrote:

'The Agreements certainly do not confer on Gt. B[ritain] a "Protectorate" in the usual sense of that much tormented word....

What with the Italians at Massowah, the French at Tajourrah & Obokh, & even the Russians & Germans on the scent, the position is not quite secure.'²

H. Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas (Oxford, 1902), p. 165.

F.O. 78/3860, I.O. to F.O., 4 June 1885, minutes by F.L. Bertie (acting senior clerk, F.O.), 5 June 1885, and Pauncefoot, 3 July 1885.

The obvious solution was to obtain extra declarations from the Somalis expressly recognising British protection.¹ Hunter objected, as he thought it would only cause the Somalis to doubt Britain's right to dominate the coast on the strength of existing treaties, and he had to be overruled by the Government of India.² All this delayed the notification, while reports continued of German activity, especially on the Mijertein coast.³ Pauncefote was 'rather anxious at the delay in notifying to all the Powers our Somali Protectorate.... in view of French or German action in those parts there is no time to be lost.'⁴ A circular letter of notification to the powers was concocted that was a masterpiece of ambiguity. It announced a British protectorate whilst managing to conceal both the precise limits of the territory claimed and the fact that no treaties of protection existed. The limits of the protectorate were purposely obscured so as to enable Britain to extend them eastwards and include the Warsangeli and Mijertein when opportunity offered.⁵ This shifty expedient was rendered unnecessary by Hunter, who, rejoined by the Government of India and stimulated by some Germans cruising off the Mijertein coast, arranged protectorate treaties. The ambiguous circular was quietly laid aside.

-
1. F.O. 78/3860, F.O. to I.O., 6 Aug. 1885.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Hogg to Bombay, no. 353/1930, 27 Oct. 1885; F.O. 78/3971, Viceroy of India tel. to Kimberley, 9 Mar. 1886, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Mar. 1886.
 3. F.O.C.P. 5243, Sir John Kirk (British consul-general, Zanzibar) tel. to Salisbury, no. 19, 30 Oct. 1885.
 4. F.O. 78/3861, Pauncefote to Sanderson, 5 Nov. 1885.
 5. F.O. 78/3971, F.O. to I.O., 1 Jan. 1886; I.O. to F.O., 13 Jan. 1886.

The necessary agreements were obtained by Hunter on a treaty-making cruise in January 1886. He visited the main ports of the Habr Toljaala and Habr Gerhajis and procured representative signatures from most of the lineage groups to a supplementary treaty. The clans and their territories were granted 'the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.' In return they handed over to Britain all control of their foreign relations, for they promised 'to refrain from entering into any correspondence, Agreement or Treaty with any foreign nation or Power, except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's Government.' Protection was to impose on Britain as few burdens as possible. Hunter made it clear that it did not involve protecting the clans against their neighbours or becoming involved in their legal disputes. There was to be no British administration on this part of the coast unless the clans specifically requested it, but Britain reserved the right to restore and maintain order whenever necessary.¹ As evidence of the protectorate the British flag was to be flown at eight main Habr Toljaala and Habr Gerhajis ports, and stipendiary flag custodians were appointed.² The two treaties came into force on 1 February 1886.³

In February 1887 Karin, a Habr Toljaala port which supplied nearly a

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Hogg to Bombay, no. 353/1930, 27 Oct. 1885; F.O. 78/3971, Hogg tel. to Churchill, 29 Jan. 1886 enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 30 Jan. 1886.
 2. F.O. 78/3973, Hunter to Hogg, 1 June 1886, enclosed in Baring to Rosebery, no. 273, 8 June 1886.
 3. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), i, 409.

quarter of Aden's sheep and goats, was occupied by a few police from Berbera. The Habr Toljaala had requested this themselves. To cover the cost of the police detachment customs dues were levied at Karin and collected at Aden. Eight months later El Darad was similarly occupied, but abandoned as a failure after three months.¹

As he was in the vicinity Hunter took the opportunity of visiting Ras Koreh to include the Warsangeli in the British protectorate. On 27 January 1886 the gerad (sultan) and elders of the clan signed a treaty which not only placed them under British protection but also included clauses about the slave trade, the right to appoint British agents and assistance to shipwrecked vessels. This was necessary because the Warsangeli, unlike the other clans, had no earlier treaty with Britain. Hunter agreed to pay them 180 dollars a year if they would hoist the British flag, which they were reluctant to do at first.² This treaty extended the eastern boundary of the British protectorate from Ras Salwein to Bender Ziada, on the Mijertein border at 49° E.

A protectorate agreement with the Habr Awal was not so urgent as

-
- 1. I.O., Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures received from Bombay (hereafter: I.O./P&S Bombay), vol. 31, Administration Report for Berbera and Bulhar, 1886-7, by Hunter, 26 May 1887; F.O. 78/4527, Decennial Report to 1893, by Stace, 4 July 1893.
 - 2. F.O.C.P. 5331, Hunter to Hogg, 29 Jan. 1886, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 16 Feb. 1886; Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.) i, 409.

Britain was in actual occupation of Berbera. They were not brought under official British protection until 15 March 1886. Care was taken to include the Jibril Abokir lineage group in this treaty as the French had recently brought forward a claim to protect them.¹

This left the Esa, the Gadabursi and the Mijertein to be brought under British protection. Any fresh treaties with the Esa and Gadabursi would merely have worsened the dispute with France; protectorate agreements with these two clans would also prove embarrassing if ever Zeila reverted to Turkish control.² However, something had to be done as the two clans were taking advantage of the dispute with France and demanding a subsidy if the original non-cession treaties were to have any permanence.³ Reluctantly, the Government of India agreed to a monthly subsidy of Rs. 1,000 being distributed among the Esa, the Gadabursi and the inhabitants of Zeila.⁴ Britain never made protectorate treaties with these clans.

The Aden authorities were loath to bring the Mijertein under

-
1. Bertelslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.) 1, 409; F.O. 78/3973, Hunter to Hogg, 1 June 1886, enclosed in Baring to Rosebery, no. 273, 8 June 1886.
 2. F.O. 78/3971, Viceroy of India, tel. to Kimberley, 9 Mar. 1886, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Mar. 1886.
 3. F.O. 78/3971, memorandum by Hunter, 8 Feb. 1886, enclosed in G. Portal (acting consul-general, Cairo) to Rosebery, no. 72, 17 Feb. 1886.
 4. F.O. 78/3974, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 21 Mar. 1886, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 14 Apr. 1886, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Nov. 1886.

British protection until the activities of other powers should make it essential. A protectorate over this independently-minded clan would have involved inconvenient responsibilities, especially in the matter of shipwrecks.¹ The longstanding dispute between Sultan Osman Mahmud of the Mijertein and Yusuf Ali, ruler of Alula, had resulted in a split in November 1884. Yusuf Ali led a filibustering expedition to Obbia, five hundred miles south of Cape Guardafui, defeated the Hawiya Somalis who lived there and set himself up as the powerful sultan of Obbia. Nominally he recognised himself as being subject to the sultan of Zanzibar, but in fact he acted as though fully independent.² Whilst in Zanzibar, arranging his relationship with the sultan, Yusuf Ali had dealings with the German consul-general. Shortly thereafter agents of the German East Africa Company began visiting the area. On 11 February 1886 one of these agents set out from Aden in a buggalow. Hunter suspected he was looking for Alula, and followed in H.M.S. Kingfisher, determined to forestall the German by bringing all Mijertein territory up to Ras Hafun under British protection. When Hunter arrived he found the Mijertein unwilling to make any treaties, and he had to leave empty handed.³ They

-
1. P.O. 78/3971, Cmdr. Rainier (H.M.S. Kingfisher) to Rear-Adm. Sir F. Richards (C.-in-C., East Indies Station), 2 Feb. 1886, enclosed in Admiralty to P.O., 17 Feb. 1886.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Blair to Bombay, no. 405, 22 Nov. 1884; P.R.O., Foreign Office Papers, Series 84, vol. 1725, Kirk to Granville, no. 87, 11 Apr. 1885.
 3. P.O. 78/3971, Rainier to Richards, 16 Feb. 1886, enclosed in Admiralty to P.O., 4 Mar. 1886.

influence and the southern Mijertein were placed under Italian protection. For the next twenty years Italy did virtually nothing to develop these areas. Her interference was minimal. She did far more to develop the Benadir, which lay south of Obbia. This district, belonging to the sultan of Zanzibar, was leased to the Imperial British East Africa Company, who immediately sublet it to Italy. In November 1889 it was declared an Italian protectorate,¹ and, after being poorly administered by two commercial companies, passed under direct Italian rule in 1905.²

To return to the British sphere, although Hunter had made valid treaties of protection with the Habr Awal, Habr Toljaala, Habr Gerhajis and Warsangeli, and had subsidised the Esa and Gadabursi, the British protectorate was not immediately notified to the powers. There was no point in further aggravating France. The matter lay forgotten until May 1887, when there were rumours that Spain was about to occupy a part of the coast between Berbera and Guardafui.³ A warship was sent from Aden to investigate, and Salisbury realised that the powers should be given notice of the British protectorate under the Berlin Act.⁴ On

1. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), iii, 1125.

2. Lewis, Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 51-54; R.L. Hess,

Italian Colonialism in Somalia (Chicago, 1966), pp. 123-6; E.S.

Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland (London, 1951), pp. 17-19, 38-76.

3. F.O. 78/4080, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 159, 21 May 1887.

4. F.O. 78/4080, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 168, 28 May 1887, minute by Salisbury, n.d.

July 1887 the British protectorate, from Ras Djibouti to Bender
 Assab, was formally notified to the powers;¹ in February 1888 the
 Anglo-French agreement moved the western boundary from Ras Djibouti to
 Assab. In fact, the Spanish scare resulted in no more than an
 agreement with Italy, giving Spain coaling rights at Assab,² but it had
 incidentally forced Britain to seek international recognition for her
 Somali Coast Protectorate.

The notification announced a protectorate that included Zeila, but
 Turkey had not renounced her rights to this port. Technically it was
 a part of the Ottoman Empire that was being temporarily looked after by
 Britain. The Egyptian flag continued to fly, thirty Egyptian soldiers
 stayed on in the town, and until he died, Abu Bekr, an Egyptian official,
 was nominal governor. In fact, the town was administered by the
 British vice-consul, but as he was paid out of the revenues of the port,
 he was paid by the power to which he was accredited.³ It was an unusual
 situation, but Britain was unwilling to annoy or embarrass the sultan of
 Turkey by assuming direct control over his possession.⁴ After Abu Bekr's
 death there was no governor, but the British vice-consul continued to

-
1. F.O. 78/4081, Salisbury circular to representatives at courts of
 signatory powers of Berlin Act, 20 July 1887.
 2. F.O. 78/4083, Sir J. Savile (Lumley) tel. to Salisbury, no. 57,
 17 Dec. 1887.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Hunter to Egerton, no. 144, 18 July 1885, enclosed
 in Hogg to Churchill, no. 21/1342, 22 July 1885.
 4. F.O. 653/7/tel. 200, Baring tel. to Granville, private, 3 Apr. 1885.

exercise supreme civil and judicial authority in the town, although he had no legal right to do this. The anomalous situation was allowed to continue because there was no one to question it.¹ In 1885 Salisbury had decided not to give Zeila to Italy, and although Britain did not deny the Sultan's title, the local authorities strongly opposed any suggestion that it should be handed back to Turkey.² The longer Britain stayed there, the more distasteful the idea of retrocession became.

Although the Government of India assumed financial responsibility for Zeila as from 15 June 1885 when the evacuation of Harar was completed,³ the pretence of continued Turkish sovereignty was used as a convenient argument to persuade Egypt to make up the deficit in the Zeila accounts until October 1885.⁴ There was a further financial liability attached to possession of Zeila. In 1875 the Porte had granted the administration of Zeila to the Khedive in return for an annual tribute of £715,000 a purely nominal sum that bore no relation to the real value of the port which yielded much less. Although the Egyptians had withdrawn from Zeila in 1884, technically the town remained Turkish, and as far as Turkey was concerned it was still farmed out to Egypt; if Egypt had chosen to abandon Zeila it made no difference,

-
1. F.O. 78/3971, F.O. to Law Officers of the Crown, 26 Feb. 1886; F.O. 78/3972, Hunter to Baring, 21 Apr. 1886, enclosed in Baring to Rosebery, no. 175, 28 Apr. 1886.
 2. F.O. 78/3862, notes by Hunter on Zeila, 26 Aug. 1885.
 3. F.O. 78/3971, I.O. to F.O., 3 Feb. 1886.
 4. F.O. 78/3862, Egerton to Salisbury, no. 831, 15 Dec. 1885.

tribute was still due. Egypt, on the verge of bankruptcy, objected to paying the equivalent of £14,000 sterling a year for a port she no longer occupied. Legally, however, she had to pay; the bargain of 1875 was a contract that could not be voluntarily terminated by Egypt.¹

In 1885, while Salisbury was considering whether to give Zeila to Italy, Baring, among others, suggested that so long as she stayed in Zeila, Britain had a moral obligation to pay the tribute to Egypt. The chancellor of the exchequer was predictably reluctant to pay £14,000 a year for a comparatively worthless port,² especially as its revenue was not going to cover the cost of the occupation,³ and Baring put up a strong case for not retaining Zeila.⁴ But it will be recalled that Hunter and Churchill persuaded Salisbury not to give Zeila away. Hunter admitted that the port was not worth £14,000 a year, but he telegraphed to Baring:

Please remember that if the £15,000 difficulty cannot be got over and Zeila once passes back to Turkey, it is only a question of time for France to obtain possession of the port in the same manner as she did of Tajourra. If French are allowed across the Tajourra Gulf it will enable them to treat with the Somal to our detriment at any time and the country up to Harrar and above Berbera may be rendered hostile thereby cutting off Aden's supply of live stock and neutralising the

-
1. F.O. 78/3862, P.O. to I.O., 3 Dec. 1885.
 2. Sal. P., A/39/73, memorandum by Sanderson on Zeila tribute, 11 Sept. 1885, and minute thereon by Hicks Beach (chancellor of the exchequer), n.d.
 3. F.O. 78/3860, memorandum by Sanderson on Zeila tribute, 15 Sept. 1885; F.O. 78/3861, Egerton to Salisbury, no. 771, 28 Oct. 1885.
 4. F.O. 78/3862, memorandum by Baring on occupation of Zeila, received at P.O., 10 Dec. 1885.

benefits to be derived from our protectorate over any portion of the Somali Coast.¹

He regarded Zeila as an integral part of the British protectorate, without which the value of Berbera would be impaired. Far from leaving Zeila because of the tribute difficulty, Hunter suggested placing the town directly under the British flag in order to check French interference.²

At the India Office Lord Randolph Churchill had no scruples about payment of the tribute:

'... it is good for us to keep Zeyla; we cannot be held to be under any obligation to pay either 14000£ a year or any other sum to the Porte.... I cannot think the Govt. of India would consent to our coming away from Zeyla and I am certain that they will altogether refuse to be responsible for any pecuniary liabilities in respect of it.'

He wrote.³ In December 1885 he told the Foreign Office that the British occupation of Zeila was an arrangement made for the mutual convenience of Britain, Egypt and the Porte because of Egypt's inability to remain there; consequently, neither the British nor the Indian Government were liable to pay the tribute. The Foreign Office doubted whether Egypt or Turkey would agree that Zeila was being occupied for their 'mutual convenience' but they decided to accept Churchill's views and leave

1. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Hunter tel. to Egerton, 21 Nov. 1885 and 22 Nov. 1885, enclosed in Hogg to Churchill, no. 44/3062, 15 Dec. 1885.
 2. F.O. 78/3862, Hunter tel. to Egerton, 24 Nov. 1885, enclosed in Egerton to Salisbury, no. 810, 24 Nov. 1885.
 3. Sal. P., A/39/73, memorandum by Sanderson on Zeila tribute, 11 Sept. 1885, minute by Churchill, 20 Sept. 1885.

...ers as they were, allowing Egypt to continue paying the tribute.¹

Churchill's views lulled the conscience of the Foreign Office until it was awakened in March 1886 by Edgar Vincent, the financial adviser to the Egyptian Government. He felt that great injustice was being done to Egypt. Britain had hustled her out of Zeila, but was insisting that Egypt continue to pay Turkey £14,000 a year for the port.² The immediate reaction in the Foreign Office was an attempt to justify their position. They reminded themselves that they were only in Zeila as protectors for Egypt, and that £14,000 was an extravagant amount quite unrelated to the value of the port which Ismail Pasha must have accepted as a speculation or for some underhand purpose. Rosebery argued:

We are not occupying Zeyla for our own convenience, and the best way for Egypt to look at the matter is to consider that it is better to pay the tribute for Zeyla than to pay the tribute plus the cost of occupation.³

Sanderson was equally unsympathetic, 'the tribute must be looked upon as one of the many burdens with which Ismail Pasha saddled the country,' he wrote; in his opinion, £14,000 was as nothing compared with the money Britain was spending on Egypt.⁴

1. P.O. 78/3862, I.O. to F.O., 17 Dec. 1885, and minutes thereon by Sanderson and Pauncefote, both 18 Dec. 1885.

2. P.O. 78/3971, Vincent to Rosebery, 11 Mar. 1886.

3. P.O. 78/3971, minutes by Pauncefote and Rosebery, both 17 Mar. 1886, on above.

4. P.O. 78/3971, memorandum by Sanderson, 15 Mar. 1886.

Their initial indignation past, the Foreign Office came to see the justice of Vincent's complaint. They also realised that the anomalous position at Zeila, where Britain had no legal basis for exercising jurisdiction, might cause embarrassments with other powers. They suggested that if the Indian Government wanted to stay on at Zeila they should arrange for Turkey to transfer it directly to their control.¹ Hunter, Hogg (the Aden resident) and the Government of Bombay put up a strong case for retaining Zeila. If it was handed back to Turkey British prestige would suffer, the whole of Somaliland would be unsettled, Berbera trade would decline, Aden's supplies would be endangered, France might gain control of Zeila, and it would be a breach of faith with the Asa and Gadabursi. Hunter calculated that the whole coast would produce a surplus of £2,000 a year, and that the political advantages of having undisputed ownership of Zeila were worth another £3,000 a year. £3,000 a year represented the interest on a capital sum of £100,000, which he reckoned to be a fair amount to pay Turkey for the purchase of Zeila. The Government of Bombay suggested that Britain might contribute towards the £100,000 as Aden was becoming as important to British strategy as it was to Indian policy, but the Government of India, whilst agreeing that it was essential to retain Zeila, could not bring themselves to consider the actual cost of buying Zeila outright.²

1. F.O. 78/3973, F.O. to I.O., 2 July 1886.

2. F.O. 78/4078, I.O. to F.O., 25 Feb. 1887, enclosing memorandum by Hunter, 18 Oct. 1886; report by Hogg, 13 Oct. 1886; Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 23 Dec. 1886; Govt. of India to Cross, no. 9 Sec., 18 Jan. 1887.

Despite India's reluctance to put a price on the town, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, who was on a special mission to Constantinople, trying to arrange terms for a British withdrawal from Egypt, was instructed to sound the Porte on the idea of purchasing the sovereignty of Zeila.¹ Wolff doubted whether Turkey would agree to cede her sovereignty,² but his suggestion that Turkey should allow Britain to occupy and administer the town for twenty-five years was favourably received at the Porte.³ The negotiations had to be called off, however, when India announced that it was too hard up to bear the whole cost; the British Government certainly had no intention of contributing.⁴

The anomalous situation at Zeila was therefore perpetuated. By now Baring was questioning the morality of staying on without paying the tribute. He wrote to Lord Salisbury:-

We have decided to stay, and I presume that that decision is not based on a philanthropic wish to extend the blessings of the Indian Penal Code to the Somalis, but to prevent anyone else going there. Under the circumstances I hardly see how we can refuse to pay.⁵

Salisbury decided to put the matter to the Government of India once more, and to try to maintain the status quo at Zeila. Orders were sent to withdraw the thirty Egyptian soldiers quietly from Zeila, but to keep

-
1. F.O. 78/4079, Salisbury to Wolff, no. 14, 13 Mar. 1887.
 2. F.O. 78/4079, Wolff tel. to Salisbury, no. 33, 16 Mar. 1887.
 3. F.O. 78/4079, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 64, 12 Apr. 1887.
 4. Sal.P., A/51/170 and A/51/175, Salisbury to Wolff, private, 4 May 1887, and Salisbury tel. to Wolff, private, 11 May 1887.
 5. Sal.P., A/52/48, Baring to Salisbury, private, 21 May 1887.

the Egyptian flag flying.¹ When the French Government questioned Britain's right to impose taxes at Zeila, Salisbury replied that the British Government was the only authority in the town, and that the Egyptian flag had no political significance.² At the same time he tried to keep the Porte sweet by means of some empty formal assurances. Then, in July 1887 he notified the powers of a British protectorate that included Zeila he was careful to inform Turkey that he did not wish to prejudice the just rights of the Sultan over the coast, but that the step had been taken to prevent other nations (in other words France) from encroaching on Turkish territory.³

This must have set Turkey thinking, for it was she who somewhat abruptly disturbed the status quo. In December 1887 she told the Khedive that she wished to bring Zeila under her direct control once again.⁴ The Turkish plan was obviously against India's interests, and created considerable consternation in the Foreign Office. Salisbury hoped Baring would persuade the Khedive to reply that he did not wish to give the port up,⁵ but the Khedive was too eager to be freed from Zeila and its tribute.⁶ He eventually agreed to reply that Turkey could have Zeila but

-
1. F.O. 78/4084, Salisbury to Count d'Aubigny (French chargé d'affaires, London), 22 Oct. 1887.
 2. F.O. 78/4083, Baring to Salisbury, no. 542, 29 Nov. 1887.
 3. F.O. 78/4081, Salisbury to Sir W. White (British ambassador, Constantinople), no. 171, 20 July 1887.
 4. Sal.P., A/52/84, Baring to Salisbury, private, 18 Dec. 1887.
 5. F.O. 78/4083, minute by Sanderson on Zeila, 12 Dec. 1887; minute thereon by Salisbury, 12 Dec. 1887.
 6. F.O. 78/4083, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 273, 15 Dec. 1887.

would obviously have to consult Britain as she had been occupying the port for three years. The Egyptians hoped that they were now freed from the tribute.¹ At the same time Salisbury told his ambassador in Constantinople that he could tell the Porte that Britain had no intention of giving up Zeila.²

On 16 January 1888 the Turkish ambassador suggested to Salisbury that Turkish troops from the Yemen should take over the occupation of Zeila.³ As soon as Italy heard of this, she proposed that she should occupy Zeila, and undertook to settle Turkey's claims.⁴ Salisbury had to answer Turkey and Italy one way or another. Baring could see little point in retaining Zeila;⁵ Sir James Fergusson, Salisbury's parliamentary under-secretary and an ex-governor of Bombay, could not understand Baring's indifference and was all for keeping the port;⁶ the Government of India were reluctant to leave Zeila but even more reluctant to pay; rather than purchase Zeila solely for India's expense, they would have preferred to let Turkey take over.⁷ In the midst of all this, the

-
1. F.O. 78/4083, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 284, 18 Dec. 1887.
 2. F.O. 78/4083, Salisbury tel. to White, no. 139, 14 Dec. 1887.
 3. F.O. 78/4165, Salisbury to White, no. 12, 16 Jan. 1888.
 4. Sal.P., A/76/98, Salisbury to White, private, 8 Feb. 1888.
 5. Sal.P., A/52/84, Baring to Salisbury, private, 18 Dec. 1887.
 6. Sal.P., E/Fergusson, Sir James Fergusson (parliamentary under-secretary, F.O.) to Salisbury, private, 14 Jan. 1888.
 7. F.O. 78/4165, Viceroy of India (Lord Dufferin) tel. to Cross, 29 Dec. 1887, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 2 Jan. 1888, and I.O./F&S India/52, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 18 Sec., 31 Jan. 1888.

boundary negotiations with the French were coming to a conclusion, and Salisbury was trying to withstand their final demands. 'The Somali coast has become the nightmare of the Foreign Office.' he wrote to Baring,

'The covetousness of the whole civilized world seems to centre upon Zeyla. The French keep trying to edge their frontier eastward; the Turks are demanding to be allowed to occupy Zeyla again with their troops; and the Italians are entreating us, if we do not mean to evacuate it, to let them step in Meantime, it is impossible to ascertain the precise nature of the English interests - Hunter, Gibbs,¹ yourself, and the Indian Government all have different theories on the subject; and unassisted contemplation will do very little for us. In my eyes it seems to be a coast without harbours, trade, produce, or strategic advantage. But as everybody else is fighting for it, I suppose we are bound to think it valuable.'²

Accordingly Salisbury made up his mind to stay in Zeila. 'On the whole we thought it more convenient to continue the occupation ourselves - though its use to us is not very patent.' he wrote to Sir William White in Constantinople.³ When the Turkish ambassador renewed his proposal at the end of February, Salisbury brushed it aside, saying that it was not an opportune moment to discuss it.⁴

-
1. Presumably, H.H. Gibbs, later Baron Aldenham; banker; past governor of Bank of England; prominent City of London Conservative; founder of St. James' Gazette.
 2. F.O. 633/7/97, Salisbury to Baring, private, 20 Jan. 1888; quoted in G. Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury (London), iv(1932), 92.
 3. Sal.P. A/76/98, Salisbury to White, private, 6 Feb. 1888.
 4. F.O. 78/4165, Salisbury to White, no. 62A, 27 Feb. 1888.

occupier and that the former may reasonably look to the latter for the protection of his financial and political interests.¹

Salisbury saw the force of Baring's arguments. As the Turkish Government was in financial difficulties he thought it might be a favourable opportunity to reopen negotiations for purchasing the ownership of Zeila.² The Government of India were prepared to contribute £50,000³ and the Treasury were willing to ask parliament for an equivalent amount.⁴ It was fairly certain, however, that the Sultan would indignantly refuse any offer under £200,000.⁵ As there was no possibility of raising such a large amount, the matter was once again allowed to drop.

The Egyptian Government persistently appealed to Baring's sense of justice. Baring suggested, not very hopefully, that the chancellor of the exchequer might agree to give Egypt a grant of £14,000 a year to be devoted to English education in Egypt. This would have partially

-
1. F.O. 78/4261, Baring to Salisbury, no. 336, 30 Oct. 1888; see also, Sal.P., A/53/59, Baring to Salisbury, private, 29 Oct. 1888.
 2. F.O. 78/4261, F.O. to I.O., 22 Nov. 1888.
 3. F.O. 78/4261, Viceroy of India tel. to Cross, 24 July 1889, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 29 Aug. 1889.
 4. F.O. 78/4261, Treasury to F.O., 25 Oct. 1889.
 5. F.O. 78/4261, A. Milner (chancellor of the exchequer's private secretary), to Sanderson, 29 Oct. 1889; F.O. to Treasury, 29 Oct. 1889; P.R.O., Foreign Office Papers, Series 800, vol. 1, Lord Sanderson's private papers, vol. 1, loose minute by Sanderson, 3 Sept. 1889, and minute thereon by Salisbury, n.d.

located the Egyptian ministers, as well as counteracting the influence of French education in the country.¹ This proposal, which was hardly likely to succeed, was rendered unnecessary by the Egyptian Government. They took courage and defied the Sultan, refusing to pay the Zeila tribute in 1889 and 1890.² Eventually, in December 1890, agreement was reached between Turkey and Egypt, whereby in return for certain concessions, including a guarantee to pay the general Egyptian tribute to Turkey for sixty years, Turkey agreed to exact the Zeila tribute no longer.³ Thus Egypt was freed from the unjust burden of paying tribute for a place she did not possess. It is not one of the more creditable episodes in British imperial history that the British and Indian Governments, having virtually ejected Egypt from Zeila, failed to relieve her of the tribute and kept the profits of the port for themselves.

Having excused Egypt from paying the Zeila tribute, Turkey never asked Britain for it. Had she done so, she would have been met with a refusal.⁴ Zeila had become, de facto, part of the Somali Coast Protectorate. Turkey had missed her chance in the summer of 1884 when

F.O. 78/4261, Baring to Salisbury, no. 361, 14 Nov. 1889; F.O. 653/913, Baring to C.J. Goschen (chancellor of the exchequer), private, 3 Dec. 1889.

F.O. 78/4324, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 1, 1 Jan. 1890;

F.O.C.P. 6180, memorandum by Clarke, 19 Mar. 1891.

F.O.C.P. 6180, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 135, 17 Dec. 1890; Cromer, Modern Egypt, ii, 54.

See: I.O./P&S to India/20, minute of I.O. Political Committee, 28 Feb. 1890.

Britain invited her to re-occupy Zeila and she failed to respond.¹ When she tried to accept that invitation, three and a half years later, Britain found that Zeila could not be detached from Berbera and the rest of the Somali Coast. Britain's title to Zeila stemmed from Selisbury's refusal to hand it back to Turkey in 1888. He acted on the principle that possession is nine points of the law. Turkey could hardly protest; it was just what France had done at Tadjoura and Italy at Massawa.

The coast from Bulhar eastwards was brought under British protection by a series of treaties with the Somali inhabitants who, confronted with warships from the great fortress of Aden, had little choice but to sell their signatures. The Zeila district was incorporated in the protectorate by appropriation from Turkey against her will. By comparison with the activities of other European powers in Africa, Britain's actions were not unusual; but they were nonetheless taken with a haughty disregard for the rights of others. Not only was the acquisition of the protectorate unorthodox, the exercise of jurisdiction there was equally irregular.

Protection simply gave the protector control over the foreign relations of the protégés, but as Berbera and Bulhar were vital to Aden's

1. See above, pp. 93-94.

plies, and as they and Zeila had a number of buildings and port facilities, a measure of European supervision was thought to be necessary. Consequently a simple administration developed, involving control over the internal affairs of the ports and jurisdiction over the inhabitants. This exercise of internal sovereignty and jurisdiction had to have some legal basis. In other British protectorates recourse was had to the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts. These Acts, passed from 1843 onwards and consolidated in 1890, were originally intended to give the Crown the power of jurisdiction outside the realm over its own subjects who resided in places where there was no ruling authority capable of exercising such jurisdiction. In the late nineteenth century, however, orders in council were issued, under these Acts, giving the Crown the right of jurisdiction and government over the inhabitants of British protectorates and over the subjects of other nations in those protectorates. Thus in 1889 and 1892 the African Orders in Council declared these powers to exist in most of the British African protectorates, though not on the Somali Coast.¹ The 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act had specifically stated that jurisdiction meant power and once such an order was in force there was little difference between a protectorate and a possession or colony, except that, in a protectorate, although the Crown had the right to exercise control over

1. Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction..., pp. 175-6, 183, 187; P.R.O., Colonial Office Papers, Series S79, vol. 34, 'Memorandum as to the Jurisdiction and Administrative Powers of a European State holding Protectorates in Africa', Feb. 1891.

local affairs, it did not necessarily choose to do so.

An order in council should therefore have been issued in 1884, giving powers of jurisdiction on the Somali Coast. At this time, however, there was little precedent for such action and the Foreign Office felt that in such a 'nondescript' territory it was unnecessary.¹ Three years later Pauncefote realised that this argument was quite unsound,² and an order in council was drafted, providing for the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction within the protectorate.³ Considering that it took thirteen months to draft, the order was not very complicated; it simply stated that an earlier order, the Persian Coasts and Islands Order in Council 1886, should apply in the Somali Coast Protectorate. The Somali Order in Council was approved by the Queen in Council on 13 December 1889⁴ but it was not to come into operation until the foreign secretary should so decide.

In drafting the order no advice was asked of the local authorities. The finished article was simply sent to Lieut.-Col. Stace⁵ (Hunter's

-
1. F.O. 78/3727, I.O. to F.O., 25 Oct. 1884 and unsigned minute thereon, n.d.
 2. F.O. 78/4083, Pauncefote minute to Sanderson, 18 Dec. 1887.
 3. F.O. 78/4410, F.O. to Law Officers of Crown, 23 Apr. 1889.
 4. See copy in F.O. 78/4410; Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), i, 410.
 5. Stace, Edward Vincent, C.B., Lieut.-Col.; 1862, joined Indian Army; 1871, Bombay revenue survey dept.; 1873, assistant political resident, Aden; 1875, assistant political agent, Kathiawar; 1880, 2nd assistant resident, Aden; 1881, assistant political agent, Kathiawar; 1885, joint administrator, Rajpipla; 1887, 1st assistant resident, Aden and political agent, Somali Coast; 1893, political agent, Cutch; 1899 retired; died 1903.

...as consul and political agent) to implement.¹ Consequently, proved to be peculiarly inappropriate. It referred to cases which could not be dealt with by native courts, but there were no native courts. It presupposed a defined kingdom and established rule, not the independent, individualistic political system of the Somalis. It failed to give the power of jurisdiction over foreigners,² and over Somalis from the far interior, such as Ogaden and Dolbonants, who visited the ports.³ It prescribed the death penalty for murder but the Somalis preferred their system of blood-money to deal with murders which were committed daily in our protectorate,.....⁴ Jopp, the Aden resident, and Stace, were very reluctant to bring the order into force, they claimed it would paralyse the administration by severely curtailing the jurisdiction which they already exercised.⁵ The Indian Government were prepared to bring the order into operation as an experiment,⁶ but Salisbury was not willing to proceed in the teeth of the opinion of the local authorities, and the order was laid aside without being brought into effect.⁷

-
1. F.O. 78/4410, F.O. to I.O., 7 Feb. 1890.
 2. F.O. 78/4410, Stace to Bombay, no. 155/1179, 5 May 1890, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 26 Sept. 1890.
 3. F.O. 78/4410, Brig.-Gen. J. Jopp (Aden resident) to Bombay, no. 306/2690, 15 Sept. 1890, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 7 Mar. 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4410, Jopp to Bombay, no. 21/138, 18 Jan. 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 30 Mar. 1891.
 5. Idem.
 6. F.O. 78/4410, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 150 Ext., 31 Dec. 1890.
 7. F.O. 78/4410, F.O. to I.O., 18 Apr. 1891.

The men on the spot continued to exercise their illegally assumed jurisdiction according to the Indian Penal Code. In early 1893 a case, involving a particularly brutal murder, which seemed clearly to call for capital punishment. Stace was not prepared to take the responsibility of condemning the man to death without express authority.¹ It was an inconsistent but natural reluctance. The Government of India decided to give executive directions, by letter, ordering the local officials to try all offences and impose any punishment recognised by the Indian Penal Code.² This still did not give a legal basis to the exercise of jurisdiction, and the India Office disliked it, except as a merely temporary expedient. They were equally averse to annexing the protectorate and bringing it under the direct jurisdiction of the Crown because of the moral obligation this would entail to administer the protectorate properly. They recommended that another order in council should be drawn up.³ This time the proposals for the order emanated from the local authorities, but by the time they reached London the possibility of transferring the protectorate from the India to the British Government was already being discussed. Action on the order was therefore postponed. During the whole fourteen year period when

-
1. F.O. 78/4688, Stace to Jopp, 4 Jan. 1893, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 26 Feb. 1895.
 2. F.O. 78/4688, Govt. of India to H.H. Fowler (secretary of state for India), no. 193 Ext., 24 Oct. 1894, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 26 Feb. 1895.
 3. F.O. 78/4688, I.O. to F.O., 26 Feb. 1895; I.O./F&S to India/21, Fowler to Govt. of India, no. 28 Pol., 4 Apr. 1895.

India administered the Somali Coast Protectorate there was no legal basis to the exercise of internal sovereignty and jurisdiction. It was in keeping with the makeshift, ad hoc character of the Indian Protectorate. India was only interested in supplies, not in the necessities of government.

CHAPTER V

AN INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.

Long before 1884 the Somali Coast had been a concern of both the Indian and Foreign Offices. The India Office and the Government of India were interested in the area because of its proximity to Aden, an Indian possession. The Foreign Office dealt with the coast because it was under Turco-Egyptian rule. During the Egyptian evacuation, Baring, the Foreign Office representative in Cairo, had become much more closely involved in the area, but he had no desire to become responsible for its administration once the Egyptians had left.¹ Administering African protectorates was not yet a Foreign Office speciality (over the next few years they were to try, unsuccessfully, to get the Oil Rivers Protectorate off their hands).² It seemed natural to Baring, the Foreign Office and the India Office that all questions connected with Somaliland should be in the hands of the Indian Government.³ Lord Ripon, the Viceroy, did not see it this way. Suspecting that the Somali Coast would prove to be a financial liability, he surprised the India Office by stating that the

-
1. F.O. 78/3727, Baring to Granville, no. 951, 16 Oct. 1884.
 2. R. Robinson and J. Callaghan, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961), pp. 184-8.
 3. I.O., Political and Secret Department Memorandum (hereafter P&S Dept. Memo.), no. B.51a, 'Proposed transfer of Aden and Somali Coast to Imperial Government' (1890), Kimberley tel. to Viceroy of India (Lord Ripon), 7 Nov. 1884.

Government of India should have nothing to do with it.¹ The India Office decided to bide their time. In December 1884 they told Ripon's successor, Lord Dufferin, that India should manage the coast. Dufferin agreed to do so, but at Britain's expense. The naivety of this was pointed out to him; the Treasury would never have agreed to subsidise an occupation that was so patently in the interests of Aden and India. Reluctantly, Dufferin's Government agreed to take on the Somali Coast and the financial responsibility.²

The protectorate that no one wanted to pay for, officially devolved on India in February 1885.³ The consul and his assistants were to be directly subordinate to the Government of India, but their supervision was entrusted to Bombay. In practice, the coast was administered as a dependency of Aden, which came under Bombay, but all important matters were referred to Calcutta. The India Office drafted instructions for the Government of Bombay. The aim was to make it financially self-supporting. Primarily it was to be a coast protectorate.

'The primary objects of Government are to secure for Aden a supply market, to check the traffic in slaves, and to exclude the interference of foreign powers. It is consistent with these objects, and with the protectorate which the Indian Government has assumed to interfere as little as possible with

-
1. I.O./P&S Dept. Memo./B.51a, Ripon tel. to Kimberley, 8 Nov. 1884.
 2. Ibid., Kimberley tel. to Dufferin, 25 Dec. 1884; Govt. of India tel. to Kimberley, 14 Jan. 1885; Kimberley tel. to Govt. of India, 21 Jan. 1885; Dufferin tel. to Kimberley, 22 Jan. 1885.
 3. I.O./P&S to India/11, Kimberley to Govt. of India, no. 7 Sec., 20 Feb. 1885.

the customs of the people, and to leave them to administer their own internal affairs.¹

First and foremost, other powers were to be excluded; beyond that the protectorate was to be as limited and as cheap as possible.

Administrative rank was given to the consul for the Somali Coast and his vice-consul at Berbera, when they were appointed political agents in late 1885.² Munter was political agent until May 1887, when he was temporarily succeeded by Major Sealy,³ and then by Stace. The political agent combined the post with that of first assistant resident at Aden, where he lived and worked; he could only pay occasional visits to the Somali Coast. Consequently, the men on the spot were left very much to their own devices. There was no telegraphic communication with Aden, but in an emergency a ship could be sent, if available, or a message could go via Perim, which was connected to Aden by cable. The local officers were a fairly motley collection. At Berbera and Bulhar, Walsh, the ex-mail officer, was vice-consul and political agent until December 1887, when he was transferred to Zeila. He stayed there until October 1892. In April 1885 David Morrison was appointed Walsh's deputy, and

-
1. I.O./P&S Dept. Memo./B.51a, Kimberley to Govt. of Bombay, 25 Feb. 1885.
 2. Annual Report on the Administration of the Bombay Presidency 1892-3, p. 184.
 3. Sealy, Charles William Henry, later Lieut.-Col; 1866; joined Indian Army; 1875, 2nd assistant resident, Aden; 1889, political posts in Bombay presidency; 1893, 1st assistant resident, Aden, consul and political agent, Somali Coast; 1896-1902, political posts in Bombay presidency; died ?1921; author and translator of works on Arab tribes around Aden.

he administered Bulhar until his death in 1892. Morrison had previously served as a sergeant in a Scottish regiment, a seaman and a clerk. In the first six and a half years of British control no less than seventeen different officers administered Zeila.¹ The first vice-consul was Peyton, an army lieutenant. He was succeeded by Kingsmill, a naval lieutenant, and then by King, an Indian Army captain. After King's departure Zeila was in charge of various army officers until Walsh took over as the first political agent at the end of 1867. These were the amateurs who hammered out a rough and ready shoestring administration. Principles of British administration in Africa had yet to be worked out. As much as they knew of them, they followed Indian methods; when in doubt, they improvised.² Hunter, at least, saw advantages in the new regime, despite their lack of qualifications. In his first administration report he wrote:

'Perhaps, the change from a venal Pasha or Bey to the upright British official has impaired the fortunes of the unscrupulous, but the community in general have profited and admit the beneficial results of our administration.'³

It was a small scale administration. By 1897 there were still only three European officers on the coast, employing four clerks.⁴ They

-
1. F.O. 78/4403, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1890-91, by Stace, 23 June 1891.
 2. For a colourful account see: Walsh, Under the Flag..., especially pp. 220-274.
 3. I.O./P&S Bombay/30, Berbera and Bulhar Administration Report, 1885-6, by Hunter, 11 May 1886.
 4. I.O./P&S India/100, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 7556, 9 Dec. 1897, enclosed in Govt. of India to Lord G. Hamilton (secretary of state for India), no. 19 Sec., 3 Feb. 1898.

administered justice according to the Indian Penal Code; they tried to keep peace in the towns and trade flowing from the interior; they collected customs dues. The subordinate staff was also small, and was mostly the same as it had been under the Egyptians; there were men to look after the harbours and the Berbera lighthouse, sweepers and waterworks men. In Zeila an old slave stayed on as treasurer and cashier.¹ The cadis continued to deal with all civil cases until 1886 when the vice-consuls also began to hear such suits.²

The Bombay Government were reluctant to commit troops to the coast³ and so Walsh had to keep order in Berbera with his force of fifty-five Indian, Arab and Somali police.⁴ It was no easy task, for at the height of the trading season Berbera was sometimes crowded with 30,000 Somalis of many different clans.⁵ Spears and daggers were freely carried and fights were common.⁶ If there was any trouble Hunter recommended a little firmness, and perhaps a shot or two to prevent any further tumult. He wanted to see perfect security for life and property so that trade

-
1. F.O. 78/3727, Hunter to Baring, 15 Oct. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 983, 27 Oct. 1884.
 2. F.O. 78/4527, Decennial Report to 1893, by Stace, 4 July 1893.
 3. F.O.C.P. 5149, Hunter to Blair, 17 Jan. 1885.
 4. I.O./P&S Bombay/30, Berbera and Bulhar Administration Report, 1885-6, by Hunter, 11 May 1886; Walsh, Under the Flag..., pp. 213, 223, gives the number as 100, but his figures and his memory must be treated with caution.
 5. F.O. 78/4403, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1890-91, by Stace, 23 June 1891.
 6. Walsh, Under the Flag..., p. 238.

could be attracted to the port.¹ Zeila, with its smaller population, had forty-nine police and a detachment of seventy-five Native Infantry, quartered there to ensure the safe evacuation of Harar.² Their value was proved in February 1885 when the police taken over from the Egyptians mutinied. Extra police were later obtained from India.³ In March 1885 Berbera was the scene of a disturbance allegedly instigated by emissaries of Osman Digna. The police opened fire and several people were killed. To prevent the situation deteriorating the Aden resident sent 100 Native Infantry to the town.⁴ Thereafter there was always a military garrison in both Berbera and Zeila, totalling about 130 men. The attempt to control the coast without using troops had not lasted long, but at least their presence made the towns more peaceful.⁵

The local administration had to be financed from locally raised revenue; the Government of India was in no position to supply grants-in-aid. Customs duty was the chief source of revenue, and the Aden authorities were at long last able to settle the rates to their liking: a 5% duty was levied on imports and 1% on exports. In the interests of Aden, livestock was exported duty-free. Customs dues provided between

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. 11/B, 9 Aug. 1884.
 2. I.O./P&S Bombay/30, Zeila Administration Report, 1885-6, by Hunter, 14 May 1886.
 3. F.O. 78/3858, Baring to Granville, no. 184, 26 Feb. 1885.
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Blair to Govt. of Bombay, no. 92/531, 16 Mar. 1885.
 5. F.O. 78/3860, C.-in-C. East Indies to Admiralty, 15 June 1885, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 1 July 1885.

and 95% of the total revenue, but the sums involved were not large. The table below gives the figures for the years 1886-7 and 1896-7¹:

	1886-7		1896-7	
	Rs.	£	Rs.	£
Berbera/Bulhar Revenue.	96,289	6,419	1,70,618	11,575
Zeils Revenue.	38,100	2,540	1,48,162	9,877
Total Protectorate Revenue.	1,34,408	8,961	3,18,943	21,263

Court fines produced a limited amount of revenue and after 1895 shipping dues were levied at Berbera to pay for the harbour amenities.²

Revenue, being so largely derived from customs dues, was strictly related to the volume of trade which fluctuated considerably as it was affected by events in Ethiopia, clan warfare on the trade routes, cattle disease, cholera and drought. The new administration tried to foster commerce, not by developing new products or markets but by abolishing the many Egyptian imposts at the ports. Livestock remained the leading export; there were believed to be inexhaustible supplies of sheep and

-
1. F.O. 78/4527, Decennial Report to 1893, by Stace, 4 July 1893; I.O./P&S India/100, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 7556, 9 Dec. 1897, enclosed in Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 19 Sec., 3 Feb. 1898.
 2. F.O. 78/4978, Lt.-Col. J. Hayes Sadler (political agent and consul, Somali Coast) to Brig.-Gen. C.A. Cunningham (Aden resident), no. 394, 25 May 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 26 Apr. 1898.

its in the interior¹ and the number exported did slowly increase. An average of 70,000 head, mainly sheep and goats, was exported annually.² Caravans from the interior also brought hides and skins (especially in years of drought or disease), gums and feathers, while ivory and Harar coffee were taken to Zeila.³ The chief import continued to be cloth, from America and Bombay, and lesser items were Italian glass beads, rice, dates and tobacco.⁴ The statistics show that the protectorate enjoyed a favourable balance of trade and, as the revenue figures quoted above show, there was a steady increase in the total volume of trade: in 1886-8 it was worth Rs.40,72,660 (£271,511)⁵ and by 1896-7 it had risen to Rs.1,26,76,009 (£845,067).⁶ It is interesting to note that in 1894 the total trade of the British Central Africa Protectorate was valued at only £35,000 and that in 1892 the trade of the Imperial British Africa Company territories was only worth £194,000.⁷

-
1. F.O. 78/4261, memorandum by Durand, 11 Mar. 1888, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 July 1888.
 2. F.O. 78/4527, Decennial Report to 1893, by Stace, 4 July 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/3957, Hunter to Iddesleigh, 3 Nov. 1886, enclosing report on Aden export trade; I.O./P&S Aden/6, memorandum by Hunter, 9 Jan. 1885, enclosed in Blair to Kimberley, no. 3/69, 14 Jan. 1885.
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/6, memorandum by Hunter, 9 Jan. 1885, enclosed in Blair to Kimberley, no. 3/69, 14 Jan. 1885; F.O. 78/3957, Sealy to Iddesleigh, 13 Sept. 1886, enclosing Aden Trade Report.
 5. I.O./P&S Bombay/31, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1886-7, by Hunter, 26 May 1887.
 6. F.O. 78/4978, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1896-7, by Cunningham, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, 28 June 1898.
 7. F.O. 78/4690, Lt.-Col. W.B. Ferris (political agent & consul, Somali Coast) to Lord Cromer (Sir Evelyn Baring), 30 Oct. 1895, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 136, 8 Nov. 1895; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 310, footnote 2.

livestock, which accounted for one sixth of the total exports, passed mainly through Berbera, Bulhar and the Habr Toljale ports, and until 1894-5 the trade of Berbera and Bulhar always exceeded, and sometimes doubled, that of Zeila. Thereafter, for the remaining years of Indian rule, the position was reversed and Zeila experienced some of its most prosperous years. This was largely due to Menelik who consolidated his hold over Abyssinia and diverted its trade to Zeila because he was at loggerheads with the Italians at Massawa. France set out to capture this rich trade which she eventually did by building a railway from Djibouti, but trade was slow to leave its established route and the railway had many early troubles so that the decline of Zeila was gradual. It was not until the railway reached Direedawa, railhead for Harar, in 1903, that Zeila seriously began to lose trade. There had been ample time in which to improve Zeila to keep it competitive but money for development was given sparingly and reluctantly. The Indian Government was unwilling to make the financial sacrifice of putting it on a par with Djibouti and making it a free port.¹ They could not afford to spend or lose money on the Somali Coast; by trying to run a protectorate there they were living beyond their means and as a result Zeila, outclassed by Djibouti, lost the reason for its existence.

Financial stringency hampered the development of the whole protectorate.

1. F.O. 78/4602, Govt. of India to Fowler, no. 47 Sec., 21 Mar. 1894, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 26 Apr. 1894.

At the beginning the India Office had decreed that local receipts were to cover the full cost of local administration.¹ The Somali Coast was to be self-supporting; the Indian tax-payer was not to be burdened with the cost of an African protectorate. Expenditure could not exceed local revenue.² It was anticipated, however, that the customs dues would be sufficiently large to provide a surplus even after paying for the cost of administration; in Berbera the surplus was to be paid to the Nabr Awal Ayal Ahmed who had long profited from the ownership of the port.³ These forecasts were correct, for the revenue at both Berbera and Zeila exceeded the expenditure. The table below shows the expenditure figures for the years 1886-7 and 1896-7.⁴

	1886-7		1896-7	
	Rs.	£	Rs.	£
Berbera/Bulhar Expenditure.	65,956	4,397	1,12,764	7,518
Zeila Expenditure.	38,834	2,589	40,091	2,673
Public Works Dept. Expenditure.	Nil.	Nil.	42,964	2,864
Total Protectorate Expenditure.	1,04,790	6,986	1,95,819	13,055

1. I.O./P&S Dept.Memo./B.51a, Kimberley to Govt. of Bombay, 25 Feb.1885.
2. India Office Library, Bombay Political Consultations (hereafter B.P.C.) 1890, p. 760, summary of Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1889-90.
3. I.O./P&S Aden/5, Hunter to Kimberley, no. 9/B, 6 Aug. 1884; F.O. 78/3727, memorandum by Hunter, 27 Sept. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 942, 10 Oct. 1884.

this surplus was not reflected in the accounts. The Government of India insisted on charging the protectorate with the cost of the military garrisons at the coastal towns and with half the annual cost of the Royal Indian Marine ship stationed at Aden. This added to the annual expenditure an average of Rs.54,642 for the military charges and Rs.61,546 for the marine charges.¹ The addition of these heavy charges produced a book deficit in the annual accounts until 1894-5, after which year the revenue was sufficient to produce a surplus even after recovering the military and marine charges. The practice of including these charges in the accounts arose because the Government of India, unwilling to make up the Zeila tribute to Egypt, wished to show that they were incurring a loss on the Somali Coast.² In fact the troops came from Aden, and neither the Aden garrison nor the Indian Army were increased by a single man to supply the Somali Coast. Nor was any increase made in the Royal Indian Marine. Nevertheless, it suited the Government of India to 'manipulate'³ the accounts to show that the Somali Coast was a financial liability.

-
4. P.O. 78/4527, Decennial Report to 1893, by Stace, 4 July 1893; I.O./P&S India/100, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 7556, 9 Dec. 1897, enclosed in Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 19 Sec., 3 Feb. 1898, and statistics attached to this letter in the I.O. minutes.
 1. I.O./P&S India/54, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 137 Sec., 11 Aug. 1888; I.O./P&S India/100, Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 19 Sec., 3 Feb. 1898.
 2. Ibid., Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 19 Sec., 3 Feb. 1898, minute by Sir W. Lee Warner (political and secret secretary, I.O., late secretary to Govt. of Bombay), ? 8 Mar. 1898.
 3. Lee Warner's word; see minute cited in previous footnote.

The Aden authorities claimed that the practice was unreasonable, because this apparent annual deficit was used as an excuse to prohibit expenditure on necessary development.¹ When the Indian Government handed the protectorate over to the British Government in 1898, they claimed that over fourteen years it had cost them Rs.10,75,000 or £71,667; but over the same fourteen years they debited to the protectorate Rs.16,26,640 or £108,443, for military and marine charges which would have arisen even if India had had no concern in the protectorate at all.² It could be argued that the Government of India exploited the Somali Coast to offset the cost of Aden; that Somali Coast customs dues contributed more than Rs.5,51,640 (£36,774) to Indian revenues.

The Government of India possessed 'only a secondary interest in the development of the Somali Coast,' their primary interest being to supply Aden as cheaply as possible.³ Development projects were therefore only sanctioned when absolutely necessary. The Egyptians had left a number of buildings at the ports, but without money for repairs they deteriorated, leaving the governor of Bombay to remark in 1894:

-
1. See F.O. 78/4260, journal of Hogg's visit to the coast, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1889; I.O./P&S India/92, note by Ferris, 6 Oct. 1896, enclosed in Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 73 Sec., 1 June 1897; I.O./P&S India/98, Viceroy tel. to Hamilton, 17 Dec. 1897, and minute thereon by Lee Warner, n.d.
 2. I.O./P&S India/100, Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 19 Sec., 3 Feb. 1898.
 3. F.O. 78/4325, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 9 Aug. 1890, and Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 2 Oct. 1890, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Nov. 1890.

is a source of regret to His Excellency the Governor that the miserable accommodation, which he witnessed on the spot in 1890, is not yet replaced by more comfortable accommodations for the officers of His Government, who in confidence and discomfort uphold British influence and administer British justice on the coast.¹

and when in the early 1890's, the young Curzon (later Lord Curzon of Kedleston) visited Zeila he described the political agent's house as 'unfit for a decent dog'.² Nevertheless, the number of official buildings slowly increased. For the sake of security, fortifications were built at Berbera, Bulhar and Zeila. Barracks, police lines, jails, offices, courts and customs houses were put up to meet the needs of the administration. Water tanks, warehouses, weighing sheds, sea fronts, harbour lights, buoys and a pier were introduced to encourage trade.³ The number of permanent stone buildings erected both by the administration and by merchants increased. Their advantages were shown in frequent fires. Bulhar, with its combustible huts, was destroyed by fire in 1885.⁴ It was rebuilt, only to go up in a pillar of smoke again in July 1892.⁵ This was apparently the third time it had been burnt down. It was laid out in broader streets and some stone

-
1. I.O./B.P.C./1894, p. 929, summary of Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1893-4.
 2. P. Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox (London, 1941), p. 30.
 3. Public works completed are listed in the annual administration reports, and especially in Stace's Decennial Report to 1893 in P.O. 78/4527.
 4. Annual Report on the Administration of Bombay Presidency 1885-6, p. 35.
 5. H.G.C. Swayne, Seventeen Trips through Somaliland and a Visit to Abyssinia (3rd edn., London, 1903), p. 116.

houses were built.¹ The old Somali part of Berbera, with its tortuous, dirty lanes of huts, was destroyed, together with a large amount of merchandise, in a great fire on 1 June 1888. Only stone buildings withstood the flames. The Bombay Government allocated Rs.5,000 to relieve the distressed, and the town was quickly rebuilt to a careful plan, with wide, straight streets and many stone buildings. It was a great improvement on the old town.²

One of the buildings destroyed in the Berbera fire was the small Government school, built the year before.³ It was the only Government school on the coast, although there were three private Arabic schools at Zeila and the Koran was taught in the mosques.⁴ Sometime after the fire the Berbera school was rebuilt, but it provided only a very elementary education in arithmetic, the Koran, and reading and writing simple Arabic. It was attended by roughly equal numbers of Somali and Arab boys, who numbered 240 in 1897.⁵

-
1. F.O. 78/4527, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1892-3, by Stace, 4 July 1893.
 2. I.O./B.P.C./1889, p. 797, summary of Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1888-9; F.O. 78/4260, journal of Hogg's visit to the coast, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1889.
 3. F.O. 78/4527, Decennial Report to 1893, by Stace, 4 July 1893; I.O./B.P.C./1889, p. 797, summary of Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1888-9.
 4. I.O./P&S Bombay/30, Berbera and Bulhar Administration Report, 1885-6, by Hunter, 11 May 1886; Zeila Administration Report, 1885-6, by Hunter, 14 May 1886.
 5. F.O. 78/4403, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1890-91, by Stace, 23 June 1891; F.O. 78/4978, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1896-7, by Cuninghame, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, 28 June 1898.

There was very little Christian missionary work among the Muslim Somalis. In the time of the Egyptian occupation French Roman Catholic missionaries had gone to Harar, and they had a small mission at Zeila.¹ In 1891 they planned to establish a farm-cum-mission station in the mountains south of Berbera, but the Somalis would not allow them to settle. In any case, the administration would not have allowed it as they feared that a Christian mission in the interior might arouse Somali hostility.² Instead the missionaries rented a house in Berbera and began to feed and educate some of the many waifs and strays in the town. In 1894 they obtained a permanent site in Berbera and built a chapel and a school. They had no medical qualifications, and confined themselves to preaching within the mission precincts and bringing up orphan Somali boys in the Roman Catholic faith. One of the missionaries produced a Somali dictionary and grammar. Their fairly unobtrusive presence in Berbera was tolerated by the Somalis.³

A limited medical service was established by the authorities. In February 1886 a civil dispensary was opened at Berbera, under an Indian

-
1. I.O./P&S Bombay/30, Zeila Administration Report, 1885-6, by Hunter, 14 May 1886.
 2. I.O./P&S Bombay/44, Sadler to Cuninghame, no. 996, 14 Nov. 1897; enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Hamilton, no. 8, 17 Feb. 1898.
 3. P.R.O., Colonial Office Papers, Series 537, vol. 44, memorandum by Wingate mission on Roman Catholic Mission at Berbera, 12 June 1909.

hospital assistant.¹ At Bulhar there was only the garrison hospital assistant, and the same was true at Zeila, although a hospital was built there in 1891.² Consequently, the cholera epidemic of 1892 killed 277 people at Zeila, 686 at Bulhar and 11 at Berbera. Among the victims were the Esa ughaz (sultan) and David Morrison of Bulhar.³ In 1896 a civil dispensary was built at Bulhar, and a new hospital and private charitable dispensary were opened at Berbera.⁴

Modest attempts were made at agriculture and horticulture. A Government garden was started at Berbera, which sent a few vegetables to Aden.⁵ Trees were also planted in the town. Experiments were made with a variety of aloe known as Hig (Sansevieria Whrenbergii), which produced fibre.⁶ Official efforts to grow sorghum and Somali projects to form agricultural settlements in the foothills south of Berbera, both failed.⁷

-
1. I.O./P&S Bombay/30, Berbera and Bulhar Administration Report, 1885-6, by Hunter, 11 May 1886.
 2. I.O./B.P.C./1892, p. 845, summary of Somali Coast Administration Report, 1891-2.
 3. F.O. 78/4527, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1892-3, by Stace, 4 July 1893.
 4. F.O. 78/4978, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1896-7, by Cuninghame, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, 28 June 1898.
 5. I.O./B.P.C./1889, p. 797, summary of Somali Coast Administration Report, 1888-9.
 6. F.O. 78/4403, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1890-91, by Stace, 23 June 1891.
 7. I.O./B.P.C./1892, p. 845, summary of Somali Coast Administration Report, 1891-2; F.O. 78/4764, Somali Coast Administration Report, 1894-5, by Ferris, 13 Sept. 1895.

Development in the interior was strictly limited to measures that would facilitate trade. Caravan passes through the mountains behind Berbera were improved and repeatedly unsuccessful attempts were made to sink a much needed well on the trade route south of Zeila.¹ An Englishman and an Australian prospected for minerals in the Bsa country in 1891, but found nothing. The authorities assisted and encouraged them, but would not grant a concession as they were uncertain about the inland limits of the protectorate and doubted whether they had the right to grant concessions for land owned by Somalis.² Two years later a British merchant, Charles MacConkey,³ toured the Habr Awal country and applied for a concession to manufacture fibre from the Hig aloe. By this time the Bombay Government had decided that they could grant concessions in the interior provided the Somali owners of the land agreed, and provided the concessionaire undertook not to introduce arms or liquor.⁴ (It is important to note that they had not ruled that the land belonged to the Crown; they still recognised the Somalis to be the owners. In

-
1. F.O. 78/4260, journal of Hogg's visit to the coast, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1889; I.O./P&S India/88, Cuninghame to Lee Warner, private, 23 June 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4402, J. Grossman to F.O., 4 Apr. 1891; I.O. to F.O., 2 June 1891; F.O.C.P. 6176, Stace to Jopp, 30 May 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 28 Sept. 1891.
 3. He had a financial interest in a coasting steamer run by a concern called 'The Somali Company' and he was Aden agent for the firm of Brown, Shipley and Co., see: A. Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries, (Cambridge, Mass. U.S.A., 1897), p. 4.
 4. I.O./P&S India/107, MacConkey to Sealy, 7 Dec. 1893 and Feb. 1894, Bombay Govt. Resolution, 5 Oct. 1893, both enclosed in Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 170 Sec., 29 Sept. 1898.

respect the policy differed from that in the East Africa Protectorate where the British Government were later to decide that waste and unoccupied land accrues to Her Majesty by virtue of her right to the Protectorate.¹ In 1895 MacConkey and Ferris,² the political agent, agreed on the draft terms of the concession, but by the time the protectorate passed to the Foreign Office in 1898 it had still not been finalised.³

MacConkey was not the only businessman to show an interest in the Somali Coast. To begin with the traders were Arabs, Indians and Jews⁴ but as trade increased a few Greeks, Italians and Frenchmen settled on the coast and Ethiopians began to visit Zeila.⁵ During the Egyptian occupation the British, Aden based, firm, Luke Thomas, had tried to run a trading steamer across to the Somali ports but had been unable to compete with the Khedivial steamers. When these were withdrawn a British shipping agent named Hay began a steamer service to the coast⁶ and later

-
1. See M.P.K. Sorrenson, 'Land Policy in Kenya 1895-1945', in V. Harlow, E.M. Chilver and A. Smith, History of East Africa (Oxford), II (1965), 672-6.
 2. Ferris, Lieut.-Col. William Butler; 1869 joined Indian Army; 1874. Bombay political dept.; March 1896, consul and political agent, Somali Coast and 1st assistant resident, Aden; 1897-1906, political agent in Mahi Kantha, Kolhapur and S. Maratha country; died ? 1923.
 3. P.R.O., Foreign Office Papers, Series 2, vol. 784, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 15, 21 Nov. 1898.
 4. I.O./P&S Bombay/30, Berbera and Bulhar Administration Report, 1885-6, by Hunter, 11 May 1886.
 5. I.O./B.P.C./1889, p. 797, summary of Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1888-9.
 6. F.O. 78/3862, notes on Zeila, by Hunter, 26 Aug. 1885; Walsh, Under the Flag..., p. 227.

Another steamer was subsidised by the administration to run a weekly rail service from Aden to the Somali Coast.¹ On a larger scale, the Foreign Office was approached in November 1890 by a group of men² who wished to form a chartered company to undertake the government and development of the Somali Coast Protectorate. They planned to found the company on the lines of the Imperial British East Africa and British South Africa companies, to spend money on roads, wells and the protection of traders, and to uphold British influence in the interior.³ Salisbury distrusted chartered companies in Africa, especially when there was a likelihood of their involving him in the affairs of the interior. In 1878 he had sabotaged William Mackinnon's scheme to form an East African company. Nine years later when Mackinnon was actually founding his company, Salisbury did not give him any encouragement. By 1890, when the Somaliland company was suggested, the Imperial British East Africa Company, chronically disorganised and inefficient, was bent on establishing its rule over strife-torn Buganda and clamouring for a government railway subsidy.⁴ Rather naturally Salisbury decided that

-
1. I.C./P&S Bombay/31, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1886-7, by Hunter, 26 May 1887; F.O. 78/4403, Somali Coast Administration Report, 1890-91, by Stace, 23 June 1891.
 2. They applied through solicitors who did not divulge their identities. The firm of solicitors has since split up. Its papers passed to three different firms, none of which can trace the 1890 papers dealing with the chartered company for Somaliland. The intriguing question of who the promoters were must therefore remain unanswered.
 3. F.O. 78/4325, Messrs. Gadsden and Treherne (solicitors) to F.O., 5 Nov. 1890.
 4. Oliver and Mathew, History of East Africa, i, 361, 378, 402-411.

such company in Somaliland was undesirable, and he told the
 persons that he had no intention of granting a charter.¹

Although the protectorate was a coast protectorate and development
 was practically limited to the ports, it was accompanied by an increase
 of European activity in the interior. Somaliland was unexplored, and
 it was extremely rich in wild game; it therefore attracted explorers
 and sportsmen. In 1884 two British officers, presumably from Aden,
 went shooting in the Golis mountains south of Berbera. This was
 probably the first British journey into the Somali interior since
 Burton's day.² South of Harar there had been a certain amount of
 exploration by Egyptians, Frenchmen and Germans, but little, if any, in
 the Berbera hinterland. In December 1884 an expedition led by W.D. and
 F.L. James left from Berbera for the Ogaden country and River Shibeli.
 They crossed the 'Unknown Horn of Africa', became the first Europeans
 to penetrate so far down the Shibeli and returned safely to Berbera.³
 Hunter was surprised. He had allowed them to leave '... to prove the
 danger to future aspirants for martyrdom in the field of exploration'.⁴
 Granville had shown more concern for their safety, ordering their recall.⁵

-
1. F.O. 78/4325, F.O. to I.O., 8 Nov. 1890; F.O. to Gadsden and Treherne, 29 Nov. 1890.
 2. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), p. 75.
 3. F.L. James, The Unknown Horn of Africa (London, 1888).
 4. F.O. 78/3728, Hunter to Baring, 15 Dec. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 1191, 30 Dec. 1884.
 5. F.O.C.P. 5057, Granville tel. to Baring, no. 378, 29 Dec. 1884.

Instructions reached the explorers when they were at the Habr Yunis hills at Burao, beyond the reach of the British authorities; they disregarded them and pressed on.¹

Shortly after the James party had left, another Englishman, Harald Swayne, a Royal Engineer officer from Aden, went on a shooting trip in the Golis. It was to be the first of many. In September 1885 he was sent to build some barracks at Bulhar and to do some surveying behind the port. In February 1886, accompanied by an escort, he penetrated the Habr Yunis country about thirty miles south of Bulhar,² while at the same time Capt. King, the Zeila vice-consul, was exploring the Gadabursi country south of Zeila.³ Swayne undertook two further expeditions in 1886, making maps for the Bombay Government. He went forty miles south of Berbera on the plateau and he traversed Gadabursi territory from Zeila to Bulhar. In the next year he confined himself to shooting elephants about fifty miles south of Berbera,⁴ while the survey of the Habr Awal country was carried on by two other officers from Aden.⁵ These early journeys were confined to a few enterprising officers from Aden. After the James expedition private parties were discouraged, and so the greater

-
1. F.O. 78/3875, Baring to Granville, no. 77, 24 Jan. 1885; James, The Unknown Horn of Africa, pp. 76-84; Walsh, Under the Flag..., pp. 283-296.
 2. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 75-85.
 3. I.O./P&S Bombay/30, J.S. King, 'Account of a trip to Mount Bilo on the Northern Frontier of the Gadabursi country', 1886.
 4. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 43, 50-73, 85-6.
 5. I.O./B.F.C./July-Dec. 1888, p. 894, summary of Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1887-8.

of the interior remained unexplored. This did not matter until 1890, when Britain wished to inform Italy, which was claiming a protectorate over Ethiopia, that the Somali Coast Protectorate was not confined to the coast but extended inland. It was suddenly realised that the administration had no idea of the inland territorial limits of the clans with whom they had treaties of protection.¹ The Government of India decided to relax the prohibitions² and there was an immediate upsurge of exploration and hunting.

The Bombay Government sent Swayne and his younger brother Eric,³ a lieutenant in the Bengal Infantry, to explore the far interior. Early in 1891 they went through the Dolbohanta country as far as Badwein and Harald Swayne returned to the coast through Habr Toljaala territory.⁴ They found the country completely untouched, except for a few huts, the

-
1. F.O. 78/4325, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 27 May 1890, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 18 Sept. 1890.
 2. I.O./P&S India/60, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, no. 1556E, 28 July 1890, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 94 Sec., 4 Aug. 1890.
 3. Swayne, Eric John Eagles (later Brig.-Gen. Sir Eric, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.M.); 1863-1929; 1883 joined Indian Army; 1886-7, Burmese expedition; 1890-2, surveying in Somaliland; 1892-8, Intelligence Branch, H.Q., India; 1898, 2 i/c, Indian contingent, Uganda Rifles; possibly first military officer to cycle from coast to Uganda; operations in Uganda and Jubaland; April 1900, commandant, Somali Coast Levies; 1901, led first expedition against Sayyid Mohamed Abdulla Hassan; 1 Mar. 1902-13 Mar. 1906, commissioner and consul-general, Somali Coast Protectorate; 1902, led second expedition against the Sayyid; 1906-1913, governor, British Honduras; 1914-17, rejoined army as recruiting inspector and labour commandant.
 4. I.O./P&S Bombay/35, Capt. H.G.C. Swayne, R.E., 'Preliminary Description of the Somali Country', 19 May 1891; H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 86-94.

... of tariga settlements (communities of Muslim religious orders)¹ Sheikh, Suksode and Kob Faradod. At Badwein they discovered some ancient ruins, and they met some British shooting parties which were already in the Dolbohanta country. Despite the chronic state of warfare among the Dolbohanta lineage groups the British parties were well received.

In May and June 1891 the Swayne brothers made their way through Habr Awal territory to Hargeisa which had already been visited by Lieut.-Col. Stace at the head of a military expedition in 1888. Hargeisa was another tariga community, founded by a group of Habr Awal in 1874 at the junction of the Ogaden and Harar trade routes. Its leader, Sheikh Maddar,² had arrived there from Harar in 1876. In 1882 they had begun growing sorghum and the population of the settlement increased rapidly. It was one of the very few permanent settlements in Somaliland. By 1892 about a thousand men lived in the village, with its mud-huts, masonry well and stone mosque. The inhabitants were mainly Habr Awal, with a large number of blind and cripples under Sheikh Maddar's protection. Outside the stockade round the village there were about nine square miles under cultivation. At the time of Swayne's visit a

1. See I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, pp. 96-8.

2. His photograph is in R.S. Drake-Brockman, British Somaliland (London, 1912), facing p. 66.

band of Ethiopian marauders were causing great anxiety in the district.¹

After another exploration deep into Gadabursi and Esa country,² the Swaynes went to Hargeisa again in 1892. North-east of Hargeisa they found another smaller but older tariqa, at Aubakhadle. From Hargeisa they struck south into the Ogaden, at Milmil, where the people were in a ferment against the Ethiopians. At Dagahbur they discovered the remains of a large Ogaden village, deserted because of clan quarrels.³ They then went north-west, through Jijiga, where there was an empty Ethiopian stockade, to Gildessa, a busy village on the Harar caravan route. Gildessa was occupied by Ethiopian troops, who were reluctant to let the Swaynes depart, but they eventually left and made their way back to Zeila.⁴

This completed the official exploration of the country, which was small by comparison with the invasion by sportsmen after 1890. Somaliland was the nearest abundant shooting-ground to Europe and Aden, and parties usually led by army officers or British and Continental aristocrats,

-
1. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 94-106; I.O./P&S Bombay/38/39, H. Swayne and E. Swayne, 'Report on an Exploration in Somali-land, N.E. Africa', enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley (secretary of state for India), no. 1265, 22 Feb. 1893.
 2. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 106-110.
 3. I.O./P&S Bombay/38/39, H. & E. Swayne, 'Report on an Exploration in Somali-land...', enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 1265, 22 Feb. 1893.
 4. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 116-146.

shot their way through the country, killing vast numbers of animals.

Within a year of the influx beginning, Harald Swayne reported that the country was becoming rapidly shot out and that measures of game protection were necessary.¹ Soon the Aden resident was reporting that the country was over-run by sportsmen² and in 1895 Ferris complained:

'There has been much slaughter of animals, and some so-called sportsmen have amused themselves, killing everything they came across, large and small, male and female, with a view to making a record.'³

In 1893 the political agent was forced to declare a large area of the Habr Awal country a reserve in which only officers from Aden could shoot, and he tried to restrict the indiscriminate slaughter of elephants.⁴

The influence of the authorities had to follow the sportsmen inland.

An attempt was made to limit the number of hunters flocking to the country⁵ and Sealy drew up rules giving the administration a much closer control over their activities and laying down strict conditions for escorts.⁶ As well as the sportsmen, Ethiopians from Harar systematically over-ran the Gadabursi country in search of ivory, and Somalis with

-
1. I.O./P&S Bombay/35, H. Swayne, 'Preliminary Description of the Somali Country', 19 May 1891.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Jopp to E. Neel (assistant political & secret secretary, I.O.), 13 Dec. 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/4784, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1894-5, by Ferris, 13 Sept. 1895.
 4. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Rules, by Sealy, 16 Oct. 1893 & 11 Dec. 1893, enclosed in Jopp to Neel, 13 Dec. 1893.
 5. F.O. 78/4527, Neel to Barrington, private, 30 Dec. 1893.
 6. I.O./P&S Aden/7, 'Rules for Sportsmen in Somaliland', by Sealy, sent to I.O., 27 June 1894.

poisoned arrows killed far more elephants than the tourists.¹ Traders began trapping and poisoning animals for their skins and trophies.² To deal with the devastation of game, the commercial export of trophies was prohibited, duties were levied on all trophies, skins and live animals privately exported, and the reserve was extended until it included nearly the whole of the Habr Awal, Isa and Gadabursi country.³

As game diminished and the reserve was enlarged, sportsmen pressed further south, exploring the country as they went. There were more trips to the Ogaden and River Shibeli in 1893, two of them by Harald Swayne.⁴ Explorers such as Bottego, an Italian, Donaldson Smith, an American, and Lord Delamere, an Englishman who had done a lot of shooting in Somaliland, set out from Berbera and reached East Africa and the Indian Ocean.⁵ As far as British explorers were concerned the administration believed that they improved relations with the Somalis of the interior, but there were frequent complaints about the behaviour of foreigners who often had disagreements with their men. Desertions

-
1. I.O./P&S Bombay/42, Ferris to Aden resident; 24 May 1896, Notes by E. Swayne, 12 June 1896, both enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Hamilton, no. 23, 22 Sept. 1896.
 2. I.O./P&S Bombay/44, Brig.-Gen. O'M. Creagh (later Aden resident) to Lee Warner, private, 25 Aug. 1898.
 3. See: I.O./P&S Aden/7, 'Revised Rules for Sportsmen', by Ferris, January 1896; I.O./P&S Aden/8, 'Revised Rules for Sportsmen', by Sadler, 11 Mar. 1897; I.O./P&S Bombay/44, 'Revised Rules for Sportsmen', by Sadler, February 1898.
 4. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 149-267.
 5. See: map at end of V. Bottego, Il Giuba Esplorato (Roma, 1895); maps at end of Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries; Huxley, White Man's Country (New edn., London, 1953), pp. 23-51.

only thirty miles from Harar.¹ This isolated post became a standing temptation to intervention, and vice-consul King had to be restrained from sending fifty Indian soldiers and a British officer there.² Before he massacred Porro's expedition in April 1886³ the Emir of Harar suddenly attacked Gildessa and captured the biladiya and sixteen Indian police.⁴ The police remained in Harar until Menelik took the town a year later and released them.⁵ Their capture had been a salutary lesson; Gildessa was too far from Zeila for the British authorities to control. No further attempts were made to garrison the place and in fact Ras Makonnen treated it as part of Harar, sending his troops to occupy it. He assumed partial responsibility for the safety of the trade route, and would have strongly resented any further British interference.⁶ Thereafter, the Zeila-Harar road was generally peaceful although feuds between the Esa and Gadabursi occasionally resulted in outrages on caravans.⁷

On the Berbera side the country was far more unsettled and raids on caravans were commonplace. An unofficial biladiya system existed, for

-
1. F.O. 78/3859, Baring to Granville, no. 242, 12 Mar. 1885.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/6, King to Sealy, 16 Oct. 1885, enclosed in Hogg to Govt. of Bombay, no. 347/1864, 19 Oct. 1885.
 3. See above, p. 108.
 4. F.O.C.P. 5331, Baring tel. to Rosebery, no. 50, 25 Apr. 1886.
 5. F.O.C.P. 5467, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 109, 16 Apr. 1887.
 6. I.O./P&S Bombay/32, Stace to Govt. of Bombay, 8 Feb. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Cross, no. 13, 1 Mar. 1888.
 7. See, e.g.; F.O.C.P. 5952, Hogg to Cross, 11 Feb. 1890, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 26 Feb. 1890.

ish merchants were only too glad to pay.¹ Biladiya, however, could do nothing to settle the persistent clan feuds and the British authorities soon found themselves intervening. Harald Swayne was probably the first to do so. In October 1885, and again early in 1886, when he was building barracks at Bulhar, he used his sappers to keep the peace between two rival lineage groups of the Habr Awal Ayal Yunis.² The feud continued however, hampering the trade of Bulhar so much that the Aden resident planned to send a larger force of troops to restore order. The Bombay Government agreed, provided that 'no suspicion of further interference in their country is raised in the minds of the Somalis.'³

This departure from strict non-interference was sanctioned because the feud was disrupting trade, but it turned out to be the thin edge of the wedge. Before any action had been taken against the Ayal Yunis the feud died out, but not before the Habr Awal Jibril Abokr had taken advantage of the dispute themselves to raid the Ayal Yunis. Trade ceased completely at Bulhar. The ports were closed against the Jibril Abokr, but without result. Hunter therefore went ahead with his punitive expedition, not against the Ayal Yunis, but against the Jibril Abokr.

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Hunter to Hogg, 8 Mar. 1886, enclosed in Hogg to Kimberley, no. 76/429, 9 Mar. 1886.
 2. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 75-82.
 3. I.O./P&S Bombay/29, Hogg to Govt. of Bombay, no. 40/175, 2 Feb. 1886, Govt. of Bombay to Hogg, no. 1009, 18 Feb. 1886, both enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 14, 9 Apr. 1886.

Hunter's strategy was to become a model for future operations. Without firearms the Somalis were unlikely to stand and face troops, but it was pointless for encumbered soldiers to try to chase nimble nomads across waterless country unknown to the pursuers. There were no towns or villages that could be captured. The attack was therefore launched on their all-important livestock. The expedition lasted a week, in February 1886. Hunter and twenty-five Bombay Native Infantry occupied an important watering point thirty miles from Bulhar. Walsh, with thirty sowars of the Aden Troop and 2,500 Ayal Yunis volunteers went after the animals. Walsh took 250 cattle, 17 camels and 160 sheep, while the Ayal Yunis took approximately 2,500 cattle. That was the end of the expedition. The troops killed no one and suffered no losses; the Ayal Yunis lost one man. Within a week the Jibril Abokk representatives came to Bulhar and submitted. They paid compensation for their raids. Hunter returned to them half the stock captured by Walsh; the rest was sold to cover the cost of the expedition. The success of the operations persuaded other clans in the area to make voluntary restitution. 'The expedition has cost nothing, and entailed little risk to our troops, who are much feared' reported Hunter.¹ Its success and economy won the approval of the Bombay Government.² Later in the year another expedition

-
1. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Hunter to Hogg, 8 Mar. 1886, enclosed in Hogg to Kimberley, no. 76/429, 9 Mar. 1886; see also the lucid but misdated account in Walsh, Under the Flag..., pp. 275-8.
 2. I.O./P&S Bombay/29, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 1857, 30 Mar. 1886, enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 14, 9 Apr. 1886.

was sent from Berbera against a predatory section of the Habr Yunis.

The looted stock was recovered without any opposition.¹

One of the oldest feuds on the coast was between two Habr Awal lineage groups, the Ayal Ahmed of Berbera and the Ayal Yunis of Bulhar. Early in 1887 Hunter intervened and fined them both. He also ordered them to surrender a few ancient firearms. The Ayal Yunis complied, but the Ayal Ahmed refused to hand over the fine or their firearms and continued raiding near Bulhar, killing women and children.² The stipends of the Ayal Ahmed skills were suspended which only made them the more recalcitrant. Their relations with the administration were worsened by the preaching of certain sheikhs (labelled 'Mullahs' by the authorities) who stirred up feeling against the unbelieving foreigners in Berbera.³ In January 1888 a warship and fifty extra Native Infantry had to be sent to keep order in the town, and Stace expelled one of the sheikhs. As the Ayal Ahmed still refused to produce the fine and the firearms Stace abolished their skill-ships and took seven of their most influential men prisoner to Aden.⁴ He felt that the lineage group needed a stiff lesson, and Hogg agreed, writing arrogantly to London:

-
1. I.O./P&S Bombay/31, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1886-7, by Hunter, 26 May 1887.
 2. I.O./P&S India/57, Stace to Govt. of Bombay, no. 281/2597, 18 Aug. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 3. Ibid., Hogg to Govt. of Bombay, no. 35/264, 31 Jan. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 4. Ibid., Stace to Hogg, no. 147, 2 Feb. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.

shall have to make an example some day of the Ayal Ahmed, who are now most insolent. Of course, the Somali is like other black men, he must be listened to, but he requires the stick now and then.¹

The Ayal Ahmed became increasingly truculent; reinforcements had to be sent to Bulhar when they threatened to burn the town. The time for action, however, was not yet, for it was still, essentially, a quarrel between lineage groups. They were not actually in arms against the authorities.² Durand, the foreign secretary to the Indian Government, who visited the coast at this time strongly recommended non-intervention:

'It should be the fundamental principle laid down for the guidance of our officers that we do not wish to interfere in any way with the proceedings of the tribes.... Any interference with their feuds, whether at their invitation or not, must land us in complications sooner or later, and once we begin advancing into the interior, there is no saying where we shall stop. Our officers on the spot naturally find this policy annoying.... This feud is a nuisance. It disturbs the caravan road and frightens the traders. It could undoubtedly be stopped in a very short time if we chose to interfere and threatened to send out some troops, even a hundred or two. But it is just this kind of temptation that we must scrupulously avoid. A steady abstention from it will in the end make us all the stronger.'

He added some prophetic words: 'There are some Mullahs among them, probably Arabs, who may succeed in doing harm hereafter;....'³ Both the

-
1. Sal.P.,E/Cross, copy of Hogg to Bradford, 22 Feb. 1888.
 2. I.O./P&S India/57, Stace to Hogg, 25 Feb. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 3. F.O. 78/4261, memorandum by Durand, 11 Mar. 1888, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 July 1888.

...ments of Bombay and India agreed with Durand. They hinted that Stace had already gone too far.¹

His action in holding hostages at least produced the fine, and the hostages were released.² The raids, however, continued. Hundreds of cattle and camels and thousands of sheep were stolen; the Ayal Ahmed plundered from Hargeisa to Bulhar and even threatened the Berbera water supply. They attacked and wounded Mohamed Shirmarke, the Habr Gerhajis skil. They killed people in attacks on caravans, including a biladiya, with the result that the rest of the biladiya refused to do any more escorting. Stace estimated the value of their plunder at Rs.60,000.³ The trade of Berbera declined and the Aden Chamber of Commerce began to complain. By August 1888 Stace could stand idle no longer. He sent twenty troopers to Berbera, and pressed for permission for a punitive expedition, saying, 'forbearance has already been carried to a mischievous extremity.'⁴

The Government of Bombay forbade Stace to use the troopers without

-
1. I.O./P&S India/57, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 16 May 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889; I.O./B.P.C./July-Dec. 1888, p. 894, summary of Somali Coast Administration Report, 1887-8.
 2. I.O./P&S India/57, Hogg tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 23 Apr. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 3. Ibid., Stace to Hogg, no. 1250, 22 Oct. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 4. Ibid., Stace to Govt. of Bombay, no. 281/2597, 18 Aug. 1888, and no. 288/2748, 27 Aug. 1888, both enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.

general tenor of these instructions, the Government of India thought they were a bit extreme.¹

The Government of India approved of Stace's suggestion that there should be a promenade militaire through the Habr Away country, 'A perfectly friendly march, nothing in any way offensive', to collect the fines and plunder and to demonstrate that Government power was not limited to the coast.² Stace took fifty men of the Aden Troop, ten Arab levies and another British officer. They left Berbera on 24 November 1888 and marched slowly to Hargeisa where they were welcomed by Sheikh Maddar, already known as a supporter of the Government. They returned to Bulhar on 22 December. Friendly relations were restored with the Ayal Ahmed who returned a reasonable amount of plunder and gave up all their firearms. No military action was taken, and the proceeds of the fine nearly covered the cost of the promenade.³ The country quietened down and Hogg reported that the promenade 'has had a most beneficial effect and reassured the neighbouring tribes,...'⁴

-
1. I.O./P&S India/57, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, no. 2191E, 5 Nov. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 2. Ibid., Stace to Hogg, no. 1250, 22 Oct. 1888, Viceroy of India tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 6 Nov. 1888, both enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 3. Ibid., Stace to Hogg, no. 189, 24 Feb. 1889, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 4. F.O. 78/4260, journal of Hogg's visit to the coast, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1889.

...only afterwards, a lineage group of the Baa known as the Mamasan (Mogito Baa), attacked the Ajal Yodis at Bulhar.¹ In view of the British Government's recent instructions about non-intervention Stace merely arranged peace between the two clans. The Mamasan 'pledged themselves... in the most solemn manner in Bulhar to keep the peace towards people of that port,....'² Six months later, on 17 August 1889, the Mamasan again attacked Bulhar in the middle of a sandstorm. They killed sixty-two people, wounded fourteen, and returned the next day to kill five more. The police in the town could not fire on them in the sandstorm but managed to drive them off.³

Stace was certain that the attack was a direct result of the policy of non-intervention. He claimed that the Somalis were well aware of the policy and thought they could act with impunity. Speaking his mind he asked for a more flexible policy and permission to take military action when it was necessary to protect trade. He backed up his case with petitions from various clans, including the Dolbohanta, asking for more direct Government intervention.⁴ Once again, Hogg agreed, and asked

-
1. I.O./P&S India/57, Govt. of Bombay tel. to Govt. of India, no. 1688, 2 Mar. 1889, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Stace to Hogg, no. 151, 16 Feb. 1890, enclosed in Hogg to Cross, no. 4/443, 20 Feb. 1890.
 3. F.O. 78/4261, Stace to Hogg, 23 Aug. 1889, enclosed in Clarke to Salisbury, no. 338, 9 Sept. 1889.
 4. F.O. 78/4325, Stace to Hogg, 23 Aug. 1889 and 26 Aug. 1889, both in mid-November section of volume.

governments of Bombay and India agreed with Durand. They hinted that force had already gone too far.¹

His action in holding hostages at least produced the fine, and the hostages were released.² The raids, however, continued. Hundreds of cattle and camels and thousands of sheep were stolen; the Ayal Ahmed plundered from Hargeisa to Bulhar and even threatened the Berbera water supply. They attacked and wounded Mohamed Shikmarke, the Habr Gerhajis akil. They killed people in attacks on caravans, including a biladiya, with the result that the rest of the biladiya refused to do any more escorting. Stace estimated the value of their plunder at Rs.60,000.³ The trade of Berbera declined and the Aden Chamber of Commerce began to complain. By August 1888 Stace could stand idle no longer. He sent twenty troopers to Berbera, and pressed for permission for a punitive expedition, saying, 'forbearance has already been carried to a mischievous extremity.'⁴

The Government of Bombay forbade Stace to use the troopers without

-
1. I.O./P&S India/57, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 16 May 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889; I.O./B.P.C./July-Dec. 1888, p. 894, summary of Somali Coast Administration Report, 1887-8.
 2. I.O./P&S India/57, Hogg tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 23 Apr. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 3. Ibid., Stace to Hogg, no. 1250, 22 Oct. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 4. Ibid., Stace to Govt. of Bombay, no. 281/2597, 18 Aug. 1888, and no. 288/2748, 27 Aug. 1888, both enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.

... permission.¹ When Hogg telegraphed for permission to attack the Ayal Ahmed because they were threatening Berbera,² he was told to negotiate and to continue friendly relations with the clan.³ Stace and Hogg were exasperated. They felt that they had negotiated more than enough, that their actions would be interpreted as weakness and that they would lose all prestige and influence on the coast.⁴ They need not have worried. On 5 October 1888 2,000 Ayal Ahmed advanced on the Somali part of Berbera. Ashby,⁵ the Berbera political agent, and the troops repulsed the attack. Only a few managed to get into the town; they killed a policeman but were easily rounded up. The remainder, having failed to storm the town, scattered and fled, pursued by the troopers. At least twenty-five Ayal Ahmed were killed.

This failure broke the Ayal Ahmed. They retreated a hundred miles to the south but surrendered several notorious murderers. On 9 October

-
1. Ibid., Govt. of Bombay tel. to Govt. of India, 12 Sept. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 2. I.O./P&S Bombay/32, Hogg tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 6 Oct. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Cross, no. 46, 15 Nov. 1888.
 3. Ibid., Govt. of Bombay tel. to Hogg, 7 Oct. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Cross, no. 46, 15 Nov. 1888.
 4. Ibid., Hogg to Govt. of Bombay, no. 344/3504, 8 Oct. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Cross, no. 46, 15 Nov. 1888.
 5. Ashby, John Shuckburgh (later Lieut.-Col.); 1876, joined Indian Army; 1888, assistant political resident, Aden; political agent at Zeila and Berbera; 1894, assistant political agent Kathiawar; 1902, assistant political resident, Aden; 1903, resigned commission and prospected on Somali Coast for Luke Thomas; 1906, became one of the concessionaires owning the British Somaliland Fibre & Development Co. Ltd.; died ? 1926.

submitted and handed over some arms. Meanwhile Stace had arrived with a warship and reinforcements from Aden. He disarmed all the inhabitants of Berbera and hanged two principal murderers. He fined another lineage group that had joined in the attack and imposed stringent peace conditions on the Ayal Ahmed. Among other things, they were to return all their plunder, surrender their firearms and end their feud with the Ayal Yunis.¹

The Government of Bombay realised that the attack on Berbera had put the Ayal Ahmed in the wrong and they conceded that 'it is only proper that a tribe which has attacked our protectorate should be severely punished.' Nevertheless, they regarded the incident as a failure on the part of the local authorities to restore friendly relations, and they took the opportunity to lay down the policy of non-intervention in the clearest terms. They recommended that Government forces should not be employed further than two miles from the ports, they ruled that no missions should be sent to the interior without definite permission and they stated that any opposition to the policy of non-intervention among local officers 'must at once be repressed.'² Whilst approving of the

-
1. I.O./P&S India/57, Stace to Hogg, no. 1250, 22 Oct. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889; I.O./P&S Bombay/32, Hogg tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 8 Oct. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Cross, no. 46, 15 Nov. 1888.
 2. I.O./P&S Bombay/32, Govt. of Bombay tel. to Hogg, 15 Oct. 1888, Govt. of Bombay to Hogg, no. 7043, 26 Oct. 1888, both enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Cross, no. 46, 15 Nov. 1888.

general tenor of these instructions, the Government of India thought they were a bit extreme.¹

The Government of India approved of Stace's suggestion that there should be a promenade militaire through the Habr Away country, 'A perfectly friendly march, nothing in any way offensive', to collect the fines and plunder and to demonstrate that Government power was not limited to the coast.² Stace took fifty men of the Aden Troop, ten Arab levies and another British officer. They left Berbera on 24 November 1888 and marched slowly to Hargeisa where they were welcomed by Shoikh Maddar, already known as a supporter of the Government. They returned to Bulhar on 22 December. Friendly relations were restored with the Ayal Ahmed who returned a reasonable amount of plunder and gave up all their firearms. No military action was taken, and the proceeds of the fine nearly covered the cost of the promenade.³ The country quietened down and Hogg reported that the promenade 'has had a most beneficial effect and reassured the neighbouring tribes,...'⁴

-
1. I.O./P&S India/57, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, no. 2191E, 5 Nov. 1888, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 2. Ibid., Stace to Hogg, no. 1250, 22 Oct. 1888, Viceroy of India tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 6 Nov. 1888, both enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 3. Ibid., Stace to Hogg, no. 189, 24 Feb. 1889, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
 4. F.O. 78/4260, journal of Hogg's visit to the coast, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1889.

...only afterwards, a lineage group of the Ma known as the Mamasan
...to the Ma, attacked the Ajali Yulin at Bulhar.¹ In view of the
...the Government's recent instructions about non-interference State
...merely arranged peace between the two clans. The Mamasan 'pledged
...themselves... in the most solemn manner in Bulhar to keep the peace
...towards people of that part,....'² Six months later, on 17 August 1889,
...the Mamasan again attacked Bulhar in the middle of a sandstorm. They
...killed sixty-two people, wounded fourteen, and returned the next day to
...kill five more. The police in the town could not fire on them in the
...sandstorm but managed to drive them off.³

Stace was certain that the attack was a direct result of the policy of non-intervention. He claimed that the Somalis were well aware of the policy and thought they could act with impunity. Speaking his mind he asked for a more flexible policy and permission to take military action when it was necessary to protect trade. He backed up his case with petitions from various clans, including the Dolbohanta, asking for more direct Government intervention.⁴ Once again, Hogg agreed, and asked

1. I.O./P&S India/57, Govt. of Bombay tel. to Govt. of India, no. 1688, 2 Mar. 1889, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 67 Ext., 13 May 1889.
2. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Stace to Hogg, no. 151, 16 Feb. 1890, enclosed in Hogg to Cross, no. 4/443, 20 Feb. 1890.
3. F.O. 78/4261, Stace to Hogg, 23 Aug. 1889, enclosed in Clarke to Salisbury, no. 338, 9 Sept. 1889.
4. F.O. 78/4325, Stace to Hogg, 23 Aug. 1889 and 26 Aug. 1889, both in mid-November section of volume.

permission to send an expedition against the Mamasan.¹ As the Mamasan had attacked a town under British protection, the Bombay Government agreed that they should be punished,² but they were not convinced by the argument that the administration of the Somali Coast was becoming impossible and they rejected the pleas for a less rigid policy.³

Bombay had hoped that the Mamasan could be punished by a round-up of stock, but the Indian Government approved Hogg's proposals for a direct attack on the sub-clan.⁴ The Mamasan could muster about 1,300 fighting men, and they lived due south of Zeila. It was planned to confine them to the coast by a pincer movement from Zeila and Bulhar.⁵ The punitive force consisted of 9 officers, more than 300 men and two Gardner guns⁶ manned by naval ratings, all under the command of Stace and Captain Domville of the Aden Troop. With such a force no disaster was anticipated but Domville was specially warned about the Esa custom of attacking by night.⁷

-
1. F.O. 78/4324, Govt. of Bombay tel. to Govt. of India, 19 Aug. 1889, Hogg tel. to Govt. of Bombay, both enclosed in I.O. TO F.O., 13 Jan. 1890.
 2. F.O. 78/4324, Govt. of Bombay to Hogg, 10 Sept. 1889, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Jan. 1890.
 3. F.O. 78/4325, Hogg to Govt. of Bombay, 7 Sept. 1889, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 7 Nov. 1889 both in mid-November section of volume.
 4. F.O. 78/4324, Govt. of India tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 24 Oct. 1889, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Jan. 1890.
 5. F.O. 78/4324, Hogg to Govt. of Bombay, 21 Sept. 1889, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Jan. 1890.
 6. An early type of machine gun with several barrels.
 7. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Hogg to Domville, 9 Jan. 1890, enclosed in Hogg to Cross, no. 3/432, 15 Feb. 1890.

The pincer movement had to be abandoned because the Mamasan were too far from Bulhar. Instead, after a rather ineffective naval bombardment of the wells at Dagarita, the whole expeditionary force left Zeila on 11 January 1890 marching south-east directly towards the Mamasan. With all their equipment they made slow progress and had little hope of catching their enemy. On 19 January Domville left the infantry behind and with sixty sowars of the Aden Troop made a surprise attack on the Mamasan at Garisa. 20 of the enemy were killed, three collections of huts were burnt, and 100 camels and 2,000 sheep captured. Before the captured sheep had joined the main body of the troops night came; 500 Mamasan fell on the sheep escort, killed twelve men and wounded three. Later, Domville was strongly criticised for not having abandoned the sheep at sunset.¹

After they had been reinforced by forty sappers, who busied themselves filling in Mamasan wells, the main force moved on Garisa, but arrived too late. Slowly they followed the retreating enemy. On 29 January they camped at Hussein. At 2.30 a.m. that night thirty Mamasan warriors pole-vaulted on their spears into the zariba, killed five soldiers and wounded sixteen before they were driven out by a sword-charge led by Stace. Seven of the intruders were killed. After this setback, the

1. I.O./P&S India/61, Adjutant-General Bombay, to Govt. of Bombay, 11 June 1890, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 180 Mil., 8 Sept. 1890.

troops continued the chase for another two days until they were forced to turn back for water. They arrived back in Zeila, exhausted, on 1 February, but the Mamasan had been sufficiently harried to submit. They swore to abstain from future attacks and Stace hoped that fear of retribution would make them keep their word.

It had not been a highly successful expedition. The Mamasan had lost some stock, they had been temporarily driven out of their territory, they had learnt that they were not secure in their wilds and many of their wells had been filled in. On the other hand, the troops had found it extremely arduous, they had had no reliable information, seventeen soldiers had been killed, the Habr Awal had been too terrified to co-operate and Gadaabursi assistance had been short-lived. Although the Mamasan had submitted, Stace regretted that they had not received such condign punishment as they richly deserved.¹

This was the first punitive expedition in which there was a serious loss of life. It had been planned as a deliberate attempt to punish the lineage group collectively by killing a certain number and seizing their stock. Rifles and machine guns were sent against spears. It may be

1. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Stace to Hogg, no. 151, 16 Feb. 1890, enclosed in Hogg to Cross, no. 4/443, 20 Feb. 1890; F.O.C.P. 5952, Stace to Hogg, 3 Apr. 1890, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 30 Apr. 1890; Walsh, Under the Flag..., pp. 329-332.

looked upon as an act of callous bullying, but it must be remembered that the Mamasan deserved all they got. The expedition underlined the lesson that it was far wiser to operate against livestock than against elusive nomads. It also demonstrated how lack of water in Somaliland made military operations extremely difficult, and it impressed the authorities with a healthy respect for the fighting qualities of the Somalis. The expedition could be justified on the grounds that it brought peace; it was more effective morally than materially. In October 1890 Stace arranged a meeting at Qabri Bahar when representatives of the Esa, Gadabursi and Habr Awal swore to keep a general peace and to submit all future disputes to the administration for settlement.¹

In undertaking to settle disputes between the clans Stace was exceeding the policy of non-intervention laid down by the Bombay Government, but 1890 had seen a change of opinion in that Government. Up to that year its policy had borne the stamp of Lord Reay, the governor, a scholarly man of Liberal convictions, who closely controlled the affairs of the presidency. In April 1890, he was succeeded by Lord Harris, a Conservative politician, a military man, a cricketer and vigorous governor. On the way to take up his new appointment, Harris visited the Somali Coast, and shortly after his arrival in Bombay his

1. F.O. 78/4403, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1890-91, by Stace, 23 June 1891.

Government were writing to Calcutta that they considered 'that it is the duty of a Government, which has taken the ports under its protection, to protect within reasonable distance, the trade routes leading to those ports.' As a step towards this end they recommended that the biladiya at Berbera should be put on a more regular, official footing.¹ It was a policy more in line with the views of the India Government who had never thoroughly approved of uncompromising non-intervention and who had themselves reached the conclusion that:

'as, in spite of our desire to avoid interference, circumstances had shown that complete abstention from such interference was out of the question; the necessity of some measure of interference in the future must be admitted.'²

Stace had obtained the freedom he had long been demanding, and he took advantage of it. An unsuccessful attempt was made to arrange peace between the Habr Awal and Habr Gornajis who were raiding close to Bulhar. After a couple of daring raids by Dolbohanta near Berbera, Stace prohibited all raiding within ten miles of the ports and he began to form a small, mounted Somali Camel Corps, twenty-six strong, to keep order in the prohibited zone. The akil-snip system, which had proved ineffective, was altered. Akil-ships were taken away from townsmen and

-
1. I.O./P&S India/61, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 3062, 16 May 1890, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 180 Mil., 8 Sept. 1890.
 2. Ibid., Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 23 July 1890, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 180 Mil., 8 Sept. 1890.

to men from the interior, in the hope that they would be influential enough to control the clans and protect the trade routes. Mills were even appointed among the warring Dolbohanta and Habr Toljaala, two clans which had previously had little to do with the administration. To further control the inland Somalis Stace put forward the idea, shared by Harald Swayne, of posts in the interior and the 'Constant movement of an officer, of some experience and of sympathy with the people, about the country,' to 'pacify it... and settle many matters which now give trouble.'¹

In Stace's time this remained no more than an idea, but before he left Aden in August 1893 he led one more expedition on the Somali Coast. The Aidagalla, a large sub-clan of the Habr Gerhajis who lived around Hargeisa, had been fined for raiding the Ayal Yunis within the Bulhar ten-mile limit.² The fine had to be collected. The other branch of the Habr Gerhajis, the Habr Yunis, were also at feud with the Ayal Yunis, and Stace wished to reconcile them. The most pressing reason for an expedition, however, was the danger of a general war between the Habr Awal and the Esa. One particular lineage group of the Habr Awal Jibril Abokir, the Rer Hared, who were traditional robbers and 'the most troublesome clan in Somali land' had been persistently attacking the Esa.

-
1. I.O./P&S Bombay/35, H. Swayne, 'Preliminary Description of the Somali Country', 19 May 1891; F.O. 78/4403, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1890-91, by Stace, 23 June 1891.
 2. F.O. 78/4526, Stace to Jopp, no. 1280, 1 Sept. 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 21 Apr. 1893.

the Esa had shown commendable restraint, but their patience was not limitless, and Stace wished to interpose as a strong mediator between the two clans.¹

This time the Government of Bombay gave ready permission.² In December 1892 thirty extra Native Infantry were sent to Bulhar by boat and Stace marched there from Berbera with the Somali Coast Camel Corps and twenty-six sowars of the Aden Troop. This show of force convinced the Esa that Stace was in earnest and they promised not to retaliate against the Habr Awal. This left Stace free to attend to the Habr Gerhajis, and he set out for their country with the Camel Corps on 7 December. They marched through Mendera to Sik, but the Aidagalla refused to pay the fine and Stace returned to Berbera to await permission to use force against them.

Although the march of the Camel Corps had had no effect on the Aidagalla it had convinced the Rer Hared that it would be wise to submit. They sent their skills to Bulhar and promised to return all the stock they had looted from the Esa. Similarly, a successful sixty-mile march in one day by the Camel Corps, against some raiders east of Berbera,

-
1. P.O. 78/4526, Stace to Jopp, no. 1708, 30 Nov. 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 21 Apr. 1893.
 2. P.O. 78/4526, Govt. of Bombay tel. to Govt. of India, 1 Dec. 1892, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 17 Dec. 1892, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O. 21 Apr. 1893.

persuaded other small lineage groups to make restitution for past raids. The administration was very pleased with the efficiency and effectiveness of its newly raised indigenous Camel Corps.

Sanction was given for the use of force against the Aidagalla.¹ Stace and Donville left Berbera with 125 men on 14 January 1893. They marched to Aubakhadle where the Camel Corps and Aden troops captured some prisoners. It was enough to frighten the Aidagalla into submission; and by 22 January the whole fine had been paid and friendly relations restored. Once again, a bloodless expedition had its side-effects; the Rer Hared produced more plunder; the Habr Yunis agreed to make peace with the Ayal Yunis; and even the Ogaden Rer Ali abandoned their time-honoured custom of raiding caravans.² Judged by its results, the policy of making the Government presence felt in the interior, coupled with a mobile Camel Corps, was highly successful.

Stace was succeeded by an old Aden hand, Lieut.-Col. Sealy who was in charge of the Somali Coast for nineteen months from August 1893. During this time the interior was very disturbed, partly because of

-
1. F.O. 78/4526, Govt. of Bombay tel. to Govt. of India, 1 Jan. 1893, Govt. of India tel. to Govt. of Bombay, 6 Jan. 1893, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 21 Apr. 1893.
 2. F.O. 78/4526, Stace to Jopp, 4 Feb. 1893, 15 Feb. 1893, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 21 Apr. 1893; F.O. 78/4527, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1892-3, by Stace, 4 July 1893.

Habr Hared had been killed, and only one bilediya and four friendlies lost their lives. Without any cost to Government a recalcitrant clan had been severely punished in its own territory, more than a hundred miles from Berbera.¹

Thereafter, the Habr Hared showed a tendency to settle down to respectability. This proved to be the last punitive expedition undertaken by the Indian administration. Much of the hinterland between Berbera and Zeila had been traversed by Government forces. The Habr Awal, Msa and Cadabursi, and to a lesser extent the Habr Gerhajis, had learnt that it was dangerous to provoke the authorities. The western part of the country had been partially pacified and the inland clans were becoming increasingly anxious to lay their troubles and grievances before the administration. The expeditions had not only punished law-breakers, they had established British moral influence in the interior; when the clans came asking for advice it proved impossible to turn them away. Minor disturbances continued, sometimes needing swift interference by the Camel Corps, but by and large the west was quiet. In the turbulent hinterland of the eastern coast, however, there had been no expeditions. The Habr Toljaala and Dolbohanta were permanently unsettled, but they were

1. F.O. 78/4690, Ferris to Cunningham, 16 July 1895, Ferris to Rennell Rodd (secretary of legation, Cairo), 14 Aug. 1895, both enclosed in Rodd to Salisbury, no. 112, 24 Aug. 1895; Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox pp. 36-47.

the reach of the small protectorate forces. For the moment they were left untouched, but it was realised that they would have to be pacified sooner or later.¹

The comparative ease with which military operations were conducted against the Somalis was largely due to the fact that they were armed only with spears and daggers. Firearms were almost unknown; the few ancient guns possessed by the Ayal Ahmed and Ayal Yunis in 1866 had been in the hands of Arab mercenaries. Nonetheless, the Somalis were most anxious to possess, if not to discharge, firearms. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a vast increase in the number of precision arms available at low prices as European armies sold their weapons and re-equipped with magazine-loading rifles. The Government of Bombay had always tried to prevent firearms reaching the Arabs behind Aden and Hunter considered that it would be suicidal to allow arms freely to enter the Somali Coast.² An unlimited supply of firearms would have intensified the clan feuds and made the task of administration doubly difficult.

Deciding to keep out arms was one thing, enforcing the policy was another. It was impossible to control the arms trade at Aden and at the

-
1. F.O. 78/4764, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1894-5, by Ferris, 13 Sept. 1895.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/6, memorandum by Hunter, 9 Jan. 1885, enclosed in Blair to Kimberley, no. 3/69, 14 Jan. 1885.

the Coast ports, but there was a back door into the protectorate.

Assab and the Gulf of Tadjoura in the north. The inexhaustible market for arms in Shoa and southern Abyssinia made Obock a centre of traffic, and a band of French merchants, including Arthur Rimbaud, were selling literally thousands of guns at four or five times their cost.¹ In 1884 Hunter had foreseen that if Tadjoura became French it would soon have a trade in arms,² and the danger of arms falling into the hands of the Somalis became one of the main reasons for keeping Zeila.³ Originally, most goods for Tadjoura and Obock had to be trans-shipped at Zeyla, Hogg arranged that no arms should be allowed to pass without the special permission of the French consul.⁴ This provided a limited check on the trade, and Hunter suggested that it should be strengthened by an agreement between Britain, France and Italy.⁵

The suggestion was put to the Italian Government on the grounds that unrestricted arms trade would endanger travellers, encourage slave raiding and clan feuds, and imperil the European settlements on the coast.⁶

-
1. F.O. 78/3858, consul Bernal (Havre) to Granville, no. 1, 21 Feb. 1885; Starkie, Arthur Rimbaud in Abyssinia, pp. 68-96, 104-120.
 2. F.O. 78/3728, Hunter to Baring, no. 74, 20 Nov. 1884, enclosed in Baring to Granville, no. 1082, 29 Nov. 1884.
 3. F.O.C.P. 5057, Baring tel. to Granville, no. 757, 8 Dec. 1884; I.O./P&S Aden/5, Blair to Govt. of Bombay, no. 8/8, 9 Dec. 1884; F.O. 78/3859, Viceroy of India tel. to Kimberley, 23 Apr. 1885, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 Apr. 1885.
 4. I.O./P&S Dept. Memo./B.45, E. Neel, 'Restrictions on the trade in Arms etc. on the Red Sea and on the Somali Coasts', 14 May 1887.
 5. F.O. 78/3728, I.O. to F.O., 17 Dec. 1884.
 6. F.O.C.P. 5057, Granville to Lumley, no. 275, 29 Dec. 1884.

the Italians agreed, provided their rivals, the French, joined in. de Granville proposed an agreement to France in February 1885. No answer was returned, perhaps because of Anglo-French rivalry on the Somali Coast. By February 1886 Hogg was complaining that in the previous fourteen months he had had to allow 7,000 rifles, 3,000 muskets, 600 carbines, 832,000 percussion caps and 572,000 cartridges to pass through Aden to Obock, and he renewed his request for an Anglo-French agreement to limit the traffic.³ France was asked once more,⁴ and perhaps because, at the same time, news arrived of the murder of two French traders in Shoa and the robbery of their 2,000 guns,⁵ she agreed that restrictions were necessary.⁶

Although he thought the arms trade should be entirely prohibited,⁷ Hogg drafted a convention whereby the signatory powers were able to allow arms to be imported into or transported through their protectorates only under special licence.⁸ By the time this reached London, Rosebery, who believed in the need to limit the arms trade, had been replaced by

-
1. F.O. 78/3857, Lumley tel. to Granville, no. 3, 5 Jan. 1885.
 2. F.O. 78/3858, Granville to Waddington, 26 Feb. 1885.
 3. F.O. 78/3972, Hogg to Kimberley, 22 Feb. 1886 and 23 Feb. 1886, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 18 Mar. 1886.
 4. F.O. 78/3972, Rosebery to Lyons, no. 185, 30 Mar. 1886.
 5. F.O.C.P. 5331, Baring tel. to Rosebery, no. 36, 7 Apr. 1886.
 6. F.O. 78/3973, de Freycinet (French minister for foreign affairs) to Lyons, 25 May 1886, enclosed in Lyons to Rosebery, no. 264, 26 May 1886.
 7. I.O./P&S Aden/6, Hogg to Govt. of Bombay, no. 441/2376, 16 Nov. 1886.
 8. I.O./P&S Dept.Memo./B.45, Neel, 'Restrictions on the trade in Arms etc....', 14 May 1887; F.O. 78/4080, I.O. to F.O., 18 May 1887.

any, who was far less concerned about it.¹ He was not

the initiative in any negotiations on the subject with France, and so nothing was done.² As it was, the Anglo-French Somali Agreement of February 1888 contained a clause by which both nations undertook to prevent the import of arms into their protectorates,³ but as the French Government held that this did not cover arms in transit,⁴ and as they were keen to win Menelik's favour, the trade in arms from the Gulf of Tadjoura to Harar and Shoa was prosecuted with renewed vigour. This gave cause for alarm to the Italians, who were at war with King Johannes of Abyssinia, and they once again proposed a tripartite agreement to restrict the trade. As they were on such bad terms with France the proposal could only emanate from Britain, and so, to please the Italians, Salisbury approached the French Government and received a favourable response.⁶

Hogg's draft convention, tightened up so as virtually to prohibit the arms trade, was adopted as a model and given to the Italian Government for their consideration in June 1888.⁷ Meanwhile, the arms trade

-
1. See e.g.: R. Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London, 1952), p. 133, footnote 4.
 2. F.O. 78/4165, Salisbury to Kennedy, no. 13, 25 Jan. 1888.
 3. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 726-8.
 4. F.O. 78/4166, Lytton to Salisbury, no. 190, 28 Mar. 1888.
 5. F.O. 78/4165, Catalani to Pauncefoot, 8 Feb. 1888.
 6. F.O. 78/4165, Lytton to Salisbury, no. 129, 28 Feb. 1888.
 7. F.O. 78/4167, Salisbury to Catalani, 9 June 1888.

remained unabated, and it was not confined to the French. In January 1889 a party of 150 Russians, led by a Cossack named Atchinoff, landed at Sagallo with a quantity of arms for Abyssinia, but they were forcibly removed and ignominiously shipped back to Russia by the French.¹ It also began to suit Italian policy to win Menelik's support against King Johannes by sending him arms from Assab.²

France had never had any interest in stopping the arms traffic; now Italy had none. Nor could Salisbury understand why the Aden authorities were so keen to stop it:

'... what does it matter to us?' he wrote, 'Surely we can hold our own upon the coast, however much Menelik may arm. And what does it matter to us if he does become King of Abyssinia?'³

The next ten years were to give him an answer, but at the time his attitude, and that of the French and Italians, meant that the tripartite agreement was doomed to failure. Italy eventually accepted the main proposals of the convention in February 1889.⁴ It was then passed to the French, who also accepted it,⁵ but it was wrecked by Italy who suddenly announced that


-
1. F.O.C.F. 5794, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 17, 15 Jan. 1889; F.O. 78/4260, Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 29, 22 Jan. 1889; Lytton to Salisbury, no. 57, 8 Feb. 1889; Hogg tel. to Cross, 21 Feb. 1889, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 21 Feb. 1889; Walsh, Under the Flag..., pp. 335-7.
 2. F.O. 78/4260, journal of Hogg's visit to the coast, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1889; Stace to Baring, private, 21 Jan. 1889, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 73, 29 Jan. 1889; Lytton to Salisbury, no. 51, 2 Feb. 1889.
 3. F.O. 78/4168, minute by Salisbury n.d., on Portal to Salisbury, no. 287, 24 Aug. 1888.
 4. F.O. 78/4260, Catalani to F.O.; 18 Feb. 1889.
 5. F.O. 78/4260, Egerton to Salisbury, no. 247, 15 May 1889.

she could not bind herself not to send arms to Harar and Menelik whom she now claimed as under her protection.¹ France would never have agreed to a self-denying agreement with Britain which gave Italy a monopoly of the arms trade and so the whole idea was abandoned.² There was, however, still some hope of stopping the trade as the matter was discussed at the Brussels Conference of 1889-90 and the Brussels Act of 2 July 1890 prohibited the arms trade in most of tropical Africa.³ It turned out to be a dead letter as far as the Red Sea and Somali Coast were concerned. In the first place, as Italy claimed a protectorate over Ethiopia she was able, under the Brussels Act, to send arms into the country under the excuse that they were for her authorities there. In the second place, as Menelik himself acceded to the Act the French were able to continue pouring in arms under the excuse that they were supplying them to the Ethiopian Government which had acceded to the Brussels Act. The unrestricted traffic in arms to Ethiopia through Djibouti was to contribute largely to the defeat of Italy at Adowa in 1896 and to the discomfiture of Britain by the Sayyid Mohamed Abdulla Hassan from 1900 to 1920.

-
1. F.O. 78/4261, Marquis of Dufferin (British ambassador, Rome), to Salisbury, no. 239, 28 Nov. 1889.
 2. F.O.C.P. 5883, Salisbury to Lytton, no. 487, 6 Dec. 1889.
 3. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 494-497.

To face page 201

TO ILLUSTRATE CHAPTERS VI & VII.



KEY

..... Ethiopian Boundary
Claimed by Menelik's
Circular April 1891

-x-x-x-x Anglo-Italian
Boundaries 1891

..... Anglo-French
Boundary 1888

----- Anglo-Italian
Boundary 1894

Areas Surrendered
to Italy by Treaty
1894.

xxxxxxx Franco-Ethiopian
Boundary 1897

..... Anglo-Ethiopian
Boundary 1897

MILES
0 50 100

AN AFRICAN RIVAL (1):

ETHIOPIA UNDER ITALIAN 'PROTECTION'

In the 1880's the dominant theme in the history of the Somali Coast Protectorate had been the conflict with France; in the 1890's it was to be complications with Ethiopia. On 8 March 1889 King Johannes of Abyssinia met his death in a battle with the Mahdists and the way was left open for Menelik of Shoa to declare himself Johannes' successor and emperor of a united Ethiopia. As far as Franco-Italian rivalry was concerned, France appeared to be the immediate loser. Italy had been backing and arming Menelik, and by way of reward she obtained, in May 1889, the treaty of Uccialli, which promised her a clear predominance in Ethiopia. The treaty was to come into force as soon as Menelik had established himself as emperor¹ and in August Ras Makonnen was sent to Italy where he was received by King Humbert² and announced that Menelik had become lord of all Ethiopia. The treaty was duly ratified and Makonnen was sent home laden with arms and accompanied by an Italian resident.³ In October, Italy notified the

-
1. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 454-7.
 2. F.O. 78/4261, H.N. Dering (chargé d'affaires, Rome) to Salisbury, no. 188, 29 Aug. 1889.
 3. F.O. 78/4324, Count Tornielli (Italian ambassador, London) to Salisbury, 27 Mar. 1890; The Somali Peninsula, p. 31.

powers, under the terms of the Berlin Act, of the treaty of Uccialli, drawing particular attention to a clause in which Menelik agreed to conduct all his foreign relations through the Italian Government.¹ In other words, Italy was implying that she had a protectorate over Ethiopia.

It was not long before this protectorate was revealed as a facade. Menelik argued that his Amharic version of the treaty did not bind him to conduct his external relations through Italy;² he would not accept Italian protection and in March 1891 the Italian representatives left his country.³ Thereafter Italo-Ethiopian relations steadily deteriorated. In December 1893 Menelik denounced the Uccialli treaty⁴ and on 1 March 1896 he finally humiliated the Italians by crushing them at Aduwa. In trying to force a protectorate on the proud Ethiopian dynasty Italy had overreached herself, and her defeat in 1896 was caused partly by arms which she had herself supplied to Menelik.

In the long run France played the wiser game. She treated Menelik with respect and never recognised the Italian protectorate. Right up

-
1. F.O. 78/4261, Catalani to Salisbury, 12 Oct. 1889.
 2. See e.g.: F.O. 78/4325, Emperor Menelik to Queen Victoria, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 7 Nov. 1890; S. Rubenson, 'The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichale Treaty', Journal of African History, v (1964), 243-283; C. Giglio, 'Article 17 of the Treaty of Uccialli', Journal of African History, vi (1965), 221-231.
 3. F.O. 78/4402, Stace to Baring, 31 Mar. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 93, 16 Apr. 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4602, Menelik to Victoria, 5 Tahsas 1886, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 15 Feb. 1894.

to the battle of Aduwa, Italian pleas notwithstanding, she allowed thousands of guns and millions of cartridges to pour into Ethiopia through Djibouti¹ and quietly established her influence. The Aden resident reported that the rupture between Italy and Ethiopia had been engineered by French intrigue and by the promise of free port facilities at Djibouti.² Certainly the facts lent credence to this theory; it was a French gun-boat that carried Menelik's letters repudiating the Italian protectorate,³ Makonnen visited Djibouti,⁴ and in 1894 Menelik granted a concession for a railway from Djibouti to Harar.⁵

By comparison, Britain had no great interest in Ethiopia during the early 1890's, but despite her efforts to stand aloof she found herself being involved. Her European policy compelled her to support Italy's patently hollow protectorate, and the Somali Coast authorities were instructed to do what they could to assist the Italians.⁶ Salisbury made a point of sending all correspondence with the Ethiopians through

-
1. See e.g.: F.O. 78/4403, Stace to Hardinge, 2 Sept. 1891, enclosed in Hardinge to Salisbury, no. 207, 11 Sept. 1891; F.O. 78/4602, Jopp to Govt. of Bombay, 10 Nov. 1893, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 7 Feb. 1894; F.O. 78/4784, Harrington to Ferris, 31 Jan. 1896, enclosed in Rodd to Villiers, 12 Feb. 1896; Harrington to Ferris, 26 Feb. 1896, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 28, 11 Mar. 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4403, extract from Jopp to Neel, 6 Oct. 1891.
 3. F.O. 78/4526, Stace to Lord Cromer (Sir Evelyn Baring's new title), 31 Mar. 1893, enclosed in Cromer to Rosebery (secretary of state for foreign affairs), no. 71, 11 Apr. 1893.
 4. F.O.C.F. 6446, Cromer tel. to Rosebery, no. 84, 27 Apr. 1894.
 5. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 461-3.
 6. F.O. 633/5/511, Baring to Stace, private, 10 Dec. 1891.

Italian intermediaries¹ until the Italo-Ethiopian rupture made this impossible.² In 1891 Italy took advantage of Britain's friendship to ask permission for her political agent, who had had to leave Harar, to live in Zeila under the name of vice-consul.³ It was an attempt to get Britain to identify herself with Italy in the eyes of the Ethiopians and it would certainly have turned Zeila into a centre of political intrigue and incurred Makonnen's displeasure.⁴ Salisbury managed to refuse the request on the grounds that it would have encouraged France to seek a similar privilege,⁵ but, despite Indian protests, he was willing to allow the Italian political agent to live in Zeila in an unofficial capacity.⁶

Britain was further involved with Ethiopia because of Zeila's connection with the trade of Harar. The arms trade was prohibited at British ports and as it flourished at Djibouti Zeila began to suffer. Merchants wishing to join in the lucrative traffic had to move into the French protectorate, and they took their conventional trade with them. At the other end of the route Makonnen was naturally inclined to divert

-
1. F.O. 78/4402, Salisbury tel. to Baring, no. 11, 20 Feb. 1891.
 2. F.O. 78/4402, F.O. to I.O., 20 May 1891.
 3. F.O. 78/4402, Tornielli to F.O., 11 July 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4402, I.O. to F.O., 28 Aug. 1891; F.O. 78/4403, Jopp to Govt. of Bombay, 19 July 1891, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 30 July 1891, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 19 Sept. 1891.
 5. F.O. 78/4403, Salisbury to Dering, no. 163, 15 Sept. 1891.
 6. F.O. 78/4403, Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 211, 17 Nov. 1891.

caravans to the port which supplied him with arms. Stace argued that Britain was harming only herself by maintaining the prohibition¹ and Menelik complained that it was hindering his crusade against the Muslims.² Pending the result of the Brussels Conference Salisbury allowed Makonnen to take a large number of arms through Zeila when he returned from Italy in 1890³ and he later interpreted the Brussels Act as allowing the Ethiopian Government to import arms for its own use.⁴ In order to keep Makonnen's friendship and safeguard Zeila's trade both the Conservative and Liberal Governments allowed Ethiopia to import arms through Zeila⁵ until April 1895 when permission was withheld at the request of the Italian Government who saw that war was approaching.⁶

Britain was forced to concern herself with Ethiopia not only because of her European policy and Zeila's entrepôt trade but also for a far more compelling reason, Menelik's policy of expansion. Prior to 1887

-
1. F.O. 78/4260, Stace to Baring, private, 21 Jan. 1889, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 73, 29 Jan. 1889; F.O. 78/4261, Stace to Baring, 10 Nov. 1889, enclosed in Clarke to Salisbury, no. 385, 20 Nov. 1889.
 2. F.O. 78/4324, Menelik to Victoria, 14/15 Dec. 1889, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 29 Jan. 1890.
 3. F.O. 78/4261, F.O. to I.O., 24 Dec. 1889; F.O. 78/4324, Salisbury tel. to Baring, no. 9, 20 Jan. 1890.
 4. F.O.C.P. 6042, Salisbury to Baring, no. 228, 10 Nov. 1890; see also: F.O. 78/4324, Victoria to Menelik, 20 Feb. 1890.
 5. F.O. 78/4403, Salisbury tel. to Dufferin, no. 18, 4 Nov. 1891; F.O. 78/4527, Rosebery to Hardinge, no. 153, 25 Aug. 1893.
 6. F.O. 78/4689, Kimberley (secretary of state for foreign affairs) to Dufferin (British ambassador, Paris), no. 182, 9 Apr. 1895; Fowler tel. to Jopp, 11 Apr. 1895, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Apr. 1895.

independent city state of Harar had acted as a buffer between the British and the Somalis. After the capture of Harar in that year Menelik was preoccupied with consolidating his position in Abyssinia and it was not until he had firmly established himself as emperor in late 1889 that he was free to attend to the Somali country. In April 1891 he announced his policy in a circular letter which he addressed to Britain, Italy, France, Russia and Germany. It may be that this letter originated from an Italian suggestion,¹ but it bore the hallmark of the emperor's personal ambitions and both he and Makonnen were later to cite it as an authentic definition of Ethiopian territorial claims.² According to the circular the boundaries of Ethiopia included the whole of the country as we know it now (except for a portion to the north including Massawa) and in addition, part of the eastern Sudan, northern Kenya (including Lake Rudolf), and, what chiefly concerns us here, the territories of the Ogaden, Habr Awal, Gadaabursi and Issa. These were described as the actual limits of Ethiopia but Menelik added that he hoped to re-establish the ancient boundaries of his empire so as to include Khartoum, Lake Victoria and a sea-coast.³ Unfortunately, the

-
1. Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland, pp. 22-3.
 2. F.O. 78/4403, Baring to Salisbury, no. 82, 8 Dec. 1891, enclosing Ras Makonnen to Stace, 29 Takarat 1884; P.R.O., Foreign Office Papers, Series 1, vol. 32, Rodd (special envoy to Menelik, Addis Ababa) to Salisbury, no. 15, 4 May 1897.
 3. F.O. 78/4402, Menelik to Victoria, 14 Mezia 1883, (21 Apr. 1891), enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 9 July 1891; see also: The Somali Peninsula, pp. 10, 33-4, 86-7; French Somaliland in True Perspective, published by Minister of Somali Affairs, Mogadiscio (Mogadiscio, n.d. but 1966), pp. 10-13.

significance of the letter was lost on its recipients. Britain and many took the attitude that it was the responsibility of Italy, the protecting power, to define Ethiopia's boundaries¹ and Salisbury sent a reply to Menelik to this effect through the Italians.² Without paying to notice Menelik's claim to control Somali clans which they considered to be in their protectorate, the British Government dismissed the circular from their minds. In so doing they seriously underestimated the emperor's strength and determination. They failed to realise that Menelik's firearms made him a formidable power bent on absorbing all the Somalis until he reached the sea.³

There is some evidence that Salisbury foresaw that the Somali Coast Protectorate was going to involve Britain in the Franco-Italian struggle for predominance in Ethiopia, and that he felt hampered by having to refer all Somaliland matters to the Government of India. That Government were likely to put their own Indian interests before Salisbury's wider Imperial interests, and he wished for a freer hand. In March 1890 he suggested that the protectorate should be transferred to the British Government.⁴ In India, Lord Lansdowne's Government were

-
1. F.O. 78/4402, Salisbury to Trench (secretary of embassy, Berlin) no. 149, 24 July 1891; Malet to Salisbury, no. 144, 31 July 1891.
 2. F.O.C.P. 6176, Victoria to Menelik, 18 Aug. 1891, enclosed in Salisbury to Tornielli, 22 Aug. 1891; The Somali Peninsula, p. 34.
 3. For a description of Ethiopian ambitions see: F.O. 78/4527, extracts from H. Swayne's private journal, Feb.-Mar. 1893, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 14 Aug. 1893.
 4. I.O./P&S to India/16, Cross to Govt. of India, no. 16 Sec., 11 July 1890.

desired to keep control of Aden, and they were equally unwilling to
 the Somali Coast out of their grasp as they suspected that
 Salisbury planned to hand it over to some other European power,
 presumably Italy. They were so indiscreet in their criticism of the
 the minister's policy, which made the Somali Coast subservient to the
 requirements of European politics, that their letter was withheld from
 him. At the same time they asked that Britain should pay half the
 bill for administering Aden and bear the cost of any measures in the
 interior of Somaliland which were not directly occasioned by the needs
 of Aden.¹ It was further suggested that as Britain benefited from the
 occupation of Aden and the Somali Coast she should provide and pay a
 full-time consul to relieve the hardpressed first assistant resident
 at Aden.²

The Government of India could not hope to have it both ways; the
 Treasury would pay nothing unless Britain were given complete control.
 Lord Cross, the secretary of state for India, agreed that India should
 not hand over the protectorate to the mercy of changeable British
 opinion, but others in the India Office, such as Sir Arthur Godley,
 the permanent under-secretary and Sir Alfred Lyall of the India Council,
 disagreed. They thought Somaliland was a financial burden and that

-
1. I.O./P&S India/63, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 79 Sec., 28 May 1891.
 2. I.O./P&S India/62, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 1362, 28 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Govt. of India to Cross, no. 46 Sec., 18 Mar. 1891.

survey. Furthermore, although Salisbury had wanted to define the western limits of Italian influence so as to keep them away from the Nile Valley¹ there was no such pressing need for defining the southern boundary of the Somali Coast Protectorate. On the contrary, the longer it could be delayed, the better, for any agreement which included Zeila in the British sphere would provide an unfortunate precedent for destroying the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.² The Italians frequently asked for a delimitation in Somaliland and on at least one occasion Salisbury put them off by hinting that Turkey would protest, not only about Zeila, but also about Massawa.³ The Indian Government were equally keen to postpone any definition because Italian explorers had gathered far more information about the hinterland than the few British visitors and they wanted to wait for the results of the Swaynes' surveys.⁴ Salisbury used Indian reluctance as another excuse for delay.⁵

Italy was not to be put off indefinitely and when Rosebery succeeded Salisbury in 1892 she brought forward a boundary proposal.⁶ In some respects this was more favourable than the British Government had

-
1. Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, pp. 303-6.
 2. Sal.P., A/55/69 (771), Salisbury to Baring, private, 4 Dec. 1891.
 3. F.O. 78/4403, Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 225, 12 Dec. 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4403, I.O. to F.O., 9 Oct. 1891; Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 28 Oct. 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 12 Dec. 1891; I.O. to F.O., 20 Nov. 1891.
 5. F.O. 78/4403, Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 192, 27 Oct. 1891.
 6. F.O. 78/4526, Vivian to Rosebery, no. 1 Africa, 9 Jan. 1893.

expected¹ and Rosebery expressed himself unwilling to be made 'the channel for a mere dogged and unreasonable "non possumus" to the prima^A facie reasonable proposals of the Italian Govt.'² The Government of India agreed to negotiations.³ With Lord Harris at Bombay and Lord Lansdowne⁴ as Viceroy, there was no question of limiting their claims to a coast protectorate and disregarding the zone to the south.⁵ Rather, it was a question of sorting out two overlapping hinterlands, the British one south of the Gulf of Aden and the Italian one west of the Indian Ocean. Until 1891 the British had neglected their hinterland, but Italian explorers had quickly pushed inland from Obbia reaching the Dolbohanta⁶ and making treaties of protection with Ogaden lineage groups near Milmil.⁷

Lansdowne and the Indian Government had originally envisaged a long

-
1. I.O./P&S to India/20, Kimberley to Govt. of India, no. 6 Sec., 3 Feb. 1893.
 2. F.O. 78/4526, minute by Rosebery, 8 Feb. 1893, on I.O. to F.O., 1 Feb. 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/4526, Viceroy of India (Lord Lansdowne) tel. to Kimberley, 27 Mar. 1893, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Apr. 1893.
 4. Petty-Fitzmaurice, Henry Charles Keith, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne (later K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.M.G., D.C.L., LL.D.), 1845-1927; began political career as a Liberal; 1869-72, junior lord of Treasury; 1872-4, under-secretary for war; 1880, under-secretary for India; resigned because of Gladstone's Irish policy, 1880; 1883-8, governor-general of Canada; 1888-94, governor-general of India; 1895-1900, secretary of state for war under Salisbury; 1900-05, secretary of state for foreign affairs; 1915-16, minister without portfolio in coalition government.
 5. F.O. 78/4325, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 123 Sec., 7 Oct. 1890, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Nov. 1890.
 6. F.O. 78/4402, Lieut. H. Merewether (political agent, Berbera) to Sealy, 8 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 43, 21 Feb. 1891.
 7. C.O. 537/44, list of treaties etc., enclosed in report of Wingate Mission, 12 June 1909.

British corridor running south-west from the Somali Coast to join up with the territories of the Imperial British East Africa Company (later known as Uganda and Kenya),¹ presumably to give them an outlet to the Gulf of Aden.² This impractical dream had been ruled out by the Anglo-Italian agreements of 1891,³ and the question remaining was whether the Dolbohanta and Ogaden clans should be included in the British protectorate. The Government of India never doubted that the Ishaak (Habr Awal, Habr. Gerhajis and Habr Toljaala), Esa, Gadabursi and Warsangeli should be included, even though there were no protectorate treaties with the Esa and Gadabursi, and though the treaty with the Habr Gerhajis had been made with a small, independent, coastal section of that clan.⁴

From 1891 onwards there was considerable discussion as to whether the Ogaden and Dolbohanta should be included. Baring hoped that the negotiations with Italy would be conducted by someone 'who does not think that the honour and interests of England oblige her to annex as many wild African tribes as possible.'⁵ Nonetheless, the advice of the

-
1. F.O. 78/4325, I.O. to F.O., 13 Nov. 1890, enclosing Govt. of India to Cross, no. 123 Sec., 7 Oct. 1890.
 2. The idea of a camel route, and even a railway, between East Africa and Berbera, was later put forward by Harald Swayne, but it met with no response. See: I.O./P&S Dept. Memo./B.64a, H. Swayne, 'Political Influence exerted in Somaliland by Great Britain, Italy, France and Abyssinia', 28 Dec. 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/4402, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 114, Sec., 7 July 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 6 Aug. 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4471, H. Swayne to Stace, 13 Dec. 1891, enclosed I.O. to F.O., 27 July 1892.
 5. Sal.P., A/54/79, Baring to Salisbury, private, 11 Dec. 1891.

expected¹ and Rosebery expressed himself unwilling to be made 'the channel for a mere dogged and unreasonable "non possumus" to the prima^A facie reasonable proposals of the Italian Govt.'² The Government of India agreed to negotiations.³ With Lord Harris at Bombay and Lord Lansdowne⁴ as Viceroy, there was no question of limiting their claims to a coast protectorate and disregarding the zone to the south.⁵ Rather, it was a question of sorting out two overlapping hinterlands, the British one south of the Gulf of Aden and the Italian one west of the Indian Ocean. Until 1891 the British had neglected their hinterland, but Italian explorers had quickly pushed inland from Obbia reaching the Dolbohanta⁶ and making treaties of protection with Ogaden lineage groups near Milmil.⁷

Lansdowne and the Indian Government had originally envisaged a long

-
1. I.O./P&S to India/20, Kimberley to Govt. of India, no. 6 Sec., 3 Feb. 1893.
 2. F.O. 78/4526, minute by Rosebery, 8 Feb. 1893, on I.O. to F.O., 1 Feb. 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/4526, Viceroy of India (Lord Lansdowne) tel. to Kimberley, 27 Mar. 1893, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Apr. 1893.
 4. Petty-Fitzmaurice, Henry Charles Keith, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne (later K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.M.G., D.C.L., LL.D.), 1845-1927; began political career as a Liberal; 1869-72, junior lord of Treasury; 1872-4, under-secretary for war; 1880, under-secretary for India; resigned because of Gladstone's Irish policy, 1880; 1883-8, governor-general of Canada; 1888-94, governor-general of India; 1895-1900, secretary of state for war under Salisbury; 1900-05, secretary of state for foreign affairs; 1915-16, minister without portfolio in coalition government.
 5. F.O. 78/4325, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 123 Sec., 7 Oct. 1890, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Nov. 1890.
 6. F.O. 78/4402, Lieut. H. Merewether (political agent, Berbera) to Sealy, 8 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 43, 21 Feb. 1891.
 7. C.O. 537/44, list of treaties etc., enclosed in report of Wingate Mission, 12 June 1909.

British territory running south-west from the Somali Coast to join up with the territories of the Imperial British East Africa Company (later known as Uganda and Kenya),¹ presumably to give them an outlet to the Gulf of Aden.² This impractical dream had been ruled out by the Anglo-Italian agreements of 1891,³ and the question remaining was whether the Dolbohanta and Ogaden clans should be included in the British protectorate. The Government of India never doubted that the Ishaak (Habr Awal, Habr Gerhajis and Habr Toljaala), Esa, Gadabursi and Warsangeli should be included, even though there were no protectorate treaties with the Esa and Gadabursi, and though the treaty with the Habr Gerhajis had been made with a small, independent, coastal section of that clan.⁴

From 1891 onwards there was considerable discussion as to whether the Ogaden and Dolbohanta should be included. Baring hoped that the negotiations with Italy would be conducted by someone 'who does not think that the honour and interests of England oblige her to annex as many wild African tribes as possible.'⁵ Nonetheless, the advice of the

-
1. F.O. 78/4325, I.O. to F.O., 13 Nov. 1890, enclosing Govt. of India to Cross, no. 123 Sec., 7 Oct. 1890.
 2. The idea of a camel route, and even a railway, between East Africa and Berbera, was later put forward by Harald Swayne, but it met with no response. See: I.O./P&S Dept. Memo./B.64a, H. Swayne, 'Political Influence exerted in Somaliland by Great Britain, Italy, France and Abyssinia', 28 Dec. 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/4402, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 114, Sec., 7 July 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 6 Aug. 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4471, H. Swayne to Stace, 13 Dec. 1891, enclosed I.O. to F.O., 27 July 1892.
 5. Sal.P., A/54/79, Baring to Salisbury, private, 11 Dec. 1891.

the spot tended in this direction. Harald Swayne's travels convinced him that British influence extended as far south as the River Shelli; he reported that within this area British biladiya escorted caravans, and that all the clans, including the Dolbohanta and many Ogaden, took their grievances and trade to Berbera, and looked to Britain as their 'Government' and protector. On the other hand, he found that effective British control was limited to the area north of the Haud, and covered only the Esa, Gadabursi and Ishaak, but not their Haud grazing grounds.¹ Stace, who had appointed a number of Dolbohanta akik, argued forcefully for the inclusion of this clan in the British sphere, and Jopp at Aden, supported him. They realised that it was not practicable to include the Ogaden, and were willing to see them go to Italy, but certainly not the Dolbohanta.² The Government of Bombay agreed, and evolved the principle that all clans trading through the British coast should be included in the British protectorate,³ but the Government of India were unwilling to commit themselves to any responsibilities towards

-
1. F.O. 78/4471, H. Swayne to Stace, 13 Dec. 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 July 1892; I.O./P&S Bombay/38/39, H.&E. Swayne, 'Report on an Exploration in Somali-land...', enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 1265, 22 Feb. 1893.
 2. F.O. 78/4403, memorandum by Stace, 27 Sept. 1891, and Jopp to Govt. of Bombay, 4 Oct. 1891, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O. 12 Dec. 1891; F.O. 78/4471, Stace to Jopp, 27 Oct. 1891, Jopp to Govt. of Bombay, 29 Oct. 1891, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 23 Mar. 1892; Stace to Jopp, 5 Jan. 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 July 1892.
 3. F.O. 78/4403, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 28 Oct. 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 12 Dec. 1891; F.O. 78/4471, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 19 Dec. 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 23 Mar. 1892; Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 12 Mar. 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 July 1892.

Assistant and turbulent Dolbohanta. They recommended that this clan should remain outside both the Italian and British protectorates.¹

In January 1893 the Italians produced their definite boundary proposals. These gave Britain a hinterland of about 56,000 square miles. The proposed frontier started from the Anglo-French boundary line, skirted a number of Somali clans near Harar, ran due east along the latitude 9°N (which corresponded roughly with the northern boundary of the Haud) until it met the longitude 49°E (which was conveniently taken to be the Warsangeli - Mijertein boundary) which it followed due north to the sea at Bender Ziada.² This line would have put the Ishaak in the Italian sphere when they went south into the Haud, and it divided the Dolbohanta between the two powers. The Government of Bombay were prepared to accept it if it were drawn nearer to Harar in the west, and further south in the east so as to include all the Dolbohanta in the British sphere, a modification which would have added about 12,00 square miles to the Italian offer.³ The Government of India were far more ambitious. They wanted to include not only all the Dolbohanta, but also all the Haud pastures of the Ishaak, and all the territory of the Ogaden as far as the Shibeli, over 300 miles from Berbera; this amounted

-
1. F.O. 78/4471, Govt. of India to Cross, no. 31 Sec., 17 Feb. 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 23 Mar. 1892.
 2. F.O. 78/4526, Vivian to Rosebery, no. 1. Africa, 9 Jan. 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/4526, Viceroy of India tel. to Kimberley, 27 Mar. 1893, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 Apr. 1893.

possess the barren Nijertein coast.¹ All that Italy obtained was a worthless assurance that her subjects in Zeila would receive the same treatment as British subjects.

The Italians therefore had to revert to discussing the earlier boundary proposals. Their representatives met with British officials, including Harald Swayne, in London in March 1894. They were prepared to grant Britain's request for a boundary along 8°N if she would surrender the two southern corners. In the south-east this presented no problem; this part of the Nogal valley was quite unexplored, and Britain conceded 2,500 square miles. In any case, it was thought that this new proposal would result in the frontier following the Dolbohanta-Nijertein boundary more exactly. It was Italy's demand for 5,000 square miles in the south-western corner near Milmil that caused difficulties and argument. Harald Swayne asserted that there was absolutely no Italian influence in this area and that the Ogaden sub-clans there took both their livestock and their disputes to Berbera. The Italians insisted that Milmil was an essential watering point on the caravan route from Harar to the Indian Ocean (a route that existed mainly in their imagination) and they said that they had definite instructions not to give way on this point. The deadlock was resolved by Kimberley, who had now moved to the Foreign Office, and who was not willing to push Italy too hard. He agreed to surrender the Milmil

1. F.O. 78/4602, I.O. to F.O., 15 Feb. 1894.

corner on condition that Britain should have the right to take temporary and exceptional measures against the Ogaden or Ishaak there to ensure the safety of her trade. In addition, as the Somali Coast hinterland had been greatly disturbed by Ethiopian raids from Harar, Britain obtained the right to communicate directly with the harar authorities on the subject of incursions even though she recognised Harar and the rest of Ethiopia as an Italian protectorate. Both these concessions, the one allowing Britain to operate across the border in the Milmil area, the other allowing her to communicate with Harar, were provisional, and were to cease when Italy had established her authority sufficiently in both places so as to make them unnecessary.¹

Although the Government of India disapproved of the way their boundary proposals had been whittled down,² they acquiesced. The final decisions were embodied in an Anglo-Italian protocol, signed in Rome on 5 May 1894.³ Britain's 80N southern boundary, without the Milmil and Nogal corners, gave her an area of about 76,000 square miles. The special concessions, allowing Britain to operate in the Milmil area and

-
1. I.O./P&S Dept.Memo./B.66, memorandum by Neel, 10 Mar. 1894; notes by H. Swayne, 10 Mar. 1894; memorandum by H. Swayne, 22 Mar. 1894; minutes of meeting by Neel, 24 Mar. 1894; F.O. 78/4602, F.O. to I.O., 29 Mar. 1894.
 2. F.O. 78/4602, Viceroy (Lord Elgin) tel. to Fowler, 12 Apr. 1894, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 18 Apr. 1894.
 3. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), iii, 951, and map on p. 952; Parl. Papers 1894, xcvi (181), 'Treaty Series no. 17, 1894'.

... note from Britain, disclaiming any designs on the status of Harar, promising to observe the spirit of the 1888 agreement and conceding that France had an equal right to communicate with Harar. Despite this, he never withdrew his reservations about the protocol as a whole.¹

It was unfortunate that Britain agreed to make the declaration confidential,² for she had nothing to hide. It was not only Hanotaux who was misled by the secrecy to suspect other motives. In 1920 Leonard Woolf actually denied the existence of the confidential declaration,³ and in 1935 Langer misinterpreted it.⁴ He was followed in 1961, by Robinson and Gallagher, who saw the whole agreement as a part of the British attempt to build 'barriers against any incursion into the Nile Valley,....' This interpretation attributed to Rosebery, the prime minister, three motives for thus encouraging Italy in Ethiopia. First, that he wished to keep her support in the Mediterranean, which is probable. Second, that he hoped 'that if the Italians mastered Menelik, this would dispose of the chance that he might appear in Nile Valley as a French ally.' It is doubtful whether Rosebery, Kimberley or Salisbury seriously imagined that the Italians might master Menelik. Both the Indian and Foreign Offices considered the Italian presence in

-
1. F.O. 78/4603, Kimberley to Dufferin, no. 361, 14 Aug. 1894; F.O. 78/4689, Hanotaux to Dufferin, 12 Mar. 1895, enclosed in Dufferin to Kimberley, no. 97, 17 Mar. 1895.
 2. F.O. 78/4602, Kimberley to Ford, no. 99, 7 May 1894.
 3. See note at the end of this chapter.
 4. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, p. 131.

Ethiopia a broken reed, their protectorate a hollow mockery¹ and their pretensions to control the Ethiopians mythical.² It was precisely because Italy was powerless and ineffectual in Ethiopia that Britain had demanded the right to intervene near Milmil and communicate with Harar. The only possible way for Italy to have 'mastered Menelik' was by force of arms; there was no evidence that Rosebery was hoping for or expecting this. The third motive attributed to Rosebery is described thus:

'... the kernel of the bargain lay in the secret annexes. Here Britain recognised Italian sway in Ogaden and Harar - and so over Menelik; what was more, she was empowered to treat Harar as part of her own sphere until Italy was ready to take over. Once under British sway, the province would bar the way between Ethiopia and French Somaliland.'³

This is not so. All that Britain wanted, and obtained, was the right to take punitive action against the Somali clans in the Milmil area and to communicate with Harar about Ethiopian raids. There was no question of taking Harar under British sway to keep France out of Ethiopia or the Nile Valley. Kimberley himself recorded the reason for the Harar concession:

'It was made solely with the view of enabling our authorities in Somali Land to communicate with Harar on frontier matters, and was founded on a suggestion of mine, as I knew from experience at the India Office the extreme inconvenience of having no direct means of communicating with Harar.'⁴

-
1. F.O. 78/4527, I.O. to F.O., 2 Nov. 1893.
 2. F.O. 78/4602, I.O. to F.O.(B), 28 Feb. 1894, minute by Sanderson, n.d.
 3. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 331-2; G.N. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile (Edinburgh, 1965), has been similarly misled, see p. 165.
 4. F.O. 78/4602, minute by Kimberley, 3 June 1894, on Ford to Kimberley, no. 98, 30 May 1894.

The Anglo-Italian protocol of 1894 was not a part of the British strategy for keeping others out of the Nile Valley. It had begun with Italy, who wanted Britain to recognise the territory between Harar and the Indian Ocean as Italian. Salisbury and Rosebery had deferred it as long as they were able. It was no more than a Somaliland boundary agreement. In return for abandoning certain Ogaden sub-clans Britain obtained two concessions to facilitate the keeping of peace in her own protectorate. If the agreement had any significance it lay in the fact that Britain had bargained away a number of Somali groups which, she acknowledged, looked to her as their protector. Anyway, the agreement was a dead letter, for Italy had no influence. While the representatives of these two European powers sat around the conference table, blithely dividing the hinterland between themselves, Ethiopian raiders from Harar were ruthlessly and effectively incorporating it in their empire.

Ethiopian expansion into Somaliland radiated outwards from Harar. To the north Menelik first tried to exert his influence peacefully; in November 1890 he wrote to Queen Victoria asking for control over the trade route to Zeila.¹ Britain could see no advantage in this, and it would have been contrary to the 1888 agreement with France which neutralised the trade route.² No answer was sent. Having waited ten

-
1. F.O.C.P. 6133, Menelik to Victoria, 2 Nov. 1890, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 341, 31 Dec. 1890.
 2. F.O. 78/4402, I.O. to F.O., 18 Mar. 1891.

French, Ethiopian troops and workmen were sent from Harar to build a small fort on the road.¹ They chose a spot ninety miles from Harar, a hundred miles from Zeila, and situated actually on the Anglo-French boundary: Bio Caboba. The Esa, in whose territory this was, were incensed,² and Stace was equally annoyed. He suspected that it was a French intrigue to divert trade to Djibouti and he feared that the advance would not end at Bio Caboba.³ Makonnen claimed that the purpose of the building was merely to protect traders on the road.⁴

The British Government favoured the idea of a joint Anglo-French demand to Makonnen to withdraw from Bio Caboba.⁵ Italy, however, was so anxious not to give France any pretext for intervention in Ethiopia that she persuaded Britain to leave it to her to remonstrate with Makonnen in her role as protecting power.⁶ This produced an assurance from Makonnen that he would withdraw, although, he said, he was only building a rest house, in Ethiopian territory.⁷ It was an empty assurance, for in November 1891 Stace received a letter from Makonnen, reasserting that

-
1. F.O. 78/4389, Hardinge tel. to Salisbury, no. 82, 9 Sept. 1891.
 2. F.O. 78/4389, Hardinge tel. to Salisbury, no. 83, 14 Sept. 1891.
 3. F.O. 78/4403, Stace to Baring, 24 Sept. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 229, 2 Oct. 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4403, Makonnen to Stace, 23 Makram 1884, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 247, 28 Oct. 1891.
 5. F.O.C.P. 6176, I.O. to F.O., 16 Sept. 1891.
 6. F.O. 78/4403, Dering tel. to Salisbury, no. 44, 20 Sept. 1891; Dering to Salisbury, no. 149, 24 Sept. 1891, I.O. to F.O., 10 Oct. 1891.
 7. F.O. 78/4403, Makonnen to Cecchi (Italian consul-general, Aden), 30 Mascarram 1884, enclosed in Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 176, 5 Nov. 1891; Makonnen to Stace, 30 Mascarram 1884, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 253, 5 Nov. 1891.

Bio Caboba was Ethiopian and stating that the troops would remain there for all.¹ The Government of India were full of indignation and wanted to issue threats of further action, but the British Government were not prepared to use force and so nothing was done.² Makonnen's troops stayed on in their so-called rest house, a wretched rubble building shored up with timber,³ and did little more than cause occasional inconvenience to travellers.⁴ Five years later a British officer wrote of Bio Caboba

'The post consists of a fragile blockhouse built of loose stones and thatched with straw, the whole enclosed within a thorn fence..., it is garrisoned by seven men... a nondescript and ragged riff-raff of Somali and Sudanese - no Abyssinians amongst them,... these poor devils, who received no pay... only lived on passing caravans....'⁵

Despite Stace's protests, this weak Ethiopian post had been established in Somali territory claimed by Britain, with complete impunity; it was a monument to successful Ethiopian encroachment; Makonnen was not to forget it.

This activity north of Harar was small by comparison with the

-
1. F.O. 78/4403, Makonnen to Stace, 29 Takarat 1891 (?), enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 282, 8 Dec. 1891.
 2. F.O. 78/4471, I.O. to F.O., 4 Feb. 1892, enclosing Viceroy of India tel. to Cross, 22 Jan. 1892; F.O. to I.O., 10 Feb. 1892.
 3. I.O./P&S Bombay/38/39, H.&E. Swayne, 'Report on an Exploration in Somaliland...', enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 1265, 22 Feb. 1893.
 4. F.O.C.P. 6298, Stace to Baring, 15 Mar. 1892, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 57, 23 Mar. 1892.
 5. A.E.W. Gleichen, With the Mission to Menelik 1897. (London 1898), p. 27, quoted in The Somali Peninsula, p. 50.

~~Harar~~ push eastwards. Sanderson guessed correctly that Makonnen would use the arms he took through Zeila in 1890 'for the purpose of increasing the territory of Harar at the expense of the hinder parts of the British Protectorate.'¹ Makonnen's army numbered perhaps 20,000 well-armed, badly disciplined, irregular troops.² When there was no other positive employment for them it was inevitable that they should inflict their presence on the districts surrounding Harar, especially on the frequent occasions when the area was visited by famine. Their methods were simple and effective. Under rapacious officers, far from Makonnen's strong control, they seized Somali livestock. Sometimes they made the excuse that they were collecting tax or tribute; often they did not bother with excuses. Any resistance met with shooting, mutilation and the burning of huts. In the face of this rapine, unarmed Somalis were practically helpless.³

-
1. F.O. 78/4324, minute by Sanderson, n.d., on Baring tel. to Salisbury, no. 5, 9 Jan. 1890.
 2. F.O. 78/4403, memorandum by Stace, 31 Oct. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 259, 11 Nov. 1891.
 3. It may seem that I have overstated the case, but there is ample unbiased supporting evidence in contemporary reports: see, e.g. I.O./B.P.C./1892, pp. 845-6, summary of Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1891-2; I.O./P&S Bombay/38/39, H.&E. Swayne, 'Report on an Exploration in Somali-land...', enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 1265, 22 Feb. 1893; I.O./P&S Dept.Memo./B64a, H.Swayne, 'Political Influence exerted in Somaliland...', 28 Dec. 1893; F.O. 78/4527, Lieut.-Col. A. Paget (Scots Guards) to Bertie, 17 June 1893; F.O. 78/4688, report by Italian agent, Harar, 31 Dec. 1894, enclosed in Ford to Kimberley, no. 24, 23 Jan. 1895; H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips (3rd edn.), pp. 127-132; F.B. Pearce, Rambles in Lion Land (London, 1898), pp. 168-178; Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries, pp. 45-109. For a possibly partisan description see: The Somali Peninsula, pp. 41-3.

In the immediate vicinity of Harar certain Darod clans were rapidly forced into subjection; more distant ones were so cowed that they paid regular tribute rather than be ravaged. In January 1891 the first large Ethiopian force was sent into the Ogaden, as far south as the Shibelli river. Reports were received that this force had looted clans and attacked trade caravans¹ but it also seems that it was decimated by thirst and returned to Harar with cholera.² The expedition caused great alarm among the British protected clans. There were rumours that Hargeisa would be attacked³ and the Gadabursi petitioned for full British protection.⁴ The Berbera political agent asked for reinforcements and there were fears of an armed clash with the Ethiopians. A warship was sent to Berbera 'to inspire confidence',⁵ and a British officer was sent to hoist the flag at Hargeisa.⁶ In fact, the panic was based on

-
1. F.O. 78/4402, Sealy to Baring, 3 Jan. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 13, 14 Jan. 1891; Morrison (Bulhar) to Lieut. Merewether (political agent, Berbera), 1 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 43, 21 Feb. 1891.
 2. F.O. 78/4402, Sealy to Hogg, 7 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 43, 21 Feb. 1891; I.O./B.P.C./1892, pp. 845-6, summary of Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1891-2.
 3. F.O. 78/4402, Merewether to Sealy, 9 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 43, 21 Feb. 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4402, Sealy to Hogg, 7 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 43, 21 Feb. 1891; Sealy to Baring, demi-official, 9 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 44, 21 Feb. 1891; Sealy to Baring, 16 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 53, 7 Mar. 1891.
 5. F.O. 78/4402, Sealy to Baring, 12 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 43, 21 Feb. 1891.
 6. F.O. 78/4402, Sealy to Baring, 16 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 52, 7 Mar. 1891.

rumour: no Ethiopian soldiers appeared within many miles of Hargeisa¹ and the scare subsided. The officers on the coast had been too precipitate. Stace had been absent on leave, and when he returned in March 1891 he issued strict orders that no action was to be taken without reference to Aden; complications with Ethiopia were studiously avoided.² Nine days later further alarm was caused by a reported Ethiopian invasion of the Gadabursi. Stace restrained the Zeila political agent from hoisting the flag inland³ and the whole incident was later proved to have been greatly exaggerated.⁴ The Indian Government did not consider it sufficient cause to grant the Gadabursi request for a treaty of protection⁵ and the British Government contented themselves with an ineffective protest through the Italians.⁶ Perhaps predictably, this only drew from Makonnen the claim that the Gadabursi were Ethiopian subjects.⁷

Hargeisa continued to be disturbed by rumours throughout 1891, as the

-
1. F.O. 78/4402, Sealy to Baring, 4 Mar. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 60, 12 Mar. 1891.
 2. F.O. 78/4402, memorandum by Stace, 8 Mar. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 83, 8 Apr. 1891.
 3. F.O. 78/4402, Aden resident tel. to Cross, 17 Mar. 1891, enclosed in Neel to Bertie, private, 18 Mar. 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4403, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1890-1, by Stace, 23 June 1891.
 5. F.O. 78/4402, Viceroy tel. to Cross, 21 Mar. 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Mar. 1891.
 6. F.O. 78/4402, Salisbury tel. to Dufferin, no. 6, 19 Mar. 1891; Rudini (Italian prime minister) to Dufferin, 21 Mar. 1891, enclosed in Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 51, 24 Mar. 1891.
 7. F.O. 78/4402, Makonnen to Nerazzini (Italian agent, Harar), sent to F.O. by Tornielli, 6 Aug. 1891.

Swayne discovered when they arrived there in May. From their new fort of Jijiga, Ethiopian soldiers were demanding tribute from the clans on the Hand.¹ The Jibril Abokir had fallen back on the Ayal Yunis grazing grounds and were demanding that Britain should fulfil her treaty obligations and protect them.² In fact Britain appeared to do just the opposite; the flag was hastily withdrawn from Hargeisa and Sheikh Maddar's request for rifles was turned down.³ All that Stace would do was address a very conciliatory letter to Makonnen, asking him to restrain his soldiers; he received an equally polite reply to the effect that the Gadabursi and Habr Awal were Ethiopian subjects.⁴ The pressure on the clans was lifted, not through any British action in their defence, but by the withdrawal of the Ethiopians to Harar. While the Government of India admitted that:

'the obligations assumed by the British Government towards the tribes with whom Treaties containing a "Protectorate" provision have been concluded, undoubtedly amount to an undertaking to intervene actively on their behalf in the last resort in case of any unprovoked attack on them or their territories,...'⁵

they were to take care that the last resort never should be reached.

-
1. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.) pp. 94-106; a good photograph of the Jijiga fort is contained in I.O./P&S Bombay/38/39, H. & E. Swayne, 'Report on an Exploration in Somali-land...', enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 1265, 22 Feb. 1893.
 2. F.O.C.P. 6176, Stace to Jopp, 30 June 1891, and enclosures, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 17 July 1891.
 3. F.O.C.P., 6176, Stace to Jopp, 8 July 1891, and another of same date, received at F.O. 24 July and 25 July 1891.
 4. F.O. 78/4402, Stace to Makonnen, 1 July 1891, Makonnen to Stace, 5 Amlil 1883, both enclosed in Hardinge to Salisbury, no. 191, 15 Aug. 1891.
 5. F.O. 78/4403, Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 26 Aug. 1891, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 29 Oct. 1891.

They were prepared to punish the protected clans but not to protect them. As a result, Ethiopian expansion was encouraged. In 1895 Makonnen even advanced claims to Hargeisa, and complained about a stone building which was being put up by Lord Delamere as a hunting base.¹ The Gadabursi continued to receive visits from Ethiopian soldiers who shot elephants and helped themselves to whatever they fancied,² and whenever Jijiga was occupied the Jibril Abokir were liable to be raided for tribute. Complaints were made to Makonnen, but he simply denied the charges;³ beyond that the British authorities did nothing.⁴ There were recurrent, large scale raids into the Ogaden, where thousands of camels and cattle were seized.⁵ The Somali Coast authorities began to talk of the 'ruin' and 'depopulation' of the Ogaden,⁶ as hordes of disorderly Ethiopian troops spread terror all the way down to the Shibeli and into the Galla country beyond. At times, hundreds of

-
1. F.O. 78/4690, Makonnen to Ferris, 21 Amli 1887, enclosed in Rodd to Salisbury, no. 112, 24 Aug. 1895.
 2. F.O. 78/4527, Stace to Hardinge, 10 Aug. 1893, enclosed in Hardinge to Rosebery, no. 152, 22 Aug. 1893; F.O. 78/4602, Sealy to Aden resident, 14 Feb. 1894, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 10 Apr. 1894.
 3. F.O. 78/4526, Stace to Jopp, 17 Sept. 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Jan. 1893.
 4. F.O. 78/4527, I.O. to F.O., 2 Nov. 1893, enclosing Jopp to Govt. of Bombay, 12 Aug. 1893.
 5. F.O. 78/4471, Stace to Baring, 12 Apr. 1892, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 76, 20 Apr. 1892; F.O. 78/4688, report by Italian agent, Harar, 31 Dec. 1894, enclosed in Ford to Kimberley, no. 24, 23 Jan. 1895.
 6. F.O. 78/4526, Stace to Jopp, 17 Sept. 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Jan. 1893; F.O. 78/4784, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1894-5, by Ferris, 13 Sept. 1895, para. 9.

refugees flocked to Berbera.¹ In 1895 Ethiopian soldiers on the Shibeli forced Donaldson Smith's expedition to turn back,² and by 1898 Menelik's authority had been felt as far south as Lugh on the Juba.³

There was little that the unarmed Somalis could do but complain to the British authorities, and even the Ogaden asked for British protection.⁴ When the Swaynes reached Milmil in July 1892 their arrival at these wells coincided with that of an influential Ogaden holy man, Sheikh Au Mohamed Sufi, who was travelling through the Ogaden to incite the clans to a jihad against the Ethiopians. He complained bitterly of the way 'the Somali nation' was being oppressed, and asked the Swaynes to join in an attack on the Ethiopians; they declined.⁵ No jihad materialised, but a revival of the spirit of Ahmed Gran amongst the Muslim Somalis was a strong possibility. They lacked only firearms, and a leader, for the influence of 'Somali sheikhs and mullahs', was 'almost entirely

-
1. Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox, p. 35; F.O.C.P. 6788, memorandum by Sealy, 14 Feb. 1895, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 12 Mar. 1895; F.O. 78/4784, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1894-5, by Ferris, 13 Sept. 1895.
 2. F.O.C.P. 6788, memorandum by Sealy, 31 Dec. 1894, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 17 Jan. 1895; Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries, p. 99.
 3. F.O. 1/32, memorandum by Lieut.-Col. F.R. Wingate (on mission to Addis Ababa) enclosed in Rodd to Salisbury, no. 18, 9 May 1897.
 4. F.O. 78/4403, Stace to Jopp, 6 Dec. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 290, 16 Dec. 1891.
 5. F.O. 78/4526, H. Swayne to Stace, 27 July 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Jan. 1893; I.O./P&S Bombay/38/39, H. & E. Swayne, 'Report on an Exploration in Somali-land...', enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 1265, 22 Feb. 1893; H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), p. 241.

social and religious'.¹ Nevertheless, the Ethiopians were storing up against themselves a deep hatred, and unwittingly fostering the growth of Somali nationalism. In 1896 the Ogaden actually managed to destroy an Ethiopian force that had ventured too far into waterless country, but such successes only provoked further punishment.²

Requests from the Ogaden for protection could be conveniently refused because they had no treaty relations with Britain, and after 1894 they were definitely beyond the British sphere. Similar requests from the Gadabursi and sections of the Habr Awal, such as the Jibril Abokr, were more embarrassing.³ The first recourse was to ask Makonnen to stop the incursions, but letters only produced denials of the complaints and claims to sovereignty over the clans in the British protectorate. Personal contact with Makonnen was obviously desirable, and in 1891 the idea of sending a mission or agent to Harar was revived. As well as dealing with border incursions and interference with British clans, a mission could provide valuable information about events in Harar and reassure Makonnen about British intentions.⁴ Salisbury was not willing

-
1. H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), p. 241.
 2. F.O. 78/4887, Sadler to Cuninghame, 16 Aug. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 9 Sept. 1897; F.O. 78/4979, Sadler to Creagh, 30 Aug. 1898, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 12 Sept. 1898.
 3. I.O./P&S Bombay/38/39, H.&E. Swayne, 'Report on an Exploration in Somali-land...', enclosed in Govt. of Bombay to Kimberley, no. 1265, 22 Feb. 1893; F.O. 78/4784, Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report, 1894-5, by Ferris, 13 Sept. 1895.
 4. F.O. 78/4402, Sealy to Baring, 23 Feb. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 51, 7 Mar. 1891; Stace to Jopp, 16 Aug. 1891, enclosed in Hardinge to Salisbury, no. 199, 27 Aug. 1891.

to send an official mission, because of Italian pretensions to a protectorate over Ethiopia and the occupation of Bio Caboba convinced him that even an unofficial mission would be unwise.¹ To Stace, however, the Bio Caboba incident was an additional reason in favour of closer communications with Harar,² and Salisbury was persuaded to agree that a British officer should go there as the bearer of certain presents from Queen Victoria to Menelik's consort.³ Italy was informed that Stace would be taking presents to Harar.⁴ She was not told that he was to try to obtain the evacuation of Bio Caboba, the cessation of raids against the Somalis and an arrangement about the safety of the Zeila-Harar road.⁵ Nevertheless, Italy was so touchy about her precarious protectorate that she even objected to an officer taking presents.⁶ The plan was postponed,⁷ and cancelled by Rosebery⁸ who disliked the subterfuge.⁹

It was soon revived under a new guise. Harald Swayne had been

-
1. F.O. 78/4403, F.O. to I.O., 14 Sept. 1891; F.O.C.P. 6176, I.O. to F.O., 17 Sept. 1891.
 2. F.O. 78/4403, memoranda by Stace, 20 Oct. 1891, 31 Oct. 1891 and 5 Nov. 1891, enclosed in Baring to Salisbury, no. 247, 28 Oct. 1891, no. 259, 11 Nov. 1891, and no. 260, 11 Nov. 1891, respectively.
 3. F.O. 78/4403, F.O. to I.O., 25 Nov. 1891; F.O. 78/4471, F.O. to I.O., 10 Feb. 1892.
 4. F.O.C.P. 6298, Salisbury to Tornielli, 6 Apr. 1892.
 5. F.O. 78/4471, memorandum by Bertie, 30 Mar. 1892; F.O.C.P. 6298, Jopp to Govt. of Bombay, 25 July, 1892, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 2 Sept. 1892.
 6. F.O. 78/4471, Salisbury to Vivian, no. 101, 28 July 1892; F.O. to I.O., 31 July 1892.
 7. F.O. 78/4471, Salisbury to Tornielli, 16 Aug. 1892.
 8. F.O. 78/4471, Rosebery to Vivian, no. 132, 27 Sept. 1892.
 9. F.O. 78/4471, minute by Rosebery, 3 Sept. 1892, on I.O. to F.O., 2 Sept. 1892.

surveying the country north-east of Harar and Makonnen wanted to meet him¹ Rosebery agreed that Swayne might use the opportunity to try to discourage incursions into the territories of British protected clans.² As it was, ostensibly, a private visit by Swayne, Italy was not informed and he reached Harar in March 1893. He had a long interview with Makonnen. The ras strongly asserted Ethiopia's independence and made it clear that he aimed to absorb all the Somalis until he reached the sea. The only thing that would stop this process was the cession of a port, such as Massawa, Djibouti or Zeila.³ This was too high a price to pay for the cessation of the raids; the most that Britain would consider was special trade facilities for the Ethiopians at Zeila. The permission to import arms was renewed⁴ but it was decided not to make Zeila a free port as this would not be enough to satisfy Ethiopia. The British Government was forced back to the conclusion that an unofficial mission to Harar was necessary, both to improve trade relations and to stop the incursions.⁵

It was for this reason that, in the boundary negotiations with Italy

-
1. F.O. 78/4526, Makonnen to Stace, 13 Famkat 1885, bound with papers of 14 Feb. 1893; I.O. to F.O., 6 Jan. 1893.
 2. F.O. 78/4526, I.O. to F.O., 11 Jan. 1893; F.O. to I.O., 13 Jan. 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/4527, extracts from H. Swayne's private journal, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 14 Aug. 1893; there is also a copy of the journal in Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss. Afr. S 553; H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips... (3rd edn.), pp. 149-174.
 4. F.O. 78/4527, F.O. to I.O., 26 Sept. 1893.
 5. F.O. 78/4602, I.O. to F.O., 26 Apr. 1894, and enclosures.

In 1894 Britain asked for the right to communicate direct with Harar. As soon as the right had been obtained, and the protocol signed, the India Office suggested that a mission should be sent.¹ Italy could no longer object, and in fact favoured it as a means of countering French influence;² but France objected. The right to communicate with Harar was a part of the ill-fated confidential declaration. Hanotaux exploited this to the full, virtually demanding the postponement of the mission as his price for acquiescing in the boundary agreement.³ It was not until January 1895, when Hanotaux had extracted sufficient guarantees about Harar to accept the agreement under protest, that the mission could be brought up again.⁴ By this time, however, the Ethiopian situation had altered. War with Italy was brewing in the north-east, towards Massawa, and there were fewer raids in Somaliland. In addition Ethiopian trade was being diverted from Massawa to Zeila and that port was booming. There was little necessity for a mission, and the Government of India were unwilling to send one at their own expense.⁵ Britain would not contribute⁶ and no longer attached any importance to the plan.⁷ Yet again, the idea was shelved.

-
1. F.O. 78/4602, I.O. to F.O., 16 May 1894.
 2. F.O. 78/4602, Kimberley to Ford, no. 113 A, 4 June 1894.
 3. F.O. 78/4603, Dufferin tel. to Kimberley, no. 49, 17 July 1894.
 4. F.O. 78/4688, Kimberley to Dufferin, no. 54, 31 Jan. 1895.
 5. F.O. 78/4689, Viceroy of India tel. to Fowler, 11 Mar. 1895, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 29 Mar. 1895.
 6. I.O./P&S Dept. Memo./B69, Neel, 'Italian Demand for Zeyla; Mission for Harrar' (1895), Fowler tel. to Govt. of India, 15 Mar. 1895.
 7. F.O. 78/4689, F.O. to I.O., 5 Apr. 1895.

The many abortive proposals for a mission to Harar were not the only answer to Ethiopian raids. The Somalis themselves suggested a remedy, firearms for self-defence.¹ The Liberal Government felt that as they had granted Ethiopia permission to import arms through Zeila, they could not, in justice, withhold them from the Somali victims. Provided the administration could exercise some control over their use the Government were ready to distribute a limited number of arms to the clans.² It was argued that the Brussels Act allowed such a scheme.³

No one questioned that the continuing Ethiopian raiding against the defenceless Somalis was a crying evil, but every one of the officials on the Somali Coast disagreed with the policy of distributing arms. Stace, who by this time (late 1893) was serving in India, said it would be madness, for the arms would be used for inter-clan warfare. Cox, in Zeila, pointed out that the groups most in need of protection were also the most lawless. 'Surely Government can have no conception what these wild people are like, men born in raid and loot and murder, and whose whole instinct leads them to that life', wrote Stace in similar vein.

-
1. F.O. 78/4527, Paget to Bertie, 17 June 1893; I.O./P&S Dept.Memo./B64a, H. Swayne, 'Political Influence exerted in Somaliland...', 28 Dec. 1893.
 2. I.O./P&S to India/19, Kimberley to Govt. of India, no. 31 Sec., 18 Aug. 1893.
 3. F.O. 78/4527, I.O. to F.O., 26 July 1893; F.O. to I.O., 31 July 1893.

Opt. Abud¹, of Berbera, was equally scathing: '... the people having no occupation but fighting and raiding, and until civilization gives them other employment they will naturally continue fighting....' The sale of a camel would purchase a gun; if some were allowed to possess them all would procure them, illegally if necessary. Control would be impossible. Game would be exterminated, complications with Ethiopia made immeasurably more probable and the overall situation worsened. In a land where it was every man for himself the actions of a single individual might plunge whole clans into war. Three British officers and twenty-five camel sowars could hardly control a heterogeneous collection of armed Somalis. British authority and influence would disappear.² The local officers were realists, they had no illusions about the Somalis and were unanimous in opposing the issue of arms. The tragic history of Somaliland was to be their vindication. Seventeen years later a more idealistic administration was to arm the clans against the Sayyid Mohamed Abdulla Hassan and an estimated third of the

-
1. Abud, Henry Mallaby; 1876, joined Indian Army; 1886, assistant political agent, Kolhapur; 1886-1896, assistant resident, Aden; 1889, political agent, Zeila; 1890 and 1893, political agent, Berbera; produced Somali genealogical trees; 1896-9, political appointments in Bombay presidency; 1899, assistant resident, Aden; 1900, assistant political agent, S. Maratha country; 1902, member of Aden Boundary Commission and acting Aden resident; 1904, political agent, Cutch; 1913, retired.
 2. F.O. 78/4602, I.O. to F.O.(B), 28 Feb. 1894, enclosing memorandum by Abud, 17 Oct. 1893, Stace to Sealy, 24 Oct. 1893, memorandum by Cox, 27 Oct. 1893, memorandum by Sealy, 11 Nov. 1893, and Jopp to Govt. of Bombay, 13 Nov. 1893.

protectorate's population was to perish in the resultant carnage.¹

In the face of such united local opinion the Government dropped their plans for issuing arms; some other means had to be devised for protecting the clans from Ethiopian raids. The men on the spot could see only one solution, an extension of administrative control inland in the form of fortified posts and an enlarged camel corps.² In this way the clans could be protected, and also kept in order. Sealy, the political agent, felt the futility of merely sitting 'at the receipt of customs'³ and argued: 'Some visible proof of our Protectorate is needed on our frontier, and that can only be given by the appearance of our forces occasionally inland'. He envisaged a European political officer constantly on the move in the interior, and a chain of five inland posts, each garrisoned by nine camel sowars, to protect the Habr Awal and Gadabursi. As a first step, he recommended such a post at Hargeisa, costing about £666, and an extra eighteen camel sowars whose cost would be offset by a reduction in the Native Infantry garrisons at the ports. Sealy backed up his case with excerpts from the Brussels Act which provided for

'the gradual establishment in the interior... of strongly occupied stations',

-
1. I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, p. 77.
 2. F.O. 78/4602, I.O. to F.O.(B), 28 Feb. 1894, and enclosures.
 3. F.O. 78/4602, memorandum by Sealy, 11 Nov. 1893, enclosed in I.O. to F.O.(B), 28 Feb. 1894.

not only for suppressing the slave trade but also to

support and, if necessary, to serve as a refuge for the native populations; and to diminish inland wars between tribes by means of arbitration;¹

The Government of Bombay agreed with Sealy² and they also recommended that the political agent should be relieved of all his Aden duties and be stationed permanently at Berbera from where he could tour the interior.³

The Indian Government did not deny that the proposals were moderate, and even imperative, but they would not provide the necessary money. Under the influence of Lord Elgin, the new Liberal Viceroy, they saw themselves being led into an ever-increasing policy of expansion in Somaliland. They protested that they were interested in nothing but Aden's meat supply; as this was in no danger they saw no reason for establishing posts and risking trouble with Ethiopia. It was their belief:

'that we are already doing more in the Somali country than our interests there warrant, and that we are unable to incur further expenditure from Indian revenues, either with a view to improving the administration, or to securing from attack the tribes in the interior of the Protectorate.'

-
1. F.O. 78/4603, Sealy to Jopp, no. 1253, 25 Nov. 1893, and memorandum by Sealy, 24 Mar. 1894, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O. (B), 5 Dec. 1894.
 2. F.O. 78/4603, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 2323, 21 Apr. 1894, enclosed in I.O. to F.O. (B), 5 Dec. 1894.
 3. F.O. 78/4603, Jopp to Govt. of Bombay, no. 324, 1 Sept. 1893, and Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 6289, 21 Oct. 1893, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O. (A), 5 Dec. 1894.

The inland posts, the camel sowars, the full-time political agent, were all necessary in the interests of peace, security and good government, but India, and the India Office, thought that Britain should pay for them; relations with Ethiopia were an Imperial, not an Indian concern.¹

A different opinion prevailed at the Foreign Office, where all responsibility for Somaliland was disclaimed. Kimberley, the foreign secretary, had been secretary for India ten years before, and his heart was not softened by this appeal for charity.

'The Somali coast was occupied to the best of my knowledge (and it was done under my instructions) because it was considered essential to have control over it in order to secure the provisioning of Aden. I never heard or knew of any other motive, and I cannot see that anything has happened since which changes the situation.'

he wrote. Sanderson, the permanent under-secretary was equally unsympathetic:

'... if the Gov. of India can suggest any alternative arrangement by which the provisioning of Aden can be secured, Imperial interests will benefit rather than suffer and our diplomatic relations will be simplified and improved by our abandoning the Protectorate. We have assumed it, we retain it, and we have wrangled about its frontiers and

1. F.O. 78/4603, I.O. to F.O.(A), 5 Dec. 1894, enclosing Govt. of India to Fowler, no. 191 Sec., 24 Oct. 1894; I.O. to F.O.(B), 5 Dec. 1894, enclosing Govt. of India to Fowler, no. 190 Sec., 24 Oct. 1894.

extent solely for the sake of India, and at the urgent request of the Indian Govt. it should be quite understood that we have no wish to spend money in developing the Protectorate beyond what is required for Indian purposes.¹

Britain had no intention of paying for the protection of the Somalis. Kimberley considered that the administration should be 'carried on quietly without any ambitious designs exercising more influence in the interior,...'² and he told the India Office so.³

As with so much else in the history of the Somali Coast Protectorate, the proposals for protecting the clans never materialised. The mission to Harar, which had the same object in view, was abandoned a few months later for the same reason: Britain would not, India could not, pay. Sealy and Cox continued to press for the posts and the extra camel sowars, devising methods of raising revenue to pay for the scheme. The plans were vetoed by the Indian Government who prohibited expenditure in Somaliland until the great deficit, outstanding from earlier years, had been made good.⁴ It is a pathetically revealing commentary on the British position in Somaliland that when the protected

-
1. F.O. 78/4603, minutes by Sanderson, 7 Dec. 1894 and Kimberley, 9 Dec. 1894, on the two letters from I.O. to F.O., 5 Dec. 1894.
 2. F.O. 78/4603, minute by Kimberley, 22 Dec. 1894, on Somali Coast Protectorate Administration Report 1893-4.
 3. F.O. 78/4688, F.O. to I.O., 3 Jan. 1895.
 4. F.O. 78/4885, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 1 Apr. 1895, and enclosures; Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 17 Oct. 1895, both enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Jan. 1897.

clans looked to Britain for protection, they looked in vain. The Somali Coast was no more than a strategic possession, occupied to guarantee British predominance on the route to India. The feeble efforts made on behalf of the Somalis inevitably petered out as their interests were sacrificed to the greater interests of European diplomacy or Indian economy. The only protection involved in this protectorate was the protection of the British and Indian interests.

Additional Note.

Leonard Woolf's suspicions about the Anglo-Italian protocol 1894.

In his Empire and Commerce in Africa (London, n.d.), pp. 170-1, 221-7, Woolf's suspicions were aroused by what was described as a 'Note officieuse' annexed to the protocol, printed in French, in the first (1894) edition of Hertslet's Map of Africa by Treaty (ii, 670), but excluded from later editions. The note stated that Harar, the Ogaden and the Mijertein were in the Italian sphere, and listed the clans on the British side of the border. I have no idea where Hertslet found this 'Note officieuse'; it is certainly not annexed to the various copies of the protocol in F.O. 78/4602. In itself the 'Note' is perfectly innocent, it states no more than can be deduced from the published parts of the protocol. Hertslet presumably omitted it from his later editions because it was neither official, nor annexed to the protocol. Its omission led Woolf to suppose that it was, in fact, the confidential declaration. In this he was wrong. He also argues, wrongly, that Britain caused embarrassment for herself by concealing from Italy the article of the 1888 agreement by which both Britain and France agreed not to annex

Harar. As early as March 1888 Italy was told that both powers had agreed not to annex Harar, (F.O. 78/4166, F.O. memorandum to Catalani, Mar. 1888). The fact that both powers also reserved the right to oppose any third power attempting to annex Harar does not seem to have been communicated to Italy, but this did not cause any complications for Britain. The reason for not publishing the Anglo-French agreement in 1888 was to avoid Turkish protests, not to keep Italy in the dark.

CHAPTER VII

AN AFRICAN RIVAL (2):

ETHIOPIA TRIUMPHANT.

During 1895 events in Ethiopia moved swiftly towards war. French influence and activity flourished. In 1894 a French syndicate obtained the Harar railway concession and a wagon road was started from Djibouti which was rapidly growing as the new French administrative centre. A government decree forbidding the arms trade there was honoured only in the breach and the traffic to Ethiopia continued inexorably, swelled by the activities of Russian freebooters.¹ By contrast, the Italian position deteriorated, and the more friendless they became, the more they turned to Britain for assistance. Kimberley failed to respond. He was content that Britain should sit peacefully at Zeila and he had no intention of pulling Italian chestnuts out of the fire. He regarded the Somali Coast as a supply centre, not as a base for Ethiopian adventures. The 1894 agreement had caused sufficient difficulty with France and he did not want any more. He was

-
1. F.O.C.P. 6567, report by Abud, 30 Sept., 1894, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 16 Oct. 1894; F.O.C.P. 6788, Jopp to Fowler, 20 Feb. 1895, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 12 Mar. 1895; F.O. 78/4784, memorandum by Ferris, 1 Jan. 1896, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 9, 18 Jan. 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4688, minute by Kimberley, 9 Jan. 1895, on Ford to Kimberley, no. 5, 5 Jan. 1895.

not to be moved by the argument that France was aiming at the Nile via Harar: the danger seemed too remote.¹ The Italian foreign minister complained bitterly that British indifference was damaging Italy and encouraging France. His complaints were in vain; in the Foreign Office papers there is a comment, possibly by Rosebery: 'There is no reading I know of so wearisome & irritating as the lucubrations of Baron Blanc.'²

In fact, Italy wanted Zeila. She had long coveted it as a means of access to Harar, and the need to counteract hostile Franco-Russian influence from Djibouti now enhanced its value. In mid-January 1895, hinting that Britain perhaps wished to see Italy defeated, Blanc challenged her to disprove this by asking for Zeila in return for the northern Mijertein.³ The same proposal had been made, and rejected, the previous year.⁴ Kimberley remained adamant: 'I am not disposed to entertain any question of the transfer of Zeyla to Italy.' he wrote.⁵ As a second best, Italy suggested a temporary lease of Zeila.⁶ In return,

-
1. F.O. 78/4688, Kimberley to Ford, no. 11, 9 Jan. 1895.
 2. F.O. 78/4688, unsigned pencil minute (? in Rosebery's hand), n.d., on printed copy of Ford to Kimberley, no. 8, 9 Jan. 1895. Baron Blanc was Crispien's minister for foreign affairs.
 3. F.O. 78/4688, Ford to Kimberley, no. 11, 16 Jan. 1895; Ford tel. to Kimberley, no. 13, 20 Jan. 1895.
 4. See above, p. 217.
 5. F.O. 78/4688, minute to Kimberley, 21 Jan. 1895, on Ford tel. to Kimberley, no. 13, 20 Jan. 1895.
 6. F.O. 78/4688, Silvestrelli (Italian chargé d'affaires) to Kimberley, 23 Jan. 1895; Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, pp. 219-20.

she promised eternal friendship for Britain in Africa. She would not even use Zeila as a base for attacking Harar. The British flag could continue to fly. All that was necessary was for the Italian flag to fly alongside.¹ Kimberley and Rosebery still refused; they would not risk trouble with France or Ethiopia.² The India Office, also, objected to the proposal 'under any conditions whatever, whether Italy be possessor, tenant, or even joint occupant....' They feared a Franco-Italian conflict in their protectorate.³ For a while, Italy was persuaded to drop her demand for Zeila.⁴

As consolation, Kimberley repeated Salisbury's offer of 1891 which they had not followed up; that an Italian agent might be stationed in Zeila without the name of consul.⁵ The Italians tried hard to get permission for this agent to fly his flag at Zeila,⁶ but they failed.⁷ Dr. Nerazzini, previously their agent in Harar, was sent to live in Zeila as a 'private individual'.⁸ In allowing this, the British Government

-
1. F.O. 78/4688, Kimberley to Ford, no. 29, 26 Jan. 1895; Silvestrelli to Sanderson, 28 Jan. 1895.
 2. F.O. 78/4688, Kimberley to Ford, no. 32, 6 Feb. 1895; P.R.O., Lord Sanderson's private papers, vol. 1 (F.O. 800/1), minutes by Kimberley, 27 Jan. 1895 and Rosebery, 28 Jan. 1895, on loose minute by Sanderson, 27 Jan. 1895.
 3. I.O./P&S Dept. Memo./B69, Neel, memorandum, 19 Mar. 1895.
 4. Sal.P.,A/125/1, H.C. Edwardes (secretary of embassy, Rome), to Barrington, private, 29 July 1895.
 5. F.O. 78/4688, Kimberley to Ford, no. 32, 6 Feb. 1895.
 6. F.O. 78/4688, Kimberley to Ford, no. 37, 13 Feb. 1895.
 7. F.O. 78/4689, Kimberley to Ford, no. 74, 5 Apr. 1895.
 8. F.O. 78/4690, memorandum by Sanderson, 3 Aug. 1895.

overruled the Somali Coast, Aden, Bombay and Indian authorities¹, all of whom wanted to keep their protectorate neutral in the worsening quarrel. India had to pay for the Somali Coast but it was made to serve Imperial, not Indian interests.

This was further demonstrated in April 1895, when a consignment of 660 rifles for Makonnen was detained at Aden at Italy's request. In the previous year Makonnen had been so grateful for the permission to import these arms that he had sent Queen Victoria three lions.² Now, when the rifles arrived, they were withheld. To Ferris, the political agent, it seemed far more important to keep the friendship of Ethiopia than to detain a few rifles for the sake of Italy,³ but he could not persuade the Foreign Office and the arms had to remain impounded at Aden.⁴

It soon became apparent that Nerazzini's activities were far from being 'private and unofficial'. His presence in Zeila was hardly a secret, for, apart from the British vice-consul, he was the only European resident in the town and he was frequently visited by Italian warships.

F.O. 78/4689, I.O. to F.O., 29 Mar. 1895; I.O. to F.O., 18 Apr. 1895, and enclosures.

F.O. 78/4784, Aden Administration Report, 1894-5, by Cuninghame, 18 July 1895.

F.O. 78/4689, memorandum by Ferris, 4 Apr. 1895, enclosed in Neel to Barrington, 4 May 1895; Ferris to Cromer, demi-official, 12 June 1895, enclosed in Cromer to Barrington, 18 June 1895.

F.O. 78/4689, F.O. to I.O., 19 June 1895; F.O. 78/4784, F.O. to I.O., 2 Jan. 1896.

He was well-known to the Ethiopians, and he was obviously spying on them. Ferris grumbled to Cromer that Nerazzini's arrival had paralysed trade, as the merchants looked upon him as the precursor of an Italian takeover, and credit had dried up.¹

Ferris' fears were doubtless increased by news of the Italian disaster at Amba Alagi, in northern Ethiopia, on 7 December 1895. 900 native troops were lost. It was a pointer to things to come, the more so as there were rumours of a Mahdist attack on the Italian garrison at Kassala. The Italian Government read the writing on the wall and tried desperately to drum up support from the Powers'. Britain could obviously help with a relief expedition from Suakin to Kassala. Cromer suggested this, but Salisbury, now back in office, 'had no wish to rush to the rescue of a member of the Triple Alliance, and was ready to see the Italians stew in their own juice'.² He was maturing his plans for the reconquest of the Sudan and did not wish to be rushed into any precipitate advance on Kassala. Britain's position in Egypt depended on the reconquest of the Sudan and its Nile, and Salisbury was not prepared to jeopardise this position by advancing before he was fully

-
1. F.O. 78/4690, Ferris to Cromer, demi-official, 31 July 1895, enclosed in Cromer to F.H. Villiers (assistant under-secretary, F.O.), 14 Aug. 1895; Ferris to Cromer, private, 30 Oct. 1895, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 136, 8 Nov. 1895; F.O. 633/5/623, Cromer to Edwardes, private, 21 Oct. 1895.
 2. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 346-7.

ready. Egyptian interests came before Italian. Nevertheless, Britain's friendship for Italy necessitated at least some show of support. If Egyptian interests were too great to upset, there was another place where Imperial interests were small by comparison, and expendable. The Somali Coast was an ideal place with which to make empty gestures.

There were some ways in which Britain could hardly avoid helping Italy. Large quantities of livestock were allowed to be exported from Berbera for Italian troops in northern Ethiopia¹ and the Aden authorities were told to keep the Italians informed of any Ethiopian movements.² This was hardly support, however; it cost little, and merely duplicated Nerazzini's efforts.³ Italy was quick to point out that the military disaster had occurred because she had no access to southern Ethiopia through Zeila,⁴ she asked if she could send a force through the British port.⁵ As before, the Indian Government wanted to keep their protectorate out of the quarrel,⁶ but Salisbury considered

-
1. F.O. 78/4784, Cuninghame to Govt. of Bombay, no. 86, 5 Jan. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 31 Mar. 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4690, Hamilton tel. to Jopp, 10 Dec. 1895, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Dec. 1895.
 3. F.O. 78/4690, Jopp tel. to Hamilton, 11 Dec. 1895, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Dec. 1895.
 4. F.O. 78/4690, Ford to Salisbury, no. 197, 12 Dec. 1895.
 5. F.O. 78/4690, Salisbury to Ford, no. 184, 17 Dec. 1895.
 6. F.O. 78/4690, Viceroy tel. to Hamilton, 15 Dec. 1895, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 16 Dec. 1895.

larger issues than Aden's meat supply to be at stake. Urged on by Germany,¹ he told Italy that she could send troops through Zeila.²

Britain had once again, apparently, disregarded India's wishes. In reality, however, Salisbury was fairly certain that Italy would not act on the offer.³ In the first place, by the time Salisbury made it, Italy had changed her request. Her object was to threaten Harar and Shoa, thereby diverting Ethiopian troops (including, probably, Makonnen) from the north where they were pressing hard on the Italian forces. This object did not require a difficult and costly expedition through Zeila, but simply the presence of a token Italian force there.⁴ Three days after her original request, therefore, Italy asked instead to be able to station temporarily 200 men at Zeila. Britain would not agree to this, for it was bound, sooner or later, to call down an Ethiopian attack on the British protectorate. When Salisbury agreed to allow Italian troops to pass through Zeila, he was offering them a concession they no longer wanted.⁵ He was also offering them a concession which he knew they could not make use of, as he explained later to Cromer:

-
1. F.O. 78/4690, Sir F. Lascelles (British ambassador, Berlin) tel. to Salisbury, no. 55, 14 Dec. 1895.
 2. F.O. 78/4690, Salisbury to Ford, no. 184, 17 Dec. 1895; G.N. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, p. 229.
 3. F.O. 78/4690, Hamilton tel. to Viceroy, 20 Dec. 1895, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 21 Dec. 1895.
 4. F.O. 78/4784, Ford to Salisbury, no. 6, 11 Jan. 1896.
 5. F.O. 78/4690, Salisbury to Ford, no. 184, 17 Dec. 1895; F.O. 800/1, loose minute by Sanderson 16 Dec. 1895, and minute thereon by Salisbury, n.d.

'The matter is a purely academical one, except for Parliamentary purposes at Rome, as it would not be possible to send an expedition through Zeyla which would produce any useful effect. The Italian and German Governments are perfectly well aware of this'.¹

To drive the point home, the British Government were at pains to tell Italy how difficult it would be to send an expedition through Zeila. The War Office produced a gloomy description of the port, listing its lack of resources, accommodation, camels and facilities, and emphasising that the route to Harar ran through miles of waterless desert.² The Italians took the hint³ and Salisbury was able to assure the India Office that they were unlikely to descend on Zeila.⁴ As a final precaution, the permission was hedged around with conditions that made it practically worthless. When the French heard of the concession they protested that it infringed the 1888 agreement and its self-denying clause about Harar;⁵ they threatened to send troops themselves if Italy advanced on Harar.⁶ Salisbury accordingly insisted that Italy should not use Zeila as the base for an attack on Harar.⁷ In the circumstances the permission to

-
1. F.O. 78/4784, Salisbury tel. to Cromer, no. 5, 22 Jan. 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4690, copy of Capt. W.E. Fairholme (W.O.) to Count Lovatelli (Italian naval attaché), 24 Dec. 1895.
 3. F.O. 78/4690, memorandum by Villiers, 23 Dec. 1895; F.O. 78/4785, Gen. Ferrero (Italian ambassador, London) to Blanc, 4 Jan. 1896, in Italian Green Book no. 23, enclosed in Ford to Salisbury, no. 100, 2 May 1896; F.O. 800/1, loose minute by Sanderson, 24 Dec. 1895.
 4. F.O. 78/4784, F.O. to I.O., 8 Jan. 1896.
 5. F.O. 78/4690, Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 570B, 19 Dec. 1895; Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 402, 19 Dec. 1895.
 6. F.O. 78/4690, Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 583, 31 Dec. 1895.
 7. F.O. 78/4784, Salisbury to Ferrero, 2 Jan. 1896.

pass through Zeila was perfectly useless; it was merely a show of support for Italy.

The Italian Government tried to wring better conditions out of Salisbury. They were particularly aggrieved by the stipulation that they should not attack Harar which they considered to be in their protectorate.¹ For all his protestations of sympathy,² Salisbury was not going to antagonise France and Ethiopia in the interests of a lost cause. As their position deteriorated the Italians' pleas became ever more pressing,³ but they fell on deaf ears. The most Salisbury would concede was to allow Nerazzini to investigate Dagarita as a landing place, although the same hampering conditions as at Zeila were to apply.⁴ Whether the Italians would ever have used Dagarita it is not possible to say; their ambitions were cut short by the battle of Aduwa on 1 March 1896; approximately 8,000 Italian and 4,000 native troops were killed, and 2,000 were captured together with all the artillery.⁵ In Rome, the militant Crispi Government fell, but not before arranging that the

-
1. F.O. 78/4784, Ford to Salisbury, no. 6, 11 Jan. 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4784, Salisbury to Ford, no. 6, 17 Jan. 1896.
 3. F.O. 78/4784, Ford to Salisbury, no. 20, 6 Feb. 1896; Ferrero to F.O., 8 Feb. 1896.
 4. F.O. 78/4784, Salisbury to Ford, no. 18, 19 Feb. 1896; Hamilton tel. to Viceroy, 24 Feb. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Feb. 1896.
 5. These numbers are based on Jones and Monroe, History of Ethiopia, p. 145; other sources give smaller casualty figures.

confidential declaration of the 1894 agreement should be published.¹ Prior to this the declaration had remained unknown to the public at large although it had been disclosed to the Governments of Europe. Its publication was presumably a parting shot at Britain for her lack of support, and an attempt to drag her down with Italy, for the declaration contained an explicit British recognition of the Italian protectorate over Ethiopia. In the face of Menelik's resounding victory this was distinctly embarrassing for Britain.

Britain's support, albeit reluctant, for Italy, was also shown in other ways. After the battle, supplies and medical assistance for Italian prisoners went through Zeila,² as did the Italian representatives who arranged peace³ and the liberated prisoners.⁴ Most damaging of all, the new Italian Government published a Green Book revealing Britain's offer of Zeila as a base for invading Ethiopia.⁵ It mattered little that Salisbury's conditions had made the offer worthless. The bare

-
1. F.O. 78/4784, extract from Il Popolo Romano, enclosed in Ford to Salisbury, no. 52, 20 Mar. 1896; Sal.P.,A/125/8, Ford tel. to Salisbury, private, 20 Mar. 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4785, Ford tel. to Salisbury, no. 49, 22 May 1896; Viceroy tel. to Hamilton, 4 Sept. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 5 Sept. 1896.
 3. F.O. 78/4785, Col. Needham (British military attaché, Rome) to Edwardes, 28 Aug. 1896, enclosed in Edwardes to Salisbury, no. 201, 28 Aug. 1896.
 4. F.O. 78/4886, Sadler to Cuninghame, 30 Mar. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Apr. 1897.
 5. F.O. 78/4785, Italian Green Book, no. 23, enclosed in Ford to Salisbury, no. 100, 2 May 1896.

facts were there for all to see.¹ Menelik had demonstrated his power by crushing Italy in the north; now he was free to attend to Somaliland. The Somali Coast Protectorate found itself in a parlous position because, Indian protectorate though it was, it had been subordinated to the pro-Italian policy of the British Government.

Harald Swayne forecast an increase of Ethiopian raids into the British protectorate.² The Government of India were equally alarmed, fearing that the alignment of the protectorate with Italian interests might lead to war with Ethiopia. They had never been able to spare the money to administer the protectorate properly and they certainly could not afford to defend it against Menelik. They were anxious for the British Government to take over the Somali Coast, leaving them responsible only for Aden.³ The India Office rejected their plea on moral grounds. If Aden depended on the Somali Coast for its supplies, and if the Government of India insisted on keeping Aden, they had no right to try to pass off the African protectorate to Britain as soon as it became inconvenient, expensive or dangerous. As Lee-Warner saw it:

'Your [*i.e.* India's] Aden firm opens a branch at Somali land for its meat business. By going there, you require the goodwill of Abyssinia to get your meat to the ports, and you

-
1. See Hansard, 4th series, 1896, xli, 297-8, questions by Gibson Bowles and Labouchere, 2 June 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4785, H. Swayne to Lee-Warner, 24 Mar. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 4 May 1896.
 3. F.O. 78/4885, Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 74 Sec., 22 Apr. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Jan. 1897.

expose yourself to the rivalry of France and the competition of Italy. You must take the advantages and disadvantages of business in Africa. The profits of the business in meat go wholly to the Aden firm. The Aden firm is responsible for the risks. You can take or leave the business. Whilst you keep it, we will help you with our advice and diplomacy from London. But that advice does not bring us into partnership with your profits or losses....¹

In any case, there were strong reasons against dividing the closely linked administrations of Aden and the Somali Coast. Aden took most of the protectorate's produce; there were 5,000 Somalis in the port, and some of the Coast customs dues were collected there.² India was told that she would have to grin and bear her Somali burden unless she could find an alternative source of supply. Only if she could provision Aden from Arabia or India would she be justified in transferring or abandoning Somaliland.³

Local opinion insisted that the Somali Coast was essential to Aden. Ferris and Brig.-Gen. Cunningham (the Aden resident) reported that the Arabian hinterland could never supply Aden's needs and that meat from India would be far too expensive. They argued that the only feasible source of supply was the Somali Coast and its hinterland, possibly an

-
1. I.O./P&S India/90, minute by Lee-Warner, n.d., on Govt of India tel. to Hamilton, 14 Jan. 1897.
 2. F.O. 78/4885, memorandum by Sir H. Brackenbury (Hamilton's private secretary), 21 May 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Jan. 1897.
 3. I.O./P&S to India/22, Hamilton to Govt. of India, no. 29, 17 July 1896, and minutes therewith by Lee-Warner, n.d., Hamilton, 3 June 1896 and Lyall, 20 June 1896.

even larger hinterland than they already possessed. Furthermore, they recommended that if Aden's supplies were to be really secure, there should be more interference and expenditure in the interior, with police posts, a larger camel corps, resistance to Ethiopian encroachment and a closer administration.¹ The Government of Bombay took a similar view, though they hoped that India would relieve them of all responsibility by taking direct charge of Aden and the Somali Coast. They also pointed out that they could not abandon the clans whom they had a moral obligation to protect, nor even the Haud 'if faith is to be kept with the tribes and the food supply of Aden secured,....'² The Government of India did not want to hear such opinions. Determined to be rid of their awkward protectorate, and having failed to foist it off on to Britain, they wished to abandon it completely. Regardless of their obligations to protect the clans, they sent Maj.-Gen. Hobday, Commissary-General-in-Chief of the Indian Army, to find out whether the Somali Coast really was essential to Aden.³

1. I.O./P&S India/92, note by Ferris, 6 Oct. 1896, Cuninghame to Govt. of Bombay, no. 44, 21 Oct. 1896, both enclosed in Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 73 Sec., 1 June 1897; I.O./P&S Aden/7, Cuninghame to H. Batty (Bombay political dept.), demi-official, 28 Nov. 1896, enclosed in Cuninghame to Lee-Warner, 22 Dec. 1896.
2. I.O./P&S India/92, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 11 Dec. 1896, enclosed in Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 73 Sec., 1 June 1897; F.O. 78/4978, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 7368, 23 Dec. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 26 Apr. 1898.
3. F.O. 78/4885, Govt. of India tel. to Hamilton, 14 Jan. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 25 Jan. 1897; I.O./P&S India/92, Govt. of India to Maj.-Gen. T.F. Hobday, no. 210½-B, 24 Jan. 1897, enclosed in Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 73 Sec., 1 June 1897.

Meanwhile, rather than abandon the protectorate, Ferris had suggested a less drastic means of avoiding a clash with Ethiopia; the old idea of a mission. In October 1896 Italy and Ethiopia made peace, and Ethiopia's independence was recognised.¹ This meant that the Somali boundary agreement of 1894, arranged with Italy as the protecting power of Ethiopia, was now practically worthless. Ferris wanted a new boundary delimitation, with Menelik,² and the Government of India offered to pay for Harald Swayne to go as British representative.³ Ferris had other reasons for pressing the idea of a mission, the most important of which was to establish better relations with Ethiopia.⁴

As had been anticipated, the battle of Aduwa was followed by increased Anglo-Ethiopian tension. In June 1896, Harrington, the Zeila vice-consul, discovered some grass huts and a zariba built by Ethiopians at some hot springs known as Alalo, about 120 miles south-west of Zeila. A few days later he received a letter from the local Ethiopian commander, protesting that he was trespassing in Menelik's territory. Harrington maintained that he was in British territory, which he was, according to the 1894 agreement. Nor was there any evidence of Ethiopian authority

-
1. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 458-9.
 2. F.O. 78/4786, Ferris to Cromer, 18 Nov. 1896, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 140, 23 Nov. 1896.
 3. F.O. 78/4786, Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 189 Sec., 28 Oct. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 15 Dec. 1896.
 4. F.O. 78/4786, Harrington to Ferris, 29 Nov. 1896, Ferris to Cromer, 1 Dec. 1896, both enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 150, 8 Dec. 1896.

in the area apart from the huts at Alalo. Harrington returned to the coast and reported to Ferris, urging that the boundary with Harar obviously needed to be defined.¹ Ferris wrote a conciliatory but firm letter to Makonnen, saying that 'buildings should not be erected within the territory of Her Majesty the Queen of England without permission.'² but Makonnen replied that Alalo, and the Gadabursi territory, were in Mehelik's empire.³

Makonnen's reply was quickly followed in early September, by reports of the Ethiopian flag at Alalo.⁴ The local British authorities wished to lower it, for their prestige and influence were at stake and they felt that inaction would only encourage Ethiopian encroachment.⁵ The British Government sympathised with this view, but their forces on the Somali coast were so meagre that their first concern was to avoid a collision with Ethiopia. They decided that if the Ethiopians were at Alalo in any strength, the flag would have to remain until reinforcements, possibly

-
1. F.O. 78/4786, journal of tour and notes on Abyssinian influence in Gadabursi and Esa country, by Harrington, 7 July 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 15 Dec. 1896.
 2. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Ferris to Makonnen, no. 6, 1 Aug. 1896, enclosed in Ferris to Hamilton, no. 37, 9 Sept. 1896.
 3. F.O. 78/4786, Makonnen to Ferris, 13 Mahasi 1888, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 15 Dec. 1896.
 4. F.O. 78/4785, Rodd tel. to Salisbury, no. 221, 2 Sept. 1896.
 5. F.O. 78/4785, Cuninghame tel. to Hamilton, 7 Sept. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 10 Sept. 1896; F.O. 78/4786, Harrington to Ferris, demi-official, 31 Aug. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 15 Dec. 1896.

Indian troops on their way back from Suakin, could deal with it.¹ Their fears were exaggerated, for the flag was simply in the custody of a dissident Esa clansman.² Ferris sent some men to remove it, but the custodian, forewarned, had decamped, flag and all, into Ethiopian territory. Ferris was determined to take some action for he feared that otherwise Makonnen would absorb all the Gadabursi and threaten Margeisa; thwarted by the elusive flag he decided to burn down the huts at Alalo.³ This was too drastic for the India Office. They tried to stop it,⁴ but were too late.⁵ The deed had been done, and Ferris wrote and told Makonnen so.⁶ The India Office found that their Somali Coast political agent was pursuing a policy far too aggressive for their liking and the danger of a hostile Ethiopian reaction caused them grave concern. The possession of Somaliland had its advantages, but

'... one risk overshadows all these advantages however substantial. Abyssinia is flushed with success, and it needs ports for trade and for arms. It has claimed the Somali Land as part of its empire....

.... If we remain, the settlement of our limits with Abyssinia seems an urgent and immediate necessity.'⁷

-
1. F.O. 78/4785, I.O. to F.O., 10 Sept. 1896, and minutes thereon by Bertie, 10 Sept. 1896, and Salisbury, n.d.
 2. F.O. 78/4785, Ferris to Cromer, 21 Sept. 1896, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 125, 30 Sept. 1896.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/7, Ferris to Cuninghame, 28 Oct. 1896, enclosed in Cuninghame to Hamilton, 29 Oct. 1896.
 4. F.O. 78/4786, Hamilton tel. to Cuninghame, 10 Nov. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 10 Nov. 1896.
 5. F.O. 78/4786, Cuninghame tel. to Hamilton, 11 Nov. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 11 Nov. 1896.
 6. F.O. 78/4885, Ferris to Makonnen, 18 Nov. 1896, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 5 Jan. 1897.
 7. I.O./P&S Dept. Memo/B74, 'The Somali Protectorate', by Lee-Warner, 25 Nov. 1896.

From the Indian point of view a mission had become highly desirable.

Lord George Hamilton, the secretary of state, wrote to Salisbury:

'Neither our title or power are much, & I should like to try
& come to some arrangement with Ras Makunan (sic) & Menelik,
if there was a reasonable prospect of successful negotiation.'¹

From Cairo, Cromer had also advocated a mission to Ethiopia for
'arranging the disputes in the neighbourhood of Somaliland....', but he
saw another, more pressing reason, too:

'The attitude of Abyssinia is becoming a matter of considerable
importance. From all I hear it is certain that Russian and
French influence is predominant, that Menelik is being incited
against us in every possible way, that he is being told that the
Anglo-Egyptian advance in the Soudan is being directed against
him, and that if we once get to Khartoum Abyssinia will be
attacked....'

Under these circumstances might it not be desirable to send a
mission to Abyssinia, which might to some extent counteract the
hostile influences now at work?'²

Ethiopia had assumed a new significance in British policy. Although
Kitchener's military railway was advancing across the Nubian desert in
the direction of Omdurman there were disquieting rumours that Menelik
might send some of his surplus arms to the dervishes. From the west,
Marchand had begun the heroic journey that was to end at Fashoda, and
the British Government were alive to the danger of a complimentary
French thrust to the Nile from the east through Ethiopia.³ Perhaps

-
1. Sal.P., E/Hamilton, Hamilton to Salisbury, private, 7 Dec. 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4786, Cromer to Salisbury, no. 150, 8 Dec. 1896; Sal.P.,
A/109/109, Cromer to Salisbury, private, 5 Dec. 1896.
 3. Robinson and Callagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 345, 348.

Salisbury feared this was already under way. It was known that Lagarde, the energetic founder of Djibouti, was returning there to study the commercial implications of the new situation in Ethiopia.¹ If Salisbury had any fears, they were justified, for Lagarde was in fact bound for Addis Ababa to get material Ethiopian support for France's designs on the Nile.² Menelik was bound to show favour towards France and Russia, the rivals of his Italian enemy. There had been plans for a Russian Red Cross mission to visit Ethiopia and a Russian warship had been engaging in suspicious activities on the coast south of Assab.³ Altogether, these factors indicated the wisdom of a mission to Menelik if Salisbury was to keep other powers out of the Nile Valley.

The War Office, under the mistaken impression that the disaster at Aduwa and a more recent one near Mogadiscio,⁴ would make Italy abandon all her African territory feared that France would step in and take over the Ogaden as a route towards the Nile. They strongly recommended that Britain should arrange with Menelik to inherit the Ogaden herself.⁵ Finally, and helpfully, even the chancellor of the exchequer favoured a

-
1. F.O. 78/4786, Sir E. Monson (British ambassador, Paris) to Salisbury, no. 216 Africa, 7 Dec. 1896.
 2. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 360.
 3. F.O. 78/4785, Sir W. O'Connor (British ambassador, St. Petersburg) to Salisbury, nos. 61 & 62, 9 Apr. 1896; F.O. 78/4786, Cromer tel. to Salisbury, no. 269, 20 Nov. 1896.
 4. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, p. 63.
 5. F.O. 78/4786, memorandum by Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence (hereafter, D.M.I.), to F.O., 23 Dec. 1896.

but the Ethiopians took years to establish any closer form of control. Harrington and Makonnen agreed to use similar methods for dealing with disputes and caravan raids and provision was made for joint Anglo-Ethiopian disciplinary action if necessary.¹ Sadler visited Berbera and Zeila and announced the new boundary to the akils who accepted it without excitement, though they realised that their chances of redress from Ethiopian raids were now slimmer than ever.² Sportsmen, who had been temporarily discouraged from crossing into Ethiopia,³ began once again to hunt across the border without interference⁴ and with Menelik's consent.⁵

In the long term, however, the 1897 agreement had tragic results. Britain had surrendered to Ethiopia 'the most fertile grain producing regions in the west of the British Protectorate and important spring and autumn pastures in the south'.⁶ For long enough, the Somalis noticed no change. In 1934 the actual demarcation of the border produced violent protests from the clans, but it was not until after the second world war that they realised the full significance of Rodd's treaty. After the defeat of Italy in 1941 nearly all the Somalis came under the British

-
1. F.O. 1/34, Harrington to Salisbury, no. 12, 17 May 1898.
 2. F.O. 78/4979, Sadler to Cuninghame, no. 202, 20 Mar. 1898, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 3 Aug. 1898.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/8, Cuninghame to Lee-Warner, demi-official, 23 June 1897.
 4. F.O. 78/4979, Creagh to Govt. of Bombay, 1 July 1898, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 5, 18 Oct. 1898.
 5. F.O. 1/36, Harrington to Salisbury, no. 13, 1 Mar. 1899.
 6. J. Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London, 1964), p. 28; pp. 25-32 also give an account of Rodd's mission.

Military Administration. This period of unity was short-lived. In 1948 the Ogaden was handed back to Ethiopia and British Somaliland reverted to civil control. Two years later ex-Italian Somaliland was returned to Italy under United Nations trusteeship. Only the Haud remained under the British Military Administration, an area that included the territory surrendered by Rodd in 1897 when it had been sparsely populated. In November 1954 Britain agreed to return this last area to Ethiopia, which she did three months later. For the first time a close Ethiopian administration was established over the clans who crossed the border to graze. During the war the nationalist aspirations of the Somalis had matured, and they were bitterly shocked when they realised that Britain had abandoned some of their kinsmen and territory to Ethiopia. The situation was worsened when the independence of the Somali Republic, and its bad relations with Ethiopia, jeopardised the trans-frontier pasturage rights secured by Rodd in 1897. His treaty is now strongly criticised as an act of bad faith towards the Somali clans whose independence and protection had been guaranteed by Britain in the treaties of 1884 and 1886.¹

Salisbury had given Rodd authority to cede territory.² It has been

-
1. The Somali Peninsula, pp. 75-6, 125-8; I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 61-2, 131, 150-151; Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, pp. 74-87, 96-7; for a less critical account see: S. Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 155-160.
 2. See note at end of this chapter.

mission

'to sooth away fears Menelik may have as to our Egyptian advance, and to find out whether he has any relations with the Mahdi.'¹

Salisbury planned the mission cautiously, not wishing merely to stimulate his rivals.² In late December he produced a short list of possible envoys. His preference was for the commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate, Arthur Hardinge.³ The other possibilities were Hardinge's cousin, Charles Hardinge,⁴ who was too far from the African scene, in Tehran, and the man who was to succeed him in East Africa, Charles Eliot,⁵ in Belgrade, whose health was a disadvantage.⁶ In the event, none of these was chosen. Instead, Salisbury followed Cromer's

-
1. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 360-61, quoting Sir Michael Hicks Beach (chancellor of the exchequer) to Salisbury, 22 Dec. 1896.
 2. Sal.P., A/84/31, Salisbury tel. to Victoria, private, 18 Dec. 1896.
 3. Hardinge, Arthur Henry, C.B. (later, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.B.), 1859-1933; 1896-1900, commissioner, East Africa Protectorate; 1900-1913, British minister to Persia, Belgium and Portugal; 1913-19, ambassador to Spain.
 4. Hardinge, Charles (later, Baron Hardinge of Penshurst, P.C., K.G., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O.), 1858-1944; 1904-6, ambassador to Russia; 1906-1910 and 1916-1920, permanent under-secretary, F.O.; 1910-16, Viceroy of India; 1920-22, ambassador to France.
 5. Eliot, Charles Norton Edgcumbe (later, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles, P.C., G.C.M.G., C.B.), 1862-1931; linguist and oriental scholar; 1900, commissioner, East Africa Protectorate; 1904, resigned; 1905, vice-chancellor, Sheffield University; 1912, principal, University of Hong Kong; 1919-26, ambassador to Japan.
 6. Sal.P., A/113/35, Salisbury tel. to Cromer, private, 22 Dec. 1896.

suggestion and selected Rennell Rodd,¹ his chief assistant in Cairo. His previous experience in Zanzibar was thought to make him more suitable for dealing with an African monarch, and he was, in addition, familiar with the facts of the Nile policy.² It is significant that Salisbury never considered India's candidate, Harald Swayne. The mission was to discuss greater problems than Somali frontiers, and none but proved members of the diplomatic service would do.

On 4 January 1897 a message was dispatched to Menelik asking if he would receive a special envoy who was coming to assure him of the queen's friendship and goodwill.³ While waiting for his reply the situation in Somaliland deteriorated considerably. Makonnen had not been pleased to receive Ferris' letter saying that the huts at Alalo had been destroyed, and he replied that it was Ethiopian territory which there could be no question of abandoning.⁴ Ferris feared that worse would follow. Recommending firm action he asked what he should do if

-
1. Rodd, James Rennell (later Baron Rennell of Rodd, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.), 1858-1941; 1883, entered diplomatic service; early service: 1884, Berlin; 1888, Athens; 1891, Rome; 1892, Paris; 1893, in charge of British agency, Zanzibar; 1894, secretary of legation, Cairo; 1897, special envoy to Menelik; 1901, councillor of embassy, Rome; 1904, envoy, Stockholm; 1908-19, ambassador, Rome; 1921 & 1923, British delegate to League of Nations; 1925 & 1928, served on international courts of conciliation; 1928-32, Conservative M.P., St. Marylebone; wrote history, memoirs and poetry.
 2. Sal.P., A/109/119, Cromer tel. to Salisbury, private, 23 Dec. 1896.
 3. F.O. 78/4885, Salisbury tel. to Cromer, no. 1, 4 Jan. 1897.
 4. F.O. 78/4885, Makonnen to Ferris, 28 Hadar 1889, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 5 Jan. 1897.

Makonnen sent troops into the Gadabursi territory.¹ The British Government hoped that Rodd's mission would settle the dispute and wished to avoid all military action, although they thought it would be wise to send a gunboat.² On 10 January, the fears of the Aden authorities were confirmed by the receipt of two letters from Makonnen. It was not easy to get Amharic translated in Aden, but there were accompanying copies in French which were telegraphed to London. One letter was to Cuninghame; it was virtually an ultimatum. Makonnen was resolved to maintain the rights of the emperor and was sending forces to Alalo to prevent any further aggression. He hoped the British were not looking for trouble.³ The second letter, to Ferris, concerned jurisdiction. An Esa, who had murdered another Somali near Bio Caboba, had been sentenced to death by Ferris. Although the crime had occurred in British territory, the victim had been an Ethiopian subject and so Ferris had informed Makonnen. Makonnen was now claiming that the scene of the crime was Ethiopian territory, and demanding that the criminal be handed over to his jurisdiction.⁴ Ferris dismissed this as a preposterous claim, and determined to go ahead with the execution.⁵

-
1. F.O. 78/4885, Ferris to Cromer, 23 Dec. 1896, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 2, 4 Jan. 1897.
 2. F.O. 78/4885, I.O. to F.O., 5 Jan. 1897; Hamilton tel. to Govt. of India, 5 Jan. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 6 Jan. 1897.
 3. I.O./P&S Aden/8, Cuninghame tel. to Hamilton, 10 Jan. 1897.
 4. F.O. 78/4885, Cromer tel. to Salisbury, no. 4, 11 Jan. 1897.
 5. F.O. 78/4885, Ferris to Cromer, 10 Jan. 1897, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 12, 20 Jan. 1897.

In London it was taken very seriously. Hamilton thought it was a matter for the Cabinet¹ and the Foreign Office asked for a warship to be sent to Zeila.² Salisbury thought Ferris had been very tactless and ordered a stay of execution.³ He did not want Ferris to wreck Rodd's negotiations before they had even begun, and he was not going to queer his Nile pitch for the sake of Somaliland. India was told that Britain did not consider the Somali Coast Protectorate sufficiently important to contribute anything beyond naval assistance to its defence.⁴ Cuninghame was ordered to avoid every kind of collision and to retire on the ports in the event of an Ethiopian advance.⁵ A muzzling order was sent, forbidding Ferris to correspond with Makonnen⁶ and on 21 January Lieut.-Col. James Hayes Sadler,⁷ the consul at Muscat, was appointed to succeed Ferris. Sadler was really far too senior for this post but the emergency

-
1. Sal.P.,A/91/18, Hamilton to Salisbury, private, 11 Jan. 1897.
 2. F.O. 78/4885, F.O. to Admiralty, 11 Jan. 1897.
 3. F.O. 78/4885, Salisbury tel. to Cromer, no. 4, 12 Jan. 1897, and addition to draft in Salisbury's hand.
 4. F.O. 78/4885, Hamilton tel. to Govt. of India, 12 Jan. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Jan. 1897.
 5. F.O. 78/4885, Hamilton tel. to Cuninghame, 12 Jan. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 Jan. 1897; Hamilton tel. to Cuninghame, 13 Jan. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 14 Jan. 1897.
 6. I.O./P&S India/90, Govt. of India tel. to Hamilton, 12 Jan. 1897.
 7. Sadler, Lieut.-Col. James Hayes (later, Sir James, K.C.M.G., C.B.), 1851-1922; 1870, joined Indian Army; 1877, transferred to Indian Political Dept.; 1892, consul, Muscat; 1897, consul and political agent, Somali Coast; 1898, consul-general, Somali Coast Protectorate; 1901, commissioner, Uganda; 1905, commissioner and 1906, governor, East Africa Protectorate; 1909-14, governor, Windward Islands.

demanded the appointment of 'a safe officer'.¹ By the time Sadler arrived in Aden on 12 February, strict orders had been issued, curtailing his freedom of action and emphasising that he was subordinate to the Aden resident.²

Makonnen's letters had caused a thorough scare. The crisis had shown that Britain would not fight for the protectorate which India did not want anyway. Obviously, both Governments would be glad to be rid of the responsibility if only Aden could get its supplies from elsewhere; if this was impossible, then their aim was for peace and quiet at almost any price. The India Office showed themselves distinctly eager to contribute towards the cost of Rodd's mission if there was a hope of its solving the Somali problem and they were even willing to procure an elephant as a present for Menelik.³ The restriction on Makonnen's rifles, which had been impounded for so long at Aden, was lifted.⁴ The Esa murderer who had been sentenced to death was reprieved, and released as an act of clemency on the queen's diamond

-
1. I.O./P&S India/90, Govt. of India tel. to Hamilton, 21 Jan. 1897, and minute thereon by Lee-Warner, n.d.; I.O./P&S India/102, Govt. of India tel. to Hamilton, 29 Apr. 1898.
 2. F.O. 78/4885, Hamilton tel. to Govt. of India, 5 Feb. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 8 Feb. 1897.
 3. F.O. 1/32, Lee-Warner to F.O., 27 Jan. 1897, also quoted in The Somali Peninsula, p. 48.
 4. F.O. 78/4885, Hamilton tel. to Cuninghame, 16 Feb. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 16 Feb. 1897.

jubilee.¹ Ironically, the panic was largely a false alarm. When the authentic versions of Makonnen's letters were finally translated they were found to be markedly different from the French copies, being far less peremptory and more friendly. They were not so much ultimatums as apologetic protests. The French versions were apparently the work of an almost illiterate Frenchman who wrote what he took to be the gist of Makonnen's letters.² Relations were not nearly so bad as had been feared. Makonnen sent no troops to Alalo,³ merely a polite letter expressing his goodwill.⁴ Menelik appeared to know nothing of any Anglo-Ethiopian difficulties in Somaliland,⁵ and on 13 February Salisbury was told that the emperor would welcome the proposed mission.⁶

The envoys assembled in Cairo and arrived in Zeila on 18 March 1897.⁷ Rodd was in political charge, and his chief assistant was Wingate,⁸ the

1. F.O. 78/4886, Viceroy tel. to Hamilton, 28 June 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 30 June 1897.
2. I.O./P&S Aden/8, Cuninghame tel. to Hamilton, 3 Feb. 1897; F.O. 78/4885, Cuninghame to Hamilton, 3 Feb. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 17 Feb. 1897.
3. F.O. 78/4885, Cuninghame tel. to Hamilton, 27 Jan. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 Jan. 1897.
4. F.O. 78/4885, Cuninghame tel. to Hamilton, 22 Jan. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 22 Jan. 1897.
5. F.O. 78/4886, Cuninghame tel. to Hamilton, 4 Mar. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 5 Mar. 1897.
6. F.O. 78/4885, Cromer tel. to Salisbury, no. 22, 13 Feb. 1897.
7. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 4, 19 Mar. 1897.
8. Wingate, Lieut.-Col. Francis Reginald, D.S.O., (later Sir Reginald Wingate, Bt., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., K.C.M.G.), 1861-1953; 1880, joined Royal Artillery; 1883, Egyptian Army; 1889, Egyptian Army Intelligence Dept.; 1894, acting governor of Red Sea littoral and O.C. Suakin; 1896, Director of Military Intelligence, Egyptian Army; 1898, accompanied Kitchener to Fashoda; 1899-1916, Sirdar of Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan; 1917-19, High Commissioner, Egypt.

Director of Military Intelligence in Egypt. Harald Swayne was sent as the Indian representative and the expert on Somaliland. Decoration was provided by three guards officers, among them a count and a Cecil complete with ceremonial uniform and an escort of Indian soldiers from Aden. Altogether the mission numbered 115 persons.¹ Its purpose was to dissuade Menelik from supporting either the Mahdists or the French in the Nile Valley, to reach agreement about the Somali boundary and to secure 'most-favoured nation' conditions for British trade.² The first object was clearly the most important.³ On his return Rodd had 'A long interview with Lord Salisbury' which 'revealed that he was not much preoccupied about Abyssinian encroachments in Somaliland. He was never much concerned with the fate of "light lands in Africa". The French advance towards the Nile was in his eyes a more serious matter,....'⁴ Nevertheless, Rodd was told:

'You will remember that one of the principal objects of your Mission is to come to arrangements with King Menelik for a definite understanding as to the frontier between Abyssinia and the [Somali Coast] Protectorate, and for friendly intercourse and relations between the British and Abyssinian authorities and the inhabitants on either side.'⁵

-
1. J.R. Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories (Second Series) 1894-1901 Egypt and Abyssinia (London, 1923) p. 125; the story of the mission is given in pp. 110-189, and also in : Gleichen, With the Mission to Menelik 1897, H. Swayne, Seventeen Trips (3rd edn.), pp. 268-286, and R. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London, 1955), pp. 109-113.
 2. F.O. 1/33, Salisbury to Rodd, no. 1 Commercial, 25 Feb. 1897.
 3. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 361; Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, p. 258.
 4. Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories (Second Series), p. 187.
 5. F.O. 1/32, Salisbury to Rodd, no. 2, 24 Feb. 1897.

On 20 March the mission left Zeila for Ethiopia. On the same day Lagarde concluded treaties with Menelik securing Ethiopian support for the French attempt on the Upper Nile,¹ and making Djibouti the official outlet for Ethiopian trade.²

On 28 April, after many trials, Rodd reached Addis Ababa, where he received a handsome welcome from the emperor. When it came to negotiation Menelik was less generous. 'Rodd had a poor hand to play'. His terms were much less attractive than Lagarde's. In the west, he offered Menelik a frontier with the Sudan, designed to keep him at a distance from the White Nile. Lagarde had already offered him a frontier actually on the right bank.³ In the east, Lagarde had agreed to a boundary for French Somaliland one hundred miles from the coast. Rodd could make no such curtailment of the Somali Coast hinterland; he could make certain limited concessions 'if absolutely necessary'. Lagarde had offered the facilities of Djibouti, duty-free. Rodd (who had wanted to offer Menelik a free port⁴) could only promise that goods for the emperor and his Government would be free of duty at Zeila. Lagarde took a hundred thousand rifles. Rodd gave an assurance that arms for

-
1. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 360.
 2. Deschamps, Côte des Somalis, p. 46.
 3. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 360, footnote 4, p. 361, footnote 3.
 4. F.O. 78/4885, Rodd to Cromer, demi-official, 17 Jan. 1897, enclosed in memorandum by Cromer, 17 Jan. 1897.

Menelik could pass through the British protectorate subject to the conditions of the Brussels Act.¹

Menelik took all the concessions that Rodd had to offer, but inevitably the British mission failed in its main object. An assurance was obtained that Menelik would withhold arms from the Mahdists who were recognised as his enemies; but it was a worthless and dishonest assurance.² Salisbury had to resort to other, less diplomatic, means for securing the upper Nile.³ Nor would Menelik grant 'most favoured nation' treatment; Rodd had to be content with equal treatment for British trade.⁴ Only in the Somaliland negotiations did Rodd achieve success.

His object was to define a frontier between the British protectorate and Ethiopia so as to end the disputes which embittered Anglo-Ethiopian relations generally, and particularly on the Somali Coast. The extravagant War Office idea that Britain should ask for the Ogaden was not pursued because Italy had not abandoned her Indian Ocean territories. Rather, it was recognised that some retreat from the 1894 frontier would

-
1. F.O. 1/32, Salisbury to Rodd, no. 2, 24 Feb. 1897.
 2. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, pp. 259-60.
 3. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 361-6.
 4. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 20, 13 May 1897; Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 423; Parl. Papers 1898, cv (143), 'Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia'.

probably be necessary in view of Makonnen's persistent claims to the Gadabursi country. Unlike the boundary with the Sudan, Rodd was not given precise instructions. On the assumption that Hobday would report that the Somali Coast was still essential to Aden, the India Office asked that Rodd should negotiate for 'the preservation of the Somali Protectorate to the extent (whatever this may be) that may be found, upon consultation with the local authorities, to be required for the regular supply of the wants of Aden'. The Government of India had 'no special interest in Somaliland beyond the regular supply of meat and provisions for the settlement and fortress of Aden'.¹ There was a hint however, that Salisbury had more interest in this unattractive part of the empire. He added a rider to Rodd's instructions: the concessions were not to inhibit 'the administration of the Protectorate itself on a basis which shall as far as possible be at least self-supporting, and should afford some prospect of further development of the resources of the country'.²

These instructions led Rodd to envisage some small territorial concessions near Harar; he was therefore not a little nonplussed when Menelik produced his circular letter of April 1891 and on the strength of this claimed all the Habr Awal, Gadabursi and Esa. Rodd had no

1. F.O. 78/4885, I.O. to F.O., 25 Jan. 1897.

2. F.O. 1/32, Salisbury to Rodd, no. 2, 24 Feb. 1897.

'I could not see my way to accepting the arbitrary line proposed by the Emperor without endangering the main interest for which the Protectorate is maintained, and from our experience of the treatment which the Abyssinians mete out to their subject tribes,... I do not think anything but the most urgent political necessity could justify handing over tribes who have known the advantages of British rule to the tender mercies of this marauding race'.¹

On 15 May, Rodd left Addis Ababa. He had obtained from the emperor a worthless treaty and an assurance 'that the Somalis who may by boundary arrangements become subjects of Ethiopia shall be well treated, and have orderly Government'.² Such paper assurances were easily given. In fact, Rodd came away empty-handed and outmanoeuvred. Time was to prove that Lagarde had been equally deceived.³ 'Verily,' wrote one of Rodd's officers, 'Menelik is a great man'.⁴

On 1 June Rodd began a series of wearisome discussions with Makonnen in Harar. The ras was no more willing to make concessions than his master had been, and Rodd was still 'extremely reluctant to hand over to such masters as the Abyssinians any tribes who had been entitled to look for British protection,...'.⁵ In the end, however, both sides gave in. Rodd later wrote:

'The sandy areas involved were in themselves worthless, and we were not disposed to use force in order to compel evacuation of a few square miles of inhospitable country and prolong

-
1. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 20, 13 May 1897.
 2. F.O. 1/32, Menelik to Rodd, 14 May 1897, enclosed in Rodd to Salisbury, no. 21, 14 May 1897.
 3. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, pp.259-60,291,296.
 4. Gleichen, With the Mission to Menelik 1897, p. 314.
 5. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 35, 4 June 1897.

unneighbourly conditions....

... interpreting the spirit of my instructions to be in the first place the conciliation of Ethiopia during the last phase of the Khartoum campaign, [1] made certain concessions.... a failure to reach a settlement would have prejudiced our certainty of securing friendly relations on the western side.¹

Menelik had claimed about 33,500 square miles of the protectorate; Rodd offered Makonnen 13,500 square miles in the south-west and south, land occupied by sections of the Esa, Gadabursi and Habr Awal, including much of the Haud.² Makonnen fought desperately for Hargeisa but this Rodd would not concede; he reported that the ras eventually gave in, reluctantly,

'murmuring that we were taking all the land that had any value and only giving him the desert, an observation which our experience of the western side of the Somali Coast lends me to think is not without justification.'³

As much of the territory surrendered by Rodd was seasonal grazing ground agreement was reached that the clans could cross the new frontier for pasture and water.⁴ Rodd carefully worded the agreement to avoid giving the impression that Britain was making any cession of territory to Ethiopia.⁵ He had had to surrender far more than had originally been expected, but he made the best of the terms he had obtained. He thought that the new boundary would make little practical difference; in return for the renunciation of some barren country he claimed to have secured an

-
1. Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories (Second Series), pp. 182-3.
 2. F.O. 78/4978, memorandum by D.M.I., 28 Feb. 1898.
 3. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 35, 4 June 1897.
 4. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), ii, 428.
 5. See note at end of this chapter.

end to the Ethiopian incursions. He hoped Salisbury would be satisfied. He had settled the territorial dispute, while maintaining sufficient hinterland to guarantee Aden's supplies and make the protectorate viable.¹

London was satisfied; the Government considered that no better terms could have been obtained.² The War Office pronounced the territorial concession to be 'but a slight loss' and a small price to pay for the cessation of Ethiopian raids.³ The Indian Government were disappointed at losing so much territory, but they acquiesced provided that Britain would bear the financial responsibility for any trouble with Ethiopia resulting from the new arrangements.⁴ Rodd's treaty was accordingly approved and ratified. In parliament there was little comment. Most members were either uninterested, or remarkably vague about African geography.⁵ The most effective critic of the agreement was Dilke who spoke of the cession of a quarter of the protectorate whose inhabitants would now face the choice of death or Christianity. Other Liberal opposition was more or less formal. Pease, who had hunted in Somaliland, and who, outside Westminster, attacked the Government for purchasing

-
1. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 35, 4 June 1897; The Somali Peninsula, pp. 51-62; 112-115.
 2. F.O. 78/4886, Hamilton tel. to Viceroy, 15 July 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 17 July 1897.
 3. F.O. 78/4886, memorandum by D.M.I., 30 July 1897.
 4. F.O. 78/4887, Viceroy tel. to Hamilton, 28 July 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 7 Aug. 1897.
 5. Hansard, 4th series, 1898, liii, 1527, question by Bartlett, 24 Feb. 1898.

'the goodwill of Abyssinia in the Nile Valley by permitting the armies of Menelik to raid, ravage, and plunder our friendly neighbours, who have till now delighted to call themselves British,....'¹

only remarked in parliament that the treaty was all 'give' and no 'take'. The Government easily justified themselves by referring to Menelik's promises of good treatment and citing the advantages of a well-defined frontier with a friendly Ethiopia.²

In its immediate results the treaty was successful. Ethiopian soldiers no longer penetrated into the diminished protectorate. Relations with the Harar authorities became very cordial. At Rodd's suggestion³ and Cromer's urging,⁴ Salisbury appointed Harrington to be British agent to Menelik.⁵ To begin with he remained as vice-consul at Zeila, paying occasional visits to the emperor's court, but by the beginning of 1899 he was residing permanently at Addis Ababa (where he stayed until 1909) and a Greek merchant was appointed honorary British vice-consul at Harar.⁶ The Somalis whose territory had changed hands noticed little difference. The intermittent raids from Harar continued,

-
1. A.E. Pease, 'Some Account of Somaliland: with notes on journeys through the Gadabursi and Western Ogaden Countries, 1896-97', *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, xiv (1898), p. 60.
 2. *Hansard*, 4th series, 1898, liii, 489, question by Pease, 14 Feb. 1898; 1373, question by Dilke, 22 Feb. 1898; 1579ff., speeches by Dilke, Pease, Grey and Curzon, 24 Feb. 1898.
 3. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, private, 3 June 1897.
 4. F.O. 78/4887, Cromer tel. to Salisbury, no. 136, 24 Nov. 1897.
 5. F.O. 78/4887, Salisbury tel. to Cromer, no. 84, 27 Nov. 1897.
 6. F.O. 1/36, Salisbury to J. Gerolimato, 20 Jan. 1899.

pointed out that he had no right to do this since the Somali had never transferred their territory to Britain.¹ Unfortunately, such niceties were of no concern to the British Government in 1897. They were not interested in the details of the earlier treaties. As in 1888, so in 1897, they were ready to abandon people with whom they had treaty relations if they could thereby avoid trouble with a neighbouring power. It was the misfortune of the Somalis that their country had no real attraction for Britain. The protectorate treaties had been the simplest way of establishing British preponderance on the coast; they were not meant to involve Britain in any responsibilities or obligations. The meaning of a protectorate was conveniently undefined. In the case of Somaliland the word was a euphemism, it was 'no more than a legal lever for acquiring an inchoate title to territory:....'² Somaliland was merely a sphere of British influence, to be maintained as cheaply as possible. It was not worth spending money on; it was not worth fighting for. Under such a regime the Somalis inevitably went to the wall.

Rodd was the first important non-Indian official to have any close dealings with the Somali Coast and he was not dominated by the narrow

-
1. This is discussed in : D.J. Latham-Brown, 'The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute', The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, v (1956), 245-264.
 2. Ibid., p. 262.

conception of the protectorate as being no more than Aden's butcher's shop. Others, especially Ferris, had held similar views, but their opinions had lacked weight. Rodd had the ear of the prime minister. He recognised the potential of Zeila as the chief port of Ethiopia, but he saw that, despite its advantages, it was fast being eclipsed by Djibouti and its free-trade facilities. He thought Zeila could be saved if its duties were reduced to a competitive level¹ and Salisbury agreed that it was worth losing some revenue in return for the political advantage of controlling the main road into Ethiopia.² Rodd also recommended that the restrictions on the passage of arms and liquor to Ethiopia be lifted in order to encourage trade.³ There was a much more radical proposal, however, which he laid before the prime minister:⁴ he suggested that the protectorate should be transferred to the direct control of the British Government. There is no record of the reasons he gave, but they were sufficient to convince Salisbury, who may have been thinking along similar lines himself, that

'the importance attaching to the relations of this country with Abyssinia, and the bearing which these relations have on the political situation in the Nile Valley,' made 'it desirable that the Administration of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast should be transferred from the Government of India to the Imperial Government, and should be placed

-
1. F.O. 78/4886, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 9 Commercial, 10 July 1897.
 2. F.O. 78/4886, F.O. to I.O., 29 July 1897.
 3. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 37, 14 June 1897; F.O. 78/4978, Rodd to C.A. Hopwood (clerk, F.O.), private, 15 May 1898.
 4. F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, private, 3 June 1897; F.O. 78/4886, Rodd to Salisbury, private, 20 July 1897.

under the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.¹

In late 1897 Salisbury had good reason to be anxious about the upper Nile. The Mahdists were stronger than expected. Menelik was unpredictable. There were rumours that Marchand had reached the Nile. Add's mission had failed in its main object. The prime minister's secret plan to send a force to the Nile from Uganda had been wrecked by the Uganda mutiny.² In such circumstances, Somaliland had its attractions. It might be second-best, but in an emergency it might prove useful. In October he suggested the take-over to the India Office.³

Seven and a half years earlier, in less urgent days, Salisbury had made a similar suggestion, but India had not been willing to relinquish its African protectorate.⁴ Now the situation was different. India with enough trouble nearer home, was only too keen to be relieved of its responsibility, but the India Office were raising difficulties. They were arguing, on moral grounds, that India could not enjoy the benefits of the Somali meat supply without bearing the responsibility; either it should be held as an Indian protectorate or, if it was dispensable, it should be abandoned entirely. They did not think it right to ask Britain to bear the responsibility so that India could enjoy the benefits.

1. F.O. 78/4978, F.O. to Treasury, 2 Feb. 1898.

2. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 362-3

3. F.O. 78/4887, F.O. to I.O., 5 Oct. 1897.

4. See above, pp. 207-8.

and the Government of India agreed, predictably pleading for a reimbursement of their earlier expenditure.¹ The India Office hardly felt they could press the claim when they were only too 'glad to get rid of a territory we cannot defend & in which we have no Indian interests to protect',² and they whittled it down to £19,050. Salisbury considered even this to be extortionate, but he agreed to let the Treasury wrangle it out with India.³ India produced figures to show that the protectorate was currently self-supporting. Rodd submitted a scheme for reorganising the administration under Sadler as full-time resident consul-general. He recommended that surplus revenue be ploughed back into development and that the expensive Indian garrison troops at the ports be dispensed with.⁴ The Foreign Office studied the figures and were satisfied that they could manage without a parliamentary grant-in-aid.⁵ The statistics showed a substantial surplus, so the Treasury raised no objection to the new acquisition.⁶ The transfer took place on 1 October 1898. Fourteen years of barren and reluctant Indian administration were over. The outlook was bright. The book deficit had been wiped out; the consul-general was experienced and enterprising; the prospective surpluses

-
1. F.O. 78/4978, Viceroy tel. to Hamilton, 17 Dec. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 4 Jan. 1898.
 2. I.O./P&S India/100, Govt. of India to Hamilton, no. 19 Sec., 3 Feb. 1898, minute by Hamilton, 9 Mar. 1898.
 3. F.O. 78/4978, I.O. to F.O., 29 Mar. 1898, and minute thereon by Salisbury, n.d.
 4. F.O. 78/4886, Rodd to Salisbury, private, 20 July 1897.
 5. F.O. 78/4978, memorandum by E.B.N., 25 Jan. 1898.
 6. F.O. 78/4978, Treasury to F.O., 25 May 1898.

meant there was no need to fear the dead hand of Treasury control. It looked as though the Somali Coast Protectorate would at last begin to benefit from Imperial rule. Lord Salisbury had appeared in the unfamiliar role of fairy godmother to the Cinderella of the Empire.

Additional Note.

Did Rodd actually cede territory to Ethiopia?

Rodd abandoned 13,500 square miles in the south and south-west of the protectorate, including much of the Haud. He was careful so to word the letters exchanged with Makonnen that they gave Ethiopian recognition of the British protectorate 'without in any way admitting recognition on our part of a cession to Ethiopia'. (F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 35, 4 June 1897). When Britain returned the Haud to Ethiopia in 1955 the colonial secretary argued that Britain could not do otherwise because the territory had been Ethiopian since 1897. Recent books (The Somali Peninsula, pp. 75-6; Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, pp. 76-7; I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 131, 151-2) argue that the British Government were wrong in 1955 and that Ethiopia had no international title to the area as Rodd had so carefully avoided recognising such title.

This argument certainly interprets the letter of the 1897 agreement correctly, but not, I think, its spirit. Rodd's despatches leave no doubt that both Menelik and Makonnen thought the agreement defined the frontier between British and Ethiopian territory. From their point of view they were surrendering to Britain a large amount of territory which they had claimed since the circular of 1891. They therefore assumed that Britain recognised the territory south of the new line as Ethiopian, and Rodd never sought to deny this assumption. In fact, he reinforced it, by obtaining a written guarantee of trans-frontier grazing rights. This guarantee, and Harrington's later arrangements for joint Anglo-Ethiopian action against refractory clans, would both have been pointless if the territory south of the new border were not Ethiopian.

In securing a guarantee of just treatment for the Somalis who were transferred, Rodd was implying that Ethiopian sovereignty would be established over the surrendered territory. Salisbury's instructions to

... had mentioned 'the transfer to Abyssinia of ... tribes now under British protection,....' and had added:

'You may assure King Menelik that wherever the possessions of the two countries are close to one another, we shall prefer that our frontiers should be conterminous,....' (F.O. 1/32, Salisbury to Rodd, no. 2, 24 Feb. 1897.).

The whole spirit of the agreement implies an acceptance of Ethiopian sovereignty over the abandoned territory, but Rodd deliberately phrased it ambiguously. For Britain to have used this ambiguity in the 1950's as a ground for not admitting Ethiopian Sovereignty over the Haud would have been to pervert the accepted meaning of the treaty. The responsibility for ceding the Haud, and the Somalis who use it, to Ethiopia, must rest squarely with Salisbury and not with any British Government of the 1950's.

It seems that Rodd deliberately worded the treaty so that it did not say what the Ethiopians thought it did. The reason is probably traceable to the ill-starred Anglo-Italian protocol of 1894. The India Office had in fact wanted Rodd to recognise Ethiopian sovereignty right up to the new boundary (F.O. 78/4885, I.O. to F.O., 22 Feb. 1897) but the Foreign Office would not agree to this. They held that the 1894 agreement was still in force, and that as it recognised the territory south of the boundary defined in the protocol as being in the Italian sphere of influence they would not now recognise Ethiopian sovereignty there. Rodd was told:

'the language of any instrument you may sign must contain nothing inconsistent with the rights of Italy as defined in stipulations to which Great Britain is a party....' (F.O. 1/32, Salisbury to Rodd, no. 2, 24 Feb. 1897).

But the area which Rodd surrendered had never been in the Italian sphere; it had been part of the British protectorate. He could therefore have recognised Ethiopian sovereignty there without prejudice to Italian claims. There seem to be two possible, though unsatisfactory explanations for Rodd's not recognising Ethiopian sovereignty over the ceded area: Either he misunderstood his instructions to mean that he should not recognise Ethiopian sovereignty over any surrendered territory; or, he may have felt that it would be impossible to recognise Ethiopian sovereignty over the ceded area without also recognising it over those areas south of the 1894 line which Britain had already acknowledged to be in Italy's sphere.

that this would ruin Zeila a competing British line was considered.¹ When Swayne accompanied Rodd to Addis Ababa in 1897 he was ordered to do some preliminary surveying for a line from Zeila.² The Government lost interest, however, when Rodd advised strongly against it.³ No such lack of decision hampered the French scheme. The Compagnie internationale des Chemins de Fers Ethiopiens laid the first rails in Djibouti in 1897 and despite considerable opposition from the Bsa⁴ the line was twenty miles long by October 1898.⁵ This threat to the Zeila trade route now became the direct concern of the Foreign Office. As a partial remedy they agreed to the lowering of import duties at Zeila to give it more chance of competing against Djibouti.⁶ At the same time, transit dues on liquor bound for Harar were lessened, in the hope of protecting a flourishing trade built up by the Greek merchants of Zeila.⁷ Such measures, however, were a poor substitute for a railway. In particular, they failed to counteract the political advantages which the Djibouti line would give the French in Ethiopia. Sadler, therefore, revived the argument for a British railway.⁸

-
1. F.O. 78/4786, Ferris to Cromer, private, 13 Nov. 1896, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 140, 23 Nov. 1896.
 2. F.O. 78/4885, Ardagh to Sanderson, 26 Feb. 1897.
 3. F.O. 1/33, Rodd to Salisbury, no. 8 Commercial, 14 June 1897.
 4. See e.g.: F.O. 78/4978, Cunningham to Hamilton, no. 15, 8 Feb. 1898, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 22 Feb. 1898, and Sadler to Creagh, 7 Apr. 1898, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 28 Apr. 1898.
 5. I.O./P&S Aden/8, Creagh to Hamilton, 5 Aug. 1898.
 6. F.O. 78/4980, F.O. to Sadler, no. 8, 9 Nov. 1898; Sadler to Salisbury, no. 17, 2 Dec. 1898.
 7. F.O.C.P. 7318, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 11 Consular, 21 Jan. 1899; F.O. 2/432, Alcoholic Liquors Regulations 1900, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 50, 10 May 1900.
 8. F.O. 78/4978, Sadler to Creagh, 4 June 1898, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 28 June 1898.

Two London businessmen were also interested in such a project. One of them, George Lane, was prepared to raise £1½ million to build a railway from Berbera to Harar if the Government would guarantee the venture.¹ The other was Albert Ochs, a financier with Belgian connections who had backed other African railways and had invested £60,000 in the French company.² Ochs' basic plan was that British capital should purchase complete control of the Djibouti railway and connect it by branch line to Zeila.³ This scheme had the influential support of Harrington in Addis Ababa⁴ but the Treasury were not prepared to hazard any money on a Zeila branch.⁵ Nevertheless, the Foreign Office were sufficiently worried at the prospect of losing all Zeila's revenue to ask Sadler's opinion on the two suggestions.⁶

Zeila was such a bad port that Sadler preferred Lane's Berbera scheme. He also doubted whether Ochs would be able to gain control of the French company.⁷ There were other objections to Ochs' scheme. The chancellor of the exchequer disliked it; Rothschilds, whose support was an important part of the plan, suspected that it was an intrigue to get control of the

-
1. F.O. 78/4979, Salisbury tel. to Sadler, 14 Oct. 1898.
 2. F.O. 78/5037, Sanderson to Count Gleichen (Intelligence Division, War Office), 22 Jan. 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/4886, memorandum by Ardagh, 30 July 1897; F.O. 78/4979, Salisbury tel. to Sadler, 14 Oct. 1898.
 4. F.O.C.P. 7107, memorandum by Harrington, 25 July 1898; F.O. 1/34, memorandum by Harrington, 15 Aug. 1898.
 5. F.O. 78/4979, Treasury to F.O., 12 Aug. 1898.
 6. F.O. 78/4979, F.O. to Treasury, 6 Aug. 1898.
 7. F.O.C.P. 7107, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 17 Oct. 1898.

Djibouti railway into the hands of the King of the Belgians; Sanderson, in the Foreign Office, thought that Ochs was only trying to save his own capital tied up in the French company.¹ Ochs was informed that he could expect no Government support.²

This decision seemed to be vindicated by a serious recurrence of the Esa opposition to the Djibouti line in February and March 1899. All the Esa in the French protectorate took up arms, and work on the railway came to a standstill. Nine European workmen were killed.³ Ochs decided that it was wise to transfer his interest to Lane's Berbera scheme.⁴ There was another, more tragic, result of the disturbances. On 2 March a large force of armed railway workers crossed into the British protectorate and attacked some perfectly innocent herdsmen, killing six and seizing their stock. Sadler described the incident as

'nothing less than the cold-blooded butchery of helpless men, women, and children, rising at dawn from their wretched grass huts to find themselves surrounded and shot down at a distance of 10 paces by an armed rabble from the other side of the border.'⁵

Although the Government had successfully discouraged Ochs from pursuing

-
1. F.O. 78/4980, Sanderson to Hicks Beach, 9 Dec. 1898; Hicks Beach to Sanderson, 10 Dec. 1898, and minutes by Sanderson, 10 Dec. 1898 and 16 Dec. 1898; F.O. 78/5037, Sanderson to Gleichen, 22 Jan. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/4980, F.O. to Ochs, 19 Dec. 1898.
 3. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 6, 19 Feb. 1899; F.O. 78/5032, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 28 Feb. 1899.
 4. F.O. 78/5037, Ochs to F.O., 24 Feb. 1899.
 5. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 8, 4 Mar. 1899.

Zeila branch scheme they were not prepared to give any financial backing to the Berbera scheme. To create the confidence needed to raise the necessary capital Lane required a public declaration by the Government that they approved of his project.¹ Salisbury refused to issue any such declaration lest it should mislead investors into thinking that the Government would guarantee their money.² There was therefore no hope of raising the capital and the plans for a railway from Berbera had to be abandoned. By contrast, the French railway progressed. Troops were sent to Djibouti,³ the Esa submitted⁴ and the line was pushed ahead with lavish expenditure.⁵ By May 1900 trains were running 84 miles from Djibouti⁶ and the British consul at Zeila was gloomily predicting the ruin of the port. Sadler again urged the Government to consider a British railway.⁷ Harrington forecast that Djibouti would replace Aden, that the Somali Coast would soon need an annual grant-in-aid of £10,000 to compensate for Zeila's lost revenue and that Ethiopia would inevitably fall under French influence.⁸ This last fear also possessed the Italian Government,⁹ and even Cromer, not easily carried away by such projects,

-
1. F.O. 78/5037, Gleichen to Tyrrell (clerk, F.O.), 20 Jan. 1899; Gleichen to Sanderson, 24 Jan. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5037, minute by Salisbury, n.d., on Gleichen to Salisbury, 24 Jan. 1899; F.O. 78/5038, Sanderson to Ochs, 13 May 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 20, 4 Apr. 1899.
 4. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 40, 14 May 1899.
 5. F.O. 2/313, report by Capt. Picton, R.E., enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 5, 20 Jan. 1900.
 6. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 47, 5 May 1900.
 7. F.O. 2/802, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 20, 24 Feb. 1900.
 8. F.O. 1/36, Harrington to Salisbury, no. 60, 31 Aug. 1899; F.O. 2/802, Harrington to Salisbury, no. 19, 14 Apr. 1900.
 9. F.O. 78/5039, memorandum by Sanderson, 2 Sept. 1899.

warned the Government that it would be more costly in the long run not to build a railway.¹

Once again Ochs came up with a solution; it was a new scheme for taking over the French company which was nearly bankrupt, with British money.² As soon as it became public, however, opinion in France reacted sharply³ and the French Government took steps to maintain French control.⁴ They arranged a loan for the railway company, on condition that no branch line would be constructed to Zeila⁵ and they guaranteed the interest.⁶ With this much-needed financial support the railway was pushed on into Ethiopia against continued Esa opposition.⁷ On 1 January 1903, Dire-dawa, the railhead for Harar, was reached.⁸ The Foreign Office had already accepted that Zeila was 'done for'.⁹ Any lingering hopes of a British railway from Berbera had been doubly crushed: the Treasury had refused any assistance until the Uganda railway was completed¹⁰ and the legal

-
1. F.O. 633/8/256, Cromer to Sanderson, private, 6 Mar. 1900.
 2. F.O.C.P. 7547, memoranda by Sanderson, 15 Oct. 1900 and 20 Nov. 1900; memorandum by Sir Francis Mowatt (permanent secretary to the Treasury) 25 Oct. 1900; Jones & Monroe, A History of Ethiopia, p. 147.
 3. F.O.C.P. 7645, Monson to Marquis of Lansdowne (secretary of state for foreign affairs), no. 33, 28 Jan. 1901, no. 52, 15 Feb. 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/481, Monson to Lansdowne, no. 220, 14 June 1901; R. Greenfield, Ethiopia A New Political History (London, 1965) p. 126.
 5. F.O.C.P. 8126, Monson to Lansdowne, no. 146 Africa, 24 Dec. 1901.
 6. F.O.C.P. 8181, Monson to Lansdowne, no. 45, 7 Feb. 1902.
 7. See, e.g.: F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 68, 29 June 1900, no. 123, 27 Dec. 1900; F.O. 2/315, C.S. Hampson (acting vice-consul, Zeila) tel. to Salisbury, 18 June 1900.
 8. Deschamps, Côte des Somalis, pp. 54-5.
 9. F.O. 2/802, memorandum by Sanderson, 4 June 1900.
 10. F.O. 2/316, Treasury to F.O., 10 July 1900.

Within three years of the transfer Sadler's European staff had doubled, and included two extra district officers and a doctor¹ whose own subordinate medical staff had also doubled.² New elementary schools had been opened at Bulhar and Zeila to supplement the old one at Berbera³, and revenue was being spent on new buildings.⁴ At Sadler's prompting⁵ the concession allowing Charles MacConkey to cultivate, manufacture and export fibre was at long last finalised⁶ and mining regulations were framed in the hope that prospectors would be attracted.⁷ Also on the consul-general's initiative, a long-standing evil was being tackled through the formation of a private fund to care for the large number of aged, blind, incurable and destitute Somalis who crowded the streets at Berbera.⁸

Economically, the new administration got off to a promising start. Trade was healthy, the total value for 1899-1900 being the second highest in the protectorate's history. Revenue that year reached a record level

-
1. F.O. 2/617, staff list included in R.E.S. Cordeaux (acting-consul-general) to Lansdowne, no. 31, 13 Mar. 1902.
 2. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 14, 23 Mar. 1899.
 3. F.O. 2/314, Administration Report, 1899-1900, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 118, 19 Dec. 1900.
 4. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 13, 6 Feb. 1899.
 5. F.O. 2/784, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 15, 21 Nov. 1898.
 6. F.O. 2/784, MacConkey to F.O., 15 June 1899.
 7. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 2, 7 Jan. 1899 (bound with papers of 27 Mar.); Sadler to Salisbury, no. 16, 25 Mar. 1899; F.O. 2/432, 'Somaliland Mining Regulations 1899', enclosed in Salisbury to Sadler, no. 9, 31 Jan. 1900.
 8. The Times, 2 Jan. 1901, letter from H.R. Fox Bourne, 1 Jan. 1901.

and the annual financial surplus increased.¹ To compensate for the reduction in customs duties at Zeila Sadler began to tax, for the first time, the protectorate's most valuable export, livestock.² Now that Aden no longer bore financial responsibility for Somaliland there seemed no reason why she should get her meat duty-free.³ There were bitter protests from India and Aden that such taxes had not even been imposed when the Egyptians controlled the coast⁴ but the Government upheld Sadler's action;⁵ at all costs the Foreign Office wished to avoid a grant-in-aid for Somaliland.⁶ As a result, revenue figures continued to climb⁷ while expenditure decreased with the removal of the Indian garrisons.⁸ Welcome and unexpected surpluses were shown in the budgets,⁹ sufficient to pay for Sadler's reorganisation and to encourage plans for future expansion.¹⁰

These conditions made possible a hope which Sadler had long cherished; to get away from the conception of a coast protectorate and to extend the administration inland. Tied to Aden he had chafed at being unable to

-
1. F.O. 2/314, Administration Report, 1899-1900, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowns, no. 118, 19 Dec. 1900.
 2. F.O. 78/4980, F.O. to Sadler, no. 8, 9 Nov. 1898; F.O. 78/5040, notice by Sadler, 30 Nov. 1898, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 Sept. 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/4978, Rodd to Hopwood, private, 15 May 1898.
 4. F.O. 78/5040, I.O. to F.O., 27 Sept. 1899 and enclosures.
 5. F.O. 2/316, F.O. to I.O., 5 Jan. 1900.
 6. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 90, 22 Nov. 1899, and minute thereon by Sir G. Dallas (chief clerk, F.O.), n.d.
 7. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 9, 9 Feb. 1900.
 8. F.O.C.P. 7382, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 66, 9 Jan. 1901.
 9. F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 10, 9 Jan. 1901.
 10. F.O. 2/313, minute, unsigned, n.d., on Sadler to Salisbury, no. 35, 5 Apr. 1900.

acquire any personal knowledge of the territory he was supposed to administer and, quite contrary to the declared policy of the Indian Government, he had encouraged his officers on the coast to tour the country and arbitrate in clan disputes.¹ As soon as he knew that the Foreign Office was to take over responsibility for Somaliland Sadler announced his intentions:

'One of the first duties of the Consul-General will be to make himself acquainted with the country and the people under his charge, and certainly for the first year a considerable portion of his time should be devoted to this purpose....

It will be advisable also that the officers on the Coast should move about more than has hitherto been customary; the presence of British officers amongst the tribes is the best preventive of inter-tribal fights, and differences can frequently be adjusted on the spot; which, if allowed to drag on, develop into a serious breach of the peace.'²

Such views were by no means original; they had been held by most of Sadler's predecessors. In the past, however, the Governments of India and Bombay had discouraged them; now, the Foreign Office, with less administrative experience, saw no reason to interfere. The men on the spot had at last got their way and a forward policy was begun.

Shortly after he moved to Berbera Sadler hired a steamer and visited the neglected eastern ports as far as Las Kereh.³ He advocated frequent naval visits to these ports⁴ and proposed to set up police and customs

-
1. F.O. 78/4979, Sadler to Cuninghame, 4 May 1898, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 3 Aug. 1898.
 2. F.O. 78/4978, Sadler to Salisbury, 28 June 1898.
 3. F.O. 78/4980, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 18, 7 Dec. 1898.
 4. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 32, 24 Apr. 1899.

posts at Heis and Mait.¹ Inland, he planned 'to gradually extend the influence and authority we have acquired over the Habr Awal to the tribes in the interior,....' by establishing posts at such points as Burao;² he hoped to move the administrative capital from Berbera to Hargeisa.³

Sadler's officers began settling disputes, arbitrating in questions of blood money and trying to abolish the road fees which clans levied on trade caravans passing through their territory.⁴ After considerable thought Sadler decided to continue the policy of excluding firearms from the protectorate⁵ and a regulation was made forbidding any Somali to buy, sell or possess a firearm.⁶ At the end of the first year of this policy Sadler reported:

'These tours had the effect of establishing more intimate relations with the outlying tribes, who had hitherto been accustomed to see us sitting at the receipt of custom in the coast towns. A number of political cases and inter-tribal disputes were settled on the spot, and in other respects our presence among the people was productive of good results, not the least of which was the preservation of peace and complete cessation of loots and raids for miles round where our camp happened to be.'⁷

-
1. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 62, 5 Aug. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 49, 16 June 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/5033, Sadler to Hopwood, private, 6 Aug. 1899.
 4. F.O. 78/5031, Administration Report, 1898-99, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 52, 5 July 1899; F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 52, 23 May 1900.
 5. F.O. 78/4978, Sadler to Cunningham, 19 Nov. 1897, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 3 Feb. 1898; F.O. 78/4980, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 10, 20 Dec. 1898.
 6. F.O. 2/432, 'Somaliland Firearms Regulations 1900' enclosed in Salisbury to Sadler, no. 9, 31 Jan. 1900.
 7. F.O. 2/314, Administration Report, 1899-1900, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 118, 19 Dec. 1900.

He was well pleased with the results of his policy of interference. It was not long before he was given a good opportunity for pursuing it. On 12 April 1899 he reported to Lord Salisbury that serious disaffection was brewing in the south-eastern part of the protectorate; its instigator was a certain Mullah Mohamed Abdulla Hassan.¹

In so far as he was a teacher of Muslim theology and law the appellation 'Mullah'² was correct, but it was not a title commonly used among the Somalis who knew him as Sheikh Mohamed;³ he himself adopted the title of Sayyid Mohamed.⁴ Nevertheless, the use of the word 'Mullah' by the British authorities was revealing. The previous two years had seen widespread trouble on the north-west frontier of India led by Sadullah Khan ('the Mad Mullah'), the Adda Mullah, Mullah Sayyid Akbar and other fanatical Mullahs who stirred up their followers to jihads against the British.⁵ To Sadler, with his Indian background, Sayyid Mohamed was just

-
1. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 26, 12 Apr. 1899.
 2. 'Mullah', a Persian, Turkish and Urdu corruption of the Arabic maulā meaning a Muslim learned in theology and sacred law.
 3. 'Sheikh', in northern Somaliland, implies a man with spiritual and religious, but not temporal or political, authority; see I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, pp. 213-218.
 4. 'Sayyid', a term denoting descent from the lineage of Mohamed.
 5. H.H. Dodwell, ed., Cambridge History of the British Empire, v, The Indian Empire 1858-1918 (Cambridge, 1932), chapter xxv, 'The North-West Frontier 1843-1918', by C.C. Davies, p. 465; C.C. Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908 (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 91-98, 123, 130.

such another mullah. Very soon, he became known as 'The Mad Mullah'.¹

Strictly, Sayyid Mohamed did not come from any of the clans inhabiting the British protectorate. He was an Ogaden Somali of the Habr Suleiman (or Bah Geri) sub-clan. Yet he had strong connections with the Aligheri sub-clan of the Dolbohanta. He had been born (probably on 7 April 1864) and brought up in their territory, and therefore inside the British protectorate. The details of his early life are uncertain, some accounts stating that he travelled fairly widely, for instance to the Sudan and East Africa.² What is certain is that he made the pilgrimage to Mecca, probably more than once; and at Mecca he came under the influence of Mohamed Salih.

Mohamed Salih was the founder of the Salihiya, a militant, strictly puritanical branch of the Ahmadiya tariga (religious order). In Somaliland there were two tarigas each with a number of settlements: the Qadiriya, which was the oldest order in Islam, and the Ahmadiya, a more recent, reforming order.³ By 1895 Sayyid Mohamed was back in Berbera

-
1. No accurate portrait of Sayyid Mohamed exists, but there is a picture which shows what he was like in the British imagination. It is 'based on various intelligence Reports' and appears on the paper cover of D.J. Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland (London, 1923). The picture is preserved inside the copy of the book in the British Museum Library.
 2. I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, p. 65; B.W. Andrzejewski and I.M. Lewis, Somali Poetry An Introduction (Oxford, 1964), pp. 53-6.
 3. For fuller treatment of tarigas see: I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 63-65 and I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, pp. 95-98 and 218-225.

proclaiming the way of the Salihya. He called for a return to the discipline of Islam and inveighed against the worldly practices of the townspeople such as smoking and the chewing of kat.¹ His message met with little response beyond provoking the disapproval of the Qadiriya who were strongly entrenched in Berbera. In 1896, therefore, the Sayyid withdrew to Dolbohanta country, to the tariqa settlement at Kob Faradod where his uncompromising teaching met with more response from the less sophisticated Dolbohanta and Habr Toljaala clansmen.² No doubt he felt this was his hijra.

Undoubtedly he left Berbera embittered not only against the Qadiriya but also against the British, unbelievers to whom he must have had a natural antipathy. British influence could be blamed for the religious laxity of Berbera; the British had, apparently, ordered the closure of Salihya mosques in Berbera;³ and finally, it was the British who were the protectors of the French missionaries, who laboured, however unsuccessfully, to bring up Somali orphans as Roman Catholics. These experiences and, probably, the example of the Senussi of Cyrenaica and the Mahdists of the Sudan, seem to have inspired Sayyid Mohamed to set

-
1. The stimulant leaves of the plant Catha edulis; known in N.E. Kenya as miraa; the chewing of kat is an expensive preoccupation of many Somalis, especially town dwellers.
 2. Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 36-39; I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 65-68; F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 26, 12 Apr. 1899.
 3. C.O. 537/44, Appendix 3 to report by Wingate, 12 June 1909.

himself up as the Islamic ruler of the interior, quite independent of British authority and its unholy influence. In so doing he probably had no intention of challenging the British, for their authority in the interior was so weak as to be almost unnoticed. Apart from a few infrequent military expeditions British power had been confined to the three coastal towns; there was nothing to show that Britain claimed any rights in the hinterland. The boundary agreements with Italy and Ethiopia, delimiting the British sphere inland, had been reached without any reference to the Somalis. The British title rested on a handful of treaties to which the signatures of certain Somalis living on the coast had been bought. The treaty with the Habr Gerhajis had been arranged with a small, isolated coastal section of the clan who had no authority to speak for the Habr Yunis or Aidagalla of the interior. Much the same applied to the treaty with the Habr Toljaala. With the Dolbohanta there was no treaty at all. At Kob Faradod, therefore, Sayyid Mohamed had ample justification for considering himself independent of the British and free to establish his own rule over the inland clans. Soon, he was to address a letter to 'the Ruler of Berbera' from 'all the Dervishes,¹ the Amir and all the Dolbohanta' which ended: 'We are a Government, we have a Sultan, an Amir, and Chiefs, and subjects.'² It was the tragedy of Somaliland that the Sayyid's plans coincided with Sadler's forward

1. Daraawiish, the name given to adherents of the Salihiya order in Somaliland.

2. F.O. 78/5031, Sayyid Mohamed to Cordeaux, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 37, 4 May 1899.

policy; the two could not coexist.

With his right-hand man, Haji Sudi, a Habr Toljaala and one-time interpreter in the Royal Navy,¹ Sayyid Mohamed began to intervene in clan disputes; by ensuring that his decisions were carried out his influence spread rapidly. In February 1899 it reached the Habr Yunis when he proclaimed Madar Hirsi, a rival of the British-appointed Sultan Nur, to be sultan of the clan. Sadler saw this as the first direct challenge and was alarmed by reports that the Sayyid had obtained sixty rifles from the Mijertein. The next month, Cordeaux², the vice-consul at Berbera, wrote to the Sayyid about a missing administration rifle. Three replies were received, hinting that the British should mind their own business. One of them consisted of Cordeaux' original letter, daubed in red paint with large, white characters superimposed.³ Sadler declared these replies to be 'defiant' and 'insolent' and he sent a report to Salisbury:

'The Mullah... has commenced to proclaim himself a power in the land. He forces all within his reach to join his sect, and threatens expeditions against the Dolbohanta tribes who hold aloof....

-
1. F.O. 2/314, Annual Confidential Report, 1899-1900, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 109, 30 Oct. 1900; Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, p. 49.
 2. Cordeaux, Harry Edward Spiller (later Maj. Sir Harry, K.C.M.G., C.B.), 1870-1943; 1894, joined army; 1896, Indian Staff Corps; 1898, Bombay Political Dept.; 1898, assistant resident, Berbera; 1898-1902, vice-consul, Berbera; 1902-1906, sub-commissioner & consul, Berbera; 1906-1910, commissioner & C.-in-C., Somaliland; 1910-1911, governor, Uganda, but did not take office; 1912-1920, governor, St. Helena; 1921-1926, governor, Bahamas.
 3. A facsimile is in Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, facing p. 42.

He has amongst his followers several bad and suspicious characters,.... He lays claim to the possession of supernatural powers, such as being able to hear with his own ears in the Dolbohanta what is being said of him in Berbera, with the usual story of being able to turn bullets into water.'

A man of Sadler's background was quite unable to understand the Sayyid's motives; he could only distinguish the symptoms of a Muslim rebellion, 'open defiance of our authority' a following which included 'the scum of Aden and the Protectorate',¹ and 3,000 fighting men. Sadler's reaction was to crush the movement before it grew out of hand:

'The Dolbohanta is now an integral portion of our Protectorate, and though we have not hitherto exerted our influence there, we cannot tolerate such a state of affairs as would follow the establishment of this Mullah's rule under the conditions which are now apparent. Nor can we permit this man to import arms against our orders, and use them to terrorize our unarmed tribes....

The best means of meeting this situation in the Dolbohanta would, I think, be to organise a military promenade. It seems necessary in Somaliland to make a display of force in the interior every four or five years, and such a display has never been made in the eastern portions of our Protectorate'.²

Sayyid Mohamed had failed to realise that Sadler regarded the interior as an integral part of the protectorate, but equally, Sadler failed to appreciate that the Sayyid had no desire to rebel but only wished to be left alone. From these mutual misunderstandings were to stem twenty years of war, misery and waste.

-
1. F.O. 2/314, Annual Confidential Report, 1899-1900, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 109, 30 Oct. 1900.
 2. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 26, 12 Apr. 1899.

Sadler was determined to suppress the movement and on 4 May 1899 he dispatched a virtual ultimatum:

'You have written several improper letters to the Vice-Consul,....

Further, reports have reached me that you are collecting men and fire-arms and interfering in the affairs of the tribes.... it is the business of a Mullah to engage himself in religious matters, and not to interfere with the affairs of the country.

If, therefore, as you say, you wish for peace in the country, cease from these matters, and salaam.¹

The consul-general believed that this warning would bring the Sayyid to heel. In the Berera mosques the Qadiriya leaders were denouncing him as an imposter and even Mohamed Salih of Mecca was said to disapprove of his conduct; 'The general opinion about the man is that he has gone religious mad,....'² Sadler reported. There was news that the Sayyid's following was dwindling, and that the looting propensities of his dervishes and his own unprincipled, violent methods were disgusting and alienating the clans.³ In fact, the movement was very far from subsiding. Sayyid Mohamed appears to have accepted Sadler's warning as a challenge to battle. In June he wrote to the Aidagalla sub-clan asking them to join him against the unbelievers who were destroying their religion and stealing their children (presumably a reference to the Roman Catholic

-
1. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Sayyid Mohamed, 4 May 1899, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 37, 4 May 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 30, 19 Apr. 1899, no. 37, 4 May 1899 and 5 June 1899; F.O. 2/314, Annual Confidential Report, 1899-1900, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 109, 30 Oct. 1900.
 3. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 34, 26 Apr. 1899.

mission)¹. He also sought support from the Habr Toljaala and Habr Yunis, throwing over Madar Hirsi in return for the open allegiance of Sultan Nur.²

Sadler only discovered the true extent of the movement when he went on tour to Hargeisa in June, July and August. In the east, the Dolbohanta and Habr Toljaala were under the Sayyid's influence and the administration had no authority over them. In the centre, the Habr Yunis were split. The eastern half, under Nur, had committed themselves to the Sayyid and had defied the authorities; the remainder were fearfully standing out against him. In the west, the Aidagalla were wavering, but the Habr Awal, under the strong leadership of the Qadiriya Sheikh Maddar of Hargeisa were still loyal to the British. Only the Esa and Gadabursi in the far west were, as they were to remain, completely outside the Sayyid's influence. There was also evidence that the Sayyid was trying to obtain arms from Djibouti.³ Yet Sadler played down the danger. He was inclined to think that the movement will now probably subside, or even resolve itself into the operations of a robber band on the confines of the Protectorate,⁴ and the Foreign Office were sufficiently unconcerned to inform the Italians that although the Sayyid 'did not appear to be altogether friendly ... it remained to be seen whether he would retain

-
1. F.O. 78/5031, Sayyid Mohamed to the Aidagalla, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 69, 20 Aug. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, 5 June 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 49, 16 June 1899, no. 55, 27 June 1899, no. 56, 22 July 1899, no. 67, 19 Aug. 1899 and no. 69, 20 Aug. 1899.
 4. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 59, 30 July 1899.

sufficient authority to be troublesome.¹

They were quickly undeceived. On 31 August Sadler, who was making his way back to the coast, telegraphed that the Sayyid had suddenly arrived at the Burao wells with 1,500 men, had declared himself to be the Mahdi, and was collecting the eastern clans for an attack on Hargeisa and possibly on Berbera. He asked for troops to dislodge him from Burao.² It is almost certainly untrue that the Sayyid had claimed to be the Mahdi for he never repeated the claim,³ but his rapid advance was nonetheless spectacular and on 31 August his followers arrived at Sheikh where they attacked and looted the Ahmadiya tariga settlement.⁴ By now the dervishes were only 38 miles from Berbera, and in Sadler's absence the Aden resident sent reinforcements to the port while panic spread among the inhabitants and a number of merchants hastily evacuated by steamer.⁵ Sadler reached Berbera on 2 September to find a letter from the Sayyid offering war or peace; he disregarded this, publicly proclaimed the Sayyid a rebel and again pressed the Government to send a military expedition.⁶ Meanwhile, the Foreign Office asked the Admiralty to send a warship⁷ and sought the advice of the War Office.⁸ From Balmoral the

-
1. F.O. 78/5039, memorandum by Sanderson, 10 Aug. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5032, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 31 Aug. 1899.
 3. See I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, p. 69.
 4. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 71, 31 Aug. 1899.
 5. F.O. 78/5039, Cuninghame tel. to I.O. 3 Sept. 1899 enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 4 Sept. 1899; Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, p. 42.
 6. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 74, 10 Sept. 1899.
 7. F.O. 78/5039, F.O. to Admiralty, 4 Sept. 1899.
 8. F.O. 78/5039, F.O. to W.O., 4 Sept. 1899.

queen telegraphed to Salisbury 'Trust that request for troops may be granted and prompt action taken.'¹, but the prime minister was more cautious;² the build up of troops in South Africa was under way, war with the Boers was almost inevitable and he had no desire to rush into another conflict, however small. The arrival of H.M.S. Pomone on 6 September, and the retirement of the dervishes towards Burao removed the immediate threat to Berbera³ and gave time for consideration of the next step.

Sadler was convinced of the importance of re-establishing British influence in the interior by driving the Sayyid from Burao and stationing troops there,⁴ a suggestion in line with his policy of garrisoning interior posts. He reported that the Sayyid was coercing the clans into his service and that the dervishes were seizing the wives and property of Somali employees of the administration. 'Such a state of affairs, I would submit, cannot be allowed to continue in the British Protectorate,' he wrote. With 400 soldiers and two Maxim guns he was confident that he could rally support from the clans and drive the Sayyid south 'and I may safely say there will be no risk of a reverse'. The need for action was emphasised by a second dervish attack on Sheikh and the burning of the Ahmadiya settlement there.⁵

-
1. Sal. P. A/83/136, Queen Victoria tel. to Salisbury, 5 Sept. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5032, Salisbury tel. to Sadler, 5 Sept. 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/5032, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 10 Sept. 1899.
 4. F.O. 78/5032, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 12 Sept. 1899.
 5. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 75, 14 Sept. 1899, no. 77, 28 Sept. 1899; F.O. 78/5032, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 20 Sept. 1899.

As Cromer supported the plans for an expedition, Salisbury reluctantly¹ asked India to send 400 infantry and a cavalry regiment² while he warned the Treasury that a grant-in-aid would probably be needed.³ A message was sent to Melek Meklik that the operations would be confined to the British protectorate.⁴ The emperor had already decided to attack the Sayyid if he moved into Ethiopia⁵ but Sadler feared that the behaviour of the Ethiopian soldiers would only alienate the Ogaden clans and drive them into the arms of the Sayyid.⁶ It was therefore decided that if the Ethiopians wished to co-operate in the operations they should be confined to their own side of the border.⁷

No sooner had the British Government decided to send an expedition than Sadler heard that the Sayyid had retired, far to the south-west, to the Dolbohanta wells at Bohotleh on the Ethiopian border. Here, he was certainly no threat to Berbera, 200 miles away, and he was far beyond the reach of the expeditionary force. There was also news that many of the eastern clans were deserting Sayyid Mohamed in disillusionment. Never-

-
1. See e.g.: F.O. 78/5032, minutes by Salisbury, n.d., on Sadler tels. to Salisbury, 22 Sept. 1899 and 29 Sept. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5040, F.O. to I.O., 27 Sept. 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/5040, F.O. to Treasury, 27 Sept. 1899.
 4. F.O. 78/5032, Salisbury tel. to Lieut. C.F. Harold (acting vice-consul, Zeila), 2 Oct. 1899.
 5. F.O.C.P. 7382, Harrington to Cromer, no. 59, 17 July 1899, enclosed in Rodd to Salisbury, no. 140, 29 July 1899.
 6. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 57, 22 July 1899.
 7. F.O. 78/5039, W.O. to F.O., 18 Sept. 1899; F.O. 78/5032, Salisbury tel. to Sadler, 30 Sept. 1899.

theless, Sadler still pressed for the occupation of the Burao wells.

'It is now more than ever necessary to effect the occupation' he

telegraphed.¹ He had made up his own mind to finish the Sayyid and his

'pernicious' influence. He could only see him to be 'a religious

fanatic who has shown himself in his true colours as a political

intriguer for his own ends, who is able to cause unrest and trouble by

fanatical preaching and offering inducements of plunder amongst the

remoter and wilder tribes of the Protectorate....'² Besides, the whole

crisis had provided Sadler with an opportunity of accelerating the

extension of British influence in the interior. He wished to show the

clans that he had the power to enforce his authority over them and to

punish them if they 'play fast and loose with us'.³ He saw it as a

clear cut issue of loyalty or rebellion:

'I propose to give the tribes to clearly understand that if they have any further dealings with the Mullah they will be considered as hostile to the Administration, and will be dealt with as such.'⁴

Greater issues, however, intervened. On 12 October the first shots

rang out in the South African War. So long as the Sayyid was at

Bohotleh there was no immediate necessity for an expedition. On 19 October

-
1. F.O. 78/5032, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 29 Sept. 1899; F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 79, 4 Oct. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Hopwood, private, 10 Nov. 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 82, 12 Oct. 1899.
 4. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 81, 5 Oct. 1899.

Salisbury ordered a postponement¹ and Sadler conceded that even the occupation of Burao could be delayed if troops were scarce.² He was told to limit himself to the defence of the ports in the hope that he could manage till the spring,³ when the South African situation was expected to be better. The preparations to despatch troops from India were cancelled⁴ (but not before they had cost over £3,700⁵) and 6,000 Ethiopian troops, who had been sent to the Ogaden to co-operate, were recalled to Harar.⁶

Sadler had to content himself with a less spectacular revenge on the clans that had supported Sayyid Mohamed. Until they made submission to the administration they were prohibited from taking supplies from the ports; having submitted, their supplies were subject to a punitive tax.⁷ In addition they had to pay fines and produce securities for their future 'good behaviour'.⁸

Deprived of his expected force from India Sadler cast around for

-
1. F.O. 78/5032, Salisbury tel. to Sadler, 19 Oct. 1899; see also, F.O. 78/5031, minute by Salisbury, n.d., on printed copy of Sadler to Salisbury, no. 81, 5 Oct. 1899.
 2. F.O. 78/5032, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 22 Oct. 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/5032, Salisbury tel. to Sadler, 23 Oct. 1899.
 4. F.O. 78/5040, F.O. to I.O., 24 Oct. 1899.
 5. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 55, 6 June 1900.
 6. F.O. 1/36, Harrington to Salisbury, no. 66, 27 Nov. 1899, and no. 67, 4 Dec. 1899.
 7. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 87, 10 Nov. 1899.
 8. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 2, 11 Jan. 1900.

alternative troops. As Cromer refused to supply any Sudanese soldiers¹ he began to consider enlisting Gurkhas, Sikhs or Pathans², but before these plans could materialise news was received, early in 1900, that the Sayyid was about to advance again. Sadler had to fall back on Somalis. He hastily armed 50 new recruits³ and sent a detachment under his chief Somali officer, Ressaldar-Major Musa Farah, to establish a post at Sik.⁴ This secured one of the main mountain passes down to Berbera; it was also the first of Sadler's interior garrisons.

In fact, the Sayyid entirely failed to take advantage of Sadler's weakness at the start of the South African War and this may be an indication that his intentions were less aggressive than Sadler feared. In October the respected leader of the Dolbohanta Girad Farih lineage group was murdered, apparently on the Sayyid's orders⁵. Already most of the Habr Toljaala had deserted his cause and this murder only alienated many of the Dolbohanta. Sayyid Mohamed found it prudent to withdraw south into Ethiopia.⁶ Here his own Ogaden kinsmen rallied to him and were soon busily raiding on the Haud against the Ishaak who had resisted

-
1. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Hopwood, 10 Nov. 1899; F.O. 633/viii/p. 243, Cromer to Sanderson, 28 Dec. 1899.
 2. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Sanderson, 9 Jan. 1900.
 3. F.O. 2/315, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 25 Jan. 1900; F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Hopwood, 25 Jan. 1900.
 4. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 8, 3 Feb. 1900.
 5. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 87, 10 Nov. 1899.
 6. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 98, 14 Dec. 1899.

the Sayyid.¹ While Sadler imposed a punitive tax on Ogaden caravans at the ports² the Ethiopians began to move troops towards the Haud.³ On 21 March 1900 the Ogaden launched a furious attack on the hated Ethiopians at Jijiga.⁴ Accounts vary as to the course of this battle, but the Ethiopian commander claimed a great victory and the slaughter of 2,600 Ogaden; 'The fight did not last five minutes before they fled', he reported.⁵ From Berbera, Cordeaux wrote:

'The Mullah... not only discreetly remained behind, but kept all his available fire-arms with him, assuring the attackers that his blessing which accompanied them, was worth more than any number of rifles. ... the Ogaden... charged with a splendid bravery worthy of a better cause.... the Abyssinians ... with their usual thoroughness, shot down every Ogaden in the neighbourhood.'⁶

The Ethiopians contented themselves with this success and wisely avoided a futile pursuit into the Ogaden. The Sayyid and his faithful Dolbohanta dervishes who had remained in the rear with him,⁷ retired to Harardiget, 175 miles from Jijiga and 80 miles south of the British border; here, deep in the Ogaden, they lay for three months, licking their wounds after their first great battle.⁸

-
1. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Hopwood, 11 Jan. 1900.
 2. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 12, 15 Feb. 1900.
 3. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 19, 24 Feb. 1900, no. 27, 16 Mar. 1900.
 4. F.O. 2/315, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 31 Mar. 1900, M. McNeill, In Pursuit of the 'Mad' Mullah (London, 1902), p. 5.
 5. F.O. 1/37, Harrington to Salisbury, no. 13, 24 Mar. 1900; F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 31, 31 Mar. 1900; Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, p. 46.
 6. F.O. 2/314, Annual Political Report, Berbera and Bulhar, 1899-1900, enclosed in Sadler to Salisbury, no. 109, 30 Oct. 1900.
 7. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 31, 31 Mar. 1900.
 8. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 42, 21 Apr. 1900.

Meanwhile, Sadler's need for troops had been met from an unexpected quarter. The demand for British troops in South Africa had forced the War Office to employ the newly-raised 2nd Battalion of the Central Africa Rifles in the Mauritius garrison. The 2 C.A.R. was composed mainly of Yao and Atonga soldiers who received such a hostile reception from the Creoles that in December 1899 they were finally provoked into a riot.¹ Obviously they had to leave Mauritius and early in February 1900 Sadler was asked if he could make use of them.² Eager to garrison the interior against the Sayyid Sadler accepted the offer³ and on 27 February 862 African soldiers and 18 European officers reached Berbera and were temporarily housed, among other places, in the mosques.⁴ One company remained at Berbera taking the place of the Indian infantry who returned to Aden; another company was sent to guard the pass at Sheikh; the remaining six companies were sent to cover the Jerato pass at Adadleh.⁵ Sadler's policy of garrisoning the interior was definitely taking shape, and he had found a further justification for it. Not only did he see it as essential in the interests of trade and economy, but now the clans 'have a right to demand' assistance, it was a 'duty we owe to our protected subjects....' and he felt the time to be 'particularly opportune

-
1. H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles (Aldershot, 1956), pp. 27-30.
 2. F.O. 2/315, F.O. tel. to Sadler, 3 Feb. 1900.
 3. F.O. 2/315, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 9 Feb. 1900.
 4. F.O. 2/313, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 22, 1 Mar. 1900, Sadler to Hopwood, 9 Mar. 1900.
 5. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 31.

for consolidating our position in the nearer portions of the hinterland'.

'It is now recognised that the country has been taken over by the Sirkar [government],' he told Salisbury, and he worked out plans for enlarging his Somali forces and establishing permanent posts at Burao, Sheikh, Adadleh and Hargeisa.¹

Another of Sadler's chief concerns was to prevent fire-arms reaching the Sayyid. From Djibouti, the great arms-mart of the area, they were shipped to the unadministered Italian Nijertein protectorate² from where they easily reached the Sayyid. The nearest Italian official, the consul-general at Aden, was equally anxious to stop this traffic, but so long as the trade continued unhindered at Djibouti there was little that could be done.³ A limited success occurred in July 1900 when a company of 2 C.A.R. intercepted a caravan consisting of 2 Frenchmen, an Italian, a Swiss and 27 Arabs, who were travelling overland through the British protectorate from Djibouti. Sadler's officers were satisfied that they were gun-runners. 51 rifles and 7,500 rounds were confiscated and the party was sent back to Djibouti.⁴ This was the first operational success of 2 C.A.R.

-
1. F.O. 2/312, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 55, 6 June 1900.
 2. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 94, 2 Dec. 1899.
 3. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 97, 8 Dec. 1899.
 4. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 32; F.O. 2/315, Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 30 July 1900; F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 83, 13 Aug. 1900.

Despite the disastrous outcome of the Jijiga attack Sayyid Mohamed had managed to re-establish his influence over the Ogaden by June. He had built up a following in the Milmil-Dagahbur area and was strenuously trying to obtain arms. Rumours that he would attack Harar led Menelik to suggest joint Anglo-Ethiopian operations against him,¹ an idea which both Cromer and Harrington supported.² Salisbury, however, already fighting Boers, Boxers and Ashanti, had no wish for an additional war.³ As if to emphasise this, half 2 C.A.R. left Somaliland in July for the Gold Coast. Command of the remaining four companies devolved upon Major A.W.V. Plunkett.⁴

Sadler had been unwilling to lose the whole battalion because of the Sayyid's increased activity.⁵ When his Ogaden followers began raiding Habr Awal caravans Sadler banned all trade with the Ogaden and moved two companies of 2 C.A.R. to Hargeisa in mid-June.⁶ The western Ishaak who grazed south of the border on the Haud were particularly at the Sayyid's mercy and in July a thousand of his horsemen attacked the Aidagalla who

-
1. F.O. 1/37, Harrington to Salisbury, no. 39, 30 May 1900; F.O.C.P. 7423, Harrington tels. to Cromer, nos. 9 & 10, 9 June 1900, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, no. 109, 10 June 1900.
 2. F.O. 1/37, memorandum by Harrington enclosed in Harrington to Fairholme, 18 Aug. 1900; F.O. 633/viii/p.281, Cromer to Sanderson, 10 June 1900.
 3. F.O.C.P. 7423, Salisbury to Cromer, 19 June 1900.
 4. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 32-41.
 5. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 64, 23 June 1900.
 6. F.O. 2/315, Sadler to Salisbury, tel. no. 2, 15 June 1900; F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 67, 26 June 1900.

had earlier raided the Ogaden. The Sayyid's superiority in fire-arms spread panic and the Aidagalla and other clans retreated northwards across the border.¹ When Sadler reached Hargeisa in early August he was dismayed at the serious overcrowding and the fear among the people who were clamouring for protection. To restore confidence he dispatched a company of 2 C.A.R. to Odweina, enlisted 20 armed biladiya to protect the Aidagalla and distributed 44 old rifles among the Habr Yunis.² The next month the Sayyid's men reportedly killed 220 men, women and children in a raid on the Habr Awal south of the border.³ This time the clan planned a retaliatory attack and Plunkett, who had moved all his troops to Hargeisa, wanted to support them. Sadler, however, strictly forbade him to cross the border; as a result the attack failed to materialise and 2 C.A.R. felt they had been cheated of a golden opportunity for catching the Sayyid.⁴

The distribution of a few rifles and the deployment of 400 soldiers were, at best, only temporary measures and Sadler was convinced that the expedition denied him the previous year could no longer be postponed, especially as Menelik was still keen to co-operate. The Sayyid was making conditions in the protectorate intolerable; the authorities were losing both prestige and revenue; the clans were now taking matters into their

-
1. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 77, 24 July 1900.
 2. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 80, 5 Aug. 1900, no. 90, 12 Sept. 1900.
 3. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 91, 14 Sept. 1900.
 4. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 108, 26 Oct. 1900; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 32, footnote 2.

own hands. 'I would submit that it is most desirable to put a stop to the present state of affairs as soon as we possibly can.' he wrote, 'We simply cannot go on as we have been doing....'¹ He therefore resisted urgent requests for the remainder of 2 C.A.R. to be sent to the Gold Coast,² but in September their removal to a more healthy area became imperative as a serious outbreak of scurvy was discovered among them.³ Their departure would leave Sadler dependent on 131 armed Somalis for the defence of the interior.⁴ To replace them with Indian troops was too expensive⁵ and so Sadler proposed raising a levy of 1,000 Somalis under British officers who could co-operate with armed 'friendly' clansmen and Ethiopian troops in an expedition against the Sayyid.⁶

As Cromer still refused to lend any troops from the Sudan the Foreign Office agreed to the replacement of 2 C.A.R. by a small Somali levy, but Salisbury was not prepared to sanction an expedition.⁷ At this juncture,

-
1. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 108, 26 Oct. 1900; Sadler to Sanderson, private, 3 Nov. 1900. For an exaggerated account of the situation see: The Times, 18 Oct. 1900.
 2. F.O. 2/315, F.O. tel. to Sadler, 30 July 1900; Sadler tel. to Salisbury, 5 Aug. 1900.
 3. F.O. 2/315, Sadler tel. to F.O., 28 Sept. 1900; F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 101, 8 Oct. 1900.
 4. F.O. 2/317, Intelligence Division, War Office (hereafter I.D.W.O.) to F.O., 10 Oct. 1900.
 5. F.O. 2/315, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, 24 Nov. 1900.
 6. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Salisbury, no. 108, 26 Oct. 1900.
 7. F.O. 78/5089, Salisbury tel. to Cromer, no. 55, 3 Nov. 1900; F.O. 78/5090, Cromer tel. to Salisbury, 4 Nov. 1900 and minutes thereon by St.J. Brodrick (parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs), 5 Nov. 1900, and Salisbury, n.d.; F.O. 2/317, F.O. to W.O., 9 Nov. 1900.

an important Cabinet change occurred following the 'Khaki' election. The aging Salisbury, whilst retaining the premiership, handed over the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne. The new foreign secretary came from the War Office and was likely to be influenced by the views of the officials there who were anxious to remove 2 C.A.R. from Somaliland and were also impressed by Sadler's arguments for an expedition. On their advice and in the knowledge that it would require a Treasury grant-in-aid, Lansdowne agreed to the recruitment of a full levy of 1,000 Somalis as requested by Sadler.¹ A week later, on 22 November, Sir John Ardagh the Director of Military Intelligence informed Lansdowne that 'It would appear... essential to at once take steps to crush the Mullah and re-establish order within our border.' He recommended an expedition of 1,500 Somali levies, 400 men of the East Africa Rifles and co-operation with Ethiopia. Lansdowne was persuaded: 'We shall have to put down the Mullah.' he wrote,² although he knew that the East African Rifles would be fully occupied in Jubaland where sub-commissioner Jenner had just been murdered by the Ogaden.³ The die had been cast. The development of Somaliland was to be sacrificed to the cause of 'putting down the Mullah.'

-
1. F.O. 2/317, W.O. to F.O., 15 Nov. 1900; F.O. 2/315, Lansdowne tel. to Sadler, 16 Nov. 1900.
 2. F.O. 2/317, D.M.I. to F.O., 22 Nov. 1900 and minute thereon by Lansdowne, 25 Nov. 1900.
 3. There is no convincing evidence to connect this incident with Sayyid Mohamed. Despite rumours to the contrary he was 600 miles away. The question is discussed by E.R. Turton in a paper entitled 'The impact of Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the East Africa Protectorate' presented at the University Social Sciences Council Conference, December 1968-January 1969, at Makerere University College, Kampala. For details of Jenner's murder and the punitive expedition which followed see: Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 114-118; G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966), pp. 72-76; Parl. Papers 1901, xlviii (215), 'Correspondence relating to the murder of Mr. Jenner, and the Ogaden Punitive Expedition.'; Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, Remark Book of H.M.S. Magicienne marked: C.P.1, 'Ogaden Punitive Expedition 1900, Intelligence Reports'.

CHAPTER IX.

'PUTTING DOWN THE MULLAH.'

As soon as Lansdowne had given his approval Swayne, with the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, began to recruit the Somali levy. Early in December 1900 they took over the garrisons of Adadleh and Hargeisa¹ and on 20 December 2¹ C.A.R. were able to leave Somaliland for the Gold Coast.² 17 officers were sent from Britain while India sent 50 Punjabis to fire three Maxim guns.³ By early April 1901 Swayne had over 1,100 men under arms and was concentrating them at Burao.⁴ Sadler was pleased with their progress while The Times carried a fulsome account stating that they were 'imbued with a fervent desire to serve well the great King, whom they regard as only less than a god.'⁵

To avoid merely driving the Sayyid south, Ethiopian co-operation was essential to force him east to Bohotleh where Swayne could attack him.⁶ The Ethiopians agreed to this⁷ but they dispatched their force of 8,000

-
1. F.O. 2/314, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 117, 14 Dec. 1900; F.O. 2/478, Swayne to Sadler, 10 Nov. 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, 18 Nov. 1901.
 2. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 33.
 3. F.O. 2/315, Lansdowne tel. to Sadler, no. 16, 15 Dec. 1900.
 4. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 18, 15 Mar. 1901, and no. 21, 5 Apr. 1901.
 5. F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 58, 10 May 1901; The Times, 29 May 1901.
 6. F.O. 2/478, Sadler to Lansdowne, 18 Nov. 1901.
 7. F.O. 1/37, Harrington to Salisbury, no. 52, 29 Nov. 1900.

men from Harar early in January, long before Swayne's preparations were complete.¹ They disappeared into the Ogaden and only occasional and conflicting reports filtered back;² it was feared that their precipitate action would only drive the Sayyid far to the south.³ In fact, however, they managed to get south of him and drive him north-east;⁴ in the middle of March Sadler reported that he was back in the protectorate, east of Bohotleh.⁵ 'Thus the role assigned to the Abyssinians... was fully and successfully carried out.' he wrote.⁶ Exhausted by this effort, and having eaten most of their transport animals, the Ethiopians returned to Jijiga, but a fresh expedition was planned to confine the Sayyid to the north where Swayne could reach him.⁷ In March, a British officer, Major Hanbury-Tracy, left Berbera to join the new Ethiopian expedition. Although it had been arranged with Menelik that both British and Ethiopian forces could cross the border, Hanbury-Tracy was to try his utmost to keep the Ethiopians out of the British protectorate.⁸

-
1. F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 23, 28 Feb. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 8, 10 Feb. 1901; F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 46, 5 Apr. 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/479, Lansdowne tel. to Sadler, 8 Mar. 1901; F.O.C.P. 7645, Lansdowne tel. to Sir C. Eliot (commissioner, East Africa Protectorate), no. 51, 9 Mar. 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 23, 13 Apr. 1901.
 5. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 18, 15 Mar. 1901.
 6. F.O. 2/477, confidential report, 1900-1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 92, 21 July 1901.
 7. F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 67, 24 May 1901; F.O. 2/481, Maj. Hon. Hanbury-Tracy (attached to Ethiopian force) to Lansdowne, no. 3, 22 June 1901.
 8. F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Hanbury-Tracy, 27 Mar. 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 37, 27 Mar. 1901; F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 20, 29 Mar. 1901.

On the strength of the Sayyid's return to the protectorate Sadler obtained permission to begin operations.¹ Swayne planned to advance into the Dolbohanta and had high hopes of capturing or killing the Sayyid within six weeks.² Apart from the Aligheri, his own lineage group, the Sayyid was believed to be bereft of support; the expedition was to relieve the Aligheri of 1,000 camels. All who deserted the Sayyid were to be treated leniently but he and his principal advisers were to be offered nothing but unconditional surrender; not even their lives were to be guaranteed.³

For the first time, Somaliland was coming to the notice of the British public. In the House of Commons the prime minister's son, Viscount Cranborne,⁴ the new parliamentary under-secretary in the Foreign Office sought to justify the expedition by comparing the Sayyid to the Sudanese Mahdi; few disagreed with this view, apart from the radical John Burns who 'resented Mullah hunting in general and the Somaliland one in particular.'⁵ The Times accused the Sayyid of waging a holy war against Christianity and

-
1. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 18, 15 Mar. 1901; Lansdowne tel. to Sadler, no. 18, 18 Mar. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/477, Swayne to Harbury-Tracy, 29 Mar. 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 47, 10 Apr. 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 46, 5 Apr. 1901; Sadler to Swayne, 11 Apr. 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 58, 10 May 1901.
 4. Gascoyne-Cecil, James Edward Hubert, Viscount Cranborne, later 4th Marquess of Salisbury, 1861-1947; held various Cabinet posts including: Lord Privy Seal, 1903-5 and 1924-29; President of Board of Trade, 1905. A diehard in the House of Lords 1909-11.
 5. Hansard, 4th series, 1901, xci, 500-501, 19 Mar. 1901.


drew attention to the 'indescribable atrocities' he committed against his enemies; but virtue would prevail, the levy would 'be quite equal to all that is wanted of it.'¹

The Italian authorities had to be informed of the British plans and were asked to try to prevent the Sayyid escaping through their protectorate to Arabia.² Their chief fear was lest the Sayyid be driven south into their Benadir protectorate which, for all its maladministration by the Benadir Company, they had high hopes of developing.³ Concern for the peace of the Benadir which was threatened by the rivalry between the two Mijertein rulers, Osman Mahmud of the north and Yusuf Ali of the south, led the Italians to take positive action in the Mijertein just at this juncture. In March 1901 they decided the time had come to force Osman Mahmud to accept their protection. As he still resisted two of his villages were subjected to a naval bombardment early in April; he fled to the interior and the Italians installed Yusuf Ali in his place.⁴ From the British viewpoint this was most inopportune; Osman Mahmud was desperate

-
1. The Times, 4 Apr. 1901 and 9 Apr. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 20, 29 Mar. 1901; F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 46, 5 Apr. 1901; F.O.C.P. 7645, Lord Currie (British ambassador, Rome) to Lansdowne, no. 4 Africa, 25 Apr. 1901.
 3. F.O.C.P. 7645, Currie to Lansdowne, no. 1 Africa, 10 Jan. 1901; Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, pp. 74-100.
 4. See above, pp. 123-4; Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, pp. 127-8; F.O. 2/480, Aden News Report, 10 Apr. 1901, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 30 Apr. 1901; F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 51, 21 Apr. 1901.

To face page 324

THE FIRST EXPEDITION 1901 (i) SWAYNE'S ADVANCE



for allies (he tried the British, Germans and Turks)¹ and would probably make common cause with the Sayyid, supplying him with men and rifles.²

Swayne's force swung out of Burao on 22 May 1901. In addition to 1,000 infantry there were 400 mounted infantry on ponies, 100 camel sowars and a fluctuating number of 'friendly' Ishaak spearmen.³ They moved towards Lassada where the Sayyid was said to be with 6,000 followers and 300 rifles.⁴ On their way they were able to burn down his tariqa settlement at Kob Faradod⁵ and seize 3,500 camels from the Habr Toljaala Adan Madoba and the Dolbohanta Jama Siad, two groups which supported the Sayyid.⁶ The captured stock was left at Samala in the charge of Captain McNeill while Swayne took his main force to Tifafle and Las Anod. McNeill had 370 riflemen, 130 spearmen and a Maxim; with so much livestock he was a sitting target. On 2 June huge numbers of horsemen, mainly Dolbohanta

-
1. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, pp. 128-9; F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 30, 23 May 1901; F.O. 2/481, Aden resident to Govt. of India, 4 June 1901, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 2 July 1901.
 2. F.O.C.P. 7645, Aden resident to I.O., 10 May 1901, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 1 June 1901; Lansdowne to Currie, no. 17 Africa, 5 June 1901; F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 64, 16 May 1901; The Times, 28 May 1901.
 3. A colourful description is in McNeill, In Pursuit of the 'Mad' Mullah, pp. 18-19.
 4. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 26, 1 May 1901; F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 67, 24 May 1901.
 5. Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, p. 61; F.O. 2/478, Swayne to Sadler, 10 Nov. 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, 18 Nov. 1901.
 6. The Times, 16 July 1901; McNeill, In Pursuit of the 'Mad' Mullah, p. 78. Swayne's despatch covering this phase is not in the Foreign Office records (F.O. 2/477); it was apparently sent to the War Office and not returned.

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
29	
30	
31	
32	
33	
34	
35	
36	
37	
38	
39	
40	
41	
42	
43	
44	
45	
46	
47	
48	
49	
50	
51	
52	
53	
54	
55	
56	
57	
58	
59	
60	
61	
62	
63	
64	
65	
66	
67	
68	
69	
70	
71	
72	
73	
74	
75	
76	
77	
78	
79	
80	
81	
82	
83	
84	
85	
86	
87	
88	
89	
90	
91	
92	
93	
94	
95	
96	
97	
98	
99	
100	

swept down from the hills and attacked him; he estimated their numbers at between 3,000 and 5,000. The battle raged until midday on 3 June. Many of the dervishes, wearing white turbans, hurled themselves with fanatical bravery against the zariba where they were shot down. The Maxim did tremendous execution; an estimated 500 dervishes were slaughtered. 10 defenders were killed and 9 wounded.¹ It was a case of:

'Whatever happens we have got
The maxim gun and they have not.'²

Having failed to regain their stock the attackers retreated eastwards and were pursued by Swayne's force. The chase continued until the dervishes were driven out of the south-east corner of the protectorate on 12 June; small detachments continued to press them but with the phenomenal Somali ability to cover vast distances across waterless country at high speed they made good their escape and found refuge in the oasis of Mudug. The Sayyid had been driven out of the protectorate in considerable disarray and many groups of the Dolbohanta came to make submission to Swayne.³

1. F.O. 2/477, Capt. McNeill to Swayne, 17 June 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 94, 22 July 1901; F.O. 2/478, Swayne to Sadler, 31 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 100, 1 Aug. 1901; McNeill, In Pursuit of the 'Mad' Mullah, pp. 80-112; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 161-2; General Staff War Office, Official History of the Operations in Somaliland, 1901-04 (London, 1907), i, 65-9.
2. From: Hilaire Belloc, The Modern Traveller, quoted in M. Perham, Lugard The Years of Authority 1898-1945 (London, 1960), p. 45.
3. The Times, 16 July 1901; F.O. 2/477, Swayne to Sadler, 13 June 1901 and 21 June 1901, both enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 94, 22 July, 1901.

left Bohotleh in pursuit.¹

Meanwhile, Lansdowne had been reluctant to let Swayne combine with the Ethiopians and pursue the Sayyid into Italian territory.² When Lord Roberts, the commander-in-chief, expressed the view that an advance to Mudug across the waterless Haud might result in disaster,³ orders were sent to terminate the operations and forbidding a pursuit to Mudug.⁴ This decision seemed to be justified when it became known that shortage of food had forced the Ethiopians to leave Gerlogubi and return to Harar early in July.⁵ Their presence had prevented the Sayyid from returning to the Ogaden but their disorganisation and their rapacious methods had made the British wary of co-operating with them in future.⁶

The order to cease operations did not reach Swayne until he was in

-
1. F.O. 2/477, Swayne to Sadler, 2 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 95, 23 July 1901; Swayne to Sadler, 8 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 96, 23 July 1901; Swayne to Sadler, 18 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 97, 26 July 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/479, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 34, 20 June 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/481, I.D.W.O. to F.O., 24 June 1901; F.O. 2/479, minute by Sir C. Hill (superintendent of African protectorates, F.O.), n.d., on Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 34, 20 June 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/315, Lansdowne tel. to Sadler, no. 32, 25 June 1901 (misplaced).
 5. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 36, 4 July 1901, and minute thereon by Lansdowne, n.d.; F.O. 2/481, Hanbury-Tracy to Lansdowne, no. 4, 13 Sept. 1901; War Office, Official History..., i, 82-8.
 6. F.O. 2/481, Director-General of Military Intelligence (hereafter D.G.M.I.) to F.O., 3 Sept. 1901; F.O. 2/482, Hanbury-Tracy to Lansdowne, 6 Nov. 1901, a report which includes interesting photographs.


While waiting for permission to move into Italian territory against the Sayyid at Mudug, Swayne decided to punish the Aligheri in the west. He rejoined McNeill and moved south to Bohotleh, seizing Dolbohanta stock en route. Simultaneously, Hanbury-Tracy and 14,000 Ethiopians from Harar arrived at Gerlogubi; from here their foraging raids against the Ogaden extended through Wardere to Gallad and north to within 45 miles of Swayne's force. Hanbury-Tracy described their tactics:

'... the Abyssinians, in their lust for blood, made no distinction between friendly and unfriendly Somalis, regarding them all alike as vermin to be killed.'¹

Their presence discouraged the Sayyid and the Aligheri from moving west.² In the north, Swayne operated in Ethiopian territory against the Aligheri and the Ogaden Ibrahim who also supported the Sayyid.³ He occupied their main watering places, captured the Ibrahim sultan and seized 6,000 Aligheri camels; by early July they were forced to submit. Swayne was now free to turn his attention to the Sayyid; as predicted, Osman Mahmud had encouraged and helped him, but fear of Yusuf Ali of Obbia forced the Sayyid to leave Mudug. Finding his way blocked by the troops at Curmis he re-entered the British protectorate and made for Weilahed; Swayne

-
1. F.O. 2/481, Hanbury-Tracy to Lansdowne, no. 3, 22 June 1901; The Times, 9 July 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/477, Confidential Report 1900-01, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 92, 21 July 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/477, Swayne to Sadler, 1 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 95, 23 July 1901.

To face page 328 THE FIRST EXPEDITION 1901 (IV) FERDIDDIN.



KEY

- Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary
- Red lines and dates British Movements
- Red circles British Positions
- Red and black arrows British Pursuit of Dervishes
- Black lines and dates Dervish Movements
- Black circles Dervish Concentrations
- Blue lines and dates Ethiopian Movements
- Blue circles Ethiopian Positions
- Broken lines Detachments

pursuit of the Sayyid near Weilahed; as his enemy was no longer at hand but back in the protectorate he decided to disregard the order. When he caught up with him on 16 July the Sayyid was at Ferdiddin ten miles on the Italian side of the boundary; with his Mijertein reinforcements he probably had 600 riflemen. The next morning Swayne attacked. The Sayyid's men had made a remarkable recovery so soon after Samala but eventually they were routed; once again the white-turbaned dervishes stood to the end. The Sayyid fled into the Haud; many of his family and leaders were killed, his own encampment and his books were burnt and the Dolbohanta seized the chance to loot his stock. One of Swayne's officers and nine of his men were killed; there is no estimate of the dervish dead. Swayne decided that his orders prohibited him from continuing the chase. The Foreign Office approved of the attack but the British officers felt cheated: '... our sudden return to the coast will encourage the Mullah at a time when our continued pursuit would have resulted in his eventual capture.' wrote Swayne, predicting that they had not seen the last of the Sayyid.¹

On 28 July Swayne and his whole force returned to Burao.² He had

-
1. F.O. 2/477, Swayne to Sadler, 18 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 97, 26 July 1901, and minute thereon by Hill, n.d.; F.O. 2/478; Swayne to Sadler, 26 July 1901 and 31 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 100, 1 Aug. 1901; McNeill, In Pursuit of the 'Mad' Mullah, pp. 168-184; War Office, Official History..., i, 75-9; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 162.
 2. F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 42, 1 Aug. 1901.

800 prisoners, 14,000 camels, 30,000 sheep, 1,000 cattle and 2 horses. For the loss of 1 officer and 24 men, and 1 officer and 25 men wounded, he estimated that 1,200 of the Sayyid's followers had been killed or wounded. Twice the Sayyid had been driven out of the protectorate and most of the Dolbohanta and Ogaden had renounced him.¹ Out of £60,000 which parliament had voted for the operations the expedition had used only £29,671.² The Foreign Office were very satisfied.³

Swayne himself was less sanguine for he had begun to recognise the true extent of the Sayyid's movement. 'Until I actually saw the Mullah's men fighting, I had no idea that a Somali could be so influenced by fanaticism.' he wrote. The expedition had not weakened the Sayyid:

-
1. F.O. 2/478, Swayne to Sadler, 10 Nov. 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, 18 Nov. 1901; an account of the expedition is contained in: Parl. Papers 1902, lxix (713), 'Correspondence respecting the Rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland and consequent Military Operations 1901-1902'.
 2. Figure in written parliamentary answer by Cranborne, Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxi, 108, 22 Apr. 1903; it is therefore hardly likely to be an overestimate although it exceeds figures given elsewhere. Swayne mentioned £22,000 in F.O. 2/809, Swayne to E. Crowe (clerk, Africa Dept., F.O.), 7 Feb. 1902; Cordeaux spoke of £25,865 in F.O. 2/617, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 40, 10 Apr. 1902. The Comptroller and Auditor General put the cost at £26,592 in Parl. Papers 1902, lxxiii, 'Civil Service Appropriation Accounts 1900-01, Report on Uganda, Central and East Africa Protectorates and Uganda Railway' but he was probably omitting the cost of Hanbury-Tracy's mission, said to be £1,298 in F.O. 2/617, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 70, 3 July 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/477, minute by Hill, n.d., on Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 96, 23 July 1901; minute by Cranborne, n.d., on Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 97, 26 July 1901; F.O. 2/476, Lansdowne to Sadler, no. 112, 29 Aug. 1901.

'... provided he has riflemen about him, he can compel every tribe in turn to join him, and there appears to be no reason why he should not increase the number of his riflemen indefinitely.'

Sadler pointed out the next step:

'The Dolbahanta have no wish to be inimical to us, but, if the Mullah returns and again dominates their country, they will be forced to do so.'

The result would be renewed raids on the Ishaak and both Sadler and Swayne emphasised that since they had fought in the expedition there was a stronger obligation to protect them. Their solution was to keep half the levy under arms as a permanent striking force based on Burao and to use the remainder of the levy to defend the Ishaak as an armed militia living with their own people.¹

A similar idea had already been suggested by the War Office² but both Lansdowne and Cranborne disliked it; they did not share Sadler's enthusiasm for occupying the interior.³ However, the opinions of Sadler and Swayne could not be lightly brushed aside and the Foreign Office were compelled to take a long look at their Somaliland policy. Cranborne thought their object was still 'to occupy and administer nothing but the

-
1. F.O. 2/478, Swayne to Sadler, 31 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 100, 1 Aug. 1901; F.O. 2/479, Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 42, 1 Aug. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/481, I.D.W.O. to F.O., 24 June 1901; D.G.M.I. to F.O., 8 July 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/479, minutes, n.d., and draft tel. by Cranborne and Lansdowne, on Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, 20 June 1901; minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Sadler tel. to Lansdowne, no. 36, 4 July 1901.

coast and its immediate neighbourhood....' Sir Clement Hill¹, the superintendent of African protectorates, differed. He had visited Somaliland earlier in the year and had been subjected to Sadler's opinions; he feared that they could no longer cling to the coastal policy and overlook their obligations to protect the clans of the interior. Lansdowne took a middle line. If the coastal policy had to be abandoned he wished to take time to consider it; he was sceptical of the obligation to protect the Ishaak at £17,000 a year and was prepared to 'leave them to work out their own salvation....' For the moment he would only agree to Sadler's scheme as a temporary expedient.² Sadler and Swayne therefore left for London to press their case.

They asked for a permanent force at Burao which, by absorbing the military police, would number 475 men and 10 British officers; in addition they wanted 500 militia. The cost would be just over £19,000 a year. They bombarded the Foreign Office with arguments to show that the occupation of the interior was essential. The very safety of Berbera was at stake. The treaties of 1886 extended to the Ishaak 'The gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen Empress' and they could not

-
1. Hill, Sir Clement Lloyd, C.B., K.C.M.G. (later K.C.B.), 1845-1913; 1867, joined F.O.; 1872-3, secretary to Sir Bartle Frere's mission to Zanzibar; 1886 & 1887, commissioner to Haiti; 1900-1905, superintendent of African protectorates; 1906, Unionist M.P., Shrewsbury.
 2. F.O. 2/481, minutes by Cranborne, 25 Aug. 1901, Hill, 26 Aug. 1901 and Lansdowne, 1 Sept. 1901, on D.G.M.I. to F.O., 23 Aug. 1901; F.O. 2/479, Lansdowne tel. to Sadler, no. 43, 4 Sept. 1901.

be left 'to be pillaged and murdered by the Mullah and his followers.' Cranborne capitulated: 'I see no way to avoid something of this kind if we are in honour bound to the Ishak tribes....' but Lansdowne still felt there must be a cheaper solution.¹ Swayne and Sadler therefore told him that without the occupation trade and revenue would disappear, the inhabitants of Berbera would starve and the port would scarcely be worth retaining. Reluctantly the foreign secretary gave in, but the defensive scheme was to last only so long as the Sayyid remained a danger.²

The force thus sanctioned was to become the 6th battalion of the King's African Rifles, a regiment composed of the Central Africa, East Africa and Uganda Rifles, which was to come into being on 1 January 1902 and which could be used instead of expensive Indian troops in any emergency in any of the four protectorates.³ By using the balance of the £60,000 grant-in-aid 6 K.A.R. could be financed to the end of March 1902⁴ but a further £16,000 would be needed for 1902-03 and the chancellor of the exchequer was unsympathetic.⁵ Hill told the Treasury that the obligation

-
1. F.O. 2/478, Sadler to Lansdowne, 1 Nov. 1901, and minutes thereon by Cranborne and Lansdowne, both n.d.; F.O. 2/482, loose minute by Brig.-Gen. W.H. Manning (Inspector-General, K.A.R.), 9 Nov. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/478, memo. by Lansdowne, 14 Nov. 1901; see also: minute by Crowe, 3 Oct. 1901, on General Administration Report 1900-01, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 123, 10 Sept. 1901.
 3. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 123-131; F.O. 2/482, F.O. to W.O., 29 Oct. 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/479, Lansdowne tel. to Cordeaux, no. 50, 22 Nov. 1901; Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, 30 Nov. 1901.
 5. F.O. 2/478, minute by Cranborne, 3 Dec. 1901, on Sadler to Lansdowne, 1 Nov. 1901.

to protect the Ishaak was a policy 'from which His Majesty's Government cannot in honour depart' and emphasised the dire economic effects that would result from neglecting the interior.¹ His lengthy eloquence was largely successful. The Treasury sent back a lecture on imprudent action by protectorate officials but sanctioned the scheme and agreed to ask parliament for the £16,000.²

6 K.A.R. met the need for a defensive force but it was also patently obvious that the arms trade must be stopped. The rifles captured from the dervishes had been French³ which gave the British Government an excuse to remind France of her duty to stop the trade at Djibouti.⁴ The size of the market was such that at least one German firm contemplated shipping 30 to 40 tons of arms and ammunition to Djibouti fortnightly.⁵ The profits were enormous: an old rifle disposed of by the Government in France at 1 franc could be sold at Djibouti for 15 francs and on the Mijertein coast for 45 francs.⁶ Any restrictive measures that the Djibouti authorities

-
1. F.O. 2/482, F.O. to Treasury, 11 Dec. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/283, Treasury to F.O., 27 Dec. 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 95, 23 July 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/677, Lansdowne to Monson, no. 123 Africa, 27 Aug. 1901.
 5. F.O. 2/677, Aden resident to Govt. of Bombay, 26 Sept. 1901, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 28 Nov. 1901; Pansa (Italian ambassador, London) memo. to F.O., 1 Nov. 1901.
 6. F.O. 2/677, Senior Naval Officer (hereafter, S.N.O.) Aden, to C.-in-C. East Indies, 3 Feb. 1902, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 21 Mar. 1902; F.O. 2/678, Lansdowne to Monson, no. 120 Africa, 28 May 1902; Hansard, 4th series, 1902, cxi, 1133-4; speech by Lansdowne, 24 July 1902.

to protect the Ishaak was a policy 'from which His Majesty's Government cannot in honour depart' and emphasised the dire economic effects that would result from neglecting the interior.¹ His lengthy eloquence was largely successful. The Treasury sent back a lecture on imprudent action by protectorate officials but sanctioned the scheme and agreed to ask parliament for the £16,000.²

6 K.A.R. met the need for a defensive force but it was also patently obvious that the arms trade must be stopped. The rifles captured from the dervishes had been French³ which gave the British Government an excuse to remind France of her duty to stop the trade at Djibouti.⁴ The size of the market was such that at least one German firm contemplated shipping 30 to 40 tons of arms and ammunition to Djibouti fortnightly.⁵ The profits were enormous: an old rifle disposed of by the Government in France at 1 franc could be sold at Djibouti for 15 francs and on the Mijertein coast for 45 francs.⁶ Any restrictive measures that the Djibouti authorities

-
1. F.O. 2/482, F.O. to Treasury, 11 Dec. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/283, Treasury to F.O., 27 Dec. 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/477, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 95, 23 July 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/677, Lansdowne to Monson, no. 123 Africa, 27 Aug. 1901.
 5. F.O. 2/677, Aden resident to Govt. of Bombay, 26 Sept. 1901, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 28 Nov. 1901; Pansa (Italian ambassador, London) memo. to F.O., 1 Nov. 1901.
 6. F.O. 2/677, Senior Naval Officer (hereafter, S.N.O.) Aden, to C.-in-C. East Indies, 3 Feb. 1902, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 21 Mar. 1902; F.O. 2/678, Lansdowne to Monson, no. 120 Africa, 28 May 1902; Hansard, 4th series, 1902, cxi, 1133-4, speech by Lansdowne, 24 July 1902.

took were short-lived and only served to stimulate the traffic.¹ France claimed to be observing the letter of the Brussels Act which permitted arms to be exported to the Arabian coast; she could do nothing if, from there, they found their way back to the Somalis. It was plain that she had no interest in stopping the traffic and that any amount of diplomatic representation was fruitless, as Salisbury had always maintained.²

Failing restrictions at Djibouti all other measures would be, at best, only partially successful; nevertheless, they were considered worthwhile. East of Berbera there were over 300 miles of unadministered coastline in the British protectorate, and although few arms were landed there, Sadler strongly recommended frequent naval patrols and a cruise to show the flag and warn the inhabitants of the severe punishment that would follow arms smuggling.³ Cordeaux accordingly visited the ports⁴ while the navy began coastal patrols early in 1902.⁵

Cordeaux discovered that the main entry point for arms was the Mijertein

-
1. F.O. 2/677, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 141, 11 Oct. 1901; Lansdowne to Currie, no. 44 Africa, 29 Oct. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/677, memo. by Sanderson, 14 Aug. 1901; Monson to Lansdowne, no. 136 Africa, 6 Dec. 1901 and minutes thereon by Hill, Cranborne and Lansdowne, all n.d.; R.W. Beachey, 'The Arms Trade in East Africa in the late Nineteenth Century', Journal of African History, iii (1962), 462-7.
 3. F.O. 2/677, memo. by Sadler, 24 Oct. 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/677, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 158, 19 Nov. 1901.
 5. F.O. 2/677, Admiralty to F.O., 1 Mar. 1902.

port of Bosaso. The Sayyid had been receiving arms from there with the connivance of Osman Mahmud.¹ The latter's continued hostility towards the Italians gave them equal cause to be worried about the arms trade but at the same time it made them unable to stop it.² On 18 August 1901, however, they reached agreement with Osman Mahmud who was reinstated, accepted their protection, and promised to stop the arms traffic and to dissociate himself from the Sayyid.³ The Italians readily agreed to co-operate with Britain against the arms trade⁴ and in March 1902 a joint patrol by warships of the two nations captured an Arab dhow with 58 rifles from Djibouti on board.⁵

Towards the end of 1901 Sadler was appointed to succeed Sir Harry Johnston as commissioner in Uganda. The Foreign Office, at their wits' end to find employment for Johnston,⁶ offered him the consul-generalship of Somaliland. Understandably, the offer was turned down,⁷ and Somaliland was left to limp along under the Berbera vice-consul, Cordeaux.

-
1. F.O. 2/478, Swayne to Sadler, 26 July 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 100, 1 Aug. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/677, Lansdowne to Buchanan (British chargé d'affaires, Rome), no. 131, 26 June 1901; communication from Italian ambassador to F.O., 8 July 1901.
 3. F.O.C.P. 8126, Currie to Lansdowne, no. 18 Africa, 23 Nov. 1901; F.O. 2/478, Pestalozza (Italian consul-general, Zanzibar) to Sadler, 4 Sept. 1901, enclosed in Sadler to Crowe, 10 Oct. 1901; Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, p. 129.
 4. F.O. 2/677, F.O. memo. for Italian ambassador, 5 Nov. 1901; Currie tel. to Lansdowne; no. 2 Africa, 16 Nov. 1901.
 5. F.O. 2/677, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 33, 17 Mar. 1902.
 6. Sal. P., E/Barrington, Barrington to Salisbury, 6 Nov. 1901.
 7. R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and The Scramble for Africa (London, 1957), p. 339.

Admittedly, there seemed little danger in the situation. All the principal sections of the Dolbohanta had disavowed the Sayyid and had been granted an amnesty¹; there was even evidence that they were taking the initiative and repelling dervish attacks themselves.² Many of the Sayyid's followers were deserting and it seemed that he had now lost the support of Osman Mahmud's Mijertein.³ So quiet was the situation that the 50 Punjabis were returned to India in November and Captain McNeill, ostensibly in command of the disorganised troops at Burao, felt free to go shooting.⁴

In reality, the Sayyid was far from quiescent. He re-entered the Dolbohanta region of the protectorate in October and he was still managing to obtain firearms from the northern Mijertein.⁵ On 16 December he suddenly appeared at Idoweina, 30 miles from Burao, with a force of riflemen; he announced that he had come to punish the clans assisting the English, and a number of defenceless clansmen were shot down. In McNeill's absence the troops at Burao were quite unprepared to move. Alarm spread among the Ishaak and Berbera swarmed with refugees. Cordeaux hastily issued firearms to the Ishaak and began to re-engage men into the

-
1. F.O. 2/478, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 116, 28 Aug. 1901.
 2. F.O. 2/482, Capt. A.G.G. Sharp to Swayne, 20 Sept. 1901, enclosed in Swayne to Crowe, 10 Oct. 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/478, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 133, 25 Sept. 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/797, Inspection Report 6 K.A.R., by Manning, 26 Feb. 1902; F.O. 2/809, Manning to Crowe, private, 7 Feb. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/677, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 143, 18 Oct. 1901; F.O. 2/479, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 52, 24 Oct. 1901.

levy.¹ The Foreign Office spent an uneasy Christmas. They warned Cordeaux not to take the offensive with inadequate forces,² summoned a warship to Berbera,³ put 300 men of the C.A.R. on stand-by,⁴ sent out half a dozen military officers⁵ and recalled Swayne, who had left the protectorate service, from holiday in Switzerland.⁶ On 27 December Cordeaux reported that the Sayyid had retired to El Dab but that he had 12,000 followers and possibly 1,000 rifles.⁷ Lansdowne was strongly averse to attacking him⁸ and Swayne was sent out with a reminder that 'His Majesty's Government do not wish to be drawn into a pursuit of the Mullah, and that the operations should as far as possible be of a defensive nature.'⁹ Reluctant consent was wrung from the Treasury for an extra £9,000 for the increased defensive measures, bringing the total grant-in-aid for 1902-03 to £25,000.¹⁰

Meanwhile, Cordeaux had earned himself the disfavour of the Foreign Office by obtaining 100 expensive Indian troops from Aden to strengthen

-
1. F.O. 2/809, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 56, 20 Dec. 1901; Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 170, 24 Dec. 1901; Swayne to Lansdowne, 17 Feb. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/809, Lansdowne tel. to Cordeaux, no. 54, 23 Dec. 1901.
 3. F.O. 2/809, F.O. to Admiralty, 23 Dec. 1901.
 4. F.O. 2/809, Lansdowne tel. to A. Sharpe (commissioner, British Central Africa Protectorate), 23 Dec. 1901.
 5. F.O. 2/809, Lansdowne to Cordeaux, no. 165, 25 Dec. 1901.
 6. F.O. 2/809, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, 23 Dec. 1901.
 7. F.O. 2/809, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 57, 27 Dec. 1901.
 8. F.O. 2/809, minute by Lansdowne on above, n.d.
 9. F.O. 2/809, Lansdowne to Swayne, 31 Dec. 1901.
 10. F.O. 2/619, Cranborne to Lansdowne, 12 Feb. 1902; F.O. to Treasury, 12 Feb. 1902; Treasury to F.O., 18 Feb. 1902.

Berbera.¹ They were probably the cause of the Sayyid's withdrawal further south-east but they laid the Foreign Office open to Treasury rebukes;² Cordeaux hastily returned them to Aden.³ He also offended by proposing an attack on the Sayyid and the occupation of Bohotleh which led Cranborne to complain: '... this is a striking example of the glibness with which the forward policy is advocated. An advanced post at Burao in 5 months becomes inadequate and must be replaced by a post at Bohotele!'⁴ Swayne arrived on 18 January 1902 and bent his efforts to building up a defensive system sufficient to avoid another expedition.⁵ The Ishaak were encouraged to look to their own defence while the levy was expanded to 1,200 men.⁶ It was becoming obvious, however, that the more arms the Sayyid received from the Mijertein the larger the defensive force would have to be to protect the Ishaak.⁷ When Brigadier Manning,⁸

-
1. F.O. 2/809, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 1, 3 Jan. 1902, and no. 14, 16 Jan. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/809, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 1, 3 Jan. 1902; minute by Cranborne, n.d., on loose minute by Hill, 14 Jan. 1902; Cordeaux to Hill, 7 Feb. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/809, Lansdowne tel. to Cordeaux, no. 2, 6 Jan. 1902; Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 2, 16 Jan. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/809, minute by Cranborne, n.d., on Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 1, 3 Jan. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/809, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 18, 24 Jan. 1902; Swayne to Crowe, 7 Feb. 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/809, Swayne to Lansdowne, 17 Feb. 1902.
 7. F.O. 2/677, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 22, 1 Feb. 1902.
 8. Manning, Brig-Gen. William Henry (later, Sir William, C.B., K.B.E., G.C.M.G.), 1863-1932; 1886, joined army; 1888, Indian army; 1893-1901, served in British Central Africa and Northern Rhodesia; acted as commissioner, B.C.A.; raised and commanded C.A.R.; 1901-7, Inspector-General, K.A.R.; 1902-4, served in Somaliland; 1907-8, acting governor, Nyasaland; 1910, commissioner, Somaliland; 1910-13, governor, Nyasaland; 1913-18, governor, Jamaica; 1918-25, governor, Ceylon.

the new Inspector-General of K.A.R., arrived at Berbera on 6 February he immediately reported that a purely defensive policy was untenable; sooner or later a collision with the Sayyid would make an offensive policy inevitable.¹

The collision came sooner than expected. On 7 February 4,000 dervishes attacked some Dolbohanta within 35 miles of Burao. Within a week, some Ishaak 20 miles from Burao suffered a similar fate. Captain Sharp, the new commandant of 6 K.A.R., moved out of Burao in pursuit and his advance guard killed 13 dervishes and captured some sheep², but this in no way made up for the heavy loss of life. The raids had shown the ineffectiveness of the defensive policy and a fatalism settled on the clans who believed that nothing could break the Sayyid's power.³ Swayne and Manning were both at Burao at the time of the second raid. It convinced them of the need to organise a sharp counter-stroke, after which the original defensive policy could be reverted to; and they urged the necessity of acting quickly before the clans lost all confidence in the British. They asked for another six K.A.R. officers from the other protectorates and for permission to enlist a further 500 men; 6 K.A.R. which had hardly enjoyed a separate existence, was to

-
1. F.O. 2/809, Manning to Crowe, private, 7 Feb. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/809, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 5, 15 Feb. 1902; Swayne to Lansdowne, 17 Feb. 1902; Manning to Lansdowne, 17 Feb. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/809, Cordeaux to Hill, 15 Feb. 1902.

become the mounted arm of the force.¹ Swayne proposed the expedition with genuine reluctance.² With far greater reluctance Lansdowne and his officials gave their approval.³ They appointed Swayne to be the new commissioner and consul-general for the protectorate,⁴ impressed on him the need for economy and instructed him to avoid prolonged operations.⁵ Later, in the House of Lords, Lansdowne explained that it had been impossible to allow the Ishaak to be further persecuted and that it was 'absolutely necessary to inflict exemplary punishment upon this dangerous chieftain.' Cranborne reiterated the 'absolutely necessary' to the Commons.⁶

Swayne wished to co-operate, not with the Ethiopians this time, but with Yusuf Ali who would attack the Sayyid from Obbia.⁷ Swayne met him in Aden and described him as:

'a splendid model for a Brigand chief - muffled chin, great studded silver dagger and broad bladed scimitar - a black burnous over a gold embroidered vest - a red mustache, brushed upwards, and sombre eyes.'⁸

-
1. F.O. 2/809, Swayne to Lansdowne, 17 Feb. 1902; Manning to Lansdowne, 17 Feb. 1902; Manning to Hill, private, 17 Feb. 1902; F.O. 2/619, Manning to Crowe, 17 Feb. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/809, Swayne to Hill, 23 Feb. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/809, minutes by Hill and Lansdowne, both n.d., on Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 27, 20 Feb. 1902; minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Manning tel. to Lansdowne, 21 Feb. 1902; Lansdowne tels. to Sharpe, no. 16, and Eliot, no. 35, both 24 Feb. 1902; F.O. to W.O., 4 Mar. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/616, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 68, 1 Mar. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/809, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 21, 7 Mar. 1902.
 6. Hansard, 4th series, 1902, cxi, 1134-5, 24 July 1902, and cxii, 571, 4 Aug. 1902.
 7. F.O. 2/809, Swayne to Hill, 23 Feb. 1902.
 8. F.O. 2/809, Swayne to Lieut.-Col. Altham (asst. Quartermaster-General, I.D.W.O.) 15 May 1902, enclosed in Altham to Hill, 31 May 1902.

Yusuf Ali arranged to block the Sayyid's probable retreat southwards to the country of the Hawiya Somalis.¹ In the event, the plan failed, partly because the Italians feared lest Yusuf Ali became too powerful and refused to supply him with firearms, and partly because he himself disliked taking such an active part against the Sayyid.² The Italians gave permission for Swayne to operate in their protectorate so long as the Sayyid was not driven to the Benadir,³ and an Italian naval officer, Captain Count Lovatelli, C.M.G.,⁴ was sent to accompany the force.⁵ They also promised to exercise naval control over the coast to stop Osman Mahmud's arms trading,⁶ but apart from the occasional patrol very little came of this.⁷ They continued to be obsessed with fears for the Benadir.⁸ In parliament Lansdowne publicly acknowledged their assistance,⁹ but in private he complained about their lack of support¹⁰ while he urged them

-
1. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 56, 1 June 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/810, Cordeaux to Hill, 27 June 1902; Lansdowne to R. Rodd (charge d'affaires, Rome), no. 54 Africa, 10 July 1902; Cordeaux to Lansdowne, 3 July 1902; F.O. memo. to Pansa, 30 July 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/809, Pansa memo. to F.O., 16 Apr. 1902.
 4. In 1893 Lovatelli had distinguished himself in a fight between Somalis and the I.B.E.A. Co. representative at Chisimaio; later that year he took part in a punitive expedition against the Jubaland Ogaden for which he was awarded the C.M.G. See: East Africa Protectorate Govt., Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District (Nairobi, 1917), pp. 23-4; P.L. McDermott, British East Africa or IBEA (London, 1895), pp. 243, 246-7; J.R. Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories 1884-1893 (London, 1922), pp. 297-9, 334-5.
 5. F.O. 2/809, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 9 Africa, 30 Apr. 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/678, memo. by Sanderson, 23 June 1902.
 7. F.O. 2/810, Cordeaux to F.O., 3 July 1902.
 8. F.O. 2/810, Lansdowne to Rodd, no. 54 Africa, 10 July 1902.
 9. Hansard, 4th series, 1902, cxi, 662, 18 July 1902 and 1135, 24 July 1902.
 10. F.O. 2/810, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Cordeaux to F.O., 3 July 1902.


to take more drastic action against Osman Mahmud.¹

Throughout March, April and May 1902 the Sayyid remained in the Dolbohanta while his followers grazed their stock in the Nogal Valley.² Swayne was disturbed to learn that the Sayyid's influence was spreading north to those sections of the Dolbohanta, and even of the Habr Yunis, who lived behind the coast east of Berbera; there were reports of arms finding their way in there.³ Swayne decided that firm measures were needed in the east before dealing with the Sayyid. A trade embargo was declared on all the ports east of Berbera except for Heis where 12 police and a customs post were installed.⁴ While Cordeaux cruised along the coast in a warship, Swayne spent the second half of April dragooning the country south of Heis with 700 troops. Heavy livestock fines were inflicted on the clans inclining towards the Sayyid.⁵ A stone blockhouse was built at Las Dureh and garrisoned with 100 men to guard the eastern approach to Berbera.

100 men were also detailed to garrison Burao leaving Swayne with a

-
1. F.O. 2/810, Lansdowne memo. to Pansa, 13 Aug. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/618, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 8, 14 Mar. 1902; Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 11, 4 Apr. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/809, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 100 (12?), 7 Apr. 1902; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 47, 5 May 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/677, Aden resident tel. to I.O., 22 Apr. 1902, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 23 Apr. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/809, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 43, 1 May 1902; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 47, 5 May 1902.

To face page 343 THE SECOND EXPEDITION 1902 (i) APRIL - SEPTEMBER.



striking force of 1,720 Somalis. With another thousand 'friendlies' skirmishing in advance Swayne left Burao on 26 May. The Sayyid was reported to be at Baran with 14,000 men and 1,500 rifles,¹ but as Swayne moved south he retired to Erego in the Haud.² Leaving men at Bohotleh to build a fort Swayne moved south and the dervishes seized the opportunity to annihilate a supply caravan in his rear. Returning to Bohotleh Swayne left 500 men there and set off again south-east towards Domo in the Haud.³ By moving so far south he caused a good deal of anxiety in the Foreign Office,⁴ especially for the safety of Berbera.⁵ In mid-June 60 Sikh soldiers from the Central African Protectorate were ordered up to garrison Berbera.⁶

Lack of water at Domo hindered Swayne's advance across the Haud and forced him northwards to Las Anod. Shortage of water also compelled Sayyid Mohamed to move south to Mudug while his Dolbohanta followers had to take their stock north-east to the Nogal. This gave Swayne an opportunity to attack them and he moved eastwards down the Nogal. His mounted troops under Lieut.-Col. Cobbe of 1 K.A.R. routed a large number

-
1. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 56, 1 June 1902; F.O. 2/618, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 20, 30 May 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 61, 10 June 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 62, 15 June 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/810, Lansdowne tel. to Sharpe, no. 55, 12 June 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/810, memo by Hill, 17 June 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/810, Lansdowne tel. to Sharpe, no. 57, 17 June 1902; F.O. to Treasury, 24 June 1902.

of dervishes and a Mijertein arms caravan at Yiwehil late in June, killing 150 men, while Lieut.-Col. Phillips, the second-in-command, had a smaller success south-east of Garoe. The Nogal was an important base for dervish raids on the Ishaak and at Halin there was known to be a stone fort occupied by dervish riflemen.¹ Swayne's mainly Ishaak troops were concerned at the danger of such raids on their families and property in their rear and therefore on 5 July Swayne asked for 300 men of 2 K.A.R., the protectorates' reserve battalion, to be sent to hold the Nogal while he took his men south to Mudug.²

Meanwhile, he moved down the Nogal 'knocking' sections of the Dolbohanta in detail. He marched to within 40 miles of Illig and then turned back north-westwards to Halin where he destroyed the fort.³ By the end of July Swayne was encumbered with 12,000 camels, 35,000 sheep and 500 cattle taken from the Dolbohanta.⁴ Another month's operations south of Halin increased his following of troops, 'friendlies' and destitute to a total of 8,000. He was satisfied that his severe tactics had forced clans to desert the Sayyid, had stopped the raids on the Ishaak and diminished the arms traffic.⁵

-
1. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 75, 4 July 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 76, 5 July 1902; Cordeaux to Hill, 23 July 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/619, Swayne to Hill, 19 Sept. 1902; F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 89, 21 July 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 90, 31 July 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 92, 20 Aug. 1902, and no. 94, 24 Aug. 1902.

Although his Dolbohanta followers were being worn down and scattered the Sayyid was prospering. Firearms continued to arrive and in August he gained complete control over Mudug oasis by capturing Galkayu fort from Yusuf Ali's men. Swayne felt that the time had come to cross the Haud and attack him.¹ The 2 K.A.R. reinforcements had been sent without hesitation by the Foreign Office but they did not reach Swayne at Baran until 30 October. Instead of leaving them to occupy the Nogal he detached 300 levies for this purpose and set out towards Mudug with 1,000 Somalis, 250 2 K.A.R. and 4,000 ration and water camels.² Advancing through the dense bush the force reached Erego on 5 October. The Sayyid, who had moved north to meet them, attacked the next morning; he had chosen his ground well. In the impenetrable bush it was quite impossible for all the troops to see one another and some of the Somali levies, firing aimlessly, panicked and fell back. Many of the transport camels stampeded. Lieut.-Col. Phillips and one other British officer were killed and Phillips' precious Maxim was captured. Lieut.-Col. Cobbe won the Victoria Cross by remaining, isolated, at his gun. 2 K.A.R. and the majority of 6 K.A.R. stood firm and Swayne was able to rally the Somalis who had broken and recover most of the camels. When the attack ended, 56 Somali levies and 43 'friendly' transport spearmen had been killed; 84 were wounded; the dervish dead were estimated at 135. Swayne was

-
1. F.O. 2/810, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 97, 7 Sept. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/811, Swayne to Lansdowne, nos. 108 and 109, both of 2 Oct. 1902; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 167.

undismayed by the battle and planned to continue through the bush to Mudug, but on 8 October his officers reported that they could no longer rely on their Somali troops who had been thoroughly demoralised by the severity of the fighting. Swayne had no choice but to return towards Bohotleh¹, hoping that he would not be attacked on the way.²

Meanwhile lack of news was causing anxiety in the Foreign Office. They were aware of the risks involved in crossing the Haud³ and were concerned that Swayne had no link with his base.⁴ Early in October Brigadier Manning was ordered to Berbera to organise proper lines of communication and was told to call for reinforcements if necessary.⁵ On 6 October, newspapers began to carry rumours of disaster which were reinforced a week later by a forged letter in the Liberal Daily News.⁶ The news of Erego was received on 18 October. Swayne, his men shaken, and hampered with wounded, had asked for 600 reliable reinforcements and the rest of 2 K.A.R.⁷

-
1. F.O. 2/811, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 117, 28 Oct. 1902; Manning to Hill, 29 Oct. 1902; F.O. 2/620, F.O. to W.O., 22 Dec. 1902; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 168-9; War Office, Official History..., i, 104-8.
 2. F.O. 2/811, Swayne to Cordeaux, ? 10 Oct. 1902, enclosed in Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 107, 20 Oct. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/810, memo. by Manning, 18 July 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/810, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 51, 1 Aug. 1902; Lansdowne tel. to Cordeaux, no. 57, 25 Aug. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/811, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 65, 2 Oct. 1902; F.A. Campbell (senior clerk, F.O.) to Manning, 4 Oct. 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/620, extracts from The Scotsman, 6 Oct. 1902 and Daily News, ? 14 Oct. 1902.
 7. F.O. 2/811, Cordeaux tels. to Lansdowne, no. 45, 16 Oct. 1902 and no. 46, 17 Oct. 1902.

The Foreign Office immediately ordered the remainder of 2 K.A.R. to Somaliland from Central Africa¹ and arranged for an Indian battalion to stand by in Aden.² The next day Manning arrived in Aden and recommended sending 100 men from Uganda, 100 from East Africa and 650 from Central Africa.³ With the newspaper placards proclaiming a disaster,⁴ with The Times assuming that Swayne's route was 'swarming with hostile bands of natives' and warning against 'the danger of carrying out a half-hearted policy',⁵ with the discovery that Aden could only supply 270 second-rate troops⁶ and Manning's fears that the ports might be attacked,⁷ all hesitancy at so denuding the protectorates of troops⁸ disappeared, and they were ordered to Somaliland.⁹ So were the inevitable warship¹⁰ and a shipload of Indian soldiers¹¹ while preparations were made to send more troops from India 'in case Swayne's force is surrounded and cut off'.¹² The Commons were assured that 'if bad news should come the Government

-
1. F.O. 2/811, Lansdowne tel. to Sharpe, no. 90, 18 Oct. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/811, I.O. tel. to Aden resident, 19 Oct. 1902, copy.
 3. F.O. 2/811, Manning tel. to Lansdowne, 19 Oct. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/620, extract from Morning Post, 25 Oct. 1902; A. Hamilton, Somaliland (London, 1911), p. 1.
 5. The Times, leader, 20 Oct. 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/811, Manning tel. to Lansdowne, no. 5, 21 Oct. 1902; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 21 Oct. 1902, copy.
 7. F.O. 2/811, Manning tel. to Lansdowne, no. 3, 20 Oct. 1902.
 8. F.O. 2/811, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Manning tel. to Lansdowne, 20 Oct. 1902.
 9. F.O. 2/811, Lansdowne tel. to Sharpe, no. 91, 21 Oct. 1902; Lansdowne tel. to F. Jackson (acting commissioner, E.A.P.), no. 189, 21 Oct. 1902.
 10. F.O. 2/811, F.O. to Admiralty, 22 Oct. 1902.
 11. F.O. 2/811, F.O. to I.O., 21 Oct. 1902; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 23 Oct. 1902, copy.
 12. F.O. 2/811, I.O. to F.O., 22 Oct. 1902.

would be prepared to supply even further troops' beyond the 4,920 already available.¹

On 22 October Manning reached Berbera to hear that Swayne had got into Bohotleh safely.² The immediate danger had been removed, but few doubted that a third expedition would follow and the war correspondents were already leaving for Somaliland.³ Punch, which nicknamed Lansdowne 'the Mad Muddlah', commented, all too truly:

'reinforcements are on the way, and when these have met with a reverse, through inadequate numbers, arrangements will be made for further reinforcements.'⁴


Swayne had marched 1,500 miles, killed an estimated 1,400 Somalis, and captured 25,000 camels, 1,500 cattle and 250,000 sheep, at a cost of 2 officers, over 100 men⁵ and £13,010.⁶ By living off captured stock the actual operations had been economical⁷ but total military expenditure in Somaliland had swallowed up the whole of the £60,000 parliamentary grant-in-aid and £15,000 of the £25,000 supplementary grant.⁸ The

-
1. Hansard, 4th series, 1902, cxiii, 223, 20 Oct. 1902, 610, 23 Oct. 1902, 946-7, 28 Oct. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/811, Manning tel. to Lansdowne, no. 7, 22 Oct. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/810, Daily Express to F.O., 21 Oct. 1902; F.O. 2/620, A. Hamilton to F.O., 24 Oct. 1902.
 4. Punch, 29 Oct. 1902.
 5. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 170.
 6. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxi, 108, 22 Apr. 1903.
 7. F.O. 2/810, information by Hill, ? 24 July 1902, for parliamentary answer.
 8. Parl. Papers 1903, xlii, 'Civil Service Appropriation Accounts 1901-02, Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on Uganda, Central and East Africa Protectorates and Uganda Railway'; Parl. Papers 1904, lv, ditto 1902-03; F.O. 2/618, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 53, 12 Nov. 1902.

careful Foreign Office policy to avoid the use of Indian troops in the protectorates was in ruins. The Sayyid was stronger than ever, his prestige had reached new heights and he had inspired a superstitious dread in all Somalis. The short, sharp counter-stroke, followed by a return to the defensive policy had failed to materialise; instead Britain was now committed to retrieving her military honour.¹

-
1. Details of the second expedition may also be found in: Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 75-86; Parl. Papers 1903, xlv (805), 'Correspondence respecting the rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland and consequent military operations 1901-1902', and Parl. Papers 1905, lvi (469), 'Despatches, etc., regarding the Military Operations in Somaliland from the 18th January, 1902 to the 31st May, 1904'.

To face page 350 THE THIRD EXPEDITION 1903: MAIN BRITISH AND ETHIOPIAN MOVEMENTS.



CHAPTER X

MANNING'S EXPEDITION.

Once Swayne's force was known to be safe the Cabinet felt free to concentrate on the next step in Somaliland.¹ Swayne was summoned to England to give advice² but in the event he was so seriously ill with Malta fever contracted during the campaign that he contributed little to the discussion. There seemed to be four possible courses of action: (i) a peace agreement with the Sayyid; (ii) retirement to the coast; (iii) a defensive policy as planned after the first expedition; (iv) a third expedition.³ The hope of coming to terms with the Sayyid was based on letters he had written to the Italian governor of the Benadir indicating his desire to live at peace.⁴ The chance was lost however, for in his communications with the British the Sayyid still wrote as an independent ruler defiantly demanding an end to the attacks against him and the cession of a coastal port; the British Government were too proud and confident to negotiate on such terms.⁵ Retirement to the coast had

-
1. CAB 37/63/146, Cabinet memo. by Lansdowne, 25 Oct. 1902; CAB 41/27/32, A.J. Balfour (prime minister) to King Edward VII, 28 Oct. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/812, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 85, 30 Oct. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/811, Altham to Cranborne, 23 Oct. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/812, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 31 Africa, 11 Nov. 1902; minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on loose minute by Sanderson, 19 Nov. 1902; F.O. 2/813, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 37 Africa, 8 Dec. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/813, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 60, 27 Nov. 1902, and minutes by Hill, Cranborne and Lansdowne, all n.d.; Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 62, 12 Dec. 1902; The Times, 15 Dec. 1902.

its attractions: 'it would bring the Mullah on to the French frontier and the French Government face to face with their own misdeeds' as Cranborne pointed out, with the Djibouti arms trade in mind. On the other hand, it was still felt that both Berbera's trade and the Ishaak clans needed positive protection in the interior. Furthermore, abandoning the interior would entail loss of prestige and influence throughout Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, while the Sayyid's prestige might increase to the point where he posed a serious threat to Jubaland and the northern frontiers of the East Africa Protectorate.¹ The possibility of withdrawing from the interior was discarded as impractical.

A defensive policy also involved loss of prestige for it would be impossible to defend a 1,500 mile frontier, and 26,000 Dolbohanta, nominally inhabitants of a British 'protectorate', would have to be abandoned.² Nevertheless, the Foreign Office were prepared to accept this policy,³ although it had failed the previous year,⁴ so long as it was the cheapest solution.⁵ They had no treaties with the Dolbohanta, who, anyway, could be said to have forfeited all right to protection by

-
1. F.O. 2/812, I.D.W.O. memo., 31 Oct. 1902; F.O. 2/813, memo. by Cranborne, 22 Nov. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/813, loose minutes by Lansdowne, 3 Dec. 1902, Hill, 4 Dec. 1902 and Cranborne, n.d.; I.D.W.O. to F.O., 11 Dec. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/813, memo. by Cranborne, 22 Nov. 1902 and separate minute by Lansdowne, 23 Nov. 1902.
 4. CAB 37/63/149, Cabinet memo. by Cranborne, 7 Nov. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/812, minute by Hill, n.d., on International Arbitration and Peace Association to F.O., 13 Nov. 1902; minutes of meeting at F.O., 18 Nov. 1902.

supporting the Sayyid.¹ The War Office drew up a defensive scheme² to include protection of the Ishaak on the Haud which Swayne insisted was the 'only thing worth having in Somaliland'.³ The cost was staggering: half a million pounds a year for an indefinite period.⁴ The cost of another expedition was estimated at only half that sum, and despite all its disadvantages it at least offered a better chance of finishing the Sayyid than did a defensive policy. On 2 December 1902, with evident reluctance, the Cabinet decided on a third expedition.⁵

Not all were dismayed at this prospect. The Times had never doubted the need to hit back hard and fast at the Sayyid;⁶ nor had Manning and the War Office.⁷ Manning hoped to command, and laid his plans. He would advance from Illig on the Indian Ocean seaboard of the Italian protectorate, and occupy Mudug with Indian troops, while K.A.R. troops would march overland to Mudug from Bohotleh. The two forces would then join to hunt down the Sayyid while Ethiopian troops held the River Shibeli.⁸ The idea of an attack from the east coast was not new. It

-
1. F.O. 2/813, Swayne to Hill, private, 8 Dec. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/813, memo. by Altham, 25 Nov. 1902; memo. by Sanderson, 29 Nov. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/812, notes by Altham on conversation with Swayne enclosed in Altham to Hill, 20 Nov. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/813, unsigned memo. n.d., on meeting of 1 Dec. 1902.
 5. CAB 41/27/36, Balfour to Edward VII, 2 Dec. 1902; see also: CAB 37/63/149, Cabinet memo. by Cranborne, 7 Nov. 1902.
 6. The Times, 24 Oct. 1902, first leader and report from a military correspondent; 4 Nov. 1902, report from Aden.
 7. F.O. 2/812, Manning to Lansdowne, 30 Oct. 1902; I.D.W.O. memo., 31 Oct. 1902.
 8. F.O. 2/811, Manning tel. to Lansdowne, no. 9, 29 Oct. 1902; F.O. 2/812, Manning to Lansdowne, 30 Oct. 1902; Manning to Lansdowne, 7 Nov. 1902.

appears first to have been suggested by Cranborne in February 1902 before the second expedition,¹ but was turned down by the War Office.² During the course of the second expedition, Cranborne and Manning again suggested a force from Illig, to give Swayne, in the Nogal, a base nearer than Berbera, and to cut off the Sayyid from Osman Mahmud's Mijertein.³ Preparations were made to employ 600 troops,⁴ but the War Office still disliked the scheme,⁵ the Italians were uneasy at being dragged into such open opposition to the Sayyid,⁶ and the plan had to be dropped because it could not be organised in time.⁷ Nevertheless, the idea remained, and Manning's proposal to lead the third expedition from the east coast was not unexpected.⁸

Everything depended on the Italians. They allowed a British ship to survey their Somali coastline for possible landing sites,⁹ but they would not say whether a British expedition could operate from their territory.¹⁰

1. F.O. 2/809, minute by Cranborne, n.d., on Swayne to Hill, 23 Feb. 1902.
2. F.O. 2/809, D.M.I. to F.O., 18 Mar. 1902.
3. F.O. 2/810, Cranborne minute to Lansdowne, 28 July 1902; memoranda by Manning, 5 Aug. 1902 and 6 Aug. 1902, enclosed in Altham to Manning, 8 Aug. 1902.
4. F.O. 2/810, Lansdowne tel. to Sharpe, no. 76, 13 Aug. 1902; Lansdowne tel. to Jackson, no. 156, 13 Aug. 1902.
5. F.O. 2/810, D.G.M.I. to F.O., 26 Sept. 1902.
6. F.O. 2/810, Italian embassy memo. to F.O., 25 Aug. 1902, and minutes thereon by Hill, 25 Aug. 1902 and Lansdowne, n.d.
7. F.O. 2/810, memoranda by Crowe, 24 Sept. 1902 and 26 Sept. 1902.
8. F.O. 2/811, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 65, 2 Oct. 1902.
9. F.O. 2/811, Rodd tels. to Lansdowne, no. 1 Africa, 22 Oct. 1902 and no. 3 Africa, 5 Nov. 1902; P.R.O., Lansdowne Papers, Italy, vol. i (F.O. 800/132), Rodd to Lansdowne, private, 29 Oct. 1902.
10. F.O. 2/811, Pansa to Lansdowne, 30 Oct. 1902.

capacity.¹ The scheme, which Lansdowne considered 'preposterous', was not adopted. For all its size, Roberts doubted whether it would finish the Sayyid, and there was, anyway, no chance that Cabinet or parliament would approve the £6 million required.²

As later reports put the Sayyid's numbers at only 12,000 men and 1,000 rifles³ Cranborne and Hill proposed a smaller expedition, to harass rather than defeat him, and to damage his prestige. British troops would occupy Mudug, his favourite refuge, build a fort there and then withdraw, leaving the oasis in Yusuf Ali's control.⁴ This fitted in with Manning's ideas; the results of the naval survey had shown Obbia to be the best site on the east coast, especially as Yusuf Ali promised to provide 6,000 transport camels there,⁵ and Manning planned to march on Mudug with 4,000 men in two columns, from Obbia and Bohotleh.⁶ The expedition would last six months and cost £250,000. This was the scheme finally adopted by the Cabinet on 2 December; the prime minister considered it 'not very satisfactory'

-
1. The Times, 23 Oct. 1902, leader; 31 Oct. 1902 & 10 Nov. 1902, reports by a military correspondent.
 2. F.O. 2/812, minutes of meeting at F.O., 18 Nov. 1902; Lansdowne Papers, Egypt, vol. i (F.O. 800/123), Lansdowne to Cromer, private, 12 Dec. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/812, S.N.O. Aden, tel. to Admiralty, 18 Nov. 1902, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 18 Nov. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/813, memoranda by Cranborne, 22 Nov. 1902 and Hill, 27 Nov. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/812, Rodd tel. to Lansdowne, no. 4 Africa, 19 Nov. 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/813, Manning tels. to Lansdowne, no. 22, 24 Nov. 1902, and no. 23, 26 Nov. 1902; I.D.W.O. to F.O., 27 Nov. 1902; memo. by Sanderson, 29 Nov. 1902.

but 'the best in our power.'¹

The Ethiopians were to be asked to co-operate on the Shibeli, but more important was co-operation from the Italians. They still had to approve the use of Obbia, and Yusuf Ali would need their support once he was installed in Mudug. They hesitated, for they feared that if they became entangled with the Sayyid the peace of their own territory would be jeopardised.² Lieut.-Col. Altham of the War Office, and Eyre Crowe³ of the Foreign Office, were sent to Rome to point out that Italy had a responsibility to stop the Sayyid using her territory as a base for attacks on the British protectorate.⁴ The Italians wanted a promise that the Benadir would not be involved in the fighting⁵ but the British did not feel able to give such a guarantee.⁶ Eventually a solution was reached which tranquillized Italian opinion without really committing the British.⁷ Britain recognised the importance of cutting off the Sayyid from the south and agreed to try to force him north or west. The Italians then gave

-
1. F.O. 2/813, unsigned memo. n.d., on meeting at F.O. of 1 Dec. 1902; CAB 41/27/36, Balfour to Edward VII, 2 Dec. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/813, Lansdowne to Rodd, no. 102 Africa, 2 Dec. 1902.
 3. Crowe, Eyre Alexander Barby Wichart (later Sir Eyre Crowe, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.), 1864-1925; 1885, joined F.O. as a clerk, where he became assistant to Sir Clement Hill, the superintendent of African protectorates; 1912, assistant under-secretary; 1919, British plenipotentiary at Versailles peace conference; 1920, permanent under-secretary; died in office.
 4. F.O. 2/813, minute by Hill, n.d., on Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 35 Africa, 3 Dec. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/813, Rodd tels. to Lansdowne, no. 12 Africa, 4 Dec. 1902, and no. 14 Africa, 10 Dec. 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/813, Lansdowne to Rodd, no. 105 Africa, 6 Dec. 1902.
 7. F.O. 800/132, Rodd to Lansdowne, private, 13 Dec. 1902.

between Berbera and Bohotleh and signal communications established by wire and heliograph.¹ To the relief of the Foreign Office, control of the operations was transferred to the War Office, who also assumed financial responsibility.² For the actual advance they decided to send Manning more men than he asked for.³ They allocated 1,098 men, mostly Indian, to garrison the Berbera-Bohotleh line, and 650 K.A.R. troops from Central Africa for the Bohotleh flying column. The east coast force was to number 2,296 men, made up of 550 K.A.R. troops from East and Central Africa and Uganda, 1,100 Indian troops, 140 British mounted infantry and 100 Boer mounted infantry. Altogether, 2,300 extra men were to be brought from India, South Africa and Britain, and the total number of non-Somali troops was to be 4,044.⁴

Among the men from India were 200 from the famous Bikaner Camel Corps, offered by the Maharajah of Bikaner; similar offers had been made by the rulers of Jodhpur and Bahawalpur, but they had not been accepted.⁵ The

-
1. F.O. 2/811, Manning tel. to Lansdowne, no. 10A, n.d., received 29 Oct. 1902; F.O. 2/812, Manning tels. to Lansdowne, 30 Oct. 1902, no. 15, 5 Nov. 1902, and no. 18, 7 Nov. 1902; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 17 Nov. 1902, (copy).
 2. F.O. 2/813, F.O. to W.O., 6 Dec. 1902; F.O. 2/620, Lansdowne tel. to Cordeaux, no. 117, 19 Dec. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/813, Manning tel. to Lansdowne, no. 23, 26 Nov. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/814, memo. of meeting at W.O., 15 Dec. 1902; W.O. tel. to Manning, 17 Dec. 1902, enclosed in D.G.M.I. to F.O., 17 Dec. 1902.
 5. The Times, 30 Oct. 1902; F.O. 2/812, Viceroy tel. to I.O., enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 3 Nov. 1902; for a description and pictures of the Bikaner Camel Corps see: War Office, Official History..., ii, 425-432.

Boers had also volunteered for service in Somaliland¹, and although Lansdowne feared they would not know how to manage African troops without a sjambok², Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, and Roberts had urged that their offer be accepted as a contribution towards conciliation in South Africa.³ Very little use was to be made of Somali troops. Their conduct at Erego had ruined their reputation. Their chief detractor was Major Plunkett of 2 K.A.R. who had fought in the battle; words were hardly sufficient to describe his contempt for Swayne and his Somali soldiers.⁴ The Times considered them utterly worthless⁵ and even Swayne, who remained their staunch advocate, admitted that they could not be relied upon for close fighting with the dervishes.⁶ Manning revised his previously high opinion of the Somalis, and disbanded both the levy and 6 K.A.R. 150 Somali mounted infantry, and 50 camelry, with a high proportion of British officers, were raised for essential scouting and pursuing; otherwise Somalis were only to be used as grazing guards, garrison troops and non-combatants.⁷

Manning's instructions were sent from the War Office just after

-
1. The Times, 1 Nov. 1902; War Office, Official History..., ii, 421-4.
 2. F.O. 2/812, Lansdowne to Lord Roberts, 4 Nov. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/812, minute by Cranborne, 3 Nov. 1902; Roberts to Lansdowne, 10 Nov. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/811, letter from Maj. A.W.V. Plunkett, 25 Oct. 1902, sent to F.O. by Col. Plunkett, 19 Nov. 1902; F.O. 2/813, letter from Maj. Plunkett, 11 Nov. 1902, bound with papers of 26 Nov. 1902.
 5. The Times, 1 Dec. 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/811, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 117, 28 Oct. 1902.
 7. F.O. 2/620, Manning to Lansdowne, 16 Dec. 1902 and 29 Dec. 1902.

mid-December. His primary object was to expel the Sayyid from Mudug; as agreed with the Italians he was to try to prevent him retreating south. The advance from Obbia was planned for the end of January¹. The first troops landed on 2 January 1903; Manning arrived two days later². It was later discovered that the Sayyid moved north-west from Gallad as soon as he heard of the landings³. Obbia was rapidly transformed as British and Italian warships stood offshore and lighters landed thousands of camels and troops that arrived from Berbera, Bombay and Durban. Rough seas and bad weather greatly hampered disembarkation and delayed the advance⁴.

Far more serious delay was caused by a dearth of transport camels at Obbia. Yusuf Ali refused to be bound by his son's promise to provide 6,000 camels⁵; by 7 January he had produced only four beasts. Manning had to arrange for 1,000 extra camels to be shipped from Berbera. At first he thought that Yusuf Ali was only holding out for a better price,

-
1. F.O. 2/814, W.O. tel. to Manning, 17 Dec. 1902 and Altham to Manning, 19 Dec. 1902, both enclosed in D.G.M.I. to F.O., 1 Jan. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/814, Manning to W.O., no. 2, 10 Jan. 1903, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 4 Feb. 1903; C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, 9 Jan. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 9 Jan. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/814, Manning to Lansdowne, 16 Dec. 1902; Manning to Altham, private, 16 Dec. 1902; Manning tel. to W.O., 7 Mar. 1903, copy.
 4. F.O. 2/814, Manning to Hill, private, 6 Jan. (? Feb.) 1903; War Office, Official History..., ii, 530-543, 556-7; Hamilton, Somaliland, pp. 178-184; interesting sketches and photographs will be found in Illustrated London News, Jan.-June 1903, pp. 266-7, 348 and 396-7.
 5. P.R.O., War Office Papers, Series 106, vol. 236, part ii, p. 23, letter from Maj. E. Forestier-Walker, R.A. (intelligence officer, Obbia).

but as he rapidly lost patience with the Somalis,¹ he became convinced that Yusuf Ali was in league with the Sayyid and purposely withholding camels. He decided that Yusuf Ali would have to go.² This was an Italian responsibility, but the Italian officers at Obbia disagreed with one another. Lovatelli, the Anglophil, sympathised with Manning; the commander of the warship 'Caprera' did not.³ The Italian Government therefore sent their consul-general at Aden, Chevalier F. Sola, to Obbia.⁴ He arrived on 28 January and the next day Yusuf Ali and his son were deported to Aden. A number of firearms were found in the sultan's house, but this was hardly evidence of hostility; he had undoubtedly been obstructive over camels and supplies, but Manning and Lovatelli were almost certainly wrong to assume that he was in league with the Sayyid.⁵

Manning, however, was sure that had Yusuf Ali been installed in Mudug

-
1. F.O. 2/814, Manning to Hill, private, 7 Jan. 1903; W.O. 106/236/ii, 24, Manning tel. to W.O., 14 Jan. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/814, Manning to Hill, private, 8 Jan. 1903; Manning to W.O., 14 Jan. 1903, copy.
 3. F.O. 2/814, Manning tel. to W.O., no. 40/41, 12 Jan. 1903, copy; Manning to Hill, private, 14 Jan. 1903; Rodd tel. to Lansdowne, no. 6 Africa, 23 Jan. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/814, Rodd tels. to Lansdowne, no. 3 Africa, 13 Jan. 1903, and no. 4, 17 Jan. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/814, Manning tel. to W.O., no. 63, 29 Jan. 1903, copy; Manning to W.O., 29 Jan. 1903, copy; Manning to W.O., 15 Feb. 1903, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., n.d., but received 11 Mar. 1903; W.O. 106/236/ii, 49, press report, 29 Jan. 1903; R.L. Hess, 'The "Mad Mullah" and Northern Somalia', Journal of African History, v (1964), 421; War Office, Official History..., i, 133; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 173; Hamilton, Somaliland, pp. 224-5.

he would either have surrendered it to the Sayyid, or have become another 'Mullah' himself. He considered that his deportation should be permanent¹ and sent the sultan and his son to Aden as prisoners of war with a warrant for their committal to prison.² In Italy, however, certain sections of the press were beginning to criticise the decision to allow Britain to land at Obbia³ and so the Italian Government demanded the release of the two prisoners⁴ and shipped them off to Eritrea.⁵ The Italians began to reassess their position. Despite a rigorous press censorship at Obbia and Berbera⁶ Reuter's correspondent managed to send an exaggerated account of the deportation and incorrectly reported that the Sayyid was being driven south.⁷ The captain of the 'Caprera' at Obbia remained convinced that Manning's operations would end in a fiasco⁸ and he informed Rome that the charges against Yusuf Ali had been exaggerated and that Lovatelli's judgement had been affected by the climate. Rennell

-
1. F.O. 2/814, Manning to Hill, private, 6 Feb. 1903; F.O. 2/814, Manning to Sola, 16 Feb. 1903, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., n.d., but received 11 Mar. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/814, Aden resident tels. to I.O., 11 Feb. 1903 and 12 Feb. 1903, both copies.
 3. F.O. 2/814, Sir F. Bertie (British ambassador, Rome) to Lansdowne, no. 11 Africa, 10 Feb. 1903; The Times, 11 Feb. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/814, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 7 Africa, 14 Feb. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/814, Rodd tel. to Lansdowne, no. 18 Africa, 14 Mar. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/813, Manning to Hill, 14 Dec. 1902; F.O. 2/814, Manning to Altham, private, 30 Dec. 1902, enclosed in Altham to Hill, 12 Jan. 1903; War Office, Official History..., ii, 415.
 7. F.O. 2/814, Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 13 Africa, 11 Feb. 1903; Forestier-Walker to Altham, private, 14 Feb. 1903, copy with letter from same to same of 7 Feb. 1903.
 8. Hess, 'The "Mad Mullah" and Northern Somalia', Journal of African History, v (1964), 421; F.O. 2/814, Maj. J. Singleton (Italian consul-general, Manchester) to Sanderson, 5 Mar. 1903.

anticipated dervish attack.¹ The main column, another 841 men, reached Galkayu on 24 March,² by which time posts had been established at Beira and Badwen.³ Contact had been made with messengers from the Bohotleh force, but not with any dervishes,⁴ although the troops were anxious for action and the Boers were 'particularly murderous'.⁵ The whole of Mudug was now held by the British except for Gallad. In late March Manning hoped to reach Gallad and, by linking up with the Bohotleh force, to occupy the remaining wells and force the dervishes to break up.⁶ The Bohotleh flying column had had small encounters with dervishes early in March, when it occupied some wells to the south and established a post at Domo.⁷ On 25 March 300 men of 2 K.A.R. commanded by Plunkett (now a Lieut.-Col.), reached Galkayu from Bohotleh.⁸ The two forces had linked up and British forces now held all important points between Berbera and Obbia.

At almost exactly the same time, 4,000 Ethiopian troops, accompanied

-
1. W.O. 106/236/iii, 36, Manning tel. to W.O., 28 Feb. 1903; F.O. 2/814, Manning tel. to W.O., 6 Mar. 1903, copy.
 2. W.O. 106/236/iv, 12 & 27, journal entries for 6 Mar. 1903 and 24 Mar. 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/iv, 24, journal entry for 19 Mar. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/iv, 16 & 19, Manning tel. to W.O., 12 Mar. 1903 and journal entry for 14 Mar. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/814, Manning to Hill, 7 Mar. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/814, Manning tels. to W.O., 6 Mar. 1903 and no. 102, 18 Mar. 1903, both copies.
 7. War Office, Official History..., i, 146-7; F.O. 2/814, Col. Swann (O.C. Berbera-Bohotleh troops) tel. to W.O., 6 Mar. 1903, copy; W.O. 106/236/iv, 15, journal entry for 10 Mar. 1903; The Times, 20 Mar. 1903.
 8. W.O. 106/236/iv, 27 journal entry for 25 Mar. 1903.

by two British officers, Colonel Rochfort¹ and Captain Cobbold (who had accompanied Hanbury-Tracy in 1901), arrived on the River Shibeli.² Menelik had been anxious to co-operate with Britain³ and although Rochfort described the troops as 'little better than a transport train',⁴ their presence seems effectively to have deterred the Sayyid from moving south to the Shibeli.⁵ He now found himself hemmed in between the British and the Ethiopians. The Times stated that 'the prospect before us seems decidedly hopeful',⁶ and reported that many men were deserting the Sayyid who was forced to maintain his authority by ruthless severity.⁷

Such reports were welcome in Britain where people had suddenly become aware of Somaliland. At the beginning of 1903 the Anglo-German debt-collecting blockade off Venezuela had seemed far more important, but in mid-February Balfour, the prime minister, speaking at Liverpool, had drawn attention to the Somaliland campaign:

-
1. Rochfort, Col. Alexander Nelson, C.B., (later Maj.-Gen. Sir Alexander, K.C.B., C.M.G.), 1850-1916; 1871, joined Royal Artillery; served in India, Sudan, South Africa and Somaliland; 1904-1910, Inspector Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery; 1910-1916, Lieut.-Governor of Jersey.
 2. F.O. 2/814, Rochfort tel. to W.O., no. R 19, 29 Mar. 1903, copy.
 3. F.O. 2/814, Harrington tel. to Lansdowne, no. 11, 31 Dec. 1902.
 4. W.O. 106/236/v, 30, extract from Rochfort's staff diary, 21 Apr. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/814, Manning tel. to W.O., no. 100, 7 Mar. 1903, copy; Rochfort tels. to W.O., no. R 17, 17 Mar. 1903 and no. R 19, 29 Mar. 1903, both copies.
 6. The Times, 10 Mar. 1903, leader.
 7. The Times, 7 Mar. 1903 and 12 Mar. 1903, reports from Aden.

'I do not think the public have taken the smallest interest in it; but the cost will be more than Venezuela both in men and money, and the effect of the operations will be far-reaching.'¹

At once, Somaliland became a major concern. A map was placed in the House of Commons tea-room², and at the opening of the new parliamentary session the operations were mentioned in the speech from the throne.³ Liberals in both houses questioned the meaning of Balfour's Liverpool speech, and their leader, Campbell-Bannerman, criticised the Government for their amateur and haphazard fashion of waging war.⁴ This was a new departure. Hitherto, opposition to Somaliland policy had been confined to a small section of the radical and pacifist fringe;⁵ now, not only did their criticism become more outspoken,⁶ but both Irish⁷ and respectable Liberal members were joining in, especially when they were asked to vote money for the campaign.⁸ In defence of their policy the Government fell back on their old argument that they had reluctantly found it 'absolutely

-
1. The Times, 14 Feb. 1903, report of Balfour's speech to Liverpool Conservative Club, 13 Feb. 1903.
 2. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxix, 1454, question by Round, 23 Mar. 1903.
 3. Ibid., cxviii, 3, king's speech, 17 Feb. 1903.
 4. Ibid., cxviii, 16-17, 75-7, speeches by Earl Spencer and Campbell-Bannerman, 17 Feb. 1903.
 5. See e.g.: Hansard, 4th series, 1902, cxii, 564, speech by Dilke, 4 Aug. 1902; F.O. 2/811, International Arbitration and Peace Association, London, to F.O., 15 Oct. 1902.
 6. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxx, 169 & 362, question and speech by Labouchere, 25 Mar. 1903 and 26 Mar. 1903; F.O. 2/815, International Arbitration and Peace Association, London, to Lansdowne, 2 Apr. 1903.
 7. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxix, 575, questions by Flynn and Swift-MacNeill, 12 Mar. 1903.
 8. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxviii, 1292-99, speeches by Bowles and Hobhouse, 3 Mar. 1903.

necessary' to take military action to defend the clans who looked to them for protection; 'We could not allow the unchecked raids of this fanatical Pretender,.....' said Balfour.¹

On 31 March Manning arrived at Gallad with over 1,000 men; he was now within 70 miles of the Sayyid at Walwal² and reconnaissance forces pushed south and west from Gallad were at last making contact with the dervishes.³ From London the Cabinet gave Manning a free hand⁴ and he planned to close on Wardere and Walwal for the kill while dry weather still tied the Sayyid to the wells.⁵ On 10 April Lieut.-Col. Cobbe and an advance force of over 570 men were sent westwards to reconnoitre but not to attack.⁶ This force was attacked on 14 April in thick bush near Gumburru, 40 miles from Gallad, and Cobbe retreated to more open ground.⁷ Continued attacks persuaded Cobbe to return to Gallad to find a better route, but before he turned back on the morning of 17 April he sent Lieut.-Col. Plunkett and 232 men to bring in a company that was thought to be engaged one mile west

-
1. Ibid., cxviii, 28-9, 95-6, speeches by Duke of Devonshire and Balfour, 17 Feb. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/iv, 28, journal entry for 26 Mar. 1903; F.O. 2/814, Manning tels. to W.O., 31 Mar. 1903 and no. 107, 31 Mar. 1903, copies.
 3. W.O. 106/236/v, 3, 8 & 9, journal entries for 1, 2, 6 & 7 Apr. 1903; F.O. 2/815, Manning tel. to W.O., no. 110, 8 Apr. 1903; The Times, 16 Apr. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/815, W.O. tel. to Manning, 8 Apr. 1903, copy, and minute thereon by Cranborne, n.d.
 5. W.O. 106/236/v, 4, Manning to W.O., 3 Apr. 1903; F.O. 2/814, Swann tel. to W.O., 4 Apr. 1903, copy with papers of 31 Mar. 1903; F.O. 2/815, Forestier-Walker to Altham, 11 Apr. 1903, copy.
 6. W.O. 106/236/v, 12-13, journal entry for 10 Apr. 1903.
 7. W.O. 106/236/v, 14-15, journal entries for 13 & 14 Apr. 1903.

'I do not think the public have taken the smallest interest in it; but the cost will be more than Venezuela both in men and money, and the effect of the operations will be far-reaching.'¹

At once, Somaliland became a major concern. A map was placed in the House of Commons tea-room,² and at the opening of the new parliamentary session the operations were mentioned in the speech from the throne.³ Liberals in both houses questioned the meaning of Balfour's Liverpool speech, and their leader, Campbell-Bannerman, criticised the Government for their amateur and haphazard fashion of waging war.⁴ This was a new departure. Hitherto, opposition to Somaliland policy had been confined to a small section of the radical and pacifist fringe;⁵ now, not only did their criticism become more outspoken,⁶ but both Irish⁷ and respectable Liberal members were joining in, especially when they were asked to vote money for the campaign.⁸ In defence of their policy the Government fell back on their old argument that they had reluctantly found it 'absolutely

-
1. The Times, 14 Feb. 1903, report of Balfour's speech to Liverpool Conservative Club, 13 Feb. 1903.
 2. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxix, 1454, question by Round, 23 Mar. 1903.
 3. Ibid., cxviii, 3, king's speech, 17 Feb. 1903.
 4. Ibid., cxviii, 16-17, 75-7, speeches by Earl Spencer and Campbell-Bannerman, 17 Feb. 1903.
 5. See e.g.: Hansard, 4th series, 1902, cxii, 564, speech by Dilke, 4 Aug. 1902; F.O. 2/811, International Arbitration and Peace Association, London, to F.O., 15 Oct. 1902.
 6. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxx, 169 & 362, question and speech by Labouchere, 25 Mar. 1903 and 26 Mar. 1903; F.O. 2/815, International Arbitration and Peace Association, London, to Lansdowne, 2 Apr. 1903.
 7. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxix, 575, questions by Flynn and Swift-MacNeill, 12 Mar. 1903.
 8. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxviii, 1292-99, speeches by Bowles and Hobhouse, 3 Mar. 1903.

necessary' to take military action to defend the clans who looked to them for protection; 'We could not allow the unchecked raids of this fanatical Pretender,.....' said Balfour.¹

On 31 March Manning arrived at Gallad with over 1,000 men; he was now within 70 miles of the Sayyid at Walwal² and reconnaissance forces pushed south and west from Gallad were at last making contact with the dervishes.³ From London the Cabinet gave Manning a free hand⁴ and he planned to close on Wardere and Walwal for the kill while dry weather still tied the Sayyid to the wells.⁵ On 10 April Lieut.-Col. Cobbe and an advance force, of over 570 men were sent westwards to reconnoitre but not to attack.⁶ This force was attacked on 14 April in thick bush near Gumburru, 40 miles from Gallad, and Cobbe retreated to more open ground.⁷ Continued attacks persuaded Cobbe to return to Gallad to find a better route, but before he turned back on the morning of 17 April he sent Lieut.-Col. Plunkett and 232 men to bring in a company that was thought to be engaged one mile west

-
1. Ibid., cxviii, 28-9, 95-6, speeches by Duke of Devonshire and Balfour, 17 Feb. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/iv, 28, journal entry for 26 Mar. 1903; F.O. 2/814, Manning tels. to W.O., 31 Mar. 1903 and no. 107, 31 Mar. 1903, copies.
 3. W.O. 106/236/v, 3, 8 & 9, journal entries for 1, 2, 6 & 7 Apr. 1903; F.O. 2/815, Manning tel. to W.O., no. 110, 8 Apr. 1903; The Times, 16 Apr. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/815, W.O. tel. to Manning, 8 Apr. 1903, copy, and minute thereon by Cranborne, n.d.
 5. W.O. 106/236/v, 4, Manning to W.O., 3 Apr. 1903; F.O. 2/814, Swann tel. to W.O., 4 Apr. 1903, copy with papers of 31 Mar. 1903; F.O. 2/815, Forestier-Walker to Altham, 11 Apr. 1903, copy.
 6. W.O. 106/236/v, 12-13, journal entry for 10 Apr. 1903.
 7. W.O. 106/236/v, 14-15, journal entries for 13 & 14 Apr. 1903.

of the camp. Plunkett had always despised the Somalis as poor fighters, and, seizing the chance to blood his men and win the glory of smashing the Sayyid, he advanced seven miles west to Gumburru, in direct disobedience to Cobbe's orders. Here, his force was suddenly attacked by a huge force of dervishes on horse and foot. Three rushes on the square were repulsed and heaps of dead piled up in front of the Maxims. In the fourth rush, sheer weight of numbers overwhelmed the defenders; dervishes actually held the bayonets whilst others speared the soldiers. With his ammunition finished, Plunkett, who was wounded, ordered his men to charge back the seven miles to Cobbe; only 37 made it. Plunkett, eight other officers, 121 men (mainly Yaos) of 2 K.A.R., 49 men of 2 Sikhs and 17 others were killed; both Maxims were captured, although not before their officers had rendered them useless. It was a hard-won victory for the Sayyid, with possibly 2,000 casualties, but it was a victory, thanks to Plunkett's disobedience, which cost him his life and the lives of 195 of his men. It was a bitter blow for Manning who believed that had he brought his whole force into action he would have been victorious; he felt that Plunkett's rashness had snatched from him the fruits of an arduous campaign.¹ As soon as the news reached him he set out with

1. F.O. 2/815, Manning tel. to W.O., 18 Apr. 1903, enclosed in Swann tel. to W.O., 23 Apr. 1903, enclosed in D.G.M.I. to F.O., 23 Apr. 1903; Manning to Hill, 26 Apr. 1903; W.O. 106/236/v, 22-24, Manning tel. to W.O., 20 Apr. 1903, Manning to Altham, 26 Apr. 1903, & extracts from undated letter from officer with Cobbe's force; War Office, Official History..., i, 156-171; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 175-9; Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 104-5; Hamilton, Somaliland, pp. 264-274; imaginative sketches of the battle, by a man who was not there, will be found in: Illustrated London News, Jan.-June 1903, pp. 657, 791, 793-5.

reinforcements and brought Cobbe, and the remnants of his force, back to Gallad.¹ Cobbe and a strong force were left there, but Manning retired with his headquarters to Galkayu.² An attack on the Sayyid at Wardere was now impossible for many of Manning's transport camels were dying and it was becoming increasingly difficult to procure replacements in the British protectorate. He pinned his hopes on an Ethiopian attack from the south.³

News of the disaster reached London on 23 April and was announced to parliament the same day.⁴ It dominated the next day's newspapers: 'BRITISH FORCE DESTROYED' ran the news headline in The Times; fears of a further reverse were widespread, but reactions in the press were varied, for the Pall Mall Gazette ridiculed the Liberal Daily News for advocating 'a prompt policy of scuttle' and 'skedaddle from Somaliland' and proclaimed:

'We must not ... repeat the gigantic Gladstonian blunder of abandonment of Khartoum after the death of Gordon.... The Mullah, like the Mahdi, has got to be "smashed".'⁵

Three days later the morning papers carried news of another dervish

-
1. W.O. 106/236/v, 29, journal entry for 20 Apr. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/v, 34 & 37, journal entries for 23 and 25 Apr. 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/v, 5, Manning to Swann, 3 Apr. 1903; F.O. 2/815, Swann tel. to W.O., 23 Apr. 1903, enclosed in D.G.M.I. to F.O., 23 Apr. 1903; Manning tel. to W.O., 24 Apr. 1903, copy.
 4. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxi, 215-7, question by Campbell-Bannerman.
 5. The Times, 24 Apr. 1903; Pall Mall Gazette, 24 Apr. 1903.

attack.¹ When Cobbe's force left Gallad on its ill-fated attempt to reach Wardere, a flying column from Bohotleh, under Major Gough,² had begun moving south-west, also in the direction of Wardere.³ Gough's 300 men came into contact with dervish horsemen at Danop, 38 miles from Wardere;⁴ ignorant of the Gumburru disaster, Gough pressed on with 200 mounted men, half of them Somalis. On 22 April this small force was attacked by the victors of Gumburru in the thick bush at Daratoleh. For over four hours the battle raged at close quarters, the British troops being saved only by their Maxim; when their ammunition ran out they retired by night to the comparative safety of Danop. All the men, including the Somali troops, had fought with great bravery, and Gough and 2 other officers were later awarded the V.C.; but it had achieved nothing beyond the slaughter of 100 or 150 dervishes, at the cost of 3 officers and 13 men. It was not a disaster, but it was certainly not a successful victory; it showed that Manning's columns were dangerously weak, and that the Sayyid had been able to maul successfully both arms of Manning's pincer movement. It also gave cause for further anxiety

-
1. The Times, 27 Apr. 1903.
 2. Gough, Maj. John Edmond (later, Brig.-Gen. Gough, V.C.), 1871-1915; 1896-7, served in British Central Africa; 1898, Sudan; 1899-1901, South Africa; 1902-3, Somaliland; 1907, A.D.C. to the king; 1907-9, Inspector-General, K.A.R.; 1908-9, Somaliland; 1914, on General Haig's staff; 1915, wounded and died; awarded posthumous K.C.B.; his father and his uncle also won the V.C.
 3. W.O. 106/236/v, 10 & 14, Manning to Swann, 1 Apr. 1903, and journal entry for 13 Apr. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/v, 27, 29 & 33, journal entries for 17 Apr. 1903 and 20 Apr. 1903.

until Gough arrived safely at Bohotleh on 28 April.¹

To add to the Government's worries Berbera, which was 'seething with discontent',² and Bulhar were the scene of serious Somali riots against the measures being used to obtain transport camels for Manning. Troops had to be called in to keep order³ and the atmosphere was hardly improved by the news of Gumburru.⁴

The final blow came when the Government heard that Italy would not hold Mudug when Manning withdrew. The occupation of the oasis by Yusuf Ali or the Benadir Company had been a basic element in the British scheme. The possibility of using Yusuf Ali had been ruled out by the events of January, culminating in his deportation, but the Benadir Company were known to be keen to occupy both Mudug and Obbia for the sake of trade.⁵ Suddenly, however, the Italian press began charging the company with tolerating and concealing the existence of slavery in the Benadir ports. The Italian Government, surprised and embarrassed by the scandal, could hardly enlarge the company's mandate at this juncture by giving it control

-
1. W.O. 106/236/v, 29, 31-33, 44, Gough to Swann, 21 Apr. 1903 & 23 Apr. 1903; journal entries for 22 Apr. 1903, 25 Apr. 1903 and 28 Apr. 1903; press reports, 22 Apr. 1903; Swann to Gough, 22 Apr. 1903; C.-in-C. tel. to Manning, 27 Apr. 1903; War Office, Official History..., i, 173-180; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 180-2; Hamilton, Somaliland, pp. 275-295.
 2. War Office, Official History..., ii, 364.
 3. W.O. 106/236/v, 16 & 19, journal entries for 14 Apr. 1903 & 16 Apr. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/v, 39, press reports, 26 Apr. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/814, Manning tel. to W.O., no. 91, 20 Feb. 1903, copy.

of Mudug¹ and the strong mutual distrust between Manning and Lovatelli's successor lessened their readiness to co-operate with the British.² They were willing to see British troops occupying Mudug in their name, but in mid-April they served notice that they themselves would hold neither Obbia nor Mudug.³ In the same month, the British base at Obbia was closed⁴ and Admiral Mirabello, whose investigations had convinced him that Yusuf Ali's deportation had been wrong, installed his son Ali Yusuf, in his place.⁵ At the end of 1904 Yusuf Ali himself was reinstated as sultan.⁶ As to the Benadir, a commission of enquiry found the slavery charges to be true; the Italian government therefore purchased the Benadir ports from the sultan of Zanzibar, relieved the inefficient and under-capitalized company of its administrative functions and, in 1905, itself assumed control of the area as the colony of Southern Italian Somalia.⁷

The installation of Ali Yusuf at Obbia and Italy's decision not to

-
1. F.O. 2/814, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 16 Africa, 17 Feb. 1903, no. 22 Africa, 1 Mar. 1903, and no. 29 Africa, 13 Mar. 1903; Rodd tel. to Lansdowne, no. 14 Africa, 5 Mar. 1903; F.O. 800/132, Rodd to Lansdowne, private, 17 Mar. 1903.
 2. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, p. 132; F.O. 2/814, Manning tel. to W.O., no. 103, 22 Mar. 1903, copy; F.O. 2/815, Manning tel. to W.O., 16 Apr. 1903, copy; W.O. 106/236/v, 6, Manning to Altham, 26 Apr. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/814, Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 45 Africa, 17 Apr. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/v, 26, journal entry for 17 Apr. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/815, Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 43, 14 Apr. 1903 and no. 49, 16 May 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Hill, demi-official, 22 Nov. 1904; F.O. 2/933, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 52, 2 Feb. 1905.
 7. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, pp. 76-87.

hold Mudug caused dismay in the British Foreign Office, and even led Eyre Crowe, Hill's assistant, to suggest that Britain should seize the Italian Mijertein protectorate herself to deny Mudug to the Sayyid.¹ Lansdowne was more realistic; he was not even prepared to keep a garrison at Mudug² let alone extend a protectorate already too large for his liking.³ In any case, the defeat at Cumburru ruled out any British occupation of Mudug; there was no choice but to acquiesce in the Italian decision.⁴ They had to content themselves with a declaration in the House of Commons that 'we have not received all the assistance from Italy we had hoped or had reason to anticipate, in relation to Mudug....'⁵

With their Somaliland policy so evidently in disarray the Government came under heavy attack in the Commons on 30 April 1903. Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal leader, had pressed for a debate⁶ and his party accused the Conservatives of mismanagement and of taking the offensive too readily. From the Government backbenches came suggestions that the

-
1. F.O. 2/815, minute by Crowe, 23 Apr. 1903, on Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 45 Africa, 17 Apr. 1903; minute by Hill, n.d., on S.N.O. Aden tel. to Admiralty, 30 Apr. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 30 Apr. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/814, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Rodd tel. to Lansdowne, no. 19 Africa, 15 Mar. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/815, minute by Lansdowne, 25 Apr. 1903, on Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 45, 17 Apr. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/815, minutes by Cranborne and Lansdowne, both n.d., on Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 49, 16 May 1903.
 5. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxi, 963-1012, speech by St. J. Brodrick (secretary of state for war), 30 Apr. 1903.
 6. Ibid., cxxi, 480, speech by Campbell-Bannerman, 27 Apr. 1903.

Sayyid had been treated too leniently. Cranborne replied that such expeditions, however regrettable, were part of the inevitable burden of empire, and that Liberal governments which had made treaties with the Somalis were equally responsible. Brodrick, the secretary of state for war, was distinctly optimistic, claiming that Manning had accomplished more than had been contemplated, hemming in the Sayyid more successfully than could have been hoped. Asquith and The Times found it hard to share this optimism, while Lloyd George accused Brodrick of trifling with parliament: 'We had sustained a severe reverse, retreated 122 miles, and abandoned our stores; and yet the Government had accomplished more than they had anticipated.' Nonetheless, the Liberals were pleased by Brodrick's very firm declaration of future policy:

'We have no intention of administering the country in which we now are, or, as far as I can predict, of attempting to hold the country. Our policy is to keep the coast line and to maintain our protection of the tribes.... But we are not going to send a large fresh expedition to pursue the Mullah....'¹

Such a course was due to the fact that the situation was far more difficult than Brodrick admitted. The Italians, stung by the criticism of the Commons, told Lansdowne that Manning's expedition had only made matters worse.² Balfour confessed to the king that the position was

-
1. Ibid., cxxi, 963-1012, speeches by Hobhouse, Cranborne, Read, Leese, Malcolm, Brodrick, Dillon, Asquith and Lloyd-George, 30 Apr. 1903; The Times, 1 May 1903, leader.
 2. F.O. 2/815, Lansdowne to Bertie, no. 59 Africa, 6 May 1903.

embarrassing, and blamed Plunkett and the Italians.¹ The only hope was that the Ethiopians might rout the Sayyid from the south.² Shortage of camels prevented any further offensive by Manning³ and the War Office recommended that he should withdraw to Bonotleh. It was undignified, but the order was sent to Manning on 5 May⁴ and Brodrick reassured the Commons that 'We have no intention of withdrawing from the announcement of the policy made to the House.'⁵

There was considerable fear of further disasters. Lord Roberts particularly warned Manning against employing small detachments against such 'a fanatical enemy'.⁶ In response to public pressure⁷ Manning was ordered to file his ammunition to give it greater stopping power against 'fanatical rushes'.⁸ This was contrary both to previous policy⁹ and to the Hague convention of 1899, but only Dillon, an Irish M.P., raised his voice against the use of bullets that tore to pieces.¹⁰ As Manning's force

-
1. CAB 41/28/7, Balfour to Edward VII, 5 May 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/v, 35 & 38, W.O. tel. to Rochfort, 26 Apr. 1903, and Manning tel. to W.O., 26 Apr. 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/v, 39, Manning tel. to W.O., 27 Apr. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/v, 42, W.O. tel. to Manning, 5 May 1903; F.O. 2/815, minute by Cranborne, n.d., on Harrington tel. to Lansdowne, no. 3, 3 May 1903.
 5. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxii, 921-3, answer by Brodrick, 18 May 1903.
 6. W.O. 106/236/v, 32, C.-in-C. tel. to Manning, 18 May 1903.
 7. The Times, 27 Apr. 1903, leader; 2 May 1903, letter from 'Infantryman' and 'Norm'; Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxi, 461-2 and 963-1012, question by Lee, 27 Apr. 1903, speeches by Malcolm and Lee, 30 Apr. 1903.
 8. W.O. 106/236/v, 45, W.O. tel. to Manning, 3 June 1903.
 9. W.O. 106/236/i, 9, I.O. to Aden resident, 26 Dec. 1902.
 10. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxi, 963-1012, speech by Dillon, 30 Apr. 1903.

was to be stationed at Bohotleh preparations were made to bore permanent wells along the route from Berbera¹ and to improve telegraphic communications in the protectorate,² for experiments with a Marconi wireless system had not proved satisfactory.³ The crucial problem, however, was that of transport. 24 tons of supplies would be needed daily at Bohotleh, yet the supply of transport camels was absolutely exhausted.⁴ It was suggested that the solution favoured by Curzon on the North-West Frontier in India should be copied,⁵ and that a light railway or tramline be laid on the rough road that had been cleared through to Bohotleh.⁶ An engineer was sent to see whether this would be practicable,⁷ and in the meantime 2,000 extra camels were ordered from Aden and India.⁸

A defensive policy had been forced upon the Government because the offensive had failed, but it would not be easy to defend the protectorate against a hostile and victorious Sayyid. Between April and June 1903

-
1. W.O. 106/236/vi, 11, Maj. S.L. Cra'ster, R.E., to W.O., 31 May 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/vii, 5, W.O. tel. to Swann, 6 June 1903.
 3. War Office, Official History..., i, 147, ii, 484; W.O. 106/236/iv, 21, staff diary entry, 15 Mar. 1903; Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxi, 947, answer by Brodrick, 30 Apr. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/vii, 6, Manning tel. to W.O., 9 June 1903; F.O. 2/802, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 22, 12 June 1903.
 5. Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, pp. 99-115.
 6. F.O. 2/815, Harrington tel. to Maxwell, strictly private, 2 May 1903; memo. by Swayne, 6 May 1903; W.O. 106/236/vi, 8, Swann tel. to W.O., 8 May 1903; The Times, 17 June 1903.
 7. F.O. 2/802, memo. by Hill, 5 May 1903; W.O. 106/236/vi, 10, F.O. tel. to Cordeaux, 5 May 1903.
 8. W.O. 106/236/vi, 9 & 29, journal entry for 15 May 1903 and W.O. tel. to Manning, 10 June 1903.

the Government seriously considered negotiating with him through the mediation of an extraordinary Hungarian adventurer named Karl Inger, or, as he preferred to be called, Emir Suleiman Ibn Inger Abdullah.¹ The man had a colourful history. Early in life he became a Muslim. In 1896 he was arrested by the British at Suakin, dressed in dervish uniform, on his way to the Khalifa at Omdurman.² The next year Rennell Rodd had him turned back from entering Ethiopia.³ In 1898 he turned up at the head of a 'scientific expedition' near Zeila, but the British authorities would not allow him to enter the protectorate;⁴ he claimed to be 'Emir' of the Somalis and was trying to interest the British Government and others in a scheme for developing trade with Somaliland;⁵ the Government dismissed him as a liar.⁶ As soon as the Sayyid began his rising in 1899, Inger, who was in London, claimed that the Sayyid was one of his 'Sheikhs';⁷ and at the start of the second expedition in 1902 he wrote from Port Said, repeating an earlier plea to avoid military action against the Sayyid and

-
1. For a full account of this bizarre episode see: A.M. Brockett, 'Emir Suleyman Ibn Inger Abdullah - A Further Episode', to be published in a forthcoming issue of Sudan Notes and Records.
 2. G.N. Sanderson, 'Emir Suleyman Ibn Inger Abdullah', Sudan Notes and Records, xxxv (1954), 22-71.
 3. F.O. 78/4886, Rodd to Sanderson, 16 July 1897.
 4. F.O. 78/4979, I.O. to F.O., 12 Aug. 1898 and enclosures; Sadler to Creagh, 5 Aug. 1898, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 22 Aug. 1898.
 5. F.O. 78/5039, Inger to Brodrick, 16 Aug. 1899; F.O. 1/36, Inger to Harrington, 26 Aug. 1899, enclosed in Harrington to Maxwell, 31 Aug. 1899.
 6. F.O. 78/5039, Inger to Salisbury, 30 Aug. 1899, and minute thereon by Sanderson, n.d.; I.D.W.O. to F.O., 9 Sept. 1899.
 7. F.O. 78/5031, Sadler to Hopwood, 27 Sept. 1899 and 30 Sept. 1899.

offering to make peace himself.¹ Both Sadler and Cordeaux believed that Inger was in some way implicated in the Sayyid's rising, which only increased the Government's determination to keep him out of the protectorate.² When the news of Erego was received, Inger claimed responsibility for Swayne's defeat, saying that the Sayyid had 'learnt to fight according to the Austro-Hungarian art of war',³ and during the early stages of Manning's expedition he wrote to both Brodrick and Chamberlain, offering to make peace between Britain and the Sayyid.⁴

Strangely, Inger's persistence and his fantastic claims eventually persuaded Sir Clement Hill that it might be possible to make use of him,⁵ while the combined effect of Gumburru, Daratoleh and the Italian decision not to occupy Mudug, made the idea attractive to Cranborne and Lansdowne.⁶ Although Cordeaux and Manning disapproved,⁷ Lansdowne began cautious negotiations with Inger through the British military attaché in Vienna.⁸ Inger repeated his claims, and said that^{as} he was senior to the Sayyid in

-
1. F.O. 2/617, Inger to consul-general, Somaliland, 27 Apr. 1902, enclosed in Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 53, 21 May 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/616, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 73, 25 Apr. 1902; F.O. 2/617, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 53, 21 May 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/811, Sir Francis Plunkett (British ambassador, Vienna) to Lansdowne, 25 Oct. 1902, and enclosure; The Times, 23 Oct. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/815, Inger to Brodrick, 3 Apr. 1903; F.O. 2/760, Inger to Chamberlain, 9 Apr. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/760, Hill to Altham, 21 Apr. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/815, Lansdowne tel. to Cordeaux, no. 10, 1 May 1903.
 7. F.O. 2/815, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 16, 5 May 1903; W.O. 106/236/vi, 5, Manning to W.O., 6 May 1903.
 8. F.O. 2/815, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on memo. by Cranborne, 9 May 1903; D.G.M.I. to F.O., 11 May 1903; Lansdowne to Plunkett, no. 4 Africa, 12 May 1903.

the Salihiya he could order an end to the fighting; as his reward Inger wished to become ruler of the Somalis of the interior.¹ This seemed reasonable to Cranborne, for at least Inger, if he controlled the interior, would have some respect for British power, whereas the Sayyid appeared sublimely unaware of the true strength of his enemies.² Lansdowne, Lord Roberts and the Director-General of Military Intelligence, managed to persuade the Cabinet that there was a chance of making peace through Inger.³ There was still, however, considerable opposition to the idea; Cordeaux, Manning, Swayne and Brodrick wanted nothing to do with Inger.⁴ The prime minister therefore decided to consult Cromer who had past experience of both Inger and dervishism and could say how the scheme would affect British prestige in the Muslim world. Cranborne explained the facts to Cromer: the Cabinet were in a dilemma; they were 'utterly sick of the Somali War' and had refused to pay for further offensive operations, yet a defensive scheme promised to be equally expensive; negotiations seemed the only solution and Inger the best agent.⁵

-
1. F.O. 2/815, Plunkett tel. to Lansdowne, no. 1 Africa, 18 May 1903; Plunkett to Lansdowne, no. 2 Africa, 19 May 1903, no. 3 Africa, 20 May 1903 and no. 5 Africa, 22 May 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/815, memo. by Cranborne, 9 May 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/815, minutes by Lansdowne, n.d., and Hill, 18 May 1903, on Plunkett tel. to Lansdowne, no. 1 Africa, 18 May 1903; minute by Hill, n.d., on Plunkett to Lansdowne, no. 2 Africa, 19 May 1903; loose minute from Lansdowne to Cranborne, 26 May 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/815, Cordeaux tels. to Lansdowne, no. 20, 26 May 1903, and no. 21, 4 June 1903; Swayne to Hill, 22 May 1903 and 4 June 1903; Brodrick to Balfour, 26 May 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/815, Cranborne to Cromer, 29 May 1903.

Despite a deep-rooted distrust of Inger¹ Cromer sought the advice of Wingate, the governor-general of the Sudan, and Slatin, his inspector-general. Both men advised against the scheme, considering Inger to be a despicable adventurer whose conversion to Islam was far too recent to give him any authority over the Sayyid. Cromer agreed, and pointed out that Inger might reveal to the Sayyid the weak points in the British military position. He also feared that negotiations would weaken the belief which

'prevails among Easterns that, although we may blunder and incur temporary reverses at the commencement of a war, we always end by being victorious.'

In Ethiopia, especially, he feared that British prestige would suffer if the impression of 'irresistibility' were refuted. Together with Wingate he urged the Government to resume the offensive and finish 'the business by one decisive blow,....' Thereafter, perhaps, contact might be made with the Sayyid, not through Inger, but through some reliable Sudanese sheikh.² In face of such objections Lansdowne had to drop his plans for using Inger, who was told that his services were not required.³ Instead, Wingate worked on the idea of sending two influential Sudanese to persuade the Sayyid to make peace, followed by Slatin who would conduct negotiations with the Sayyid.⁴ But events in Somaliland overtook

-
1. F.O. 2/815, extract from Cromer to Sanderson, private, 15 May 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/815, Slatin to Wingate, 4 June 1903, and Wingate to Cromer, 4 June 1903, both enclosed in Cromer to Cranborne, 5 June 1903; also to be found in F.O. 633/8/355-368.
 3. F.O. 2/815, Lansdowne to Plunkett, no. 8 Africa, 24 June 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/815, Wingate to Hill, 21 June 1903.

this policy..

Throughout April the Ethiopian force had been in the valley of the Shibeli, operating more or less indiscriminately against any Somalis it met; the largest engagement had been on 4 April at Burhilli when they claimed to have killed 300 alleged 'dervishes'.¹ Towards the end of the month they began operating more systematically against the Ogaden Bah Geri, the Sayyid's own sub-clan and his most faithful supporters.² In the second half of May the rains enabled them to move north from the Shibeli towards the Sayyid at Gerlogubi, as the British Government hoped they would.³ On 31 May they attacked a large concentration of Bah Geri dervishes sent south by the Sayyid, at Jeyd, and followed this up by thoroughly scouring the surrounding countryside.⁴ The Bah Geri casualties were very severe (the Ethiopians claimed to have killed over 1,000) and it was clear that the Ethiopians were effectively blocking any southward move by the Sayyid.⁵ Once again, they had fulfilled the role assigned to them, and they fell back on the Shibeli for water and grain.⁶

-
1. W.O. 106/236/v, 6, Cordeaux tel. to W.O., 18 May 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/v, 44, entry in Rochfort's diary, 27 Apr. 1903; W.O. 106/236/vi, 10, Rochfort to W.O., 4 May 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/vi, 29, 30 & 31, journal entries for 24 May 1903 and 26 May 1903; Rochfort to W.O., 27 May 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/vi, 35, Rochfort tel. to W.O., 6 June 1903 and journal entry, 6 June 1903.
 5. W.O. 106/236/vii, 5, Rochfort to W.O., 6 June 1903; F.O. 2/815, Rochfort to Altham, 19 June 1903, copy.
 6. W.O. 106/236/vii, 7 & 19, extract from Rochfort's staff diary, 11 June 1903, and Rochfort tel. to Manning, 14 June 1903; War Office, Official History..., i, 161-4.

Meanwhile, Manning had concentrated all his troops between Gallad and Galkayu for the move back to Bohotleh. He could gather no information whatsoever as to the Sayyid's whereabouts¹ and took delight in the belief that he had gone south to trouble the Italians.² But any such southward movement by the Sayyid had been stopped short by the Ethiopian victory at Jeyd; instead the Sayyid turned north, crossed Manning's line of retreat near Domo and took his dervishes back into the Nogal Valley where they could replenish their arms from the Mijertein ports.³ The move was conducted with great secrecy and took the British by surprise; the Sayyid was back in their protectorate, but their forces at Bohotleh were too weak to attack him.⁴ More serious still was the prospect of several thousand dervishes between Bohotleh and Manning's 1,350 men.

By 15 June anxiety about Manning's position was being voiced by both press and parliament⁵ and Balfour, who was very uneasy, called a special Cabinet committee to discuss the problem.⁶ They ordered 600 reinforcements

-
1. W.O. 106/236/vii, 4, distribution statement, 4 June 1903 and Manning tel. to F.O., 4 June 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/815, Manning to Hill, 22 May 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/vii, 7, 8 & 13, Swann tel. to W.O., 11 June 1903 & 12 June 1903; extracts from staff diaries, 11 June 1903 & 12 June 1903; intelligence officer, Bohotleh, to Cordeaux, 11 June 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/vii, 11 & 47, extract from staff diary, 13 June 1903, and Manning to W.O., 29 June 1903.
 5. Pall Mall Gazette, 15 June 1903; Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxiii, 940, question by Norton, 15 June 1903.
 6. CAB 41/28/11, Balfour to Edward VII, 16 June 1903.

to be sent immediately from Aden,¹ decided that all future ammunition to be used in Somaliland should be of the forbidden expanding variety,² telegraphed to Malta and South Africa about extra transport³ and ordered over 1,000 troops to stand by in India.⁴ These troops were to be commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Egerton,⁵ a soldier with much experience of Indian frontier warfare; so great was the Government's sense of urgency that they upset the Government of India by nominating Egerton without first consulting them.⁶ Alarmist opinions continued to appear in the press,⁷ leading to further concern in parliament. The Government stated that there was no reason to worry,⁸ but in private they believed that Manning and Cobbe were probably cut off.⁹ In such a situation any idea of negotiating with the Sayyid through Sudanese agents was out of the question; the policy of the Government was to rescue Manning before

-
1. W.O. 106/236/vii, 21, I.O. tel. to Aden resident, 17 June 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/v, 45, W.O. to I.O., 19 June 1903; W.O. 106/236/viii, 47, journal entry for 22 July 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/vii, 22, W.O. to G.O.C. Malta, 15 June 1903; W.O. to G.O.C. South Africa, 17 June 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/vii, 19-20, journal entry for 15 June 1903 and I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 15 June 1903.
 5. Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles Comyn Egerton, D.S.O., K.C.B. (later G.C.B.), 1848-1921; A.D.C. to Queen Victoria and Edward VII; 1867-1902, on many campaigns in India; 1896, commanded Indian contingent in Sudan; 1903-4, commanded Somaliland Field Force; 1904-7, commanding troops, Madras; 1906, full general; 1907, retired from army; 1917, field-marshal; 1907-1917, member of Council of India.
 6. W.O. 106/236/vii, 20, Viceroy tel. to I.O., 17 June 1903; I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 18 June 1903.
 7. Pall Mall Gazette, 17 June 1903 and 18 June 1903.
 8. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxiii, 1301, 1304-6, questions by Fuller, Hobhouse and Norton, answers by Brodrick, 18 June 1903.
 9. W.O. 106/236/vii, 26 & 27, W.O. tel. to Lord Kitchener (C.-in-C. India), 19 June 1903; I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 19 June 1903.

they considered anything else.¹

By 21 June they knew that Manning was approaching Domo, but nonetheless they decided to send reinforcements 'in case of accidents' and 'as there seemed a chance of operations assuming more formidable proportions....'² Egerton and a thousand men were ordered from India.³ His appointment was generally welcomed⁴ although Punch reported that the War Office was busy arranging for relays of generals to rescue one another.⁵ In the newspapers it was realised that the net result of Manning's expedition had been to drive the Sayyid out of Mudug into the British protectorate and that 'all the progress of the last six months... appears now to have been effected in a backward direction'; but the blame was attributed to the Government for giving Manning too few men.⁶

On 26 June Manning brought his men into Bohotleh without incident⁷ and eight days later the last garrison outside the British protectorate, at Domo, was also brought in.⁸ Manning optimistically reported that the

-
1. F.O. 2/815, minutes by Cranborne, 19 June 1903, and Lansdowne, n.d., on Fairholme to Hill, 17 June 1903.
 2. CAB 41/28/12, Balfour to Edward VII, 23 June 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/vii, 31, I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 21 June 1903.
 4. Pall Mall Gazette, 22 June 1903.
 5. Punch, 1 July 1903.
 6. The Times, 23 June 1903, leader; Pall Mall Gazette, 22 June 1903 and 25 June 1903.
 7. W.O. 106/236/vii, 40, Manning tel. to W.O., 26 June 1903.
 8. W.O. 106/236/viii, 7, Manning tel. to W.O., 3 July 1903.

Sayyid's following was in confusion¹, and the Government congratulated him for having fulfilled the original objectives of the expedition, the occupation of Gallad and Galkayu.² Yet it was inescapable that at a cost of nearly $\text{£} \frac{1}{2}$ million, 17 officers, 346 men³ and over 3,000 (63%) of his camels,⁴ Manning had merely driven the Sayyid back into British Somaliland.⁵

-
1. W.O. 106/236/vii, 40, Manning tel. to W.O., 26 June 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/vii, 33, W.O. tel. to Manning, 22 June 1903.
 3. Hensard, 4th series, 1903, cxxi, 458, answer by Lord Stanley (financial secretary, W.O.), 27 Apr. 1903; cxxiii, 1304-6, answer by Brodrick, 18 June 1903; cxxv, 397-8, answer by Brodrick, 13 July 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/vii, 41, staff diary entry, 26 June 1903.
 5. The story of Manning's expedition will also be found in: Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 87-123; Parl. Papers 1903, xlv (909), 'Despatches relative to Operations of the Somaliland Field Force'; Parl. Papers 1905, lvi (469), 'Despatches etc., regarding the Military Operations in Somaliland from the 18th January, 1902 to 31st May, 1904'.

CHAPTER XI

THE BIG BATTALIONS.

After the disaster at Gumburru the Government had announced that they would send no fresh large-scale expedition against the Sayyid¹ but when he re-entered the protectorate in mid-June 1903 and threatened Manning's withdrawal they had to reconsider this position. Another offensive once again became a possibility² and Major-General Egerton and 1,000 men were ordered from India.³ Cromer advised the Government to attack the Sayyid again as negotiations would only be construed as a sign of weakness.⁴ Slatin, Wingate and Lord Roberts all agreed.⁵ All this time soldiers, camels, mules and wagons were pouring into Somaliland from Aden, India and South Africa, and by the end of July there were over 8,800 troops and followers, and over 10,000 transport animals in the country.⁶ Egerton reached Berbera early in July.⁷ By this time Manning was known to be safely in Bohotleh, but although Egerton had been asked to report on the

-
1. See above, pp. 373-4.
 2. F.O. 2/815, Lansdowne tel. to Cromer, no. 2 Africa, 24 June 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/vii, 31, I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 21 June 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/815, Cromer tels. to Lansdowne, no. 1 Africa, 25 June 1903 and no. 2 Africa, 6 July 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/815, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 76, 27 June 1903; D.G.M.I. to F.O., 29 June 1903 and 10 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/vii, 32, journal entry for 13 July 1903.
 6. W.O. 106/236/ix, 3 & 7, strength return, 1 Aug. 1903 and distribution return, 3 Aug. 1903.
 7. W.O. 106/236/viii, 7, journal entry for 3 July 1903.

best defensive measures his immediate recommendation was for a large new expeditionary force and the re-occupation of Mudug¹. He then conferred with Manning and Cordeaux² both of whom advocated an immediate advance into the Nogal to finish off the Sayyid who was believed to be in desperate straits³. Egerton, however, came up with two alternative policies which he put to the Government; either a large expedition through Italian territory, with Ethiopian co-operation, to kill or capture the Sayyid; or a big military occupation of the protectorate coupled with effective administration of the Dolbohanta to keep the Sayyid outside British territory; each course required considerable reinforcements and improved communications⁴. The Government liked neither alternative; they had no intention of keeping a large permanent garrison in Somaliland and no desire to occupy Bohotleh and administer the Dolbohanta. They wanted a quick, relatively cheap strike in the Nogal, to deliver the coup de grâce before the Sayyid could recover from the last campaign. They asked Egerton to plan a smaller expedition with the troops already available⁵ and assured the House of Commons that

-
1. W.O. 106/236/vii, 42, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 27 June 1903; W.O. 106/236/viii, 8 & 9. Egerton to W.O. and Egerton tel. to W.O., both 5 July 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/viii, 14, journal entry for 8 July 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/vii, 40, Manning tel. to W.O., 26 June 1903; W.O. 106/236/viii, 25, journal entry for 15 July 1903; F.O. 2/815, Cordeaux tels. to Lansdowne, no. 28, 29 June 1903 and no. 29, 3 July 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/vii, 43 & 44, Egerton tels. to W.O., 10 July 1903 and 12 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/viii, 27, Egerton to W.O., 14 July 1903.
 5. W.O. 106/236/viii, 10, W.O. to Egerton, 13 July 1903; CAB 41/28/14, Balfour to Edward VII, 14 July 1903.

there was 'no intention whatever of undertaking enterprises involving great expense.'¹

Egerton, however, was a major-general and he was not going to conduct operations on a brigadier's scale. He insisted on the necessity for extra reinforcements and many more camels from India and put in such a list of requirements, ranging from printing equipment and an ice machine to sweepers and staff officers, that the Foreign Office wondered he did not ask for a section of Woolwich Arsenal and a fleet of battle-ships.² At this rate the Government would be spending over £1½ million before the year was ended³ and they were only prepared to agree if Egerton guaranteed to capture or kill the Sayyid, or permanently shatter his power.⁴ Egerton could not give such a guarantee but he thought his large-scale operations had the best chance of success; anything smaller would only produce a stalemate, driving the Sayyid backwards and forwards among the Dolbohanta. He agreed with Cordeaux that their primary object should be to expel the Sayyid completely from Dolbohanta country and then to occupy the Dolbohanta in such force that he could never return. In fact, they were arguing that Britain should extend a military, and later a civil

-
1. Mansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxv, 1140-41, answer by Lord Stanley (financial secretary to W.O.), 20 July 1903; see also, ibid., cols. 887-8 & 905-7, speeches by Hobhouse and Brodrick, 16 July 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/viii, 32 & 38, Egerton tels. to W.O., 16 July 1903 and 19 July 1903; F.O. 2/815, Egerton tel. to W.O., 20 July 1903, copy, and minute thereon by Crowe, 22 July 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/viii, 45, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 31 July 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/viii, 44, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 22 July 1903.

administration over the Dolbohanta. The Dolbohanta lived in the British protectorate, but they had no treaties of protection and the Government was unwilling for such an extension of responsibility.¹ The Government's attitude is reflected in the reports on Cabinet meetings which the prime minister sent to the king; on 28 July:

'The Cabinet was somewhat perturbed at the growing cost of Military operations. The financial demands of General Egerton greatly exceeded the most extravagant estimate originally formed as to the cost of the war. And as Somaliland brings us nothing, and is, from a financial point of view, quite worthless, this becomes a serious consideration. ... we are resolved to keep Somaliland as we have got it ... we do not mean to hand it over to the Mullah On the other hand we recognise that it will prove impossible to spend millions of the taxpayers money year after year on its defence....'²

and a week later:

'Somaliland - most unsatisfactory of topics - again came up for discussion. The Cabinet inclined, as the least of two evils to adopt General Egerton's policy: but if possible to induce him to carry it out with somewhat greater economy than he at first designed. Indian generals are not always careful of money, especially of British money: - and in the present position of the National finances it is difficult to contemplate with equanimity the scattering of hundreds of thousands of pounds in the Somaliland wastes.'²

It was strongly pressed on Egerton that the Government had no desire to increase their territory or responsibilities, and he was urged to plan

-
1. W.O. 106/236/viii, 44, Egerton tel. to W.O., 26 July 1903; F.O. 2/815, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 35, 26 July 1903, and minute thereon by Lansdowne, n.d.
 2. CAB 41/28/16, Balfour to Edward VII, 28 July 1903.
 3. CAB 41/28/17, Balfour to Edward VII, 4 Aug. 1903.

as economically¹ as possible. Yet Egerton insisted that the job could not be done properly without more troops, more camels and the occupation and administration of the Dolbohanta.² By mid-August Balfour was reporting to the king:

'... the eternal question of Somaliland occupied the greater part of yesterday's Cabinet.... The Cabinet were strongly disposed to share Mr. Balfour's view that General Egerton seemed desirous of carrying on the campaign on a scale quite unsuitable....'³

The Cabinet decided to put their foot down. Lord Roberts telegraphed to Egerton that a protectorate over the Dolbohanta was out of the question, that India could supply no further camels, that the additional staff and troops were unnecessary and that he should attack the Sayyid as soon as possible, employing Somali levies if necessary.⁴ If he was unwilling to carry out this policy 'the cabinet committee ... resolved to appoint General Willcocks (of Ashantee fame) to serve in his place.'⁵ But Egerton knew when to back down; he agreed to reduce his demands and submitted a fresh scheme involving a strong mobile force in the Dolbohanta.⁶

Nevertheless, in the long run, Egerton obtained most of his original requests, and the campaign proved to be much larger and much more expensive

-
1. W.O. 106/236/viii, 45 & 54, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 31 July 1903 and C.-in-C. tel. to Egerton, 28 July 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/ix, 16, 19 & 25, Egerton to W.O., 7 Aug. 1903, and tels. of 9 Aug. 1903 and 12 Aug. 1903.
 3. CAB 41/28/18, Balfour to Edward VII, 14 Aug. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/ix, 19, C.-in-C. tel. to Egerton, 13 Aug. 1903.
 5. CAB 41/28/18, Balfour to Edward VII, 14 Aug. 1903.
 6. W.O. 106/236/ix, 20, Egerton tel. to C.-in-C., 20 Aug. 1903.

than the earlier ones. Although some of his troop requirements had been turned down, when he began the expedition in November he had under his command over 7,500 soldiers, 6,600 followers and 14,600 transport animals, a force which needed a considerable staff for its organisation.¹ Similarly, although the Government refused to send him the camels he wanted they agreed to provide him with 1,000 ekkas (described by The Times as 'a vehicle sui generis, a light covered native cart capable of accommodating two or three persons besides the driver, and horsed, in India, with a scraggy, hard-mouthed country-bred animal capable of astonishing feats of endurance on a minimum of doubtful forage.'²) from India.³ Huge bills began to come in from India⁴ and the Government had to qualify their earlier promises of economy; in August Balfour was telling the Commons:

'We deplore the expenditure which has already taken place; and that which I am afraid is still likely to take place. But much as I regret the sacrifices which these operations have entailed, and are likely to entail in the future, we cannot, conformably with our obligations, withdraw our hands from the plough or turn our backs upon the task we have deliberately undertaken.'⁵

The most pressing problem was the transport of supplies for such a

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xi, 38, strength return, 27 Oct. 1903; War Office, Official History..., ii, 338-344, 346, 367-87.
 2. The Times, 17 Nov. 1903, report by a military correspondent.
 3. W.O. 106/236/ix, 26, Egerton tels. to W.O. 16 Aug. 1903 and 1 Sept. 1903; W.O. 106/236/x, 15, I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 9 Sept. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/vii, 35, Viceroy tel. to I.O., 24 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 6, I.O. to W.O., 3 Dec. 1903.
 5. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxvii, 716-7, speech by Balfour, 10 Aug. 1903.

large force; wood or coal-burning lorries, petrol lorries, traction engines and a light railway to Bohotleh were all considered, and rejected as unsuitable.¹ The only practical solution was to improve the Berbera-Bohotleh road and rely on ekkas, mule-wagons and camel-carts, none of which was entirely satisfactory.² Accordingly, Indian sappers, miners and 'coolies' and local labourers were put to work on the road, repairing it, metalling sections and building a new route 'over Sheikh pass'.³ At Berbera, the landing facilities were extended to cope with all the supplies, a tramway was laid along the pier, and the town was transformed with stacks of food, strings of camels and wagons.⁴ In addition, 16 garrisons were established along the road between Berbera and Bohotleh, at approximately 15 mile intervals, and for most of them defensive works and water supplies were constructed.⁵

The Government's decision that Somali levies should be used rather

-
1. F.O. 2/802, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 22, 12 June 1903; W.O. 106/236/viii, 47 & 50, Egerton tels. to W.O., 23 July 1903 and 28 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/ix, 37, Inspector-General of Fortifications to Egerton, 19 Aug. 1903 and Egerton to Inspector-General of Fortifications, 14 Sept. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/802, memo. by Hill, 25 June 1903; W.O. 106/236/x, 19, journal entry for 12 Sept. 1903; War Office, Official History..., ii, 490-511.
 3. W.O. 106/236/viii, 58, I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 6 Aug. 1903; W.O. 106/236/ix, 10, Egerton to W.O., 5 Aug. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xi, 3 & 9, journal entries for 1 Oct. 1903 and 4 Oct. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/ix, 15, journal entry for 6 Aug. 1903; F.O. 2/816, J. Baird (2nd secretary, British consulate-general, Addis Ababa) to Harrington, 28 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Harrington to Maxwell, 23 Nov. 1903.
 5. W.O. 106/236/viii, 43, journal entry for 21 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/x, 20, journal entry for 14 Sept. 1903; War Office, Official History..., ii, 350.

than additional troops from overseas, was welcomed by Egerton.¹ The behaviour of the Somali soldiers at Eregu had created a general impression that they were unreliable, and only Swayne still believed in the men who:


'cheerfully came forward when I called them and followed me in two years' hard marching and fighting and were content to be shot down whilst doing so.'²

But during Manning's expedition the remnant of 6 K.A.R. had rendered such excellent service, especially at Daratoleh, that on Manning's suggestion their number was doubled to 300.³ In addition to this, the Government now gave Egerton permission to raise another 1,000 Somali levies.⁴ These were recruited from the Ishaak, Dolbohanta and Gadabursi,⁵ and by 9 November they had been organised into two corps of 500 men each, called the Tribal Horse and the Gadabursi Horse; their uniform was a length of red cloth.⁶ At the same time, advantage was taken of an offer by certain Ogaden elders in Ethiopian territory south of the protectorate to co-operate against the Sayyid's followers in that area and two British officers were sent to advise them. They were not to be given arms, but at the very least it was hoped that they would not now raid the Ishaak

-
1. W.O. 106/236/ix, 20, Egerton tel. to C.-in-C., 20 Aug. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/758, Swayne to Hill, private, 17 July 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/797, Manning tel. to Lansdowne, 9 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/viii, 16, F.O. tel. to Cordeaux, 27 July 1903; War Office, Official History..., ii, 417.
 4. W.O. 106/236/x, 4, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 14 Sept. 1903.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xi, 32, Egerton tel. to W.O., 25 Oct. 1903.
 6. W.O. 106/236/x, 26, journal entry for 18 Sept. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xii, 5 & 10, Egerton to W.O., 3 Nov. 1903, progress report, 9 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/874, W.O. to F.O., 16 Sept. 1904; War Office, Official History..., ii, 417-420.

To face page 394

EGERTON'S EXPEDITION 1903-04: (i) THE FIRST PHASE.



clans whose men had joined the Tribal Horse.¹

Inevitably all this preparation took time. There had been an initial delay while Egerton and the Government argued about the scale of the operations, a delay which prompted questions in the Commons² and led Punch to report that 'a Royal Commission is to be appointed to find out who (if anybody) is conducting the Somali War.'³ Once the policy had been dictated to Egerton by the Government in mid-August his massive preparations caused further delay and his date for advancing had to be postponed from mid-October to 8 November.⁴ This meant that the Sayyid had been left undisturbed for nearly five months since crossing back into the protectorate. The British had maintained a small mobile force at El Dab⁵ but the Sayyid was more than 100 miles to their east, in the Halin-Adadero-Kallis area of the Nogal Valley.⁶ Here, he had ample time to recover, and all hope of catching him disorganised and weak was doomed.

-
1. W.O. 106/236/x, 26 & 36, journal entry for 18 Sept. 1903 and 29 Sept. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xi, 31, Egerton tel. to W.O., 24 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Egerton tel. to W.O., 4 Oct. 1903, enclosed in D.G.M.I. to F.O., 7 Oct. 1903.
 2. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxxvi, 69-70, question by Dillon, 23 July 1903; ibid., cxxvii, 668, question by Dillon, 10 Aug. 1903.
 3. Punch, 26 Aug. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/x, 27, Egerton tel. to W.O., 19 Sept. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xi, 32, Egerton tel. to W.O., 25 Oct. 1903.
 5. W.O. 106/236/viii, 60, journal entry for 31 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/xi, 14, journal entry for 8 Oct. 1903.
 6. W.O. 106/236/viii, 25, journal entry for 12 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/xi, 24, intelligence report, 20 Oct. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xii, 6, journal entry for 4 Nov. 1903.

He replenished his arms supply from the northern Mijertein coast until, at the lowest estimate, he had 2,000 rifles,¹ and he built up his shattered following until in early October one intelligence report put his followers at over 38,000 of whom nearly 22,000 were Dolbohanta.² Such figures could be wildly inaccurate, but they emphasised that the Sayyid had been able to recover fully since June. As an illustration of this, it was discovered in early September that 600 dervishes had established themselves in three strong forts near Illig where the Nogal meets the sea. This gave the Sayyid a landing place under his direct control. An Italian warship which tried to investigate in October was met by heavy fire and reported that the forts could only be taken by an armed landing. The Sayyid was also raiding towards Obbia and terrifying Ali Yusuf the new sultan, launching raids against the north-east of the British protectorate,³ and keeping a careful watch on the British positions through his ilalos (scouts) at Domo and in the Nogal.⁴ Dervish morale was obviously high⁵ and by early November it seemed likely that the Sayyid was planning a move back into the southern Haud.⁶

-
1. W.O. 106/236/viii, 49, S.N.O. Aden to Admiralty, 23 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/x, 24, intelligence report, 18 Sept. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xi, 12, intelligence report, 7 Oct. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/816, Bertie tels. to Lansdowne, no. 30 Africa, 3 Oct. 1903 and no. 32 Africa, 25 Oct. 1903; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 112, 7 Oct. 1903; S.N.O. Aden tel. to Admiralty, 24 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 24 Oct. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xi, 23, journal entry for 19 Oct. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xii, 6, intelligence report, 4 Nov. 1903.
 5. W.O. 106/236/x, 24, intelligence report, 18 Sept. 1903.
 6. W.O. 106/236/xii, 8, intelligence report, 7 Nov. 1903.

This was the last thing Egerton wanted, for he believed the only way to bring the Sayyid to action was to hem him up north; he had, however, anticipated that he might try to break south and he wanted the Ethiopians to advance towards Mudug for he was sure that if there was the possibility of Ethiopian troops south of the Haud the Sayyid would stay north.¹ The British Government had realised that Ethiopian co-operation would be useful although they distrusted Ethiopian methods, and, until they received news of the battle of Jeyd, considered that they had been ineffective. Nevertheless, they were prepared to grant a subsidy to the Ethiopians in the hope that it would improve their effectiveness.² The news of the Ethiopian success at Jeyd removed their hesitations³ and Menelik was asked to co-operate once more against the Sayyid.⁴ Menelik was only too willing⁵ provided Britain gave him water-containers for his troops.⁶ Colonel Rochfort, who had accompanied the Ethiopian force in the last campaign, and Egerton, both recommended that the Government should provide 1,000 water tanks and a subsidy.⁷ In return they wanted Menelik

1. W.O. 106/236/x, 19, 27 & 32, Egerton to C.-in-C., private, 14 Sept. 1903, Egerton tels. to W.O., 19 Sept. 1903 and 23 Sept. 1903.
2. W.O. 106/236/vii, 25, W.O. tel. to Rochfort, 17 June 1903; F.O. 2/815, Cromer tel. to Harrington, no. 20, 26 June 1903, enclosed in Cromer to Lansdowne, no. 7 Africa, 26 June 1903; minute by Hill, n.d., on D.G.M.I. to F.O., 10 July 1903.
3. CAB 41/28/14, Balfour to Edward VII, 14 July 1903; F.O. 2/815, W.O. tel. to Rochfort, 17 July 1903, copy.
4. F.O. 2/815, Lansdowne tel. to Cromer, no. 27, 18 July 1903.
5. F.O. 2/815, Cromer tel. to Lansdowne, no. 3 Africa, 18 July 1903; F.O. 2/816, Harrington tel. to Crowe, 14 Sept. 1903.
6. F.O. 2/815, G.R. Clerk (assistant British agent, Addis Ababa) to Lansdowne, 22 July 1903.
7. F.O. 2/815, Rochfort to Altham, 8 July 1903, enclosed in Altham to Hill, 27 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/viii, 20, Rochfort tel. to W.O., 30 July 1903.

to send 4,000 men to Wardere and to send some of them on to Gallad.¹ The War Office offered Menelik 1,000 camel tanks and £10,000.² He agreed to send the troops but asked for an extra £5,000 for transport and supplies.³ By this time £5,000 was but a drop in the bucket to the British Government; it was readily given⁴ and another £5,000 was also provided for Rochfort's use should he need it to spur on the troops.⁵ The £15,000 given to Menelik seemed to have been wisely spent for many of Ras Makonnen's soldiers were demoralised by the rigours and lack of plunder on the previous expedition,⁶ but on this occasion Menelik distributed £5,000 among them at the outset, by way of inducement, agreed to provide each soldier with a horse or mule instead of making him provide his own, and, for the first time in Ethiopian history, arranged for regular rations of grain and water for the troops.⁷ The British also agreed to provide food for the Ethiopians when they reached Gallad⁸ and sent medical supplies

-
1. W.O. 106/236/ix, 39, Egerton tel. to W.O., 21 Aug. 1903; W.O. 106/236/x, 3, Egerton tel. to W.O., 1 Sept. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/ix, 43, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 28 Aug. 1903; F.O. 2/816, W.O. to F.O., 11 Sept. 1903; Lansdowne tel. to Clerk, no. 13, 14 Sept. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/816, Clerk tel. to Lansdowne, no. 9, 20 Sept. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/816, minutes on above by Crowe, 23 Sept. 1903, Lansdowne, n.d., and Harrington, n.d.; W.O. to F.O., 3 Oct. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xi, 11, journal entry for 27 Oct. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/816, Harrington to Hill, private, 20 Oct. 1903; Lansdowne tel. to Clerk, 25 Oct. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/816, Clerk tel. to Lansdowne, no. 7, 5 Sept. 1903.
 7. F.O. 2/816, Clerk tel. to Lansdowne, no. 31, 31 Oct. 1903; Clerk to Sanderson, 31 Oct. 1903.
 8. W.O. 106/236/xi, 44, Egerton tel. to W.O., 31 Oct. 1903, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 4 Nov. 1903.

three doctors, Rochfort and three other officers to accompany the force.¹

Meanwhile, Egerton's advance in the British protectorate had begun. Of his 7,500 troops, 1,150 were distributed as garrison troops along the line between Berbera and Bohotleh, and another 200 were stationed at Hargeisa in the west and Las Dureh in the east.² The infantry were organised in two brigades, the first under Brigadier-General Manning, composed largely of K.A.R. troops from East and Central Africa, and the second under Brigadier-General C.G.M. Fasken (52nd Sikhs), composed of Sikhs, Punjabis and British soldiers of the Hampshire Regiment.³ The mounted troops, about 2,000 strong, were grouped in four corps under Lieut.-Col. P.A. Kenna, V.C., and included British, Indian and Somali Mounted Infantry, the Bikaner Camel Corps and the Tribal and Gadabursi Horse.⁴ By 9 November 1903 Egerton's force had concentrated, with the 1st Brigade at Bohotleh and the remainder at Ber and Kirrit.⁵ Eric Swayne, who had recovered and returned as commissioner and consul-general,⁶ had

-
1. F.O. 2/816, W.O. to F.O., 21 Sept. 1903 and 23 Sept. 1903; Lansdowne tel. to Clerk, no. 15, 23 Sept. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xi, 27, distribution order, 22 Oct. 1903; War Office, Official History..., ii, 357, 360.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xi, 36, concentration orders, 26 Oct. 1903; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 184.
 4. W.O. 106/236/ix, 33, journal entry for 17 Aug. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xi, 16, Egerton tel. to W.O., 12 Oct. 1903; War Office, Official History..., ii, 424-5.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xi, 32, Egerton tel. to W.O., 25 Oct. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xii, 10, progress report, 9 Nov. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/757, Lansdowne to Swayne, 31 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/x, 5, journal entry for 1 Sept. 1903.

already issued a proclamation to the clans, calling for their co-operation as Egerton was about to wage war on the Sayyid on their behalf¹, and on 9 November the Somali Mounted Infantry opened the campaign by occupying Domo.²

The Sayyid was still in the eastern Nogal but Egerton was still anxious to confine him to the north³ and to do this he gave the impression that he intended to occupy Mudug. The Ethiopians were behind schedule and so Egerton decided to send troops to hold Gallad until they arrived.⁴ Manning and the 1st Brigade, 1,350 strong, reached Gallad on 15 November;⁵ they left 400 men there and returned to Bohotleh with some captured sheep and camels before the end of the month.⁶ At the same time, to further the false impression that Mudug was his objective, Egerton arranged for a naval demonstration at Obbia where Manning's expedition had landed.⁷ Some British and Italian warships anchored off the coast and on 14 November

-
1. F.O. 2/816, proclamation by Swayne, 3 Nov. 1903, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 10 Nov. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xii, 9, Egerton tel. to W.O., 14 Nov. 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xii, 12, 15 & 19, intelligence reports, 11 Nov. 1903, 13 Nov. 1903 and 17 Nov. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/x, 19 & 27, Egerton to C.-in-C., private, 14 Sept. 1903, Egerton tel. to W.O., 19 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Egerton tel. to W.O., 6 Oct. 1903, copy.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xii, 11 & 18, journal entries for 11 Nov. 1903 and 15 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Egerton tel. to W.O., 12 Nov. 1903, copy.
 6. W.O. 106/236/xii, 26 & 28, journal entries for 22 Nov. 1903 and 24 Nov. 1903.
 7. W.O. 106/236/x, 27, Egerton tel. to W.O., 19 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/816, C.-in-C., East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 23, 2 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 3 Oct. 1903.

bogus inquiries were made about the possibility of landing a force at Obbia.¹ Ali Yusuf, the new sultan, was willing to assist the British and so Egerton decided to employ him also to stop the Sayyid moving south.² 460 rifles were sent to him and, with Italian encouragement, he sent 1400 men to garrison Galkayu early in December.³

Egerton was still not satisfied that there were sufficient British and Obbian troops at Mudug to stop the Sayyid breaking south. He did not want to strike at the Sayyid in the Nogal until the Ethiopians were near Mudug, yet he was beginning to doubt whether it was worth waiting for their 'problematical and certainly tardy co-operation'....⁴ Great difficulty had been experienced in getting the Ethiopian force on the move. There was, apparently, friction between Menelik and Ras Makonnen⁵ and despite the £15,000 subsidy none of the transport animals promised by Menelik were forthcoming. Everything therefore depended on Makonnen. Rochfort and Egerton recommended offering him several thousand pounds to

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xii, 4 & 17, journal entries for 1 Nov. 1903 and 14 Nov. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xii, 15, journal entry for 14 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Egerton tel. to W.O., 14 Nov. 1903, copy.
 3. F.O. 2/816, S.N.O. Aden tel. to Admiralty, 26 Nov. 1903, copy; Lansdowne to Bertie, no. 164, 16 Dec. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 13, 19 & 29, journal entry for 12 Dec. 1903, Egerton tel. to W.O., 17 Dec. 1903 and S.N.O. Aden to Admiralty, 22 December 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xii, 29, Egerton tel. to W.O., 29 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Egerton tel. to C.-in-C., 2 Dec. 1903, copy.
 5. F.O. 2/816, Rochfort to Altham, 26 Nov. 1903; copy.

'grease the wheels',¹ and the Government promised another £2,500 (raising the total amount allocated for the Ethiopian force to £22,500)² to pay Makonnen by results, on the basis that he would receive his money if his troops reached certain points by certain fixed dates.³ This bribery was not required,⁴ for suddenly Makonnen began to exert himself, appointed a commander, collected supplies and equipped the troops as well as he could.⁵ On 3 December the force of 5,000 men left their base outside Harar, without any of Menelik's promised transport animals;⁶ ten days later a few pitiful camels, sent by Menelik, arrived at Harar, too late to be of much help.⁷

Rochfort hoped that the Ethiopians would reach Wardere about 28 December 1903⁸ and Egerton took heart.⁹ But their hopes were soon dashed. Hangers-on increased the size of the Ethiopian force to 10,000

-
1. F.O. 2/816, Rochfort to Harrington, 28 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Harrington to Maxwell, 23 Nov. 1903; Egerton tel. to W.O., 2 Dec. 1903, copy; W.O. 106/236/xii, 31, Egerton tel. to W.O., 4 Dec. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 14, W.O. to Treasury, 12 Dec. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/816, W.O. tel. to Rochfort, 1 Dec. 1903, copy.
 4. F.O. 2/908, Rochfort tel. to W.O., no. 91, 17 Apr. 1904, copy.
 5. F.O. 2/816, Rochfort tel. to F.O., no. 54, 4 Nov. 1903; Rochfort tel. to W.O., no. 64, 28 Nov. 1903, copy; Baird to Cromer, 1 Dec. 1903, enclosed in Cromer to Sanderson, 19 Dec. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xii, 7, extracts from Rochfort's staff diary, 4 Nov. 1903 and 5 Nov. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/816, Rochfort to Altham, 26 Nov. 1903, copy; W.O. 106/236/xii, 28, Rochfort tel. to W.O., 24 Nov. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 6, journal entry, 3 Dec. 1903.
 7. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 26, extract from Rochfort's staff diary, 19 Dec. 1903.
 8. F.O. 2/816, Rochfort tel. to W.O., no. 66, 1 Dec. 1903, copy.
 9. W.O. 106/236/xii, 31, Egerton tel. to W.O., 6 Dec. 1903.

men¹ and as they made their way into the Ogaden those in front began to drink the wells dry, leaving nothing for those behind.² Discontent and indiscipline spread, lack of transport slowed down the advance and by 21 December Rochfort was telling Egerton not to rely on Ethiopian co-operation.³ Eventually, on 14 January 1904, the advance guard reached Wardere⁴ but the main force got no further than Gerlogubi where they were rejoined by the advance guard on 31 January.⁵ Shortage of supplies forced them back to Gorraheh where they hung on, serving little useful purpose, seizing young women from the Ogaden and handing them back on the basis of one woman for a rifle, until Makonnen's supplies stopped coming and they had to move back towards Harar on 28 March.⁶ It is impossible to say whether their presence deterred the Sayyid from moving south, but as they began to return to Harar they heard that British operations in the Nogal had forced the Sayyid north. Their co-operation was no longer necessary.⁷ The British Government thanked Menelik for his loyal co-operation although Lansdowne refused to describe it as 'valuable

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 22, extract from Rochfort's staff diary, 17 Dec. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/816, Rochfort tel. to W.O., 10 Dec. 1903, copy; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 16, 22 & 24, extracts from Rochfort's staff diary, 15 Dec. 1903 and 18 Dec. 1903, Rochfort to Egerton, 17 Dec. 1903; J.W. Jennings and C. Addison, With the Abyssinians in Somaliland (London, 1905), p. 126.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 12, Rochfort tel. to Egerton, 21 Dec. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/907, Rochfort tel. to Egerton, no. 77, 14 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Intelligence Officer, Bohotleh, tel. to W.O., 18 Jan. 1904, copy.
 5. F.O. 2/907, Rochfort to W.O., 26 Jan. 1904 and 29 Jan. 1904, copies; Rochfort tel. to W.O., no. 81, 31 Jan. 1904, copy.
 6. F.O. 2/907, Rochfort tel. to W.O., 22 Feb. 1904, copy; Rochfort to Altham, 29 Feb. 1904, copy; Rochfort tel. to W.O., no. 86, 29 Mar. 1904, copy.
 7. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 16, Egerton tel. to Rochfort, 4 Apr. 1904.

assistance,¹ and Makonnen was offered £4,000 as a reward for his genuine help.²


Throughout November and December 1903 Egerton refrained from action, hoping that the Ethiopians would reach Mudug, although he moved the mounted troops and the 2nd Brigade east to El Dab ready to attack down the Nogal.³ Similarly, the Sayyid observed Ramadan by remaining near Adadero⁴ although he was faced with a serious shortage of food and grazing.⁵ In order to keep the Sayyid in the Nogal, Egerton tried to encourage false hopes of peace negotiations through an agent produced by the Italians. Anxious as ever about the security of their Benadir protectorate, the Italians wanted peace⁶ and had persuaded one of the Sayyid's chief gun-runners, Abdullah Shahri, to board an Italian warship at Bosaso and conduct peace negotiations for the Sayyid.⁷ He arrived at Sheikh, under

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Lansdowne tel. to Cromer, no. 29, 10 Apr. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/908, W.O. to F.O., 17 June 1904. The story of the Ethiopian part in this campaign is also given in: Jennings and Addison, With the Abyssinians in Somaliland; War Office, Official History..., i, 251-2; Parl. Papers 1905, lvi (469), 'Despatches, &c., regarding the Military Operations in Somaliland from the 18th January, 1902 to the 31st May, 1904.'
 3. W.O. 106/236/xii, 28 & 33, journal entries for 24 Nov. 1903 and 25 Nov. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xii, 36, Egerton tel. to W.O., 5 Dec. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 13, journal entry for 11 Dec. 1903.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xii, 33 & 36, journal entry for 25 Nov. 1903 and Egerton tel. to W.O., 28 Nov. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/815, Rodd tel. to Lansdowne, no. 29 Africa, 22 Aug. 1903.
 7. F.O. 2/816, F.O. to W.O., 12 Dec. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiv, 8, intelligence report, 7 Jan. 1904.

Italian escort, on 8 December¹, and laid his peace proposals before Egerton; although he had no authority to negotiate he thought that peace could be arranged if the Sayyid were allowed to keep his firearms and control the Nogal nearly as far west as Las Anod. The Italians were anxious for these proposals to be considered² but the British thought there was nothing in them worth listening to, for they involved surrendering a large part of the protectorate to the Sayyid with hardly any guarantee of peace. Nevertheless Egerton decided to play Abdullah Shahri along in the hope of convincing the Sayyid that the proposals were being considered and so keep him in the Nogal until he was ready to attack³.

During November and December only a few minor skirmishes occurred, mostly in the Nogal⁴. The largest was on 19 December when 700 men under Kenna encountered 2,000 dervishes at Jidballi, 50 miles east of El Dab. It was an inconclusive engagement, in which about 80 dervishes and 3 of Kenna's men were killed, and one Victoria Cross won, but Kenna was surprised at the dervish strength and was forced to retire⁵. It was clear that shortage of water and grazing had made the dervishes determined

-
1. F.O. 2/816, Lansdowne to Fansa, 19 Dec. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/816, F.O. to W.O., 18 Dec. 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 9, Egerton tel. to W.O., 25 Dec. 1903, copy, and minutes thereon by Hill and Lansdowne, both n.d.; F.O. 2/907, W.O. to F.O., 5 Jan. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xii, 26, journal entry for 22 Nov. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 4, 6 & 18, journal entries for 2 Dec. 1903, 4 Dec. 1903 and 16 Dec. 1903.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xii, 19 & 25, journal entries for 17 Dec. 1903 and 19 Dec. 1903.



to hold the Jidballi wells, and so Egerton had a chance of coming to battle although the Sayyid himself was said to be moving north.¹ Swayne was therefore asked to raise a levy force in the north among the Habr Toljaala Musa Abokr around Dabbata² while Egerton established his headquarters at El Dab³ and concentrated both his brigades for an attack down the Nogal.

The dervishes were reinforcing Jidballi⁴ and so Egerton wanted every available man. He recalled troops from Gallad, hoping that the combination of Ali Yusuf's forces, the Ogaden under British officers, and false reports of the Ethiopian advance would stop the Sayyid going south.⁵ He also asked the naval authorities to attack the dervish fort at Illig at the same time as he attacked Jidballi, so as to create the impression that troops might advance up the Nogal from the east coast. Illig could only be taken by an armed landing but Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes,⁶ the naval commander-in-chief on the East Indies station, insisted that the

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 27, intelligence reports, 20 Dec. 1903 and 21 Dec. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 33 & 34, Egerton tel. to W.O., 27 Dec. 1903, journal entry for 28 Dec. 1903.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 34, journal entry for 29 Dec. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 10, journal entry for 24 Dec. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/816, Egerton tel. to W.O., 29 Dec. 1903, copy; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 35, Egerton tel. to Rochfort, 31 Dec. 1903.
 6. Atkinson-Willes, Rear-Admiral George (later Admiral Sir George, K.C.B.) 1847-1921; 1861, joined Royal Navy; 1868, served in naval brigade in Abyssinia; 1899-1901, A.D.C. to Queen Victoria and King Edward VII; 1902-03, second-in-command Home Fleet; 1903-06, C.-in-C. East Indies; 1912, retired.

weather at that time of year made landing too dangerous.¹ Instead, a 'demonstration' and possibly a bombardment, was arranged to take place off Illig between 9 and 12 January 1904.² From the west, Manning and 1,175 men of the 1st Brigade were to advance from Bohotleh, while Egerton and the 2nd Brigade, 2,400 strong, were to advance from El Dab, joining the 1st Brigade 12 miles west of Jidballi on 9 January.³

All was therefore ready for the big attack to catch 'The Bohotle Imp' as Punch called the Sayyid⁴ and on 25 December 1903 The Times carried a stirring first leader:

'Though Christmas Day finds us fighting once again, it is at least satisfactory to reflect that the enemies with whom we are engaged are savage tribesmen, and not members of any of the great Christian communions. No just and reasonable man, however averse he may be to war, can doubt that the struggle in Somaliland... was absolutely necessary for the defence of the tribesmen whom we had pledged ourselves to protect. We can hope to win little from it, beyond the advantage of having proved once more to those who have trusted us that we are true to our word. We have undertaken it as a plain duty which we could not shirk without discredit, and our one desire must be to finish it with all the speed which is compatible with thoroughness and permanence.'⁵

1. F.O. 2/816, S.N.O. Aden tel. to C.-in-C. East Indies, 28 Dec. 1903, enclosed in C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 66, 29 Dec. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 29 Dec. 1903.
2. F.O. 2/907, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, 3 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 7 Jan. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xiv, 7, G.O.C. Somaliland Field Force to S.N.O. Aden, 6 Jan. 1904.
3. W.O. 106/236/xiii, 35, orders, 30 Dec. 1903 and Egerton tel. to Rochfort, 31 Dec. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiv, 5 & 6, journal entry for 5 Jan. 1904 and concentration order, 6 Jan. 1904.
4. Punch, 9 Dec. 1903.
5. The Times, 25 Dec. 1903, first leader.

The Sayyid was obviously about to experience a hearty measure of the Christmas spirit.

When all was ready, Egerton rejected Abdullah Shahri's peace proposals¹ and handed him back to the Italians,² while the two brigades concentrated according to plan on 9 January.³ The next morning 3,200 British, Indian, K.A.R. and Somali troops advanced to attack Jidballi. It was the largest engagement to date and the combined effect of artillery, Maxims and disciplined rifle fire was too much for the estimated 5,000 dervishes. After half an hour they broke and fled and the mounted troops pursued them for ten miles. It was a severe defeat for the Sayyid: 680 bodies were counted, but Egerton estimated that the total number killed exceeded 1,200; 215 prisoners and 366 rifles were captured. The Sayyid's main fighting force had been routed for the loss of only three British officers and 21 men.⁴ The victory vindicated both Egerton and the Government and satisfied The Times.⁵ When the king opened the new session of parliament on 2 February 1904 he was, at last, able to speak of success in Somaliland

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xiii, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 5 Jan. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/907, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 27, 9 Feb. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 9 Feb. 1904; Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 8 Africa, 10 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xiv, 12, journal entry for 5 Mar. 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 10, journal entry for 9 Jan. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 11 & 12, Egerton tels. to W.O. 10 Jan. 1904 and 13 Jan. 1904; War Office, Official History..., i, 238-244; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 186-7, Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 137-141.
 5. The Times, 12 Jan. 1904, leader.

and Lansdowne could claim that the British position was infinitely stronger than before.¹ Yet the Sayyid was still at large; he had not been at the battle and had now escaped north to the Sol Haud plateau, beyond Egerton's reach.² Earl Spencer, leader of the Liberal opposition in the House of Lords, complained all too truly that:

'... though now our arms seem to have been crowned with victory, the Mullah, or whatever he is called, like a will-of-the-wisp, flits in front of the troops, and there seems but little hope of catching or surrounding him.'³

Egerton's object after Jidballi was to catch the Sayyid if possible and to use all means to prevent his fleeing south. While he moved to Dariali with the 2nd Brigade, Manning with the 1st Brigade and mounted troops, was sent down the southern side of the Nogal in a series of forced marches to Garoe which they reached on 21 January.⁴ Leaving a strong post at Dariali the 2nd Brigade moved to Gaolo and Taleh and joined the 1st Brigade near Halin on 27 January.⁵ The two brigades then climbed to the Sol plateau and reconnoitred its southern edge.⁶ But the Sayyid and the

-
1. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxix, 2, 3, & 41-2, speeches by Edward VII and Lansdowne, 2 Feb. 1904.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 21, Egerton to Swayne, 18 Jan. 1904.
 3. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxix, 23-4, speech by Earl Spencer, 2 Feb. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 20 & 26, journal entries for 17 Jan. 1904 and 21 Jan. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 18 Jan. 1904, copy.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 24, 28 & 30, journal entries for 20 Jan. 1904, 25 Jan. 1904 and 27 Jan. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 21 Jan. 1904, copy.
 6. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 31, 32 & 37, journal entries for 28 Jan. 1904, 29 Jan. 1904 and 30 Jan. 1904.

bulk of his followers had made a disastrous crossing of the waterless Sol, losing much livestock but finding refuge in the north among the Warsangeli near Gebi. It was quite impossible for troops to follow across the Sol so Egerton decided to leave Manning and the 1st Brigade at Halin to hold the Nogal Valley, while he withdrew the 2nd Brigade to march on the Sayyid from Las Dureh.¹ The centre of operations shifted northwards and the main defensive line now stretched through El Dab and Hudun to Halin; Bohotleh was no longer important. The Tribal and Gadabursi Horse, who had not performed satisfactorily at Jidballi, were disbanded;² a moveable column of 700 men was left at El Dab and the remainder of the mounted troops and 2nd Brigade arrived back at Sheikh on 22 February. Egerton set up his headquarters at Berbera.³

British troops were now south and west of the Sayyid and it was Egerton's plan to box him in on the north and east. In the north he relied on assistance from the clans.⁴ In mid-January Swayne had built a blockhouse at Onkhor and armed 250 Habr Toljaala Musa Abokr levies under the command of Lieut.-Col. C.E. Mellis, V.C.. Mellis took the levies

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Egerton tels. to W.O., 29 Jan. 1904 and 8 Feb. 1904, both copies; W.O. 106/236/xv, 6, Egerton tel. to W.O., 3 Feb. 1904.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xv, 20 & 22, journal entries for 22 Feb. 1904 and 24 Feb. 1904; F.O. 2/874, W.O. to F.O., 16 Sept. 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xv, 11, 18 & 20, journal entries for 8 Feb. 1904, 18 Feb. 1904 and 22 Feb. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 16 Feb. 1904, copy.
 4. F.O. 2/907, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 6, 1 Feb. 1904.

35 miles inland to Dubbatad where he built a post and armed another 400 Musa Abokir clansmen.¹ From here they began raiding eastwards, seizing prisoners and stock from the Sayyid's followers around Jidali.²

Further east along the north coast were the Warsangeli, members of the Darod clan-family like the Ogaden, Dolbohanta and Mijertein. Apart from the protectorate treaty of 1886 their contact with the British was of the slightest. The Sayyid had now taken refuge in their territory. Swayne therefore visited Las Korah in January to enlist their support but their sultan was too frightened of reprisals from the Sayyid to co-operate; he wanted effective protection in return for assisting the British.³ His assistance was necessary for Egerton was planning to embark his troops at Las Korah when their operations from Las Dureh were finished.⁴ The most obvious means of protecting the Warsangeli sultan was to employ the navy whose activity had so far been limited to arms patrols, the demonstration off Obbia in November and the demonstration (without bombardment) off Illig at the time of Jidballi. Admiral Atkinson-Willes

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 25, 9 Feb. 1904; Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 66, 10 Feb. 1904. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 17 journal entry for 13 Jan. 1904.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xv, 20 & 24, journal entry for 23 Feb. 1904 and Egerton tel. to W.O., 26 Feb. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 1, 26 Feb. 1904; War Office, Official History..., ii, 419-20.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 23, journal entry for 15 Jan. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 25, 9 Feb. 1904; Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 66, 10 Feb. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 8 Feb. 1904, copy.

wanted more exciting action and had been planning an assault on Illig when the weather improved in February¹. The capture of Illig at this stage, however, seemed somewhat irrelevant², and Atkinson-Willes was persuaded that he would be more useful at Las Koreh³. Agreement was reached with the Warsangeli sultan to occupy Las Koreh for two months, during which time the people would be protected from molestation by the Sayyid⁴, and on 28 February a post of 90 men was established under the guns of a warship at anchor⁵. Their reception was not altogether friendly and petty disputes cropped up with the sultan, but with Admiral Atkinson-Willes and four warships on the coast⁶, there was little the sultan could do and he made a show, at least, of opposing the Sayyid⁷.

If the co-operation of the Warsangeli against the Sayyid was uncertain, far more so, and far more vital, was that of Osman Mahmud and his Mijertein in the north-east of the Italian protectorate. Their

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Admiralty to E.O., 16 Feb. 1904 and enclosures; C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 15, 26 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 26 Jan. 1904; C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 18, 27 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 28 Jan. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/907, D.G.M.I. to F.O., 28 Jan. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xiv, 29, Egerton tel. to W.O., 3 Feb. 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 29, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, 9 Feb. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xv, 25, journal entry for 26 Feb. 1904.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 19, journal entry for 28 Feb. 1904; War Office, Official History..., ii, 543-5, 552, 562.
 6. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 19 & 25, journal entries for 12 Mar. 1904, 16 Mar. 1904, 17 Mar. 1904 and 25 Mar. 1904.
 7. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 25, journal entry for 19 Mar. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvii, 4, intelligence report, 1 Apr. 1904.

co-operation was essential to hem the Sayyid in on the east but being Italian protégés they could not be dealt with in the same high-handed manner as the Warsangeli; the Italians would have to persuade them. Yet Italian assistance was equally uncertain. At the end of Manning's expedition they had failed to occupy Mudug but they had been quick to claim compensation for those Somalis in their protectorate who had suffered from British raids and requisitions.¹ When Egerton's expedition was being planned they asked that Britain should pay compensation for damage caused by Ethiopian troops in Italian territory.² This exasperated the British Government who felt that the Italians had just as much interest in suppressing the Sayyid and, insofar as he used Mudug as a base, almost as much responsibility for him. Balfour considered that the Italians were being unreasonable 'in view of the fact that we are in truth fighting their battles without asking them to bear any part of the cost of the campaign.'³ In fact, they withdrew their conditions and agreed to allow the Ethiopians in their territory⁴ (in the event, the Ethiopians never reached that far) but they were clearly obsessed by the fear of involving the Benadir in the fighting⁵ and wished to avoid being drawn into overt and active hostility against the Sayyid. Consequently

-
1. F.O. 2/816, Pansa to Lansdowne, 15 Dec. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/815, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 25 Africa, 11 July 1903.
 3. CAB 41/28/14, Balfour to Edward VII, 14 July 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/815, Rodd tel. to Lansdowne, no. 26 Africa, 16 July 1903;
F.O. 2/816, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 40 Africa, 19 Dec. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/816, Pansa to Sanderson, 14 Nov. 1903.

their support for Britain was lukewarm.¹

The Italians had not remained inactive, however. In October 1903 when one of their warships was greeted by rifle fire from the dervish fort at Illig it had replied with a bombardment.² In November, they had supplied Ali Yusuf of Obbia with rifles and persuaded him to occupy Mudug.³ They had also proposed supplying 800 carbines to Osman Mahmud to strengthen his resistance against the Sayyid and enable him to capture Illig.⁴ Swayne and Egerton objected to their giving more firearms to a clan which already had about 3,000 and over which the Italians exercised no control, especially as there were rumours that Osman Mahmud had patched up his quarrel with the Sayyid.⁵ Nevertheless, the Italians intended to go ahead with the arms supply⁶ when the situation suddenly altered. On 3 December an Italian armed dhow on arms patrol arrived at Durbo on the north coast of the Italian protectorate and the lieutenant in command rather tactlessly ordered the people to hoist the Italian flag. They refused,

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 4 Africa, 11 Jan. 1904, enclosing extract from Tribuna, 11 Jan. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/816, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 32 Africa, 25 Oct. 1903; Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 7 Africa, 26 Oct. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/816, S.N.O. Aden tel. to Admiralty, 26 Nov. 1903, copy; Lansdowne to Bertie, no. 164, 16 Dec. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/816, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 33 Africa, 26 Oct. 1903; S.N.O. Aden tel. to Admiralty, 29 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 30 Oct. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/816, Swayne tels. to Lansdowne, no. 55, 25 Nov. 1903 and no. 57, 3 Dec. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xii, 23, Egerton tel. to W.O., 28 Nov. 1903.
 6. W.O. 106/236/xii, 15, Egerton tel. to W.O., 5 Dec. 1903.

he opened fire and was killed. Commander Gaunt, captain of a British warship in the vicinity sailed to Durbo on 6 December and demanded satisfaction on behalf of the Italian Government. The people refused his terms, he opened fire, landed men, burnt the village and killed about 20 people; Gaunt himself was seriously wounded and one marine private killed.¹ This unauthorised action on the Italian coast displeased Their Lordships at the Admiralty, but it won thanks and a medal for Gaunt from the Italian Government.² The incident made the Italians more friendly to the British and persuaded them that it would be unwise to give Osman Mahmud any more firearms.³

Yet a British warship had attacked a Mijertein village and Egerton realised that there was urgent need to improve relations with Osman Mahmud lest he be driven into the arms of the Sayyid.⁴ At the time of Jidballi Osman Mahmud was raiding the Sayyid's followers⁵ and after the battle

1. F.O. 2/816, H.M.S. Mohawk tel. to Admiralty, 7 Dec. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 8 Dec. 1903; H.M.S. Porpoise tel. to Admiralty, 11 Dec. 1903, copy; F.O. 2/907, S.N.O. Aden to C.-in-C. East Indies, 15 Dec. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 11 Jan. 1904; C.-in-C. East Indies to Admiralty, 19 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 12 Feb. 1904; War Office, Official History..., i, 271-9.
2. F.O. 2/816, minutes by Hill and C, Hardinge (assistant under-secretary, F.O.), both n.d., on Admiralty to F.O., 12 Dec. 1903.
3. F.O. 2/816, Carignani (Italian chargé d'affaires, London) to Sanderson, 10 Dec. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 5, press report, 11 Dec. 1903.
4. F.O. 2/816, Egerton tel. to W.O., 11 Dec. 1903, enclosed in D.G.M.I. to F.O., 14 Dec. 1903.
5. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 5, 12 & 15, Egerton tel. to W.O., 5 Jan. 1904, intelligence report, 11 Jan. 1904 and Egerton tel. to W.O., 13 Jan. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 18 Jan. 1904, copy.

Swayne wrote to urge him to harrass the scattered dervishes,¹ but Egerton feared that he was not going to co-operate actively.² This impression was strengthened late in January when an Italian warship bombarded three of Osman Mahmud's villages near Cape Guardafui, seized some dhows and blockaded the coast. The Italian Government immediately disapproved of the action, lifted the blockade and recalled the ship's commander, but the damage had been done.³ Mijertein co-operation against the Sayyid was now less likely, and yet more vital, than ever.⁴

The British Government therefore fell back on an idea suggested earlier by Cordeaux that Osman Mahmud should be bribed and a figure of £5,000 was suggested to the Italians.⁵ The Italian consul-general in Aden relayed the offer to the sultan⁶ who demanded 400 rifles as well.⁷ Egerton would not agree to the rifles as he feared they would reach the

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Swayne to the sultans of the Mijertein and Warsangeli, 12 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 15, 12 Jan. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 29 Jan. 1904, copy.
 3. F.O. 2/907, S.N.O. Aden tel. to Admiralty, 30 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 30 Jan. 1904; Bertie tels. to Lansdowne, no. 3 Africa, 4 Feb. 1904 and no. 9 Africa, 10 Feb. 1904; S.N.O. Aden to C.-in-C. East Indies, 27 Jan. 1904 and 8 Feb. 1904, both enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 12 Mar. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 34, Egerton tel. to W.O., 3 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xv, 17-18, intelligence report, 17 Feb. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 8 Feb. 1904, copy.
 5. F.O. 2/815, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 34, 23 July 1903; F.O. 2/907, W.O. to F.O., 4 Feb. 1904; minutes by Hill and Lansdowne, both n.d., on Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 3 Africa, 4 Feb. 1904; Lansdowne tel. to Bertie, no. 6 Africa, 6 Feb. 1904.
 6. F.O. 2/907, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 7 Africa, 10 Feb. 1904.
 7. F.O. 2/907, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 14 Africa, 5 Mar. 1904.

Sayyid¹ and so Osman Mahmud had to be content with the money. He agreed to oppose the Sayyid and received a first instalment of £1,000²; the remainder was to be paid in instalments according to results³ and the British Government was to reimburse the Italians.⁴

Despite this arrangement there was a strong possibility that when the advance from Las Dureh began the Sayyid would retreat east into the Italian protectorate. It was therefore essential for the British to have permission to cross the border.⁵ The Italians consented, but laid down conditions⁶ that were felt to be unreasonable by the British, especially in the War Office where it was argued that a neutral power (i.e. Italy) had an obligation to prevent raids into neighbouring territory and that if it failed to do so troops from the neighbouring territory were free to pursue raiders across the border without the consent of the neutral power.⁷ These arguments were not passed on to the Italians but they were persuaded to modify their conditions and agreed to allow the force to operate in their territory on condition that it paid

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 18 Africa, 18 Mar. 1904; Egerton (acting commissioner and consul-general) tel. to Lansdowne, no. 4A, 19 Mar. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/908, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 32 Africa, 6 Apr. 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 24, journal entry for 19 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 23 Africa, 24 Mar. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/907, Army Council (W.O.) to F.O., 23 Mar. 1904.
 5. F.O. 2/907, Lansdowne tel. to Bertie, no. 13 Africa, 29 Feb. 1904.
 6. F.O. 2/907, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 13 Africa, 4 Mar. 1904.
 7. F.O. 2/907, Army Council to F.O., 10 Mar. 1904; Director of Military Operations (hereafter D.M.O.) to F.O. 25 Mar. 1904.

compensation for livestock requisitioned and that it tried to drive the Sayyid northwards.¹ The fearful prospect of having the Sayyid in the Benadir still dominated Italian thinking.²

All these arrangements for the second phase of the campaign, with the Warsangeli, Mijertein and Italians took time. So did the actual preparations for the advance from Las Dureh such as the laying of telegraph lines and the raising of a new 'Tribal Horse', a mounted levy of 100 men acquainted with the north-east.³ All was not ready until 8 March.⁴ The delay began to cause restiveness in parliament, especially as the Government asked for a supplementary grant of £1,600,000 to pay for Somaliland operations up to the end of March 1904, a sum in addition to the £250,000 voted at the start of the financial year. They attracted further criticism by including no figure for the Somaliland campaign in the 1904-05 army estimates on the grounds that it was impossible to estimate although they announced that they would have to bring forward a supplementary estimate when the cost was finally known.⁵ Both votes were

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Lansdowne tel. to Bertie, no. 14 Africa, 11 Mar. 1904; Bertie tels. to Lansdowne, no. 19 Africa, 22 Mar. 1904 and no. 20, Africa, 24 Mar. 1904; W.O. tel. to Egerton, no. 802, 31 Mar. 1904, copy.
 2. F.O. 2/907, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 21 Africa, 24 Mar. 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xv, 22 & 26, journal entries for 24 Feb. 1904 and 28 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvi, 5, Field Force Order, 1 Mar. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 25 Feb. 1904, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 29 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvi, 13, journal entry for 8 Mar. 1904.
 5. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxx, 578-581 & 1486, speeches by H.O. Arnold-Forster (secretary of state for war) and Campbell-Bannerman, 22 Feb. 1904, answer by Arnold-Forster, 2 Mar. 1904; ibid., cxxxi, 346-7, speech by Arnold-Forster, 7 Mar. 1904.

passed¹ but not without opposition.

Campbell-Bannerman and his Liberals did little more than call for an end to the war and remind the Government that, before Egerton's expedition began, they had been told there was no intention of undertaking further campaigns at fresh expense.² Criticism of the war on moral grounds came from the more radical members. Labouchere argued that

'Whenever we quarrelled with any of these tribes we, in order to bring to them the blessings of Christianity, sent out an expedition to burn down their houses, and to destroy all we possibly could; and then, having mowed down the natives with our machine guns, we thanked God we were superior to them.'

He had no idea 'why they were at war with this respectable prophet, who was a brave man struggling to be free and maintaining the independence of his country.' John Burns, a veteran opponent of the campaigns, 'contended that the Mullah had the right, as a religious zealot and a tribal chief, to exercise what rights he thought he had and to contend for them....' and he 'protested against the wicked expenditure of money on wanton expeditions.'³

Arnold-Forster,⁴ the new secretary of state for war, had to defend the

-
1. Ibid., cxxx, 1054; voting result, 25 Feb. 1904; ibid., cxxxi, voting result, 10 Mar. 1904; ibid., cxxxii, 410, voting result, 22 Mar. 1904.
 2. Ibid., cxxx, 581, 1033-1054, speeches by Campbell-Bannerman, 22 Feb. 1904, Courtenay Warner and Bryce, both 25 Feb. 1904.
 3. Ibid., cxxx, 1033-1054, speeches by Labouchere and Burns, 25 Feb. 1904; ibid., cxxxi, 803, speech by Labouchere, 10 Mar. 1904.
 4. Arnold-Forster, Rt. Hon. Hugh Oakeley, M.P., 1855-1909; 1880-82, private secretary to W.E. Forster (chief secretary for Ireland); 1886, joined Liberal Unionists; 1892-1906, M.P. for West Belfast; 1900-03, secretary of the Admiralty; 1903-1905, secretary of state for war; 1906, M.P. for Croydon.

costly prolongation of the operations. His arguments were not new. He justified the campaigns as being in self-defence and in defence of clans to whom they were pledged by treaty; he claimed that the Sayyid was the aggressor and that therefore, 'If a war for the protection of life and property was justifiable, the question of cost ought not to decide whether it should be undertaken or not.' It was one of the inevitable burdens of empire, 'It was obvious ... that there was no glory or profit in the campaign.' but they could not stop until 'they had made it reasonably probable that further raids upon our territory would not occur.' Nevertheless, he was cautiously optimistic for he believed that Egerton's campaign might bring the war to an end and he assured the House that

'If an opportunity be given, consistent with the safety of those who depend upon us, of winding up this campaign, I, at any rate, as responsible for the War Office - and in this matter I speak on behalf of the Government - shall avail myself of the opportunity.'¹

His argument that the campaigns had been undertaken to defend the clans under British protection was rather spoilt by C.T. Ritchie, chancellor of the exchequer from July 1902 until Balfour had dismissed him in September 1903.² Ritchie recalled that a large number of Somalis in the protectorate were supporters of the Sayyid, and that the Government's

-
1. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxx, 578-9, 619-20, 1033-1054, speeches by Arnold-Forster, 22 Feb. 1904 and 25 Feb. 1904; ibid., cxxxi, 346-7, speech by Arnold-Forster, 7 Mar. 1904.
 2. R.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (Oxford, 1936), p. 374, footnote 1.

original intention had been to deliver a short, sharp blow at the Sayyid and then retire; instead they had been drawn on into huge operations.¹ Also, doubtless because he was Unionist M.P. for West Belfast, Arnold-Forster attracted criticism from the Irish nationalists, especially from William Redmond, brother of their leader John Redmond. They complained that while Ireland was denied money for development the Irish were being heavily taxed to finance a war for which they had absolutely no sympathy: 'From the Irish point of view expenditure of this kind was simply and absolutely intolerable.' 'It was an unfair, an unjust, and a monstrous thing that Ireland should be directly or indirectly charged a single shilling for this expedition.' Their sympathies lay with the Sayyid, who was simply a religious enthusiast: 'There were religious zealots in this House but they did not spend any money in pursuing them.' 'It was an outrage, a scandal, and a piece of diabolical injustice....' Millions were being spent on a madcap venture for which there would be no return, and as the closure was moved in the middle of one of Redmond's impassioned attacks he cried: '... I will make the Government pay for this over and over again.'² Even though such criticism came from radicals and Irishmen, the Government, weakened by the dispute over Tariff Reform and Free Trade, could not lightly ignore it.

-
1. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxx, 1033-1054, speech by Ritchie, 25 Feb. 1904.
 2. Ibid., cxxx, 1033-1054, speeches by C. Devlin, J. Devlin and W. Redmond, 25 Feb. 1904; ibid., cxxxi, 517-9, 780-6, 797-800, speech by Redmond, 8 Mar. 1904, and speeches by Redmond and O'Mara, 10 Mar. 1904.

Before Egerton advanced on the second phase of his campaign an important change occurred in the administration of the protectorate. By July 1903 Swayne had recovered from his illness and was sent back to Somaliland to lay the foundations for a more normal administration once the operations were over. He was commissioner and consul-general, but this time he had no military functions, Egerton was the military commander.¹ Egerton relied on regulars, Swayne was the advocate of an irregular Somali levy. He did not believe that Egerton's thousands of regulars would achieve anything more than he and his levies in the first two expeditions² and he complained that despite the masses of troops in the country the friendly clans were still subject to serious raids from the dervishes and the Ogaden.

'Whilst the troops have been here during the last 6 months the tribes have been raided 8 times and even small children have been stabbed - the misery has been wholesale and the people are hopeless of regular troops being able to protect them against raids.'

he wrote to Hill. He had his own ideas as to how the operations should be conducted, and they differed from Egerton's.³

Moreover, Swayne and Egerton differed in their attitudes towards the Somalis. Swayne knew them well, sympathised with them and wished to

-
1. F.O. 2/757, memo. by Hill, 22 July 1903; Lansdowne to Swayne, 31 July 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/816, Swayne to Hill, 10 Sept. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/816, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 47, 19 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 25, 9 Feb. 1904; Swayne to Hill, 10 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xv, 16, Swayne to Egerton, 14 Feb. 1904.

protect them. Egerton saw them through a soldier's eyes: he had no respect for them as troops¹ and insofar as their interests clashed with those of his own men he considered them to be a nuisance. Swayne believed that the Somalis had neither liking nor respect for Indian troops and forecast friction between them.² He claimed that the best Somalis were refusing to join Egerton's force because they knew that the soldiers had no respect for them, and when he raised the Musa Abokir levy in the north he told Egerton that he had had to assure the men that 'they would have nothing to do with the military.'³ In particular, Swayne feared that friction would arise at the wells and he made arrangements with Egerton to separate military and civil wells to avoid 'the possibility of disaster'. Egerton thought that Swayne was under 'a delusion that the troops are seeking an opportunity to open fire on the tribesmen....'⁴ and when just such an incident did occur, and 2 Somalis were shot at a well, Swayne told Egerton that 'an order justifying a sentry in firing on our protected people, who are driven by want of water to drink at the nearest well, is unjustifiable.'⁵ Swayne was distressed by the effect

-
1. F.O. 2/874, report by Egerton, n.d., attached to W.O. to F.O., 16 Sept. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/816, Swayne to Hill, 10 Sept. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xi, 23, Swayne tel. to F.O., no. 48, 20 Oct. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/872, Swayne tel. to Egerton, 31 Jan. 1904, quoted in memo. by Hill, 27 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Hill, 10 Feb. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/872, Swayne to Egerton, 20 Oct. 1903 and Egerton to W.O., ? 5 Mar. 1904, both quoted in memo. by Hill, 27 Mar. 1904.
 5. F.O. 2/869; Swayne to Egerton, no. 220, 5 Mar. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 36, 5 Mar. 1904.

of over three years military operations in Somaliland. He claimed that half the Dolbohanta had already been killed and that the process was continuing, that the protectorate's livestock had been seriously diminished and would take years to recover, that the numbers of destitute were increasing and that 'the country has got to the end of its tether'.¹

Relations between Swayne and Egerton broke down and they began to disagree.² Egerton took advantage of the fact that Swayne was only a lieutenant-colonel and sent him rebukes such as:

'I do not consider the tone adopted in your telegrams to me ... is calculated to promote harmonious working relations between the Civil Administration and the Field Force.... Unless there is a marked difference in the tone you may choose to adopt in future correspondence, I shall regretfully be compelled to bring the matter to the notice of His Majesty's Government.'³

It was a strange way to address the commissioner and consul-general and Swayne reacted by being critical of the conduct and result of the operations. He infuriated Egerton by minimising the effect of Jidballi, claiming that the Somalis did not believe the Sayyid's best men had been in the battle. Egerton complained that since the battle Swayne 'has consistently endeavoured to disparage and discount its importance, and to belittle the results obtained by the troops under my command.... in

-
1. F.O. 2/816, Swayne to Hill, 10 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 25, 9 Feb. 1904; Swayne to Hill, 10 Feb. 1904.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xii, 25, Egerton to W.O., 21 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 29, 13 Feb. 1904, and enclosures.
 3. F.O. 2/872, Egerton to Swayne, 8 Feb. 1904, quoted in memo. by Hill, 27 Mar. 1904.

this respect I consider him to have been indirectly disloyal.¹ Finally on 26 February 1904 Egerton appealed to the War Office:

'Instead of the loyal co-operation I have a right to expect..., I have repeatedly received incoherent and hysterical complaints against the actions of my officers or of offences committed against civilians which though characterized as involving disaster or breach of faith usually turn out to be of a trivial nature.

His correspondence with my subordinate commanders is most insulting in tone People in military employment have been arrested tried and sentenced without reference to military authorities....

My own opinion is that he is in a nervous, excitable, and hysterical state and is not responsible for his actions.... This is also the opinion of General Manning....

...his attitude towards men and members of the force generally has produced a situation which, besides being the subject of general comment, hampers my operations and accentuates the antipathy which is traditional between Somalis and the nationalities of India or Arabia.'

Egerton also wrote: 'I do not consider that he is mentally in a fit state to deal with the situation that exists.'² At the War Office the newly-created Army Council asked for Swayne to be superseded. The Foreign Office recalled him on the pretext that he was needed in London to advise on the future administration of Somaliland³ but they decided to see whether there was any substance in Egerton's charges.⁴ On 8 March, Egerton became the new acting commissioner and consul-general although he

-
1. F.O. 2/872, Egerton to W.O., ? 5 Mar. 1904, quoted in memo. by Hill, 27 Mar. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/872, Egerton tel. to W.O., 26 Feb. 1904; enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xv, 24, F.O. tel. to Swayne, no. 10, 1 Mar. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xv, 24, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 4 Mar. 1904.

deputed Cordeaux, the sub-commissioner, to deal with the civil administration on his behalf.¹

On the same day, preparations for the second phase of the campaign were completed. Egerton's total force numbered over 7,700 troops and 10,900 followers at this time.² Of these, over 1,000 K.A.R. and Somali Mounted Infantry were in the Nogal with Manning; Fasken had 1,830 British and Indian troops waiting at Las Dureh, and the El Dab mobile column numbered 714.³ The Sayyid and his haroun (his family, personal livestock and headquarters) were reported to be at Jidali which lay 150 miles east of Las Dureh via El Afweina.⁴ Intelligence sources listed his fighting men as 10,940 Dolbohanta, 1,270 Mijertein, 860 Ogaden and 430 others, making a grand total of 13,500.⁵ Egerton had issued terms to the Sayyid, offering to stop the advance if he surrendered with 1,400 good rifles and the 2 Maxims he had captured in previous expeditions; the Sayyid was promised his life, but had he surrendered he would almost certainly have been deported. In fact, the offer probably never reached

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xv, 24, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 29 Feb. 1904; Egerton tel. to W.O., 5 Mar. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvi, 13, journal entry for 8 Mar. 1904.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 4, strength return, 1 Mar. 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xv, 22, journal entry for 25 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvi, 15, journal entries for 9 Mar. 1904 and 10 Mar. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 10, Egerton tel. to W.O., 5 Mar. 1904.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xiv, 24, intelligence report, 20 Jan. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvi, 6, journal entry for 3 Mar. 1904.

him; he sent no reply.¹ Similarly, amnesty terms sent to the Dolbohanta, offering them peace if they laid down their arms, seem to have met with little response.² Egerton therefore decided to advance in a final effort to dispose of the Sayyid before the April rains gave him an opportunity to escape.³

On 9 March Fasken's force left Las Dureh and the mobile column left El Dab⁴ and they met at El Afweina on 16 March.⁵ Mellis and the Musa Abokr levies were already operating in this area and as the troops moved on north-eastwards the Sayyid and his haroun began to fall back east of Jidali. On 19 March Kenna's mounted troops clashed with a dervish party at Megedu, killing fifty, and on 22 March the force reached Jidali. The Sayyid, however, and 700 of his riflemen were reported to be retreating to Buran more than 80 miles south-east.⁶ Fasken kept up the chase, reaching Bihen on 25 March, and from here the mounted troops followed the tracks of the haroun to the Buran area where they killed 30 or 40 dervishes. It was plain that the Sayyid had been fleeing in disarray for the troops

-
1. F.O. 2/907, W.O. to F.O., 4 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xv, 4, journal entry for 20 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvi, 38, Egerton tel. to W.O., 7 Apr. 1904.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 14 & 18, journal entries for 10 Mar. 1904 and 12 Mar. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 15 Mar. 1904, quoted in Cabinet print prepared at F.O., 2 Mar 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 15, journal entry for 9 Mar. 1904.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 20, journal entry for 15 Mar. 1904.
 6. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 19, 21, 22 & 24, journal entries for 14 Mar. 1904, 16 Mar. 1904, 17 Mar. 1904 and 19 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 25 Mar. 1904, copy.

found innumerable scattered water carriers, many dead or dying camels and the bodies of men, women and children, dead of exhaustion or starvation.¹ But the troops had also lost large numbers of transport animals and on 29 March the pursuit had to be called off; in any case Egerton had not yet received permission to send his men across the border into Italian territory. The dervishes had been thoroughly scattered and broken up, many were deserting, and the Sayyid himself, with a remnant of 600 riflemen, prevented from entering the Nogal by Manning's brigade, seemed to be making for Illig.² Egerton telegraphed to London:

'As militant power Mullah now may be considered as having been stamped out or at any rate for a long time to come whether he actually falls into our hands or not.'³

At the beginning of April Fasken and the infantry of the 2nd Brigade were withdrawn to Las Koreh ready to embark for Berbera before the monsoon set in. Egerton now had little choice but to end his campaign for his transport was so weakened by hard marching and poor grazing that he would soon be unable to supply or support either brigade, and once the rains broke the camel transport would be quite unable to operate.⁴ Nevertheless,

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 36 & 37, journal entries for 25 Mar. 1904 and 27 Mar. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvii, 4, journal entry for 29 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 8 Apr. 1904, copy.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 30 & 37, journal entry for 28 Mar. 1904 and Egerton tel. to W.O., 31 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to Lansdowne, no. 6, 29 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 3 Apr. 1904, copy.
 3. F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 31 Mar. 1904, copy.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 32 & 33, Egerton tels. to W.O., 5 Apr. 1904, 9 Apr. 1904 and 11 Apr. 1904.

as the Sayyid was still at large Egerton took the risk of prolonging his operations. In the Nogal, the 1st Brigade, on half-rations, were ordered to hold on as long as possible.¹ In the north-east, the mounted troops under Kenna were sent to Badan to co-operate in any offensive measures Osman Mahmud might take.²

The Mijertein were so tardy and half-hearted, however, that Egerton believed they were giving the Sayyid asylum. He was in desperate straits, a discredited refugee, at Osman Mahmud's mercy, and yet he was able to stop and recover, unmolested, at Bilbilo in the Darror Valley.³ After a visit from the Italian consul-general at Aden, who took £1,000 of British money,⁴ Osman Mahmud claimed that he was sending men against the Sayyid, but Egerton was sceptical and felt that it was three weeks too late anyway.⁵ On 10 April Admiral Atkinson-Willes sailed to Bargal to see Osman Mahmud but he came away convinced that the sultan's promises of co-operation were insincere; he expected no more than a few raids

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 8 & 17, journal entry for 8 Apr. 1904 and medical report, 12 Apr. 1904.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 10, H.Q. staff diary, entry for 11 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 13 Apr. 1904, copy.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 32 & 35, Egerton tels. to W.O., 5 Apr. 1904 and 9 Apr. 1904; C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, 4 Apr. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvii, 4, intelligence report, 1 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 3 Apr. 1904, copy.
 4. F.O. 2/908, Bertie tels. to Lansdowne, no. 32 Africa, 6 Apr. 1904 and no. 33 Africa, 8 Apr. 1904; Pansa to Lansdowne, 25 Apr. 1904.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 32, Egerton tel. to W.O., 9 Apr. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvii, 12, Egerton tel. to W.O., 12 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/908, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 61, 10 Apr. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 10 Apr. 1904; Egerton tel. to W.O., 13 Apr. 1904.

against the Sayyid.¹ By mid-April, however, these raids were forcing the Sayyid to move south from the Darror Valley across the Sol in the direction of Illig.² He kept to the Italian side of the border and thus avoided Kenna who was raiding deep into the Sol on the British side.

Egerton had already given up all hope of effective Mijertein co-operation and recommended the withdrawal of all his troops before the rains. He claimed that the Sayyid had been decisively beaten at Jidballi and driven out of the protectorate with his followers scattered: 'They have received a lesson that should teach them to avoid collision with us in future.' he reported, and as 'There is now no enemy in arms against our authority in the Protectorate' he advised ending the campaign and offering the Sayyid safe conduct to Mecca.³ The Government agreed to his proposals⁴ and on 18 April Arnold-Forster announced in the House of Commons:

'The Mullah has, we believe, escaped into Italian territory. He has sustained very severe losses in men and animals. The force under his command has been routed and driven out of the Protectorate, and he is now practically without a following.

-
1. F.O. 2/908, C.-in-C. East Indies to Admiralty, 13 Apr. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 29 Apr. 1904; C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 64, 14 Apr. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 14 Apr. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 19 Apr. 1904, copy; Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 41 Africa, 24 Apr. 1904; D.M.O. to F.O., 12 May 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 12, Egerton tel. to W.O., 12 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/908. Egerton tel. to Lansdowne, no. 8, 16 Apr. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 13, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 15 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/908, Lansdowne tel. to Egerton, no. 25, 19 Apr. 1904.

In view of these circumstances it has been decided to discontinue the military operations, and to reduce the field force.¹

and Lansdowne wrote to Cromer:

'We shall have to wind up our Somaliland operations I fear without catching the Mullah, but we have, I hope, pretty well discredited him.'²

Overtaken by the rains and hampered by mud Kenna withdrew to Las Koreh. His force had only captured a small amount of dervish livestock. By 14 May they were back in Berbera³ and towards the end of the month the garrison was withdrawn from Las Koreh.⁴ The 1st Brigade was also withdrawn. Since early February they had been isolated on the northern edge of the Nogal, based at Halin, Tagabei and Damodleh. In February and March they had been busy raiding dervish stock left behind in the Nogal, on the southern Sol and in Italian territory. By 12 March they had captured over 10,600 sheep, 7,700 camels and killed over 180 men; dervish power in the Nogal was practically ended.⁵ In April they received orders to stay in the Nogal as long as possible⁶ and thereafter they saw very

-
1. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxxiii, 370-72, answer by Arnold-Forster, 18 Apr. 1904.
 2. F.O. 800/124 (Lansdowne Papers), Lansdowne to Cromer, 18 Apr. 1904.
 3. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 25, journal entry for 20 Apr. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xviii, 5 & 23, journal entries for 29 Apr. 1904, 30 Apr. 1904 and 14 May 1904; F.O. 2/908, Egerton tels. to W.O., 3 May 1904 and 9 May 1904, both copies.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xviii, 31, journal entry for 23 May 1904.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xv, 6, 19 & 25, Egerton tel. to W.O., 3 Feb. 1904 and journal entries for 21 Feb. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xvi, 15, 17-18 & 24, journal entries for 9 Mar. 1904 and 12 Mar. 1904, orders, 20 Mar. 1904.
 6. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 23, extract from H.Q. staff diary, 18 Apr. 1904.

little action. The indications were that the Sayyid's principal Dolbohanta followers, the Aligheri, had trekked south-east towards Illig, leaving their route strewn with bodies. Early in May the 1st Brigade found traces of the Sayyid's flight through Italian territory to Illig, but they saw no dervishes.¹ Nevertheless, their presence almost certainly prevented the Sayyid from taking refuge in the Nogal once again. The conditions under which they held out were far from easy: they were on half-rations; their transport animals had suffered so severely that by May only 80 of their 300 Mounted Infantry were actually mounted, and they on crocks. The K.A.R. reached the limit of their endurance.² In mid-April Manning had to be invalided to Britain with a severe attack of remittent fever and command of the brigade passed to Lieut.-Col. Cobbe.³ Finally, on 9 May, while Kenna was withdrawing in the north-east, the 1st Brigade evacuated Halin. Leaving their 300 Somali Mounted Infantry to form a mobile column at El Dab they reached Berbera on 30 May.⁴ Egerton, in his final despatch, paid them high tribute: 'I consider the steadfastness of the 1st Brigade, consisting entirely of King's African Rifles troops, under these trying circumstances was worthy of all praise.'⁵

1. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 10 & 19, extract from H.Q. staff diary, 18 Apr. 1904 and journal entry for 14 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/908, Egerton tels. to W.O., 19 Apr. 1904, 26 Apr. 1904, 3 May 1904 and 9 May 1904, all copies.
2. F.O. 2/908, Maj. M.L. Hornby (5 K.A.R.) to Hill, 4 May 1904; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 188.
3. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 24, Egerton tel. to W.O., 19 Apr. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xviii, 24, journal entry for 17 May 1904.
4. W.O. 106/236/xviii, 11, 25 & 33, journal entries for 9 May 1904, 18 May 1904 and 30 May 1904.
5. F.O. 2/908, Egerton to Army Council, 30 May 1904, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 5 July 1904.

The Sayyid was reported to be making for Illig, but Illig was no longer his; while the final phase of the campaign had been taking place in the north-east a separate force had captured Illig. As soon as the Sayyid had been chased over the border at the end of March Egerton recommended its capture, for it was a useful refuge and convenient for the import of arms.¹ Lansdowne agreed, for 'Even if the place is not subsequently held the harder we can hit the Mullah now the better.'² Admiral Atkinson-Willes was only too willing to carry out the operation³ and the Italians agreed to assist from the sea although they were not prepared to occupy Illig after its capture.⁴ Egerton intended that Osman Mahmud's Mijertein should garrison it against the Sayyid.⁵

Atkinson-Willes, accompanied by an Italian ship, took three British warships to Illig and at dawn on 21 April 745 men, mostly sailors, from the British ships stormed the dervish fort. The 200 Dolbohanta defenders put up a determined fight and 56 were killed before the fort was captured for the loss of 3 British seamen. The Italian and British flags were run up and a temporary garrison of 125 men of the Hampshire Regiment

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Egerton tel. to W.O., 31 Mar. 1904, copy.
 2. F.O. 2/908, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Egerton tel. to W.O., 3 Apr. 1904, copy.
 3. F.O. 2/908, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 60, 9 Apr. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 9 Apr. 1904; C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 61, 10 Apr. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 10 Apr. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/908, Bertie tels. to Lansdowne, no. 35 Africa, 9 Apr. 1904 and no. 36 Africa, 12 Apr. 1904.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 32, Egerton tel. to W.O., 9 Apr. 1904.

occupied the fort.¹ The fortifications were then demolished (the commander of the Italian warship probably exceeded his instructions by sending men to assist in this) and after five days the British troops were withdrawn, the flags were hauled down and the site abandoned. Osman Mahmud refused to take over Illig; so did Ali Yusuf, but he ordered one of his sub-clans to do so.² The Sayyid was therefore unable to take refuge in Illig and The Times welcomed the news of 'a useful little operation, which ought to shorten the tether of that elusive potentate, the MULLAH.'³ But in less than five months the dervishes had reoccupied Illig and the Sayyid once again had a port for importing arms.⁴

The ability to obtain firearms had all along been one of the Sayyid's strongest advantages. The standard method of stopping the supply was by naval patrols along the Somali coastline and in 1902 the Italians had agreed to co-operate in these patrols.⁵ Initially they were successful and by March 1903 there were reports that gun-running on the British coast was practically at an end.⁶ But the Admiralty were hard

1. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 27, journal entries for 20 Apr. 1904 and 21 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 26 Apr. 1904, copy; C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 66, 27 Apr. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 27 Apr. 1904; War Office, Official History..., i, 265, 279-304; Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 148-152; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 189.
2. F.O. 2/908, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 67, 30 Apr. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 30 Apr. 1904; C.-in-C. East Indies to Admiralty, 1 May 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 20 May 1904; Egerton tel. to W.O., 3 May 1904, copy.
3. The Times, 28 Apr. 1904, leader.
4. F.O. 2/909, minute by Swayne, 15 Sept. 1904, on intelligence diary enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 8 Oct. 1904.
5. See above, pp. 334-5.
6. The Times, 30 Mar. 1903.

pressed to spare the ships for this work and the patrols became less frequent; the Italian patrols also slackened off.¹ Intelligence sources indicated that arms were still getting through, often landed from small boats on lonely beaches; in March 1904 it was estimated that the Mijertein had 3,460 rifles apart from those issued by the Italian Government, that the Dolbohanta had 1,400 and the Warsangeli 350.² There were also reports that a British firm, E.W. Carling, was supplying arms to the Sayyid through Djibouti.³ Carling strongly denied the charges,⁴ which were impossible to prove, but the possibility that they were true led Punch to remark: 'This is satisfactory. Great Britain may at least claim credit for the successes of the MULLAH.'⁵

There was no doubt that Djibouti was the main source of supply for the arms reaching Somaliland. Suggestions that the Sayyid obtained arms

1. F.O. 2/815, F.O. to Admiralty, 16 June 1903; F.O. 2/816, Swayne to Hill, 10 Sept. 1903; Swayne to S.N.O. Aden, 7 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 112, 7 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/969, F.O. to Admiralty, 26 Sept. 1903; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 106, 26 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/970, F.O. to Admiralty, 18 May 1904; W.O. 106/236/x, 37 & 38, Admiralty to W.O., 30 Sept. 1903, W.O. to Admiralty, 2 Oct. 1903.
2. W.O. 106/236/viii, 49, S.N.O. Aden to Admiralty, 23 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiv, 8, intelligence report, 7 Jan. 1904; F.O. 2/816, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 55, 25 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/809, Egerton to W.O., 22 Mar. 1904, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 14 Apr. 1904.
3. F.O. 2/969, extract from The Times, 1 Sept. 1903 and minute by Crowe, 18 Sept. 1903 on separate minute by Sanderson, 18 Sept. 1903; Aden resident to D.G.M.I., 10 Sept. 1903, enclosed in I.D.W.O. to F.O., 29 Sept. 1903; The Times, 4 Sept. 1903, letter from Sir F. Carne Rasch, M.P.
4. F.O. 2/970, E.W. Carling & Co. to Harrington, 1 Oct. 1903.
5. Punch, 9 Sept. 1903.

from Zanzibar and East Africa were discounted¹ but there was no denying that thousands of rifles and tons of ammunition were being shipped to Djibouti² and that dhows were continually leaving Djibouti 'in many cases loaded up to the gunwale with arms and ammunition.'³ The French Government formally denied that they were conniving at the supply of arms to the Sayyid⁴ and claimed that they were complying with the Brussels Act. They said that although they could not prevent arms being shipped to the Arabian coast they did stop dhows if they suspected that they were going to smuggle arms back to Africa.⁵ There were reports that the French authorities were genuinely trying to stop the illicit trade, and Sir Clement Hill, who had visited Djibouti, believed them.⁶ On the other hand, British officials in Aden believed that Frenchmen themselves were actively involved in gun-running⁷ while Cordeaux expressed the wish to see Djibouti levelled to the ground.⁸

-
1. F.O. 2/969, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, 18 July 1903; B. Cave (British agent and consul-general, Zanzibar) tel. to Lansdowne, no. 14, 29 July 1903; F.O. 2/815, Cave to Lansdowne, no. 64, 14 Aug. 1903, enclosing Cordeaux tel. to Cave, 7 Aug. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/969, Lansdowne to Monson, no. 29 Africa, 22 Jan. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/812, report on Djibouti by commander of H.M.S. Dryad, 22 Aug. 1902, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 31 Oct. 1902; Malcolm Jones (vice-consul, Zeila) to Swayne, 2 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 121, 14 Oct. 1903.
 4. The Times, 5 Feb. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/677, memo. by Hill, n.d., ? 17 Apr. 1902; F.O. 2/678, Lansdowne to Currie, no. 42 Africa, 11 June 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/678, S.N.O. Aden to Aden resident, 4 Oct. 1902, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 19 Nov. 1902; minute by Hill, n.d., on I.O. to F.O., 12 Nov. 1902.
 7. W.O. 106/236/vii, 34, Viceroy tel. to I.O., 22 June 1903.
 8. F.O. 2/678, Cordeaux to Hill, 10 Dec. 1902.

There were many views as to the route by which arms reached the Sayyid. In late 1902 Cordeaux suggested that preventive measures at sea were forcing the traffic to develop a new route overland from Djibouti through the Ogaden.¹ The French Government positively denied it² but the Italians, ever eager to prove that no arms entered Somaliland through the coast of their protectorate, claimed that Harar and Djibouti were the main distribution centres.³ The Aden authorities agreed with the Italians, no doubt because they wished to discount the possibility that arms came from their territory.⁴ Swayne however, was convinced that very few arms entered Somaliland direct from Djibouti and Harar and that nearly all of them came via the Arabian coast.⁵ If this was so, at least the British could exercise some control on the coast of Aden and its protectorate; unfortunately, in the Aden protectorate the British authorities had to work through sheikhs who were themselves interested in the arms trade. Nevertheless, warnings were issued to the sheiks and chiefs and regulations were passed to limit the trade.⁶ Cordeaux believed that

-
1. Idem.
 2. F.O. 2/969, Lansdowne to Monson, no. 48, 18 Feb. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/969, minute by Cranborne, n.d., on Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 55, 13 May 1903; note verbale, from Italian ambassador to F.O., 9 July 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/969, Aden resident to D.C.M.I., 10 Sept. 1903, enclosed in I.D.W.O. to F.O., 29 Sept. 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/970, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 123, 21 Oct. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/677, memo. by Cranborne, 22 Apr. 1902; F.O. 2/678, I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 1 May 1902, enclosed in I.O. to F.O.; 3 May 1902; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 8 May 1902, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 13 May 1902; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 15 May 1902, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 17 May 1902; regulation signed by Lord Curzon (Viceroy and Governor-General of India), 3 Oct. 1902 (copy).

Mukalla was probably the leading entrepôt in the Aden protectorate for supplies for the Sayyid¹ but neither the naval authorities nor the Aden resident believed this² and in fact, in March 1904, the sultan of Mukalla actually detained a Somali gun-running dhow and handed it over to the British.³ The Aden authorities had also seized supplies of arms and ammunition bound for the Somali Coast on Socotra⁴ and at Shaikh 'Uthman just outside Aden.⁵ On the Omani coast, Major Cox, the British consul at Muscat, who had served on the Somali Coast in the 1890's, persuaded the sultan of Muscat to prohibit the export of arms and ammunition to the Somali protectorates.⁶

Cordeaux was confident that measures taken on the coast of British Somaliland prevented any arms from being landed there; he was sure that most of them were imported through Bosaso in the Italian protectorate.⁷ The Italians repeatedly denied this and asserted that no arms entered

-
1. F.O. 2/814, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 10, 18 Mar. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/969, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, 31 Mar. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 1 Apr. 1903; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 18 Apr. 1903, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 29 Apr. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/970, I.O. to F.O., 19 Oct. 1904 and enclosures.
 4. F.O. 2/969, Aden resident to Govt. of Bombay, 12 May 1903, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 29 July 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/969, Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, 11 July 1903, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 20 Aug. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/970, I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 9 Oct. 1903, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 10 Oct. 1903; Maj. P.Z. Cox to Govt. of India, 20 Oct. 1903, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 27 Jan. 1904.
 7. F.O. 2/814, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 10, 18 Mar. 1903; F.O. 2/969, minute by Hill, n.d., on Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 55, 13 May 1903; F.O. 2/815, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 23, 18 June 1903; W.O. 106/236/vi, 19, Cordeaux to Hill, 14 May 1903.

through their ports;¹ but the weight of opinion seems to have been against them. British intelligence officers, Manning, Swayne, The Times, all believed that arms came through the Italian protectorate.² Even Abdullah Shahri, the Sayyid's gun-runner, who had been sent to negotiate with Egerton by the Italians and who was assumed to be serving their purposes, admitted that arms were always landed on the Mijertein coast.³ The Italians had agreed to co-operate in suppressing the trade⁴ but in the opinion of Swayne and Cordeaux their efforts were negligible, despite frequent British urgings.⁵ There was one case of active Italian co-operation but it achieved nothing. News was received that a large quantity of ammunition for the Sayyid had been stored at Bereḍa near Cape Guardafui.⁶ At British instigation, and somewhat to British surprise, the

1. F.O. 2/969, memo. from Italian minister for foreign affairs, 24 Apr. 1903, enclosed in Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 46, 26 Apr. 1903; note verbale, from Italian ambassador to F.O., 9 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/vii, 16, Italian minister for foreign affairs to Bertie, 24 June 1903.
2. The Times, 29 Jan. 1903, leader; F.O. 2/814, intelligence report, 24 Feb. 1903, enclosed in D.G.M.I. to F.O., 26 Mar. 1903; W.O. 106/236/vii, 41, Manning tel. to W.O., 26 June 1903; F.O. 2/816, Swayne to S.N.O. Aden, 7 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 112, 7 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/970, intelligence report, 29 Sept. 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 18 Oct. 1904.
3. F.O. 2/872, S.N.O. Aden to C.-in-C. East Indies, no. 47, 26 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 12 Mar. 1904.
4. F.O. 2/677, Italian minister for foreign affairs to Currie, 23 Apr. 1902, enclosed in Currie to Lansdowne, no. 7 Africa, 26 Apr. 1902.
5. F.O. 2/969, Lansdowne to Bertie, no. 34 Africa, 27 Mar. 1903; F.O. 2/815, Swayne to Cranborne, 27 Apr. 1903; W.O. 106/236/vi, 19, Cordeaux to Hill, 14 May 1903; W.O. 106/236/vii, 14, Cordeaux to S.N.O. Aden, 13 June 1903.
6. F.O. 2/815, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 23, 18 June 1903 and minute thereon by Cranborne, 20 June 1903.

Italians agreed to joint naval action to destroy this ammunition;¹ but they insisted that the landing parties were not to go inland beyond range of the ships' guns.² Three British warships and one Italian reached Bereda on 27 June 1903; they landed men but no arms were found. It was assumed that they had been moved inland out of reach of the landing parties.³

One of the measures recommended to the Italians by the British who were implementing it on their coast, was that customs officers should be placed at the principal ports while armed dhows patrolled the coastline.⁴ By September 1902 the Italians had promised to provide armed dhows⁵ and they planned to use boats captured from Red Sea pirates.⁶ Twelve months later, however, they had still not fulfilled their promise despite a British reminder.⁷ Their warships seldom visited the coast⁸ and although

-
1. F.O. 2/815, Lansdowne tel. to Bertie, no. 32 Africa, 21 June 1903; Bertie tels. to Lansdowne, nos. 22 Africa and 23 Africa, both 21 June 1903; P.R.O., the private papers of Sir Francis Bertie, A Series, vol. xv (F.O. 800/173), It/03/17, Bertie to Lansdowne, private, 22 June 1903.
 2. F.O. 800/132, Bertie to Lansdowne, private, 24 June 1903; F.O. 2/815, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 24 Africa, 24 June 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/969, S.N.O. Aden to C.-in-C. East Indies, 1 July 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 30 July 1903; W.O. 106/236/viii, 49, S.N.O. Aden to Admiralty, 23 July 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/677, Lansdowne tel. to Currie, no. 18 Africa, 20 Feb. 1902; F.O. 2/678, F.O. memo. to Italian ambassador, 30 Oct. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/678, Treasury to F.O., 24 Sept. 1902.
 6. F.O. 2/678, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 34 Africa, 24 Nov. 1902; F.O. 2/969, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 4 Africa, 13 Jan. 1903.
 7. F.O. 2/815, Lansdowne to Bertie, no. 67 Africa, 22 May 1903; F.O. 2/758, Swayne to Hill, 1 Sept. 1903.
 8. F.O. 2/969, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 106, 26 Sept. 1903.

they allowed British ships to operate in Italian waters and search vessels flying the Italian flag they were not prepared to risk the complications of operations on land against the arms traffic.¹ Their denials that arms came through their protectorate and their assurances of co-operation² began to have an increasingly sceptical reception in the British Foreign Office where Crowe minuted on one: 'The usual, valueless, assurance.' and Lansdowne on another: 'I am profoundly incredulous as to the possibility of doing anything effectually through the Italians....'³ Most contemptuous and exasperated of all was Swayne, who wrote at the start of Egerton's campaign:

'It is pitiful to think that our soldiers will be shot down by ammunition which is now being imported under our noses through Italian territory.'⁴

His solution, frequently reiterated, had the virtue of simplicity. If the Italians would not effectively occupy and administer their coast, then 'Won't the Italians give up the Coast and let us control it for them? Nothing else will do than that we should see to it ourselves.' for

-
1. F.O. 2/815, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 21 Africa, 17 June 1903; F.O. 2/969, Rodd tel. to Lansdowne, no. 28 Africa, 22 Aug. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/vii, 16, Italian ministry of foreign affairs to Bertie, 24 June 1903; F.O. 2/969, Italian ministry of foreign affairs memo. to Rodd, 21 July 1903, enclosed in Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 62 Africa, 23 July 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/969, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 30, 5 July 1903; minute by Lansdowne, 8 July 1903, on D.G.M.I. to Hill, 7 July 1903; minute by Crowe, 21 July 1903, on Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 59 Africa, 11 July 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/816, Swayne to Hill, 10 Sept. 1903.

'We've closed the front door to arms and the back door and windows are open and the only result is that we've succeeded in preventing our loyal tribes from getting arms and have in no way been able to prevent the enemy from doing so.'

The Foreign Office realised that any such transfer of the Italian protectorate was quite out of the question¹ but they did begin to consider policing the Italian coast themselves.

They favoured using armed dhows because they considered them to have been successful on the British coast. Their advantage over warships lay in their ability to come alongside unsuspecting arms smugglers before they had time to jettison their contraband. The idea had been pioneered by the Royal Navy who had had an encouraging initial success off the Arabian coast in June 1902, capturing 62 rifles and 8,000 rounds of ammunition.² As a result of this success Cordeaux had suggested that the protectorate should employ armed dhows to hunt down gun-runners, to collect customs duties and to keep up communications with the eastern coast.³ He proposed that the customs post established at Heis in 1902 should become the base for two dhows whose costs would be covered by the

-
1. F.O. 2/815, memo. by Swayne, 6 May 1903, enclosed in D.C.M.I. to F.O., 9 May 1903, and minute thereon by Lansdowne, n.d.; F.O. 2/816, Swayne to Hill, 10 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/802, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 3, 6 Oct. 1903, and minute thereon by Hill, n.d.; F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Hill, 10 Feb. 1904; F.O. 2/908, minute by Swayne, n.d., on Admiralty to F.O., 29 Apr. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/678, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 49, 4 June 1902, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 4 June 1902; War Office, Official History..., i, 267-270; Hamilton, Somaliland, pp. 217-220.
 3. F.O. 2/678, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 57, 7 June 1902.

customs dues collected there.¹ The scheme was approved,² volunteers to man the dhows were called for from the navy³ and the first dhow began patrolling the territorial waters east of Heis as far as the Italian boundary in March 1903.⁴ The dhows collected sufficient customs revenue nearly to meet their running costs and in addition Swayne was convinced that they were a powerful deterrent to arms smugglers.⁵ Consequently, Swayne suggested that Britian should equip six armed dhows to patrol the Italian coast.⁶ Cranborne had already suggested this in the Foreign Office, where the idea was well received⁷ but before any action could be taken, news was eventually received, in October 1903, that the Italians had stationed three armed dhows on their coast, based at Bosaso.⁸

Italy's tardy measures to stop the arms traffic were typical of her activity in Somaliland. The impunity with which the Sayyid reoccupied Illig after its destruction in 1904 showed that he was perfectly safe in

-
1. F.O. 2/678, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 87, 16 Aug. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/678, Treasury to F.O., 24 Sept. 1902; F.O. 2/616, Lansdowne to Cordeaux, no. 201, 21 Oct. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/678, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 48, 28 Oct. 1902.
 4. F.O. 2/969, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 23A, 28 Feb. 1903, and no. 28, 16 Mar. 1903; Lansdowne tel. to Cordeaux, no. 21, 19 June 1903.
 5. F.O. 2/758, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 136, 31 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 60, 12 Dec. 1903.
 6. F.O. 2/816, Swayne to Hill, 10 Sept. 1903; Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 46, 17 Oct. 1903.
 7. F.O. 2/815, minute by Cranborne, 17 June 1903, on Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 21 Africa, 17 June 1903; F.O. 2/816, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 52, 27 Oct. 1903.
 8. F.O. 2/970, Italian ministry of foreign affairs note to Bertie, 28 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Bertie to Lansdowne, no. 78 Africa, 31 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 60, 12 Dec. 1903.

Italian territory. The Italians themselves were unwilling to occupy any part of their protectorate and depended on the two Mijertein sultans. Neither sultan was prepared to stand up to the Sayyid. In Obbia, Ali Yusuf was as unpredictable as his father had been and in his desire to support the winning side he withdrew his garrison from Galkayu in July, leaving Mudug wide open to the Sayyid.¹ In the north, Osman Mahmud's authority over his people was insufficient to counteract the powerful influence of the Sayyid's supporters² and even the Italians came to admit that his boasted hostility against the Sayyid had been quite ineffectual³ although he had been shrewd enough to extract a good deal of British money out of them. It was clear that the Italians would not attack the Sayyid and the fact that an Italian warship had merely played spectator while British forces captured Illig in Italian territory led to laughter in the House of Commons and ridicule in the Italian opposition press.⁴ This offended the Italian Government and they had to be mollified by an official statement in the House of Commons that:

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 23, 21 July 1904; D.M.O. to F.O., 27 July 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Hill, 21 Apr. 1904; minutes by Swayne, n.d., on Admiralty to F.O., 29 Apr. 1904, and 13 May 1904, on Bertie to Lansdowne, 13 May 1904; F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 95, 10 Aug. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/908, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 50 Africa, 30 July 1904.
 4. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxxiii, 1439, question by Hobhouse, 28 Apr. 1904; ibid., cxxxiv, 110, question by Hobhouse, 2 May 1904; F.O. 2/908, Bertie tel. to Lansdowne, no. 42 Africa, 3 May 1904; F.O. 800/173, It/04/4, Bertie to Lansdowne, private, 4 May 1904.

'The decision of the Italian Government not to place troops in the field during his successive campaigns against the Mullah (a decision which was communicated to His Majesty's Government at the commencement of the operations) does not lessen the value of the service which they have rendered in allowing their territory to be used as a base for military operations which could not otherwise have been carried out at all.'¹

In essence, Lansdowne agreed with this statement; he thought it reasonable that Italy should decline to get entangled in expensive military operations, but he thought she could have been less rigid and dilatory in giving permission for Britain to cross the border. There were others, however, who were galled by the fact that when they had all but defeated the Sayyid he should be able to find asylum in Italian territory, and Lansdowne told his ambassador in Rome that there was

'a pretty strong feeling that throughout our troubles in Somaliland the Italians have not helped us as they might.'²

Sir Clement Hill felt that

'In any general negotiations with Italy in regard to Africa we might well bear in mind her entire failure to prevent the Mullah using Italian territory as a base for repairing the damages inflicted on him in British possessions.

If the positions were reversed we should be held responsible.'

In the War Office, the new Director of Military Operations (who had replaced the Director-General of Military Intelligence) Major-General

Sir James Grierson argued that

1. F.O. 2/908, Lansdowne tel. to Bertie, no. 46, 6 May 1904; Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxxiv, 759, answer by Lord Percy (parliamentary under-secretary, F.O.), 9 May 1904.

2. F.O. 2/908, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Admiralty to F.O., 22 Apr. 1904; F.O. 800/133, Lansdowne to Bertie, 10 May 1904.

'His Majesty's Government would be justified in claiming from the Italian authorities, compensation for any raids which the Mullah may in future make on British Somaliland from their territory.'¹

The strongest critic of the Italians was Egerton. He was angry that when the Sayyid had been driven out of the British protectorate in disarray Osman Mahmud had not opposed him, and he claimed to have proof that Osman Mahmud had acted on the advice of Italian officials. He argued that the Italians were guilty of duplicity and that the responsibility for failing to crush the Sayyid absolutely rested primarily with them. Because of his criticisms of the Italians Egerton's final despatch on the operations had to be withheld from publication. Lansdowne and Grierson did not believe that the charge of duplicity could be substantiated but Grierson did consider that Italian co-operation 'was throughout exceedingly lukewarm and lacked in a marked degree that energy which it was reasonable to expect from a friendly power in dealing with a common enemy.'² When the two-volume official history of the operations was published in 1907 reference was made to the begrudging spirit of the Italians and Osman Mahmud's part was described thus:-

'As a matter of history it is evident that the Mijertein Sultan not only did nothing to oppose the Mullah, but, on

-
1. F.O. 2/908, minute by Hill, n.d., on Admiralty to F.O., 22 Apr. 1904; D.M.O., to F.O., 30 Apr. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/908, Egerton to Army Council, 30 May 1904, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 5 July 1904, and minute thereon by Lansdowne, n.d.; Egerton to Hill, 8 July 1904, enclosing report, dated 14 May 1904, on attitude of Italian authorities, and minute thereon by D.M.O., 18 July 1904; Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 50 Africa, 30 July 1904 and minute thereon by Lansdowne, n.d.

the contrary, aided him in effecting his escape.... From information gathered at the time, it appears that the Mullah only decided upon entering the Mijertein country after being assured that he would not be molested.¹

Blame was heaped upon the Italians because Egerton's campaign had not been a complete success. Publicly it was announced as such: the Commons were told that

'The result of the operations has been to expel the enemy from British territory, to relieve the tribes under our protection from the suffering and loss which his presence occasioned, and so completely to break up the Mullah's following as to make a re-establishment of his power improbable.'²

and the king told the new session of parliament that 'The military operations in Somaliland have ended in the infliction of a severe defeat upon the Mullah's forces....'³ Undoubtedly the Sayyid had received his

severest defeat to date, and Egerton claimed that he had practically received a death-blow from which he would take at least two years to

recover.⁴ The Somali belief in the Sayyid's invincibility had been shattered at Jidballi and his flight from the protectorate had ruined his

prestige.⁵ An estimated 2,034 dervishes had been killed and 304 taken prisoner. 473 rifles, 24,300 camels and 36,400 other animals had been

captured by Egerton and the Mijertein.

-
1. War Office, Official History..., 1, 315, 319.
 2. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxxiii, 1046-7, answer by Percy, 25 Apr. 1904.
 3. Ibid., cxi, 549, king's speech, 15 Aug. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/908, memo. by Egerton, 15 June 1904, also printed in CAB 37/71/81.
 5. F.O. 2/908, memo. by Cordeaux, 29 May 1904, enclosed in Egerton to Lansdowne, 29 May 1904, also printed in CAB 37/71/79.

Yet, these results had been costly. Only 42 soldiers or levies were killed or missing¹, but Egerton had been employing about 8,000 troops at approximately £115,000 a month². Different figures have been given for the total sum involved. Jardine, writing in 1923, said that Manning's and Egerton's expeditions cost £5 million³. More recently, I.M. Lewis mentioned a figure of £5½ million⁴ and Moyse-Bartlett, in his history of the King's African Rifles, stated that Egerton's expedition cost £2½ million⁵. These figures appear to be exaggerated although actual figures are hard to discover for the amounts voted in parliament do not agree with the army appropriation accounts. During the period when the War Office was responsible (that is, during Manning's and Egerton's campaigns) a total of £2,650,000 was voted by parliament for the operations⁶, and an extra £10,000 was carried forward from the Foreign Office vote⁷. Manning's expedition was said to have cost £500,000⁸ and, after Egerton left, the temporary garrison probably cost £280,000⁹; this leaves the sum of

-
1. F.O. 2/908, list of casualties in May section of volume; W.O. 106/236/addenda, p. 1, casualty list.
 2. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxx, 551, answer by Arnold-Forster, 22 Feb. 1904.
 3. Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, p. 155.
 4. I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, p. 73.
 5. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 189.
 6. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxxiv, 1162, answer by Arnold-Forster, 12 May 1904; ibid., 4th series, 1905, cxlii, 206-8, speech by financial secretary to W.O., 2 Mar. 1905.
 7. F.O. 2/620, Lansdowne tel. to Cordeaux, no. 117, 19 Dec. 1902.
 8. Hansard, 4th series, 1903, cxxv, 397-8, answer by Brodrick, 13 July 1903.
 9. See footnote 6 above.

£1,880,000 for Egerton's expedition. According to the appropriation accounts the War Office spent £2,538,520 on the Somali expeditions.¹ If we add £10,000 for the Foreign Office contribution and deduct £780,000 for the cost of Manning's expedition and the temporary garrison, we are left with a figure of £1,568,520 for Egerton's expedition. This does not include any charge for the navy.

Although the expedition had cost over £1½ million the Sayyid was still alive and free, somewhere north-west of Illig. In late April intelligence reports estimated his followers at 1,400 and his rifles at between 600 and 1,000.² Egerton cannot have been satisfied with this but in his final despatch he tried to put the best interpretation on it and laid the blame on the Italians:

'The actual capture or surrender of the Mullah was not, and could not be, the only aim and object of the campaign, though I believe the latter might have been obtained but for the unavoidable delays incidental to a foreign, if friendly, Power [Italy], and the consequent failure of friendly tribesmen to co-operate at the critical moment.

Though the Mullah himself might escape, the capture of the

1. Parl. Papers 1904, li, 'Army Appropriation Accounts 1902-1903, Approximate Statement of Extra Charges borne by ARMY VOTES 1902-1903, in consequence of the WAR IN SOMALILAND.'; Parl. Papers 1905, xlv, ditto for 1903-4; Parl. Papers 1906, lxvii, ditto for 1904-5; Parl. Papers 1907, xlix, 'Army Appropriation Accounts 1905-1906, Statement of Military Expenditure in the Colonies, Somaliland and Egypt.'; Parl. Papers 1908, lxiv, ditto for 1906-7.
2. W.O. 106/236/xvii, 31, intelligence report, 26 Apr. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xviii, 8, intelligence report, 4 May 1904; Mansard, 4th series, 1904, 1169-70, answer by Percy, 12 May 1904.

Haroun would mean absolute destruction of his prestige and in all probability, his own final surrender. It is this objective which was so narrowly missed owing to the want of the Mijjertein "stop" at the end of March.¹

The troops were already departing and the next day, on 31 May 1904, Egerton left Somaliland.²

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Egerton to Army Council, 30 May 1904, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 5 July 1904.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xviii, 24 & 33, journal entries for 17 May 1904 and 31 May 1904. The story of Egerton's expedition will also be found in: Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 124-155; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 183-190; War Office, Official History..., i, 288-304; F.L. Owen, 'The Somaliland Operations June 1903 to May 1904', Journal of the United Services Institution, xlix (1905), 169-182; Parl. Papers 1905, lvi (469), 'Despatches, &c., regarding the Military Operations in Somaliland, from the 18th January, 1902 to the 31st May, 1904.'

CHAPTER XII

WITHDRAWAL.

The decision to end Egerton's campaign was largely Arnold-Forster's. He was obviously concerned about the considerable criticism voiced in parliament in February and March 1904¹ and on 2 March he wrote to Grierson, the Director of Military Operations:

'It is obviously most undesirable that the present expenditure of men and money should continue indefinitely.

.... I shall be glad to know what... would be the real loss to the Empire either locally or generally, if, at the end of this month, I were to give the order to the force to withdraw to the coast.'²

Grierson replied that so long as the Sayyid was expelled from the protectorate and discredited it would be safe to withdraw most of the troops.³ At the same time, Egerton himself recommended that they should be withdrawn, partly for the sake of their health.⁴ On 18 March Arnold-Forster recommended this course to the Cabinet:

'I am of opinion that the time has come when we must reconsider the whole question of our operations in Somaliland. I am clear that we cannot continue to spend money indefinitely, and I see no reason to believe that unless some considerable success be obtained during the next few weeks, we shall be able to make any further impression upon the Mullah, or to pursue our present

-
1. See above, pp. 417-420.
 2. CAB 37/69/43, Arnold Forster to Director of Operations, 2 Mar. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/907, memo. by Brig.-Gen. J.M. Grierson, 9 Mar. 1904, copy.
 4. F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 15 Mar. 1904, in Cabinet print, 2 May 1904.

enterprise with advantage. The heavy cost will continue, the condition of the troops will deteriorate, and the Mullah with ample water in any direction will easily escape our pursuit.

.... The Mullah has been beaten, his forces have been dispersed, and he himself appears to be in a very serious plight. The General in Command himself recommends a reduction of the scale of operations, and I think we should be open to censure if, in the face of such a recommendation, we continued the campaign, save for very grave reasons. I am not aware that any such reasons exist....

.... From the point of view of the War Office, I am convinced that the sooner this campaign can be brought to a termination the better.¹

The Cabinet discussed the matter and Balfour reported to the King:

'Somaliland presents now - as always - a most embarrassing problem. Our arms have been successful, but not completely or conclusively successful:- while the season during which we can pursue the Mollah with any hope of catching him is drawing to a close. In these circumstance/s what are we to do? The Cabinet have decided that probably the best course would be to reduce the number of our troops to that which would be sufficient to maintain the Berbera-Bohotle line. We cannot go on indefinitely pouring money into the Somali sands....'²

At the end of April Arnold-Forster told the Cabinet that

'The reason for campaigning is at an end, the troops are reported to be weary and homesick; the transport animals are exhausted; and General Egerton himself strongly recommends the cessation of operations.'³

On 10 May Egerton was told to send his troops back to their permanent stations in India, Britain and the African protectorates, apart from a small force being retained to hold the Berbera-Bohotleh line.⁴

-
1. CAB 37/69/43, Cabinet memo. by Arnold-Forster, 18 Mar. 1904.
 2. CAB 41/29/9, Balfour to Edward VII, 23 Mar. 1904.
 3. CAB 37/70/62, Cabinet memo. by Arnold-Forster, 29 Apr. 1904.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xviii, 12, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 10 May 1904.

The expeditionary period, which had begun with Swayne's small campaign in 1901, had at last been brought to an end. For nearly four years the Sayyid had withstood the British and he was still not thoroughly defeated. He had proved himself a leader with military genius, diplomatic skill, administrative ability and amazing tenacity of purpose. Nimble and extremely mobile, he had out-generalled Swayne and Manning, and had usually avoided being brought to battle except when it suited him. Although he had coerced many Somalis to follow him, and although he was undoubtedly tyrannical, strict and harsh in his rule, his religious objectives and his appeal to all Somalis, regardless of clan, had won to his cause men from all clans and qualified him to be considered the first modern Somali nationalist. His gift for organising his followers, in a dervish brotherhood which took no account of clan or lineage group, had created a combination against which none of the disunited clans of British Somaliland could hope to stand. Dr. I.M. Lewis has ably summarised the reasons for his success:

'It was more than anything else his magnetic personality, his ruthlessness and his complete and utter defiance of his enemies, that appealed to the Somali mind and deeply stirred the imagination of a people who with all their traditional democracy, admire, above all else, unswerving strength of purpose and unwavering determination. Tyrannical he might be, but to many Somali, though not all, his tyranny was directed towards a noble end. These qualities the leader of the jihad possessed abundantly; and the magnificent rhetoric and poetry with which he denounced his foes so scathingly found a ready response amongst his countrymen. The excitements

of battle and raiding, and the attractions of the spoils of war, also naturally exerted a strong appeal.¹

Yet the Sayyid's glory and achievements had not been without cost to others. In the first place, the four British expeditions had cost about 405 lives and over £2½ million,² for which the Government were heavily criticised.³ More tragic was the effect on Somaliland which had been one of the reasons behind Swayne's criticism of Egerton. Thousands of lives had been lost and large numbers of destitute refugees were now urgently in need of relief. Swayne reported that:

'Absolute starvation is what has actually occurred, not in a few cases, but in a wholesale way, with the death of the weaker people and of women and children.'

while

'Everywhere in the jungle there are people living in caves and

1. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, p. 82; see also: pp. 80-85; Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, pp. 225-228; Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 50-56, 94-5, 315; Drake-Brockman, British Somaliland, pp. 178-188; E. Cerulli, review in Journal of African History, vii (1966), 552; Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss. Afr. S552, 'History of the Somaliland Camel Corps', 1935, pp. 182-3.
2. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxxv, 1048, answer by Percy, 8 June 1904; ibid., 1905, cxlii, 9-10, answer by Arnold-Forster, 1 Mar. 1905, 180 & 206-8, answers by financial secretary to W.O. and Arnold-Forster, 2 Mar. 1905. In C.O. 535/3, Swayne to Earl of Elgin (colonial secretary), no. 354, 20 Dec. 1905, Swayne stated that the use of unexpended South African War grants raised the total cost of the Somaliland campaigns to nearly £10 million but I have found no evidence to support this statement.
3. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxxxiv, 1484, speech by Churchill, 16 May 1904; cxxxv, 137, speech by Asquith, 17 May 1904; ibid., 1905, cxlii, 646-656, speeches by Hobhouse and Trevelyan, 7 Mar. 1905, 741-806, speeches by Lloyd George, Pease, Burns, Labouchere, Bryce, Buxton, Reid and Walton, 8 Mar. 1905.

on berries alone - all their livestock having gone - I know I am not overstating matters, for I have seen this when on my expeditions, and recent reports show that the numbers of people so living has (sic) increased.¹

The Dolbohanta had suffered most through having been the Sayyid's principal supporters in the protectorate. The British had made their country the main scene of operations and the Sayyid had broken down their organisation by making his dervishes renounce their clan and family.² The peoples' livestock had been devastated by raids, military requisitions and the wastage of transport camels.³ Meat supplies, the raison d'être and staple product of the protectorate, were increasingly difficult to obtain, and measures had to be enforced to limit slaughter and export to avoid any further decrease.⁴

Trade had suffered severely from five years of disturbance. In 1899-1900 the total value of trade in the protectorate had been £844,878; the next year, when the Sayyid's war began, the total dropped to £757,978. Thereafter it continued to decline, apart from misleading rises in 1903-04

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Hill, 21 Apr. 1904; War Office Library, 'Journal of the Principal Events connected with Somaliland', part xix (hereafter W.O.L./Journal/xix), 24, extract from staff diary, 25 June 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Hill, 10 Feb. 1904; F.O. 2/908, memo. by Cordeaux, 29 May 1904, enclosed in Egerton to Lansdowne, 29 May 1904, also printed in CAB 37/71/79.
 3. F.O. 2/816, Swayne to Hill, 10 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 25, 9 Feb. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/758, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 149, 19 Dec. 1903; F.O. 2/868, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 65, 19 Feb. 1904; F.O. 2/869, Regulations no. 5 (1904), 11 July 1904.

and 1904-05 caused by the presence of thousands of soldiers. When they left, the figures gave a truer picture of the state of trade as the total sank to £464,560. In fact, for the whole period of Foreign Office control, from 10 October 1898 to 1 April 1905 when the protectorate passed to the Colonial Office, the highest annual total trade figure (£844,876) was £189 less than the highest figure reached while the protectorate had been governed from India. This was contrary to the reasonable forecasts of 1898, and although the decline is partly attributable to the Djibouti railway which was throttling Zeila, the main cause was unquestionably the war with the Sayyid.¹

The revenue figures fell with the trade figures. In an attempt to meet the increasing costs of administration customs dues were raised, but in vain. In 1899-1900 when export duties stood at 1% and import duties at 5%, revenue had reached £25,648. By 1904-05, although both export and import duties at Berbera (which handled most of the trade) had been raised

-
1. F.O. 2/478, Administration Report, 1900-01, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 123, 31 Mar. 1901; Trade Report, 1900-01, enclosed in Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 161, 25 Nov. 1901 and minute thereon by Sadler, 22 Dec. 1901; F.O. 2/477, Confidential Report, 1900-01, enclosed in Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 92, 21 July 1901; F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 153, 28 Dec. 1903; C.O. 535/2, Annual Report, 1904-5, enclosed in Cordeaux to A. Lyttelton (colonial secretary), no. 270, 7 Sept. 1905; C.O. 535/3, Treasury to C.O., no. 6134/05, 4 Apr. 1905; C.O. 535/6, Annual Report, 1905-06, enclosed in Cordeaux to Elgin, no. 160, 21 Sept. 1906; The Times, 29 Mar. 1902, report on trade of Somali Coast Protectorate; The Times, 9 Apr. 1903, consular report on Somaliland, 1901-02.

Swayne, and although they thought he had been unnecessarily prone to complain against the troops, and too quick to take offence, they decided that the evidence entirely failed to prove the 'delusions', 'hysteria' and 'disloyalty' attributed to Swayne. Lansdowne wished to give him an opportunity of 'showing that he is - as I believe him to be - of sound mind.'¹ he believed he had not hit it off with the soldiers because 'he knew more about the country than they did and ... they were impatient with him because they could not get him to agree to their views and methods.'²

The big question facing the Government concerned future policy. Should they now withdraw to the coast, leaving the clans to defend themselves, or should they occupy and protect the interior? The leading advocate of the theory that Britain had an obligation to protect the clans of the interior was Swayne. It was he and Sadler who, in 1901, had forced the Foreign Office to accept that the duty to protect the clans was a policy 'from which His Majesty's Government cannot in honour depart.'³ This policy had led to the second, third and fourth expeditions, yet Swayne still believed in it. In February 1904 he wrote to Sir Clement Hill:

1. F.O. 2/872, minutes by Hill, 29 Mar. 1904, Lansdowne, n.d., and C.J.B. Hurst (assistant legal adviser, F.O.), 12 Apr. 1904, on W.O. to F.O., 24 Mar. 1904 and minutes thereon by Barrington and Lansdowne, both n.d.; F.O. 2/873, F.O. to W.O., 15 Apr. 1904.
2. F.O. 800/133, Lansdowne to Bertie, 10 May 1904.
3. See above, pp. 331-3.

'... we have here the makings of trouble for all times unless we adopt the only course open to us - viz occupation - but this occupation must be based on the needs of the people and not be a merely military occupation of block-houses from which the troops could never issue in time to protect the "heart of blood" of the tribes viz their livestock without which the country is not inhabitable. These are my views and they have come about owing to the despair I have of ever carrying out my original idea of administration from the coast,....'¹

Not only was he no believer in the old Indian policy of non-intervention; he believed that Britain should extend her active protection beyond the Ishaak clans to the Dolbohanta although there were no treaties of protection with them. He believed that if there was to be peace in the protectorate the Dolbohanta would have to be detached from the Sayyid but he was convinced that they

'will never leave the Mullah and give up their arms, unless they are assured of subsequent protection. They still remember the punishment they received at the hands of the Mullah after the return of my first expedition.'²

In arguing for the extension of protection to the Dolbohanta Swayne was expounding views similar to those suggested by Egerton before he began his campaign, views which the Cabinet had firmly squashed.³ Yet Swayne obtained a better hearing than Egerton. In the Foreign Office, Eyre Crowe minuted:

-
1. F.O. 2/907, Swayne to Hill, 10 Feb. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/816, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 41, 19 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/802, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 3, 6 Oct. 1903.
 3. See above, pp. 387-390.

'As a general principle of policy there can be little doubt that we ought to promise and afford protection to all tribes within our protectorate against the Mullah or any other aggressor.'

and: '... we shall have in some form to assert & uphold our authority in the region bounded by the frontiers of our Protectorate.' He pointed out that experience on the Indian frontier showed that money spent on expeditions was wasted if the troops withdrew and left the clans at the mercy of their enemy.¹ Sir Clement Hill was less certain, but he doubted whether they could free themselves from the responsibility for protecting the Dolbohanta who lived within an area declared to be a British protectorate.² Lansdowne was less ready to commit himself: 'This problem is a serious one and has been more than once discussed by H.M.G. - As at present advised they are not in favour of the policy of enlarging the skirts of our protectorate in the manner proposed.' he wrote.³

In the War Office, the Intelligence Division took up Swayne's views and even suggested that they erred too much on the side of the defensive.⁴ Grierson, the Director of Military Operations, argued strongly against

-
1. F.O. 2/816, minute by Crowe, 19 Sept. 1903, on Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 41, 19 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/802, minute by Crowe, 19 Oct. 1903, on Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 3, 6 Oct. 1903.
 2. F.O. 2/816, minute by Hill, 13 Oct. 1903, on Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 109, 28 Sept. 1903.
 3. F.O. 2/816, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 298, 19 Oct. 1903, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on D.G.M.I. to F.O., 21 Oct. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/816, D.G.M.I. to F.O., 21 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/907, loose minute by Altham, 27 Feb. 1904, on Swayne to Hill, 10 Feb. 1904.

withdrawal from the interior:

'So far as our relations with other Powers are involved, especially Abyssinia and Italy, we are equally responsible for every portion of the whole Protectorate, from the coast line to its southern frontier.'

Withdrawal would damage British prestige and waste British money:

'We have spent two millions in maintaining our position in the country; to renounce that position now will make the whole of that expenditure a useless folly.'

He believed it important to control Somaliland not only because it flanked the main route to India but because it bordered on Ethiopia where France was exerting her influence:

'A European Power which possessed the healthy plateau of Abyssinia, and succeeded in disciplining and training as soldiers its hardy inhabitants, would dominate the entire Sudan and Uganda; including the upper waters of the Nile and the Great Lakes. Ultimately, therefore, she would control Egypt.'

Far-reaching issues are, therefore, at stake in the diplomatic struggle between France and Great Britain in North-East Africa. The chief factors in this struggle are the maintenance of our prestige and the full assertion of all our existing rights.'

Finally, on top of this exposition of the upper Nile theory, he added a melodramatic paragraph on the genius of the British Empire:

'Furthermore, the fact cannot be too plainly stated that throughout Egypt and the Sudan, and throughout the great Protectorates of Uganda and British East Africa, our whole position depends entirely upon prestige. We are governing with a mere handful of white officials vast populations alien to us in race, language and religion, and for the most part but little superior in civilization to savages. Except for the small, and from a military point of view inadequate, British force in Egypt, the authority of these officials is supported only by troops recruited from the subject races,

where obedience to their officers rests on no other basis than a belief in the invincibility of the British Government and confidence in its promises. If that belief and confidence be once shaken, the foundations of all British authority between Cairo and Mombasa will be undermined, and at any moment a storm of mutiny and insurrection may sweep us into the sea.¹

It is hardly likely that many members of the Government would have fully endorsed these arguments, but at least Arnold-Forster allowed himself to be persuaded. He felt that India had the greatest interest in the maintenance of British control in Somaliland, and so long as the Indian Government was prepared to contribute towards the cost of keeping its troops there, he recommended a military occupation of the protectorate.²

Lansdowne, too, was won over:

'... it seems to me that we could not possibly repudiate our obligations to defend those tribes to whom we have promised protection and that we cannot wash our hands even of those tribes to whom we have not actually promised protection but with whom we have treaties.'

He telegraphed to Lord Cromer, for the Government had decided to seek confirmation from their Cairene oracle.³ Cromer was unconcerned about the effect which any Somaliland settlement might have on Egypt, Sudan or Ethiopia. He greatly preferred the idea of withdrawal but he was forced to admit that a military occupation of the interior was the only solution 'compatible with our national dignity.' and he continued:

-
1. F.O. 2/907, memo. by Grierson, 9 Mar. 1904, copy.
 2. CAB 37/69/43, Cabinet memo. by Arnold-Forster, 18 Mar. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/907, Lansdowne tel. to Cromer, no. 5, 19 Mar. 1904.

'I should advise limiting the territory occupied as much as possible and I should be inclined to think that the construction of a light railway is an essential and probably in the end an economical portion of the scheme.'¹

Reluctantly, and motivated largely by a sense of duty, the Government were coming to the conclusion that they would have to protect and occupy the interior, and Balfour wrote gloomily to the king:

'no British interest and no Indian interest is apparently involved... and were it not for the engagements entered into with the tribes by the India Office and Gov[ernmen]t some years ago, we might almost abandon the country as derelict.'²

Before a final decision was reached however, the Cabinet asked Lansdowne and Brodrick, the secretary of state for India, to find out exactly what were their obligations to the clans. What they discovered surprised them, and caused a fundamental change of approach to Somaliland. The treaties of protection, with the Habr Awal, Habr Gerhajis, Habr Toljaala and Warsangoli, had all been concluded by Hunter in 1886. They extended to these clans: 'the gracious favour and protection of the Queen-Empress.' and it was for this reason that the Government had felt bound to protect the Ishaak against the Sayyid. Nevertheless, on re-reading the correspondence, Lansdowne and Brodrick discovered that Hunter had clearly stated to the signatories 'that we have nothing to do with intertribal feuds' and that British responsibility was limited to the

1. F.O. 2/907, Cromer tel. to Lansdowne, no. 4 Africa, 21 Mar. 1904.
 2. CAB 41/29/9, Balfour to Edward VII, 23 Mar. 1904.

maintenance of order along the coast.¹ This was the policy of non-intervention, and it came as a surprise to the two ministers; but it was a policy that met with their full approval for it meant that they had no legal obligation to protect the clans of the interior. At the same time, they recognised that the clans were unlikely to accept this interpretation: 'They must, on the contrary, have been led by the course of events to rely more and more upon our "gracious favour and protection".' It was therefore essential to show that the policy of non-intervention had been adhered to.

Lansdowne and Brodrick argued that under Indian rule the policy of complete non-intervention had been found to be impossible and that in 1890 the Governments of India and Bombay had had to adopt the modification 'that it is the duty of a Government which has taken the ports under its protection to protect, within reasonable distance, the trade routes leading to those ports.'² Punitive expeditions, followed by withdrawal to the coast, had therefore become a legitimate part of the policy of non-intervention. They produced evidence to show that Sadler had been faithful to this policy, and they continued:

'The operations undertaken in Somaliland during the last three years cannot, however, be said to have arisen out of any interference of ours in the inter-tribal affairs of the Somali.'

The expeditions had been quite in harmony with the policy of

1. See above, p. 116.

2. See above, p. 138.

non-intervention:

'The view held by the Foreign Office, and we believe accepted by His Majesty's Government, was that the activity of the Mullah had become so dangerous that it would be impossible to neglect it unless we were prepared to run the risk of the whole country up to the coast falling into his hands.... it was believed that such a policy would not only involve a complete loss of authority over the tribes, but would impair our position in Abyssinia and probably in the Soudan.'¹

The implication of their report was that although the Foreign Office had acted largely in ignorance of the policy of non-intervention happily they had not acted in any way inconsistent with that policy. Consequently, now that the Sayyid was too weak to reassert his control over the interior, the British would be perfectly correct and justified in withdrawing to the coast; they had neither legal nor moral obligations to protect the clans.

The memorandum produced by Lansdowne and Brodrick makes no explicit suggestions as to future policy; nor do there appear to be any comments upon it by other members of the Government. Nevertheless, it seems to have been decisive for a month later the Foreign Office wrote to the Treasury on the subject of future policy in Somaliland:

'The object aimed at is, that His Majesty's Government should, as soon as possible, be relieved from all military responsibility, except for the coastline of Somaliland.... Except as an interim arrangement ... it is not intended that any posts in the interior shall be held by Regular troops.'²

1. F.O. 2/908, memo. on 'British Obligations to the Somali Tribes' by Lansdowne and Brodrick, 13 Apr. 1904.
2. F.O. 2/873, F.O. to Treasury, 14 May 1904.

This was the policy of coastal concentration, formulated by a Conservative Government in 1904 although not finally executed until 1910 by a Liberal Government. The reason why it was not carried out until 1910 lies in the history of the intervening years, but one important underlying cause may be mentioned here. Lansdowne, Brodrick and the other members of the Government, either wishfully or genuinely misunderstood their officials on the spot. They believed that the policy of non-intervention was still respected in the protectorate. They claimed that Sadler had followed this policy, yet surely Sadler had been bent on interfering in the interior, and had taken advantage of the transfer from India Office to Foreign Office to break away from the policy of non-intervention?¹ Similarly, they argued that the expeditions against the Sayyid had not arisen out of any British interference in the interior, yet surely it was Sadler's forward policy which had heightened the crisis and led to military action? In 1908, after a brief visit to Somaliland in the previous year, Winston Churchill, the under-secretary for the colonies, wrote that the

'suggestion that the expeditions against the Mullah resulted from "the policy of confining ourselves to the coast line" is a contradiction in terms, it being quite clear that that hideous waste was the direct result of abandoning the said policy of "confining ourselves to the coast line" and plunging ourselves into the interior.'²

-
1. See above pp. 296-8, 314-5.
 2. C.O. 535/10, minute by W.S. Churchill (parliamentary under-secretary of state, C.O.), 19 Jan. 1908, on notes by Cordeaux, 28 Dec. 1907, on minute by Churchill, 28 Oct. 1907.

Yet what was so clear to Churchill: that Sadler's policy was one of intervention which had at least hastened the war against the Sayyid, and had led the clans to expect British protection; was hidden from Lansdowne and Brodrick.

Furthermore, Swayne and Cordeaux, the two men who were to be in charge of Somaliland until 1910 were both men who had served under Sadler. It is reasonable to assume that they had been influenced by his views; indeed it would be surprising had they not been, for there seems to have been no administrative officer in Somaliland between 1884 and 1910 who did not chafe against the policy of non-intervention. There can be little doubt that, at heart, Swayne and Cordeaux disagreed with the policy they were meant to implement. Swayne felt a special responsibility towards those Somalis who had fought for him, and he had all along argued for an extension of active protection to the interior; he was later to claim that the abandonment of his policy, in 1910, led to the deaths of 100,000 Somalis.¹ Similarly, Cordeaux was to write in 1907:

'The policy of confining ourselves to the coast line is no new one. It was tried before and resulted in the Mullah and the subsequent costly expeditions necessary to drive him out of the British Protectorate. To revert to that policy now would, in my opinion, be to precipitate a state of affairs in Somaliland which we have already spent several millions in averting.'²

-
1. Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss. Brit. Emp. S 279, Papers of E. Swayne (hereafter, E.S.P.), note by Swayne, n.d., on Swayne to Hill, 21 Apr. 1904, copy.
 2. C.O. 535/10, notes by Cordeaux, 28 Dec. 1907, on minute by Churchill, 28 Oct. 1907.

The policy of withdrawing to the coast, although decided upon by the Government in 1904, was entrusted to men who disagreed with it. This must be part of the reason why it was not carried out until 1910 when Somaliland was put under a man who was prepared to carry the policy through, Manning. But by 1910 the one condition essential if the policy were to succeed, namely that the Sayyid be weak and powerless, no longer held good, if indeed it had ever done.

Once the basic policy had been decided, the details had to be worked out and Swayne's ideas had to be brought into line with it. It was clear that the interior could not be abandoned overnight. Since 1900 there had been troops stationed in the interior and since 1903 there had been British administrative officers (temporarily loaned from the Indian police service) at Burao and Hargeisa, settling civil lawsuits brought by Somalis.¹ The previous systems of organisation among the clans had been devastated by four years of war. If the troops and administrative officers were to be withdrawn, some form of defence system and self-government was needed in their place; Lansdowne saw that the need was to 'evolve tribal organisation out of the present chaos.'²

-
1. F.O. 2/758, Swayne to Hill, 28 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/762, Treasury to F.O., 4 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/757, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 319, 10 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/872, I.O. to F.O., 2 Jan. 1904.
 2. CAB 37/71/79, note by Lansdowne, 14 June 1904, on memo. by Cordeaux, 29 May 1904.

The North-West Frontier of India, which had had its own Mullahs and punitive expeditions, provided a precedent. Here, Curzon had withdrawn all British forces from the forward areas, established a militia scheme and used tribal forces in defence of tribal territory.¹ Manning had been one of the first to suggest a similar scheme for Somaliland. Despite his low opinion of the Somali as a soldier he felt strongly that the Ishaak at least should be made to play a part in their own defence. He thought that the cheapest way of defending the interior would be for the clans to supply a fixed number of men to garrison certain posts all the year round. An essential part of this scheme, however, was the need for direct civil administration of the interior by European officers.²

For years, Swayne had cherished the idea of a Somali militia in defence of its own territory;³ he now developed this idea. He proposed that either a considerable force of mounted Somali troops should garrison the whole interior, or else that a smaller force of Somali or Sudanese troops should occupy Hargeisa, Burao and Las Dureh while arms were issued to the clans to defend the more distant territory and garrison advanced posts such as Bohotleh and Ainabo. But he was very clear that either alternative would require an extension of the civil administration to the interior; if the clans were to be armed they would have to be

1. Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908, pp. 99-115.

2. F.O. 2/797, Manning to Lansdowne, 7 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/908, memo. by Hill, 17 Apr. 1904.

3. F.O. 78/4979, 'Preliminary Notes on Somaliland', by Swayne, bound with papers of 20 Oct. 1898; F.O. 2/802, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 3, 6 Oct. 1903.

'under the strict control of a civil local organization of a Protectorate force which would be distributed between posts at certain well-recognised strategic points.'

He maintained that the people

'would welcome a civil administration, supported by a properly constituted and carefully selected local force.... The people quite realize that our administrative control of the interior in some form or other offers the only hope of putting a stop to a state of affairs which has got worse year by year, and is rapidly making life in the interior of the country impossible.'

He was sure that the clans were anxious to enter into an organisation for their own defence but they needed help:

'their only hope is on our assuming administrative control inland and proceeding to organize a system of defence based upon a careful arming of the tribes.

What the people want to see is that we have come to stay, and not to make a military expedition and again retire.... For the Mullah and the Dervishes.... do not leave the country but are always there.

The people very willingly submit to civil control and appreciate our justice, and for its sake would cheerfully accept such military control as it would be necessary to establish....'¹

He proposed that each of the three Ishaak clans be 'placed under' a political officer who would supervise their organisation and issue and inspect their arms.²

This was fundamentally different from the Government's policy of withdrawing to the coast. The object of the Cabinet was 'to narrow to

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Hill, 21 Apr. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/908, memo. by Swayne, 10 May 1904.

the utmost possible extent, the area of our Imperial responsibilities.¹ to be relieved from all military responsibility except for the coastline. Swayne wanted to hold not only the coast, but inland posts such as Hargeisa, Burao and Las Dureh. While the Cabinet wanted to withdraw from the whole interior, Swayne recommended withdrawing only from advanced posts like Bohotleh and Ainabo. Swayne wanted permanent political officers, the Cabinet assumed they would be temporary.² Yet the importance of this basic difference between Swayne and the Government does not seem to have been fully appreciated at the time. Lansdowne merely expressed doubts about Swayne's plans to garrison interior posts and extend the civil administration inland,³ he does not seem to have told him that such proposals were out of the question. In fact, even the Government and its officials were divided about policy. Hill certainly seemed to share Swayne's views⁴ and the War Office believed that an effective civil administration would probably be necessary in the interior.⁵

When Swayne left England in May 1904 his instructions were deliberately

-
1. CAB 41/29/18, Balfour to Edward VII, 9 June 1904.
 2. CAB 57/70/62, Cabinet memo. by Lansdowne, 28 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/868, Lansdowne to Balfour, 11 May 1904; E.S.P., note by Swayne, n.d., on copy of Swayne to Hill, 21 Apr. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/873, minute by Lansdowne, 7 May 1904, on memo. by Hill, 7 May 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/908, memo. by Hill, 17 Apr. 1904; F.O. 2/873, memo. by Hill, 7 May 1904.
 5. F.O. 2/908, W.O. to F.O., 5 May 1904.

phrased in general terms. He was to

'arm and organize the protected tribes in such a manner as to enable them after a time, to protect themselves.... You should point out to them.... that they must take advantage of the opportunity now afforded them in order to secure themselves for the future.'

He was reminded of the Government's policy:

'You will understand clearly that the object aimed at is that we should as soon as possible be relieved from all military responsibility, except for the coast line of Somaliland, and that the tribes themselves should be so organized as to enable us to entrust them with the defence of the remoter parts of the Protectorate as well as with the settlement of all inter-tribal questions.... it is not intended that any posts in the interior shall be held by regular troops....'

But these instructions were sufficiently imprecise to allow Swayne to put his own interpretation on them. The details of the policy were to be decided when Swayne had had time to evaluate the situation on the spot and submit his recommendations;¹ inevitably, the detailed policy would bear the stamp of his views.

As the expeditions were ended, military responsibility for the protectorate was handed back from the War Office to the Foreign Office, and Egerton left Somaliland before Swayne returned, possibly to avoid an awkward meeting.² In the coastal area, where British control was

-
1. F.O. 2/868, Lansdowne to Balfour, 11 May 1904; Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 157, 19 May 1904, also to be found in CAB 37/70/67.
 2. W.O. 106/236/xviii, 12, Egerton tel. to W.O., 21 May 1904; F.O. 2/871, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 34, 4 June 1904.

south of Berbera. During 1904 and 1905 he managed to obtain extra European officers, an assistant treasurer, a superintendent of police and a third assistant district officer.¹ This last official was appointed to administer the coast east of Berbera, an extension largely the result of continued efforts to stop the arms trade. Sir Clement Hill had recognised that:

'All our slave trade experience showed the possibility of really stopping that traffic till we got a good hold of the ports. The arms traffic will be even harder to stop on the sea.'²

Swayne agreed that some sort of 'positive policy' against the arms trade was needed. As the customs-cum-police posts at Korin and Heis, established in 1902, had proved so profitable, he proposed a similar post at Las Kereh with a third armed dhow to patrol the coast.³ In addition, he suggested the purchase of a steamer to maintain communications with Heis and Las Kereh and 'mother' and supervise the armed dhows; in this way calls on the navy could be avoided.⁴ The plans for the steamer (in place of the third armed dhow) and the post at Las Kereh were approved.⁵

1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 153, 28 Dec. 1903; F.O. 2/868, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 82, 1 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/869, staff list, 1 Apr. 1904; E.S.P., staff list, 1 Apr. 1905.
2. F.O. 2/970, minute by Hill, n.d., on Admiralty to F.O., 18 Nov. 1903.
3. F.O. 2/758, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 136, 31 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Swayne tels. to Lansdowne, no. 55, 25 Nov. 1903, no. 57, 3 Dec. 1903 and no. 60, 12 Dec. 1903.
4. F.O. 2/816, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 40, 3 Nov. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 4 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 153, 28 Dec. 1903; F.O. 2/872, minute by Swayne, 19 Apr. 1904, on Admiralty to F.O., 12 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 110, 8 Sept. 1904.
5. F.O. 2/970, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 69, 30 Dec. 1903; F.O. 2/908, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 45, 30 June 1904; F.O. 2/871, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 53, 22 Sept. 1904.

but in the event neither materialised. The Warsangeli were dissatisfied over certain claims for compensation resulting from Egerton's expedition and Swayne decided to postpone the post at Las Kereh until he had the steamer to keep in close touch with the area;¹ but the steamer itself fell victim to economy cuts in 1905.²

Together with these plans for expanding the administration Swayne was hoping for more activity in the field of private enterprise. In 1899 Charles MacConkey had eventually been granted his concession to cultivate, manufacture and export aloe fibre;³ but he failed to act on this, probably because he lacked the necessary capital. Using the excuse that he was unable to find suitable machinery and that war was preventing him from starting, he applied for extensions to the time limit in his concession on no less than six separate occasions.⁴ Five times the Foreign Office accepted his arguments and extended his concession.⁵ By March 1904, however, when his sixth request for an extension arrived, they were losing

-
1. F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 160, 20 Oct. 1904 and enclosures; F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, 30 Dec. 1904.
 2. C.O. 535/1, minutes by H.J. Read (clerk, C.O.) 5 June 1905 & 11 Aug. 1905, and C.P. Lucas (assistant under-secretary, C.O.), date unclear, on Swayne to Lyttelton, no. 172, 28 Apr. 1905; C.O. 535/2; minutes by Lucas, 15 Aug. 1905 and Sir M.F. Ommamey (permanent under-secretary, C.O.), 15 Aug. 1905 on Admiralty to C.O., 10 Aug. 1905.
 3. See above, pp. 161-2, 295.
 4. F.O. 2/784, MacConkey to F.O., 1 Nov. 1900, 20 Aug. 1901, 1 Jan. 1903, 18 May 1903 and 29 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/983, MacConkey to F.O., 10 Mar. 1904.
 5. F.O. 2/784, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 15, 22 Jan. 1901; F.O. to MacConkey, 30 Dec. 1901; Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 15, 23 Jan. 1903; F.O. to MacConkey, 16 May 1903, 22 May 1903 & 9 Nov. 1903.

south of Berbera. During 1904 and 1905 he managed to obtain extra European officers, an assistant treasurer, a superintendent of police and a third assistant district officer.¹ This last official was appointed to administer the coast east of Berbera, an extension largely the result of continued efforts to stop the arms trade. Sir Clement Hill had recognised that:

'All our slave trade experience showed the possibility of really stopping that traffic till we got a good hold of the ports. The arms traffic will be even harder to stop on the sea.'²

Swayne agreed that some sort of 'positive policy' against the arms trade was needed. As the customs-cum-police posts at Karin and Heis, established in 1902, had proved so profitable, he proposed a similar post at Las Kereh with a third armed dhow to patrol the coast.³ In addition, he suggested the purchase of a steamer to maintain communications with Heis and Las Kereh and 'mother' and supervise the armed dhows; in this way calls on the navy could be avoided.⁴ The plans for the steamer (in place of the third armed dhow) and the post at Las Kereh were approved.⁵

1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 153, 28 Dec. 1903; F.O. 2/668, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 82, 1 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/869, staff list, 1 Apr. 1904; E.S.P., staff list, 1 Apr. 1905.
2. F.O. 2/970, minute by Hill, n.d., on Admiralty to F.O., 18 Nov. 1903.
3. F.O. 2/758, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 136, 31 Oct. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Swayne tels. to Lansdowne, no. 55, 25 Nov. 1903, no. 57, 3 Dec. 1903 and no. 60, 12 Dec. 1903.
4. F.O. 2/816, C.-in-C. East Indies tel. to Admiralty, no. 40, 3 Nov. 1903, enclosed in Admiralty to F.O., 4 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 153, 28 Dec. 1903; F.O. 2/872, minute by Swayne, 19 Apr. 1904, on Admiralty to F.O., 12 Mar. 1904; F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 110, 8 Sept. 1904.
5. F.O. 2/970, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 69, 30 Dec. 1903; F.O. 2/908, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 45, 30 June 1904; F.O. 2/871, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 53, 22 Sept. 1904.

but in the event neither materialised. The Warsangeli were dissatisfied over certain claims for compensation resulting from Egerton's expedition and Swayne decided to postpone the post at Las Koroah until he had the steamer to keep in close touch with the area;¹ but the steamer itself fell victim to economy cuts in 1905.²

Together with these plans for expanding the administration Swayne was hoping for more activity in the field of private enterprise. In 1899 Charles MacConkey had eventually been granted his concession to cultivate, manufacture and export aloe fibre;³ but he failed to act on this, probably because he lacked the necessary capital. Using the excuse that he was unable to find suitable machinery and that war was preventing him from starting, he applied for extensions to the time limit in his concession on no less than six separate occasions.⁴ Five times the Foreign Office accepted his arguments and extended his concession.⁵ By March 1904, however, when his sixth request for an extension arrived, they were losing

-
1. F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 160, 20 Oct. 1904 and enclosures; F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, 30 Dec. 1904.
 2. C.O. 535/1, minutes by H.J. Read (clerk, C.O.) 5 June 1905 & 11 Aug. 1905, and C.P. Lucas (assistant under-secretary, C.O.), date unclear, on Swayne to Lyttelton, no. 172, 28 Apr. 1905; C.O. 535/2; minutes by Lucas, 15 Aug. 1905 and Sir M.F. Ommaney (permanent under-secretary, C.O.), 15 Aug. 1905 on Admiralty to C.O., 10 Aug. 1905.
 3. See above, pp. 161-2, 295.
 4. F.O. 2/784, MacConkey to F.O., 1 Nov. 1900, 20 Aug. 1901, 1 Jan. 1903, 18 May 1903 and 29 Sept. 1903; F.O. 2/983, MacConkey to F.O., 10 Mar. 1904.
 5. F.O. 2/784, Sadler to Lansdowne, no. 15, 22 Jan. 1901; F.O. to MacConkey, 30 Dec. 1901; Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 15, 23 Jan. 1903; F.O. to MacConkey, 16 May 1903, 22 May 1903 & 9 Nov. 1903.

patience and they stipulated that he should import machinery into Somaliland and commence work within a specified period.¹ When he failed to meet these conditions his concession finally lapsed.² But the Aden trading firm, Luke Thomas, had also applied, in 1903, for a concession to work fibre and prospect for minerals. It was hoped that they would be sufficiently enterprising to develop new industries in the protectorate and their concessions were approved.³ In February 1904, however, Luke Thomas cried off, when they realised that it would require more money than they could afford; they abandoned their concessions.⁴ There were others, however. In 1903, two Canadians, Major R.G.E. Leckie and Guy H. Kirkpatrick, had begun prospecting for minerals in the west of the protectorate, while Lieut.-Col. Ashby, who had been political agent in Zeila and Berbera in the late 1880's,⁵ and who had been investigating the possibilities of fibre manufacture for Luke Thomas, had also been prospecting in the east of the protectorate.⁶ In 1904 Leckie and

-
1. F.O. 2/983, minute by Swayne, 31 Mar. 1904, on MacConkey to F.O., 10 Mar. 1904; F.O. to MacConkey, 6 Apr. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/983, MacConkey to F.O., 18 Apr. 1904; minutes by W.E. Davidson (legal adviser, F.O.), 13 Mar. 1905 and 14 Mar. 1905, and Hill, n.d., on Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 75, 22 Feb. 1905.
 3. F.O. 2/758, Luke Thomas & Co. Ltd., Aden, to Cordeaux, 7 Feb. 1903, enclosed in Cordeaux to Hill, 12 Feb. 1903; Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 82, 2 July 1903; F.O. 2/784, Cordeaux tel. to Lansdowne, no. 2, 10 Feb. 1903; Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 22, 18 Feb. 1903 and no. 39, 9 Apr. 1903; Lansdowne to Cordeaux, no. 71, 13 Mar. 1903 and no. 140, 16 May 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/983, Luke Thomas & Co. Ltd., London, to Hill, 4 Feb. 1904.
 5. See above p. 180, footnote 5.
 6. F.O. 2/757, Lansdowne to Cordeaux, no. 47, 23 Feb. 1903; F.O. 2/758, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 82, 2 July 1903; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 113, 8 Oct. 1903.

Kirkpatrick obtained a concession to export guano and Kirkpatrick was given a thirty-year licence to collect it; he began to work the guano deposits on Meit Island and later transferred his rights to a London company calling itself the Meit Island Company.¹ The next year, Kirkpatrick joined with Leckie and Ashby in applying for a concession to grow and manufacture aloe fibre in the protectorate and they planned to form a company with a capital of £150,000 to carry this out. These men were bringing more energy to the task of developing Somaliland than anyone had done previously, and Swayne was looking forward to employing considerable numbers of destitute refugees in the fibre industry.²

On the other hand there were some development projects which were abandoned as a direct result of the policy of withdrawal. A small, yet important, example was the attempt to drill for water. There were hopes that an artesian well system could be developed,³ and Egerton's force had included an engineer officer who began drilling for water south of Sheikh and Burao.⁴ There were no immediate results, but there was a fair chance

-
1. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 86, 20 July 1904; F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 197, 2 Dec. 1904, and unnumbered despatch, 30 Dec. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/985, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 75, 22 Feb. 1905; C.O. 535/4, Ashby, Kirkpatrick and Leckie to C.O., 11 May 1905.
 3. F.O. 2/617, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 39, 10 Apr. 1902; F.O. 2/758, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 102, 7 Sept. 1903.
 4. W.O. 106/236/xii, 21, journal entry for 17 Nov. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiii, 8, 13 & 30, Egerton tel. to W.O., 5 Dec. 1903, journal entries for 10 Dec. 1903 & 23 Dec. 1903; W.O. 106/236/xiv, 7, journal entry for 6 Jan. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xiv, 15, staff diary entry for 10 Mar. 1904; W.O.L./Journal/xix, 18, O.C. line of communications tel. to W.O., 13 June 1904; F.O. 2/909, staff diary entry for 14 July 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 8 Aug. 1904.

of success and Egerton had recommended that the experiment be continued after the operations were ended.¹ Swayne also wished to continue the experiment, but as this would have involved a further call on the Treasury, and as drilling in the interior was hardly in accordance with the policy of withdrawal, Lansdowne ruled that the project be dropped.²

A far bigger casualty of the new policy was the plan to build a railway. It will be recalled that in 1900 the Treasury had refused to consider a railway in Somaliland until the Uganda railway was completed, and that in 1901 the French Government had given a subsidy to the Ethiopian Railway Company to prevent its Djibouti railway from falling into foreign hands.³ British plans for a railway had therefore been shelved, but throughout 1902, as the Djibouti railway crept towards Direedawa the effect on British Somaliland became increasingly obvious as the Zeila trade figures fell; there were fears that Aden too would suffer.⁴ Consequently, people began to reconsider a British railway in Somaliland, especially as the Uganda railway had reached Lake Victoria in December 1901, giving some hope of Treasury support. The Intelligence Division of the War Office

-
1. W.O. 106/236/xvi, 15, Egerton tel. to W.O., 22 Mar. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/871, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 24, 28 July 1904, and minutes thereon by Hill, 30 July 1904 and Lansdowne, n.d.; F.O. 2/863, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 238, 11 Aug. 1904.
 3. See above, p. 292.
 4. F.O. 2/617, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 80, 31 Mar. 1902; F.O. 2/619, F.O. to Treasury, 12 Apr. 1902; F.O. 2/802, memo. by Sanderson, 28 June 1902; The Times, 29 Mar. 1902, report on Somali Coast Protectorate Trade Report 1900-01; Hansard, 4th series, 1902, cix, 1103, question by Pease, 19 June 1902.

would be worthwhile on commercial grounds alone;¹ in Egypt, Cromer considered that the danger of French dominance in Ethiopia was almost enough to justify the project regardless of other considerations.²

Harrington, also, and his staff in Ethiopia, had no doubts about the urgent need for the railway, for political purposes in Ethiopia and administrative purposes in Somaliland.³ Only the Treasury was sceptical. They feared that a British survey would merely stimulate the French to hasten on their line and that anticipated returns would not justify the initial outlay of £2 million on a British line. They were not willing to finance a survey until the French line was completed and its effects properly gauged, and Foreign Office protests left them unmoved.⁴

The Foreign Office therefore approached the War Office, who were financing and directing the campaign in Somaliland, and the result was that the Treasury allotted £2,000 for a railway survey from Berbera to Harar, on condition that this in no way committed the Government to the construction of the line.⁵ In April 1903, Major S.L. Cra'ster, R.E., was

-
1. F.O. 2/802, Cordeaux to Lansdowne, no. 84, 14 Aug. 1902.
 2. F.O. 2/802, Cromer tel. to Lansdowne, no. 80, 17 Oct. 1902.
 3. F.O. 2/802, Harrington to Sanderson, 24 Jan. 1903; memo. by Harrington, 16 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/816, Baird to Harrington, 28 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Harrington to Maxwell, 23 Nov. 1903; F.O. 800/124, Baled to Cromer, 20 Oct. 1903, enclosed in Cromer to Sanderson, private, 15 Nov. 1903.
 4. F.O. 2/802, Treasury to F.O., 14 Nov. 1902 & 17 Dec. 1902; F.O. to Treasury, 1 Dec. 1902; Sanderson to Mowatt (private), 2 Dec. 1902.
 5. F.O. 2/802, F.O. to W.O., 23 Dec. 1902; Mowatt to Sanderson, 28 Jan. 1903; Treasury to F.O., 7 Mar. 1903.

commissioned to survey the route from Berbera, and on Menelik's suggestion, to continue the survey as far as Harar.¹ Egerton, who arrived soon after Cra'ster, agreed with Swayne in advocating a branch from the Berbera-Hargeisa line to Burao and possibly to Bohotleh. This would facilitate the administration of the protectorate and give some assurance to the friendly clans that the British were there to stay.²

Cra'ster's report was laid before the Cabinet in November 1903. If the railway were to be a commercial success he thought it should be built to Harar, not only to Hargeisa or Jijiga; but this would depend on whether Menelik would finance the construction of the section within Ethiopia. Politically, he thought the case for a railway was far stronger. He recommended that a branch line from Argan (60 miles southwest of Berbera) to Burao would enable Britain to occupy the interior more cheaply, supply it more easily, control it more effectively and reinforce it more rapidly. In fact, he argued that the construction of a railway would be a more certain way of destroying the Sayyid's power than defeating him in battle. Argan, in the hills, was his proposed railway headquarters; from here lines were to run to Berbera, Burao and Harar via Hargeisa. The 373 miles of line would cost £1,033,760 for

-
1. F.O. 2/802, Cromer tel. to Lansdowne, no. 13, 6 Apr. 1903; Lansdowne to Maj. S.L. Cra'ster, 8 Apr. 1903.
 2. W.O. 106/236/viii, 44 & 47, Egerton tels. to W.O., 26 July 1903 and 23 July 1903; F.O. 2/802, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 3, 6 Oct. 1903.

2'6" gauge or £1,131,573 for metre gauge, figures which included over £30,000 for improvements to Berbera harbour and jetty. The annual revenue which he expected from the railway, £25,519, would give an annual return of about 2½% on the original capital.¹

Sir Francis O'Callaghan, the railway engineer who had been managing member of the Uganda Railway Committee, persuaded the Treasury to finance a secondary survey of the section from Berbera to Argan.² This secondary survey did not begin until the second half of 1904; but by this time the decision had been taken to withdraw to the coast. There was no hope of getting approval for a railway. Lansdowne appreciated this, but he still wanted the secondary survey carried out for an entirely different reason. Tripartite negotiations were being held between Britain, France and Italy about Ethiopia and the Djibouti railway; Britain and Italy hoped that the French would agree to internationalise the railway. Lansdowne felt that it would be a useful bargaining factor in these negotiations if the British were able to keep alive the idea that they were prepared to build a line of their own to compete with the Djibouti railway.³ Accordingly,

1. F.O. 2/802, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 43, 8 Oct. 1903; Cabinet print by Craister, 12 Nov. 1903; CAB 37/67/78, Cabinet memo. prepared by F.O., 28 Nov. 1903; F.O. 2/905, Craister to F.O., 2 Jan. 1904; memo. by Sir F.L. O'Callaghan, 25 Mar. 1904.
2. F.O. 2/802, Treasury to F.O., 7 Dec. 1903; F.O. 2/905; F.O. to Treasury, 6 Jan. 1904; Treasury to F.O., 13 Jan. 1904.
3. F.O. 800/2 (Sanderson papers), Ochs to Cromer, 29 Jan. 1904, enclosed in Cromer to Sanderson, 30 Jan. 1904; F.O. 2/905, I.D.W.O. to F.O., 26 Feb. 1904; minutes by Lansdowne and Percy, both n.d., on I.D.W.O. to F.O., 6 July 1904; F.O. to I.D.W.O., 15 July 1904.

two Royal Engineers surveyed the proposed route to Arjan and pegged it out; their report was ready by April 1905. By this time the tripartite negotiations were nearly ended, and as the survey had served its purpose the plans were sent to the War Office where they were put away and forgotten.¹ The tripartite negotiations did not secure the internationalisation of the Djibouti railway; in fact, France obtained the right to continue the line to Addis Ababa, which was eventually reached, in the face of Ethiopian obstruction, in 1918. In return, Britain and Italy were guaranteed equal treatment with France on the line, Britain was given the right to build the line west of Addis Ababa and another railway from Somaliland through Ethiopia to the Sudan, while Italy was allowed to build a line from the Benadir to Eritrea. These agreements were attached to the Anglo-Franco-Italian treaty of 1906 which divided Ethiopia into spheres of influence in the event of its breaking up.² Needless to say, the line from Somaliland to the Sudan never materialised; nor did any line in British Somaliland. The decision of 1904 to withdraw from the interior had effectively ruled it out.

-
1. F.O. 2/905, W.O. to F.O., 17 Sept. 1904; C.O. 535/4, Capt. A.G. Stevenson, R.E. to C.O., 29 Apr. 1905, and minutes thereon by W.C. Bottomley (clerk, C.O.), 15 May 1905, and Read, 17 May 1905; F.O. to C.O., 26 July 1905, and minute thereon by Read, 31 July 1905; C.O. to D.M.O., 8 Aug. 1905.
 2. C.O. 535/4, F.O. to C.O., 26 July 1905; F.O. 800/160, Ab/05/2, Bertie (British ambassador, Paris) to Lansdowne, private, 22 Jan. 1905, and Ab/06/3, Sir E. Grey (secretary of state for foreign affairs) to Bertie, private, 1 June 1906; The Times, 14 Dec. 1906; Jones & Monroe, A History of Ethiopia, pp. 147-8, 152-3; Greenfield, Ethiopia..., pp. 126-8.

It was only to be expected that the railway would go after the new policy had been adopted; that was a straightforward decision. The really agonising question concerned the details of the defensive scheme which was part of the new policy. For the first few months, the War Office was to pay for a temporary military garrison¹ which would hold the Berbera-Bohotleh line until Swayne's armed clansmen were ready to take over.² This garrison consisted of two battalions of Indian Native Infantry in the posts and two companies of Indian Mounted Infantry based at El Dab from where they could command the Nogal Valley.³ The garrison numbered 1,876 officers and men, and 2,248 followers, and was commanded by Lieut.-Col. Melliss, V.C., (101st Grenadiers)⁴ who had organised the Musa Abokir levies during Egerton's campaign. Swayne was sent out with the local rank of Brigadier-General to give him overall command;⁵ In addition to the temporary garrison, the new policy envisaged a small nucleus of regular troops at Berbera, as a permanent garrison, as had always been the case since 1865.⁶ This force was to be a reconstituted 6 K.A.R.. Swayne hoped to include in it a proportion of Sudanese who would provide

-
1. F.O. 2/873, F.O. to Treasury, 14 May 1904; F.O. 2/874, W.O. to F.O., 19 July 1904; Hansard, 4th series, 1905, cxlii, 206-8, speech by financial secretary to W.O., 2 Mar. 1905.
 2. F.O. 2/908, I.D.W.O. to F.O., 18 Apr. 1904 (misplaced at 2 May 1904)
 3. F.O. 2/908, Egerton tel. to W.O., 15 Mar. 1904, included in a print prepared for the Cabinet, 2 May 1904; Egerton tel. to W.O., 22 Apr. 1904; W.O. 106/236/xviii, 12 & 13, W.O. tel. to Egerton, 10 May 1904, and journal entry for 13 May 1904.
 4. W.O.L./Journal/xix, 3, strength return, 1 June 1904 and journal entry for 1 June 1904.
 5. W.O. 106/236/xviii, 25, F.O. to Army Council, 18 May 1904.
 6. CAB 37/70/62, memo. by Lansdowne, 28 Apr. 1904.

an element unaffected by local feeling and the almost superstitious fear of the Sayyid which possessed Somalis. Cromer, however, refused to spare any Sudanese as he had difficulty enough recruiting them for the Egyptian army.¹ 6 K.A.R. would therefore have to be an all-Somali force.

Even before Swayne reached Somaliland he began pressing for a modification of the strict policy of withdrawal. He did not believe that he could properly organise the clans for their own defence, and give them sufficient cohesion in the three or four months before the temporary garrison was due to leave. He argued that when the garrison withdrew, the arms issued to the clans would simply fall into dervish hands. His solution was to raise a temporary Somali force who could hold the country until the clans were ready to defend themselves; this force would then be disbanded and the men would become the nucleus of the clan defence system.² A similar proposal had already been made by Grierson in the War Office. As the temporary garrison would have to leave within four months for the sake of its health he recommended that a force of 1,300 Somalis be recruited to take its place.

This was no new proposal, as far as the War Office was concerned, but

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Hill, 21 Apr. 1904; memo. by Swayne, 10 May 1904; F.O. 2/868, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 158, 19 May 1904; F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Hill, 29 May 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Hill, 29 May 1904.

it surprised Lansdowne who had foreseen no difficulties in the withdrawal. On 3 June 1904 a meeting was held to try to reach some agreement. Hill, who was no believer in the strict policy of withdrawal, represented the Foreign Office, Col. Altham represented the War Office and Sir George Murray¹ the Treasury.² They accepted that it would be 12 or 18 months before the clans were ready to defend themselves and they recommended a temporary Somali force of 1,500 men for six months. If this was not done, and the withdrawal took place in September, they prophesied a rapid increase in the Sayyid's power, renewed raids, anarchy and large, new expeditions.³ Lansdowne, however, was not prepared to modify his policy without good reason. He wanted Swayne's opinion now that he was actually back in Somaliland, and he reminded him of the official policy:

'I cannot too strongly press upon you that His Majesty's Government are determined not to approve any scheme which would involve the establishment at points remote from the coast of a regular civil administration under the superintendence of resident European officers.'⁴

Swayne's reply recommended a departure from the policy. He thought

-
1. Murray, Sir George Herbert, K.C.B. (later Rt. Hon. Sir George, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.V.O.), 1849-1936; 1873, entered Foreign Office; 1880, joined Treasury; private secretary to Gladstone and Rosebery when they were prime ministers; 1897-99, chairman, Board of Inland Revenue; 1899-1903, secretary to the Post Office; 1903-11, permanent secretary to the Treasury.
 2. F.O. 2/873, memo. by Grierson; 21 May 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to Hill, 21 May 1904 and minutes thereon by Lansdowne and Hill, both n.d.
 3. F.O. 2/873, memo. by Murray, Hill and Altham, 4 June 1904, also in CAB 37/71/75.
 4. F.O. 2/871, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 36, 8 June 1904.

that it would take a year for the clans to organise themselves adequately for defence against the Sayyid; any withdrawal before that would only result in disaster. Yet he wanted the temporary garrison withdrawn in September because its followers and its Indian allowances made it expensive but inefficient. He wished to replace it with a force of 800 Punjabis, who would be recruited for one year from the Indian Army and who would garrison the interior more cheaply and effectively than a regular Indian regiment. During this year of grace the Ishaak clans would be reorganised. 100 rifles would be issued to the Aidagalla in the west to protect their grazing grounds. In the centre, 500 rifles would be given to the Habr Yunis who would have to garrison Bohotleh with 200 riflemen. In the east, 300 rifles would go to the Habr Toljaala who would be expected to hold El Dab with 200 riflemen. The garrisons of Bohotleh and El Dab would be properly organised under trained Somalis and the Government would give 23,500 a year towards the cost of paying and rationing them. 6 K.A.R., the permanent force, was to consist of 500 mounted men, initially Somalis, based on the coast, who, together with two political officers would be responsible for maintaining order among the clans of the interior.

Lansdowne did not like the idea of controlling the clans from the coast, but Swayne had given way on certain of his own points. In particular, he had originally wanted to hold Burao and Las Dureh permanently, but he compromised and recommended that they be evacuated

after twelve months and handed over to the clans in the same way as Bohotleh and El Dab.¹ This compromise seems to have won Lansdowne's approval for Swayne's scheme.² Crowe and Hill, the two Foreign Office officials responsible for the African protectorates, gave strong support to Swayne's plans, arguing that in the long run they would be cheaper than immediate withdrawal.³ The king put in a word in favour of Swayne's scheme,⁴ the chancellor of the exchequer agreed to provide the necessary annual subsidy⁵ and predictably, the Director of Military Operations urged that the scheme be approved at once, although he disliked the early evacuation of Bohotleh and El Dab.⁶

Because it was in line with the original policy the Foreign Office gave immediate approval to the plan to raise 500 men for 6 K.A.R. although they reminded Swayne that their ultimate function was to protect the coastal districts, not the interior. Similarly, despite advice to the

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne tels. to Lansdowne, no. 2, 13 June 1904, no. 6, 17 June 1904 and no. 12, 27 June 1904; (copies also in F.O. 2/871); F.O. 2/871, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 12, 27 June 1904; F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 73, 27 June 1904 and no. 83, 14 July 1904; Swayne to Hill, 13 July 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/869, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 73, 27 June 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/871, minute by Crowe, 20 June, on Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 6, 17 June 1904; memo. by Hill, 29 June 1904, on Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 12, 27 June 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/908, minute by Edward VII, n.d., on Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 2, 13 June 1904.
 5. F.O. 2/869, minute by A. C. Chamberlain⁷ (chancellor of the exchequer), 13 July 1904, on Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 73, 27 June 1904.
 6. F.O. 2/873, D.M.O. to F.O., 17 June 1904.

contrary from the Director of Military Operations and General Egerton, they approved the plan to hand over Bohotleh and El Dab to the clans.¹ The remaining points, being modifications of the original policy, required more consideration. On 23 June the Cabinet approved the recruitment of 500 Punjabis for one year² and soon afterwards the Foreign Office approved Swayne's plans for arming the clans. At the instigation of the Director of Military Operations they also sanctioned the employment of political officers, based on Berbera, to keep in touch with the clans and inspect their military organisation;³ when the wisdom of distributing arms to the clans was questioned in parliament it was convenient to be able to state that they would be 'subject to the close supervision of the British officers stationed at Berbera.'⁴

In planning to recruit 800 Punjabi volunteers from the Indian Army to relieve the temporary garrison Swayne hoped to avoid the cumbersome establishment of followers, transport and medical men which added to the expense and reduced the mobility of a regular Indian regiment. The Government of India, however, refused to allow him to recruit trained men

-
1. F.O. 2/908, memo. by Egerton, 15 June 1904, also in CAB 37/71/81; Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 40, 17 June 1904.
 2. CAB 41/29/22, Balfour tel. to Edward VII, 29 June 1904; F.O. 2/908, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 45, 30 June 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/874, D.M.O. to F.O., 12 July 1904; F.O. 2/868, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 206, 14 July 1904; F.O. 2/871, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 48, 14 July 1904.
 4. Hansard, 4th series, 1904, cxl, 411, question by Dilke and written answer by Arnold-Forster, 12 Aug. 1904.

or reservists; it was pointless to recruit untrained men.¹ The most India would offer was a regular regiment at twice the cost Swayne had estimated for the Punjabis. Brodrick however, managed to persuade the Indian Government to halve the cost of the proposed regiment, the Foreign Office found themselves committed to accepting it,² and Swayne, who objected, was overruled.³ The 33rd Punjab Infantry was eventually chosen.⁴ They reached Berbera on 1 October 1904, 762 strong, with only 108 followers and Swayne was sufficiently impressed to comment: 'I do not recollect to have ever seen a finer body of men.'⁵

His impressions of the second-rate Bombay troops in the existing temporary garrison, with its masses of followers and staff, were far less favourable. Out of 1,600 men they could only muster 600 for the important

-
1. W.O.L./Journal/xix, 24, I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 5 July 1904, Viceroy tel. to I.O., 8 July 1904; F.O. 2/874, D.M.O. to F.O., 12 July 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/874, Viceroy tel. to I.O., 28 July 1904, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 29 July 1904 and minute thereon by Hill, 29 July 1904; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 5 Aug. 1904, copy; D.M.O. to F.O., 6 Aug. 1904, minute thereon by Hill, and Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 10 Aug. 1904, attached; memo. by Hill, 10 Aug. 1904; F.O. to I.O., 12 Aug. 1904; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 28 Aug. 1904, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 29 Aug. 1904, and minute thereon by Crowe, 29 Aug. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/871, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 47, 8 Sept. 1904, and minutes thereon by Crowe, 10 Sept. 1904 & 12 Sept. 1904, and Manning, 11 Sept. 1904; Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 81, 14 Sept. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/874, Viceroy tel. to I.O., 4 Sept. 1904, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 5 Sept. 1904, and minutes thereon by Crowe, 5 Sept. 1904 and Lansdowne, n.d.; Viceroy tel. to I.O., 11 Sept. 1904, copy.
 5. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 148, 13 Oct. 1904.

mobile column at El Dab¹, and when an emergency did arise this column was far too immobile to be of any use². Friction occurred between Swayne and Melliss, the commander of the temporary garrison, just as it had between Swayne and Egerton. The commissioner prohibited Melliss from sending long-range reconnaissances down the Nogal; Melliss complained that he would be unable to obtain reliable intelligence as a result, but Swayne dismissed this as 'blind heroism' and the Foreign Office supported him³. Melliss also protested that Swayne was depriving him of essential transport animals while Swayne complained that Melliss underestimated the hostility between Indian and Somali troops⁴. Swayne then began to claim that Melliss was criticising all his orders, and when, finally, in August, Melliss refused to stop his sentries firing on civilians, Swayne deprived him of

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 6, 17 June 1904; F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Q.M.G. India, 22 Sept. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 135, 4 Oct. 1904; F.O. 2/933, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 10, 10 Jan. 1905; W.O.L./Journal/xix, 23, journal entry for 22 June 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to W.O., 10 Sept. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 115, 10 Sept. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Hill, 13 July 1904; F.O. 2/909, staff diary entry, 15 July 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 8 Aug. 1904, and minute thereon by Hill, n.d.; staff diary entry, 17 July 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 15 Aug. 1904, and minutes thereon by Hill and Lansdowne, both n.d., staff diary entry, 31 July 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 22 Aug. 1904; Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 246, 19 Aug. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/909, staff diary entry, 2 Aug. 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 31 Aug. 1904; F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 114, 9 Sept. 1904.

command of the temporary garrison and assumed control himself.¹

Fortunately, these strained relations were not to last for long for on 13 October the 33rd Punjabis marched inland to relieve the temporary garrison, which returned to India at the end of that month.²

The Punjabis were to stay for one year during which time Swayne had to organise the clans so that they would defend themselves when the Punjabis left. Their headquarters were at Wadamago, and companies were stationed at Burao, on the coast, and temporarily at Bohotleh until the clans took over. Swayne was pleased with them, especially as they only cost about one-third of the cost of the former temporary garrison; furthermore, he got on unusually well with their commanding officer.³ Communications with the interior posts were kept up by the maintenance of the temporary telegraph and telephone lines erected during the expeditions,⁴ but the Treasury hoped that these would be abandoned when the year of grace ended on 30 September 1905.⁵

-
1. F.O. 2/874, Swayne tel. to W.O., no. 5, 13 Aug. 1904, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 16 Aug. 1904; Melliss tel. to W.O., 26 Aug. 1904, enclosed in W.O. to F.O., 31 Aug. 1904; F.O. 2/871, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 61, 17 Aug. 1904; Swayne tels. to Lansdowne, no. 37, 19 Aug. 1904 and no. 46, 8 Sept. 1904; F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Hill, 1 Sept. 1904; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 113, 8 Sept. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 147, 13 Oct. 1904; F.O. 2/871, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 68, 12 Nov. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 191, 2 Dec. 1904; F.O. 2/933, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 10, 10 Jan. 1905.
 4. War Office, Official History..., ii, 477-487.
 5. F.O. 2/871, Swayne tels. to Lansdowne, no. 29, 4 Aug. 1904 and no. 50, 16 Sept. 1904; Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 94, 5 Oct. 1904; F.O. 2/874, Treasury to F.O., 30 Sept. 1904; C.O. 535/3, Treasury to C.O., 12 Apr. 1905.

Swayne also had permission to raise 6 K.A.R. to 500 men and to use them to keep order among the armed clans of the interior. Major M.L. Hornby¹ of 5 K.A.R. recruited the battalion which was complete by August 1904 when command passed to Lieut.-Col. E.H. Gorges² of 4 K.A.R.;³ Hornby became chief staff officer to Swayne⁴. In February 1905 Gorges left to take command of 1 K.A.R., a Central African battalion serving in East Africa; and Major J.A. Hannington⁵ of 3 K.A.R. took over 6 K.A.R.⁶ The battalion was exclusively Somali, but care was taken to enlist influential men; Swayne and Hornby were well pleased with them.⁷ At first 300 men were mounted on camels and 200 as mounted infantry on ponies, but Manning, the Inspector-General of K.A.R., considered these proportions wrong, and 100 men were transferred from the camelry to the mounted infantry.⁸

-
1. Hornby, Maj. Montague Leyland, D.S.O. (later Brig.-Gen. Hornby, C.B., C.M.G.), 1870-1948; early service in Indian Army and 5 K.A.R.; 1904-7, staff officer to commissioner, Somaliland; 1914-18, commanded a battalion and later a brigade, in Europe.
 2. Gorges, Lieut.-Col. Edmund Howard, D.S.O. (later Brig.-Gen. Gorges, C.B., C.B.E.), 1868-1949; 1887, joined army; 1898, joined K.A.R.; 1905, commanded 1 K.A.R.; 1912-16, commandant, West Africa Regt.; 1914-16, commanded a brigade in Europe.
 3. W.O.L./Journal/xix, 15, Swayne tel. to F.O., no. 15, 4 July 1904; F.O. 2/871, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 40, 25 Aug. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/871, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 113, 28 Dec. 1904.
 5. Hannington, Maj. John Arthur (later Brig.-Gen. Hannington, D.S.O., C.B., C.M.G.), 1868-1918; 1889, joined army; early service in Indian Army and K.A.R.; 1905-1910, commanded 6 K.A.R. in Somaliland.
 6. F.O. 2/871, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, 21 Dec. 1904.
 7. F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 96, 12 Aug. 1904; F.O. 2/875, extract from Hornby to Crowe, 29 Dec. 1904.
 8. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 148, 13 Oct. 1904 and minute thereon by Manning, 28 Oct. 1904; Swayne to Crowe, 2 Dec. 1904; F.O. 2/933, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 10, 10 Jan. 1905.

The employment of political officers to supervise the organisation and arming of the clans had been approved by the Government. An early idea had been to employ Harald Swayne, Swayne's brother in the Indian Army who had much experience of travelling in Somaliland,¹ but he did not believe the policy of withdrawal would succeed and declined to serve under his younger brother.² Instead, one of the police officers from India, who had been loaned as a temporary administrative officer, R.S.F. Macrae, agreed to stay on as political officer, and a certain eccentric Captain Frank Smitheman, who was said to have done invaluable work of a similar nature in South Africa, was appointed his assistant.³ Swayne was very satisfied with their work and claimed that with half a dozen like them he could easily work the protectorate without the assistance of other Europeans.⁴

Although in principle, Swayne disagreed with the policy of withdrawal, he seems to have made an honest attempt to implement it. The essential thing was to evolve sufficient cohesion among the clans to enable them to withstand the Sayyid. Macrae worked in the east, among the Isbr Toljaala

-
1. F.O. 2/868, Lensdowne to Swayne, no. 158, 19 May 1904; W.O. 106/236/xviii, 29, I.O. tel. to Viceroy, 21 May 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/874, H. Swayne to Chief Engineer Bombay, 25 June 1904, enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 18 Aug. 1904; W.O.I./Journal/xix, 23, Viceroy tel. to I.O., 25 June 1904.
 3. C.O. 535/8, Swayne tel. to Lensdowne, no. 19, 8 July 1904; E.S.P., staff list, 1 Apr. 1905.
 4. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Crowe, 2 Dec. 1904.

and Habr Yunis, while Smitheman concentrated on the Habr Awal and Aidagalla around Hargeisa.¹ Carefully registered arms were issued to the clans while men were trained and prepared to hold Bohotleh and El Dab.² It was not easy to persuade influential men to co-operate or to induce the clans to combine³ but by August 1904 150 armed Habr Toljaala had moved into El Dab and in November 150 Habr Yunis occupied Bohotleh. The regular troops were withdrawn from El Dab although they remained temporarily at Bohotleh. Another 50 armed Habr Yunis were distributed among their grazing grounds, 10 Habr Toljaala riflemen took over the post of Shimbir Berris and a further 40 were protecting their encampments. The riflemen were organised into companies and sections, ponies and mules were issued to them, and a 'Wakil' or clan deputy for each clan was appointed.⁴ On the principle that the clans should bear at least part of the cost themselves, Barbera duties were raised from 3% to 7% to pay for the scheme.⁵

One of the disadvantages of the system was that the clans were tempted to misuse their firearms. The Hargeisa area had been disturbed for a long time by inter-clan fights and raids by rifle-armed Ogaden from

-
1. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 89, 27 July 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Hill, 13 July 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 125, 22 Sept. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/909, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 59, 2 Oct. 1904; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 160, 20 Oct. 1904; F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 213, 13 Dec. 1904.
 5. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 82, 14 July 1904; F.O. 2/870, Regulation no. 9 of 1904, 23 Nov. 1904.

Ethiopia. As arms were being smuggled in for use in these fights¹ only 50 old Sniders were issued to the western clans, but some of these were quickly misused in a border raid against the Ogaden. As a result, the armament of the Aidaqalla was postponed, Smitheman was sent to inflict heavy fines on the offenders and Swayne decided that he must meet with Ras Makonnen to arrange a settlement of the border disputes before he issued more arms in the west.² This meeting took place at Jijiga at the end of March 1905; a settlement of all old claims arising from Ogaden-Ishaak feuds was agreed upon, representatives of the clans signed a peace agreement and Ras Makonnen promised to disarm the Ogaden.³

Swayne's defence scheme was not solely concerned with the Ishaak. He hoped that if he could persuade the Dolbohanta to desert the Sayyid, the Sayyid's influence in the protectorate would disappear. Accordingly he tried to detach the Aligheri, the lineage group among whom the Sayyid had grown up, and other Dolbohanta dervishes, from their master.⁴ The plan was successful and Aligheri refugees began drifting into Bohotleh and El Dab. However, on fleeing from the Sayyid they had to leave their

-
1. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Hill, 1 Sept. 1904; F.O. 2/909, intelligence report, 7 Sept. 1904, and marginal note thereon by Swayne, n.d., enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 8 Oct. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Crowe, 19 Sept. 1904; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 169, 2 Dec. 1904 and no. 213, 13 Dec. 1904; F.O. 2/933, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 36, 25 Jan. 1905.
 3. C.O. 535/1, report by Hornby, 4 Apr. 1905, enclosed in Swayne to Lyttelton, no. 147, 8 Apr. 1905.
 4. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to Hill, 1 Sept. 1904.

livestock behind, and Swayne felt he could only achieve a wholesale Aligheri desertion if he had £10,000 to provide new livestock for them. The Foreign Office thought that £10,000 would be a small price to pay for such an advantage¹ but the Treasury were reluctant to provide the money.² The Aligheri continued to come over, and by January 1905 Swayne had over 1,200 destitute refugees on his hands and was reiterating his plea for the £10,000.³ The Treasury finally consented⁴ and Swayne was able to meet the needs of the Aligheri and other Dolbohanta refugees.⁵ He planned to withdraw the Habr Toljaala and Habr Yunis from El Dab and Bohotleh, and to hand over these posts to the Dolbohanta refugees, thus identifying their interests with those of the administration; he thought a monthly subsidy would guarantee their loyal behaviour.⁶

Early in 1905 Swayne developed a new scheme for the Isnaak. Copying the enemy's methods he planned to form harouns or vast encampments where all the armed clansmen would be gathered with their families and flocks. This would avoid small, outlying groups while providing defensive groups

-
1. F.O. 2/909, intelligence summary, 6 Oct. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 142, 6 Oct. 1904, and minutes thereon by Crowe, 24 Oct. 1904 and Manning, 25 Oct. 1904; F.O. 2/875, P.O. to Treasury, 5 Nov. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/875, Treasury to P.O., 25 Nov. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/933, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 37, 25 Jan. 1905 and no. 66, 16 Feb. 1905.
 4. F.O. 2/937, Treasury to P.O., 23 Feb. 1905.
 5. F.O. 2/934, intelligence report, 28 Feb. 1905, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 107, 2 Mar. 1905.
 6. E.S.P. Swayne to Barrington, 18 Mar. (?1905); C.O. 535/1, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905.

strong enough to repulse all attacks, where the men would find themselves compelled to combine in defence of their flocks and herds. Swayne attached immense importance to the haroun scheme.¹ The first one was to be organised by Hessaaladar-Major Musa Parah² ('the most influential man in Somaliland' according to Swayne) among the Habr Yunis around Ber. It was to be large enough to muster 1,000 riflemen in an emergency.³ Part of the £10,000 Adigaheri grant was used to finance it,⁴ and the intention was that when El Dab and Bobotleh were handed over to the Dolbohanta the Ishaak garrisons would fall back to join the new harouns.⁵ There was considerable opposition to the scheme from the clansmen⁶ but by June 1905 Swayne was reporting moderate success, and was already handing over El Dab and Bobotleh to the Dolbohanta.⁷

Despite these successful aspects of the defence scheme, however, its overall success was doubtful. The fundamental presupposition on which

-
1. C.O. 535/1, Swayne to R.S.F. Macrae (political officer), 22 Feb. 1905 and 25 Feb. 1905, and Swayne tel. to F. Smitheman (assistant political officer), 11 Mar. 1905, all enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905.
 2. An outline of Musa Parah's career will be found in Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 311-312.
 3. F.O. 2/935, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 60, 16 Feb. 1905; C.O. 535/1, Swayne tel. to Macrae, 22 Feb. 1905, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905.
 4. F.O. 2/935, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 8, 9 Mar. 1905; Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 17, 18 Mar. 1905.
 5. E.S.P., Swayne to Barrington, 18 Mar. (?1905).
 6. C.O. 535/1, Smitheman tels. to Swayne, 11 Mar. 1905 and 15 Mar. 1905, both enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905.
 7. C.O. 535/1, Swayne to Lyttelton, no. 202, 9 June 1905.

the scheme was based was that the Sayyid had been defeated and was now weak and powerless. Yet this was soon seen to be far from the fact. As early as mid-June 1904 he was back in the eastern Nogal, between Illig and the British frontier, with his stock inside the British protectorate.¹ There were reports that he had 6,000 followers and 2,000 rifles² which led Punch to hope 'that he knows, what our Government knows, that he is powerless.'³ These figures were exaggerated, but there was no doubting that the Sayyid was back, for there were skirmishes with his ilalos at Halin and near Domo, in late June,⁴ and in July several reports of the Sayyid himself being near Kallis.⁵ As early as 27 July 1904 Swayne was writing to the Foreign Office: 'the Mullah is still a constant menace to the Protectorate.' He believed that he still had 1,500 rifles, that he was planning further raids, and that his prestige in Somaliland stood as high as, if not higher than, it had ever stood. To make matters worse, Ali Yusuf had retired to Obbia, leaving Mudug and the southern Haud open to the Sayyid. In view of all this, Swayne hinted that Government policy would have to be changed; withdrawal would not succeed; so long as the

-
1. W.O.L./Journal/xix, 16, staff diary entry, 13 June 1904; F.O. 2/908, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 5, 17 June 1904; staff diary entry, 30 June 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 20 July 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Director of Intelligence, W.O., 17 June 1904, /copy.
 3. Punch, 13 July 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/908, intelligence report, 22 June 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 13 July 1904; W.O.L./Journal/xix, 24, journal entry for 26 June 1904.
 5. F.O. 2/909, intelligence report, 16 July 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 8 Aug. 1904; intelligence report, 23 July 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 15 Aug. 1904.

Sayyid remained in or near the Nogal the regular troops could not be withdrawn for the clans had no stomach for resisting him.¹

During August the Sayyid seems to have stayed outside the British protectorate; in September he seems to have crossed the frontier briefly, and then to have retired to the coast where he reoccupied Illig.² Here he was able to import more arms and ammunition, while there were other reports of arms reaching him through the Warsangeli as well as through Bosaso. During September and October dervish raiding parties began to reappear, both in the British protectorate, as far west as Wadamago, and south of the protectorate among the Ogaden.³ By December Swayne was reiterating that he could not 'accept the comfort of the conclusions arrived at as to the powerlessness of the Mullah'.⁴

As the danger of the dervish raids increased Swayne found that he had

-
1. F.O. 2/908, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 88, 27 July 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/909, intelligence report, 8 Aug. 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 31 Aug. 1904; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 96, 12 Aug. 1904; intelligence report, 31 Aug. 1904, enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 29 Sept. 1904; intelligence report, 7 Sept. 1904, and minute by Swayne, 15 Sept. 1904, on intelligence diary, both enclosed in D.M.O. to F.O., 8 Oct. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/909, Swayne tels. to Lansdowne, no. 42, 26 Aug. 1904, no. 58, 29 Sept. 1904 and no. 59, 2 Oct. 1904; telegraph report from intelligence officer, El Dab, 11 Sept. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 116, 13 Sept. 1904; intelligence summary, 10 Oct. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 149, 13 Oct. 1903; intelligence summary, 20 Oct. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 160, 20 Oct. 1904; intelligence report, 30 Oct. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 171, 3 Nov. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 201, 7 Dec. 1904.

insufficient mounted men to protect the clans and he asked permission to raise 150 or 200 mounted ilalos to collect information, prevent raids and pursue raiders. As these would be in addition to the 500 men of 6 K.A.R. this would be a departure from the policy as laid down, and the Foreign Office refused the request.¹ Swayne replied that his consent to that policy, and his defence scheme, had been based on Egerton's assumption that the Sayyid was crushed; as the Sayyid had made a spectacular recovery, and as his name and prestige stood so high, the policy would have to be revised. There was no question of the clans having to cope with insignificant raids; they had to face 'enterprises on a considerable scale organised by the Mullah himself who, we know, disposes of some 1,500 to 2,000 rifles and can at will collect an indefinite number of men.' The clan defence system was simply inadequate for such a situation. In fact, Swayne believed the 33rd Punjabis would have to be retained beyond the twelve-month period for which they had been approved.²

Such views were most unwelcome in the Foreign Office and several reminders were sent to Swayne to the effect that the occupation of the

-
1. F.O. 2/869, Swayne to W.O., 10 Sept. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 115, 10 Sept. 1904; F.O. 2/909, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 58, 29 Sept. 1904, and minutes thereon by Crowe, 29 Sept. 1904 and Lansdowne, 4 Oct. 1904; Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 59, 2 Oct. 1904; F.O. 2/871, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 90, 4 Oct. 1904; Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 62, 14 Oct. 1904; F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 148, 13 Oct. 1904, and minutes thereon by Crowe, n.d., and Manning, 28 Oct. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 153, 19 Oct. 1904 and no. 213, 13 Dec. 1904.

interior was a purely temporary measure for twelve months.¹ The Foreign Office, however, were not having to grapple with the realities of the situation. Swayne was, and he was convinced that the friendly clans would be unable to defend themselves. In February 1905 he and Hornby, who believed Swayne to be too moderate, had worked out a new policy for the protectorate. They believed that the jealousies between clans and sub-clans would prevent their supporting one another and that once the troops withdrew the Sayyid would be able to absorb each of the clans piecemeal until he controlled them all. Quite apart from the damage this would cause to the prestige of the British, it would confine them to a precarious position on the coastline and renewed hostilities would become almost inevitable. The solution, first suggested by Hornby and later embraced by Swayne, was to retain a larger number of British political officers in the interior, together with a good militia force who would be paid, trained as well as armed, and sufficient to repel any attack by the Sayyid. The regular troops would probably have to prolong their stay in the interior, and 6 K.A.R. would have to be changed to a non-Somali force.

Swayne realised that he was asking for a modification of policy but he submitted that the Sayyid's revival made it inevitable. He claimed to have tried honestly to fulfil the Government's policy, which he believed would have succeeded if the Sayyid had been crushed; but he had not been,

1. F.O. 2/868, Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 318, 28 Oct. 1904; F.O. 2/909, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 110, 12 Dec. 1904.

and the policy of withdrawal would not work.¹ Grierson, the Director of Military Operations, who had always favoured some such retention of control, strongly supported Swayne's proposals.² Hill and Lansdowne also found the arguments impressive, but they were spared the responsibility of taking a decision, for by the time these views reached the Foreign Office it had been decided to transfer Somaliland to another Government department.³

This was a logical decision. The Foreign Office was hardly intended for the administration of overseas protectorates and over the past few years it had been shedding these appendages. In 1899 the Niger Coast Protectorate had passed to the Colonial Office, and in 1904, the Central Africa Protectorate. Now, in 1905, the Colonial Office had agreed to take East Africa and Uganda. Somaliland was to be the only protectorate left under Foreign Office control; it seemed ridiculous to retain Sir Clement Hill and his staff in the Foreign Office solely for the purpose of looking after Somaliland. But the Colonial Office had no desire for Somaliland and its troubles and suggested that it be returned to India. The India Office, however, had had too much experience of Somaliland and

-
1. F.O. 2/936, Hornby to Crowe, private, 9 Feb. 1905; F.O. 2/933, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 60, 16 Feb. 1905; F.O. 2/934, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 74, 23 Feb. 1905.
 2. C.O. 535/4, D.M.O. to F.O., 21 Mar. 1905, enclosed in F.O. to C.O., 29 Mar. 1905.
 3. F.O. 2/933, minutes by Hill, 11 Mar. 1903, and Lansdowne, n.d., on Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 60, 16 Feb. 1905.

persuaded the Cabinet to transfer it to the Colonial Office. It was decided that the protectorate which nobody wanted should pass to the Colonial Office on 1 April 1905.¹

The responsibility of deciding on future policy was therefore to be left to the Colonial Office, who had no familiarity with past policy and no experience of restraining Swayne. In the circumstances, it seemed predictable that Swayne would get his way. There seemed no hope of success in the old policy, for the Sayyid had returned to the warpath. Only in the unlikely event of a peace agreement with the Sayyid could the policy of withdrawal have any chance of success. Strangely, such a peace agreement was about to be concluded, through the unlikely mediation of the Italians.

1. F.O. 2/936, unsigned memo., 'Transfer to C.O. of British Protectorates in East Africa', 2 Feb. 1905 and minute thereon by Lansdowne, 5 Feb. 1905.

CHAPTER XIII

PEACE.

The Italian policy of avoiding confrontation with the Sayyid, and of regarding him as 'a not ignoble rebel'¹ had at last paid off. In March 1904 as Egerton's troops were chasing him out of British territory into the Italian protectorate, he wrote to the Italians, asking for friendship and permission to settle in their territory and expressing a wish for peace. The Italian press reported that the Sayyid had asked for Italian protection and mediation with Britain.² Several factors made this approach attractive to Italy. She was about to obtain full ownership of the Benadir ports by outright purchase from the sultan of Zanzibar and good relations with the Sayyid would make an extension of her authority in the Benadir very much easier. Further, Swayne believed that the Italians had at last decided that their Mijertein protectorates had potential which was worth developing; it looked as though they were planning to occupy the important ports. Osman Mahmud might well offer resistance to such occupation, and the Sayyid, if he could be brought under Italian influence as a sort of headman while he was weak and desperate, might prove a useful ally for bringing pressure to bear on Osman Mahmud,

-
1. Hess, 'The "Mad Mullah" and Northern Somalia', Journal of African History, v (1964), 415.
 2. P.O. 2/908, Lansdowne tel. to Bertie, no. 67 Africa, 27 Apr. 1904; The Times, report from Rome, 6 May 1904..

and even on Ali Yusuf and his father, in Obbia.¹ At any rate, the Italians decided to follow up the Sayyid's letters and make contact with him, and at the same time they offered to conduct negotiations with him on behalf of the British Government.² Lansdowne was pleased that they were considering some sort of administration in their Mijertein protectorates,³ and, without committing themselves, the British Government encouraged the Italian plans.⁴

Signor Giulio Pestalozza, recently Italian consul at Zanzibar, and previously consul in Aden, was appointed to lead the Italian mission to the Sayyid, and he was to be accompanied by Abdullah Shahri, the gun-runner whom the Italians had been keeping in confinement. These two left Aden for Illig early in October 1904. The first indication that they had achieved anything came from an intelligence report later that month to the effect that the Sayyid had forbidden his dervishes to raid clans in the British protectorate as he had a truce with the British and was expecting a settlement. Swayne responded by issuing strict orders to all

-
1. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, p. 74; Fess, 'The "Mad Mullah" and Northern Somalia', Journal of African History, v (1964), 422; F.O. 2/908, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 49 Africa, 30 July 1904; F.O. 2/909, Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 53 Africa, 10 Aug. 1904; Swayne to Hill, 16 Nov. 1904; F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Hill, private, 3 Dec. 1904, postscript.
 2. F.O. 2/908, memo. by Hill, 25 July 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/909, minute by Lansdowne, n.d., on Rodd to Lansdowne, no. 53, 10 Aug. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/908, memo. by Hill, 25 July 1904; F.O. 2/909, Lansdowne to Bertie, no. 120 Africa, 5 Aug. 1904.

his men to initiate no hostile action against the dervishes.¹ At the very end of October Pestalozza and Abdullah Shahri returned to Aden and confirmed the reports. They had landed at Illig where they met the Sayyid on 16 and 17 October. The Sayyid agreed to a fifty day truce with the Italians and Mijertein and formulated certain terms for peace with Italy, Britain and Ethiopia. In these terms it was agreed that the Sayyid should receive Italian protection and that he should live in the no-man's land between the two Mijertein protectorates, an area stretching from Ras Gabah to Garad. He also demanded freedom to trade, and grazing rights in the Nogal.²

The prospect of peace was welcome news to the Foreign Office.³ Hill discussed the Sayyid's terms with Egerton, Manning and Sadler. They decided that the demands were acceptable in view of the policy of withdrawal and as to the question of grazing rights in the Nogal, they recommended that it would be 'better to give the Mullah what he will certainly otherwise take for himself.' Lansdowne concurred, and accepted the Italian suggestion that Pestalozza was the best man to act as British

-
1. F.O. 2/909, intelligence report by Macrae, 25 Oct. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, 27 Oct. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/870, Cmdr. A.R. Hulbert (H.M.S. Prosperine) to Swayne, 31 Oct. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 176, 11 Nov. 1904; F.O. 2/909, Aden resident tel. to I.O., 31 Oct. 1904, copy; Lansdowne to Rodd, no. 146 Africa, 2 Nov. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/909, minute by Hill, 2 Nov. 1904, on Aden resident tel. to I.O., 31 Oct. 1904, copy.

negotiator.¹ Swayne was told that the proposals offered a reasonable basis for a settlement and was ordered to Aden to work out the details with Pestalozza.² Swayne took the attitude that as the Italians seemed sure to make peace with the Sayyid whether Britain liked it or not, it was as well to be included in the agreement. The revival of the 'dead Mulla' had spoilt his defence scheme and he was ready to grasp at any chance of peace, however slender.³ He saw no fundamental obstacle in the way of a satisfactory settlement.⁴ He was quite willing to allow the Sayyid's followers to graze in the Nogal and he suggested only a few minor alterations in the proposed terms. He wanted the agreement to state clearly that the Sayyid had subjected himself to Italy and that peace was being granted purely as an act of grace by Britain. He also wanted the Sayyid to agree to disarm on condition that the British clans did so, but he realised that the impossibility of disarming the Mijertein and Ogaden almost ruled out any hope of this. Finally, he recommended that Pestalozza should not be entrusted with the conclusion of a precise settlement with the Sayyid; he should be asked to arrange an extension to the truce while the Sayyid sent an ergo or deputation to hammer out

-
1. F.O. 2/909, 2 memoranda by Hill, both 7 Nov. 1904, and minute thereon by Lansdowne, 7 Nov. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/909, Lansdowne tels. to Swayne, no. 100, 2 Nov. 1904 and no. 101, 8 Nov. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Hill, demi-official, 22 Nov. 1904; F.O. 2/870 Swayne to Crowe, 2 Dec. 1904; Swayne to Hill, private, 3 Dec. 1904, postscript.
 4. F.O. 2/909, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 70, 14 Nov. 1904.

the details in consultation with British representatives.¹ The Foreign Office agreed to this,² but they were far less concerned about the details than Swayne. Their chief concern was to establish 'friendly relations with the Mullah on a lasting basis.' 'The main thing' minuted Hill, 'is that he should leave us & our tribes alone.'³

Late in November 1904 Pestalozza sailed off on his second visit to the Sayyid. In his absence an event occurred which threatened to jeopardise the whole negotiation. On 30 November a group of dervishes, probably acting against the Sayyid's wishes, raided some British clans at El Dab. Contrary to Swayne's orders some mounted infantry of 6 K.A.R., in an excess of zeal, pursued the raiders and killed two very near the Sayyid's haroun. There was considerable fear that the Sayyid would interpret this as an offensive attack against the spirit of the truce and that Pestalozza's life might be endangered. Swayne sent urgent letters, both by sea and overland, to Pestalozza, warning him, and to the Sayyid, putting the onus for breaking the truce on the dervishes. Strict orders were reiterated to restrain the troops in the protectorate.⁴ The letters were probably effective for reports were received that the Sayyid was punishing the

-
1. F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Hill, 16 Nov. 1904; Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 71, 16 Nov. 1904; Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 1N, 16 Nov. 1904.
 2. F.O. 2/909, Lansdowne tel. to Swayne, no. 106, 21 Nov. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/909, minute by Hill, n.d., on Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 1N, 16 Nov. 1904; Lansdowne to Swayne, no. 360, 2 Dec. 1904.
 4. F.O. 2/909, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 211, 9 Dec. 1904, and enclosures; Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, no. 76, 10 Dec. 1904; Swayne to Hill, private, 16 Dec. 1904.

dervishes responsible, and the truce certainly continued.¹ Nor was Pestalozza himself endangered, for the surf had prevented his landing at Illig. Instead, he had put Abdullah Shahri ashore somewhere on the coast and arranged for him to bring a deputation from the Sayyid to Bosaso.² Although this deputation failed to appear, and although Pestalozza had been unable to arrange an extension of the truce, an uneasy peace was observed between the dervishes and the British and their clans.³

Early in 1905 Pestalozza sailed back to Illig, where, on 5 March 1905, he and the Sayyid signed a peace treaty. The Sayyid made peace with the Italians and their clans, the British and their clans and the Ethiopians and theirs. He was to live, under Italian protection, between Garad and Ras Gabah, and Italy reserved the right to instal a resident in his territory. Free trade was allowed, but the Sayyid and his people solemnly pledged to stop trading in arms and slaves. The boundary of the dervish grazing concession in the Nogal was to run from Halin via Hudun and Tifafle to Domo, and the Sayyid renounced his claim to Botohleh.

-
1. F.O. 2/870, Swayne to Hill, 29 Dec. 1904, extract.
 2. F.O. 2/909, Hulbert to Swayne, 14 Dec. 1904, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 220, 16 Dec. 1904; Swayne tels. to Lansdowne, nos. 79 & 80, both 18 Dec. 1904.
 3. F.O. 2/933, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 66, 16 Feb. 1905, enclosing Pestalozza to Swayne, 1 Feb. 1905; F.O. 2/934, intelligence report 28 Feb. 1905, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 107, 2 Mar. 1905; C.O. 535/1, P.O., Burao tel. to Swayne, 4 Mar. 1905 and Swayne tel. to C.O., 33rd Punjab Infantry, 11 Mar. 1905, both enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905.

All disputes between the dervishes and others were to be referred to the Italian Government for decision.¹

After signing the treaty Pestalozza took an influential deputation of the Sayyid's followers, consisting of Abdullah Shahri and three other leaders, to Obbia and Bosaso, where they explained the peace terms to the Mijertein. They then went on to Berbera, arriving in mid-March while Swayne was away in the west on his way to meet Ras Makonnen.² The deputation was met by Ressaldar-Major Musa Farah, Smitheman the assistant political officer and Malcolm Jones, the acting deputy-commissioner. Neither side had plenipotentiary powers, but the peace terms were agreed to and certain points clarified. In particular it was stipulated that dervish trade caravans in the British protectorate would be limited to a strength of ten men who would have to leave their guns behind at the frontier posts.³

1. C.O. 535/1, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 135, 24 Mar. 1905; C.O. 535/4, Pansa to Lansdowne, 28 Mar. 1905, enclosed in F.O. to C.O., 12 Apr. 1905; Pertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), iii, 1120-22; The Somali Peninsula, pp. 118-120; Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia, pp. 133-4; Hess, 'The "Mad Mullah" and Northern Somalia', Journal of African History, v (1964), 422; Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 72-4; Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, pp. 156-9; F.S. Caroselli, Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia (Rome, 1931), pp. 74-93. An Italian Green Book containing the correspondence (Documenti Diplomatici, no. XXVII, 1904-06, 'Somalia Italiana Settentrionale') will be found in C.O. 535/7, in the February 1906 section.
2. C.O. 535/1, Pestalozza tels. to Swayne, 16 Mar. 1905 and 17 Mar. 1905, both enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905.
3. C.O. 535/1, Malcolm Jones to Lansdowne, 24 Mar. 1905; Swayne tel. to Pestalozza, 17 Mar. 1905, enclosed in Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905.

Insofar as it affected Britain, the peace agreement was subject to ratification by the British Government. In essence, they agreed to it, and Pestalozza was awarded a K.C.M.G.¹ There were, however, some points which they considered badly or loosely worded, and others needing clarification. These points were elucidated in a supplementary explanatory agreement between Britain and Italy which, after lengthy discussions, was finally ratified by an exchange of notes on 19 March 1907.²

In Somaliland, however, the peace took effect immediately, in 1905. Swayne believed that the desertion of the Aligheri and other Dolbohanta had been an important factor inclining the Sayyid to ways of peace and pleasantness. The Sayyid had tried to stop the desertions by executing a number of influential elders, but they had continued, especially after Swayne was able to spend the Aligheri grant. As he could no longer trust the Dolbohanta, who made up the majority of his followers, the Sayyid had judged it wise to make peace. Swayne was also anxious that the peace appear to be, primarily, a peace between the dervishes and the British clans, to which the British Government gave its approval. He did not want it to seem to be a peace forced on the clans by the British, and for this reason he refused to insist on a suggestion of Pestalozza's that Musa Farah's daughter should be married to Abdullah Shahri, although he hoped

-
1. C.O. 535/4, F.O. to Pansa, 26 May 1905, enclosed in F.O. to C.O., 2 June 1905; The Times, 3 July 1905.
 2. C.O. 535/4, F.O. to C.O., 12 Apr. 1905; Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn.), iii, 961; The Somali Peninsula, pp. 121-2.

that the peace would be sealed by other similar marriage arrangements.¹

The peace had an important effect on Government policy in the British protectorate. Before its conclusion Swayne had been despairing of the policy of withdrawal and his defence scheme, and he had put forward his militia scheme as a solution. The peace changed all this. In telegraphing news of the peace to London he added that it would now probably be unnecessary to modify the policy.² Two days later he wrote

'I am prepared to give a further and fuller trial to the carrying out of His Majesty's Government's policy of non-intervention in the interior, without modification of any kind, and to provide for the control of the tribes by Political Officers whose permanent location would be at the Coast, and whose duties would be carried out by means of periodical tours of inspection and by their presence for stated periods with training camps.'

He still preferred the idea of a more regular, paid militia under a substantial number of resident British political officers, but in view of the peace he was prepared to carry on with the Government's declared policy. He pinned his hopes on his new haroun scheme and he hoped that by placing the Dolbohanta renegades in Bohotleh and El Dab he could win them thoroughly to his side and employ them as a buffer between dervish and Ishaak.³

-
1. C.O. 535/1, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905, no. 135, 24 Mar. 1905 and no. 141, 31 Mar. 1905.
 2. F.O. 2/935, Swayne tel. to Lansdowne, 17 Mar. 1905.
 3. C.O. 535/1, Swayne to Lansdowne, no. 130, 19 Mar. 1905 and no. 135, 24 Mar. 1905.

In London, there were mixed reactions as to the prospects afforded by the peace. Grierson, true to form, considered that, regardless of the peace, the policy of withdrawal would fail and would have to be replaced by a militia scheme under resident political officers as previously advocated by Swayne. The Foreign Office, as we have noted, were spared the trouble of evaluating the peace and its effect on policy. The Colonial Office, who were inheriting this awkward responsibility, allowed themselves the hope that the peace would rule out the need for any elaborate military arrangements.¹

The Treasury, however, seized on the peace as an admirable chance for dictating economy. No sooner had the Colonial Office taken over Somaliland than they received a lecture in financial prudence from Their Lordships. They listed the relatively large sums of money poured into this seemingly worthless possession since 1898 and 'in view of the alarming growth of its expenditure and the unsatisfactory character of its history in the last few years' they took the opportunity to point out that,

'the military position of the country has been changed by the recent agreement with the Mullah, which should remove the only serious source of military disturbance by which the Protectorate is threatened - and My Lords trust that the result of this alteration may soon become apparent in the Protectorate Estimates.'²

-
1. F.O. 2/937, D.M.O. to F.O., 21 Mar. 1905, and minutes thereon by Hill and Lansdowne, both n.d.; C.O. 535/4, minute by Read, 21 Mar. 1905, on F.O. to C.O., 16 Mar. 1905.
 2. C.O. 535/3, Treasury to C.O., no. 6134/05, 4 Apr. 1905.

The colonial secretary, Alfred Lyttelton,¹ a man with little parliamentary and less ministerial experience, was overawed by this lecture and by the general attitude of the Government:

'It must be remembered that the Cabinet entertain as a whole very strong views against entanglements in the interior, & unless absolute necessity imposes departure from that policy have determined upon withdrawal to the Coast.'²

he wrote. Others in his department showed less awesome respect for the dictates of the Treasury. His permanent under-secretary, Sir Montague Ommamney,³ wrote:

'... it is quite too early in the day to make a forecast of the reality of the Mullah's conversion, or of its effects, especially from the point of view of finance. We must run no risks for the sake of momentary reduction of what is, after all, a very moderate Grant in Aid.'⁴

The next five years were to see a policy struggle between those, like the Treasury, who for the sake of economy insisted on withdrawal, and those, like Ommamney, who took other factors into consideration and argued for a solution less severe; Swayne, of course, was among the latter. The initial victories were to go against the policy of withdrawal but in 1910 that policy was to be enforced, literally and

-
1. Lyttelton, Alfred, 1857-1913; barrister, 1881-1903; M.P., 1895; colonial secretary, 1903-15; cricketer and amateur tennis champion.
 2. C.O. 535/4, minute by Lyttelton, 29 Apr. 1905, on F.O. to C.O., 29 Mar. 1905.
 3. Ommamney, Sir Montague Frederick, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., I.S.O., 1842-1925; 1864, entered Royal Engineers; 1877-1900, Crown Agent for the Colonies; 1900-07, permanent under-secretary, C.O.
 4. C.O. 535/3, minute by Ommamney, 30 Apr. 1905, on Treasury to C.O., no. 6134/05, 4 Apr. 1905.

absolutely. There were to be no victors in this policy struggle, only losers - the people of Somaliland; they were the sufferers because Britain could not make up her mind what to do with them. In 1905, however, when the protectorate passed to the Colonial Office, all seemed set fair for the old policy, the policy of the 1880's, the policy of confining British administration to the coastline alone. Yet this was deceptive. It was an attempt to put the clock back. It was not her influence that Britain wished to confine to the coast, but her expenditure. The interior was just as much part of a British protectorate and British blood and British treasure had been spent in asserting that protectorate. It was all very well asserting that the interior was to be evacuated, but there was no intention of allowing the Sayyid, or any other power, to fill the vacuum. The policy of abandoning the interior was, in fact, unworkable. It was a further example of that half-hearted, indecisive, penny-pinching imperialism which had no interest in the welfare or development of its subjects or their land and which only exerted itself when its own paramountcy was threatened.

APPENDIX A

BRITISH MINISTERS CONCERNED WITH SOMALI AFFAIRS 1870-1905W.E. GLADSTONE'S MINISTRY 1868-1874.

Foreign secretary	1868-1870	Earl of Clarendon
	1870-1874	Earl Granville
Secretary for India	1868-1874	Duke of Argyll

LORD BEACONSFIELD'S MINISTRY 1874-1880.

Foreign secretary	1874-1878	Earl of Derby
	1878-1880	Marquess of Salisbury
Secretary for India	1874-1878	Marquess of Salisbury
	1878-1880	Viscount Cranbrook

W.E. GLADSTONE'S MINISTRY 1880-1885.

Foreign secretary	1880-1885	Earl Granville
Secretary for India	1880-1882	Marquess of Hartington
	1882-1885	Earl of Kimberley

MARQUESS OF SALISBURY'S MINISTRY 1885-1886.

Foreign secretary	1885-1886	Marquess of Salisbury
Secretary for India	1885-1886	Lord Randolph Churchill

W.E. GLADSTONE'S MINISTRY 1886.

Foreign secretary	1886	Earl of Rosebery
Secretary for India	1886	Earl of Kimberley

MARQUESS OF SALISBURY'S MINISTRY 1886-1892.

Foreign secretary	1886-1887 1887-1892	Earl Idgcoteleigh Marquess of Salisbury
Secretary for India	1886-1892	Viscount Cross

W.E. GLADSTONE'S MINISTRY 1892-1894.

Foreign secretary	1892-1894	Earl of Rosebery
Secretary for India	1892-1894	Earl of Kimberley

EARL OF ROSEBERY'S MINISTRY 1894-1895.

Foreign secretary	1894-1895	Earl of Kimberley
Secretary for India	1894-1895	H.H. Fowler

MARQUESS OF SALISBURY'S MINISTRY 1895-1902.

Foreign secretary	1895-1900 1900-1902	Marquess of Salisbury Marquess of Lansdowne
Secretary for India	1895-1902	Lord George Hamilton
Secretary for war	1895-1900 1900-1902	Marquess of Lansdowne Hon. St.J. Brodrick

A.J. BALFOUR'S MINISTRY 1902-1905.

Foreign secretary	1902-1905	Marquess of Lansdowne
Secretary for India	1902-1903 1903-1905	Lord George Hamilton Hon. St.J. Brodrick
Secretary for war	1902-1903 1903-1905	Hon. St.J. Brodrick H.O. Arnold-Forster

APPENDIX B

VICEROYS AND GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF INDIA 1870-1898

Earl of Mayo	1869-1872
Lord Northbrook	1872-1876
Lord Lytton	1876-1880
Marquess of Ripon	1880-1884
Earl of Dufferin	1884-1888
Marquess of Lansdowne	1888-1894
Earl of Elgin	1894-1899

APPENDIX C

GOVERNORS OF BOMBAY 1870-1898

Sir W.R.S.V. Fitzgerald	1867-1872
Sir P.E. Wodehouse	1872-1877
Sir R. Temple	1877-1880
Sir J. Fergusson	1880-1885
Lord Reay	1885-1890
Lord Harris	1890-1895
Lord Sandhurst	1895-1899

APPENDIX D

ADEN RESIDENTS 1839-1898

Cmdr. S.B. Ruines	1839-1854
Col. J. Outram	1854
Brig. W.M. Coghlan	1854-1863
Col. W. Moreweather	1863-1867
Maj.-Gen. E.L. Russell	1867-1870
Maj.-Gen. Sir C.W. Tremeneere	1870-1872
Brig. J.W. Schneider	1872-1877
Maj.-Gen. F.A.E. Loch	1877-1882
Brig.-Gen. J. Blair	1882-1885
Brig.-Gen. A.G.F. Hogg	1885-1891
Brig.-Gen. J. Jopp	1891-1896
Brig.-Gen. C.A. Cuninghame	1896-1898
Brig.-Gen. G.O'M. Creagh	1898-1900

APPENDIX E

OFFICERS ADMINISTERING THE BRITISH PROTECTORATE IN SOMALILAND 1884-1905

Lieut.-Col. F.M. Hunter	1881-1885 consul for the Somali Coast 1885-1887 consul and political agent
Lieut.-Col. E.V. Stace	1887-1893 consul and political agent
Lieut.-Col. C.W.H. Sealy	1893-1895 consul and political agent
Lieut.-Col. W.B. Ferris	1895-1897 consul and political agent
Lieut.-Col. J.M. Sadler	1897-1898 consul and political agent 1898-1901 consul-general
Capt. H.E.S. Cordeaux	1901 acting consul-general
Lieut.-Col. E.J.E. Swayne	1902-1904 commissioner and consul-general 1904-1906 commissioner

From March to May 1904 Maj.-Gen. Sir C.C. Egerton acted as commissioner and consul-general although in practice he deputed his administrative duties to Cordeaux.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(A) MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

1. Foreign Office Papers, Public Record Office, London.
2. Colonial Office Papers, Public Record Office, London.
3. Cabinet Papers, Public Record Office, London.
4. Sanderson Papers, Public Record Office, London.
5. Lansdowne Papers, Public Record Office, London.
6. Bertie Papers, Public Record Office, London.
7. Cromer Papers, Public Record Office, London.
8. India Office Records, Commonwealth Office, London.
9. Salisbury Papers, Christ Church, Oxford.
10. African Manuscripts and others in Rhodes House, Oxford.
11. Kenya National Archives, Nairobi.

(B) PRINTED SOURCES

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Foreign Office Confidential Prints.
2. Colonial Office Confidential Prints.
3. Cabinet Prints.
4. Journal of the Principal Events Connected with Somaliland.
5. India Office Records.
6. Annual Reports on the Administration of the Bombay Presidency.
7. Parliamentary Papers.

8. Periodicals.

9. Hansard.

10. Other Primary Sources.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books

2. Periodicals.

3. Maps and Atlases.

(C) UNPUBLISHED TYPESCRIPTS AND THESES

(A) MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

1. Foreign Office Papers, Public Record Office, London.(a) F.O. 78 (Turkey) Series:

(i) 64 volumes entitled 'Egypt; claims to Sovereignty in the Red Sea, Africa, and Arabia. (Somali Coast).' covering the years 1825-1898.

Volume numbers:

3185-3193	4077-4083	4526-4527
3364-3366	4165-4169	4602-4603
3496-3497	4260-4261	4688-4690
3725-3728	4324-4325	4784-4786
3857-3862	4402-4403	4885-4887
3971-3975	4471	4978-4980

(ii) 7 volumes for 1899 containing draft despatches to Somaliland, despatches from Somaliland, telegrams and miscellaneous correspondence.

Volume numbers:

5030-5032	5037-5040
-----------	-----------

(iii) 15 volumes concerned with consular affairs on the Somali Coast 1881-1905.

Volume numbers:

3334	3957	5033
3467	4317	5092
3586	4521	5236
3702	4675	5371
3831	4964	5435

(iv) A volume containing correspondence concerning the Somali Coast Order in Council 1887-1891.

Volume number:

4410

(v) 5 volumes of telegrams to and from Lord Cromer in Egypt which contain material on the Somali Coast.

Volume numbers:

4313	4389
4350	5089-5090

(b) F.O. 1 (Ethiopia) Series:

(i) 2 volumes concerning Rodd's mission to Ethiopia 1897.

Volume numbers:

32-33

(ii) 5 volumes of correspondence with and about the British agency in Ethiopia 1898-1901.

Volume numbers:

34-37 39

(c) F.O. 2 (Africa) Series:

(i) 37 volumes containing draft despatches to Somaliland, despatches from Somaliland, telegrams and miscellaneous correspondence 1900-1905.

Volume numbers:

312-317	- 616-620	868-875
476-482	757-762	932-937

(ii) 11 volumes entitled 'Campaign (Somaliland) against the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah.' These contain a mass of invaluable material on the campaigns: despatches, telegrams, memoranda, minutes, correspondence with the War Office, etc..

Volume numbers:

809-816 907-909

(iii) 4 volumes concerning the arms trade 1901-1905.

Volume numbers:

677-678 969-970

(iv) 2 volumes concerning fibre concessions in Somaliland.

Volume numbers:

784

983

(v) 2 volumes concerning the proposed railway in Somaliland.

Volume numbers:

802

905

(vi) 24 miscellaneous volumes dealing with financial matters, regulations, military organisation, etc..

Volume numbers:

232

439

797

253

544-545

885-887

260

547

947-948

419-420

555-556

985

424

654-657

432

777-778

(d) F.O. 844 (Embassy and Consular Archives, Somaliland) Series:

One box containing copies of treaties.

Box number:

1

2. Colonial Office Papers, Public Record Office, London.

(a) C.O. 535 Series:

Correspondence between the Colonial Office and Somaliland from March 1905. 13 volumes consulted, covering the period to December 1908.

Volume numbers:

1-13

(b) C.O. 534 Series:

Correspondence concerning the King's African Rifles from 1905. 4 volumes consulted for the years 1905-1908.

Volume numbers:

1.

4-5

9

(c) C.O. 537 Series:

One volume concerning Wingate's mission to Somaliland 1909. This contains a number of extremely valuable reports with information concerning the years before 1905.

Volume number:

44

3. Cabinet Papers, Public Record Office, London.

CAB 41 Series:

Photographic copies of Cabinet papers in the Royal Archives. These contain letters from the prime minister to the sovereign describing the proceedings of Cabinet meetings and are useful for learning the opinions of the prime minister and his colleagues.

Volume numbers:

18 28-30

27 32

4. Sanderson Papers, Public Record Office, London.

The private papers of Lord Sanderson, permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office 1894-1906. A few marginally useful letters and loose minutes and occasional ministerial minutes. In the F.O. 800 Series.

Volume numbers:

1-2

5. Lansdowne Papers, Public Record Office, London.

These include personal papers of both Lord Lansdowne and

Sanderson for the years 1898-1905. Useful on occasions for Lansdowne's private correspondence with Lord Cromer in Cairo and Sir Francis Bertie and Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome. In the F.O. 800 Series.

Volume numbers:

115	132-133
123-124	145

6. Bertie Papers, Public Record Office, London.

Private correspondence between Sir Francis Bertie, ambassador in Rome and Paris 1903-1918 and the foreign secretary.

Occasionally these papers throw more light than the official despatches on Italian and Ethiopian affairs.

In the F.O. 800 Series.

Volume numbers:

160	173
-----	-----

7. Cromer Papers, Public Record Office, London.

Private correspondence between Lord Cromer and the Foreign Office, Lord Northbrook at the Admiralty, other British ministers, Hunter at Aden, etc.. Very useful in view of

Cromer's long stay in Cairo, his responsibility for the evacuation of the Egyptian garrisons from the Somali Coast, and the fact that the British Governments of the day sought his advice on most North-East African problems. In the P.O. 633 Series.

Volume numbers:

4-5

7-9

11

8. India Office Records, Commonwealth Office, London.

These have recently been moved from the India Office Library, King Charles St., to a new home at 197, Blackfriars Rd., London, S.E.1. When they were in the India Office Library it was a time-consuming and frustrating task to consult these often massive and decomposing volumes. These difficulties were compensated for by the large amount of very useful information contained in the records. Fortunately there is a fairly comprehensive system of indexing despatches which saves the need to wade through every volume.

(a) Secret Letters Received from Aden:

Volume numbers:

45-47 covering the years 1870-1874.

(b) Political and Secret Letters Received from Aden:

Together with the series above these contain most of the important correspondence about events on the Somali Coast sent by the Aden resident direct to the India Office.

Volume numbers:

2-8 covering the years 1875-1899.

(c) Secret Letters to India, Madras, Bombay, Aden, Muscat, Persian Gulf and Zanzibar:

These volumes contain very little of importance.

Volume numbers:

2-6 covering the years 1870-1874.

(d) Political and Secret Despatches to India:

Generally straightforward letters containing the decisions of the India Office being transmitted to the Government of India. Some volumes contain useful minutes by members of the India Office.

Volume numbers:

1 9-14

4-6 16-22

covering the years 1875-1896.

(e) Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received
from Bombay:

These volumes include a number of interesting annual reports, exploration reports and details of military expeditions in Somaliland, sent from Aden to the Government of Bombay and thence to the India Office.

Volume numbers:

29-32 37-39

35 41-44

covering the years 1886-1898.

(f) Secret Letters and Enclosures from India:

Volume numbers:

6-8 16-17 19

covering the years 1870-1874.

(g) Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received from India:

Together with the series above these include the lengthy despatches sent from the Government of India to the India Office. Much of the material is valuable, giving the views of the Government of India on Somali questions, but some of it consists merely of copies of letters already sent to the India Office from Aden or Bombay.

Volume numbers:

1-3	54-55	76-78
22-24	57-58	84-96
33	60-63	98-107
41-43	65-66	110
46-47	68-70	
49-52	72-73	

covering the years 1875-1898.

(h) Register and Index of Political and Secret Letters from India,Madras and Bombay:

Consulted for the years 1876-1896. An essential guide to the volumes of despatches received.

9. Salisbury Papers, Christ Church, Oxford.

Lord Salisbury's private papers, very useful for discovering his unofficial attitudes and personal opinions. Two series have proved valuable:

Class A:

Private correspondence whilst Salisbury was at the Foreign Office, largely with his ambassadors, also with Queen Victoria. Most useful were the correspondence with Lord Lyons in Paris in the 1880's and with Lord Cromer in Cairo.

Volume numbers:

11	59	91
37	67	109
39	76	113
51-55	83-84	125

Class E:

Special correspondence: Main series. Useful for occasional letters from secretaries of state for India (Lord Randolph Churchill, Viscount Cross, Lord George Hamilton), from under-secretaries in the Foreign Office (Sir James Fergusson and Lord Tenterden) and from his private secretary (Sir Eric Barrington).

10. African Manuscripts and others in Rhodes House, Oxford.

A small number of documents concerning Somaliland have been deposited in Rhodes House thanks to the Colonial Records Project. Among these are:

Mss. Afr. S 552, a typewritten, anonymous 'History of the Somaliland Camel Corps', originally dated 1935 but with later additions.

Mss. Afr. S 553, A copy of the private journal of Harald

Swayne kept during his trip to Harar in 1893; another copy is in the Public Record Office, in F.O. 78/4527. . . .
 Mss. Brit. Emp. S 279, some papers of Sir Eric Swayne. His widow, Lady Yda Swayne very kindly searched these out for me and allowed them to be deposited in Rhodes House. In addition to a few papers concerning Somaliland they also contain material from his later service in British Honduras and during the first world war. The few Somaliland papers are mainly copies of letters to be found in the Foreign Office volumes in the Public Record Office, but they do include some personal comments by Swayne as well as a private letter to Barrington of 1905.

11. Kenya National Archives, Nairobi.

The papers here are of marginal value as regards British Somaliland. Correspondence with the sub-commissioner for Jubaland in the East Africa Protectorate does contain a few references to rumours that the Sayyid was moving south.

Among the volumes of interest are:

C.P. 1, Intelligence Reports of the Ogaden Punitive Expedition 1900.

C.P. 3 - C.P. 5, Jubaland outward and inward correspondence, 1896-1902.

Three unreferenced files in 'bundle 3' contain Jubaland miscellaneous correspondence 1901-1902.

(B) PRINTED SOURCES

I. PRIMARY SOURCES.1. Foreign Office Confidential Prints.

These are volumes of printed Foreign Office despatches, both those sent and those received. Most important despatches are included although one seldom finds minutes attached. They can be useful for finding enclosures which are no longer included with the original despatch. They are also useful for discovering the occasional despatch missing from the Public Record Office volumes, and they include copies of despatches whose originals are in different series of the Public Record Office volumes. They are a very useful guide to the Public Record Office volumes.

A set of Foreign Office Confidential Prints dealing with Somaliland, almost complete, is in Rhodes House, Oxford. Complete sets are in the library of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, and the Public Record Office.

The two most useful series are:

(a) Correspondence respecting the Red Sea and Somali Coast:

32 volumes covering the years 1874-1899.

Volume numbers:

1949	5331	6176
2432	5399	6298
3568	5467	6446
4099	5587	6567
4429	5659	6788
4627	5752	6932
4796	5794	7044
4940	5883	7106
5057	5952	7107
5149	6042	7318
5243	6133	

(b) Correspondence respecting Affairs in North East Africaand the Soudan:

In this series the 7 volumes covering the years 1899-1901 are relevant.

Volume numbers:

7379	7547	8181
7382	7645	
7423	8126	

Swayne kept during his trip to Harar in 1893; another copy is in the Public Record Office, in F.O. 78/4527. . . .
Ms. Brit. Emp. S 279, some papers of Sir Eric Swayne. His widow, Lady Yda Swayne very kindly searched these out for me and allowed them to be deposited in Rhodes House. In addition to a few papers concerning Somaliland they also contain material from his later service in British Honduras and during the first world war. The few Somaliland papers are mainly copies of letters to be found in the Foreign Office volumes in the Public Record Office, but they do include some personal comments by Swayne as well as a private letter to Barrington of 1905.

11. Kenya National Archives, Nairobi.

The papers here are of marginal value as regards British Somaliland. Correspondence with the sub-commissioner for Jubaland in the East Africa Protectorate does contain a few references to rumours that the Sayyid was moving south.

Among the volumes of interest are:

C.P. 1, Intelligence Reports of the Ogaden Punitive Expedition 1900.

C.P. 3 - C.P. 5, Jubaland outward and inward correspondence, 1896-1902.

(a) Correspondence respecting the Red Sea and Somali Coast:

32 volumes covering the years 1874-1899.

Volume numbers:

1949	5331	6176
2432	5399	6298
3568	5467	6446
4099	5587	6567
4429	5659	6788
4627	5752	6932
4796	5794	7044
4940	5883	7106
5057	5952	7107
5149	6042	7318
5243	6133	

(b) Correspondence respecting Affairs in North East Africa
and the Soudan:

In this series the 7 volumes covering the years 1899-1901 are relevant.

Volume numbers:

7379	7547	8181
7382	7645	
7423	8126	

Another series useful for information on the Zeila tribute question was:

(c) Finances of Egypt:

7 volumes covering the years 1889-1891 are useful.

Volume numbers:

5816	5987	6180
5882	6026	
5986	6047	

2. Colonial Office Confidential Prints.

These are found in the Public Record Office Series C.O. 879.

Those listed are prints of important memoranda or single letters.

Volume numbers:

Title:

34	'Memorandum as to the Jurisdiction and Administrative Powers of a European State holding Protectorates in Africa', February 1891.
88	Swayne to Lyttelton, 13 July 1905.
97	'A Minute on the Somaliland Protectorate' by W.S. Churchill, 28 October 1907.
98	'Notes on Mr. Churchill's minute of 28 October 1907', by Cordeaux,

28 December 1907.

3. Cabinet Prints.

In the Public Record Office CAB 37 Series. This contains photographic copies of prints circulated to members of the Cabinet. These are usually memoranda or reports, sometimes important despatches. Generally they are very useful. There are a number of volumes which include material on Somaliland between 1884 and 1907.

Volume numbers:

12	63	75
19	67	89
36	69-71	

4. Journal of the Principal Events Connected with Somaliland.

This is an extremely valuable daily journal printed by the War Office for the period December 1902 to mid-1904 when they were responsible for the campaigns in Somaliland. It includes such things as copies of telegrams and despatches, extracts from journals and intelligence reports. Parts i-xviii of the journal are in the Public Record Office in

the W.O. 106/236 Series. Part xix is in the War Office Library in the old War Office building, Whitehall, where it has a reference number: 1G - 34 (A.G.)

5. India Office Records.

(a) Political and Secret Department Memoranda:

Printed copies of treaties, collections of correspondence on specific topics, summaries of certain subjects, reports, notes and memoranda. Some are very useful, others merely copies of what may be found elsewhere.

Volume numbers:

B3	B41	B64A
B8	B44 - B46	B66
B17	B48	B69
B22	B51a	B74
B27	B64	B106

(b) Bombay Political Consultations:

Printed summaries of consultations of the Government of Bombay. Useful for tracing Somali Coast administration reports missing from the volumes of despatches.

Volumes used:

July-Dec. 1888	1894
1889	1897
1890	1898
1892	

6. Annual Reports on the Administration of the Bombay Presidency.

Also useful when administration reports for the Somali Coast are not in the India Office Records. These reports contain sections on the Somali Coast, consisting largely of statistics and of other facts considered suitable for the enlightenment of the public.

Volumes consulted:

1884-1885 - 1893-1894.

7. Parliamentary Papers.(a) Reports on the state of the protectorate:

These consist largely of statistical information.

Parl. Papers 1903, xiv (569), 'Memorandum showing the position of the Four African Protectorates administered by the Foreign Office in June 1903', Africa No. 9 (1903), [Cd.1635]

Parl. Papers 1904, lxii (649), 'Report on the trade and commerce of the Somaliland Protectorate for the year 1902-3', Africa No. 2 (1904), [Cd. 1935].

Parl. Papers 1906, lxxv (645 & 683), 'Somaliland 1904-5', Colonial Reports - Annual No. 468, [Cd. 2684-14], and 'Somaliland Protectorate 1905-6', Colonial Reports - Annual No. 508, [Cd. 2684-54].

(b) Appropriation Accounts:

Useful for discovering the cost of military operations in Somaliland.

Parl. Papers 1902, lxiii, 'Civil Service Appropriation Accounts, 1900-01. Foreign and Colonial Services. Uganda, Central and East Africa Protectorates, and Uganda Railway. Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General.'

Parl. Papers 1903, xlii, 'Civil Service Appropriation Accounts, 1901-02. Foreign and Colonial Services. Uganda, Central and East Africa Protectorates and Uganda Railway. Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General.'

Parl. Papers 1904, li, 'Army Appropriation Accounts, 1902-03. Approximate Statement of Extra Charges borne by ARMY VOTES 1902-1903, in consequence of the WAR IN SOMALILAND.'

Parl. Papers 1904, lv, 'Civil Service Appropriation Accounts, 1902-03. Foreign and Colonial Services. Uganda,

Central and East Africa Protectorates and Uganda Railway.

Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General.'

Parl. Papers 1905, xlvi, 'Army Appropriation Accounts,

1903-04. Approximate Statement of Extra Charges borne by

ARMY VOTES 1903-1904, in consequence of the WAR IN SOMALILAND.'

Parl. Papers 1906, lxvii, 'Army Appropriation Accounts,

1904-05. Approximate Statement of Extra Charges borne by

ARMY VOTES 1904-1905, in consequence of the WAR IN SOMALILAND.'

Parl. Papers 1906, lxxii, 'Civil Service Appropriation Accounts,

1904-05. Foreign and Colonial Services - Uganda, East Africa

and Somaliland Protectorates, and Uganda Railway.'

Parl. Papers 1907, xlix, 'Army Appropriation Accounts

1905-06. Statement of Military Expenditure in the Colonies,

Somaliland and Egypt, including the value of the stores

supplied thereto for military purposes.'

Parl. Papers 1908, lxiv, 'Army Appropriation Accounts

1906-07. Statement of Military Expenditure in the Colonies,

Somaliland and Egypt ... during the year 1906-1907.'

(c) Papers on special topics:

These contain selected despatches and telegrams; most of the important correspondence is included although the Government sometimes saw fit to exclude some documents, or parts of them.

They do not therefore always give a thoroughly reliable picture.

Parl. Papers 1882, lxxxii (627), 'Correspondence respecting Assab Bay', Egypt No. 15 (1882), [C. 3300].

Parl. Papers 1884-5, lxxxix (713), 'Correspondence respecting Ports in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden', Egypt No. 14 (1885), [C. 4417]. Edited to play down Britain's part in encouraging the Italian occupation of Massawa.

Parl. Papers 1901, xlvi (215 & 271), 'Correspondence relating to the Murder of Mr. Jenner, and the Ogaden Punitive Expedition', Africa No. 3 (1901), [Cd. 591], and 'Correspondence respecting the Rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland and consequent Military Operations 1899-1901', Africa No. 5 (1901), [Cd. 597].

Parl. Papers 1902, lxxix (713), 'Correspondence respecting the Rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland and consequent Military Operations 1901-1902', Africa No. 3 (1902), [Cd. 1006]. This contains mainly correspondence on Swayne's first expedition.

Parl. Papers 1903, xlv (805 & 909), 'Correspondence respecting the Rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland and consequent Military Operations 1901-1902', Africa No. 1 (1903), [Cd. 1394], and 'Despatches relative to the Operations of the Somaliland Field Force', [Cd. 1500]. These consist chiefly

of correspondence about Swayne's second expedition and Manning's campaign.

Parl. Papers 1905, lvi (469), 'Despatches, &c., regarding the Military Operations in Somaliland, from the 18th January, 1902 to the 31st May, 1904', [Cd. 22547]. As well as reports of Egerton's expedition this contains the final reports on Swayne's second expedition and Manning's campaign. It was edited to avoid offending the Italians.

(d) Treaties, etc.:

These simply contain the texts of treaties and agreements which may be found elsewhere.

Parl. Papers 1894, xcvi (103 & 181), 'Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and France with regard to the Somali Coast, February 1888', France No. 1 (1894), [C. 7389], and 'Protocol between Great Britain and Italy respecting the Demarcation of their respective spheres of Influence in Eastern Africa', Treaty Series No. 17 (1894), [C. 7388].

Parl. Papers 1898, cv (143), 'Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia', Treaty Series No. 2 (1898).

8. Periodicals.

(a) The Times:

Before 1900 there is hardly a mention of Somaliland in this newspaper but between 1900 and 1907 it figures prominently.

At the height of the war with the Sayyid there were frequent military reports and, not infrequently, a leader on Somaliland.

(b) The Pall Mall Gazette:

Its vigorous Conservative opinions are interesting for the critical period January-June 1903 when British fortunes in Somaliland were at their lowest ebb. Being an evening paper it was able to summarise and comment upon the news and opinions in the morning papers.

(c) Punch:

Useful for the years 1902-1904 when Somaliland was a matter of public interest. Several times during these years Somaliland featured as the subject of the big, main cartoon.

(d) Illustrated London News:

From January to June 1903 this magazine had an artist with the troops in Somaliland. A large number of sketches of the campaign appeared, many of them picturing battles at which the artist was not present. Nevertheless the sketches are helpful in giving an indication of what the campaigns were like and

occasional photographs of officers who were involved also appear

9. Hansard.

The volumes between 1874 and 1907 have been consulted with the help of the index. It has proved a valuable source of parliamentary opinion and during the years when Britain was at war with the Sayyid there were a number of long debates on Somaliland.

10. Other Primary Sources.

Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads (4th edn., Calcutta, 1909), vol. xiii.

Hertslet, E., The Map of Africa by Treaty (3rd edn., London, 1909), 3 vols. A new impression has recently been published by Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London. An exhaustive collection of the treaties by which Africa was partitioned.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books.

- Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Ibadan & London, 1966), edited by J.C. Anene & G. Brown.
- Andrzejewski, B.W. & Lewis, I.M., Somali Poetry An Introduction (Oxford, 1964).
- Archer, G., Personal and Historical Memoirs of an East African Administrator (Edinburgh, 1963).
- Bottego, V., Viaggi di Scoperta nel Cuore dell'Africa ii - Il Giuba Esplorato (Roma, 1895).
- Budge, E.A.W., A History of Ethiopia (London, 1928), 2 vols.
- Burton, R.F., First Footsteps in East Africa; or an Exploration of Harar (London, 1856); memorial edition, London, 1894; new edition with valuable introduction, edited by G. Waterfield, London, 1966.
- Cambridge History of the British Empire, The, v - The Indian Empire 1858-1918 (Cambridge, 1932), edited by H.H. Dodwell, chapter xxv 'The North-West Frontier', by C.C. Davies.
- Caroselli, F.S., Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia (Roma, 1931), the main Italian account of the Sayyid's life.
- Cecil, G., Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, iv (London, 1932).

- Collins, D., A Tear for Somalia (London, 1960).
- Coupland, R., The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890: The Slave Trade and the Scramble (London, 1939); second edition, London, 1968.
- Cromer, Earl of, Modern Egypt (London, 1908), 2 vols.
- Crowe, S.E., The Berlin West Africa Conference (London, 1942).
- Davies, C.C., The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908 (Cambridge, 1932).
- Deschamps, H., Côte des Somalis (Paris, 1948), part of L'Union Française.
- Donaldson Smith, A., Through Unknown African Countries (Cambridge, Mass., 1897).
- Douin, G., Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismail (Roma & Le Caire, 1933-1941), 3 vols., of which Tome iii, L'Empire Africain, is the most useful. A massive, detailed but unfinished work.
- Drake-Brockman, R.E., British Somaliland (London, 1912). An interesting, comprehensive description of the country, with some straightforward administrative history and photographs.
- Drysdale, J., The Somali Dispute (London, 1964).
- Ensor, R.C.K., England 1870-1914 (Oxford, 1936).
- French Somaliland in True Perspective (Minister of Somali Affairs, Mogadiscio, n.d., but 1966).
- Gleichen, Count A.E.W., With the Mission to Menelik 1897 (London, 1898).

Graves, P., The Life of Sir Percy Cox (London, 1941).

Greenfield, R., Ethiopia A New Political History
(London, 1965).

Hamilton, A., Somaliland (London, 1911). A rather unreliable
account of the expeditions against the Sayyid by Reuters'
correspondent.

Herbert, A., Two Dianas in Somaliland (London, 1908).

Hess, R.L., Italian Colonialism in Somalia (Chicago, 1966).

The best history in English of the Italian sphere.

History of East Africa, i (Oxford, 1963), edited by R. Oliver
and G. Mathew.

History of East Africa, ii (Oxford, 1965), edited by V. Harlow
and E.M. Chilver, assisted by A. Smith.

Hoskins, H.L., British Routes to India (New York, 1928).

Hunt, J.A., A General Survey of the Somaliland Protectorate
1944-1950 (London, 1951).

Hunt, J.A., Genealogies of the Tribes of British Somaliland
and Mijertain (Hargeisa, 1944).

Hunter, F.M., A Grammar of the Somali Language (Bombay, 1880).

Huxley, E., White Man's Country (London, 1935 & new edition
1953), 2 vols., of which vol. i contains the account of

Delamere's journeys in Somaliland. In 1968 a new impress-
was published in New York.

Inger, S. (Suleyman ibn Inger Abdullah), Magyarország
Nyomata Szomaliföldön (Budapest, 1904).

Inger, S., Ungarns Kolonie in Somalilande (Budapest, 1904).

James, F.L., The Unknown Horn of Africa (London, 1888
& 2nd edn. 1890).

Jardine, D.J., The Mad Mullah of Somaliland (London, 1923).

Written by a secretary to the administration in Somaliland
this has often been used as the standard work on the Sayyid.
It is a slightly light-hearted, facetious book, interesting
for its photographs and useful as a summary of other
published material.

Jennings, J.W. and Addison, C., With the Abyssinians in
Somaliland (London, 1905).

Jenkyns, H., British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas
(Oxford, 1902).

Jones, A.H.M. and Monroe, E., History of Ethiopia
(3rd impression, Oxford, 1955).

Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District (East Africa
Protectorate Government, Nairobi, 1917).

Kamerer, A., Essai sur L'Histoire Antique d'Abyssinie
(Paris, 1926).

Keith, A.B., The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act
(Oxford, 1919).

Langer, W.L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York, 1935).

Laurence, M., The Prophet's Camel Bell (London, 1963).

Lewis, I.M., A Pastoral Democracy (London, 1961).

Lewis, I.M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa. Somali, Afar, and Saho. Ethnographic Survey of Africa. North Eastern Africa Part i (London, 1955).

Lewis, I.M., The Modern History of Somaliland (London, 1965).

The best history of the Somalis; balanced and accurate.

Marston, T.E., Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area 1800-1878 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1961). Little known, but extremely useful.

McDermott, P.L., British East Africa or 'IBEAF' (2nd edn., London, 1895). 3rd edition recently published in London.

McNeill, M., In Pursuit of the "Mad" Mullah (London, 1902).

Military Report on Somaliland (General Staff, War Office, London), i (1907), ii (1908).

Moss, A.H.E., My Somali Book (London, 1913).

Moyse-Bartlett, H., The King's African Rifles (Aldershot, 1956).

Mungeam, G.H., British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966).

Murdock, G.P., Africa Its Peoples and their Culture History (New York, 1959).

Official History of the Operations in Somaliland, 1901-1904 (General Staff, War Office, London, 1907), 2 vols. An

extremely detailed military history, obviously intended for the guidance of officers in future campaigns. The first volume deals with tactics and strategy, the second with logistics.

Oliver, R., Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (London, 1957).

Oliver, R., The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London, 1952).

Oliver, R. and Atmore, A., Africa Since 1800 (Cambridge, 1967).

Oliver, R. and Fage, J.D., A Short History of Africa (2nd edn., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1966).

Pankhurst, E.S., Ex-Italian Somaliland (London, 1951). Justly described by R.L. Hess as 'A garbled account, violently anti-Italian and indignantly pro-Ethiopian, based on a somewhat untrustworthy use of published sources and on the author's crusading biases.' (Italian Colonialism in Somalia, p. 224.)

Pankhurst, R., Travellers in Ethiopia (London, 1965).

Pearce, F.B., Rambles in Lion Land (London, 1898).

Pease, A.E., Half a Century of Sport (London, 1932).

Pease, A.E., Travel and Sport in Africa (London, 1902), 3 vols.

Perham, M.F., Major Dane's Garden (London, n.d., but about 1925). A novel which catches the atmosphere of colonial Somaliland.

- Perham, M.F., The Government of Ethiopia (London, 1948).
- Report on the Egyptian Provinces of the Sudan, Red Sea, and Equator (Intelligence Branch, War Office, London, 1884).
- Robinson, R. and Gallagher, J., with Denny, A., Africa and the Victorians The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 1965).
- Rodd, J.R., Social and Diplomatic Memories 1884-1893 (London, 1922).
- Rodd, J.R., Social and Diplomatic Memories (Second Series) 1894-1901 Egypt and Abyssinia (London, 1923).
- Rotberg, R.I., A Political History of Tropical Africa (New York, 1965).
- Sabry, M., L'Empire Egyptienne sous Ismail et l'ingérence anglo-francaise (1863-1879) (Paris, 1933). Very anti-British.
- Sanderson, G.N., England, Europe and the Upper Nile (Edinburgh, 1965).
- The Somali Peninsula A New Light on Imperial Motives (Information Services of the Somali Government, ? Mogadiscio, 1962). A scholarly piece of propaganda.
- Speke, J.H., What Led to the Discovery of the Source of the Nile (Edinburgh, 1864, new edn., London, 1967).
- Starkie, E., Arthur Rimbaud in Abyssinia (Oxford, 1937).
- Swayne, F., A Woman's Pleasure Trip in Somaliland (Bristol, 1907).

- Swayne, H.G.C., Seventeen Trips through Somaliland (London, 1895). The third edition was entitled: Seventeen Trips through Somaliland and a Visit to Abyssinia (London, 1903).
- Touval, S., Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).
- Trimingham, J.S., Islam in Ethiopia (London, 1952). New impression recently published in London.
- Ullendorff, E., The Ethiopians (London, 1960).
- Walsh, L.P., Under the Flag and Somali Coast Stories (London, 1932). A whimsical, self-centred, sometimes unreliable, but nonetheless valuable account of the earliest years of British administration.
- Wellby, M.S., 'Twixt Sirdar and Menelik (London, 1901).
- Wingate, F.R., Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan (London, 1891). New edition recently published in London.
- Wingate, R., Wingate of the Sudan (London, 1955).
- Wolverton, Lord, Five Months' Sport in Somali Land (London, 1894).
- Woolf, L., Empire and Commerce in Africa (London, n.d., but probably 1920).

2. Periodicals.

- Beachey, R.W., 'The Arms Trade in East Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century', Journal of African History, iii (1962), 451-467.
- Bell, G.W., 'Suleiman Hariga', Sudan Notes and Records, xx(1937), 296-9.
- Cerulli, E., review of I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, Journal of African History, vii(1966), 530-2.
- Fearon, D., 'Notes on the History of Berbera', The Somaliland Journal, i, part 1(1954), 11-20 and part 2(1955), 70-80.
- Fearon, D., 'Somaliland Protectorate, 1883-1885', The Somaliland Journal, i, part 3(1956), 147-167.
- Giglio, C., 'Article 17 of the Treaty of Uccialli', Journal of African History, vi(1965), 221-231.
- Hess, R.L., 'The 'Mad Mullah' and Northern Somalia', Journal of African History, v(1964), 415-433.
- Latham-Brown, D.J., 'The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute', The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, v(1956), 245-264.
- Lewis, H.S., 'The Origins of the Galla and the Somali', Journal of African History, vii(1966), 27-46.

- Lewis, I.B., 'The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa',
Journal of African History, i(1960), 213-230.
- Owen, F.C., 'The Somaliland Operations June 1903 to May 1904',
Journal of the United Services Institution, xlix(1905),
169-182.
- Pease, A.E., 'Some Account of Somaliland: with notes on
journeys through the Gadabursi and Western Ogaden Countries,
1896-97', Scottish Geographical Magazine, xiv(1898), 57-73.
- Ramm, A., 'Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power in
the Red Sea, 1868-1885', English Historical Review, lix(1944),
211-236.
- Ravenstein, E.G., 'The Recent Territorial Arrangements in
Africa', Geographical Journal, iv(1894), 54-58.
- Rubenson, S., 'The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichale
'Treaty', Journal of African History, v(1964), 243-283.
- Sanderson, G.N., 'Emir Suleyman Ibn Inger Abdullah', Sudan
Notes and Records, xxxv(1954), 22-71.
- 'Treaty with Abyssinia', Geographical Journal, xi(1898),
293-4.

3. Maps and Atlases.

Page, J.D., An Atlas of African History (London, 1965).

A good large scale map is in the World 1:1,000,000 Series
GSGS 4646 (D. Survey, War Office and Air Ministry, London,
1956), sheets NC 38, NC 39 and NB 38.

A useful smaller scale map published by the Directorate of
Colonial Surveys (No. 983) in 1956 will be found at the
back of the biennial reports Somaliland Protectorate
Report for the years 1956 and 1957 (H.M.S.O., London, 1959)
and Somaliland Report for the years 1958 and 1959 (H.M.S.O.,
London, 1960).

Wherever possible placename spellings in this thesis have been
taken from The Oxford Atlas (Oxford, 1963).

(C) UNPUBLISHED TYPESCRIPTS AND THESES

Brockett, A.M., 'Anglo-French Rivalry on the Somali Coast in the 1880's' (paper read at the Historical Association of Kenya Annual Conference 1968, and to be published in Hadith 2).

Brockett, A.M., 'Emir Suleyman Ibn Inger Abdullah. A Further Episode' (to be published in a forthcoming issue of Sudan Notes and Records).

Fries, F., 'Anglo-Italian Relations, 1884-5, and the Italian Occupation of Massawah' (Cambridge Univ. Ph.D. thesis 1939-40).

Lewis, I.M., 'Some Aspects of the Social Structure of a Nomadic Muslim People. The Somali Lineage System: An Introduction to Somali Political Institutions' (Oxford Univ. D.Phil. thesis 1957).

Lewis, I.M., 'The Social Organisation of the Somali' (Oxford Univ. B.Litt. thesis 1954). Most of the information in these two theses by Lewis has been incorporated in his later publications.

Turton, E.R., 'The Impact of Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the East Africa Protectorate' (paper submitted to the University of East Africa Social Sciences Conference, Makerere, December 1968 - January 1969).

MAP NO. 1.


NORTH-EAST AFRICA

KEY

Present International
Boundaries



Previous Boundary
between British and
Italian Somaliland

MILES
0 100 200 300



THE HORN OF AFRICA.

Boundaries of British Somaliland.



MAP No. 3 THE WESTERN GULF OF ADEN.

