



---

**Electronic Theses and Dissertations**

---

2022

# Toward a reconciliatory outlook at Aquinas' application of the politic and royal rule analogy to the passion/reason relation: a conceptual-interpretive contrast between Robert Miner and Leonard Ferry.

Millewa, Owino Luke  
*School of Humanities and Social Sciences*  
*Strathmore University*

## **Recommended Citation**

Millewa, O. L. (2022). *Toward a reconciliatory outlook at Aquinas' application of the politic and royal rule analogy to the passion/reason relation: A conceptual-interpretive contrast between Robert Miner and Leonard Ferry* [Thesis, Strathmore University]. <http://hdl.handle.net/11071/13050>

Follow this and additional works at: <http://hdl.handle.net/11071/13050>

**Toward a Reconciliatory Outlook at *Aquinas*' Application of the  
Politic and Royal Rule Analogy to the Passion/Reason Relation**


*A Conceptual-Interpretive Contrast between Robert Miner and Leonard Ferry*

By

OWINO LUKE MILLEWA

102705

Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Masters of Applied Philosophy and Ethics at Strathmore University



School of Humanities and Social Sciences  
Strathmore University  
Nairobi, Kenya

October, 2022

This Dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is a  
copyright material and that no quotation from the Dissertation may be published  
without proper acknowledgement.

## Declaration and Approval

### Declaration

I declare that this work has not been previously submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Dissertation contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the Dissertation itself.

© No part of this Dissertation may be reproduced without the permission of the author and Strathmore University

Student's Name: Owino Luke Millewa

Sign: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

### Approval

The Dissertation of Owino Luke Millewa was reviewed and approved for examination by the following:

Rev. Fr. Dr. Paul Mimbi,  
School of Humanities & Social sciences,  
Strathmore University

Dr. Magdalene Dimba,  
Dean, School of Humanities & Social Sciences,  
Strathmore University

Dr. Bernard Shibwabo,  
Director of Graduate Studies,  
Strathmore University

## Abstract

*Robert Miner's* understanding of *Aquinas* on the passions seems to downplay the dominating role of reason, claims *Leonard Ferry*. *Ferry* argues that *Miner's* general work, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, and particularly his understanding of the morality of the passions as he has interpretively put it in the chapter four of the same work, is an over-statement in regard to the Thomistic spirit and application of the politic and royal rule analogy. In this research work, we have endeavoured to establish the true Thomistic stance as he conceived the passions/reason relation through the *lens* of politic and royal rule (not generally). It is a reconciliatory effort to pull the extremes (of understanding reason as *a controller, commander* and its *dominating* role and passions as having *something of their own, a right of opposition or resistance* to a lawful command of reason) to the centre while remaining faithful to the Thomistic spirit. This work has made a triad of presentations by first underlining *Aquinas's* medieval context which was largely religiously Christian, authoritatively political, morally Christian and scholastically intellectual. First, we have generally presented the views of different commentators assumed to advance either sides of the debate in their interpretive views to show the general and a commonplace tension of passions/reason relation in the thoughts and lives of many. Secondly, we have presented *Miner's* main lines of thought and what he deems to be *Aquinas's* true position in relation to the employment of this *Aristotelean* metaphor of the politic and royal power. The presentation and scrutiny of *Miner's* work on the analogy of political rule and its interpretation of passions/reason relation has considered *Miner's methodological assumptions*. Thirdly, we have presented *Ferry's* interpretive stance on the politic and royal rule analogy, and the contentious items he has against *Miner*. Mindful of the wider context of *Aquinas's Anthropology* and *Treatise on the passions*, we have demonstrated throughout the work, that deviating from his original conceptual position, in regard to the application of politic and royal rule analogy is detrimental to moral conduct of human beings, both at private and public life. We have found out that there has been a long rationalistic-interpretive preference of 'control,' 'command,' and 'domination' against the passionistic inclination and view of passions as having 'something of their own' and 'right of opposition or right of resistance' that has widened the rift on passions/reason relation. We have argued that a continued conceptual crisis of this kind translates into real personal and social difficulties and hinder human progress and moral wellbeing.

We have concluded by arguing that labouring toward pulling both *Miner's* and *Ferry's* conceptual views (as representative of the two divergent sides) to a reconciliatory table where both passions and reason stand correct in *Aquinas'* thinking is quite urgent and necessary in our contemporary settings. This, we have done by prioritizing *Aquinas'* own citations and insights in the *Summa Theologiae* as it is found in chapter four of this research. As an effort of arbitration, we have demonstrated that this reconciliation must begin by getting ourselves dressed in a true conceptual and epistemic outfit which finally and consequently translates into the practice of virtues.




## Table of Contents

<b>Declaration and Approval</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>List of Definition of Key Terms</b> .....	<b>ix</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>xi</b>
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1 Introduction .....	1
1.2 Background of the study .....	3
1.3 Statement of the problem .....	4
1.4 Objectives.....	6
1.5 Research questions .....	6
1.6 Scope of the study .....	6
1.7 Significance of the study .....	7
1.8 Conclusion.....	8
<b>Chapter 2: Literature Review</b> .....	<b>9</b>
2.1 Introduction .....	9
2.2 Research questions .....	10
2.2.1 Medieval worldview and the passions .....	10
2.2.2 Stoicist view of the passions .....	11
2.2.3 Platonic view of the passions .....	12
2.2.4 Aristotelian view of passions .....	12
2.3 Democratic political systems versus tyrannic ones.....	12
2.4 What is an analogy? .....	15
2.4.1 Aristotle’s analogy and its use .....	15
2.5 <i>Miner’s</i> claims on the basis of <i>Aquinas’</i> politic and royal rule analogy .....	15
2.5.1 <i>Miner’s</i> methodological assumptions and its possible gaps.....	16
2.7 Passions/reason relation versus the ruled/ruler analogical framework .....	19
2.8 Reason, the slave of passions: <i>Hume’s</i> central Dissertation .....	21
2.8.1 <i>Aquinas’</i> pro-passion attitude interpreted (Passio-centric approach).....	21
2.8.2 The Philosopher King: <i>Plato’s</i> view of reason .....	23
2.8.3 <i>Aquinas</i> anti-passion attitude interpreted (Ratio-centric approach) .....	23
2.9 Theoretical framework .....	26
2.10 Conclusion.....	28
<b>Chapter 3: Research Methodology</b> .....	<b>29</b>

3.1 Introduction .....	29
3.2 Research design.....	29
3.3 Data collection method.....	30
3.4 Data analysis and interpretation .....	31
3.5 Research quality and validity .....	32
3.6 Ethical considerations .....	33
3.7 Conclusion.....	33
<b>Chapter 4: Research Findings .....</b>	<b>34</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	34
4.2 The word passion in <i>Aquinas</i> ’ literature .....	35
4.2.1 The medieval spirit and development of the concept of passions.....	37
4.3 Contemporary grasp of the passions .....	37
4.4 The Problem of incommensurability in the contemporary context.....	38
4.5 The everyday use of the word ‘passion’ .....	39
4.6 A systematic exposition of the politic and royal rule analogy in the <i>ST</i> .....	39
4.7 <i>Miner</i> ’s interpretive work on <i>Aquinas</i> ’ Passions/reason relation.....	43
4.8 <i>Ferry</i> ’s submissions on the politic and royal rule as depicted in <i>Aquinas</i> and <i>Miner</i> .....	48
4.9 Controversial items between <i>Ferry</i> and <i>Miner</i> .....	51
4.10 <i>Aristotle</i> ’s theory of analogy and its application.....	52
4.10.1 The Limits of the structure-mapping approach.....	53
4.10.2 Role of analogies .....	53
4.10.3 Analogy as didactic .....	54
4.10.4 Analogy as a heuristic device.....	54
4.11 Reasoning by analogy .....	54
4.12 Politic and royal rule in <i>Aristotle</i> ’s political theory .....	55
4.12.1 The ruler and the ruled? .....	55
4.12.2 The extent of freedom and equality in a political regimen .....	56
4.12.4 <i>Aquinas</i> ’ intended purpose of politic and royal rule analogy.....	57
4.12.5 The Goal of <i>Aristotle</i> ’s <i>polis</i> in informing passions/reason relation.....	59
4.13 Conclusion.....	60
<b>Chapter 5: Discussions and Conclusion.....</b>	<b>61</b>
5.1 Introduction .....	61
5.2 Reasoning by analogy and the <i>Aristotelian</i> conceptual context.....	61

5.3 The social context: thinking reason and living passions .....	64
5.4 The moral burden of passions and undeniable reason’s responsibility .....	66
5.5 Moral success and remedy to disobedience of the passions.....	68
5.6 A recourse to and an arbitration based on the thomistic spirit as a reconciliatory benchmark .....	70
5.7 Limits of ruling of the politic and royal kind to the interpretation of passions/reason relation in <i>Aquinas</i> .....	73
5.8 Passions/reason relation at the service of common good.....	76
5.8.1 Contemporary social context and <i>Ferry’s</i> challenge to <i>Miner’s</i> creative thinking .....	76
5.9 Reality and the limits of conceptual analogical frameworks in defining passions/reason relation.....	81
5.10 General conclusion and recommendation .....	82
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>89</b>
Appendix A: Similarity Report .....	89
Appendix B: Ethical Review Approval Letter .....	90



## List of Abbreviations

<b>CBC</b>	Competency Based Curriculum
<b>MAPE</b>	Masters in Applied Philosophy and Ethics
<b>NACOSTI</b>	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
<b>PDF</b>	Portable Document Format
<b>ST</b>	Summa Theologiae



## List of Definition of Key Terms

The following are the key concepts and theories for the study:

- a. **Control** – reason’s control of the passion is not an arbitrary or tyrannical suppression of reason over the passions but harmonious coordination of man’s powers in striving for the realization of his deepest spiritual potentialities. It is a peaceful integration of man’s powers into one perfect actuality, which should be his true self (Miner, 2009).
- b. **Passions** – are the sensitive impulses of the human person on matters of food, drinks and sex (concupiscible appetite) and the irascible powers that pertains to goals, which are difficult to achieve. They are also defined as the principles of appetite in the sensitive part of the soul, namely the eleven kinds of the passions of the soul: the six concupiscible passions of love and hate, desire and aversion, and joy and sorrow; the five irascible passions of hope and despair, confidence and fear, and anger (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003). The word passion is used changeably with emotions in this study.
- c. **Concupiscible** – Mimbi (2007), in his work, ‘The Overlooked Factor: The Power of Being Fully Human,’ refers to concupiscible power as the desire of the pleasurable in the here and now of one’s daily life. It is synonymous to the term *epithymia* (Mimbi, 2007).
- d. **Irascible** – Mimbi (2007), in the same quoted work, refers to irascible as the desire of what is pleasurable at a later time and place. This has *Thymos* as its synonym. These two powers constitute the complexity of tendencies to this study over which reason has a special place as the ruler.
- e. **Reason** – This is the order of the intellective power in man. It is what pertains to the activities of the intellect.
- f. **Political and royal rule** – It is a political paradigm in which members of the political community rule and are ruled in turns. They are equal and free in dignity and common life (Trott, 2013). It can also be said that “the rule in this community should be “political and royal rule”, which is defined as the authority over free and equal or similar persons (1255b20 and 1277b7-9). This rule can thus be considered as power of peers, distinct from the despotic rule of a master over his slaves, who are not free, and the household rule of a man over his wife and children, who are free but not equal to their husband and father.

- g. **Despotic rule** – This is a political paradigm where the master rules over his slaves. The slaves have no right and are forcefully tasked anything that their master will judge as right (Koebner, 1951).
- h. **Analogia** – is a *Latin* word which originally had the meaning of a mathematical proportion. Over the years, the meaning of the term ‘proportion’ has been extended by philosophers to mean any relation. However, proportionality has grown to mean any similarity between relations of any kind (Spielthener, 2014). The political rule analogy falls under the categorization of the analogy of proportionality. Just like in a political rule, the citizens are free and equal, both rulers and the ruled, so will the categories of equality and freedom be applied to passions and reason. It is also important to note that analogates in ethical reasoning are not always similar, because the terminology used in ethical reasoning are not yet standardized. Analogates are always called analogues, while others refer to them as primary and secondary analogates. Spielthener calls them source and target domains (Spielthener, 2014).
- i. **Freedom** – *Aristotle* states that in the political regimen a man is termed free only and only if his psyche is controlled by reason.
- j. **Equality** – It is the measure through which a member of the political community attains the political right for the allotment of political offices. The offices are only allotted to the virtuous proportionately. Equality is gained by one’s moral worth.

## **Acknowledgements**

I acknowledge Rev. Fr. Dr. Paul Mimbi who has been my supervisor throughout this dissertation writing. I acknowledge too the final defense panel members and particularly Prof. Christine Gichure and Prof. Ernest Beyaraza who critiqued this dissertation and helped me to come up with a better work. I also acknowledge MAPE Program Administrators who facilitated our studies in Strathmore University and finally my appreciation goes to the entire MAPE teaching staff.



## Chapter 1: Introduction

### 1.1 Introduction

It is important to note the undeniable reality of the emotions/passions in the life of human beings. It is also an observable fact that emotions have constantly posed serious challenges to the moral well-being of human beings and created unending conflicts toward their relation with reason (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003a). In order to mitigate this tension, many scholars since the medieval times have sought always to engage in relevant scholarly enterprises in order to come up with a better way of understanding the passions/reason relation. *Thomas Aquinas* is one among the first medieval scholars to have given passions a thorough and a systematic consideration. In his *Summa Theologiae* questions 22-48 of the *Ia2ae*, passions have received a robust treatment in the wider context of his anthropology. However, this consideration, as it seems to us, and in the present interpretive work of some scholars, and in their understanding of the passions, have created confusion, misgivings and added more injury to what ought to be a quality relation of these two anthropological constitutive elements of the human being: passions and reason.

Moved by the continuous contemporary conceptual and social contexts of scholars and ordinary people respectively, we have sought to respond to the needs of common life by seeking to neutralize the tensions advanced by contributions made by both *Miner* and *Ferry's* creative philosophical enterprises. *Robert Miner*, is a contemporary philosopher and a professor of philosophy at Baylor University, in the *USA*. He has contributed a great deal to the study of the passions and has endeavoured to interpret *Aquinas* on his conception of the passions. It is noted by *Ferry* that *Miner* is one of the first scholars to have given a comprehensive and argumentive rigor to secure the place of passions in *Aquinas' literature* in this most neglected part of the *ST*; 'treatise on the passions.' (Ferry, 2012a). On the other hand, *Leonard Ferry* is a Canadian and Catholic scholar who has contributed a lot on the moral theory of *Aquinas* and to the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*. Against *Miner's* insights on the work of *Aquinas on passions*, *Ferry* has taken a rationalistic stance in this study against *Miner* with a special application of his insights from the work; *Passionalist or Rationalist? The emotions in Aquinas' moral theology*.

In the philosophical theatre, therefore, there have been different models that have been used to lay open and understand the nature of passions/reason relationship. *Lippens* discusses them as the following (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003a):

1. *Dualistic model*: this model discusses emotions as belonging to the body and therefore should be dominated because the body is opposed to the mind as emotions are opposed to reason.
2. *Divided reason (rational and the irrational) model*: in this model reason is charged with the responsibility to learn and to know how to use the irrational part in itself, appropriately. It should be noted that the above two models are more opposite in their nature and do not add any or improve the complementarity that ought to exist between them. This has led to the development of a better model as we have discussed in *Aquinas*' ST and shown right below.
3. *Composite nature of the body and soul model*: in this model, the passions do not solely belong to the body nor to the soul. Reason, in this case is not put over and against the passions because passions though not essentially rational, they are not strangers to rationality. As is argued by *Lippens*, in this model, the concept of reason finds a broader definition.

It is only surprising that the understanding of the passions/reason relation as is depicted in the model of the unity of the body and soul which is the most original Thomistic brand has again and again taken different versions as is shown in the philosophical reflections of both *Miner* and *Ferry* among others. Like *Lonergan* would attest, it requires much labouring in order to reach up to the mind of *Aquinas* (Schepers OP, 2012). It is therefore important for us to understand that this third model has formed the basis of contention and reflection rooted in the anthropological and moral conceptual framework as put by *Aquinas* in his systematic *Treatise on the passions*.

In order to realize the outcome of this research study: that is, to be able to advance a possible reconciliatory path between *Miner* and *Ferry*, this work has been arranged in the following order: *chapter one* has given a general introduction with attention to the background of the study, rationale, questions and objectives which have worked toward answering the problem why the study needed to have been carried out. *Chapter two* has delved on literature review that has actually helped us to see clearly the gap and respond to it effectively. It is briefly done in the order of the questions raised in chapter one. *Chapter three* has shown our *modus operandi* in regard to research methodology

involved in this study and the manner in which the research has been executed. *Chapter four* has put together all our findings got right from *Aristotle's* conception of analogies and analogical reasoning, *Aquinas'* contextual application of the analogy, *Miner's* interpretive work and presentation of the passions/reason relation and *Ferry's* reflections and reservations. This chapter has borrowed relevant literature from relevant areas in order to assist in the outcome of the research. Though the work has been logically and analytical executed all through, *chapter five* is the bedrock of all our discussions, analysis, conclusion and recommendations.

## **1.2 Background of the study**

*Thomas Aquinas* has generally enjoyed a greater appreciation and prominence in the whole Christian philosophical world (Perini, 1979). Intellectually, he has been inaugurated and celebrated by the mainstream Catholic Church as the philosopher *par excellence* after *Aristotle* in Ancient Greece. His works especially the *ST*, has received a wider acceptance a cross the divide especially within the academia. His thoughts on anthropology and morality have also infiltrated different spheres of individual and public life.

However, the ordinary context of social life and the pursuit of tranquillity, peace and flourishing has seemingly put doubts on the insights that come from *Aquinas* especially on passions/reason relation. Kenya is one among many societies that have witnessed brutalities and hostilities in regard to responses both from individuals and the public where a member of that very society has failed to sustain and harmonize the turbulent nature of his passions. The sensual impulses or the mastery of emotions in the life of individual persons has remained a challenge and disastrous to many good citizens. This is proven so by deaths, injuries, punishments up to including scandals that come from most trusted personalities. The Kenya Gazette is almost daily reporting scandals which are morally related to emotional failures. This ranges from sexuality, corruption, to anger-based incidences etc.

Generally, one can easily be assertive that a greater number of most cases in the Kenyan courts are of a moral kind. From children stealing, to the youth molesting colleagues, to adults and the elderly and the aged failing to act responsibly, the problem remains the same. The tension is a sort of unsettling experience and majority of the victims are either unhappy or scandalized of their own moral failures. Emotions pull toward their own good and reason seems over-powered or overwhelmed.

The contemporary society has suffered ferociously from such setbacks resulting from emotional lives extremely lived or from over intellectual perception of every bit of individual lives. Ranging from drug abuse, sexual scandals, greed and corruption to over emphasis on formal education as the true measure and the only future assurance of good life, (as we have already mentioned above) majority of children, youth, men and women, elderly and the aged, continue to suffer harsh societal responses and treatments occasioned by failed mastery of emotions/passions. These are, in our moral judgements, non-humane and unorthodox ways of treating one another or dealing with reason-capable members of the human family.

Continuous child-molestation and overflowing greed and appetite for scarce resources, and constant parental anti-human disapprovals of kids who fail to achieve academically is hurting. Some youth who have felt the burdensomeness of their emotive (passionate and sensual appetitive) impulses have failed to reconcile their knowledge of 'what ought to be done' and the reality of what they experience in their somatic spheres. The societal demands and expectations are set so high, notwithstanding the religious discipline and rectitude of moral life demanded of them daily. As a result of such stringent measures, many have so often entertained suicidal thoughts brewed in them through their realization of helplessness upon the promptings of impulsive passions.

We have realized through our engagements with different people, and as a student of moral philosophy at *Strathmore University*, this experience needs to be remedied. The needs of tranquillity and peaceful co-existence has pushed us to seek long lasting solutions to this divergent social context. We have found *Aquinas* most reasonable. The current conceptual contrasting views on his moral theory and especially the relation that exists between passions and reason reflects the social reality between passions and reason. The moral man is wounded and divided in thought and deed. No religion, nor institution is left impenetrable with the evils of distorted anthropological grasp of man. The human being ought to remain a composite of body and soul and must work toward this unity. Any conceptual divergent view or clash on *Aquinas'* take on the politic and royal rule advanced to understand the passions/reason relation is likely to add injury to this very social reality of division both at a personal or public moral levels. Where then does the problem lie?

### **1.3 Statement of the problem**

It is natural and expedient that when individuals are disordered in their emotional lives, the society is generally unhappy. There is for sure a real problem of disharmony and

ambiguity on the right course of action. It is only unfortunate that many people have been tempted to think that the human anthropologically constituting elements: reason and passions have turned to work against man's own well-being, or differently put, against his own wellness. Experience has taught that there is a correspondent mismatch both in the social context of people's experience and their moral societal codes, and the academic conceptual grasp of passions/reason relation. There is tension between the dominating experiences of man's sensitive impulses (passions) and the assumed responsibility of reason's practical guidance and control in order that man be enabled to attain morally good life.

On the other hand, a constructive interpretation of *Aquinas'* politic and royal rule analogy of the passions/reason relation has remained overwhelmingly contentious area. There are two schools of thought: the *Rationalists* who think that *Aquinas* is entirely negative about the passions or to some extent sees them as impediments against good moral and flourished lives and the *Passionalists* who view *Aquinas* as a medieval intellectual giant who fully embraced the passions up to including their surprisingly positive role and contribution to the *telos* of man (Miner, 2009a, p. 107).

The social context today, in Kenya, as is also experienced elsewhere and the conceptual tension that is still unresolvable many centuries later beyond the medieval moral framework under which passions/reason relation were discussed, endanger the reception, attitudes, responses (individuals and society) and general anthropological harmony between passions and reason in our daily personal and public lives on those occasion when this relationship fails to bear fruit. There is a need to work toward a reconciliatory path and a remedy as we move into the future. It is because of the above reasons that we state categorically that our research problem is a continued conceptual tension between passions and reason, as is exemplified in *Miner* and *Ferry*. It is an unhealthy state of affairs for any individual or a society that hopes to flourish holistically.

We need to reconcile our thinking with our living. *Ferry's* work on '*Passionalist or Rationalist? The Emotions in Aquinas,*' and *Miner's* work on *the passions* stand to support and inspire us to explore the understanding behind passions 'having something of their own or right of resistance' on one hand against the conceptual metaphor of 'control, domination and commanding role' of reason detested in *Miner's* work (Miner, 2009a, pp. 106–108).

## 1.4 Objectives

- I. To do an exposition of the contextual grasp of the meaning of passions in an environment which was formally religiously Christian, intellectually scholastic and politically authoritarian in contrast to *Miner's* and *Ferry's* contemporary contexts. This has to raise a contextual difference in meaning which has significantly added value to our contemporary interpretation of the passions/reason relation.
- II. To investigate and expose the conceptual contentious items between these two scholars (*Miner* and *Ferry*) in order to demystify the tension and chart a reconciliatory path that would enliven the true Thomistic spirit which we believe is peaceful, good and healthy for the governance of individual lives and the human society.
- III. To demonstrate the dangers incumbent in the two extremes: a person or a society that is solely guided by passions and a person or a society that only pays attention to reason. It is our goal to show that such persons and societies do not actually progress holistically. This would clarify the crucial need for complementarity between reason and passions within the Thomistic anthropological framework and the vocation laid upon man toward the natural fulfilment of his end (*telos*).

## 1.5 Research questions

- I. How does *Aquinas'* contextual, political, Christian-religious, and intellectual medieval conception of passions contribute to the varying contemporary reception and interpretation of passions/reason relation?
- II. Are *Miner's* and *Ferry's* interpretation of *Aquinas'* use of the politic and royal rule analogy to understand passions/reason relation faithful to *Aquinas'* traditional Thomistic spirit?
- III. How would a person or a society which is extremely *passio-centric* be different from an extremely *ratio-centric* one?

## 1.6 Scope of the study

Our methodological scope is limited to library documentary analysis of medieval literature particularly the *ST* on *Treatise on the passions*. This also includes *PDF* documents downloaded from google scholar, readings from *Strathmore* online library and direct hard copies where possible. This has been conceived within the paradigm of interpretivist-constructivist qualitative research as it has been shown in chapter three. This study is bound by my personal experiences as a Christian religious, a Kenyan citizen and a student of moral philosophy who, like any other ordinary maturing adult, is well aware of the experiences, difficulties and challenges facing the ordering of

passions and how it militates against the achievement of a fruitful, peaceful and a resourceful private and public moral life. This work is tied to the observable social and moral experiences, context and environment of the Kenyan people.

Content-wise this research study has sought to advance a possible reconciliatory take on both *Rationalists* and *Passionalists* as particularised in the philosophical reflections of *Miner* and *Ferry*. It is limited to the clarification of the perceptions, meaning and interpretations that surround *Aquinas'* understanding of the passions/reason relation as conceived in him and interpreted by both *Miner* and *Ferry* within the analogical application of the Aristotelian politic and royal rule model. It has taken into consideration those literatures which are relevant to the resurgent passions/reason relation debate. It is purely a philosophical undertaking tied to the analogy of politic rule with a strong backing of the wider Aristotelian context of ancient Greek political community (the *polis*). It is also important to note that this work has not paid attention to individual passions but has only mentioned by passing, those individual passions that were useful for particular conceptual emphasis.

### **1.7 Significance of the study**

Human persons are neither extremely emotional nor extremely intellectual beings. This informs us of the need to be knowledgeable about the fact that any persons, societies or institutions ought to put at its interest the demand for a balance between a purely intellectual life and an extreme regard for emotional cravings.

It is also a call to positive societal responses to cases of overindulgences with emotional appetites, which in many cases are severely punished. It is a call to review the kind of disciplinary actions and policies that our institutions do take against the young (children), youth, adults and the aged, where passions and reason are not set at a balance.

We need to tame perceptions or attitudes in our societies where intellectual achievements or merits are overly appreciated at the expense of passions-oriented enterprises. These pressures should be calmed by a new understanding that no longer looks at or perceives passions as burdensome, or naturally sits against the general welfare of human progress but are part and parcel of it.

It is probable that families or a society may become the bedrock for breeding and promoting self-inflicted and suicidal thoughts, based on its reception and ruthless responses toward those who are victims of disordered passions. We hope that this study has contributed in informing public policies on the value of human life and the need to

respect and integrate human passions in the Kenyan legislative assemblies where laws are enacted.

It is hoped that this study should change a complacent attitude among many people who find it difficult to appreciate their emotional lives based on spiritual ethics and anthropologies of 'otherworldly' nature. This spiritual outlook that sees the world as a place of passage and not a home worth considering in certain fundamental decisions is misplaced. Emotional lives (passions) therefore, should not be looked at with suspicion and disregarded as trouble makers and ought not to be suppressed as such.

We seek to draw a context in which our struggle for virtuous and ethical maturity is appreciated and valued, especially in the language and ethics of scholars like *Aquinas*. We have worked hard to ensure that our understanding and struggle to arrive at a consensus agreement between *Miner* and *Ferry* would contribute and upgrade the aspirations of many people who long to achieve a moral rectitude and balance in the manner in which they live their lives among others. We have sought too, to meet the needs of tranquillity, happiness and peaceful life constantly endangered by the turbulent and conflicting sensual impulses rooted in the deficiency in reason's dominance and guardianship.

### **1.8 Conclusion**

We have given a comprehensive introduction to the research study. We have paid attention first of all to the social and the conceptual contexts which have facilitated the need to embark on the synDissertation of the two sides of the debate. Starting with the general introduction, to the background of the study, to problem statement, objectives and the research questions, we have briefly addressed the nature and the general focus of the research. We have elaborated chapter by chapter what is to be expected in the whole work as put in chapter one to five. From this point, it is only wise that we see what literature review has provided and the gaps underlined to make this research study more relevant and meaningful.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### 2.1 Introduction

We note with emphasis the need to remain faithful to a framework of looking at relevant literature on the basis of a side by side explication of the passions/reason relation versus the politic and despotic rule analogy. Mindful that this research work is an effort to arbitrate against the perennial tension between passions and reason, first, due to deviation from the Thomistic spirit, and secondly due to lack of proper understanding on how to coordinate our passions and reason in the real life, the literature here below is meant to demonstrate that a conflict do exist due to how some scholars or ordinary people have been trained or socialized to understand certain characteristic features of both passions and reason. As a work of arbitration, this literature review considers as necessarily relevant any piece of scholarly work that demonstrate, across the divide, both conceptually and socially, that passions are at loggerheads with reason and are consequently either conceived as positive or negative components of human constitution.

In the first part, which is specifically, the first question, we have related with literature that pays attention to the medieval context, its spirit and what might have influenced *Aquinas'* conception of the relation between passions and reason as it is depicted by his analogy of the politic and royal rule in the *ST*. This has pushed us to go back to the pre-Socratic times, *platonian* views and *Aristotle's* literature relevant to *Aquinas'* context and medieval conception of the passions.

Secondly, the second part of the literature review has paid attention to the concept of analogy, politic and royal rule metaphor and how it is originally understood by *Aristotle* and assimilated in *Aquinas'* work, the *ST*. This is where *Miner's* and *Ferry's* interpretive views and versions of the passions/reason relation are aired through the parameters of the politic and royal rule analogy.

We have finally, ended our literature review with question three by looking at those institutions or theories that have aligned themselves to either of the extremes: overly ratio centric or passio centric. We have concluded that deviation from *Aquinas'* spirit is unavoidable and the gap is apparent due to the possibilities implicit in the use of analogies and the literatures that are extremely tied to ratio-centric or passio-centric inclinations.

## 2.2 Research questions

**A. How does the contextual, political, Christian-religious, moral and intellectual medieval conception of passions contribute to the varying contemporary interpretation of the relationship between reason and passions?**

### 2.2.1 Medieval worldview and the passions

*Reeves* (2014) says that the philosophical worldview of medieval times was richly Latin Christianity with a spiritual outlook on every issue. There was an adoption of philosophical ideas from antiquity that were applied to religious commitments. Basically, general culture, metaphysics and religious themes among others like the problem of the universals were hotly discussed.

From the 11th century through the 13th century, Christian anthropology and the conception of human beings were totally reshaped with a gradual shift. This took place both in the monastic context and the new scholastic milieu (*Bouquet & Nagy*, 2016). *Bouquet* and *Nagy* argue that in the earlier medieval times, emotions were understood in terms of the dual moral perspectives of vices and virtues and defined by the parameters of fall and salvation.

According to *Bouquet* and *Nagy* (2016), affective life was largely reduced to either negative disturbances of the soul that a Christian should resist or to a positive love of God that the soul ought to cultivate. Emotions were considered to be the most complex picture of human nature and attracted considerable attention. Within the Christian framework, it was described in relation to the powers of the soul. The human being was slowly but definitively understood as an emotional being. Emotions finally became part of human nature and were natural to humans. There was a tremendous shift from the stoic conception where passions were illnesses from outside the self.

Emotions were no longer a legacy of the original sin but instead became an ontological part of the created being. Salvation proposed by the medieval thinkers was no longer bound to an austere dialectic opposing spiritual and carnal man but proceeded from a new understanding of the divine project as expressed from the physical world. Passion, according to *Aquinas*, exemplifies the fundamental transformation and the conception of affectivity, which led to the birth of the science of the soul where emotions were central to the definition of humanity (*Bouquet & Nagy*, 2016).

The medieval context had also shown several competing accounts of the theory of emotions, yet there was much agreement on the scope and nature and its place in affective psychology. They understood that emotions were influenced by and varied

with changes in thought and belief systems and were bound up, perhaps essentially, with their physiological manifestations (King, 2010).

The historical approach to the theory of emotions singles out three important interpretive paradigms for explaining medieval emotions. First, these emotions are seen as an uninhibited release of affect or stress. The second paradigm views emotions as well understood modes of communication in a society that used the gesture as often as it used words while the third understands them as norms within an emotional community. *Aquinas'* paradigm seems to fall in the first case (Rosenwein, 2010).

Nagy & Biron-Ouellet (2020) state that medieval religious context also went through a complex historical phenomenon called the Flagellant Movement (flogging or whipping) which provided interesting cases that may feed research in “emotion science” by bringing forward different cultural ways of conceptualizing and experiencing emotions and bodily gestures in order to give meaning to life. It is fascinating that the Flagellant Movement succeeded in its use of violence to achieve a collective and individual state of peace (Nagy & Biron-Ouellet, 2020).

Nagy and Biron-Ouellet (2020) observe that two pleasures might have been experienced by the participants. First, a feeling of God’s love as a result of inner conversion meant a foretaste of the greatest pleasure to come: that of being saved, but with eschatological overtones. Second, collective penance practiced in this very specific-ritual way included an additional pleasure. He argues that the intensity of self-afflicted violence associated with this “costly ritual” promoted strong social cohesiveness and peace.

We would like to argue that within the medieval context, there was a growing positivity in understanding emotions as a constitutive element of human nature. However, there were negative invisible belief tendencies that flew underneath and remained fixed by the general religious and intellectual progress of the time.

### **2.2.2 Stoicist view of the passions**

The general understanding of a Stoician passion is that: it is excessive impulse, an impulse that ignores reason, a false judgment or opinion, or a fluttering of the soul (Becker, 2004). Passions, according to the stoics, happen to us and propel us toward action. But again, they have a temporal strong dimension that weakens overtime. They are always known for their disruption and contradiction to reason. They misrepresent a thing’s value and so misdirect our impulse towards achieving it (Becker, 2004). They identified two passions: appetite and fear which are directly related to pleasure and

distress. Excess (sex, food and drink) passion results into mistaken judgment and consequently causes emotional disquietude.

Stoics are known to oppose passions that psychologically manipulate us, thereby undermining our reason and volition. How then should we defeat the negative responses caused by excessive passions, they ask? They say, “let us think whether they are called for”. Fear according to them is poor thinking. Virtue is the answer by which they gain a healthy state of mind. This is the only genuine good that guarantees happiness (Machek, 2015). It is all about positive thinking.

### **2.2.3 Platonic view of the passions**

*Plato* in the *Phaedo* treats the passions with disdain (they are to be exterminated and be controlled by the intellect) (Lange, 1938). *Plato* says that some passions are to be turned away from or to be eliminated, especially wild lust and fear. Those which are not to be turned away from or eliminated, may deserve a severe restriction and limitation. In the *Phaedo*, he mentions a number of them: pleasure for food, drink, laughter, sexual frenzy, grief, indignation etc. (Lange, 1938). He thinks that the more the passions are limited, the better. He equates the passions to a dark horse which requires the intellect’s mastery, control, reigning in and discipline. We have to understand that the Platonic model of passions conceives passions and intellect as relatively independent and structurally opposed components locked in a struggle.

### **2.2.4 Aristotelian view of passions**

Vaguely considered, passions are certain movements of the irrational appetite. *Aristotle* sees passions as ethically neutral. They are to be felt in the right fashion and they have to do with the correct deployment and employment (N.E 1106 B5-24). Placed under the command of reason and will, passions cannot be morally neutral. They are, therefore, *subiacens imperio rationis et voluntatis* (Miner, 2009a). *Miner* clarifies the fact that *Aquinas’* notion of passions (*passiones animae*) does not correspond to our contemporary conception of emotion. *Aquinas* understands passions in Aristotelian terms. Holding to *Aristotle’s* Psychology, passions are associated with what he calls the sensory part of the human soul.

## **2.3 Democratic political systems versus tyrannic ones**

The Greek understanding of a political community points to the idea that one party would persuade another on the best course of action for the sake of common good. Members were therefore ordered through persuasion and were able to respond to the appeal of reason, like the philosopher kings would do. As a result and in the light of the

above insight, reason should have no coercive power within the command structure (McAleer, 1999a).

Political rule by definition is a kind of a rule ‘over free and equal persons’ within a political community (Bradshaw, 1991). Both the ruled and rulers in the words of *Aristotle*, are similar in stock and free. The leader has respect for the equality of the citizens and does not see himself as endowed with certain exclusive capacity that sets him permanently over others (Bradshaw, 1991). Political rule therefore presupposes a kind of an equality of means and a sharing of the virtues. While it pursues moderation and affection, the polis is saved from the extremes of *wealth and poverty* which are the doors to dominance of one faction over the other. Political rule is a kind of a middling sort of a regime which in its ideal conception is healthy and appropriate due to the fact that it is a rule among equals with no real distinction between the ruled and the rulers (Bradshaw, 1991).

Yet it must be stated that the virtue of the ruler is not the same as the virtue of the ruled. As *Bradshaw* says, "For it is clear that a virtue-[the virtue] of justice, for example-would not be a single thing for [a ruler and for] a ruled but free person who is good, but has different kinds in accordance with which one will rule or be ruled, just as moderation and courage differ in a man or a woman (Bradshaw, 1991)."

According to *Aquinas*, regimen is political when he who rules has ‘power restrained’ according to some laws of the city. Ruling is done in part based on the fundamental equality of the citizens. There is no natural difference but only a fortuitous one of the actual time during which one holds the office (Blythe, 1986a). *Aquinas* says the following in explicating *Aristotle’s* metaphor of politic rule:

“Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium rationis, quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio praeest irascibili et concupiscibili non principatu despotico, qui est domini ad servum; sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, qui non totaliter subduntur imperio.” (Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.) (ST. I-II, 17, a. 7, c.).

Political rule therefore is like a polity in which the kings rule according to established laws by the whole community. *Blythe* thinks that a political or regal rule is not necessarily related to the extent of popular participation, the number of rulers or the size of the community. What is crucial is the distinction whether the rule is absolute or according to law. Subsequently, there are possible forms of political rule. These could be; political monarchy, aristocracy and political democracy (Blythe, 1986a). Looking at political rule through the spectacles of *Aristotle*, we must say that Aristotle sees politics in the light of the Greek conception of polity while Aquinas preserves Aristotelian terminology and assimilates it into the medieval context where monarchic rule was a normal state of affairs (Blythe, 1986a).

Since according to *Aristotle*, political rule is achieved by taking turns ruling (Pol. 127, a 10), all have a role in the ruling, thereby sharing in all its burdens and benefits. Ruling is and should not be reduced to holding the office, but also to sharing in the opportunities for action. Its main *determination* is in the role the ruled have in the ruling (Trott, 2013). As emphasized in the politics of *Aristotle*, the ruler learns how to rule by being ruled (Pol. 1277b8-9). This is likely to mean that reason can guide passions better by experiencing passions overwhelming take over.

*Summarily*, the medieval context points to the following: there are indicators that construe passions, both as negative disturbances or the positive love of God. There is also a gradual transition in understanding human nature as an emotional being, thereby giving the passions an ontological status in every created human being. Passions are no longer a legacy of original sin. *Stoics* argue that thinking is the remedy for their control. According to *Plato*, wild passions need severe restrictions because passions and intellect are constantly antagonistic. *Aristotle* integrates them and conceives them but not as independent forces. *Aristotle* views passions as appropriate, reliable and insightful responses to our situations. He relinquishes and diminishes the desirability of a deliberating control and dominance by intellect. In *Aristotle*, intellect's battle with a hoped-for victory over passions becomes unnecessary.

All signs show that something is exactly not stable about passions. They are likened to free citizens who have 'something of their own.' There are all kinds of struggles when it comes to giving them their rightful place in the general anthropological constitution of man. They are endowed with the 'right of resistance.' This right is implicit in them as it is alluded to in the politic and royal analogy. Mimbi (2009) has an interesting

description of ‘passions’ and this is what captures the nature and the concept of the passions that has most likely informed and pre-judged the outcome of this study. He asserts that the term ‘passion’ is generally assigned to the acts of the sensitive appetites or tendencies which, actually, are a ‘kind of awareness of the harmony (or lack of it) between reality and these tendencies.’ Passion is a way of feeling the tendencies and they arise both in the concupiscible appetite for the pleasurable good and irascible desire for rejecting evil or attaining the most difficult tasks (Mimbi, 2009).

Moreover, we have understood that in a political regimen, there is an emphasis on *freedom* and *equality*, minimal coercive power from the ruler and the need for both the ruled and the ruler to share in the virtues and means of leadership and governance of the *polis*. It is also true that in a political system, the power is restrained according to law, and any determination is achievable through the ruled. It is a rule that tries to avoid the extremes of wealth and poverty. We have discussed all these against the spirit of despotic rule where masters over-burden their slaves for the sake of their own individual gains. It is a tyrannical state run through the master’s own principles.

**B. Are Miner’s and Ferry’s interpretation of Aquinas’ application of the politic and royal rule analogy to Passions/Reason relation faithful to the Thomistic spirit?**

**2.4 What is an analogy?**

**2.4.1 Aristotle’s analogy and its use**

An analogy is a 4-term comparison of the typical form A is to B as C is to D, with the A and B side being a familiar source domain or process and the C and D side being unfamiliar target domain or process. Beyond the typical 4-term analogy structure is the characteristic of allowing one to draw inferences. We can, therefore, say together with *Nathan Smith* that:

These inferences are initially directly from the A and B relation to the C and D relation, but they can extend further if the analogy allows for such elaboration. This involves the supposition of sufficient similarity in the relevant ways between the source (the familiar side, A and B) and the target (the less familiar side, C and D).

**2.5 Miner’s claims on the basis of Aquinas’ politic and royal rule analogy**

The following claims are grounded on chapter four of his work of *Aquinas on Passions* (Miner, 2009a, pp. 88–108):

- a. He claims that there are good reasons to think that the metaphor of ‘control’ does not capture passions/reason relationship. He asks this question: “But

does the metaphor of “control” adequately capture *Aquinas*’ understanding of the relation between reason and passions (Miner, 2009a, p. 107)?”

- b. *Miner* talks of *perfect subjection* of passions to reason, thereby qualifying the concept of control by introducing the very substitution of extirpation or exclusion for control (Miner, 2009a, p. 108).
- c. *Miner* argues that the analogy of the politic rule implicitly refers not only to the negative resistance but also the ‘potential’ for the positive contribution (Miner, 2009a, p. 107).
- d. He further claims that passions can contribute ‘something of their own.’ He argues that the fact that politic rule by showing passions as ‘having something of their own,’ is not a sad fact. It points to the ability of the sensitive appetite to make a contribution of its own in the return of the rational creature to the ultimate end (Miner, 2009a, pp. 94–95). He states that, “As free citizens contribute something of their own to the life of a well-organized *polis*, beyond what is already known or prescribed by rulers, so the passions are able to contribute “something of their own,” as *Aquinas* says (I. 81.3.ad 2m) to the life of the human being (Miner, 2009a, p. 107).

### **2.5.1 *Miner*’s methodological assumptions and its possible gaps**

In his study of the ‘*Treatise on the Passions*’ according to *Aquinas*, *Miner* underscores the following four methodological assumptions (Emotions, 2015):

1. That different fields of inquiry, that is, empirical psychology, cognitive sciences and cultural anthropology have not eliminated humanistic inquiry. They still value and use insights that come from literature, philosophy and theology.
2. That a necessary condition of learning from a major thinker like *Thomas Aquinas* requires a sympathetic reading of the primary text. We must try to understand him from the inside and see the emotions as he sees them. We must, on the same note, keep our minds ready to learn something from him. His medieval context does not make him irrelevant to us, neither does it out-date him.
3. That there must be a certain degree of scepticism in any thinker regardless of how much he is celebrated. It can help to avoid a surprise in the moment that we find his thoughts outdated or under-developed. His work on *Aquinas*, claims *Miner*, is an exhortation to a sympathetic reading. In this regard, he approaches

*Aquinas* not as a canonized *St. Thomas Aquinas*, nor as a distinct and abstract person, nor a religious and a Theologian but simply as *Thomas Aquinas*.

4. *Aquinas* is worth reading, not as someone we can learn about but simply as someone we can potentially learn from. He is an aid to our thinking about passions (Emotions, 2015). Through him, we can formulate and address questions about what they are and by reading his texts, we get insights into the reality of passions. His work is born not out of personal experience, nor phenomenology but it is out of dialectical examinations of inherited language for the analysis of the emotions.

### **2.5.2 Miner's possible gaps and interpretation of the politic analogy based on his methodological assumptions (Emotions, 2015)**

1. Readiness to learn something from *Aquinas* does not necessarily mean a conventional insight into how much his text can be applied. Medieval literature, we argue, should be read in the light of the development of thought traced back incessantly to antiquity in order to see why that context would be necessary to a true interpretation of *Aquinas'* thought within a contemporary perspective.

2. We also think that reading *Aquinas* just as that man *Thomas Aquinas*, deprives him of his background and context, i.e., his religious aspirations, intellectual tradition of the medieval times, social and political orientations, ethical perspectives and his vocation as a theologian and a Christian. We think that justice will not be done to his literature if his background and medieval context is detached from him. *Aquinas* is more than just that Man *Thomas Aquinas*. He carries with him the whole baggage of his religious formation and the intellectual spirit of the Christian Tradition. One cannot eliminate these aspects when he endeavours to grasp the reality of his thinking.

3. *Miner* is also very clear on the fact that he looks at *Aquinas* as somebody who aids his thinking. This means that he does not remain tied to the things he has learned from him, but that he can also have the freedom to interpret him even if this would mean over-stepping the thoughts of *Aquinas*.

First, *Miner's* study of passions is interdisciplinary, drawing on several areas such as neuroscience, psychology, education, philosophy, and others. He points out that *Aquinas'* work has drawn a lot from his predecessors in the field and was framed in terms of passions and not emotions (Colón-Emeric, 2010). *Miner* has also claimed an entirety of treatment of the passions as opposed to other commentators who deal with the study of the passions in segments or specified areas. *Miner* discusses *Aquinas'*

understanding of the passions considered in themselves. Though his interpretation has been rated as a meticulously well-argued account, there are sections of the book where *Miner* seems to have over-stretched the meanings of the texts to fit his commitment to a unified account (Colón-Emeric, 2010).

*Aquinas'* work is rooted in a dialectical examination of inherited languages from his intellectual predecessors. *Aristotelian* conception of the politic against despotic rule within a political community as is used by *Aquinas* to elaborate the relationship between reason and passions is also rooted in Greek philosophical categories. Yet *Miner* tries to interpret *Aquinas'* work off his intellectual and religious formative background. It cannot go without raising major concerns and interest on our critical analysis of the same analogy.

## **2.6 *Ferry's* interpretive stance on the basis of *Miner's* claims**

The politic and royal rule analogy is applied by *Aquinas* to the passions/reason relation in order to demonstrate that the sensitive appetite can for sure frustrate the human agency. *Ferry* thinks that in the general understanding of the passions as it is found in *Aquinas'* literature, passions remain a threat to man's progress toward his flourishing. Their role therefore cannot be out rightly positive. They must be put under the guiding role of reason. According to *Ferry*, *Miner* seems to minimise the threats the emotions often pose to meritorious action in order to attempt to award a positive role to the emotions (Ferry, 2012a).

Secondly, *Ferry* says that whenever *Aquinas* uses the analogy of the politic and royal rule, the connotation is always and primarily negative. The royal rule is not used to suggest the positive value of passions. The right of opposition, by all means, says *Ferry*, is at least potentially stands on the way of human flourishing.

Thirdly, the potential resistance of the passions to reason is not to their credit but to the discredit of a fallen humanity. This therefore require that a remedy be given and this remedy is virtuous life where reason alone must remain the mover and commander.

Last but not least, *Ferry* claims that the politic and royal rule analogy should not be taken too literally and expansively as depicted in *Miner's* creative and robust work on *Aquinas* passions. This enables him to make a positive case for the passions yet there is no positive case, *Ferry* claims (Ferry, 2012a).

The politic rule analogy, as used by *Aquinas*, needs to be placed within the political, Christian-religious tradition, and the medieval context as assimilated in the *ST* from *Aristotelean* background. With a particular emphasis on the purpose of such

applications and in understanding what *Aquinas* had to communicate, *we need to grasp how far then should our thoughts go with this simple analogy in the construction of Aquinas' thoughts on passions/reason relation.* Additionally, we need to be mindful of practical consequences that result from continuous epistemic divergence likely brewed by deviance from the strict Thomistic and traditional stance and its impact on individual lives and society at large.

### **2.7 Passions/reason relation versus the ruled/ruler analogical framework**

As it is expressed in the politic and royal rule analogy, it is important to understand that in any analogical reasoning, the analogy itself functions as the explanation (Tindale, 2007). This is what makes it potentially a powerful method of scientific inquiry. It involves the pulling of causal elements from a source object, which is more familiar and better understood. These are then mapped onto the targeted object. It is a mode of causal inference. What is invoked in the postulation is an ontological causal correspondence which is a crucial aspect of any analogy (Olszewsky, 1968).

Analogical reasoning aims at causing explanation beyond stating mere epistemic reasons. It demands that the two domains of analogy be significantly different as is shown in the above sub-heading. *Lombardo* in footnote number 26 on his work, *'The Logic of Desire'* shows *McAleer's* stance that the model of a political community is designed to inform the reader that there is a composite of needs in the human person, which must be brought into a well-ordered community of mutual satisfaction (*Lombardo*, 2011). In his interpretation, *McAleer* argues that rational appetite is a superior appetite that *commands* and at the same time has the responsibility to ensure that the sense appetite is enabled to satisfy its legitimate wants. Reason has no legitimate authority to command as it so wishes. *Lombardo* points to the fact that the ideal relationship between reason and passion is more fluid because while sometimes passions hinder the use of reason, sometimes it sharpens it. This sharpening is more possible in a political community where just laws are obeyed and unjust ones resisted (*Lombardo*, 2011).

But the rule of reason over passions is more of a politic and royal rather than a despotic rule. A tyrannical control of the passions would be a form of over-control that suppresses the legitimate role of passions in moral life. The sole purpose of this political authority is not to eliminate them, but 'to enable them to play their proper role' in the virtuous human action. They, therefore, possess participative rationality and so are potentially intelligent and potentially virtuous (*Goodill*, 2019).

This understanding does not take away the fact that even the temperate person at times will have to exert effort not give in to irrational passions. We can, therefore, conclude that this brief understanding of passions leaves temperance with a 'primary duty of integrating and right ordering of the desires of attraction rooted in the human body and capacity for emotions (Goodill, 2019). It must also be noted that virtue consists in the rational ordering of the various faculties towards human flourishing and not by forceful submission (McAleer, 2001).

Floyd (1999) says that moral life involves a conflict between bodily appetite or passion and reason. He notes the fact that this is a recurring theme in the Christian moral tradition and argues that there are two strands within the moral Christian tradition. One view looks at passions as those emotions that should be conquered since they invariably inhibit the ability to make good decisions and carry out proper acts. On the other view, passions are not inherently conflicted. *Floyd* claims that *Aquinas* adopts the second strand where temperance denotes not conquest but a modification of passions that accompany physical activity.

*Butera* (2002) argues that temperance causes someone to experience the right passions toward the right objects. Temperance in the understanding of *Aquinas*, is not just the habit of performing the right external functions, says *Butera*, but also that a temperate person performs good actions with the right internal disposition. This means that their right doing goes hand in hand with the experience of right passions. It, therefore, remains a disposition that enables reason to incite, increase, diminish or curb a passion as needed.

In the *ST*, temperance (*temperantia*) is defined by *Aquinas* as the virtue by which we gain the proper control or moderation over the desires and the pleasures of touch (passions) associated with food, drink and sex (T. Aquinas & Adler, 1990) . Temperance does not repress desire but forms and channels it positively, placing it at the service of the right relationship to one's self, others and God. In the case that it does limit or restrain desire, it is for the sake of deeper or more meaningful goods (Austin, 2010). It modulates harmoniously between restraint and redirection of desire. It is not a purely negative ideal of repression and constraint, argues Austin. What then is the definitive character of passions from *Aquinas'* understanding of temperance? For we understand that temperance does not repress them, yet it must form and channel them rightly. He states:

Temperance, therefore, is a cardinal virtue because the desire for food, drink and sex is the most basic natural to our animal nature (Austin, 2010). Since temperance rectifies the passion of sensible attraction, its subject is the concupiscible appetite or the power of the soul in which these passions reside. The mode of temperance is to restrain by moderating concupiscence (Goodill, 2019). Temperance is marked by ease and delight that characterizes the exercise of true virtue. It can also be simplified as a well-ordered eros (Austin, 2010).

**C. How would a person or society which is passio-centric be different from a ratio-centric one?**

**2.8 Reason, the slave of passions: *Hume's* central Dissertation**

*Hume's* political theory throws much light on how much he expected a society to be run. According to him, reason, whether in anyone's own person or in the person of the other should serve the interest of the passions. Passions are the masters, and reason needs to serve in the interest of what passions command. *Hume* had observed that life is about impressions and that experience dictates the human existence (Buckle, 2012).

**2.8.1 *Aquinas's* pro-passion attitude interpreted (Passio-centric approach)**

It should be noted that *Aquinas* never displayed any tendency to exalt reason by denigrating the passions nor exalting the passions by condemning the rule of reason (Miner, 2009a). Passions, in the definition of *Aquinas*, are the sensitive reactions to the external world and are, therefore, an integral part of the basic teleological directedness of human beings toward their proper fulfilment (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003). Passions are necessarily present when human's *telos* is realized in and through moral activity. The discussion about passions is not about how reason controls them but rather how 'passions form a necessary dimension of rational human nature and its fulfilment', says *Lippens*. We must insist, adds *Lippens*, that passions, as sensitive appetites can be an integral part of the human striving for self-fulfilment, but that reason bears the responsibility of giving them the place they deserve.

Contrary to the thinking, *Hume* thought, that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions and can never aim for any other office but to serve and obey the passions. *Debeljuh* (2006) defines passions as the movement of affectivity. As a sensitive affectivity, it reflects a way of judging and evaluating the real world. Passions as acts of the sensitive appetite are subordinate to the intellect and the will. According to the study, passions are physical facts with no moral connotation. They are neither good nor bad yet voluntary in the sense that they are permitted by the will. This does not mean that they constitute the act of the will. However, their connection with the will grants

them the possibility of having a moral value. They form part of the being of 'man' and they ought to be for the overall good of the person. As a result, passions can be good or bad in conformity with the right reason and moral norms (Debeljuh, 2006). This conception too does not brand *Aquinas* an anti-reason person in his understanding of the role of passions.

*Hampson* (2012) commends the expertise of *Lombardo* by seeing him as expertly showing how for *Aquinas* the dynamics of desire, appetites and affections are not only essential to normal human functioning but are intrinsically good and equally essential aspects of our God seeking. That emotions direct being towards its telos, and that appetite is inextricably linked to being and goodness. *Hampson* says that appetite motivates creation to God. In his opinion therefore, "evil is not just a privation of good but also a frustration of appetites and a consequent disintegration of being because to frustrate appetite is to impede it from attaining to natural telos". Our sins against God could easily be sins against our deepest desires. We need to understand the teleo-logical point of emotions. Neither should we sever its connection with reason nor treat it as a mere sentiment to be privately indulged, an enslaving tyrant to be ascetically overcome or a disrupter to be repressed (*Hampson*, 2012). Suppression against passions can easily transform a person or a society to irreligiosity and disruption of the fulfilment of our naturally inclined teleological vocation, the absolute good. Neither this observation gives passions any lead in the philosophical literature of *Aquinas*.

*Lombardo* argues that passions apply only to the emotions of the sensitive appetite and have the primary function to incline us towards the perfection of our nature because we are fundamentally oriented towards the good and it is, therefore, indispensable to the attainment of the telos of human existence (*Lombardo*, 2011).

*Stanley* (1998) states that according to *Aristotelian* canons of definitions to which *Aquinas* subscribes, a complete definition of something necessarily entails an articulation of its final cause and the final cause of a being is its end or *telos* in the sense of what it would be if it were to become fully realized in accordance with its nature. In the light of this logic, it can be seen why questions of human nature are tightly linked to the questions of human destiny, which according to *Aquinas* must be set within the context of creation. Passions deserve this same logic.

*Chanderbhan* (2013) projects a fact that at the highest stages of development, emotions have a more prominent role than in the lower stages and must not be treated as auxiliary to the life of flourishing. In the moral life, emotions truly have a prominent role. He

further asserts that pointing this out helps us to resist over-intellectualizing interpretations of *Aquinas*' moral philosophy. Yet even in Chanderbhan's observation, *Aquinas* does no over-positioning of passions at the expense of reason.

*Lippens* (2003) states that to arrive at the correct and deepened understanding of the passions, they must be understood within the hylomorphic conception of human nature. Summarily, the pro-passion attitude does not eliminate the guidance of reason. We cannot use these logical inclinations to claim a possibility of a life (personal) or societal that will only operate based on passion-oriented interests at the expense of reason.

### **2.8.2 The Philosopher King: *Plato*'s view of reason**

*Plato* thought that passions had nothing much to offer on the governance of society. He referred to those who led a life of rationality and wisdom as philosophers, and had the right to rule society since they were the custodians of the true good (De Vries, 1991). Since Truth in *Plato*'s ideal state is convertible to the good, passions had no space in this leadership and could not make essential contribution to its wellbeing. But *Aquinas*' position was not the same as *Plato*'s. He was a realist who opted for an integral vision of both man and society. Ratio centric vision of life and society in general does not reflect the true spirit of *Aquinas*. It automatically calls for the extermination of passions. Conclusively, attention to reason in the guidance and management of any person or society finally presents a utopian state of life both in individuals and in society. Such a life or a society has little regard for emotions and loses the sense of freedom and finally leads to a despotic regime where the master puts everyone else to slavery. Equality becomes a thing of the past and aspirations for common good are lost. This is not what *Aquinas* would think of if we go by his anthropology and the general welfare of man. Neither passions on the lead nor reason alone solves the equation. Taking either direction fails to measure up to the analogy of a political rule that considers the complementary and obligatory relationship between passions and reason for the common welfare of the different constitutive elements in man.

### **2.8.3 *Aquinas* anti-passion attitude interpreted (Ratio-centric approach)**

*Ferry* (2012) states that there is a need to challenge a growing consensus among *Aquinas*' scholars who attribute a pro-passion attitude to *Aquinas*' thinking. He furthers his position against *Miner* by saying that *Aquinas* is more sceptical of the role played by emotion in the virtuous life. According to *Aquinas*, he argues, emotions are often threats to peaceful and good-moral life and need to be controlled by the virtues. *Ferry* also steps up his position against *Miner* whose understanding of *Aquinas* on the

Passions and virtues downplays the dominating role of reason in his moral theory. He argues that *Miner* elevates emotions to nearly a co-equal status with reason and so minimizes the need it has of being controlled by reason. *Ferry* thinks that this is exegetically inaccurate and experientially deficient (Ferry, 2012a).

Rose (2013) argues that *Aquinas* seems to underrate and disregard the body; the bedrock from which passions arise. *Rose* argues that *Aquinas* assigns no role to the body in the teleological ends and virtuous aspirations. Tracing *Aquinas'* thought on human embodiment, *Rose* argues that there is tension in *Aquinas* between the desire to locate human distinctiveness in the conjunction of body and soul. Drawing on *Aquinas'* account of human nature, teleology and ethics', he traces *Aquinas'* account of human embodiment through *Aquinas'* discussion of the relationship between human and angelic nature, the beatific vision, law and virtue, and the active and contemplative lives. *Aquinas* is interpreted to mean that at a certain point in the course of our journey toward beatific vision, embodiment is precisely that which obstructs progress towards God. According to *Rose*, tension is inextricably connected to *Aquinas'* understanding of human calling and discipleship and poses serious challenges to any attempt to draw on *Aquinas'* work as an ethical resource. This does not fit with *Aquinas'* understanding of human calling and discipleship. He seems to have had an ambiguous view of the body and so this understanding sits negatively on contemporary ethical debates. The question that arises is whether reason on its own has the capacity or moral power to propel man as an integral being to his final destination.

Trabbic (2011) is assertive that there appears to be no serious treatment of the positive role played by the body in *Aquinas'* account of human happiness. This goes against *Aquinas'* insistence that a human person is a composite of body and soul. He says that among the three forms of human happiness discussed by *Aquinas* in the *ST*, the perfect happiness of the beatific vision is the happiness *simpliciter*. *Aquinas* fails to show how the body is involved (Trabbic, 2011). We must pay attention to the above claim, otherwise we may find passions redundant in the general pursuit of blessedness. *Aquinas'* context should be drawn clearly to show his firm grip of the political analogy that is best suited to explain the place of passions and contributions without provoking suspicion as is depicted in *Miner's* work.

When a person cannot control his passions, it means that he has something in him beyond him. He cannot make free decisions and so he does not possess himself fully, says *Debeljuh*. This must, therefore, mean that he cannot decide about himself nor give

himself to others as moved by love (Debeljuh, 2006). The disordered passions are an obstacle, says *Debeljuh*, for they weaken the guiding function of reason. This capacity to weaken the guiding role of reason should not be construed as something positive about them that must be harvested for a better re-constitution of man and his operations towards his end. While on the same note, it is not stated explicitly that this weakening ability gives passions a negative tag as a component of the human constitution.

Quinn (1993), in following *Aquinas*' understanding of the acquisition of knowledge, observes that generally, *Aquinas* agrees with *Aristotle* that any production of knowledge is indispensable of the body and the senses. Quinn also indicates that this agreement with *Aristotle* on *Aquinas*' side is to some extent contradictory. *Aquinas* himself says that "to understand God's essence, we must dispense with any kind of knowledge that is mediated through the senses and the body's capacity to interfere with the intellect at highest level of cognition must consequently be curbed." How then do the passions contribute to our nearness to God, which is pure intellection? *Aquinas*' negative view of the body, its implications in his theory of knowledge and its contribution to the philosophy of religion is tapped deep on his perception of senses and bodily images, the phantasms, which in his opinion are redundant when it comes to the cognition of God. His reservations about human bodiliness and sense-based cognition suggests a greater affinity with the thinking of Plato (Quinn, 1993).

However, according to *Miner*, in his book, '*Thomas Aquinas on Passions*', *Aquinas*' understanding of Passions helps us see how generally and particularly each passion contributes to human flourishing and prepare a way for a felicity beyond the passion yet does not leave it behind (Miner, 2009). The only thing that is lacking in *Miner*'s account is how these passions are integrated into *Aquinas*' overall conception of human perfect happiness (happiness simpliciter) in relation to infused virtues and gifts.

Nevertheless, the concept of the flesh is more misunderstood in Christian thought than anywhere else (McAleer, 2001). According to *McAleer*, the concept of flesh is typically dismissed as negative or conservative. It is extravagance within us and is set up with eroticism against the law of decency; a conception that imprisons the body and its desire and denigrates what ought to be celebrated. On what grounds then does the Christian notion of the flesh get quickly dismissed? (McAleer, 1999). We wish to argue that it is on these grounds that little positive attention is given to passions in entire traditional Christian philosophical circles.

According to *Adams* (2010), Christians believe that even though we die, we shall rise to live again embodied forever. *Adams* argues that the medieval accounts of the life to come do not seem to give the bodies anything to do. For medievalists argue that the elect will be principally occupied with the beatific vision and enjoyment of God. For philosophical theology, we need a theoretical coherence about this. But since form follows function, despite the appearance of the body, for a proper and an optimal function in the life to come, the soul-body re-union will be required. Finally, the neo-Thomistic tag that ‘grace builds on nature’ put forth the normative hypothesis that supernatural ends and what orders us to them do not take away anything from nature but instead improves it (*Adams*, 2010).

## **2.9 Theoretical framework**

A theoretical framework consists of concepts, their definitions and existing theories that we have used in this particular study (*Kombo and Tromp*, 2006). It demonstrates an understanding of theories and concepts that are relevant to the topic of our research. By its application, it fulfils one primary role of explaining the meaning, nature, and challenges of a phenomenon (*Kombo and Tromp*, 2006).

The literature review has employed topical, thematic and a little bit of classic studies organization model (*Bradshaw*, 1991). *Bradshaw* observes that thematic organization involves organization of the research into sections. These sections represent categories or conceptual subjects or topics. The classical studies are a discernment of major writings regarded as significant in an area of study or benchmark studies or articles that should be acknowledged. For our case as is reflected in chapter four we have done a direct study of the *ST*, and pointed out the instrumental use of the politic and royal power analogy to explain the usual tension that passions seemingly independent character poses to the guidance of reason. This has been followed by a direct study of *Miner’s* work on the passions. We have also shown that *Ferry’s* take on passions/reason relation is seen through his critique on *Miner’s* version and interpretation of the analogy.

On the other hand, we have employed the *Aristotelian* conceptual metaphor framework. This affirms that people understand abstract domains via more concrete domains of knowledge. This states that according to metaphor enriched perspective, people conceptualize abstract concepts in terms of concrete concepts, which for our case is the politic and royal rule. It is a standard that presents the concept of a ‘*model-theoretical isomorphism.*’ It is a set standard for thinking about similarity and its role in analogical

reasoning (Bartha, 2019). It is based on syntactical similarity and overall structure of the analogy. It is also pointing to the fact that analogies are about relations rather than simple features no matter what kind of knowledge it is (Bartha, 2019). It is the interrelationship between facts that should determine the content of analogies. *Bartha* argues that the best mapping in an analogical argument as *Aristotle* envisioned is determined by systematicity.

We have therefore, paid attention to the theory of analogical reasoning or what *Aristotle* calls reasoning by analogy (Bartha, 2013) in order to seek clarity on, *Aquinas'* conception as it is put in the works of both *Miner* and *Ferry*. We have underscored the *systematicity* principle where the explanations of certain concepts is arrived at by mapping structural similarities or what is called higher relational matches between the source domains onto the target domain.

We have proceeded by looking at major figures in the field and major studies, books, articles etc., and especially those of *Thomas Aquinas* which have pointed to the application of politic and royal rule analogy to explain the nature of the relationship that exist between passions and reason. *Miner's* work on the passions and *Ferry's* work on this subject matter and other scholarly literature relevant to the course of reconciling the two, have been given proper attention. *Nicholas Lombard (the logic of desire)*, *Pasnau*, and *Peter King, Lippens* are among those who have been cited as most crucial. We have also made our voice, perspective, position and standpoint clear, not only in the literature review but also in the study as a whole. With this reconciliatory trajectory that has run throughout this critically reviewed literature, we hope we have reached a *synDissertation* that lays open the need for a clear, concise, rigorous and a consistent scholarly work that would lessen and bridge the gap between the *Miner's* propassion stance and *Ferry's* rationalistic view point which we have deemed non-resourceful to the moral social context of the contemporary society.

*Summarily*, there is an agreement that analogies aim at causing explanations beyond stating epistemic reasons. There is an implicit claim and indeed as *Miner* argues, that reason's rule should neither be absolute nor coercive. For passions, just like free and equal members of a political society (the ruler and the ruled) should not endeavour to rule as he so wishes. Despite the positive views that we have so far seen in the works of both *Miner* and *Ferry*, they remain inclined to either side of the extremes. In the moments that passions may take the lead, they should do the ruling in accordance with the well stipulated laws of the *polis*. But the law is their ordination to the guidance of

reason. If going beyond in analogies is acceptable, why then is *Miner's* interpretation thought of as an over-pitch in his scholarly interpretive advances? Is it true that he has lost *Aquinas'* traditional meaning and spirit? Of course he has claimed that *Aquinas* is read and analysed as a person aiding his thinking. All the above *summaries and the assumptions* have forcefully echoed areas where *gaps* are visible and have created interest on our part to further and advance an effort to reconcile *Miner* and *Ferry* on those most contentious lines where they do not agree to mean the same thing. The discussions and appropriate facts as per our problem statement attest to this conceptual tension, it is real and should be handled appropriately.

## **2.10 Conclusion**

This chapter has done an extensive review of literature and we have proven the reality of possible gaps which we believe have informed the need for this research work. This has been done in line with the three general research questions where each question has got significant attention. The random choice of literature was meant to show the general public and intellectual attitude over passions/reason relation. By choosing not to strictly rely on those scholars who have expertise in *Aquinas*, we wanted to show this common place and negative evaluation of passions/reason relation and how it has overtime translated into our social contexts, for example, the Kenyan public. After every question a summary of the gaps has been underscored in order to make more conspicuous the problem of the research. It is important now to pay attention to the methodological approach that we have employed to enable us carry out this research as we have put in the next chapter.

## Chapter 3: Research Methodology

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter has explained in details the research methodology that we have employed in undertaking the research work. Research methodology in this context has been understood as “the overall plan of the entire research process in a particular research that explains the choice of a particular paradigm, justifies a particular approach, highlights specific method(s), and describes the data generation techniques and analysis procedures (Ong’ondo, Jwan, 2020).” We have started therefore by addressing each step effectively beginning with the research approach to ethical considerations in order to facilitate a reliable and a trustworthy research outcome. It is intended to address the choice of particular paradigms, justification of the chosen approaches and methods, data generation techniques and analysis procedures. This chapter has ended with the research quality and validity, the ethical considerations behind the whole work and the conclusion.

### 3.2 Research design

**The research approach:** Our research design or research methodology used in this work is qualitative research method. This is the overall plan and arrangements that has enabled us to do the research. *Creswell* refers to research design as the overall strategy that a researcher chooses to integrate the different components of a study coherently and logically (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). The research design enables a researcher to effectively address the research problem. In other words, the research design constitutes a blueprint for the philosophical paradigm, approaches, methods, data generation techniques, data analysis, presentations and discussions (Ong’ondo, Jwan, 2020).

**The research paradigm:** The focus of our research has been on the meaningful interpretation of the concept of passions/reason relation as is employed by *Aquinas* in his *ST*. The study has combined the constructivist and interpretivist paradigms research processes. In the *constructivist* paradigm, the interpreter, we, the (researcher) conceptualizes and understands a phenomenon based on the social context while *Interpretivist* research is guided by the researcher’s set of beliefs and feelings about certain issues, how they should be understood and studied. It is important to understand that with this paradigm, knowledge is relative to particular circumstances, historical, temporal, cultural and subjective and exists in terms of multiple forms of representations from individual interpretations (Creswell & Creswell, 2017).

The Kenyan social context where the challenges of the sensitive impulses is experienced has appealed to our choice of these paradigms. The societal tension of appreciating intellectual or reason oriented achievements over sensual passionate pursuits or failures resulting from sensual appetitive powers provoked our questioning as to whether these constitutive elements of the human being are originally ordained to oppose one another. We were in deep doubt why even at the level of institutions like the family, schools, and churches, etc. suppression and disregard of passions (emotions) and over-acknowledgment of reason-oriented achievements has been given little attention.

**Research method:** we have employed *content analysis* as our analytical method by paying attention to *Aquinas' Treatise of the passions*, *Miner's work on Thomas Aquinas on the passions*, and *Ferry's article on Emotions on Aquinas moral theology*. We have explored the manner in which these writers/authors have presented their treatment of the passions/reason case or their appraisal of the documents which for our case is the treatise on the passions. We have further subjected our analysis to a comparative take from different scholars (Ong'ondo, Jwan, 2020). Again, we have considered medieval setting of *Aquinas*, and particularly the contemporary social and academic contexts that seem to weigh distractively on the celebrated Thomistic –moral traditions of the medieval times. In considering this method for our research, we have extensively studied the above mentioned scholarly literatures in content, context, possible interpretations, relevance, inclinations, and any other issue that has been of interest to us (Ong'ondo, Jwan, 2020).

As a social actor, it has been important for us to appreciate differences between people, focus on the meaning of concepts and employ multiple methods to reflect on the issue at hand. Our concern has been: is the disharmony between passions and reason and by extension the conceptual disagreement over the same amongst varied scholars an epistemic problem? What exactly should motivate persons and institutions to work toward their unity where theory and praxis is harmonised? Does the reality of passions/reason heightened relation been wholly depicted by the conceptual tussle between *Miner* and *Ferry*? We have paid attention to the principles of contextualization, abstraction and generalization, dialogical reasoning, and multiple interpretations.

### **3.3 Data collection method**

We have gathered data by studying relevant scholarly documents which we believe follows the same line of thinking as observation or interviewing (Ong'ondo, Jwan,

2020). Data collection method which is also called data generation technique refers to information gathering with the sole purpose of serving or proving certain facts. It should be comprehensive and up-to-date data on the issue under discussion (Kombo and Tromp, 2006). The random data from the two sides of the debate was necessary without strictly relying only on those Scholars who have expertise on *Aquinas*. This is meant to show the general public and scholarly attitude about passions/reason relation and how such misplaced attitudes translate to our social moral life. This data gathering technique has helped in clarifying facts. It has ranged from primary sources as indicated above, to secondary sources and has included other works of scholarly literature. We have done our data collection in a manner that shows the involvement of multiple sources.

The research tool that assisted us in this collection is document analysis. These are the documents that from the onset we have utilised and have been relevant to the study. Data has been collected by examining written literature, especially the *Summa Theologiae*, *Miner's* and *Ferry's* work on the Passions and other scholars' interpretations through library study and direct personal evaluation of varied scholarships. Combining narrow themes into overarching perspectives, the study has related the literature and provided a general explanation and interpretations of the study (Creswell et al., 2007). The data gathered has been reviewed, made sense of and organized into themes that cut across all the data sources.

### **3.4 Data analysis and interpretation**

Our analysis has been critical textual analysis. Data analysis is an ongoing process that involves continual reflection about the data by asking critical questions (Creswell et al., 2007). The analysis proceeded by the collection of document data, organizing and preparing it for analysis, reading through all data, interrelating themes and descriptions, and finally interpreting them as a way of validating their accuracy (Creswell et al., 2007). The data analysis process has constituted organization and discussion of the collected content into themes.

In this document analysis, we, (the researcher) has been the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. We have decided on the number or sizes of the data to be gathered as a corpus of the study (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). We were the primary instrument of data collection, analysis and organization into themes to form the body of the research outcome. These data have been analysed inductively and critically. This means that we developed them from particular themes to general ones, including their

interpretation. The analysis has put into consideration the intersection of philosophy, strategies of inquiry and specific methods.

According to *Charles Ong'ondo* and *Julius Jwan's* work on, '*Qualitative Research Process: From conceptualization to Examination,*' data analysis involves looking at the data, assigning categories and putting together emerging issues with the sole purpose of answering research questions (Ong'ondo and Jwan, 2020). In doing so, we have constantly made recourse to the research problem to make meaningful and relevant our research process.

We have carried out our analysis in the following manner:

- a. *Aquinas, Miner, and Ferry* works on the politic rule and passion-reason-related literature have been collected and presented, beginning with the main works: '*Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, Robert Miner's work on Thomas Aquinas on the Passions' and Ferry's article on Emotions in Aquinas moral theology.* These are texts where the above scholars express their thoughts on passions/reason relation.
- b. Different commentators on *Aquinas' and Miner's and Ferry's* work on Passions and other scholarly books and articles related to medieval aspirations have been considered too.
- c. We have looked at this work mainly through the lens of analogical reasoning. Aristotelian-Thomistic view of political rule analogy and its relevance to the understanding of passions has shown the possibilities implicit in analogies and shown what *Aquinas* is up to in his special employment of the politic rule analogy many times he tried to understand passions/reason relation.
- d. Our analytical strategy has been descriptive of the case by paying attention to the textual and content issues that are developed.

Based on our critical analysis of *Aquinas, Miner, Ferry* and other scholarly works on medieval literature, we have been able to demonstrate how far *Aquinas' politic rule analogy* is useful, and to what extent it should be applied to the study of passions/reason relation. We have ascertained and drawn the lines on the best way forward in thinking and living harmonised and virtuous integrated passions-reason oriented lives within the Thomistic moral traditional insights.

### **3.5 Research quality and validity**

Qualitative validity in research implies checking for the accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures while qualitative reliability implies indicating consistency of approach across different researchers and projects (Creswell et al.,

2007). Therefore, the study has documented the procedures employed in the research process. The objectivity of this study is based on its coherence, insight and instrumental use of approved procedures, without necessarily relying on the traditional validity and reliability measures. We have presented and defended this work in an academic oral panel of examiners both internal and external ones. Having been approved, we hope that it will assist other researchers in the future.

### **3.6 Ethical considerations**

The research has fully considered and adhered to all ethical issues and has safeguarded its integrity by acknowledging all the citations and the relevant sources it has used. We had presented the research proposal for approval to the *Strathmore University's Ethics Committee*, which is the mandating authority to its acceptance as a scholarly work within the department of humanities and social sciences. We received its approval and proceeded as was guided. This work has not carried out interviews and experimentations and so was recommended by the same committee not to require the approval of *NACOSTI*.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

We have shown the research design and methodology and the rationale why it has been employed in this study. This research work has assumed the constructivists-interpretive philosophical worldview and paradigm of the qualitative study. It has also employed the textual critical analysis as the strategy of inquiry. *Aquinas'* context and setting are termed crucial for validating the accuracy of our interpretation. We have shown the manner of attaining the quality of the research based on proper methodology. This chapter is concluded by considering ethical issues involved in the study.

## Chapter 4: Research Findings

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter begins by clarifying the definition of passions as it is conceived in *Aquinas*. It states what we ought to understand about passions, the medieval contexts in the development of the concept of passions, contemporary understanding of this concept, and everyday use of the modern version of the same concept and incommensurability problem.

Secondly, *Aquinas*, *Miner* and *Ferry*'s direct references and presentation of their application and reflection on the politic and royal power metaphor is presented. For *Aquinas*, the analogy of the politic and royal rule versus despotic one are presented beginning with the first part of the *ST* to the second. *Aquinas*' main insights on passions/reason relation are taken from the first part of the *ST* questions (*ST*. 1a 81. 3ad2, 83. 3, 95.2) and the *prima secundae* questions (*ST*. 1a2ae 17. 7, 58. 2, 74. 2ad3) where then the discussions on passions were contextually and primarily a theological exposition. For *Miner* direct quotes from his work on *Aquinas*' passions are sighted and with a special attention to chapter four on the morality of the passions, and first part of this very book where he discusses passions in general. *Ferry*'s thoughts as they are expressed in his article, 'Passionalist or Rationalist? The emotions in Aquinas' moral theology,' are largely considered.

Thirdly, this chapter, having discussed the issues above, recurses to the originality of *Aristotle*'s conception of analogies and analogical reasoning. This is done purposely to put the use of analogies in context and see the possibilities implicit in them for a better review of the above authors' interpretation of the analogy under our study. Additionally, the politic and royal rule concepts are underlined in order to give relevance to *Aquinas*' assimilations. It is therefore expedient and proper to recourse to *Aristotle*'s understanding of analogies and how he applied them to achieve his literary goals, and *Aquinas*' medieval setting and contextual exposition of the *Thomistic* spirit are both meant to contribute in arbitrating the tension brought about by an over-reaching interpretation of the politic and royal metaphor.

## 4.2 The word passion in *Aquinas*' literature

*Aquinas*' teaching on the passions is contained in the first part of the second part of *Summa theologiae* (ST. I-II. 22-48). He does not offer a clear definition although his idea of the passion can be gleaned from the following text:

Passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above [*passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi; ut etiam patet per definitiones Damasceni inductas*] (ST. I-II. 22, a. 3, c.)

The definition of John Damascene referred to is the *sed contra* section of the question:

"Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil." [*passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali.*]. *Ibid.*, *sed contra*.

To be sure, according to many of his interpreters, *Aquinas* has varied meanings to the word 'passion'. Like *Miner* would say, *Aquinas* does not give a straight forward definition at the beginning of his Treatise on the passions. *Miner* says and we quote:

But *Aquinas*, like Wittgenstein, does not desire that his writing should spare his readers the trouble of thinking. Rather than provide a complete definition of passion at the beginning, *Aquinas* employs a more subtle strategy. He desires, that the reader should sift through the proposals of a range of *auctoritates*-Aristotle, Cicero, Damascene, Nemesius, and Augustine among them- so that she arrives at a conception that includes elements of the integral tradition (*Miner*, 2009a, p. 31).

We discuss the following meanings in order to capture his lasting reliable concept of the passions. He has three meanings that he assigns to the term passion (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003a). In the first case, passion means ‘to receive’ or *recipere* (*ST. I-II, q. 22, a. 1, c.*). In this sense, it is a movement that involves the cause of the passion and the receiver of it. That is, agent and the patient are involved. There is a potency-act kind of relation involved yet the main idea is that passion is constituted by the receiving activity of the patient. *Aquinas* uses this meaning to explain the apprehensive act of the senses and intellect. In this case, sense perception and understanding are simply passive reception of known objects (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003b).

Secondly, *Aquinas* attributes to the word ‘passion’ as an act of receiving an accidental form by losing another form which was already in existence (*ST. I-II, q. 22, a. 1, c.*). It is letting go of what is already in existence to receive the other or a different form. It is an alteration, which is a qualitative transmutation. When a person loses health, he acquires illness. So whatever is lost is contrary to whatever is received. Passion therefore in this second sense has to do with the ability to receive a form and this is not a mere reception. It must demonstrate the capacity of a corporeal substance to undergo a qualitative accidental change.

The third sense of passion is what *Aquinas* calls *passio proprie dicta* (*ST. I-II, q. 22, a. 1, c.*). The change is said to only have a negative effect. There is a reception of a form in this third sense that can affect the natural quality or the disposition of a being. It is negative in the sense that such a change or a movement prevents the natural movement of a being from reaching its specific fulfilment, for example, preventing a stone from falling, or preventing man from exercising the activity of the will. This puts the being into pain and suffering. This third sense of passion, according to *Aquinas*, in its entirety, is suffering. We need therefore to agree that while discussing this analogy of the passion-reason relation, it is necessary to carry along with us these three levels of meaning.

According to *Aquinas* and in accordance with the manner in which we wish to understand the word passion for this specific work, passion is experienced largely when the natural disposition of an individual substance is harmed, but even more than that, when an individual substance is impeded from fulfilling its natural inclination or reaching its natural end (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003a). Extensively, passions of the human soul are all movements of the appetitive power of the sensitive soul inclusive of those negative effects while bodily passions are moved movements or reaction-action

evoked by an attractive external object which results in the modification of an individual subject.

#### **4.2.1 The medieval spirit and development of the concept of passions.**

The medieval monastic life was of great contribution to the understanding of passions and an optimal ground for personal awareness and pursuit of perfection. The discussions surrounding the definitive character of passions focused on the Church fathers, Origen, St. Basil of Caesarea (Llansana & Gallifa, 2012) etc. Passion as a substratum of sin is understood by *Aquinas* as the psychosomatic constant of the sensitive affectivity. The study of the passions took different perspectives: social, psychological, moral and spiritual etc., (Llansana & Gallifa, 2012). These perspectives are key to the proper contextualization of *Aquinas*' mind and interpretation. It subsequently follows that Christian tradition ought to influence any contemporary interpretations of the passions.

By considering the different perspectives of passions, spiritual approach of the monastic life demands that we sink into the very depth of medieval reality in order to achieve a standard level of civilization and wholeness as persons and society. Psychological perspective treats passions as dysfunctions, confusions or deviations of impulses. Moral perspective indicates that domination by passions would lead to serious capital sin. Finally, sociological perspective according to *Naranjo* looks at evils of the world as universal (Llansana & Gallifa, 2012).

The medieval context presents evils of *authoritarianism* – which is the enforcement of strict obedience to authority at the expense of personal freedom or lack of concern for the wishes or opinions of others, *repression* – which is a restraint, prevention, or inhibition of a feeling, corruption, mercantilism of the world as equally evils of the soul (Llansana & Gallifa, 2012). Additionally, political perspective of life and the religious conception of reality and medieval society in terms of virtues and vices, soul and body, fall and salvation, evil and good, could as well influence the authoritative conception of the kind of relationship between reason and passions. Since *political monarchy* was a normal form of governance, the domination by reason of those components of the soul which were not fully virtuous would not have been an issue, and so was the medieval language of domination, control (Llansana & Gallifa, 2012) and so forth.

#### **4.3 Contemporary grasp of the passions**

*Miner* claims that the current work on emotions basically rests on the pioneering work written in Europe during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Century by thinkers like *Spinoza*, *Descartes*,

and Hume etc. Their work in turn rests on the work produced in Europe during the Middle Ages, and particularly to that of *Aquinas*. This is an indicator that there is continuity from the past to the present. The only difference between *Miner* and different scholars on the passions is the fact that they do not focus on the entire treatise of *Aquinas* and this amounts to a number of mistakes and misconceptions (Miner, 2009a). *Miner* claims that these different literatures are products of partial reading of *Aquinas*. In the contemporary work, passion is understood as a strong emotion which is mainly anger or love. It is related exclusively to the body and more consistent to the sexual or erotic feelings. It belongs to a semantic field where opposition exists between rationality, reflection, morality, calm, control and connection, irrationality, absence of reflection, immorality, disturbance, unexpected devouring fire or even extra-marital inclination (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003b).

#### **4.4 The Problem of incommensurability in the contemporary context**

We need to further state that medieval affective psychology involved many conceptual categories such as passions, affections, sentiments, appetites etc. It is not immediately clear whether these medieval categories were indeed controvertible to the modern or contemporary category of emotions (Dryden, 2016). We can argue that at medieval period, any thinking about the passions was at its infancy and its outcome was imbued with much historical influence, especially for *Aquinas* (Dryden, 2016). *Lombardo* believes that *Aquinas* did not write about passions as we understand it today (Lombardo, 2011).

*Miner* states, as we have seen in the definition of passions above, that *Aquinas* never offered a comprehensive definition of passions, and treats this lack of a concise and complete definition of passion as a stylistic and a pedagogical strategy (Miner, 2009a) rather than an oversight with a goal of keeping his readers thinking (Dryden, 2016). Although in *Damascene's* quote on passions, *Aquinas* defines passion as the movement of the sensitive appetite, *Stump* observes that it is not easy to provide a satisfactory translation of the term *appetitus* in a single word as inclination, tendency or desire (Dixon, 2012). *Passio* therefore as a medieval category cannot be translated to mean passion, though *emotion* and *affection* have always been suggested as the right translations, which in the opinion of many scholars do not carry the richness of the Latin '*passio*.'

#### **4.5 The everyday use of the word ‘passion’**

Here, we rely on *Lippens* argument that there is what is referred to as ‘active passion’, which is an overwhelming power. This power then is a force that should either be tempered or suppressed. There is also what is referred to as ‘passive passion’ which is something that someone undergoes and suffers without really knowing its source nor controlling it (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003a). Moreover, other scholars think that the contemporary language see passions simply as reactions.

*Summarily*, the characteristic feature of reason as a controller and commander of the passions remained. This was a consequence of the medieval perception of life and society where political monarchy was non problematic, or authoritarianism where the opinions of masses was not very much considered. Domination by passions was unacceptable and anything surrounding feelings were dysfunctional and inhibited. Contemporarily, active passions are to be suppressed while passive passions were suffered without necessarily knowing how to deal with them. They belong to the semantic field where opposition exist between rationality and irrationality. However, reason’s role as a commander and controller over them is not sufficient and arrogant.

#### **4.6 A systematic exposition of the politic and royal rule analogy in the *ST***

It should also be understood that *Aquinas* is an intellectual giant of the middle ages whose relevance to the present topic of discussion needs to appreciate the totality of his intellectual context. In matters related to his ethics, *Aquinas* is basically grounded on Holy Scripture, the doctrine of the Church, and the writings of the Church Fathers (Elders, 2006). These sources influenced his work directly on matters *Theology* and indirectly on ethical questions. Supported by *Elders’* reflections on *Aquinas’* mind, the principles upon which his ethics is based depend on theological insights which consequently make it a science subject to theology. According Elders, even though, reason is a determinant factor in the morality of our acts, it should not be seen as a self-sufficient and arrogant power. As argued by *Elders*, the doctrine of reason as determinant factor in the morality of our actions is central to *Aquinas’* ethics. This is why *Aquinas* thinks that its governance is of a politic and royal kind (T. Aquinas & Adler, 1990). Let us now turn to the *ST* itself.

1. In the *Ia* of the *ST*, question 81, 3ad2, *Aquinas* raises the question as to whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason. There is an objection to this question which is defended by quoting the letter to the *Romans* (Rm 7: 23) where the Apostle Paul says that, “I see another law in my members fighting

against the law of my mind.” *Aquinas* answers this question by saying that the sensitive appetite where the irascible and the concupiscible powers are seated, do actually obey reason and the will. He argues that in man, the cogitative power which has its resemblance in animals as the estimative power, has the capacity to compare individual intentions. As a particular reason, the cogitative power moves the sensitive appetite but as guided naturally by the universal reason. On the other hand, man has to wait for the consent of the superior appetite (the will) in regard of his sensitive appetitive inclinations. Therefore whenever there is an order among a number of motive powers, the higher powers must move the lower powers, so the *Will* must move the sensitive appetites. Based on the analogy of the politic and royal power that is an assimilation from *Aristotle’s* political philosophy (*Polit.* 1. 7), *Aquinas* says that the soul moves the body in a despotic way like a Master or a despot would do to his slaves, who actually ‘have nothing of their own.’ As he puts it in this text, they ‘do not have a right to resist’ the command of the master. Like foot and hand, the soul moves these bodily organs at once and without any resistance to its sway, they follow suit. On the other hand, the intellect moves the irascible and concupiscible powers in a political and royal way. The sensitive appetites which are rightly called the passions have something of their own like the free citizens in a politic and royal rule kind of a system. Though subject to the government of the ruler, ‘they have something of their own.’ We postulate that he does not mention directly their right of opposition here, but derivatively when he talks of slaves ‘having no right to resist’ the commands of their Master (*ST.* 1a 81.3ad2). In the politic and royal rule, the interior powers, both the apprehensive and the appetitive do not require the external organs. *Aquinas* states categorically that though the passions have something of their own like free subjects in a politic and royal regimen, and so are enabled to easily resist reason’s command, ‘we must not conclude that they do not obey.’ They are subject to reason’s command which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive powers but can also form phantasms of the imagination.

2. Secondly, in the *1a* of the *ST*, question 83.3, *Aquinas* raises a question as to whether the free-will is an appetitive power. Against the objection that it is not an appetitive power, he answers to the positive that free will is an appetitive power. He begins by defining the concept of choice as the desire of the things which are in us. Moreover,

desire together with choice are acts of the sensitive appetite (the appetitive power). *Free-will*, according to this line of argument is the means or that by which we choose. *Aquinas* is assertive that free-will is an appetitive power. For a choice to occur, first, the cogitative power must give a proper counsel. Secondly, the appetitive power must accept the judgment of the counsel. So, it is a twofold occurrence that involves counsel and acceptance. In this text, the political and royal power is mentioned but derivatively based on the way choice comes about.

3. Thirdly, in the *Ia* of the *ST*, question 95. 2, *Aquinas* asks whether passions existed in the soul of the first man. There is an objection to the negative that the first man never experienced passions. In objection 1, the book of Galatians is quoted (Gal 5: 7) where it is written, “Adam’s soul was much nobler than his body, which was also impassive, so no passions were in his soul.” The objector conjectures that by passions of the soul, the flesh lusts against the spirit which was an impossibility in the state of innocence. *Aquinas* answers that in the state of innocence, our parents actually had undisturbed love of God and other passions of the soul. *Adam* did not have passions with evil as their object, i.e., the evil of fear, sorrow etc. He did not even have passions as a good possessed, but only as a burning concupiscence.

There were passions which regarded the present and future goods like love, joy and desire, hope respectively. *Aquinas* states that sensual appetite where the passions reside, “is not entirely subject to reason.” He further states that, “At times our passions forestall and hinder reason’s judgment, at other times they follow reason’s judgment accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent.” But in the state of innocence, he adds that passions-which he calls the inferior appetites, were wholly subject to reason. They, passions of the soul, only existed as consequent passions upon the judgment of reason. He does not mention anything metaphorical here in regard to the use of political and royal rule analogy.

We now transit to the *Ia2ae* of the *ST*;

4. In question 17.7. The question that *Aquinas* puts forth in this article is as to whether the sensitive appetite is commanded by the Will? The objector thinks otherwise because the *Apostle* says (Rm 7: 15) that, “For I do not do that good which I will.” *Aquinas* argues that the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason while the disposition of the body is not. The movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason. He further illustrates that the movement of the sensitive appetite is ‘sometimes aroused suddenly’ as a result of the

apprehension of the imagination and the sense. We are very particular to quote him saying this, “And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen (*ST.1a2ae 17.7*).” *Aquinas* quotes *Aristotle’s* political philosophy (*polit. I, 2*) where *Aristotle* says that reason governs the irascible and concupiscible by a politic and royal supremacy where the ‘free’ are governed who are not wholly subject to the command of reason. This kind of governance is unlike the despotic supremacy that a Master exercises over his slaves. Finally *Aquinas* notes that apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason in proportion to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power.

5. Question 58 article 2 of the *1a2ae* of *ST*, takes note of the fact that reason is the first principle of human acts. *Aquinas* argues that other principles of human acts may be found (whichever these principles may be) to obey reason too but though in a way. He argues that there are those principles which obey reason blindly and without any contradictions whatever, like bodily limbs. They only need to be in a healthy condition. The soul fits in this measure since it rules the body like a despot likened to the rule that a Master tenders to his slaves who ‘have no right to rebel.’ He argues that if this be true in man, then it would mean that man’s reason is perfect. Mindful that virtue is the habit of perfecting man in view of his good actions, it then follows that in every reason, prudence would automatically exist. *Aquinas* emphasises the fact that this was Socratic view.

On the other hand *Aquinas* asserts that the sensitive appetite obeys reason not blindly but with a certain “power of opposition.” For the philosopher says (*polit. I, 3*) that reason commands the appetitive faculty with a politic power where the rule is over free subjects having a “certain right of opposition.” He quotes Augustine (*Ps. 118 Serm. 8*) where he says, “Sometimes we understand what is right where desire is slow, or follows not at all, in so far as the passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action (*ST.1a2ae 58. 2*).”

6. Finally, in question 74. 2ad3 of the same *1a2ae* of the *ST*, *Aquinas* asks as to whether the *Will* alone is the subject of sin. He answers that we do sin by the *Will* as the first mover. Secondly, we can sin when moved by other powers which are consequently moved by the *Will*. Members of the body therefore are compared to the soul which moves them because they are organs of actions like slaves would be moved without necessarily moving others in turn. This is different with what happens to the internal

appetitive powers which ‘are compared to’ reason as free agents because they both act and are acted upon.

In article 3 of the same question 74, on an inquiry as to whether sin is found in the sensuality, *Aquinas* responds that, on the contrary, it is written that (Rm. 7: 19), “the good I will, I do not; but the evil I will not, that I do.” *Aquinas* says that *Augustine* had referred to this as concupiscence. Sin therefore is found in sensuality. Additionally, *Aquinas* states that sin is found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate. Sensitive appetite therefore is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. But the sensitive appetites have a certain excellence only when they are united to reason and in this way are enabled to surpass the kind of passions which are in animals. The passions of the soul consequently have the aptitude to obey reason and so become principles of voluntary action and subject of sin. Sin therefore is in sensuality. The effects of the original sin remain and so is the continual corruption of sensuality which is never destroyed while human beings continue to live in this world. It is clear that *Aquinas* takes note of the need for a deliberative act of reason in the perfection of human acts. Whenever passions fail to seek reason’s deliberative act, actions fail or result into sins (1a2ae 74. 3).

*Summarily*, we note the fact that though the passions ‘have something of their own’ like free men in a politic and royal governance, this something of their own does not mean that they do not obey reason. Like the ruled are subject to the government of the ruler, so are the passions to the governance of reason. The ordination of passions is to the guidance of reason. It is only unfortunate that sometimes passions disobey reason but had reason foreseen such a scenario, it would out rightly prevent it. Passions have a right of opposition that when employed by the appetitive faculty, cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. The excellence of the appetitive faculty is only assured in their unity to reason. This is how they surpass the passions found in other animals. The sensitive powers though remain continually corrupted due to the effects of the original sin.

#### **4.7 Miner’s interpretive work on *Aquinas*’ Passions/reason relation**

In his introductory notes of chapter 4 of the book, *Thomas Aquinas on the passions*, *Miner* states the following: 1. *Aquinas* does not restrict the potential moral goodness of the passions. 2. He states that passions have a surprising responsibility toward the achievement of the *telos* of man. 3. Passions elevate human cognition. 4. Human beings are responsible for their passions regardless whether they know how. 5. Passions

governed by human reason can make ‘any important contribution’ to the moral goodness of actions. The discussion on this chapter is guided by attention to the passions and their relation to the political rule as rightly mentioned in the above sub-heading. The discussion begins right away in page 89 of this book that passions are certain motions of the irrational appetites and are by this fact morally neutral in themselves (1a2ae 24.1). Here, *Miner* emphasises the fact of ‘in themselves.’ The idea as to whether they are evil, is also eliminated in response to article 2 of the same question 24 of the *ST* as he discusses in this chapter. The response gives a comprehensive take on the passions, and the reason as to why *Stoics* understood passions as the disturbances (*perturbationes animae*) of the human soul that lack reason. *Aquinas*’ point concerning why the *Stoics* erred is because they did not discern the ‘relation’ between sense and intellect nor did they discern the relationship between the intellectual and the sensitive appetite (*Miner*, 2009a).

*Miner* further states that passions in human beings when are under the command of reason and Will (*subiacens imperio rationis et voluntatis*) cannot be morally neutral. As confirmed in the (*ST* 1a2ae 24.3) *Miner* advances *Aquinas*’ thinking by showing that the good of man rests solely in reason. Though he emphasizes that in the *ST*, *Aquinas* does not show any tendency to exalt reason by denigrating the passions or exalting passions by concealing the role of reason. He ratifies the above idea by making reference to *Eileen Sweeney* who argues that though the good of man rests in reason, *Aquinas* does not appeal to the rational control of the passions (1999. P.222). *Miner* adds that *Aquinas* does not show such a distrust to the extent that they need to be controlled (*Miner*, 2009a, p. 107).

Though, generally, claims *Miner*, *Aquinas* is overly leaning on the passions side (*Miner*, 2009a), in article 3 of question 24 of the *1a2ae* the question on the capacity of the passions to augment or diminish the quality of moral goodness or badness is discussed. *Miner* interprets *Aquinas* to mean that not all passions are evil, however, the disordered passions actually subtract from the act’s goodness (*Miner*, 2009a, p. 91). Additionally, when an individual exercises an act of charity out of pity and another person does the same act out of the judgment of reason, the one whose act is approved by reason has a higher quality of an act than the one who operates under pity. The act approved by reason retain the force of moral goodness and deserves full moral credit (*Miner*, 2009a). *Miner* argues that *Aquinas* would agree that, “If an act is done out of the rational judgment accompanied by a passion that obey reason, the presence of that passion will

increase the moral goodness of that act (Miner, 2009a, p. 91).” According to *Miner*, the task we have over passions is to govern and cultivate them, not any elimination since *Aquinas*’ main intention in the *1a2ae* of the *ST*, is the promotion of total human flourishing. Additionally, he states that though *Aquinas* work points to the possibility of good acts without the passions, man does not achieve his complete good without the passions and so is forever involved in an unending battle (Miner, 2009a).

*Miner* claims that *Aquinas* unlike *Kant*, would not deny the power of good will which shines brightly in accordance to the moral law, contrary to the inclinations, but *Aquinas* would rather hold that, “the opposition of the Will and the passions is a second-best scenario (Miner, 2009a).” It is important to note that (Romans 7: 9) is a condition from which we seek to be freed in accordance to *Aquinas* interpretation. A virtuous person according to *Aquinas*, and as is interpreted by *Miner*, is partly defined by his freedom from the condition of (Romans 7: 9), where the sensitive part is wholly subject to reason. This can be seen as was earlier quoted in the exposition we made under *Aquinas*’ reflections on the passions/reason analogical relation in the *ST*. *Miner* claims that, “a virtuous person’s sensitive appetite disposes her to desire the same path reason would judge to be attractive without the passions (Miner, 2009a).”

In this very page 94, *Miner* has the conviction that *Aquinas* must have meant that the passions should gladly serve reason. The only task therefore in the moral life is to make the ascent from the condition where the sensitive appetite is an ‘obstacle’ for the will to overcome, to a better condition where passions gladly serve reason. We are only tempted to ask *Miner* that, is it always the case that sensitive appetites do not always serve reason gladly? If this is the case then what is their contribution toward the general pursuit of human flourishing?

*Miner* argues that this task requires that reason should ‘govern’ the passions without being a despot to the sensitive appetites. It is only unfortunate that while *Miner* explains the nature of this governance, he quotes not *Aquinas* but *Thomas Merton* whom we know does not write anthropologically, but only as a spiritual author. *Miner* understands the governance between passions and reason in *Merton*’s terms as the harmonious co-ordination of man’s powers in striving for the realization of his deepest spiritual realities (Miner, 2009a). It is, quotes *Miner*, “a peaceful integration of all man’s powers into one perfect actuality which is his true self (Miner, 2009a).”

From the above understanding, *Miner* interprets the governance or the kind of relation of leadership that exists between the passions and reason as non-despotic and that this

should mean that it is not a 'control' of one part of man by another. It is not a control which is arbitrary and tyrannical like in a pharisaic and a super-ego conscience. In reference to *Bonaventure's* quote on the journeys to God, *Miner* agrees that the journey is an embodied task of the human person as a composite of body and soul. Going by his opinion, though the mind would direct this journey, it does not make the journey its own. It requires the contributions of the passions, and he (*Miner*) interprets *Aquinas* to mean the same thing. He therefore thinks that in the light of the journey toward God discussed above, *Aquinas* compares the relationship that exists between the mind and the sensitive appetite as that which exists between the rulers and their free subjects. In this context, *Miner* quotes the *ST*, where the free subjects, says *Aquinas*, "have something of their own, by which they resist the command of the one who rules (*ST*.1a.81.3ad 2)."

In page 95 of *Miner's* book, he asserts that 'having something of its own' that is, passions, is not a sad fact. It is the reason why passions can resist the command of reason. Secondly, it points to the ability of the sensitive appetite to make a contribution of its own in the return of the creature to its ultimate end (*Miner*, 2009a, p. 95). How this contribution is made claims *Miner*, can't be done generally but must be reduced to and done through particular passions.

*Miner* thinks that *Love* being the first root of all passions play this contributive role more effectively as the first particular passion: the sensitive love. *Miner* argues that when a person allows himself to be passively helped by God, he acquires a particular state which is a precondition of *dilectio*: being turned toward God by rational means. However, when the power of God draws a creature to Himself by a sensible means, the passion of love cannot be neglected by rational creature in her motion to God (*Miner*, 2009a). God's power of drawing creatures through sensitive means to Himself exceed the power of human reason, says *Miner*. As it is stated in the *ST*, "But man is more able to tend toward God through *Amor* drawn passively by God himself, than he can lead himself to God by a rational means of his own reason (*ratio*) (*Miner*, 2009a)), (1a2ae 26.3 ad4m)."

By quoting *C. Lewis*, who said that the highest does not stand without the lowest, *Miner* thinks that Thomistic line of thinking is kept intact. It must therefore be argued that the rational love can only grow out of the sensitive love for God. The passion of love cannot be neglected by a rational creature toward her motion to God. It is for this insight that *Miner* thinks that the conventional wisdom is surprised. He argues that the conventional

wisdom disagrees about this interpretation of this part of the *ST* due to its lack of attention to the questions on the passions of the *Ia2ae* (Miner, 2009a).

*Miner's* claim is much robust when he says that *Aquinas* himself paid attention to the passions because they have the potency to serve as sources of energy which consequently hasten the creature's motion toward the end (Miner, 2009a). *Miner* further states in page 122 of this very work that *Amor intellectualis Dei* will be completely weak if it lacks the energy of the sensitive appetite. *Miner*, relies too on *Pinckaer's* interpretation of *Aquinas* to believe that passions contribute to moral action and the progress of man in his journey toward God.

Love therefore is in the concupiscible power. It is the principle of sensitive appetite's motion. As a motion proper and a principle motion (*principium motus*), it is reconciled in *Aquinas* thinking. Love as *Amor sensitivus* is present and belongs to the concupiscible but is only attributed to the natural and rational appetite by extension. In page 116 of *Miner's* work, he says and we quote, "As it exists in human beings, love cannot simply be considered as a motion of the sensitive appetite without any reference to reason (Miner, 2009a)." It must also be remembered, says *Miner*, that love cannot be equated with motion itself, that is, desire or concupiscence, because the motion may cease to be while the inclination remains. Love as a principle of motion therefore is a source of desire that remains constantly while certain particular desires wax and wane away according to human experience. Having *Amor* proper means that we have been acted upon by something outside us. Sensitive love therefore is a passion in the proper sense (Miner, 2009a, p. 119).

In relation to reason's duty toward passions, *Miner* wonders whether the metaphor of control really captures adequately *Aquinas'* understanding of the relation between reason and passions. According to *Miner*, *Aquinas* denies any kingship and despotic rule between the passions/reason relations. He says, "The passions are subject to reason and obey reason, but in the same manner as free citizens obey their rulers (not controllers) (Miner, 2009a, p. 107)." Moreover, he thinks that *Pasnau's* idea that the metaphor of politic and royal rule leaves passions in a curious-in-between status, and reinforces the fact that they can really resist reason. *Miner* accuses *Pasnau* of failing to notice that the analogy of the politic and royal rule implies not only negative resistance but also the potential in the passions for a positive contribution. He therefore makes reference to this famous *Aristotelian* quote as is referenced by *Aquinas* in the *ST*:

As the Philosopher says (Polit. i. 2): We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power. For power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by despotic power because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. (ST I 81, 3ad2).

*Miner* shares in the thinking of *Pasnau* who believes that subjection is politic while control or domination is despotic. The controversy with many scholars concerns passions' 'something of their own.' What then is the essence of perfect subjection which is highlighted as passions responsibility to reason without necessarily extirpating them? *Miner's* advice generally concerning passio/reason relations as it is put in page 111 of his masterpiece on the passions is this, "in order to understand *Aquinas'* as he so wishes to be understood, the usual practice of simply focusing on the passion in general must be abandoned (*Miner*, 2009a, p. 111)."

Summarily, *Miner* has a problem with the manner of understanding and interpreting the role of reason within the categories of this analogy of the politic and royal rule. In his reaction against the metaphor of 'control' and 'domination' and his preference to perfect subjection, he falls back to a despotic grasp of passions/reason relationship.

#### **4.8 *Ferry's* submissions on the politic and royal rule as depicted in *Aquinas* and *Miner***

By considering the resurgence in the study of the passions, *Ferry* in his article; *Passionalist or Rationalist? The emotions in Aquinas' moral theology*, has expressed concern whether the emerging pro-passion outlook on passion is the true *Aquinas'* conceptual spirit? By singling *Miner* as one of the pro-passion proponents on *Aquinas'* work on the passions, *Ferry* thinks that 'experiential differences' in the passions of the post-lapsarian agents should be reconsidered at depth (*Ferry*, 2012a). On the same note, *Ferry* claims that *Miner* has employed the metaphor of the politic and royal rule to

expound on the Thomistic account for the structural difference between passions/reason relation (Ferry, 2012a).

In defense of the rationalistic take on the passions, *Ferry* thinks that *Miner*, among other pro-passion thinkers accords too much significance to the passions. He says, even in *Miner's* choice of and emphasis on the politic and royal power analogy to express *Aquinas'* pro-passion attitude, he fails to meet his goals of defending passions capacity to contribute something of their own but only make the case more difficult. *Ferry* pays attention to the pre and post-lapsarian conditions of the human persons in order to understand how *Aquinas* employs the politic and royal rule analogy (Ferry, 2012a). The two conditions as suggested by *Ferry*, help us to understand better the metaphor of control and the responsibilities human beings have over their passions.

From a reason-centred perspective of *Aquinas'* ethics, as is also expressed in *Eleonore Stump*, *Ferry* accuses *Miner* of his pejorative attitude against those who attribute to *Aquinas* 'a rationalist animus.' He further argues that though *Miner* is pro-passion in his treatment of the passions, this treatment of the passions is less convincing than the rationalistic one in *Aquinas* moral theory (Ferry, 2012a). For *Ferry*, and in his understanding of *Aquinas*, reason is and must remain the commander, controller and mover in the moral life. It seems to *Ferry* that *Miner* would never accept to view passions as threats than rather look at them as supporters for moral agency. In *Ferry's* own thinking, *Miner* is simply defending in part, what *Eileen Sweeney's* claims that *Aquinas* does not express any fundamental distrust of the passions or make a serious appeal for any rational control of the passions (Ferry, 2012a).

In his understanding of the passions/reason relationship, *Ferry* says that *Miner* has only come closer to *Eileen's* position. He is therefore pro-*Eileen* than *Aquinas* in his application of the politic and royal rule analogy. In page 107 where *Miner* makes reference to the analogy, he sees nothing wrong by understanding both control and subordination as meaning the same thing. Yet on the same note, he thinks that control is something more than subordination. In reference to the same control, *Miner* is quoted to have said that *Aquinas* interpreters are conflating control as subordination and control as domination (Miner, 2009a, p. 107). *Miner* has expressed concern over control as domination and control as subordination. But since he thinks of perfect subjection, *Ferry* sees him to mean the same thing as the type of a command-obedience structure that *Aquinas* attributes to the body/soul relation. But we understand that this is not what

*Aquinas* mean when he refers to the politic and royal rule against the despotic style of leadership majorly found between the body and the soul.

When a subject or a subordinate element constantly or regularly resist the command of the ruler, would there be anything perfect about that? *Ferry* asks the above question and thinks that passions are capable of exercising genuine resistance to the guidance of reason and so they are not perfectly subject to reasons' command even if reason retains its position of commander. Otherwise it would be relation of a despotic kind and this makes *Miner's* interpretation of this Aristotelian politic and royal metaphor problematic in explaining the passions/reason relationship (*Ferry, 2012a*).

According to *Ferry's* take, *Miner* seem to cognize control as domination to almost mean extirpation, yet this is not true of *Aquinas* and is totally not the case. He needs to justify why he makes a leap in meaning of this metaphor of control, says *Ferry*. *Aquinas* meaning is more of a mitigation as is illustrated by *Lippens* (*Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003a*). On the same note, suppression is recommended in *Aquinas's* understanding of the passions because where there is complete lack of rational order, the situation demands that passions be repelled with immediate effect.

*Ferry* finds *Miner* guilty of his over-interpretation and misconception of the contrast between body/soul and passions/reason relationship. *Ferry's* advice is that in, trying to understand what *Aquinas* has to say about the emotions, it is important to treat domination, subordination and perfect subjection as synonymous terms (*Ferry, 2012a*). This is why it can be argued that when a person exercises control over his tongue, appetites etc., it does not mean that he wants to eliminate them. On the other hand, when passions exercise resistance to the command of reason, even when doing so is wrong, and owing to the fact that they are ordained toward its guidance, such a resistance does not yield to something positive. The potential resistance of the passions to reason is not to their credit but to the discredit of a fallen humanity (*Ferry, 2012a*). *Ferry* thinks that the construal of the politic and royal rule analogy as it is assimilated in *Aquinas* is out-rightly mistaken in *Miner's* conceptual grasp. *Aquinas* does not understand or indicate anywhere in the *ST*, that passions' resistance is in their favour.

In footnote 8, of this article, *Passionalist or Rationalist? The emotions in Aquinas's moral theology*, the passions present the wayfarer with obstacles to his flourishing. This expresses the negative nature of emotions which does not clearly emerge or is minimally represented in *Miner's* work on '*Aquinas on the passions.*' Only in a state of sinfulness does he accept the negativity of passions. He says, "what exists naturally in

animals (Miner, 2009a) is deformed in human beings by both fallen nature and bad acquired habits. *Miner* seems to align his thinking against the metaphor of control and further sees the politic and royal rule analogy to carry within it the possibility of a positive contribution ensuing from the resistance of the passions toward the good of human life. In page 298 of this article, he says that the assumption behind the above reasoning is that (according to *Miner*), the resistance is something good because just like free citizens in a political theory are better off than slaves in despotic rule, so are the passions which secure a political and a royal relation with reason. *Miner*, as is stated by *Ferry*, calls for a robust interpretation of the analogy where he says, “the analogy to political rule implies not only negative resistance but also the potential for positive contribution p. 107 (Miner, 2009a).”

#### **4.9 Controversial items between *Ferry* and *Miner***

While paying attention to the footnote on page 298 of *Ferry's* article, he argues that the implications of the analogy should not be drawn too broadly with respect to emotions free agency. The objection against Romans 7: 23 denies that passions can obey reason but *Aquinas* answers that this is not true about the ordination of passions. Passions can still be brought to order. This is the goal and the mission *Aquinas* has while he assimilates this *Aristotelian* metaphor of control in the politic and royal rule analogy. The analogy is not about whether the passions can provide something positive (*Ferry*, 2012a), (1a 81. 2ad3). *Ferry* argues that *Aquinas* had created in the passions, through his use of the politic rule analogy, a conceptual room for seeing in the passions the potential for obeying reason (*Ferry*, 2012a). Resistance of the passions is an obvious negative thing and only that it is something given in experience.

In his *Commentary on Aristotle's politics*, the argument presented by *Aquinas* is that out of all things that exist, there is always something ruling and ruled. This should be understood to be natural and expedient. This is how nature has disposed things otherwise the contrary is true for corrupted things (*Ferry*, 2012a). Subjection therefore should be understood as a natural experience and any contradiction to it is normatively problematic, argues *Ferry*. If anything should happen that the part that rules should be ruled and the vice versa, then we must be prepared for serious problems. Either the body will be destroyed or such rule might lead to inordinate desires (*Ferry*, 2012a).

In *The Disputed questions on the Virtues in General*, article 4 shows that the analogy of the politic and royal power is likened to the relation between passions and reason. Though the rule is likened to the free men who have the right and the capacity to resist

to some degree the command of the king, *Aquinas* was meant to suggest the limitations and constraints it raises for the moral agent (Ferry, 2012a). It is important to note that because it has the capacity to resist the command of reason, it naturally follows that a remedy should be sought and this remedy is virtue; which is the perfection of the sensitive appetite through which passions easily obey reason (Ferry, 2012a). From *Aquinas*, *Miner* and *Ferry*, the assimilated use of the politic and royal rule analogy as it is presented in the *ST*, has seemed to have varied interpretation. We therefore recommend that we revert back to *Aristotle* himself in order to understand the scope of analogies.

#### 4.10 *Aristotle's theory of analogy and its application*

Although *Aristotle* uses the term analogy as gotten from the Latin word *analogia*, he does not purely talk about analogical reasoning *per se*. For the evaluation of analogical arguments, he insists on four conditions (Bartha, 2019):

1. The strength of an analogy depends on the number of similarities
2. Similarity reduces to identical properties and relations
3. Good analogical description derives from underlying common causes or general laws
4. A good analogical argument need not presuppose acquaintance with the underlying universal generalization.

The question then is, how do we measure the similarities? For the observable similarities, the case of material ones is much easier. The challenge is only in the high-level structural correspondence of the formal kind.

Aristotelean standards present the concept of a 'model-theoretical isomorphism.' This, we have understood as the set standard for thinking about similarity and its role in analogical reasoning (Bartha, 2019). It is based on syntactical similarity and overall structure of the analogy. It is also a fact that analogies are about relations rather than simple features no matter what kind of knowledge it is (Bartha, 2019). It is the interrelationship between facts that should determine the content of analogies. Bartha understands *Aristotle* to mean that the best mapping in an analogical argument is determined by systematicity. Whereas **Systematicity** is a principle in which a predicate that belongs to a mappable system of mutually inter-connecting relationship is more likely to be imported into target domain than is an isolated predicate (Bartha, 2019). As argued by the above-mentioned author, systematic analogy places high order relations

and components in correspondence. The higher the systematicity, the higher the analogical inference and plausibility of the analogy.

#### **4.10.1 The Limits of the structure-mapping approach**

How then do we arrive at the value of systematicity? Though it is important, high-level relational matches can be outwitted by superficial feature matches. High-level relational matches are more of a fallible marker for good analogies than the very essence of good reasoning. It takes no account of causal relevance. It is, therefore, important to note that in all our reasoning by analogy, we should determine which features of both domains are relevant and their relations to the analogical conclusions. Our case pays attention to the categories of *free citizens*, *equality* among them as common features of both the ruled and the ruler. This expresses the maples in the source domain which are to be mapped onto the target domain of passions and reason.

However, in most analogies, not all properties involved in the theory are likely to correspond in the formal sense to properties of the analogue (Achinstein, 1964). It is not a requirement for a theory to have the same calculus as the set of laws governing the objects that are inferred in the analogy. It is only some propositions in the theory that will have the same formal structure as certain propositions describing the analogue. Formal analogies in many cases have the analogue described as having at least some properties physically similar in important respects to those of the theoretical object (Achinstein, 1964). Moreover, even in the formal analogies, not all equations in the theory will find counterparts in the analogy. Attention to logical similarities can be of help in clarifying the formal features of certain concepts, but cannot render intelligible the physical conditions relevant for their applicability (Achinstein, 1964). Finally, though formal structure may prove useful in developing logical consequences of a set of empirical assumptions that have already been formulated, they are not sufficient for the purpose of generating additional plausible assumptions.

The Dissertation states that analogies, construed in the logical sense, provide important guides for the development of theories. There is a need to modify claims which involve an emphasis on logical structure and complete similarity in form between theory and analogy. They are not, in most cases, sufficient for allowing analogies to fulfil the roles imputed to them.

#### **4.10.2 Role of analogies**

1. An analogy serves to render various concepts in a theory more intelligible.

2. It aids scientists in formulating and developing theories. Because of its emphasis on the similarity of form and the Dissertation that it is a sufficient condition for analogies, understanding and furnishing clues in theories, familiar objects in the analogy are decreased by a set of laws whose logical structure is that of the theory.

3. Analogies construed in the logical sense provide important guides in the formulations and extensions of theories.

Attention to formal structure when employing an analogy can be useful in developing the logical consequences of a set of theoretical postulates, and in conjunction with certain empirical assumptions about the theoretical objects which appear reasonable given the available data, may prove helpful in the formulation of additional hypoDissertation (Achinstein, 1964).

#### **4.10.3 Analogy as didactic**

Analogy in the weaker reading is seen as serving a didactic function. In this sense, it has no explanatory force (Olszewsky, 1968). It is taken to be something along the line of an example or illustration. It is basically meant to support an argument or an explanation. It is not integral to Aristotle's investigations of causal accounts. It is used here to comfort or instruct the reader. Just as an illustration, we find ourselves limited to use didactic functions as a theoretical framework that would fit this investigation.

#### **4.10.4 Analogy as a heuristic device**

In the stronger reading, analogy is used as a didactic reading towards the generation of a genuine causal explanation (Olszewsky, 1968). It is a guide to Aristotle's investigations and discovery of an explanation. In this case, the analogy becomes part of the explanation. It does not carry any explanatory force. It is a tool that assists the researcher in his scientific inquiry (Olszewsky, 1968). In our evaluation, the heuristic sense of analogy would not help us get a proper explanation for the politic analogy.

#### **4.11 Reasoning by analogy**

Cases of analogical reasoning are those in which the causes postulated through the analogy were otherwise not immediately available empirically. The collection of data in that particular domain seems unattainable or impossible. Although *Aristotle* does not discuss it explicitly and does not develop a formal account of analogical reasoning in his scientific writings, analogical reasoning serves as an explanation in a way that is directly evident in *Aristotle's* works of natural sciences (Olszewsky, 1968).

*Aristotle* does it by identifying a phenomenon that is well-known and open to empirical investigations and that which he thinks is somehow structurally and causally similar to

the unknown domain. This is typical of the political rule as a well-known domain, which actually is structurally and causally similar to the unknown relationship between passions and reason which is under our investigation.

In analogical reasoning, the analogy itself functions as an explanation. And this is what makes it *potentially a powerful method of scientific inquiry*. It involves the pulling of causal elements from a source object, which is more familiar and better understood, which are then mapped onto the targeted object. It is a mode of causal inference. What is invoked in the postulation as an ontological causal correspondence is key. Analogical reasoning aims at causing explanation beyond stating mere epistemic reasons. It demands that the two domains of analogy must be significantly different. It is this third sense of *Aristotle's* use of analogy that we find fit to interpret Aquinas' political analogy as an explanation to the relationship between passions and reason. This is what *Aquinas* calls common proportion to diverse subjects or proper proportionality. Analogical reasoning involves successive stages: selection, mapping, evaluation and learning. Analogies should enhance thinking rather than substituting it. After this long discussion of reasoning by analogy, let us now discuss the conceptual elements or the maples in the source domain that we have applied to the target domain. The ruler and the ruled is hereby discussed as applied by *Aristotle* in his political theory.

#### **4.12 Politic and royal rule in *Aristotle's* political theory**

*Aristotle's* contextual use of political analogy was meant to touch on ideal relationship.

##### **4.12.1 The ruler and the ruled?**

In a politic and royal system of ruling, *Aristotle* states that prudence (*phronesis*) is the only virtue that is peculiar to the ruler and thus creates a difference. The ruled, on the other hand, are endowed only with true opinion. As *Aristotle* did compare, the ruler is like a flute player while the ruled is like the flute maker. Any judgment therefore of the quality of a political association can only be given by the flute players, not the flute makers. Why would *Aristotle* think so?

In his (N.E 1143a) *Aristotle* defines prudence as a true, or a correct conception of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end. It is a correct manner of thinking applied to a particular course of action (Crisp, 2014). It is about applying thinking to choosing the most appropriate means to an end. Prudence therefore has the trait of not just making judgments, it does indeed issue commands (see N.E 1143a) (Crisp, 2014). Prudence as a virtue possessed by the ruler has the objective of action,

ought, and ought-not of our actions. As a virtue, it creates in the ruler the need of intelligence and practical sensibility (Bradshaw, 1991).

It is further proposed by *Aristotle* and *Aquinas* that political rule as is differentiated from a despotic one, is comparable to the leadership that exists between a husband and a wife. The quote below elaborates better the place of the ruled in a political system. Together they believed:

The wife never takes her turn as ruler because the equality necessary for alternation is lacking; the man is naturally and permanently superior, and, as a result, naturally rules. The inequality is so obvious to Aristotle and Aquinas that they sum up the situation by observing that, when rulers change, the new ones take on the honors and appurtenances of rule, but a woman can never become a man (Blythe, 1986a).

#### **4.12.2 The extent of freedom and equality in a political regimen**

At the beginning of *Aristotle's* treatise on politics (Pol. I.5. 1254b 6-9), he says that what is natural and beneficial is for the affective (the desiring) part of the psyche to be ruled by the part that has reason. A free man therefore has a psyche in which reason rules the desires, but then freedom can only be predicated of a human person and not his psyche (Anagnostopoulos & Santas, 2018). Freedom is aristocratic and a life of a free man is far much better than the life of a master of slaves. The life of a free man is a life of *virtuous activity*, and a rule over free men is much better than a rule over slaves, says *Aristotle*.

In his conception of political rule, which has at its heart the aim of common advantage, *equality* is specified either arithmetically or proportionally. Proportional equality is applied by the aristocrats by evaluating the moral worth of men for the sake of distribution of political rights (Anagnostopoulos & Santas, 2018). Political offices should therefore be allotted to the fully virtuous since amongst them equality reigns.

In a political rule, *Aristotle* would argue that citizens, being equal in virtue, are, by aristocratic justice, equal in political power and authority. Equality is the same to those who are alike in ruling and being ruled in turn (Anagnostopoulos & Santas, 2018). Virtue stands out in the distribution of power and authority. Where then is passions rated, virtuously neutral, or rational by participation?

*Derrida* argues that, '*freedom and equality*' according to *Aristotle* can only make sense when persons who are equals and are also free by participating in the rule take turns in the rule (Trott, 2013). By taking turns ruling, *Aristotle* meant that equals are never free at the same time and so not equal all at once but only by turns (Trott, 2013). This could

only be possible in corrupt natures to find what should rule and what should be ruled equal and concurrently getting ruled and ruling at the same time.

In a politic and royal power system, it is no real difference only that deliberation is a shared activity of plurality and it involves a true difference by including all of those who are at stake in the community in order to achieve stability (Trott, 2013). This demands that reason should consider passions in all its crucial decisions. It is therefore important to see why *Aquinas* found it convenient to use the politic and royal rule analogy to expound on the passions/reason relation.

#### **4.12.4 *Aquinas*' intended purpose of politic and royal rule analogy**

*Aquinas* on the '*Disputed Questions in the Virtues in General*' in article 4 states that reason rules the inferior parts of the souls with a royal and a political governance (S. T. *Aquinas* et al., 2010). With this kind of governance, the sensitive powers are likened to free citizens. There is therefore the capacity of resistance of those free citizens who have the right and ability to resist to 'some degree' the command of the king. *Aquinas* believes that this is something natural and given in experience. While according to *Ferry*, politic and royal power analogy is not used in *Aquinas* to suggest any positive value of the passions. Right of opposition automatically stands on the way to human flourishing (Ferry, 2012a).

*Pasnau* argues that *Aquinas* model gives passions 'a curious-in-between status.' In the argument of *Ferry*, *Miner* should not charge *Aquinas* with the fault of neglecting the positive side of the passions as per the analogy. According to *Miner*, passions are positive and this is something implied in the *Aquinas* model of the politic and royal rule. In addition to the resistance being a positive thing in *Miner's* interpretation, passions are capable of making a contribution just "like free citizens contribute something of their own to the life of a well governed *polis* (Ferry, 2012a, pp. 106–108)." In our reading of *Aquinas*, we don't find anything positive and good about the passions' resistance to reason command suggested in all the citations in the *ST* we had presented above.

In characterizing the virtuous person, *Aquinas* insist that what is central is the domination of reason over the passions. It therefore means that when the passions are properly dominated, then there should be absence of any resistance on the part of the passions to reason's guidance. This does not also mean that *Aquinas* gives an impression that passions are to be avoided (Ferry, 2012a). The political and royal rule analogy, says *Ferry*, is meant to demonstrate that passions can for sure *frustrate* human

agency. The irascible and the concupiscible powers do resist reason in those moments when we sense and imagine something as pleasant which reason forbids (Ferry, 2012a, p. 303), (*ST, Ia* 83.3) (Ferry, 2012a).

*Aquinas* would agree that emotions were positive in the state of innocence, yet this condition does not give them an opportunity to be used by *Miner* to justify their positive and single handed impression that he creates for them in his interpretation of the politic and royal analogy. In fact, *Ferry* contends that, in the primitive state, passions were completely truncated. There were no sorrow, fear, no evil. This therefore meant that not every passions was meant to contribute to human flourishing. The absence of certain passions in the pre-lapsarian state makes the idea of passions' contribution even more complicated. Because passions which were likely to cause resistance were completely excluded from the pre-fallen condition (Ferry, 2012a). Where then would the exercise of opposition benefit the good of human being? It is our opinion that *Aquinas* would agree with *Ferry* that resistance was not meant to show the potential in the passions to make any positive contribution toward human flourishing.

As is already shown in 1a of the *ST*, question 97 article 2, sensation and understanding were both impassable and this enabled man to avoid death by controlling his passions. According to *Aquinas*, impassibility for the soul was in regard to those passions that impede free use of reason. This did not regard general impassibility (*ST, Ia* 95.2). In the paradise, *Aquinas* Model of the royal rule points to the fact that it was not a mere subordination but a complete domination, argues *Ferry*. In the state of innocence the sensitive or inferior powers were wholly subject to reason (Ferry, 2012a, p. 305). This consequently meant that the passions only existed as a consequent upon the judgement of reason (*ST, Ia* 95.2). There was no opposition. But this complete domination of the passions by reason was lost due to the fallen humanity and consequently from then passions lost complete subjection under the command of reason as it was before ( i.e., *non totaliter subset rationi*) (Ferry, 2012a).

*Aquinas* understands that diseased human beings and those who are wrongly disposed experience the rule of the body over the soul, and a deviation of this kind is normatively problematic. The body ought not to rule the soul. For it would be harmful for whatever regime that finds the part that were to be ruled equal or contrary to that which should rule (S. T. Aquinas & Regan, 2007). However, the original plan as it is put in the *ST*, *Aquinas* makes reference to *Augustine* who said that man was created in the rectitude that consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the

body to the soul. God being the first in that order, was the cause of the second and the third (*ST*. 1a, 95.1), (p. 306), (Ferry, 2012a). It appears to *Ferry* that, even in the state of innocence, all passions ought to have been consequent passions because antecedent passions would be a threat to the judgment of reason. As it is interpreted by *Ferry*, *Aquinas* stresses the power of the passions to undermine the human good (Ferry, 2012a, p. 307). Passions indeed have the capacity to cause sin. And by sin human beings lost the remedy of grace and reasons power to dominate passions.

Politic and royal rule is analogously used by *Aquinas* in the *ST*, to represent the relationship between passions and reason as a kind of a rule appropriate for free and equal citizens in a constitutional government. It is a complicated concept and *Aristotle's* sense of the relationship between those he calls free and equal by association are separated only by the virtue of *prudence*, which is possessed only by the ruler (Bradshaw, 1991).

The relationship between reason and passion is a complex debate and has always raised moral questions. *Mimbi* (2009) says that the moral question arises because man's sensitive domain, that is, his passions, tends to its own good in an absolute manner. By the absolute manner, he meant to say that passions tend to operate in total disregard of reason. *Mimbi* adds that the yardstick that reason applies to regulate passions is somewhat exogenous to the passions themselves. Let us now look at *Aristotle's* goal of the *polis* and how it would add value to our understanding of the need for harmony between passions and reason.

#### **4.12.5 The Goal of *Aristotle's polis* in informing passions/reason relation**


The *Polis* exists not only for life but also for the sake of well living. *Carrie Ann Biondi* says that anything less about the above goal is an insult to justice and good life (Biondi, 2007). As is stated in (Pol. I.21253a 2-3), a human being by his very nature is a political animal. In this respect, he is not self-sufficient by living in isolation. Passions in a virtuous human being implies their integrity in his general governance. Neither reason nor passions become self-sufficient. Constitutionally, organized life therefore needs a society and law in order for man to attain his *telos* (end). This kind of governance points to the organisation of the human person toward his flourishing and ultimate end.

Man is thought to be the most savage of all the animals in the absence of law and justice. Within the political community, man is restrained and habituated through moral education and so grows in taming and harmonizing his appetites (Biondi, 2007). What is of paramount importance in the political community is *habituation*, which is to be

understood as being in the habit of obeying the law even if the law is less than perfectly just (Biondi, 2007). We cannot err by thinking that this habituation would properly fit the demands of a well lived life in man, when passions are constantly called upon to the obedience of reason.

#### **4.13 Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed in detail what we have indicated in the introduction. We began with introduction, definition of the passions, contemporary understanding of the passions, its everyday use, *Aquinas*, *Miner* and *Ferry's* interpretation of the analogy, *Aristotle's* background, the concept of freedom and equality as found between the ruled and the ruler, purpose of the analogy and the goal of a constitutionally founded community. All the exterior insights ranging from different interpreters to *Aristotle*, in our reasoning, are related to how they help in the reconciliatory interpretation of the politic and royal rule in order to harmonize and to do justice to the passions/reason relation. This gives us the courage to discuss in chapter five the necessary precautions that we need to consider while dealing with politic and royal analogy and remaining true to *Aquinas's* insightful reasons for their use.



## Chapter 5: Discussions and Conclusion

### 5.1 Introduction

We set out to discuss the conclusions of our findings in an order that we have shown below. This is done by keeping faithful to the general research context; seeing passions/reason relation through the lens of politic and royal rule analogy. We postulate that the basis of contention is on the interpretations which are deviant to Thomistic spirit. We pay attention to the aftermath of such divergent versions which do work against consolidating *Aquinas'* spirit and have consequently widened the conceptual rift. This also affects positive reception of passions or reason thereby resulting into disharmony within individual private moral life and public moral order. We have finally made our conclusions and recommendations.

### 5.2 Reasoning by analogy and the *Aristotelian* conceptual context

We state the following facts concerning analogies in general and particularly to formal analogies: they function as explanations and are indeed a powerful method for scientific inquiry. Though analogies are open to creativity, they can also lead to serious errors. Some scholars define analogies as recalling past familiar situations in order to deal with unfamiliar ones and that they are sought according to one's purpose. Analogies also aim at causing explanations beyond stating only the epistemic reasons and should therefore enhance thinking.

Secondly, there is a serious difficulty on how to tie the original meaning of certain concepts to their original context while using an analogical reasoning to explain their meaning. There is always the challenge of not getting the exact counter-parts from the source domain which are to be fitted in the target domain. Sustaining such meanings overtime while employing creativity clearly has the likelihood to leading someone into serious errors. We think that *Miner* is prepared for this deviation and does not worry about it. He is open and tries to point out ahead of everybody else the great possibilities implicit in *Aquinas'* use of politic and royal rule analogy. This is something positive and should be embraced. The only challenge is that due to his methodological assumptions, he has, in our opinion, pushed the idea of 'free citizenship' too far.

Additionally, many scholars have also indicated that medieval literature was at its infancy (Dryden, 2016) inclusive of *Aquinas'* work on the passions. There isn't anything wrong if a continued research and efforts are made to understand their relations with reason deeper in the contemporary times. It is therefore in *Miner's*

opinion that lack of concise and complete definition of passions was a stylistic and a pedagogical strategy of *Aquinas* to keep his readers thinking (Miner, 2009a). This can be referred to in the definition of passions as we had indicated in the chapter four above. Applying therefore the category of a ruler to reason, *Miner* positively underscores the fact that reason's mandate, power and authority as a ruler is not and should not be coercive and absolute, and the rule should not and is not as it so wishes. The rule is done within a constitutional community which has a restrained law; the *polis*.

However, *Miner* seems not to have paid attention to the background of *Aquinas*' predecessors' contextual meanings and applications. In *Aristotle*, certain concepts are used and are assimilated in *Aquinas*' literature with their original contextual taste. For example, Prudence (*phronesis*), which is a virtue of a ruler, is not limited to making judgments only but can also issue commands. This is wholly implicit in the analogy of a politic and royal rule. It was acceptable that in every political community, restraint, habituation and education of persons to gain understanding of the laws and the operations of the ruler and the responsibilities of the ruled toward their ruler was a daily endeavour. This minimized ignorance and contradictions. Though *Ferry* is quite strong about reason's power to command, *Miner* does not come out strongly as *Ferry* does over this outstanding ability of reason as a ruler, i.e., the power to command.

The *freedom* and *equality* of the citizens in a politic and royal regimen are the foundation on which the relationship between passions and reason is construed. This is fundamentally what *Aristotle* attests to. Passions in this respect take the place of the ruled while reason takes the place of the ruler respectively. Freedom and equality becomes the common ground of this relation. Yet there remains still something special about the character of the ruler. This should limit the application of the source domain (ruler and the ruled within the politic and royal regimen) which carries with it the structural elements that are necessarily mapped onto the target domain (reason and the passions).

Going by the conceptual views of *Aristotle*, the only free man in any politic and royal regimen is so, only on the basis that reason must rule his psyche. This means that the life of a free man is a life of a virtuous activity. How then are passions free in the predication that *Miner* over-stretch upon them when he says that passions, like free citizens, 'have something of their own,' 'a right to resist or oppose' the government of the day?

We argue that even if passions and reason are analogically conceived to be equal and free in the context of *Aristotle's* politic power, we should not literally apply every detail of the analogy to passions/reason meaningful and constitutively ordained relation. The idea of 'something of their own' is an analogical feature that has interpretive technicalities within *Miner's* literature.

We know that in the conventional insight to which *Miner* agrees, passions are morally *neutral*. If we analogously and totally predicate freedom to passions in the manner that *Aristotle* thought of freedom in the context of politic and royal power, then passions ought to be virtuous in the same manner as reason and retain a unique characteristic feature of a commander all through without limitation. In other words, passions must be capable of a virtuous life and an activity that fits the standard of the rule of reason. But this is experientially impossibility. We must transit from a conceptual analogical backing of the capacities of passions to a real life context.

What is conceptually real and experientially possible, while the politic and royal power is put aside, is the fact that passions are naturally ordained to the guidance of reason and its command is achieved when their outrageous traits are fully dominated. We therefore argue that a perfect life of virtue and single handed positive contribution of passions based on the analogical idea that they 'have something on their own' or 'a right of opposition,' is not supported in *Aquinas's* thinking, looking at the anthropological *telos* and goals of human flourishing and the finality of the *polis* as it is envisioned in *Aristotle's* political theory. It is unattainable to passions on their own and this is why it is conventionally agreed that passions are not *essentially* free to take the lead as a ruler in any particular deliberation and so not *equally* the same to reason. They are rather free by participating in reason's own freedom just like its rationality is also participatory.

Furthermore, it is also clear that *equality* as the second attribute of a free citizen in a politic and royal regimen is measured by the moral worth of that member for the sake of the proportional distribution of political rights and offices. *Miner* is made to think that passions can also at certain points probably lead in turns. Remember, in the politic and royal regimen, political offices are shared amongst equals who have the same moral worth. However, the proportionality through which these political offices are shared, it is mandatory that, the higher you are in moral worthiness, the higher office you get. But since virtue is a fruit of rationality of which reason essentially is, there is not such a time envisioned in *Aristotle* and *Aquinas* when passions are likely to overtake reason

and take the lead due to a limitation embedded in their participatory rationality. It is only natural that political rights are granted only by the measure of your moral worth. Conventionally, passions do not have any natural moral standing unless they are sustained to be so through the moral guidance of reason. They are considered morally neutral. We need to know how far analogical reasoning should be utilized.

### **5.3 The social context: thinking reason and living passions**

The social and conceptual rift created by wrongly seeing the passions/reason relation in the analogy of politic and royal rule resulting from different interpretive works of *Passionalists* and *Rationalists* is a great threat to a life of moral distinction. Neglecting to reconcile and bridge these tensions, conflicts and disharmony demeans the individual moral lives and the public moral order which is ultimately not healthy and peaceful for any of us. Considering the extremes of passions as *Hume* thought so or over inclination to what passions are capable of achieving on their own as *Miner* conceived, thereby minimizing the controlling role of reason, and considering the extremes of reason, so that only philosophers would lead and speak or defending the course of a rationalistic perception of the human being as *Ferry* so wished is detrimental to a society that has every age on board. We cannot afford to be totally *Humean* or take such a robust consideration of passions nor rationalize life as *Plato*, *Ferry* and their allies have done. This is why we make these concerted efforts to restore the dignity of living an integrated life that will only be successful in the long run that we theorize and practice faithfully the Thomistic interpretive spirit as it is exemplified in *Aquinas*.

To this end, we argue the two extreme positions appeal not to the Kenyan context. Let us review the reality of passions and reason relation as it is experienced in the different age groups as we indicate below:

**Children:** what really happens to a child who steals food, sweets, sugar etc., and is caught by his parents? What if she does this in school and is identified by colleagues? If he or she becomes chaotic and irredeemable, what is the usual attitude towards such children as they live among others? When they are made to understand that they are bad characters, what usually become of their attitudes in the correctional facilities where they are frequently sent to for rehabilitation? What of their attitude towards those who are tasked on a daily basis to help them normalize and reform their bad habits?

**Youths:** when a young boy is overwhelmed by his sensitive appetites and sensually engages in sexual activities such as incest, or plays sex with a neighbour's child, what becomes of him from those neighbours, colleagues, and the general public? What if he

does that out of ignorance due to lack of sexual education? Are we sure that our Kenyan society understands such behaviours in a positive way? What of sexual inclinations such as homosexuality, lesbianism etc.? But again, where do the youth learn all these badly acquired habits or who influences young ones to indulge in drug and substance abuse in today's society?

**Adults:** Who messes up the young ones today in the society through rape and manipulative activities? Do we not see adults more lenient on kids who achieve more academically than those engaged in other arts? It is easier, out of experience, and from social media reports that adults culprits. They have no exemptions over these bad influences.

**The aged:** Have we not heard of children being molested and raped by old people beyond 70 years and above? Are they not in our cells?

It is a common knowledge that in *children*, reason is not yet developed fully, yet the fierceness with which their mistakes in families and the general public is dealt with is baffling. The youth suffer the same attitudes. Surprisingly, adults have nobody to listen to them because at their level and age, perfect subordination of their passions to reason is expected. It is taken for granted that they ought to behave. Are we taught anything about passions/reason failure in adults that can enlighten and inform our understanding so as to better responses and attitudes toward them in our own persons, in the person of others and the society at large?

We can testify from experience that no person or any organized society is freed permanently and absolutely from the lures of extravagant and disordered passions. Yet their overindulgences are harshly responded to by the human society. A person who is out to satisfy his appetites at all cost and in total disregard of reason is met with fierce measures from his very kins and the public at large. Passions are not received positively and the majority are not taught that passions as well, are good human components that when groomed and given proper formation and habituation, do add to human felicity and virtuous living. It is surprising that in the general public and particularly from Christian corridors, passions are erroneously presumed to be threats to peaceful following and ultimate vocation of man to God. They are at once treated with suspicion and at once given a negative moral tag. They are mostly bad and have nothing to do with our composure and journey towards attainment of peaceful human life and society. This is a reflection of a purely pro-rationalistic attitude against passions that deserves to be detested in our society as we have done in this research.

The above reality gives *Miner's* interpretation an idealistic status which does not resonate with our daily living. In the past or today, bringing the passions to the centre of intellectual discussions yet focusing on emotional aspects of life and practically employing a positive view of it to moral life has received little appreciation in our ordinary life. The social context approves little of their positive contribution. Yet passions are paramount and active in our daily living. Our experience shows that in living, passions are practically on the lead yet by thinking we suggest that reason should lead and command them. This is where the tension lies within the vocation of man to blessedness as a composite of body and soul. The contradiction is the struggle for which we must be successful in rooting out. Majority pull towards a perception of a society and persons guided by reason. This is why it is easy to hear these common comments as; *'I can't understand why you have behaved that way. My friend, are you a beast?'* We live in societies where sensual failures are understood to be beastly in nature. We live lives imbued with total disregard for passions and especially when they are impulsively contradicting reason.

This research has found its relevance in pulling towards a pivotal centre the extremes of living passions and thinking reason, in order to hit a standing that shall enable every person or society to set a balance. Now that passions is resurgently pulling to the centre in intellectual discussions as it has been enabled and exemplified by *Miner's* creative and interpretive thinking, this research is cautious enough to suggest that such theoretical intellectual discussions deserve to be brought outside the board rooms to the theatre of life where reason and passions can engage each other on a moral-praxis basis.

#### **5.4 The moral burden of passions and undeniable reason's responsibility**

When a person lacks the capacity to control his passions, it means that he has something in him beyond him. He cannot take free decisions and so he does not possess himself fully. This should mean also that he cannot decide about himself nor give himself to others moved by love (Debeljuh, 2006). The *disordered passions* are an obstacle, says *Debeljuh*, for they weaken the guiding function of reason. On the other hand and particularly to *Miner*, in his book, *'Thomas Aquinas on Passions,' Aquinas'* understanding of passions should help us see how generally and particularly each passion contributes to human flourishing and prepare a way for a felicity beyond the passion and that this going beyond should not leave it *behind* either (Miner, 2009b).

Supported by other scholarly works like *Mimbi's*, we need to note that, "moral virtue consists mainly in an ordering of reason (Mimbi, 2009)." In the sense above, virtue

becomes an imprint of reason on the appetites. It is an imprint on our natural inclinations. It is made clear that passions have to be ordered and guided to the final end. The only thing that is lacking in *Miner's* account is how these passions are integrated into *Aquinas'* overall conception of human perfect happiness in relation to infused virtues and gifts (Colón-Emeric, 2010). *Lippens* argues that the theory of passions in *Aquinas* is based on the fundamental insights into his anthropology; hylomorphic conception which reflects human's unique position in God's creation, and the fulfilment of his being which is to be realized in the spiritual world (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003a).

Nevertheless, the concept of the passion is tied with the concept of the flesh which is more misunderstood in Christian thought than elsewhere (McAleer, 2001). It is typically dismissed as negative, conservative and extravagance within us and it is set up with eroticism against the law of decency. This is a conception that imprisons the body and its desires and denigrates what ought to be celebrated. On what ground then, does the Christian notion of the flesh is quickly dismissed (McAleer, 1999b)? It is on a conception that militates against its values and so displaces it in the general vision of man's final end.

Since passions are not essentially rational, it should be noted that any kind of resistance from them is not any sort of a good. They cannot independently contribute to good life, and if this has to happen then passions would be posing serious dangers to virtuous living. This shall consequently create a crisis on how human anthropology should be construed. Their domination by reason is something positive and reasons' duty to control them in the manner that is agreeable to the natural orientation of man, does not render them dysfunctional and threatening components of the human person that we should avoid (Ferry, 2012b) .

If any negative impression is given to the metaphor of control in *Aquinas'* literature, then we suggest that this could be a problem of interpretation of the politic rule analogy applied ambitiously by mapping the categories in the source domain to the counterparts in the target domain without reservation.

As a reaction to the external world of changing objects, passions sometimes become unpredictable and uncontrollable in their nature. They also have relations with the body and so are not always attuned to reason (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003b). Disposition of the body is crucial for passions' perfect compliance to reason. It is also asserted that passion may occasionally have sudden movements as we had already shown in chapter

four of this work (*ST. 1a2ae 17, 7 ad1*). Furthermore, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ. Just like an act of vision depends on the power of sight and the condition of the eye (*ST. 1a2ae, 17 7ad 1*), so are our passions on particular organs and their physical conditions. Mindful that an act is subject to our command in so far as it is in our power, how then is the sensitive appetite within our power when we know very well that it is a power of the corporeal organ? Disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason. The movement of the sensitive appetite therefore is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason. Due to the fact that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly as a result of the apprehension of imagination and sense, it escapes so often the guidance and command of reason as it is found in the 1a2ae, (*ST. 17. 7ad 1*).

### **5.5 Moral success and remedy to disobedience of the passions**

*Aquinas* borrows *Aristotle's* conception of virtue as a state of character concerned with choice but that choice which lies in the *mean*. It is a mean relative to us but determined by the rational principle (Mimbi, 2009). The determination is done prudentially. This therefore becomes the foundation of any moral success of any person imbued with passions. Reason, according to *Mimbi*, bears the authority of not only an efficient cause but also a final cause. A person and a society is successful in the long run if both are inclined to the good of reason (*bonum rationis*) without literally abandoning the *insights* that come from passions (Mimbi, 2009).

The superior rational appetite has to ensure that the lower sensitive appetites satisfies its legitimate wants (McAleer, 1999a). The model of a political community is designed to show that the human being has a composite of needs which must be brought into a well ordered community for mutual satisfaction (Lombardo, 2011). The role of commanding that is given to reason is not done with absolute authority. Reason does not command as it so wishes. It is done in a manner that pays attention to the fact that the commanded or the ruled by reason are free and can exercise their will in regard to certain things (McAleer, 1999a). Freedom of the passions therefore means that the passion or flesh *should* have virtues in themselves from which they are disposed to act well. They ought to have virtues. It is only that they do not have at once, until they are influenced or educated to do so. Through their placement in the general pursuit of blessedness in man, passions are elevated to a participated rationality thereby giving them the status to acquire certain virtuous status. It is from this angle that they are

enabled and given the capacity to respond obediently to the rule of reason. It is from this point that they are disposed to follow the rule of reason. *Aquinas* therefore sees concupiscence as a problem of *political persuasion* and *obedience* and not a metaphysical one (McAleer, 1999a).

*Aquinas* does not write about passions to merely stress the fact that they are common to man and animals. He writes about passions to show their unique trait of being impulsive and unmediated aspects in the absence of reason (McAleer, 1999a). He also writes to point out the fact that passions are attuned in a natural way to reason, to its command and control. The power of control is found in the rationality of reason.

As mentioned earlier, whatever is rational refers not only to that which is rational *per se* (in itself), as in man's intellect, reason and will (*intellectus, ratio and voluntus*), but also to that which participates in reason (Kahm, 2019). This participation of the sensitive powers or passions means that they are directed towards reason and are open to its influence. The sensitive soul therefore has the natural capacity and so is capable of and readily wills to be controlled by reason and to obey its orders. Reason in this case extends its field of operation beyond what is strictly rational. It is on the basis of this mutual relationship that passions make contributions to human acts and general development of man. They are therefore intrinsic to the teleology of man, to his original appetite for fulfilment, realization and completion of human nature (McAleer, 1999a). Since the sensitive powers have their own proper movements, which at times acts against the command of reason, they will only be well disposed to act through virtue. Virtue becomes the answer since it is the disposition or perfection in the sensitive appetite by which reason is easily obeyed (ST. 1a2ae 56, 4 ad3). It is not a forced submission of passions to reason, but an ordering of passion to reason (Lombardo, 2011). Reason is the only guarantee that passions will contribute to a moral action (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003b). *Control* according to *Aquinas* is mitigation rather than exclusion or extirpation. *Virtue* is not a forced submission of passions to reason but a conscious ordering of it. Virtue has to stand out in the distribution of power and authority. The analogy of the politic and royal rule is meant for ideal relationships and is not necessarily calling for a strict following and application as it seems done in *Miner's* work.

## 5.6 A recourse to and an arbitration based on the thomistic spirit as a reconciliatory benchmark

The present discourse in this research work is about the tension that usually arises between passions and the demands of practical reason. *Miner* thinks that due to the quality of freedom passions have, based on the politic rule analogy and their standing as free subjects in a political community who ‘have something of their own,’ they consequently earn the right or are automatically are guaranteed the freedom to oppose the right command of reason. What are the possible repercussions if we agree with *Miner* that the opposition to reason by passions is a natural right and a positive capacity meant to make a contribution towards teleological directedness? What is important is to reach out to a morally balanced life that harmonizes the conflict between the bodily appetites and reason (Floyd, 1998).

*Aquinas* rejects negative evaluation to the passions though. He says that they are not obstacles to the *telos* of human existence but are indispensable to its attainment. We quote him say this:

*I answer that*, we may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above... If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will. (*ST. I-II, 24. 1*).

In a fallen condition, yes, passions require the guidance of reason in order to become virtuous for the sake of human flourishing. Passions, in *Aquinas*’ view, need education, habituation and domination. In this respect, pleasure is understood to perfect action and should not be thwarted or dismissed as negative or as a disturbance (*ST. I-II, q. 24, a. 2. c.*) because insensitivity to pleasure is a vice (Lombardo, 2011).

It is understood that *Aquinas*, together with *Augustine* represent the Christian and virtue ethics traditions of the medieval times. To the contemporaries of *Aquinas* who looked up to his writings and the general audience of the past and present traditions, emotions

or passions is central to his theological project (Lombardo, n.d.). This does not mean over-reliance on them towards human teleological enterprise.

The *Dominican* order defended the goodness of the material world and creation generally. The legacy of the *Dominicans* is said to might have influenced *Aquinas*' appreciation of the emotions. According *Lombardo*, it is very easy to misread *Aquinas*, since "there are some negative texts in reference to passions/emotions that could be referenced as his attitude." What must be understood is that *Aquinas* builds over backgrounds to show continuity with the opinions of established intellectual authorities of his time (Lombardo, 2011).

*Lombardo* sees in *Aquinas* a positive assistance of passions in the execution of virtue at reason's command. In an intense passion, there is always a proportional intense virtue so long as there is compatibility with reason. *Aquinas*' significant contribution and the relevance of his literature on the passions is his ontology of the passions and his conviction that it is essential to the ethics of the person (Lombardo, 2011).

Literally and in accordance with the politic and royal rule, passions' acquisition of a right of resistance is an analogical enterprise that is severely limited in the realm of ordinary life. Though many scholars like *Miner* who are pro-passion in their thinking and interpretation seem to incline to something positive about this right of opposition, *Aquinas* would only concede that it is a right to *self-determination*. It is not a right to take the lead against the guardianship of reason. Passions are not able to advance on their own, (as per the conceptual context of freedom and equality) any opposition against reason. Freedom is checked in relation to reason while equality is checked in relation to virtue. We find a certain degree of limitation in passions which is conventionally agreed.

We cannot therefore go by such a detailed mapping of the source domain onto the target domain, as *Miner* seems to do. It is likely to cause confusion. Structural similarities and inferences need to be tied to contextual and conceptual application of original meaning rather than tying them to individual details of similar counter-parts on the target or source domain.

According to the analogy of the politic and royal rule, passions cannot competitively outdo reason for political offices where the qualities of rationality and moral worth are the basis of awarding or getting such opportunities. Reason will forever own higher offices than passions and this is always the case against the wishes of passions. By doing so, they are morally justified to take the lead as it is consequently pronounced by

their moral standing. Political offices are given in proportion to an individual moral worth. The free citizenship for which the passions share, and as it is analogously emphasized by *Miner*, passions can only attain a virtuous moral standing when they are perfectly subject to reason's guidance, control and command.

We also understand that deliberation is a shared activity. Reason being a just leader, shall only involve the passions at their level. It does this to passions, not as an equal, but as a constitutive partner in the general formation and governance of a just human community. Passions lack of total subjection to reason's command and their arbitrary movement by the senses and imagination is not something that ought to be celebrated. Their resistance is not a dependable positive feature.

Moreover, *Aquinas*' discussion on the relation between passions and reason rests on a number of presuppositions: First, the hylomorphic view of man as a being with one soul of three dimensions, i.e. vegetative, sensitive and intellective souls. Additionally, it should be noted that the political relation exists between the sensitive and rational dimension of the human soul. Man is also a frontier being. He has passions which are common to him and animals only that his passions are ordered to reason. Passion therefore has a natural instinctive pattern of response to natural external world. It is an impulsive, unmediated aspect which shows in the absence of reason yet it should be attuned naturally to reason and its command.

*Aquinas* believes that the nature of reason in itself explains the relationship it has with passions. He emphasizes that, what is rational, "refers not only to that which is rational *per se*, in itself, or essentially, as is man's intellect (*intellectus*), reason (*ratio*), and will (*voluntas*) but also to that which participates in reason" (*ST. I-II, q. 24, a. 1.*); (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003b). This therefore means that the distinction that is recognized in any other animals, apart from man, is neither essential by their rationality nor by their participating in reason. That is to say, passions in animals neither have rationality essentially nor by participation.

Let us understand that, "the sensitive soul can obey reason and it is meant to obey reason (*potest obedire rationi or nata est obedire rationi, subjectus rationi, sequit rationem*)" (*ST. I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 1; Ibid., q. 24, a. 1, ad 2; ibid., q. 50 a. 3, ad 1 and ad 3; Idem, De Veritate, q. 25, a. 4, c. and 5 c.*); (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003b). Reason's field of activity in the Thomistic thinking is extended beyond what is strictly rational, for there are those aspects of man which are rational by participation. In *Aquinas*' mind, the relationship between passions and the rational soul which he calls politic and royal is

simply an interplay between the openness of the sensitive soul toward reason and its independence. By politic rule, *Aquinas* recognizes the independence and the right to self-determination of the ruled party. This is inclusive of the right to contradict certain aspects of ruling by the ruler yet he does not mean or state categorically that the contradiction is something good. The ruler remains the ruler and constantly tries to persuade and convince his subjects—the ruled—, that it is worthwhile to live according to his prescription. *Lippens* indicates to us that when *Aquinas* says that passions are reasonable *per participationem* or that there exists a political relationship between passions and reason, he means one and the same thing.

*Lippens* identifies five implications: 1. Passions are not mere instincts and do not belong to the irrational soul which stands over and against the rational soul. It has to deal with what is presented to the sensitive appetite either by sense or imagination as the first stock of information. 2. Passion is the basic tension in human life between the body and the soul. It is not only an expression of hylomorphic tendencies but also a reflection of man as frontier being, that is, an intellectual being standing in the material reality of the world. 3. A political ruler has to act with responsibility towards his subjects. This means that reason has a responsibility to necessarily relate constructively to those passions of the sensitive level as an essential component of the rationality of a human being. 4. Influence of reason therefore must be seen as an attempt to heightening the reasonable aspect of the passion by lessening the unpredictable and uncontrollable character of the passions. 5. Political relationship between passions and reason should mean that they do not affect freedom which is the responsibility for every human act. Freedom of man remains intact and if there is any interference, then it is occasioned by rare cases.

*Conclusively*, man does not have to be subject to his passions as such. Due to the participatory rationality in his passions, he has the capacity to break his reaction to apparent external *stimuli* coming from his external environment and respond to them in the future and at a different place. Passions are not instincts in the terms that we talk of instincts in animals. Finally, we need to understand that sensitive appetites are an essential dimension of man's natural and original appetite for the fulfilment, realization and completion of human nature.

### **5.7 Limits of ruling of the politic and royal kind to the interpretation of passions/reason relation in *Aquinas***

Rule, in this context, refers to the regulation and procedures of the polity governing the rotation of offices (Blythe, 1986a). It is true to some extent that passions can

inordinately be both the ruler and the ruled, a governor and the subject, yet this political analogy should not unjustifiably be applied to reason and passion relationship. However, it is necessary to understand that even within the political system; there are laws independent of the rulers and the ruled. It is the laws that control and dictate when a ruler had to be a subject to be ruled at one point and a ruler at another. If ruling is done in accordance to the political discipline, then the ruler rules in part as regards those things under his power, and in part he is a subject to be ruled as regards those things under which he is a subject of the law (Blythe, 1986a).

*Ferry* argues that *both Aristotle and Aquinas* do not advocate for an interchange of the rule between passions and reason (Ferry, 2012a, pp. 304–305) due to their preference of male rule over female. *Aquinas* says, and we quote:

“For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates (ST. I. 92, a.1, ob. 2).”

This quote explicitly shows the nature of the relationship between males and females, as it is depicted in *Aquinas*, though its context in the *Summa* as it is quoted above was not meant to discuss the politic rule. It clarifies better why *Aquinas* does recommend it for understanding the nature of relationship between passions and reason. If the interchange has to be so, then it would mean that at one moment, passions would rule and at another moment reason would rule yet the analogy of male/female rule does not regard that as necessary. Of course experience attests to moments when passion is on the lead, but that should not be the case. This would bring about an unrestrained power (Blythe, 1986b) which would be full in itself. This would sound like a complete independence of the passions without recourse to the guidance of reason and this is what *Miner's* literature is liable to suggest as he advance an interpretation that promote a contribution of passions beyond the known relational subscriptions already present in the community of man's constitution. He argues that the analogy of the politic rule, is not limited to negative resistance but that it also gives them the 'potential' for a positive contribution. As we had said in his main claims in the literature review, “as free citizens contribute something of their own to the life of a well-governed polis, beyond what is already known or prescribed by rulers, so the passions are able to contribute something of their own (Miner, 2009a, p. 107),” to the life of the human being. He attaches the last part of the statement to *Aquinas*. He claims that the extra-ordinary thing (passions'

own thing) is made as a contribution to the life of the human being. However, as it is described in the above quote, we clearly see that it is passions' self-centred or put differently, an individual effort, without being mindful of (rulers) reason's prescriptions. Mindful of passions' own ordination, how then can they promote the welfare of the community when other members are not involved and does not share in this vision? This in itself would not be good for them and in their relation to reason. We contest the above interpretation and argue that application of politic and royal analogy is not done by a *wholesome mapping* of all details of the analogue to the target principles. It is not exactly what is projected in *Aquinas*' conception and application of the analogy to the relationship between passions and reason. There seems to be lack of caution in *Miner* when it comes to the immanent capacities of passions.

Though passions have positive contributions to the well-being of man, their frustration could as well be evil since frustrating them impedes them from attaining their natural end. By being cautious about our concupiscible and irascible appetites, we need to understand that they are not mere sentiments to be privately indulged, nor an enslaving tyrant to be ascetically overcome nor disruptions to be repressed (Uffenheimer-Lippens, 2003b). We need to promote their good and this is an indispensable responsibility.

*Aristotle*, as well as *Aquinas* have likened the politic rule analogy to the kind of rule that exists between a man and his wife (as we have indicated above) in order to elaborate further the relation between passions and reason, though this seems contradictory to what we had conceived as a rule in turns amongst free and equal citizens. He says, "The relation of male to female is by nature a relation of superior to inferior and ruler to ruled (S. T. Aquinas & Regan, 2007)," Additionally, *Aristotle* says that, "The slave is wholly lacking the deliberative element; the female has it but it lacks authority (S. T. Aquinas & Regan, 2007)." *Aristotle* says that husbands properly rule their wives politically, but without alternating in positions of and being ruled (Pol. 1.3, 1253b 8-10; 1.12, 1259a37-9). The wife will never take her turn as a ruler because the equality necessary for alternation is lacking in women just like it is lacking in the passions. Man is naturally and permanently superior and as a result naturally rules (Blythe, 1986b). This reminds us that the essence of political rule is either rooted in nature or ensues from human anthropological constitution.

## **5.8 Passions/reason relation at the service of common good**

Is it possible that an individual person can feed all his appetites as they come to him without necessarily bringing reason on board? Sex, food and drinks are those natural goods that incline majority of us to the sway of the sensitive powers. In the relentless and uncontrolled pursuit of these appetites, it is possible to break the communal bond of brotherhood and friendship. Is it then possible to hold first to my personal and private good as an independent part of a polis or community with a shared goal? This would automatically result in the loss of the bond of unity in a well governed self or an institution, which are naturally dictated by law to secure common good above all other interests. Can a society give precedence to a favour that it knows contradicts the general common good? We react to *Miner's* expansive interpretation because we think it gives passion an independence that it does not deserve by looking at the very constitution of man, his anthropological structure and moral aptitude.

Moreover, politically constituted community is managed through a restrained law. Freedom and responsibility are tied together only in the spirit that progress and development of the organism are the foundational basis of engagement. If each person or society is going to immediately favour all his or its sensual inclinations, then that person or society must suffer all kinds of victimhood and sensual abuses i.e. greed, envy, and jealousy, up to including constant strife. If all those who are hungry are to meet their fill without moderation or modification, then a good number of persons will go without food. We cannot also drink as per the demands of our thirst. The one common good of a person, of a society or of whichever institution demands that governance or laws go hand in hand with the power to reinforce them. It is called, in other quarters, as the power of arms. We understand that reason must be endowed with a certain power of rectitude. This implies that 'control' carries within it a capacity to restore order. This should be done even forcefully where the persuasive power of reason as a political leader fails.

### **5.8.1 Contemporary social context and *Ferry's* challenge to *Miner's* creative thinking**

Although *Miner's* work on the passions has received enormous appreciation within the philosophical communities of American universities and has been treated as a recent robust endeavour on the *ST's* part that has been neglected for years as per the opinions of many scholars (Miner, 2009), he has given *ST* an instrumental use by claiming that it should aid his thinking (Emotions, 2015). *Miner* has 'over-strikingly elevated

passion, to a nearly co-equal status with reason' (Ferry, 2012); something that goes against the spirit of the medieval times and gives passions a competitive chance to reign just in the same way as reason would do. This is a threat to *Aquinas*' originality and spirit, given the initial medieval controversy of the 'unicity of the substantial forms'. We think that debate about the application of analogies in interpretive works of scholars is re-awakened in *Miner*'s work and particularly to his employment of the politic and royal analogy.

*Ferry* suspiciously thinks that *Miner* has made a gross over-statement concerning passions/reason relation. He thinks that *Miner* is overstressing and confusing certain passion's capacities rooted on the politic and royal rule analogy to attest for their place in the general governance of the human being. *Miner* states that,

*"perfect subjection of the passions entails their responsibility to reason and will...it does not imply, or even remotely suggest, a 'life entirely free of the passions' (Miner, 2009a, p. 107)."*

*Ferry* thinks that the above quote as it is found in *Miner*'s work page 107, points to *Miner*'s argument that *Aquinas* interpreters are guilty of conflating control as subordination, with control as domination. According to *Miner*, there should be a difference between control as subordination and control as domination. However, this is logically contradictory if *Miner had to* think of something like 'perfect subjection'. Perfect subjection in the context of the quote would mean the same thing as a type of command-obedience structure *Aquinas* attributes to the relation between the body and the soul where the body is perfectly under the command of the soul (Ferry, 2012a).

Like *Ferry* did, we too ask: what then would be perfect about subjection or a subordination where a subject or a subordinate constantly resists the command of the ruler? *Miner*'s interpretation of the politic and royal analogy in reference to perfect subjection is more despotic than political. We wonder why the claim that reason must control passions (107), where control equally means subordination, *Miner* finds nothing wrong with such readings yet he thinks that control is more than subordination. According to *Aquinas*, domination, subordination and perfect subjection are synonymous because one can be perfectly subject to or dominated or subordinated to something else without literally being extirpated (Ferry, 2012a). In *Miner*'s opinion, control is a subordination which does not fit the nature of reason/passions relation. This clearly shows that *Miner*'s grasp of the Politic and royal rule analogy as is used by *Aquinas* is mistaken.

*Ferry* also steps up his position against *Miner* on his understanding of *Aquinas* on the passions and virtues. For *Ferry*, *Miner's* interpretation passions/reason relation downplays the dominating role of reason, and brings the passions to the centre of the debate. On the contrary, he elevates emotions to nearly a co-equal status with reason and so minimizes the need it has of being controlled by reason. For he says, “passions are ‘subject’ to reason and ‘obey’ reason but in the same manner as free citizens obey their rulers (not controllers) (Miner, 2009a, p. 107).”

*Ferry* thinks that *Miner's* position in understanding control as a negation and his gesture of minimizing reason's role is exegetically inaccurate (it is not the exact interpretation of *Aquinas*) and experientially deficient (and that experience does not attest to it) (*Ferry*, 2012a). Passions resistance to reason is not and cannot be to passions' own credit but to the discredit of a fallen humanity. This fact we had mentioned in chapter four. *Miner's* construal of politic and royal rule analogy is certainly an over-pitch as we continue to attest in our analysis of his work.

*Ferry* believes that in moral matters, reason, and in its facet of prudence, ‘has always held the place of ‘a commander, a ruler and a king’ regardless of the fact that the sensitive appetite is also rational by participation. *Ferry* is amongst the majority of scholars who do to interpret *Aquinas'* theory of emotions as reason centred (*Ferry*, 2012b) as opposed to *Miner* who has moved emotions to the centre. Though *Miner* appears positive and lenient with *Aquinas*, he is overly inclined to the passions and unknowingly draws much attention to it at the neglect of reason dominating responsibility. *Miner* is passionately committed to raise passions to a level where they can be looked at positively against their lasting medieval taste of negativity that we had mentioned in chapter two of our literature review.

*Miner* argues that the possibility of a positive contribution of the passions is implicit in the analogy. He further draws attention to the politic and royal rule analogy in order to contest the usefulness of the metaphor of control as we have seen above. According to *Aquinas*, political rule is everywhere in nature and passions' subjection to reason is a natural occurrence and deviating from it is normatively problematic (*Ferry*, 2012b). *Miner* has no reason to argue otherwise, because the lower appetites are perfected by proper disposition to follow the command of reason but only through virtue. Knowing that the contrast in understanding passions/reason relation is not limited the conception of it through the politic and royal approach, let us see what is happening in the ordinary social context both at individual and public life.

We ask whether there is a possibility of a sound, resourceful and a life of integrity where it is only the sensitive powers taking lead in all crucial decision-making moments. Can concupiscible and irascible powers on their own stand guided and well-ordered, in the presence of those goods whose appetition are highly favoured by the appetites and cravings of their kind?

We realize that freedom and equality is the basis under which members of a political regime are thought to be independent, yet we would still argue that one is only free and equal in proportion to the particular roles carried out within specified natural ordering. Any responsibilities and independence are meant to ensure justice in a well-coordinated *polis*. If this is applied to the human personal life, then tranquillity and peace ought to be realized. It is only surprising that this independence of the passions as observed and experienced in personal lives and institutions only results into chaos and confusions. We see right from the youths to adults, chaos of erotic kinds whenever sexual impulses are given priority and chance to take the lead.

It should be remembered that the place of the passion in *Aquinas*, has its meaningfulness within the context of teleological aspirations of man. Since its equality is analogously equated to reason as a fellow citizen in the polity, passions' independence must be geared towards this same *telos* and it cannot favour the organism in parts but holistically. Freedom and equality of passions and reasons as analogously put must be applied within the law of the natural inclination of man. Law must always create a restraint in society as an instrument of governance for the sake of common good. The favour of independence cannot be a favour tied to the body at the expense of the soul, neither can it be for the good of the passions themselves at the expense of reason.

Looking at the reality of the anthropological definition of man, he is not solely a passionate being, nor solely a rational being. What then becomes the general orientation of a man who has and thinks of a life led and controlled by passions? Although we might think differently, a life of arbitrary independence of both passions and reason, a life that whatever befits either of the case becomes the order of the day, cannot be a morally viable life. The principle of *the mean* as a virtuous disposition is a fundamental option in the case of these two extremes. Any direction taken, whether it be a *passio* or *ratio*-centric inclination, contradicts, in some way, the anthropological constitution of man as a composite being. This composition of man as body and soul, and the intrinsic constitution of his operations as found in the relation between the sensitive and intellectual powers is automatically endangered. We think that the *Aristotelian* mean

would be considered as we conclude and seek to solve the problem statement of this research.

Advancing our contestation further by looking at this kind of governance within the public institutions, we find it quite difficult to experience a society that is purely rationalistic and thus pay little attention to the passionate cravings of its members in relation to the resources meant for the common good. A rationalistic society is a theoretical model of managing and understanding life. This is why we think that many governments today, Kenya included, are resorting to education systems that would integrate the lower powers of its citizens. The Competency Based Curriculum education system is an assurance of an integral search for what befits the good of each member within the general public sphere.

In all efforts for an integral engagement of a person as a frontier being, there will always be a need to tame over-zealous appetites of the most fortunate members of any institution. Whether concupiscible or irascible, there is automatic call for complementarity of governance in relation to the common good. It is our opinion that though reason is the order of the society, this ordering must be virtuously motivated. It is not a conquest at the detriment of passions. Even up to when reason shows certain heights of ferocity and command, it should not be seen as negative domination just to the intimidation of passions. It should still be understood as love made manifest for the sake of achieving a stable and morally grounded personality or society. There cannot be any political win without perfecting the persuasive art of the contestant. As an ordinance of reason from a legislative authority of the person who has the care of the community, passions are lawfully ordained to the guidance of reason. The art of persuasion is also ordained to the winning over of those free subjects who would want to oppose the sway of their political leader within the general structure of the *polis*.

What is the societal common experience when the goods of passions are prioritized over reason and the goods of reason prioritized over passions and the governance of one is accepted at the expense of the other? In our families, we see children punished because they ate someone else's food. Similarly, when the youth are overwhelmed with their sensual appetites, and are mistakenly indulged in impulsive and erotic habits, they are often punished. Over drinking is harshly detested as a bad habit, both in the youth and adults. The implications of such harsh attitudes to the victims of overindulgences are simply aspirations to put order in the passions and ensure that their operations are tamed. We wonder whether the freedom to operate independently has anything of

favour to the general good of the passions. Could there be anything worth resisting in the operations where reason takes the lead, both at personal and institutional levels?

We have shown that *Miner's* interpretation should not be taken lightly. A society that suggests a random or arbitrary independence of the sensitive powers is doomed to perish. Well-ordered persons, institutions or societies should promote a rule where reason is a defining factor. We have also shown the reasons why our critique of *Miner* creates an *agendum* for future research on exactly what relationship stands undisputed between passion and reason. It is therefore clear that ratio-centric or passio-centric persons or societies cannot be any ideal interpretations of the right relationship between passions and reason. There is an indispensable complementarity that is to be promoted at all times between these two medieval categories: reason and passions.

### **5.9 Reality and the limits of conceptual analogical frameworks in defining passions/reason relation**

Though analogies are open to creativity, they can also lead to serious errors. They aim at causing explanations beyond stating only the epistemic reasons and are indeed powerful methods for scientific inquiry which should enhance our thinking. It is clear in our findings that the virtue of prudence (*phronesis*) creates in the ruler (reason) the need for intelligence and practical sensibility.

For any political community to achieve its end, law is a necessary requisite, otherwise men are the worst of savages in the absence of law and justice. Restraint and habituation through moral education reduces excesses and enhances the habit of obeying the law. Since deliberation is a shared activity of plurality, that is, bringing on board all stakeholders, reason should consider passions in all its crucial and lawful decisions. Diseased and wrongly disposed natures are normatively problematic. In its role and responsibility of commanding, reason must learn that it is not an absolute authority since passions are not wholly subject to it. It should be understood that the tension between the passions and reason is not a *metaphysical problem* but a political problem of persuasion and obedience. Since passions are impulsive and unmediated, the power to control them is found in the rationality of reason. Reason is the only guarantee that passions will contribute to a moral action. Insensitivity to pleasure is *a vice* and we must reject like *Aquinas* did, any negative evaluation of the passions. Conclusively, the tension between reason and passions has no scholarly consensus on how it should be resolved.

### 5.10 General conclusion and recommendation

The tension between passion and reason has no consensus on how it should be solved. It is important to want to control the passions or, in other words, to want to do good amidst the impulsive passions, but it is more necessary and meaningful to have the *knowhow* of doing good where passions are at work. The invitation is to put at work the Aristotelian *phronesis*, which is the right measure of what must be done in order to validate virtue as remedy of unruly sensitive passions (Mimbi, 2009). Our research work concludes by underscoring the fact that moral virtues in general and prudence in particular—especially in its ordering function of the passions and hence ensuring their harmony—is a necessity. *Recta ratio agibilium* (prudence) is the right application of the ideal to concrete situations and circumstances (Debeljuh, 2006). Reason as a ruler must have this mandate at heart in order to save individuals and the public who may have a social or a conceptual deficiency in what kind of relation expected between passions and reason.

*Though Miner* has contested the metaphor of ‘control’ or ‘command.’ It is however, important for him to know that prudence’s command (*imperium*) is to be understood correctly within the framework of moral virtue. As command, it is to be placed somewhere after the partial act of intention and before choice which, by and large, is about the golden mean regarding passions, e.g., getting angry just enough to correct a wayward child. *Mimbi* argues that practical reason in its perfection of prudence, precisely commands choice—in what refers to the mean of reason in the passions—while mindful of the drive it gets from moral virtue’s intention of the end, and then proceeds to commands active use thus ensuring the presence of reason also in the implementation of the choice. The happy outcome is owed to the force of moral virtue’s partial act of choice, which is commanded by reason—we insist, in its perfection of prudence—and yet also takes full account of the movements of the sensitive appetites (passions). Each time an optimal choice is made, an imprint of reason is left in the corresponding sensitive appetite orienting it, every time more, to the *bonum rationis*—the good of practical reasonableness and thus creating in the passions a kind of co-naturalness with the good of reason (Mimbi, 2009).

We have finally considered the politic rule as a source domain applied to the relationship between passions and reason as the target domain. We have scrutinized its limits in reference to both *Aristotle* and *Aquinas*’ sense of what analogy is. In trying to find out what is ‘something of their own’ or right of opposition in the passions and

consequent ability for a positive contribution, we have concluded that, the relationship or the social and conceptual divergence between the two, is a question of meaning and perception of categories as interpreted and applied by scholars who have their own goals and interests. Against the Thomistic spirit, *Miner* seems extremely positive about passions, yet we know that there is no independence of passions that we can talk of, unless they remain tied to reason's guardianship.

This research work has proven to be a win-win endeavour which has pulled the two extremes to the middle ground. By analogical principles and by remaining faithful to his methodological assumptions, *Miner* has done a commendable job. However, we feel that his creativity is a betrayal and infidelity to the Thomistic spirit. *Ferry* on the other hand has tried to make *Aquinas'* synDissertation relevant in *Miner's* work. By contextualizing *Aquinas'* literary work on the passions within his wider theological framework and by remaining faithful to the conventional spirit within the medieval Christian and intellectual tradition of his time, *Aquinas* remains an academic giant far from being exhausted in this study. If *Miner's* academic work has pulled the debate on passions to the centre, then *Aquinas'* has always remained the pivotal middle ground to create the necessary balance especially on the special categories we have analysed above. Ranging from chapter one where the research was introduced to chapter five, we have endeavoured to show that the extremes of *Passionalists* represented by *Miner* and *Rationalists* represented by *Ferry* are not good for us, and that the remedy is to build a consensus toward the golden *Aristotelian* mean in life and in the general human development agenda. The relationship between reason's *command* and *control*, and passions' resistance or something of their own, which are their characteristic features needs not to be tied to a literal application of analogical argumentation, but to a contextual meaning and setting where understanding and explaining passions/reason relation is originally expounded. *Miner* must be mindful of *Aquinas'* theological framework under which he discussed passions all through in the *ST*.

We recommend that in the study of the passio/reason relation, it is important that reason should be understood to retain its guardianship and prudential responsibility whatsoever without intimidation and to be able to consider passions in all its primary decisions and deliberations. As a commander and a controller, and in considering what is good for the governance of an individual person or *polis*, reason is guide is key because it is the only ruler who knows what is best for the care of the passions. This responsibility is to be done by reason as someone who has the care of community as his primary duty. It is

only in remaining faithful to the originality of *Aquinas* thinking, shall we be able to carry out a meaningful research in the future. His personality, medieval setting and context and the historical outgrowth of his thinking should be put into consideration. Finally, and in the very words of *Mimbi*, who has also done extensive work on the passions/reason relation understood within the conceptual framework of being fully human, “*mastery over sentiment is not assured; this part of the soul is not always docile to the will and to reason. It is governed by “political dominion”, as opposed to despotic rule. It is like a domestic cat—you have mastery over it, yet it can also get out of control (Mimbi, 2007).*”



## Bibliography

- Anagnostopoulos, G., & Santas, G. (Eds.). (2018). *Democracy, Justice, and Equality in Ancient Greece: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives* (Vol. 132). Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96313-6>
- Aquinas, S. T., Hause, J., & Murphy, C. E. (2010). *Disputed questions on virtue*. Hackett Publishing.
- Aquinas, S. T., & Regan, R. J. (2007). *Commentary on Aristotle's Politics*. Hackett Publishing.
- Aquinas, T., & Adler, M. J. (1990). *Summa theologiae* (Vol. 2). Encyclopaedia Britannica.
- Austin, N. O. (2010). *Thomas Aquinas on the Four Causes of Temperance* [PhD Dissertation]. Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
- Bartha, P. (2013). *Analogy and analogical reasoning*.
- Becker, L. C. (2004). *Stoic emotion*.
- Biondi, C.-A. (2007). Aristotle on the mixed constitution and its relevance for American political thought. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 24(2), 176.
- Blythe, J. M. (1986a). The mixed constitution and the distinction between regal and political power in the work of Thomas Aquinas. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 547–565.
- Blythe, J. M. (1986b). The Mixed Constitution and the Distinction between Regal and Political Power in the Work of Thomas Aquinas. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 47(4), 547. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2709717>
- Bradshaw, L. (1991). Political Rule, Prudence and the “Woman Question” in Aristotle\*. *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de*

*Science Politique*, 24(3), 557–573.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900022691>

Buckle, S. (2012). Hume on the Passions. *Philosophy*, 87(2), 189–213.

Colón-Emeric, E. (2010). Thomas Aquinas on the Passions by Robert Miner. *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review*, 74(3), 481–485.

Crisp, R. (2014). *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics*. Cambridge University Press.

De Vries, M. F. K. (1991). Whatever happened to the philosopher-king? The leader's addiction to Power. *Journal of Management Studies*, 28(4), 339–351.

Debeljuh, P. (2006). *Ethics: Learning to live*.

Dixon, T. (2012). “Emotion”: The history of a keyword in crisis. *Emotion Review*, 4(4), 338–344.

Dryden, J. (2016). Passions, Affections, and Emotions: Methodological Difficulties in Reconstructing Aquinas's Philosophical Psychology. *Literature Compass*, 13(6), 343–350. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lic3.12261>

Elders, L. J. (2006). *The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas*.

Emotions, H. of. (2015, October 8). *Robert Miner &lsquo;Two Powers, One Appetite: How Thomas Aquinas Thinks About the Passions*;  
<https://vimeo.com/141850374>


Ferry, L. D. G. (2012a). Passionalist or Rationalist? The emotions in Aquinas' moral theology. *New Blackfriars*, 93(1045), 292–308.

Ferry, L. D. G. (2012b). Passionalist or Rationalist? The emotions in Aquinas' moral theology. *New Blackfriars*, 93(1045), 292–308.

Floyd, S. D. (1998). Aquinas on Emotion: A Response to Some Recent Interpretations. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 15(2), 161–175.

- Kahm, N. (2019). *Aquinas on Emotion's participation in reason*. Catholic University of America Press.
- Lange, S. (1938). Emotion in Plato's "Phaedo". *The Classical Journal*, 33(5), 296–298.
- Llansana, L. S., & Gallifa, J. (2012). Human Passions: From Classical Greece to the Contemporary Psychology of Passions and the Contribution of Christian Spirituality to the Tradition of the Capital Sins. *Journal of Religious History*, 36(2), 184–203. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9809.2011.01166.x>
- Lombardo, N. E. (n.d.). *The Logic of Desire*.
- Lombardo, N. E. (2011). *The logic of desire: Aquinas on emotion*. CUA Press.
- Machek, D. (2015). "Emotions that Do Not Move": Zhuangzi and Stoics on Self-Emerging Feelings. *Dao*, 14(4), 521–544.
- McAlear, G. J. (1999a). The Politics of the Flesh: Rahner and Aquinas on Concupiscentia. *Modern Theology*, 15(3), 355–365.
- McAlear, G. J. (1999b). The Politics of the Flesh: Rahner and Aquinas on Concupiscentia. *Modern Theology*, 15(3), 355–365.
- McAlear, G. J. (2001). Sensuality: An Avenue into the Political and Metaphysical Thought of Giles of Rome. *Gregorianum*, 82(1), 129–147. JSTOR.
- Mimbi, P. (2007). *The Overlooked Factor: The Power of Being Fully Human*. Strathmore University Press.
- Mimbi, P. (2009). *The Sources of Effective Leadership: Exploring the Principles of Pure and Applied Ethics*. Strathmore University Press.
- Miner, R. (2009a). *Aquinas on the Passions*.
- Miner, R. (2009b). *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48*. Cambridge University Press.

- Ong'ondo, Jwan, C., Julius. (2020). *Qualitative Research Process: From Conceptualisation to Examination*. Jomo Kenyatta Foundation.
- Schepers OP, M. (2012). Lonergan on the Person and the Economy:“reaching up to the mind of Aquinas,” in view of responding to Pope Leo XIII, vetera novis augere et perficere. *New Blackfriars*, 93(1043), 99–115.
- Trott, A. M. (2013). Rule in Turn: Political Rule against Mastery in Aristotle’s Politics. *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 17(2), 301–311.
- Uffenheimer-Lippens, E. (2003a). Rationalized passion and passionate rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the relation between reason and the passions. *The Review of Metaphysics*, 56(3), 525–558.
- Uffenheimer-Lippens, E. (2003b). Rationalized passion and passionate rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the relation between reason and the passions. *The Review of Metaphysics*, 56(3), 525–558.



# Appendices

## Appendix A: Similarity Report



### Document Information

---

Analyzed document	THE LAST STRIKE ON THE DISSERTATION 2.docx (D130861953)
Submitted	2022-03-19T08:46:00.0000000
Submitted by	
Submitter email	Ouma.Millewa@strathmore.edu
Similarity	1%
Analysis address	library.strath@analysis.orkund.com

### Sources included in the report

---

<b>W</b>	URL: <a href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt7d25w3x9/qt7d25w3x9_noSplash_e95440c8a3c0e11ee604f0dc912e2f9f.pdf">https://escholarship.org/content/qt7d25w3x9/qt7d25w3x9_noSplash_e95440c8a3c0e11ee604f0dc912e2f9f.pdf</a> Fetched: 2020-12-17T03:24:25.1770000		1
<b>W</b>	URL: <a href="https://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/123456789/22563/A%20Critique%20of%20the%20Implementation%20of%20Moral%20Aims%20of%20Education....pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/123456789/22563/A%20Critique%20of%20the%20Implementation%20of%20Moral%20Aims%20of%20Education....pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a> Fetched: 2022-03-19T08:46:20.3830000		2
<b>W</b>	URL: <a href="http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Aquinas_on_the_Passions.pdf">http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Aquinas_on_the_Passions.pdf</a> Fetched: 2020-11-27T14:50:46.9870000		2
<b>W</b>	URL: <a href="https://dsc.duq.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2330&amp;context=etd">https://dsc.duq.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2330&amp;context=etd</a> Fetched: 2021-11-18T05:55:43.0170000		5
<b>W</b>	URL: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/thomas-aquinas-on-the-passions/F0286DE7C5AE807EFA9E8D64C4C8F20F">https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/thomas-aquinas-on-the-passions/F0286DE7C5AE807EFA9E8D64C4C8F20F</a> Fetched: 2021-09-06T21:56:53.6230000		1
<b>W</b>	URL: <a href="https://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/97488/frontmatter/9780521897488_frontmatter.pdf">https://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/97488/frontmatter/9780521897488_frontmatter.pdf</a> Fetched: 2022-03-19T08:46:09.1230000		1

## Appendix B: Ethical Review Approval Letter



29<sup>th</sup> March 2022

Mr Owino Luke,  
owinoluke83@gmail.com

Dear Mr Owino,

**RE: INDEPENDENCE OF THE PASSIONS: A critique of Robert Miner's interpretation of Aquinas' political analogy of the passions-reason relationship**

This is to inform you that SU-IERC has reviewed and approved your above SU masters' research proposal. Your application reference number is SU-IERC1294/22. The approval period is 29<sup>th</sup> March 2022 to 28<sup>th</sup> March 2023.

This approval is subject to compliance with the following requirements:

- i. Only approved documents including (informed consents, study instruments, MTA) will be used
- ii. All changes including (amendments, deviations, and violations) are submitted for review and approval by SU-IERC.
- iii. Death and life-threatening problems and serious adverse events or unexpected adverse events whether related or unrelated to the study must be reported to SU-IERC within 48 hours of notification
- iv. Any changes, anticipated or otherwise that may increase the risks or affected safety or welfare of study participants and others or affect the integrity of the research must be reported to SU-IERC within 48 hours
- v. Clearance for export of biological specimens must be obtained from relevant institutions.
- vi. Submission of a request for renewal of approval at least 60 days prior to expiry of the approval period. Attach a comprehensive progress report to support the renewal.
- vii. Submission of an executive summary report within 90 days upon completion of the study to SU-IERC.

Prior to commencing your study, you will be expected to obtain a research license from National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI) <https://research-portal.nacosti.go.ke/> and obtain other clearances needed.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ben Ngoye".

Dr Ben Ngoye,  
Secretary, SU-IERC

Cc: Prof Fred Were,  
Chairperson; SU-IERC

