A critical analysis of the role of think tanks in Kenya’s Economic Policy

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A Critical Analysis of the Role of Think Tanks in Kenya’s Economic Policy

Alex Ndungu Njeru

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Public Policy and Management at Strathmore University

Institute of Public Policy and Governance
Strathmore University

May 2018
Declaration

I declare that this work has not been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other university. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis contains no material published or written by any other person except where reference is made in the thesis itself.

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Research Supervisor: Dr. Julius Muia, EBS

Date:……………………………………………………………………
Abstract
This research sought to examine the part played by think tanks as actors in economic Policy Advice Supply in Kenya. The study employed an exploratory qualitative research approach with a purposive sample of think tanks that had a focus on economic policy and the government’s Ministries, Department, and Agencies that were involved in economic policy planning, formulation, implementation and evaluation. The findings showed that think tanks played a role in economic policy making through four main approaches: capacity building; economic policy research and analysis; advocacy and policy engagement; and through the use of consultancies. Key areas of involvement included agenda setting, participation in policy formulation and contribution to economic policy content. Key informants pointed out that most policy advice from think tanks was supply-driven rather than demand-driven. In addition, there seemed to be a communication buffer, between policy technocrats and think tanks, which reduced the participation of think tanks in economic policy advice. The convergence of Policy Advice Supply and Policy Advice Demand was found to be when technocrats in government communicated their policy advice needs clearly and unambiguously and when think tanks possessed the technical capacity to provide the policy advice. The study established that the endogenous factors that determined the ability of think tanks to play a role in Kenya’s economic policy were: technical capacity; reputation and social capital; corporate governance and communication capital. The exogenous factors that were found to have an effect on think tanks’ influence on economic policy included donors who had both macro-level and micro-level effects on think tanks; a think tank’s mandate and categorization; political leaders/political culture and political freedoms. The research recommends that think tanks should consider and involve public sector officials in the design and execution of their policy advice. In addition, think tanks should endeavor to re-orient their policy advice supply to be demand-driven rather than supply-led. A useful way of actualizing the link between Policy Advice Supply and Policy Advice demand is for both think tanks and government agencies to establish exchange programmes between public sector officials and researchers in think tanks. This would give think tanks the opportunity to get acquainted with the socio-political dynamics of economic policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. In addition, policy makers in government would have a chance to help think tanks to distill their policy advice products to have a structure and language that would appeal to policy advice demand. Areas of further study include the role of the leaders in think tanks and government institutions in influencing the contribution of think tanks to economic policy.
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Abbreviations

ACF  Advocacy Coalition Framework
ACBF  African Capacity Building Foundation
ACEG  African Centre for Economic Growth
ACCORD  African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AfDB  African Development Bank
AERC  African Economic Research Consortium
BIDs  Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
CREA  Centre de Recherches Économiques Appliquées
CCR  Centre for Conflict Resolution
CGD  Clear Government Demand
CMAAE  Collaborative Masters in Applied Agricultural Economics
CMAP  Collaborative Masters Programme
CPP  Collaborative PhD Programme
ERS  Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment
GoK  Government of Kenya
IJR  Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
ISS  Institute for Security Studies
IDS-UoNbi  Institute of Development Studies – University of Nairobi
IPAR  Institute of Policy Analysis and Research
IDRC  International Development Research Centre
IFIs  International Financial Institutions
IREN  Inter-Region Economic Network
KIPPRA  Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KII  Key Informant Interview
MIMMAP  Macroeconomic Adjustment Programme
MRPP  Master of Research and Public Policy
MDAs  Ministries Departments and Agencies
NACOSTI  National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation
NESC  National Economic and Social Council
NARC  National Rainbow Coalition
PASGR  Partnership for African Social & Governance Research
PAD  Policy Advice Demand
PAS  Policy Advice Supply
SAIIA  South African Institute of International Affairs
TTI  Think Tank Initiative
YPP  Young Professionals Programme
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Dedication

Dedicated to, Wacuka and Muthoni Ndungu. To the beauty of their dreams and future that holds, promise beyond horizons.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
This research constitutes a study designed to examine the contribution of think tanks to Kenya’s economic policy. Chapter one includes a brief overview of what economic policy entails; a brief history of the development of think tanks globally, on the African continent and in Kenya; the problem definition; the research objectives; the scope; and significance of the study. Chapter two contains the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed for this study; the chapter also includes the conceptual framework of the study. Chapter three contains the methodology, research design; population and sampling techniques used in the study; the data collection methods; data analysis; and outputs of the Study. Chapter four contains findings of the study, while chapter five contains the summary of findings and recommendations.

1.2 Background of the Study
The role and importance of economic policy in national development cannot receive enough emphasis. For instance, Keynes (1936) observed that the ideas of economists both when right and wrong have profound ramifications than is often acknowledged. Conversely, Omotunde (2007) notes that the absence of sound economic policy has been detrimental to growth and development in the African continent. On a positive note, Wambala and Khan (2013) opine that Africa’s economic growth within the last few years is in part due to sound economic policy experienced in the continent, during the same period. To crown it all, Skousen (2015) argues that governments have played a significant role in national economic policy, particularly after the advent of paper money in the late 17th century.

The foregoing suggests that economic policy is vital for the positive transformation of societies. But, what is economic policy and how does it come about? Partly owing to its complexity, importance, and impact, the players in economic policy are diverse. Suffice to state that the main actors are legislators, technocrats, interest groups, corporations, academic scholars, development partners and think tanks. On account of the emerging importance of the role of research and informed expert input in guiding policy, this study proposes to examine the role of research institutions, often referred to as (think tanks) in Kenya’s economic policy.
Literature reviewed (Dunn, 1994; Jann & Wegrich, 2007; Coning & Cloete, 2014) suggest that policy formulation happens in cyclical, distinct but at times intertwined phases. These phases include, agenda setting; policy formulation; policy adoption; policy implementation; and policy assessment. In the case of attribution, think tanks and other interest groups tend to play a significant role in the agenda-setting and policy formulation phases, which revolve around the recognition of a public policy problem and the purposeful attempt to solve the problem.

Progressing through the phases, it is common practice that public policy implementation is a preserve of government through its structures such as ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). Completing the policy chain, recent studies (Ducote, Weyrauch, Braun & Chudvonsky, 2015; Jann & Welgrich 2015) indicate that think tanks are important actors in policy evaluation, which revolves around determining whether policy under implementation policy meets intended goals.

### 1.2.1 General overview of economic policy

Economic policy can be categorized into two broad fields: microeconomic policy, which mainly involves autonomous decision making by economic agents; and macroeconomic policy which deals with the aggregate economic trends in a particular economy. Keat, Young and Erfle (2014) further show that macroeconomic policy can further be broadly categorized into two: monetary policy; and fiscal policy. Macroeconomic policy also entails increasing aggregate demand which is often achieved through industrial, trade and regulation policy (Arestis & Sawyer, 1998).

Stigler (1975) identified three goals of economic policy: the largest possible output of goods and services; through the full and efficient use of resources (full employment of the factors of production); economic growth; and reduced inequality. Tresch (2015), notes that the role of government in the economy is to enhance the performance of the markets to meet the goals above. In practice, the formulation of economic policy is an outcome of processes that are characterized by a multiplicity of actors with varied interests. These actors include government technocrats, research institutions, the private sector, and politicians. Although economic policy is not a manifestly political process, the bargaining, deliberations, and conflicts of interest that characterize it happen within an environment and context that is characterized by politics.
As such, economic policy sometimes traverses technical and economic considerations into issues that are manifestly political. Besides, economic policy possesses the ability to distribute values and resources in society. For this reason, actors in economic policy need a substantial level of societal-political entrenchment because politics affect economic policy, (Crewe & Young 2002; Vogenbesck & deLeon, 2007). The aforementioned indicate a need to examine the role that think tanks play amongst the multiplicity of actors that are involved in economic policy. Specific attention should be paid to the placement of think tanks in the socio-economic and political landscape. It is also important to determine the extent to which think tanks can influence or are influenced by politics in their quest to have meaningful footprint in a country's economic policy.

The socio-political context within which think tanks operate explains to a large extent their ability to interact with government and its officials in the policy process. Besides, the production of policy research and the subsequent transformation of their research into outputs for policy advice is inherently a political process which is influenced by political and institutional pressures. On top of the socio-political context, is the nature of the interaction that takes place between Policy Advice Demand (PAD) and Policy Advice Supply (PAS). Which in part could impact the nature, ability, and extent of think tanks to influence economic policy formulation, (Crewe & Young, 2002; Start & Hovland, 2004).

Examining the policy process on the basis of the PAD and PAS framework cited above enables a useful configuration; that think tanks are in the business of offering policy advice (PAS); while government, through its technocrats in Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and politicians, primarily demand policy advice (PAD). Scholarly discourse in this field by Crewe and Young (2002); Start and Hovland (2004), suggests that the interaction between PAS and PAD is a function of the perceived quality of PAS and the presence or lack thereof of PAD. In Kenya, the presence of PAD and perceived quality of PAS have not been adequately investigated, in addition it is no clear how whether Kenyan think tanks compete with other PAS actors in economic policy.
In Kenya, policy formulation is primarily the reserve of technocrats in MDAs. The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) (2018), observes that, “a relevant MDA formulates policy guidelines for discussion within the MDA and other government departments.” KIPPRA continues to observe that at stage two, “the relevant MDA conducts comprehensive and comparative research on the specific policy issues and seeks expert opinion.” It is expected that think tanks provide some of expert opinion and also carry out research on the policy issues under consideration by MDAs. It is however not clear to what extent think tanks provide these policy opinions and research finding as policy advice in the policy process.

1.2.2 A Brief History of Think Tanks in the Economic Policy

Think tanks seem to have evolved from society’s urgent and ever-present demand to benefit from sound, contextual, independent and evidence-based policy advice. In the United States and the United Kingdom, think tanks institutionalised due to the consolidation of the policy science movement. In developed countries, where think tanks have enjoyed a long period of existence, their influence in the public policy processes is considerable. In these countries some of the areas where think tanks have had notable footprints include, changing economic paradigms, policy reversals and policy discourse (Stone, 2000; Smilov, 2004; Hart & Vromen, 2008; Heffernan, 2014).

The development of think tanks in developing, and emerging economies has been a relatively recent phenomenon. Srivastava (2011) opines that their emergence in post-independent states has been constrained by over-reliance on Bretton Woods 1 institutions, private foundations and other donor agencies in shaping policy discourse. To add to this, the political culture of post-independent states have impacted the ability of think tanks to operate in different countries. For instance, democratic and pluralistic societies such as India have allowed think tanks to flourish, whereas authoritarian states such as Pakistan and Bangladesh have reigned down on them. Schneider (2002) also observes that bottoms-up political culture, allows think tanks to provide more inputs in the policy process than in top-down political governance. However, the mere existence of an environment that enables think tanks to flourish does not necessarily translate into meaningful think tank participation in policy making.

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1 International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
Scholars like Brown, Knox, Tolmie, Kay, Gugerty, Kosack and Fabrizio (2014) have sought to determine the driving force behind policy processes. At the heart of the conundrum is the question of whether objective policy advice reigns, or whether politics trumps objective PAS in the policy processes. As such, it is incumbent on players in the economic policy spaces to answer when, timely, relevant and reliable new knowledge has an influence on economic policy decisions, or politics overrides the policy process (Carden, 2009). In Kenya as in other sub-saharan African countries, the dynamics between PAS from think tanks and PAD from the government have not been adequately interrogated.

Literature surveyed shows that think tanks in developing countries, mainly independent and autonomous ones started emerging after the economic and political liberalization era of the 1980s and 1990s, (Kimenyi & Datta, 2011). After the turn of the millennium, a new accelerated phase of growth was occasioned by lack of capacity by the governments to use data and information to make informed choices and the desire for governments to adopt competitive economic policies in the global economy (Kalija, 2015). Think tanks also emerged to fill the void by positioning themselves as sources of PAS to governments, corporations, and the public. In Africa, their contribution is likely hampered by weak linkages between research conducted by non-state bodies and policy practice (Ohemeng, 2005). The African Development Bank (AfDB) observes that “a wide gap exists between the producers and consumers of knowledge,” (AfDB, 2011).

Although the number of think tanks in Africa and the breadth of policy areas they are involved in has been growing, generalizations are not helpful. Each country on the continent has a unique political culture and historical legacy that could either enfeeble, or enable think tanks in their quest to influence economic policies. Within countries, different regimes or time epochs could facilitate a pronounced role for think tanks in economic policy, while at times the same could herald their receding role. It is not clear whether African think tanks have or are contributing to the economic policy capacity of countries they are situated in (Kaija, 2015).

Think tanks in different African countries also face different challenges. In Nigeria for example, autonomous research institutions have not been mainstreamed in critical economic policy making, like in trade policy policy for example.
Military dictatorships in the country in the past viewed autonomous research institutions with suspicion and abhorred alternative ideas (Jerome, 2007). Reinforcing this thinking, Olomola (2007) observes that the distrust of research institutions by the government has meant that "public policy decisions seem not to have benefited from relevant research input." Kenya’s fifty-three think tanks, are the second most in Africa, after South Africa with eighty-six and well ahead of her East African peers with Uganda at twenty-eight and Tanzania at fifteen, McGann (2016). These think tanks straddle categories provided by the GGTTI 2016. The categories are: Autonomous and Independent; Quasi-Independent; Government-Affiliated; Quasi-Governmental; University-Affiliated, Political-Party Affiliated; and Corporate (for profit), find the definition of these categories in (Appendix 1).

Although Kenya posses a substantial number of think tanks, their role in the public policy formation and economic policy in particular has not been studied. Seck (2011) observes that there exists a legitimate need to evaluate the capacity of economic policy research institutions in Kenya. This position is supported by Kimenyi (2012) who argues that it is not possible to examine to what extent the government takes heed of policy advice from think tanks. Mendizabal (2015) observes that the development of relations between think tanks and the Kenyan government is interesting and paradoxical. He continues to state that, on the one hand, the Kenyan government is becoming more professional and technical and therefore demanding for evidence-based policy advice. On the other hand, a new generation of government technocrats is not so keen on competing with think tanks in providing policy ideas. It is therefore crucial to assess whether Kenyan think tanks have PAS outputs that translate into their meaningful participation in the country's economic policy and its inherent processes, as well as evaluate the nature of PAD from the government through its MDAs. In addition, the locus of think tanks in the political environment, and the effect this has on their ability to influence policy needs further attention.

Considering that relationships between think tanks and governments are still in their nascent stages in Kenya and other African countries, there is need to examine the gap and gulf of expectations between PAD and PAS. This study seeks to answer whether, how, when and in what context(s) Kenyan think tanks contribute to the country’s economic policy.
It is expected that this examination will yield insights on how think tanks can refine their processes and outputs into a form that the Kenyan government can appreciate and consume as input for economic policy. It is also expected that the Kenyan government, comprising of ministries, departments, and agencies, can position itself as a receptor of policy advice from think tanks.

1.3 Problem Statement
Think tanks have been shown to play important roles in national economic policies of various countries they are situated in (Brown et al., 2014; Crewe & Young, 2002). According to the GGTTTI 2016, Kenya has fifty-three think tanks, nine of which devote themselves to the study and analysis of economic policy issues. Globally think tanks operate within the economic policy space through the provision of capacity building, advocacy, research and analysis and consultancy (Mackenzie, Pellini & Sutiyo, 2015; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith's, 1993).

However, even though Kenya possesses a substantial number of economic policy think tanks, it is not clear what role these think tanks play in the country's economic policy (Kimenyi & Datta, 2011; Seck, 2011). Mendizabal (2009), for example observes that "the role of think tanks has not been studied with the same intensity as the role of other civil society organizations in developing countries." As such, the links between think tank PAS and economic policy formulated by government are not clear.

In addition, the link between think tank PAS outputs and the government's PAD needs is not clear. It is not clear that Kenyan think tanks have outputs that meet the specific requirements of the government for economic policy formulation, sustenance or review and that policy advice demand from the Kenyan government exists in the first place (Seck, 2011; Mendizabal, 2015). It is also not clear what the contingent endogenous and exogenous factors that either impinge or enhance the role of think tanks in Kenya's economic policy are.

This study, therefore focused, on the role think tanks play in improving the economic policy making capacity of the Government of Kenya (GoK). A critical analysis of think tank research, advocacy, capacity building and communication of evidence was carried out to establish their influences on economic policy making in Kenya. In addition, the factors that affect the utility of think tanks in the country's economic policy capacity were also studied.
1.4 Overall Research Objective
The main research objective of this study is to “ascertain the role think tanks in play in Kenya’s economic policy.

The specific research objectives of this study are to:

i. Examine the contribution of think tanks to Kenya’s economic policy.

ii. Determine the gaps that exist between economic policy advice demand in Kenya and the outputs by think tanks.

iii. Establish the factors that determine the influence of think tanks on Kenya’s economic policy.

1.5 Research Questions

i. How do think tanks contribute to Kenya’s economic policy?

ii. To what extent does policy advice from think tanks meet the specific economic policy advice needs of government institutions?

iii. What factors determine think tank influence on the economic policy in Kenya?

1.6 Scope of the Study
This study is limited to the review of nine think tanks that have a focus on economic policy in Kenya, this study is also limited to the MDA’s that deal with economic policy formation in the country. The universe of the said think tanks is provided by the GGTITI 2016, while the list of ministries and their function is provided by the Office of the President of the Republic of Kenya. Furthermore, the study is restricted to exploring the role of think tanks in Kenya's economic policy at the national level.

1.7 Significance of the Study
This study has significance to: academia; think tanks; policy technocrats in MDAs as well as political leaders in government; and donors, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), multilateral development agencies as well as bilateral agencies.

The findings of this study will contribute to building the stock of knowledge in role think tanks play in improving the economic policy making capacities of countries they are situated in. Since a lot of research of this kind has been done from an American and Eurocentric perspective, this study also contributes to relevant, context-specific research in Kenya and much more generally in the context of sub-Saharan African countries.
The findings of this study will help think tanks to configure approaches that are more effective and efficient in their quest to offer economic policy advice to the government of Kenya. The findings, will also help think tanks to understand the contingent exogenous and endogenous factors that have the ability improve or reduce the utility of think tanks in economic policy advice and thus develop strategies to position themselves as credible sources of economic policy advice supply.

This study will also help the government of Kenya to communicate its policy advice demand much more appropriately, as well as deal with communication buffers between its programmes and policies and the activities and policy advice endeavours of think tanks. In addition, the findings of this study will help technocrats and political leaders within the government of Kenya to set-up an environment conducive for the exchange of knowledge, experiences and capacities, between think tanks and the government.

As actors in economic policy advice in Kenya, this study will help donors, IFI’s and other development institutions to reduce negative endogenous and exogenous effects of their policies, activities and programmes. The findings of this study will also help donors understand the programmes that build the capacity of think tanks to be better producers of economic advice, as well as promoting an environment that demands evidence based economic policy making.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
This chapter comprises a review of theoretical and empirical literature. This involved examining the relevant theories that underpin the role of think tanks in policy processes as well as reviewing empirical evidence from studies on the application of these theoretical frameworks. The preceding led to the development of an appropriate conceptual framework that informs the research methodology used in this research.

2.2 Review of Theoretical Literature
According to Grant and Osanloo (2014), theories are the blueprints for social science research. Within this view the Policy Cycles Model, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the RAPID framework were reviewed in this study.

2.2.1 Policy Cycles Model
Literature reviewed shows that the most common framework for analyzing public policy is the policy cycle's model, which first appeared in academic circles in the 1950s. As introduced by Harold D. Laswell, the policy cycle's model postulated that policy change happens in a series of recurrent yet independent stages, which form the policy cycle, (Sonntagbauer, Nazemi, & Burkhardt 2014).

The stages in the policy cycle are: agenda setting; policy formulation; policy adoption; policy implementation; and policy evaluation (Dunn, 1994). Agenda setting involves the identification of a public policy problem. Policy formulation, on the other hand, consists of the acceptance of a feasible course of action. Adoption entails the selection of a plan of action from available alternatives to government. Policy implementation requires the conversion of laws and programmes into policy practice. Whereas policy evaluation entails a review determining whether the intended policy achieves intended goal, (Knill & Tosun, 2011).

Some of the inherent advantages of the policy cycles model is its ability to identify the various stages through which a policy is developed. The policy cycles model also brings clarity to the policy cycles making process and allows for the evaluation of the role of different actors in the policy process (Coning & Cloete, 2014). Knill and Tosun (2011) observe that the “policy cycles model provides a useful heuristic for breaking policy making into different units to illustrate how policies come into being.”
However, over time the policy cycles model received criticisms both for its theoretical construction as well as its empirical validity (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). One such criticism is that the policy cycles model, though invaluable in providing a broad framework for understanding policy change, is a little removed from the realities of policy making in the real world. Its relegation of the political and social dynamics involved in policy formulation has also been a source of concern. Empirical research has shown that policy is not an automatic technical process as assumed by the cycle's model (Coning & Cloete, 2014).

Although the policy cycles model, is useful in in the study and analysis of public policy making in many contexts, it is not ideally suited to study the research objectives of this study. This is mainly because its theoretical assumptions as well as its innability to explain other non technical factors in the policy process pose challenges to the research objectives in the study. The policy cycle model, thus does not allow for the evaluation of contribution of think tanks within Kenya’s social-political and economic context.

2.2.2 Advocacy Coalition Framework

Subsequent advancement in knowledge and passage of time yielded different analytical frameworks that provide useful alternatives to the study of policy processes and how to deal with the deficiencies that are inherent in the policy cycle’s model. The newer models departed from the assumption that policy formation happens in finite and clearly identifiable stages. In addition these newer models contextualized policy formation within the wider social-political context within which it happens.

One of these frameworks is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) propounded by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988). Although, the ACF acknowledged the Policy Cycle’s model as a useful framework for analyzing policy change, it introduced social, cultural and political variables in the policy process (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith’s, 1993). The distinguishing feature of the ACF is the identification of “beliefs” as the key driver of political behavior (Weible, Sabatier, & Mcqueen, 2009). According to Cairney (2014), the ACF was developed to deal with policy problems involving substantial goal conflicts. The ACF departed from conceptualizing policy change in cyclical or linear forms.
To achieve the above, Fenger and Klok (2001) observe that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith substituted the policy cycles with “policy sub-systems” where actors with similar interests are deemed to join together to form advocacy coalitions. Notwithstanding this reordering, Fenger and Klok criticized the ACF for not paying enough attention to the process that brings together actors with similar interest groups into advocacy coalitions. Kim and Roh (2008) observe that the unit of analysis in the ACF is ambiguous as well as its inability to explain the role of collective action in the policy process. The theory falls short in explaining policy making in political systems outside the United States due to fundamental differences in institutional and political contexts. He also continues to observe that the both the relationship and conflict between policy sub-systems and partisan interests is underdeveloped.

As an improvement of the policy cycles model, the ACF provides an opportunity for evaluating policy processes within a wider scope. However, critiques of the ACF by Kim and Roh (2008) raise doubts as to whether it is useful in evaluating the utility of think tanks in economic policy advice. In addition, there is considerable doubt as to whether the ACF can be applied to institutional systems outside the united state. This suggests that the ACF may not be appropriate for this study.

2.2.3 The RAPID Framework

An advancement of the ACF and the policy cycles model is the RAPID framework, which Crewe and Young (2002), opine, offers an invaluable model for analyzing the role of think tanks amongst other players in the policy process. This is because the RAPID model conceives that the most critical factors in the policy process to comprise the following four aspects: (i) context, the politics and institution; (ii) evidence, approach and credibility and how they are communicated; (iii) links, influence, legitimacy and the interaction between and with the actors involved in policy processes; and (iv) external influence. A diagrammatic representation of this model is shown in Figure 2.1 below.
From Figure 2.1 above, the RAPID framework looks at the policy process through a prism that includes the political context within which policy evolves; the links between policy makers and other stakeholders; and evidence, credibility, methods and relevance and how they are presented for the policy. The RAPID framework evaluates these issues with the consideration of the effect of the external environment has on internal factors. The external factors include: international factors; and cultural and economic influences in the policy process.

The RAPID framework is useful in analyzing the role of think tanks in economic policy advice in Kenya because it allows for critical variables in PAS and PAD. Some of the variables that the RAPID framework helps analyze on the supply side are evidence and credibility of think tanks in policy advice and the links between think tanks and other actors in economic policy formulation. Concerning demand, the RAPID framework permits analysis of the context within which demand for policy advice emerges.
Brown et al. (2014) note that in developing country contexts means that its utility for the study of policy processes in such policy environments has already been tested. In this regard, the analysis of the political and institutional context of policy analysis points to the government's attitude and orientation towards think tanks, their research, and advocacy in policy formulation. Also, the RAPID framework provides a basis for evaluating the role of other moderating variables like “external influence” in economic policy. Therefore, the RAPID framework allows this study to situate think tanks amongst a myriad of other actors in economic policy formulation within Kenya's policy formulation landscape. This enables the analysis of relative power between the PAS from think tanks as compared with other sources of policy advice like the government's subject specialists. Furthermore, the analysis of the links that think tanks use in their quest to influence public policy is also essential in that it incorporates aspects of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy Coalition Framework.

2.3 Review of Empirical Literature

A review of empirical literature was conducted based on the research objectives. These are: to ascertain the role think tanks in play in Kenya’s economic policy; to determine the gaps that exist between economic policy advice demand in Kenya and the outputs by think tanks; and to establish the factors that determine think tank influence on Kenya’s economic policy.

2.3.1 The role of Think Tanks in Economic Policy

According to Bennett et al. (2011) policy research institutes influence public policy through policy research and analysis, policy, advocacy, capacity building and technical assistance. Empirical studies have also been conducted to test Crewe and Young's (2002) RAPID framework. Brown et. al. (2014), did studies in Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Peru and Bangladesh, to test the role played by context in affecting how think tanks influence policy change.

2.3.1.1 Capacity Building

On capacity building, Buldioski and Stojanovic (2012) observe that “Capacity building can be both an opportunity for building a network and a vehicle for validating research result.” They observed that think tanks around the world had prospered thanks to their training programmes. Training and capacity building programmes also give think tanks a cohorts alumni who provide future networks of
influence. Through their case study in Serbia, they observed that training and capacity building is a useful way of communicating research findings.

A review of five South African think tanks collaborates Buldioski and Stojanovic's observation. Through a case study of: the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD); the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR); the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR); the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), SIDA (2015), observed that capacity building through training programs was a popular approach taken by the five think tanks that augments both research and advocacy functions of the think tank. SIDA also observed that the think tanks take this approach as they eschew direct advocacy and prefer to be viewed as "research and training centers.

2.3.1.2 Advocacy

Advocacy is an attempt to influence public policy and practice of any other decisions of institutional elite (Casey, 2011). It involves the active espousal of a view and includes the encouraging citizens to participate in public policy processes. Bennett, Doherty, Tangcharoensathien, Patcharanarumol, Jesani, Kyabaggu, Namaganda, Hussain and Akin (2012) conducted a case study of six think tanks in different low and middle-income countries. In the study, they observed that think tanks successfully used advocacy and were able to influence health policy, mostly by conducting policy dialogues at the national level.

On the other hand, SIDA (2015) report that South African think tanks do not endeavor to be viewed as advocacy organizations. While on the other hand, in China, Zhu (2011), observed that think tanks mainly those not supported by government play an active advocacy role. Hasan (2010) noted that in the USA it is difficult to distinguish between the position of think tanks from that of political pressure groups.

Empirical studies in India and Bangladesh, show that that think tanks in economic policy also use advocacy. Think tanks in Bangladesh and India typically use the media for their policy advocacy Signh, Sharma, and Jha (2013) note that think tanks also developed symbiotic relationships with the media for advocacy.

2.3.1.3 Research and Policy Analysis

FARO (2012) observed that think tanks carry research that could be categorized into three categories: instrumentation research; academic research; planning research; and
action research. Academic research seeks to answer questions on why things occur and usually results in frameworks that aid researchers and policymakers to outline a problem. Similarly, planning research focuses on what could be expected of a given policy; instrumentation research focuses on how to achieve a given outcome, and action research is ultimately concerned with achieving the desired goal.

Think tanks also use research and policy analysis to play a role in economic policy formulation. SIDA (2015) contend that in a multi-case study research of five South African think tanks, observed that research remains the core anchor of think tanks. Other think tank functions like advocacy and training revolve around their research outputs.

Zeleke (2015) observed that Ethiopian think tanks had over ten research publications within the last five years. PASGR (2015) collaborates these findings, by observing that 95% of think tanks had responded to having carried out a research project within the last five years as opposed to 24% of university departments.

The preceding empirical literature suggests that research and policy analysis is a critical function of think tank policy functions.

2.3.1.4 Consultancy

Think tanks use the consultancy approach to provide advice on narrow public policy issues (Struyk, 2018). Think tanks also use consultancy the path to provide technical information to the government and other partners. PASGR (2015) observed that 62% of the universities and 68% of think tanks had done at least one consultancy in that period. Of these, only 14% of universities and 32% of think tanks have had more than ten consultancies.

2.3.2 The Gap between Policy Advice Demand and Policy Advice Supply

Ideally, the sole reason for the existence of independent policy research is to influence public policy. However, experience in developing countries shows that development research rarely affects public policy (Ayuk & Marouani, 2007).

In this regard, Rutter (2011) argues that there exists a gap between theory and practice in policy making. This gap arises because policy researchers fail from the very onset to include and consult the leadership in the executive wing of government, such as government ministers and other policymakers, in their policy research
endeavors and also because of proffering unrealistic models or policy solutions. On the other hand, civil servants know what they should do but have problems in translating that into policy. Rutter (2011) for example, found out that lack of inclusion between the political heads, civil servants and policy researchers as one of the policy weaknesses in evidence-based policy making in the United Kingdom.² Ajakaiye (2007) added that there is a disconnect between policy-making and the knowledge base that policy researchers are producing on the African continent. He also observed that policy makers do not make full use of research findings to inform policy decisions. However, despite these developments, research and researchers in Africa are still under-utilized (Court & Young, 2003; Carden, 2009).

In the same vein, Ajakaiye observed that governments, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and other non-state-actors are among organizations that demand policy research as inputs in the iterative policy-making process. However, the capacity of these organizations to demand and procure quality policy research is asymmetrical. IFIs have the most elaborate and well-endowed research institutions, while some non-state actors either have internal research departments or can obtain policy research and advice services from the market (Ajakaiye, 2007; Ravallion, 2016). Ravallion, extend the argument and pointed out that although the role of the World Bank as a knowledge broker has withered over time. For example Stone (2005) observed that some of the roles the World Bank and other international organizations have played include, advocating for new imperatives and the utility of enhanced policy analytic capacity for contemporary governance in South East Asia.

With regards to government, they either have semi-autonomous research departments (government think tanks) or embed research functions within the traditional bureaucratic governmental structures. All these three organizations use research for different reasons within the policy change process. Donors and non-state-actors demand more of evaluative research (Ajakaiye, 2007).

Examining the nature of PAD requires that we look keenly at both the policy makers and politicians that are in charge of economic policy. Fred Carden in his work, “Knowledge To Policy: Making The Most Of The Development Research” carried out informative comparative studies in twenty-three countries on the dynamics and determinants of PAD (Carden, 2009). Carden distinguished the essential factors that

² Ibid
set-apart PAD in developed countries and that of developing countries. Carden (2009) observed that the role of research on policy assumes that there is an inherent demand for policy-relevant research in developing countries, while that is not always the case.

Datta, et al., (2011), collaborate Carden, by observing that both researchers and policy makers mentioned that they are more likely to focus on an issue if it has been highlighted as a priority by the president. In some cases, research was used to back up pre-determined policy positions. This, in essence, shows that PAD and PAS are to an extent influenced by the policy whims of politicians in power.

Because of differential political and economic environments, and the differences in the orientation of policy bureaucrats and politicians towards research, it is critical to establish and apply an objective means to examine the influence of think tank research on policy. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC)\(^3\) assesses the impact of research on policy in three ways. First, research expanding the policy capacity. This analysis involves the role of research in helping the policy community to not only demand policy advice but be critical of that policy advice. Second, research can broaden the policy horizon. A crucial role of policy and development research lies in how it subtly or fundamentally changes the environment to be more receptive to policy research in future. These changes in the environment are subtle and incremental but are critical in engendering communication and trust between policy advice and policy demand. Finally, research can affect decision regimes. The quality of research can improve the policy process framework, by opening the rationalization of legislating, administering, and evaluating government programmes and policies (Carden, 2009).

Carden further observed that the nature of policy demand is contingent upon the problem at hand. Routine decisions are attracted to data analysis that reinforces policy choices or slightly alters them. Incremental decisions are attached to analysis that offers possible alternative solutions for current problems, while radical changes to fundamental decision regimes are open to challenges on conventional policy choices and logic. Carden continues to observe that in most countries, policy change is routine and incremental, as such policy makers profess little appetite for policy-

\(^3\) Ibid
relevant research. He argues that that policy makers do find "big question," research unnecessary. They neither question nor seek answers to "big issues."  

Carden goes on to provide a framework for analyzing policy advice demand; offers five types of policy advice demand from government. The five types of policy advice demand are clear government demand; government interest in research, but leadership absent; government interest in research, but with a capacity shortfall; a new or emerging issue activates research, but leaves policymakers uninterested; and finally, the government treats research with disinterest or hostility.

Carden further observes that policy advice supply has more utility when there is clear government demand (CGD). In such an instance, policy makers have a great urgency of policy advice and usually, use bureaucratic or political authority to close the loop between policy advice and implementation. CGD also means that researchers are spared both the costs and inconveniences that are attached to advocacy campaigns intended to make policy advice supply popular.

Case studies drawn from International Development Research Centre (IDRC)’s project; the Micro-Impacts of Macroeconomic Adjustment Programme (MIMMAP) in Bangladesh by Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDs) and poverty studies project and Senegal’s Centre de Recherches Économiques Appliquées (CREA) have shown that policy advice and research has more impact when there is clear government demand for policy advice (Carden, 2009).

2.3.3 Factors that Influence the role of Think Tanks in Economic Policy

Brown, et al., (2014), extended Crewe and Young’s (2002) RAPID framework, by, disentangling the constituent elements of external influence, which they referred to as, “exogenous context.” They perceived the constituent elements of exogenous context to include: the political-economic environment, donor presence and preference, the intellectual environment and finally the civil society environment. In addition, Brown, et al. (2014) also conceptualized think tank “endogenous” context to include those variables that could be determined by decisions and actions within a think-tank’s internal environment. The endogenously controllable factors include the

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credibility capital, communication capital, social capital and resource capital. Brown et al. (2014) used their version of an extended RAPID framework to test, the utility of the model in four case studies in Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Peru and Bangladesh. Brown et al. (2014) conceptualization of the matrix of factors, both endogenous and exogenous is shown in Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2: Exogenous and Endogenous Influence on Think Tanks
Source: (Brown, Knoxx, Tolmie, Gugerty, Kosack & Fabrizio, 2014)
In Figure 2.2 above, Brown et al. (2014) show how exogenous and endogenous factors influence think tank capacity in their quest to influence policy. They further explain how a think tank could use cues in the exogenous environment to make changes at the organization and project level to improve its chances of influencing policy change. From the four case studies carried out by Brown et al. (2014), the interplay of exogenous factors and endogenous determine a think-tank’s ability to influence policy change. Arguably, therefore, a think tank’s ultimate policy influence is determined by its stock of strategic leadership and other resources that allow it to respond to key exogenous variables.

In addition empirical studies in Ghana, Ethiopia and Argentina by Keijzer, Spierings and Heirman (2011), show that exogenous factors like donors could both aid the work of think tanks by encouraging uptake and more pluralism in ideas, whereas on they could also derail think tanks by creating shrouds of doubt as to their independence and aims. In line with this, Mackenzie, Pellini and Sutiyo (2015) indicate that government-affiliated think tanks influence policy in two significant ways; the first being, "as briefing machines" that are focused on responding to policy requests and the second being the provision of long-range policy advice. Further research evidence shows that in developing countries, think tanks have recently been involved in the policy advice space and have recorded success in some areas of public policy such as health policy.

Empirical studies show that think tank’s research capacity is critical for meaningful inputs into and contribute to policy formulation. This is because research lends credibility to a think tank’s work and provides evidence of the practical value of policy solutions proffered (Crewe & Young, 2002; Brown et al., 2014). This is supported by Carden (2009) who observes that “development research, done right, can improve public policy and help accelerate development progress.” The shift to evidence-based policy making heralds the onset of modernist approaches to policy, which shift their view of policy making from a hitherto preserve of technocrats and politicians into a much wider group of non-state actors and independent researchers. In this new paradigm the role of research in providing evidence as inputs into the policy process is critical (Sanderson, 2002; Newman, Capillo, Fameruwa, Nath & Siyanbola, 2013; Rutter, 2012).
The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) (2015), for example, found out that endogenous factors such as the lack of "procurement skills" affected the operations and the outputs of think tanks in the African continent. In Kenya, a study done to proximate the roles of actors in trade policy formulation, discovered that the power of policy research institutes, relative to other actors was relatively small. Other actors like MDA’s, private sector organizations, donors and political power holders played a bigger role in the formulation of both international trade policy as well as domestic (KIPPRA, 2007) (see figure 2.3).

![Figure 2.3: Relative Influence of Actors in Trade Policy Formulation](image)

Source: (Kenya Institute of Public Research and Analysis, 2007)

Figure 2.3 above, not only points to the low relative influence of policy research centers; it also depicts a wider problem. Other actors with more relative power in the policy process do not necessarily provide policy advice but take on policy stances based on their various interests. The findings above are supplemented by literature reviewed from Keijzer, Spierings and Heirman (2011) who conducted studies in Ghana, Ethiopia and Argentina had shown that donors could both increase the uptake of research policy output due to improved methods and capacity but also at the same time make question policy makers question the independence of think tanks. Therefore, at the micro level, the effects of donors are positive when the lead to improved technical and administrative capacities within thin tanks.
At the macro level, the effects of think tanks are generally positive when the donors encourage deeper interaction between the PAD and PAS, as well as lead to new evidence-based policy making paradigms and negative when they engender a crisis of legitimacy and independence with the work think tanks do. Ideally, the role think tanks in that mix of actors with a multiplicity of interests would be to moderate their interests by providing mutually beneficial policy advice for all actors, but they hardly do so because of their relative low influence in doing so. In addition to having lower relative influence over trade policy making research institutions and other civil society organizations reported being excluded from key bodies responsible for the formulation of trade policy.

2.4 Conclusion
The literature reviewed for this study shows a conspicuous gap between policy advice supply PAS and policy advice demand PAD. This problem is particularly acute in the African continent where the African Capacity Building Foundation (2015) observes, “no quantitative and qualitative metrics for evaluating Africa’s think tanks exist. This is supported by (Olomola, 2007; Kibua & Oyugi, 2007) who pointed out a gap between policy research and policy initiation and implementation. Some researchers have put some criticism against the traditional rational policy cycle model. These critics include (Carden, 2009; Court & Young, 2003; Crewe & Young, 2002). These criticisms suggest that evaluating the role of think tanks in economic policy within the policy cycles framework would be inappropriate. Other researchers opine that policy change is a contested political process which means that evaluating the role of think tanks in economic policy change ultimately involves assessing how well they transform technical policy advice outputs into material that fits well within the realms of political authority holders and policy bureaucrats in government. For this reason, their communication and advocacy can be judged based on how best they attract interest and inspire action from policy makers and politicians.

The works of Crewe and Young (2002) are invaluable in building foundational frameworks upon which the analysis of think tanks and their role in public policy can
be conducted. Crewe and Young’s (2002) RAPID framework, is not only helpful in analyzing the role of think tanks in policy change, but also in analyzing the effect of the contextual environment political culture and the effect of donors on think-tank policy advice.

For this reason, this research will augment the analytical framework in the works (Crewe & Young, 2002; Carden, 2009; Brown et al., 2014) in the formulation of an analytical framework to examine the gaps between policy advice demand and policy advice supply. Although Carden addresses both PAS and policy and PAS, his analytical framework has useful insights that are helpful in examining the nature and the dynamics of policy advice demand. Whereas Carden provides insights in answering, when, how and in what manner demand policy advice, studies such as Brown et al. (2014) are helpful in operationalizing the variables of examination, especially in analysing the impact of the contextual environment Kenyan think tanks find themselves in economic policy formulation.

2.5 The Proposed Conceptual Framework

Literature examined in this study suggests that policy and policy change are indeed dependent on two main variables: policy advice supply and policy advice demand (see Appendix 3). For this reason, the availability or lack thereof of a economic policy to address an economic problem stems from; the matches, miss-matches and synergy between PAS and PAD, (Carden, 2009; Court & Young, 2003; State Services Commision (SCS), 1999).

Whereas both PAS and PAD have a direct impact on economic policy, the two also exert influence indirectly through each other. Moreover, both PAS and PAD are functions of a cohort of other variables. It is the presence or absence of these variables that ultimately affect the quality of both (PAD) and (PAS) and subsequently the quality of economic policy.

The arguments cited above suggest that economic policy is a product of an ecosystem of variables affecting both PAD and PAS. Where there exist sufficient synergy and clear communication between the variables that constitute PAD and

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7: Appendix 3 Operationalization of Independent and Dependent Variables
PAS, the net effect is “good economic policy.” Conversely, the absence of this synergy results in inadequate and sub-optimal economic policy. Often this happens in the form of maintenance of the economic policy, whereas it should be changed or the adoption of ineffective economic policy and the absence of public policy to address a particular problem whereas there should be one. For this reason, the conceptual framework for evaluating the role of think tanks in economic policy needs to be expanded to not only probe PAD and PAS but to also investigate the effect of inherent moderating variables. The evaluation of the relationship between PAS and PAD crucially forms the crux around which this study revolves. This is because it enables us to evaluate how economic policy is generated from the inputs into the process PAS from think tanks, how PAD is communicated by the government for economic policy formulation (policy output). The conceptual framework is detailed in Figure 2.4, below.

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The goals of economic policy as defined by Stigler (Stigler, 1975)
Figure 2.4: Proposed Conceptual Framework for the Study
Source: Researcher’s own conceptualization
From Figure 2.4 above, the dependent variable is conceptualized as economic policy that is adopted at both the ministerial and cabinet levels by the government of Kenya. Economic policy may entail: fiscal policy; monetary policy; trade and regulation policy and regulation policy and micro-economic development policy. The above conceptualization is operationalized in Appendix 2. The dependent variables are evaluated based on the influence and contribution of think tanks to economic policy that adopted at the ministerial level or at the cabinet level.

This conceptual framework captures the conceptualized relationship between the independent and dependent variables on the one hand, as well as the indirect influence of moderating variables. The above conceptual model suggests that economic policy formulation in Kenya is mainly a product of PAD by government and PAS by think tanks and other actors as depicted by the bold arrow.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the research methodology that was applied in this study. Its coverage includes the research design, population and sampling, data collection methods, data analysis approaches, research quality and ethical issues that were taken into consideration.

3.2 Research Design
This research employed an exploratory qualitative research design. According to Baxter and Jack (2008), a qualitative approach facilitates explorative studies using a variety of data sources. An inductive approach was also used to establish when, how, what and in what manner think tanks contribute to Kenya’s economic policy.

This methodology was selected because it was deemed to be best suited to explore what, when, how and in what manner think tanks play a role in Kenya's economic policy. The primary respondents of this study were think tanks that devote their work to economic policy, and Government Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs) with the responsibility of economic policy formulation, implementation, sustenance, review or change in Kenya.

The literature reviewed also illuminated the role of other auxiliary institutions in the development of economic policy. They include bilateral, multi-lateral organizations, IFIs or donors that enhance the technical or financial capacity of think tanks and or government departments to improve their ability for economic policy formulation. These organizations include the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) – Canada through its Think Tank Initiative (TTI) program and the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). As such secondary data was also collected from these auxiliary institutions to interrogate the role they play in the interplay between PAS from think tanks and PAD from the government. Triangulation in this research was achieved through the employment of both primary and secondary sources of data to enable comparing and contrasting the views of key informants in MDAs with those in think tanks.
3.3 Population
Kombo and Tromp (2006) posit that a population is a group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are taken for measurement. They continue to observe that a population consists of entire groups or persons that have one thing in common.

The population for this study was split into two categories: think tanks and government MDA's. Think tanks were chosen as PAS actors while government MDA's were chosen as PAD actors. The population of think tanks was drawn from Kenya's ranked think tanks in the GGTTTI 2016. This population consisted of 22 think tanks that deal with varied issues such as: science and technology studies: nature and conservation population and health policy as well as economic policy (see Appendix 3). The study population for the PAD from government ministries comprised all the 21 government ministries in Kenya at the time of data collection (see Appendix 4).

3.4 Sampling
Kombo and Tromp (2006) identify a sample as the method of selecting individuals or objects from a population. This research employed a purposive sampling method. Tromp and Kisilu (2006) observe that this is a sampling technique used when targets are reliable for the study.

This method was employed, as it was thought to be best suited for the general objective of the study. The sample of think tanks constituted the constituted research institutions that devote their work to economic policy, (Table: 3.1). The sample of government Ministries constituted ministries that deal with economic policy affairs, (Table 3.1).
### Table 3.1: Sample for the Study

#### Think Tanks – Policy Advice Supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank Name</th>
<th>Area of Focus</th>
<th>Think Tank Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)</td>
<td>Economic affairs</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)</td>
<td>Economic affairs</td>
<td>Quasi-Governmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Region Economic Network (IREN)</td>
<td>Economic affairs</td>
<td>Independent/consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR)</td>
<td>Economic and social issues</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Development Studies – University of Nairobi (IDS-UoNBI)</td>
<td>Economic and Social issues</td>
<td>University Affiliated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership for African Social &amp; Governance Research (PASGR)</td>
<td>Economic and social issues</td>
<td>Quasi Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Centre for Economic Growth (ACEG)</td>
<td>Economic affairs</td>
<td>Independent Consultancy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Ministries Departments and Agencies – Policy Advice Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Policy Focus</th>
<th>Departments of Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry Trade and Cooperatives</td>
<td>Trade and industrialization policy</td>
<td>State Department for Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Treasury and Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>Fiscal Policy and economic planning</td>
<td>State Department for Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
<td>International trade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Data Collection Methods

The tools for primary data collection are shown in Appendix 5. Primary data was collected through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) administered by the researcher. Data with regard to think tank categorization, finances and annual budgets, think tank history, corporate structures as well as missions and visions was collected from secondary sources of data. Primary sources of data were used to find out the programmatic areas think tanks operate in as well as the nuances of economic policy advice in the country. Both primary and secondary data were used to re-enforce each other as well as fill in the gaps of information identified from either.

Primary data from think tanks was collected from the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of think tanks or senior program officers of the sampled think tanks or officers that were availed for the study by the CEOs. Primary data from government ministries was collected through KIIs administered to chief economic planning officers or other senior officers within the ministries.

Secondary data from the government was collected from the constitution, other subsidiary laws as well as economic plans and strategies published by the government of Kenya. Secondary data from think tanks was collected from their annual reports, strategy documents and think tank websites. Appendix 6 provides a list of all the sources of secondary data used in this study. Data from the ACBF and Think Tanks Initiative was collected from annual reports and project documents of both institutions.

3.6 Data Analysis

Content analysis of the qualitative data was carried out to establish enable the researcher to obtain evidence and answers to the research questions in (section 1.5 above). Key themes from key-informants were documented after recurring themes were identified and reported. Key theme were drawn and categorized according to literature previously reviewed in Chapter Two of this study.

Data analysis in this research was conducted using the following sequence enumerated. The first step was analysis of secondary data from think tanks. The second step involved the analysis of primary data collected from key informants in think tanks.
This was followed by analysis of both primary and secondary data from government ministries and or departments partly to compare the results with the observations derived from think tanks’ data. The third step was analysis of data collected from auxiliary institutions to add depth and the observation in steps one and two above.

3.7 Research Quality
Internal validity refers to the extent to which changes in dependent variables can be explained by independent variables (Calder, 1982). In this study, internal validity was secured using a robust conceptual framework. In addition, triangulation was also used to enhance internal validity and the integrity of collected data.

External validity, which refers to whether the results of a study can be generalized, will be assured by the use scientific methods of research and comparing the research findings with other empirical studies in different contexts within the field of study.

3.8 Ethical Issues in the Research
In order to ensure that high ethical standards were maintained, the researcher sought informed consent from the respondents using a letter (see Appendix 7) explaining the purpose of the research. Respondents were assured of confidentiality while the study findings were also be anonymized to ensure that findings cannot be linked back to respondents. The researcher also sought a research license from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), (see Appendix 8).

3.9 Outputs of the Study
The outputs of the study are discussed in relation to the research objectives in Chapter 4. The format adopted is a delineation of the research findings.
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research findings of the study. These are organized according to the research objectives and presented in a thematic format where the finding for each research objective are arranged according to a main theme, followed by the attendant sub-themes as shown in Table 4.1 below. The themes and sub-themes are drawn from literature reviewed in Chapter Two of the study. They correspond with both the theoretical literature within the RAPID framework as well as the empirical findings of other studies conducted to test the utility of the framework.

Table 4.1: Thematic Presentation of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Research Objective</th>
<th>Specific Research Objective</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ascertain the role think tanks in play in Kenya’s economic policy. | i. Examine the contribution of think tanks to Kenya’s economic policy. | Approach | 1. Capacity building  
2. Research and Analysis  
3. Advocacy  
4. Consultancy |
| | ii. To determine the gaps that exist between economic policy advice demand in Kenya and the outputs by think tanks | The direction of (PAS) | 1. Supply Driven PAS  
2. Demand Driven PAS  
3. Other Contextual factors for PAD/PAS[^10] |
| | iii. To establish the factors that determine think tank influence on Kenya’s economic policy. | Nature of Factors | 1. Endogenous Factors  
2. Exogenous Factors |

Source: Study Analysis

[^10]: PAS – Policy Advice Supply; PAD – Policy Advice Demand
Table 4.1 above, details the themes and corresponding sub-themes that were used to present the findings of each specific research objective. It is expected that this framework will permit a useful structure for discussing the findings of this study.

4.2 Response Rate

Data was collected from six out of the nine think tanks in the sample (see Table 4.2), which represented a response rate of 67%. Primary data was collected from five think tanks, while secondary data was collected from six think tanks. These six think tanks were drawn from four out of the seven categorizations provided by the GGTTTI (2016) (Appendix 1).

Data from the six think tanks was regarded to be sufficient to achieve the research objective of the study. This response rate mirrors a multi-country multi-case study done by Brown et al. (2014) who collected data from two thinks in Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Peru.

### Table 4.2: Categories of Think Tanks in This Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think tank</th>
<th>Category as per (GGTTTI, 2017)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>Quasi-governmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA-Kenya</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS-UoNbi</td>
<td>University-affiliated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGR</td>
<td>Quasi-independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAR</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Data

As per Table 4.2 above, three of the think tanks were independent; one was quasi-governmental, one was quasi-independent, while one was university-affiliated. Data from government MDAs was collected from two government ministries; the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Co-operatives, as well the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning. Seven current and or former officers were interviewed from these two ministries.

4.2.1 Key Characteristics of Sampled think tanks

The five think tanks that provided primary data were: IEA-Kenya, IDS-UoNBI, AERC, KIPPRA, and IPAR (Refer to Table 4.2). Secondary data was collected from the
aforementioned five think tanks in addition to PASGR. KII’s were carried out with six key informants, (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Demographic Characteristics of KII Respondents from Think Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank</th>
<th>No. Of Respondents</th>
<th>Gender of Respondent</th>
<th>Experience In years</th>
<th>Highest Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>PhD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA-Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bachelors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS-UoNBI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>PhD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>PhD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Average 25.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Median 24.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Data

From Table 4.3 above, a total of six key informants from think tanks were interviewed for the study. Each think tank from which primary data was collected provided one key informant, with the exception of IDS-UoNBI, which provided two. The average professional experience for think tank key informants was 25.3 years with a median of 24.5 years. In addition, three of the six respondents had education qualification of Ph.D. level, two had a master's degree and one had a bachelor's degree. The KII’s many years of experience and high level of education provided comfort on the quality of responses received and relevance to the study. The findings regarding the study objectives are outlined in sections 4.3 to 4.5 below.

4.3 Ascertain the role think tanks in play in Kenya’s economic policy.

This study found out that think tanks in Kenya participate in the economic policy formation using various approaches. These approaches include: capacity building; advocacy; research and analysis, and consultancy (See Table 4.4 for a Summary).

Table 4.4: Approaches Used by Think Tanks in Economic Policy Making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank</th>
<th>Capacity Building</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Research &amp; Analysis</th>
<th>Consultancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>To a Large extent</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>To a Large extent</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA-Kenya</td>
<td>To a small extent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS-UoNBI</td>
<td>To a Large extent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAR</td>
<td>To a Small extent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGR</td>
<td>To a Large extent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Data
The findings in Table 4.4 above are discussed below.

### 4.3.1 Capacity Building

Four think tanks (AERC, KIPPRA, IDS-UoNBI, and PASGR) out of the five sampled responded that they use capacity building as a deliberate approach to participating in the economic policy process. These findings are in line with Bennett et al. (2011) who found that think tanks play a role in technical support and advisory, as well as capacity building.

Amongst these think tanks, KIPPRA and AERC place a large emphasis on capacity building. The key informant at AERC said that "the institution builds capacity for economic policy research and analysis in Africa through three main programs: the Collaborative Masters in Applied Agricultural Economics (CMMAAE); the Collaborative Masters Programme (CMAP); and the Collaborative PhD Programme (CPP)."

On the other hand, the key informant at KIPPRA said that the institution “has a mandate for capacity building, research and policy analysis and technical assistance.” The respondent further stated, “The main capacity building programmes are: the Young Professionals Programme YPP; macro-economic modelling; and the routine capacity building for policy technocrats in ministries.”

However, the three think tanks (KIPPRA, AERC, and PASGR) have different capacity building products and varying focuses as shown in Table 4.5 below. Whereas KIPPRA focuses on up-skilling and re-tooling, the thrust of AERC and PASGR is providing skills through graduate training. In this regard, AERC has three capacity graduate training programs namely: CMAP, CMMAAE, and CPP. PASGR’s primary capacity building program is the Master of Research and Public Policy (MRPP).
Table 4.5: A Summary of Capacity Building Programmes by Think Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think tank</th>
<th>Capacity Building Focus</th>
<th>Think Tank Programme</th>
<th>Number of Kenyan(s) trained (2016 – 2017)</th>
<th>Cumulative No. Of Kenyans trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>Up-skilling technocrats in MDAs</td>
<td>Young Professionals Programme (YPP)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Routine Capacity Development</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>Graduate Training</td>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CMAAE</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGR</td>
<td>Graduate Training</td>
<td>CRMPPR</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CMAP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,741</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Secondary Data

Table 4.5 above brings out the differences in the capacity building programmes that are supported by think tanks within Kenya’s economic policymaking process. KIPPRA's capacity building focus is on up-skilling and re-tooling technocrats in MDAs. In this regard, the YPP focuses on training young professionals, "policy process, research methodology, applied econometrics, macroeconomic modelling, and government operations," (KIPPRA Website). These routine capacity development programmes revolve around onsite training for policy technocrats in MDAs and at times professionals in the private sector. Some of the components of KIPPRA’s training programmes include macro-economic modelling, mentoring and tailor-made courses for government MDAs.

At times, the Government of Kenya (GoK) signs capacity building partnerships with think tanks. One such partnership is the AERC-GoK Capacity Building Project for Policy Analysis. Through this partnership, the GoK through the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning facilitates the training of Kenyans in AERC’s capacity building programmes by funding their training. For example, in the 2015-2016 CPP cohort, Kenyans constituted 11 of the 18 trainees, representing 61% of all trainees. In addition, the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning provides Kenyan CPP doctoral

11 http://kippra.or.ke/capacity-building-2/
candidates with opportunities to get practical policy practice experience by giving them traineeships in the pertinent departments within the ministry. This collaborative partnership allows the intersection of PAS with PAD as well as ensuring that the policy advice needs of the Kenyan government are consistently put at the fore of graduate Ph.D. training. In addition, the ministry also provides internships to Kenyan CMAAE students.

Suffice to say that the capacity building programmes by Kenyan think tanks mirror studies as cited by SIDA (2015) in South Africa that show that think tanks have an affinity for capacity building programmes.

### 4.3.2 Policy Research and Analysis

Key informants interviewed also identified economic policy research and analysis as a way for think tanks to play a role in economic policy. This seems to agree with the findings of (Crewe & Young, 2002; Brown et al., 2015) who opine that think tanks are first and foremost policy research and analysis centers. In Kenya’s case, even think tanks that were found to have a strong anchor on the capacity building approach seem to have evolved these functions from policy research and analysis. The key informant at KIPPRA mentioned that the think tank “carries out research on seven themes that include macro, productive sector, tourism, trade, the social sector and governance, infrastructure and economic services.”

On its part, the AERC produces research papers with the aim of building a credible local capacity for policy-oriented research; generating research results for use by policy analysts and policy makers; promoting links between research and policy; and encouraging retention of high-quality researchers. The key informant at AERC indicated that the think tank gives grants to African scholars to carry out research on five thematic areas that include: poverty, income distribution and food security; macroeconomic policies, investment and growth; finance and resource mobilization; trade and regional integration; and Political economy, natural resource management and agricultural policy issues.” The respondent also mentioned that, “research is the oldest of AERC’s three components, the two others being capacity building, and policy advice.”
The key informant at the IDS-UoNBI said that, "we provide solutions for development problems through evidence from research; we do research that is relevant to ministries by working very closely with them. “One key informant from the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning disagreed with the statement by the informant at IDS-UoNBI saying that “think tanks rarely understand the shoe-wearer, they produce research that has casual recommendations, is abstract and often behind time.”

The key informant at IEA-Kenya said that the think tank produces research reports in four programmatic areas of; “public finance management; trade and development; the futures approach; and trade and competition policy.”

Similarly, the key informant at IPAR reported that the think tank used to “provide unlimited policy advice supply by exploring areas that were not under the radar of policy makers in government.”

Think tanks sampled also have different research outputs. These range from short volume policy briefs to mid volume briefing papers and then to longer volume and book-length reports as outlined in Table 4.6.

Evidence obtained in this study (see Table 4.6) indicates that the research and analysis component of each think tank’s activities is guided to a large extent by a think tank’s mandate and tends to have forward and backward linkages with other think tank programmes like capacity building and advocacy.

In KIPPRA’s case, its research emanates from its mandate as espoused in the KIPPRA Act (2016), which affirms that the think tank should, “develop capacities in public policy research and analysis and assist the Government in the process of policy formulation and implementation.” For KIPPRA, therefore, research and analysis provides an opportunity to meet two of its core functions, capacity development and policy advice supply to the government’s MDAs.

On the other hand, for the IDS-UoNBI, research integrates into its graduate training programs. Similarly, for the AERC, research and analysis is the strand that links its capacity building and its policy advice components. Therefore, the AERC envisages that
its capacity building beneficiaries translate their research into PAS products. For the IEA-Kenya, research and analysis directly feed into its advocacy process.

Think tanks also deliver their research in different formats, which are ideally directed at different consumers with different needs. The think tank project offerings include research reports, discussion papers, working papers, and policy briefs as shown in Table 4.6 below.

Table 4.6: Cumulative Think Tank Research Outputs by Category (2013 - 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think tank</th>
<th>Research Reports</th>
<th>Discussion papers</th>
<th>Working Papers</th>
<th>Policy Briefs</th>
<th>Policy Papers</th>
<th>Special reports</th>
<th>Conference Proceedings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIPRA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total research outputs</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Review of Secondary Data (See Appendix 6 for sources of secondary)

As shown in Table 4.6 above, think tanks in Kenya produce a range of research outputs in different formats to inform policy. The most common outputs are research reports, followed by discussion papers and policy papers. These are in line with empirical findings of Zeleke (2015) in Ethiopia and a multi-country case study in sub-Saharan Africa by PASGR (2015).

A review of the specific research products of think tanks shows that they address a wide range of economic policy issues. Responses received from the think tanks surveyed in this study indicate that their research products are drawn from programmatic areas as espoused in their strategic plans. For example, the IEA-Kenya produces research reports in their four programmatic areas of public finance management, trade and development, the futures approach, as well as trade and competition policy. Some of the research papers produced by IEA-Kenya, for example, include: Enhancing Mobilization of Own Source Revenue in Nairobi City County: Issues & Opportunities and Are Private Sustainability Standards Obstacles To, Or Enablers of, SME Participation in Value Chains? The research is carried out by its secretariat where the officers of the four programme areas in the institution take the lead in research and policy analysis.
On the other hand, KIPPRA carries its research projects under the auspices of seven divisions that are housed under two directorates. The Directorate of Economic Management houses the: Macroeconomic; Governance; and the Social Sector divisions. The Directorate of Integrated Development houses the: Infrastructure and Economic Services Division; Productive Sector; Private Sector Development; and the Trade and Foreign Policy Division.

The IDS-UoNBI produces research outputs that are not entirely economics-related but has tangents on the economic discipline. Currently, the focus of researchers at the institute includes: globalization, localization and development; population, environment and sustainable livelihoods; institutions, governance and development; and social inclusion and identity. Research professors, associate research professors, senior research fellows, research fellows, and junior research fellows (currently numbering 18) produce research at the institute while at the same time teaching masters and doctorate programs at the same institute.

Research at the IDS-UoNBI is mainly of academic nature and may not necessarily be suited for consumption by policy makers. Where the institute produces research outputs that are highly relevant for policy, the drawback is the lack of mechanisms to transform the research output to policy on account of its academic orientation and structure. In this regard, policy practitioners interviewed in this study reported ignoring most policy research from the IDS-UoNBI because of their perceived academic nature, or generally being oblivious of research at the institute. This is mostly because the institute does not advocate for uptake of its research products or communicate their presence.

4.3.3 Advocacy

Two of the sampled think tanks use advocacy as an approach to influence economic policy; the two are IPAR, and IEA – Kenya. In the same vein, two other think tanks (KIPPRA and AERC) use advocacy to a limited extent. On the other hand, PASGR and IDS –UoNBI do not use advocacy (see Table 4.4).

Two of the think tanks that expressly use advocacy were categorized as “independent” by the GGTTTI 2016. The findings in this study are similar to the SIDA’s (2015) in South Africa, which show that think tanks eschew advocacy and have an apprehension
for using it as a tool for policy influence as opposed to other methods. For instance, six of the think tanks reviewed carry out research. On the other hand, five of the think tanks affirmed that they do use capacity building to a large extent and only one think tank uses capacity building to a small extent.

Although the respondent at KIPPRA acknowledged that the think tank does not expressly use advocacy, the respondent pointed out that, “advocacy has its place in economic policy because it plays a role in influencing policy will.” The respondent at KIPPRA thus acknowledged the utility of advocacy for policy influence. The respondent continued to allude to the KIPPRA’s mandate and political contexts as one of the reason does not use advocacy.

The respondent continued to point out that even though KIPPRA does not explicitly use advocacy, its research provided inputs of policy advocacy by other organizations. The respondent continued to point out that some governmental institutions, mostly “constitutional commissions,” have used KIPPRA’s research for advocacy at the national level.

On the opposite end, the key informant at IDS-UoNBI pointed out that the think tank does not use advocacy. The respondent said, “IDS is not an activist or advocacy organization. Advocacy organizations require elaborate infrastructure to identify the impact of their work.” The respondent at the IDS also alluded to the institute’s mandate as the reason why it does not use advocacy.

IEA-Kenya identifies itself as an organization that “seeks to promote pluralism of ideas through open, active and informed debate on public policy issues. We undertake research and conduct public education on key economic and topical issues in public affairs in Kenya and the region, and utilize the outcomes of the research for policy dialogue and to influence policy making.”

The key respondent at IEA mentioned that "evidence-based policy advocacy has informed IEA’s work, however, the space for think tanks in Kenya has shrunk in Kenya because the government has been mischaracterizing advocacy for political action."
However, even organizations that do not do use advocacy as their primary approach try to influence economic policy but they divert from traditional advocacy methods which could have political risks as identified by the respondent from the IEA. The AERC, for example, makes reference to “policy engagement.” One of its strategic goals in the 2015 – 2020 period, for example, is “to enhance AERC visibility, outreach, and policy engagement to maximize the uptake of AERC products in policy.” Similarly, KIPPRA, in its 2016 annual report alludes to “policy engagement and communication.”

It appears therefore, that “policy engagement” is a benign advocacy approach employed by the AERC and KIPPRA. These two think tanks employ this benign approach to steer away from the negative connotations associated with a conventional understanding of advocacy.

In addition, the advocacy approach employed by AERC and KIPPRA is collaborative, rather than confrontational. For example, AERC organizes the AERC – Senior Policy Seminars that brings senior policy makers to make them aware of AERC’s work. On the other hand KIPPRA advocates for policy advice uptake through the taskforces it participates in (see Table 4.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Engagement Sessions</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Round Table meetings</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Taskforces constituted by the government</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimonies to parliament</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIPPRA Annual Report 2017

From Table 4.7 above, it is evident that a majority of KIPPRA's policy engagement sessions are round Table meetings, followed workshops and taskforces constituted by the government. Policy taskforces constituted by government provide KIPPRA an opportunity to offer policy advice within the Medium Term Plans (MTPs) that plug into Kenya's long-term development planning framework, Vision 2030. In addition, the few policy engagements with parliament mean that the legislature does not adequately benefit from KIPPRA's policy advice.
As a think tank that has a strong advocacy focus, the IEA-Kenya uses various strategies in its advocacy (see Table 4.8).

### Table 4.8: Summary of IEA-Kenya’s Policy Advocacy and Engagement Sessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Media Briefings &amp; press releases</th>
<th>Advocacy Coalitions</th>
<th>Policy Memos Submitted</th>
<th>Public Forums Held</th>
<th>Capacity building for Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IEA Annual Reports 2016 and 2015

Table 4.8 above indicates that the IEA-Kenya is involved in advocacy coalitions with other institutional partners as a means of achieving its advocacy aims. Some of the institutional advocacy coalitions which the Institute is involved in include the Parliamentary Initiatives Network (PIN) that brings together eighteen Kenyan organizations including civil society, professional associations, think tanks and research institutions that focus on supporting and influencing parliamentary business, a coalition of new-born child health economics with PATH, and a coalition of water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) with SNV Netherlands. The institute also holds public forums as part of its advocacy efforts, as membership-based organization the IEA-Kenya, gives members an, “opportunity to shape public policy space in the country.”

The IEA-Kenya also does advocacy through submitting policy memorandums to legislators or policy technocrats in government MDA's. The IEA-Kenya cites its successes in policy formulation using this approach to include the policies in intellectual property rights as well as in competition policy. The key informant at IEA-Kenya said “after our research on intellectual property rights and particularly the findings on indigenous knowledge and genetic stock of intellectual property, we were able to share recommendations with parliamentarians and set the stage for policy formulation.”

Key informants also identified some certain inherent problems with advocacy as primary means for think tanks to play in the policy space; one being that advocacy is perceived with a negative connotation. Advocacy is increasingly seen as being borrowed from the NGOs/CSOs world, which has traditionally been seen to be having a confrontational rather than collaborative relationship with government. For this reason, the effectiveness of advocacy as a means to play in the policy environment is much more susceptible to
the political environment and particularly the level of intellectual freedom and freedom of speech.

### 4.3.4 Consultancy

Three of the six think tanks reviewed use consultancy as a means of playing a role in Kenya's economic policymaking process. The three are KIPPRA, IEA-Kenya, and IDS-UoNBI. Stryk (2018) observed that think tanks at times use consultancies to provide technical advice to government. In addition, PASGR (2015) had observed that 68% of African think tanks in a multi-country case study of African think tanks used consultancies and 32% of the think tanks evaluated had more than 10 consultancies in the last one year.

The key informant at KIPPRA respondent that, “government departments request us to do research, at times requests us for technical assistance.” The respondent continued and said that, “Once we receive these requests we cost them and assign them to research analysts to work on them.”

A review of secondary data from IDS-UoNBI also shows that the institute carries out consultancies. For instance, the Institute’s website lists four ongoing research consultancies. However, it is not clear whether the institute’s fellows carry out the consultancies at the institutional level, or at a personal level.

There are two ways through which think tanks use consultancies within the economic policy space. The first is that think tanks are consulted by MDAs, the private sector and other organizations to study specific issues within the economy. The second way is that think tanks’ experts are used as consultants to produce research products. In most cases where MDAs have contracted think tanks directly to carry research, it is with the hope and aim of informing a particular policy, strategy or intervention.

However, in some instances, policy technocrats find the policy recommendations of consultations they have issued to think tanks as impractical and unfeasible. Pointed out that recommendations from think tank consultancies are one key informant from the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning, advised that, “at time we give consultancies to think tanks but shelve the reports rather than implement them because they appear
oblivious of the political forces that influence policy change and are thus have recommendations that are politically suicidal.”

Consultancies are also a means of developing an income stream for think tanks. In 2016, for example, KIPPRA had annual revenue of Kenya Shillings 430,698,000; mostly made up of a GoK grant of KES 281,836,000 and development partner grants of KES 29,243,000. In the same year, KIPPRA earned an income of KES 118,630,000 from consultancies and rendering other services amounting to twenty-eight percent of its income in the year.

![Figure 4.1: Distribution of KIPPRA Income in %](source)

Figure 4.1 above shows that consultancy and services incomes constitute just above one-quarter of KIPPRA’s annual revenue.

Some respondents, however, pointed out to the negative effects of relying too much on the consultancies as a model for raising income and playing in the economic policy space. The trustees of IPAR-Kenya were afraid that use of consultancies “would affect the organization’s independence and lead to mission drift.

On the other hand, one key informant at the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning, observed, “The use of consultancies by think tanks is not novel and unique, think tanks
have to produce what is not readily available, otherwise people begin to look elsewhere.”

4.3.5 The Relative influence of think tanks on Kenya’s economic policy

From the section above, think tanks in Kenya operate in the economic policy space through a couple of approaches, most notably, capacity building; advocacy; research and policy analysis; and through the use of consultancies. However, literature reviewed shows that think tanks are not the only actors in PAS. In addition, the employment of the aforementioned approaches and tools does not necessarily mean that their PAS translates into verifiable footprints in the country’s economic policy. Towards this end, key informants in both MDAs and think tank were asked to evaluate the relative influence of think tanks in the policy process. Key informants in think tanks and technocrats in MDAs were asked to estimate the relative influence of think tanks in economic policy formulation. They were asked specific questions on the relative influence of think tanks in economic policy: origination; the relative participation of tanks among other actors in the economic policy formulation; and the relative influence of think tanks in the content of economic policy formulated. The responses obtained are summarised in Table 4.9 below.

Table 4.9: Perception of Think Tank’s Influence Economic Policy Formulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank</th>
<th>% of Economic Policies originated by think tanks</th>
<th>% relative participation of think tank amongst other actors</th>
<th>% of policy content contributed by think tank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS-UoNBI</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Data

From Table 4.9 above, on average think tanks attribute about 12.6% of economic policy as originating from their policy advice and agenda setting. More specifically, KIPPRA attributes itself as originating the highest number of economic policies at 30%. The
results in Table 4.9 also show that think tank acknowledge that most of the economic policies in the country do not originate from their PAS products.

This policy technocrats in MDAs estimate that 13% of policy proposals originate from think tanks. Coincidentally, government technocrats interviewed in this study gave the same percentage (13%) of economic policy proposal that were originated by think tanks. The relatively low levels of think tank origination of economic policy proposals suggests that technocrats in MDAs or other actors are responsible for the origination of most economic policy proposals pointing to a subdued role of think tanks in agenda setting.

Think tanks rated their participation in economic policy formulation higher (21%) than their contribution in economic policy origination. KIPPRA, indicated to participate highest in economic policy formulation than the other research institutions; a position that ties with their participation in policy taskforces as shown in Table 4.7 above.

However, policy technocrats in MDAs estimate think tank participation in economic policy formulation at 33.6%, which is higher than think tank’s estimation of their participation rate. This estimation is an acknowledgement by policy technocrats that the think tanks play a notable role in the policy formulation process.

Key informants in think tanks estimated that the percentage content that their organizations contributed to economic policy to be 18% on average, compared to an of 22% according to MDA technocrats. KIPPRA attributes 35% of economic policy content as coming from its PAS.

### 4.4 Gaps between economic policy advice demand in Kenya and the outputs by think tanks.

Section 4.3 above indicated the approach think tanks take their quest to improve economic policy, in addition section 4.3.5 above indicate the differences in the attribution of the origination, participation and econtent of economic policy between think tanks and technocrats in MDAs. For this reason an evaluation of the direction of PAS, level, and nature of policy advice demand was carried out to determine the gaps that exist between policy advice supply and policy advice demand, This was supplemented by an examination of the nature, utility and perceived quality of PAS.
4.4.1 Direction of Policy Advice Supply

Three of the six sampled think tanks responded that majority of their PAS outputs are supply-driven rather than demand-driven. One of the think tank’s key informant pointed out that their PAS has a considerable aspect of demand-driven policy advice, while the other think tank pointed out to a mixture of both demand driven and supply driven policy advice. These findings are mixed and do not particularly concur with the views of Ajakaiye (2007) and Rutter (2012) who observed that policy advice in Africa is supply driven, (see Table 4.10) for a summary of the direction of policy advice supply.

Table 4.10: Direction of Policy Advice Supply (PAS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think tank</th>
<th>Direction of PAS</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Approach to Economic policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IEA-Kenya</td>
<td>Supply Driven</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Advocacy and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAR</td>
<td>Supply Driven</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Advocacy and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>Mostly Demand Driven</td>
<td>Government-affiliated</td>
<td>Research and Capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>Both Demand-driven and supply driven</td>
<td>Quasi-Independent</td>
<td>Research and Capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS-UoNBI</td>
<td>Supply-driven</td>
<td>University-affiliated</td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study findings

Table 4.10 above shows that KIPPRA is the only think tank that mostly provides demand-driven policy advice, being a government-affiliated think tank. These finding agree with Mackenzie, Pellini, and Sutiyo (2015) who had observed that government-affiliated think tanks provide demand-driven policy advice by acting as “briefing machines to policy makers.” IDS-UoNBI, which is university-affiliated, and the independent think tanks mostly provide supply driven policy advice. The AERC, which is quasi-autonomous, provides both demand driven and supply driven advice.

Using the framework identified above, further analysis at institutional level brought out some idiosyncratic aspects of the nature of interaction between policy advise demand and policy advise supply. These findings are elaborated below.
On supply driven policy advice, the key informant at IPAR said that, “most of our policy advice was supply driven, at that time there was no policy advice demand and our role as an independent research institution was to query the effectiveness of government policy.” This suggests a passive PAS stance that can be categorised as reactive.

The key informant at the IDS-UoNBI indicated a less passive PAS stance and pointed out that, "the IDS provides solutions to development problems, through the evidence we get from research."

Contrasting the above, the key informant at KIPPRA indicated a proactive PAS stance by stating that, "most government departments are clear about their policy advice demand needs and come to us to try and find solutions to their policy problems." This policy stance is, however, a recent phenomenon as indicated by the key informant from KIPPRA who advised that, “a while back, KIPPRA did not play a proactive role in providing policy advice unless consulted..... these days, however, we have what we call policy intelligence. ....we contiously scan the environment to identify policy problems before they arise and we provide policy solutions to the affected parties as fast as we can.”

A specific finding in this study was that in most cases think tanks that produce supply driven policy advice do not engage relevant policy technocrats or policy makers during the design and inception of their PAS outputs. Consequently, a lot of research to inform policy tends to be originated away from the policy advise demand.

Commenting on this scenario, one key informant in the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning observed that, “at times think tanks call us into forums and ambush us with research findings, they do not consult us for context or seek clarifications on why and how policy decisions are made. That is why we ignore most research findings from think tanks.” The dearth of consultation was echoed by the key informant at IPAR who observed that, “we felt that we had good research, but most of our recommendations were often ignored”. One of the unfortunate results of the unreconciled view points above is that think tanks that provide supply driven policy advise have reported that their research findings are often ignored by policy makers. This inability to leverage on think tanks’ policy advise capacity can be construed as a “lost policy opportunity.”
The existence of supply-driven PAS points to situations where both the research and advocacy that think tanks undertake are intrinsically decided within the think tank. This also points to policy advice products being designed without the consideration of the PAD actors in government MDAs who should be the ultimate users of these products. Consequentially, supply driven PAS heralds problems for think tanks and for government. In this regard, an unfortunate outcome is that think tanks’ goals of improving policy capacity in government tends to remain unmet on account of supply driven PAS. stance. In addition, supply driven PAS also denies the government an opportunity to benefit from the diversity of policy alternatives in economic policy.

4.4.2 The Constitutional Imperative for Policy Advice Demand

An incidental observation in this study is the influence that the legal environment exerts on the processes that underlie the supply and demand for policy advice. Alluding to the foregoing, one key informant in a government agency pointed out that the Kenya constitution provides an anchoring basis within which policy advice affects economic policy. The key informant said, “the constitution demands that my office gives policy advice to other agencies in government. I do that through my experience and training but at times I consult think tanks and other knowledge holders.”

Support for the observation indicated above is evident in Kenya’s constitution (2010), which created a paradigm shift in the dynamics between PAD and PAS. In this regard, Article 1 (2) of the Constitution states that “sovereignty rests with the people of Kenya and that they may exercise either directly or delegation”.

In addition, Article 10 (2) (a) of the constitution espouses some of the national values and principles of governance as being, “the rule of law, democracy and participation of the people.” The constitution identifies public participation as an avenue of allowing people to be at the heart of the management of their natural resources, public finance, public finance and legislative. Specifically, Article 232 (1) (d) requires the public service to involve people in the process of policy making. Public participation is viewed as a way to provide people with a means of exercising direct sovereignty. Responding to the above constitutional imperative, KIPPRA, for example, reported to have participated in thirty-nine policy taskforces, with most of these taskforces and committees being
explicitly related to economic issues. Think tanks such as the IEA-Kenya take this opportunity and organize structured public policy debates. One such policy debates include the “pre-budget” hearings that the IEA-Kenya holds each year.

Key informants also identified the character of politicians and policy technocrats as determinants of policy advice demand. In Kenya, for instance, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) which came into power in 2003 is credited with heralding a new style of governance that established a mechanism to communicate demand for policy advice and thereby allowed think tanks to flourish. One key informant in the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning said that “politicians in the stature of Hon Mwai Kibaki (President of Kenya 2003 to 2012) demanded that policy makers interact with the private sector and civil society; policy expertise ceased from being seen as a preserve of policy technocrats in government alone.”

The above observation is corroborated by evidence from secondary data regarding the Kenya government’s economic plan, “Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) 2003-2007” which acknowledged that part of the reason for the country’s poor economic performance in the past was, “poor implementation of economic policies and mismanagement and weak institutions of governance.” The government thus established the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), "to provide an arena for partnership in the making, monitoring, and evaluation of public policy." NESC was thus established as the first think tank meant to advise the government on economic policies. The NARC government also passed the KIPPRA Act in 2006, which gave KIPPRA the legal locus to provide policy advice supply to the government.

**4.4.3 Framing and Communicating Policy Advice**

Policy makers also reported having problems with the packaging, framing, and communication of policy advice especially because think tanks communicate their research findings and policy advice in standardized formats. A key informant at the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning observed that, “their reports are too big.” The key informant continued to say that sometimes the language in think tank reports is abstract, “it is like think tanks speaking to other think tanks in a language only they can understand.”
Although some policy makers reported being satisfied with the quality of think tank research products, others reported problems particularly with the recommendations of policy research. One key informant in the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning said that “at times think tanks make casual recommendations, and do not detail how their recommendations will affect the consumers of the policy.” The key informant pointed out that they would benefit from policy advice with an array of recommendations that allow them to “cherry pick the policy solutions to their challenges.”

Policy makers also pointed to policy advice not being properly costed. Information gathered in this study showed that the government evaluates policy proposals based on their effect on the exchequer. In this regard, recommendations can be classified into three categories: revenue negative, policy advice and recommendations that reduce government revenue; revenue neutral, policy advice and recommendations that do not change government revenue; and revenue positive, policy advice that maximizes government revenue. Commenting on the foregoing, the key informant from the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning advised that "think tanks should make it easy for technocrats to pick up their policy by providing revenue positive and revenue neutral recommendations."

In the same vein, a key informant at the Ministry of Industry Trade, and Co-operatives for example, pointed out that, "think tanks lack access data bases, or lack the technical ability to extract simulations from these databases that would allow policy makers to develop useful trade policy as well as shape Kenya’s negotiating positions in international trade negotiations.”

Secondary data also reveals that buffers in communicating government activities and programmes with think tanks also exist. For example, after review of the government’s implementation of the MDGs, one of the key informants from the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning observed that “universities were not involved in the research and drawing up of the MDGs implementation road map.” The statement shows that think tanks or at least the IDS-UoNBI, which is a university-affiliated think, lost an opportunity to provide economic policy advice because of the non-communication of a policy advice need. A summary of the findings discussed above is laid out in Table 4.11 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Technocrats (PAD)</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Think Tanks (PAS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Quality of PAS**      | - Think policy research outputs generally of high quality  
- Orientation of policy advice academic or intellectual in nature | - Most policy makers have technical understanding of economic policy issues in their department.  
- Asymmetries between and among policy makers, relatively low understanding of policy issues amongst legislators | Perception of technical skills of policy makers |
| **Utility of PAS**      | - Think tanks lack technical tools to provide highly technical policy advice  
- Think tanks oblivious of the political, social and economic context of policy implementation  
- Think tanks not providing last mile solutions to policy makers  
- Policy recommendations not costed  
- Policy advice arrives late or is not an immediate priority of policy makers  
- Policy advice from think tanks competing with advice from technocrats and IFIs  
- Policy advice supply often contextual | - Developed methodologies to provide policy advice over time | Tools available for production of (PAS) and policy influence |
| **Communication of PAS**| - PAS communicated in standard think tank products that are often voluminous.  
- Language un-inviting and fit for other think tanks or academia | - Policy advice needs to be communicated unambiguously particularly in consultations  
- Policy advice needs at times not communicated at all (communication breakdown between technocrats and think tanks) | Communication of PAD |

*Source: Study Analysis*
4.5 Factors that determine think tank’s influence on Kenya’s economic policy

4.5.1 Endogenous Factors

This section discusses findings in this study following the typology used by Brown et al (2014) which classified endogenous factors to be those which can be controlled by a think tank. Each of these is discussed below. These endogenous factors that determine a think tank’s influence on the economic policy space include: the approach a think tank employs to situate itself in the economic policy environment; a think tank’s technical ability to offer credible products in the economic policy environment; its corporate governance; its reputation; and its social and communication capital.

4.5.1.1 Approach

Think tanks that use advocacy as a primary method to play in the economic policy space were found to face resistance from policy makers. In this connection, the key informant at IEA-Kenya, for example lamented, “our ability to use advocacy in Kenya is reducing because of the government’s action in the civil society environment. The respondent continued with the observation that “at times the government mischaracterizes advocacy for political action.” Besides, the key informant added that, “over the last three years, the government has blocked funding sources and some officers have individualized disagreements with other CSOs.

On the other hand, think tanks that use a capacity building approach are able to exercise subtle influence on policy makers, particularly if policy makers are aware of their capacity building programmes or have been part of their capacity building programmes. For example in its 2016/2017 annual report, the AERC acknowledges, “as a result of a large alumni base in the policy space, AERC has cultivated a considerable convening power.” The AERC thus views capacity building as means through which to build future policy influence.

However, advocacy has been shown to be effective particularly when policy proposals are novel, revenue neutral or maximizing. In this regard, the key informant at the IEA-Kenya observes, “it is easier to advocate for policy adoption with members of parliament than with policy technocrats.”
In addition, the key informant also points to an inherent problem of using advocacy for policy influence, saying, “it is very difficult to evaluate our influence, if a policy we are advocating for changes, we are not sure whether to attribute to ourselves or to other factors.” Advocacy has also been shown to be effective when informal approaches to advocacy are adopted as opposed to traditional models of advocacy, which have often been characterized as confrontational. The respondent at IPAR, for example, observed, "I learned that to have influence, we did not have to face policy makers head-on."

Key informants alluded to informal approaches especially where think tanks’ drive to cultivate personal relationships with policy makers has been identified as being critical in building buy-in for policy change. The respondent at IEA-Kenya observed "at times we invite parliamentarians for informal sessions to break down issues further to them."

4.5.1.2 Technical Capacity

This study established that think tanks’ technical capacity determines its ability to influence policy change. Technical capacity enables a think tank to produce thorough research products and produce credible policy advice. In this regard, a key informant at KIPPRA said that, “our capacity, our methods and the calibre of our researchers allows people to trust us.” While agreeing with the above view, the key informant at IPAR viewed the institute's technical capacity as stemming from somewhere else. Thus, the informant clarified that; “we developed approaches and methodologies and approaches that allowed government technocrats to trust our work over time.”

Other observations in this study were that the number of researchers in a think tank and their expertise are key determinants of its technical ability. In line with the above, the key informant at IDS-UoNBI observed that, "the IDS has a unique multi-disciplinary team, in fact, we do not recognize disciplinary boundaries for our researchers."

This study also examined the human capital of think tanks which research has shown that tends to determine the technical ability of a think tank. It was noted that KIPPRA has twenty-nine dedicated researchers, the IEA-Kenya has ten researchers, the IDS – UoNBI has eighteen researchers (see Table 4.12). It is to be noted that most researchers in KIPPRA and IDS UoNBI have at least a master’s degree.
Table 4.12: Academic Qualifications of Think Tank Research Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank</th>
<th>Bachelors Level Training</th>
<th>Masters Level Training</th>
<th>Ph.D. Level Training</th>
<th>Total No. Of Researchers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA-Kenya</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS-UoNBI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Data

Table 4.12 above shows that KIPPRA with 29 has the highest number of researchers, which may also explain why KIPPRA has the highest output of research products (see Table 4.6). However, researchers at IDS-UoNBI have a higher academic qualification with 16 out of 18 of its researchers having Ph.D. qualification.

An observation that is worth mentioning is that think tank researchers tend to have higher academic qualifications than policy technocrats. However, policy technocrats pointed out that researchers lack experience in an active policy making environment. One key informant at the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning observed that “think tanks make recommendations that are technically right but politically incorrect, we in the ministry are good at adjudging what is politically correct.”

4.5.1.3 Corporate Governance

Some key informants alluded to the role of corporate governance in a think tank's performance. Corporate governance could act as a catalyst for a think tank's role in economic policy or act as an inhibitor. For example, the respondent at IPAR observed that, "our trustees were not very flexible and could not change with the times, leaving the organization stranded in the midst of a changing environment.” On the positive side, the key informant at AERC observed that, "the organization’s programme committee and board ensure that there is financial oversight that is above board and that the organization achieves its mission.”

It was noted in this study that a think tank's corporate governance structure determines whether it will attract funding to sustain its activities. The AERC’s tripartite governance structure of the Board, the Advisory Committee, and the Secretariat has been credited for creating a sustainable think tank. One of the key respondent at AERC, acknowledged in the AERC’s commemorative publication, “the board took responsibility for fundraising,
key appointments and financial and policy oversight, the Secretariat implemented the programme, while the Advisory committee took charge of the research programme.” A review of AERCs secondary data buttresses the above view as shown in Table 4.13 below which shows the division of work; diversity of people with varied experience, gender and from different nationalities. In addition, the corporate structure at AERC allows the organization to benefit from the experience of policy technocrats in different African countries.

Table 4.13: Membership of AERC's Board and Programme Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AERC Organ</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>No. Of Kenyans</th>
<th>Gender Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Board</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6       12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Programme Committee</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2       8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AERC Annual Report 2016/2017

Table 4.13 shows that Kenyans are represented in both AERC’s corporate organs. Better still, the two Kenyan’s in the organization’s corporate organs are technocrats in the National Treasury and Ministry of Planning.

KIPPRA’s corporate governance structure demonstrates the benefit of a diversified Board. The institute’s corporate governance is dictated by the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis Act NO 15 of 2006, which provides for thirteen members-three of whom must be the Principal Secretaries in the ministries of National Treasury, Planning and Foreign Affairs. This government representation permits a close interface between PAD and PAS, which enables more influence of the think tank’s output on economic policy.

The foregoing suggests that corporate governance is a key component of credibility capital as intimated by Brown et al. (2014). In addition to providing oversight within AERC’s and KIPPRA’s the corporate governance structures of an institution can enable boards to provide research institutions with policy technocrats that bridge the PAD-PAS divide.
4.5.1.4 Social Capital

Think tanks surveyed recognize that social capital is important and try to build their social capital through networking. They do so by creating and joining institutional partnerships in a bid to achieve the institutional mandate, augment their efforts as well as improve their institutional reputation. Findings from this study show that the think tanks surveyed belong to national and international networks. Some think tank key informants pointed out that these networks are important in increasing the stock of influence on policy makers. Social capital networks in Table 4.14 below are also important in building intrinsic capacities within the think tank and resource mobilization.

Table 4.14: Number of Networks for Think Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think tank</th>
<th>Regional Networks</th>
<th>National Networks</th>
<th>International Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA-Kenya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS-UoNBI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Data

Table 4.14 above, shows that the think tanks reviewed have a preference for international networks as opposed to regional networks. The key informant at IEA-Kenya acknowledges, "Partnerships and networks are an essential component of advocacy." Some of the networks the IEA-Kenya belong to include, the Parliamentary Initiative Network.

Three of the sampled think tanks responded to belonging to the Think Tank Initiative (TTI), a global network of think tanks. The aim of the, "think tank initiative is to provide think tanks with the support they need to improve the quality of their research, the effectiveness of their organizations, and their interactions with policy makers, civil society, and the media. This allows them to increase their impact on social and economic policies in their countries and beyond."

In Kenya, Think Tank Initiative supports KIPPRA and the IEA-Kenya. TTI builds the endogenous capacity of think tanks to improve the quality of their research as well as equip think tanks with the tools and techniques of translating research into policy inputs.
The foregoing discussion confirms Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) Advocacy Coalition Framework, Crewe and Young’s (2002) RAPID framework and Brown et al. (2014) work, which identify a think tank’s “social capital” as an important component of its influence on the policy formulation.

### 4.5.1.5 Communication Capital

Evidence from this study as laid out in Table 4.15 below shows that think tanks in Kenya use both traditional media communication tools. Traditional communication tools include media hits in newsprint and broadcast (television and radio). New media tools include channels such as twitter, facebook, youtube, blogs in the website as well as the institution’s website itself.

#### Table 4.15: Communication Profile of Think Tanks Sampled in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think tank</th>
<th>Traditional Media Channels Use</th>
<th>New Media Channels used and following</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Print Media Hits</td>
<td>Broadcast Media Hits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA-KENYA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS-UoNB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Analysis

According to Table 4.15 above, KIPPRA had sixty newsprint hits, mostly from op-eds placed by its researchers in leading dailies, but it does not use some new media channels like Facebook. Other think tanks like IEA-Kenya, employ new media tools to a great extent, it has over ten thousand twitter followers.

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12 As at 1 April 1, 2018
13 Report according to [https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/kenya](https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/kenya)
Literature reviewed in this study indicates that think tanks mostly use communication tools and strategies for two kinds of audiences, the first being the direct audiences that include policy technocrats, legislators, politicians and other stakeholders already acquitted with a think tanks work, while the second group comprises generic audiences such as the general public.

Think tanks structure their communication outputs based on their target audience. They mostly use traditional and new media channels to communicate with the general public, and technical communication documents like research papers, policy briefs to communicate with technocrats in MDAs, “policy makers and policy technocrats,” (see Table 4.3).

Key informants from government MDAs pointed out that “technical communication documents,” have language and formats that are difficult and would thus benefit from language that is akin to those that are contained in communication audiences meant for generic audiences.

A general observation in this study is that Kenyan think tanks do not utilize new media tools very well. For instance, think tank websites are found to rank poorly (see Table 4.15) amongst other websites in the country, which means that the general public does not benefit from their policy research output. Consequently, this reduces think tanks’ capacity to build communities of policy savvy citizens for policy advocacy.

**4.5.2 Exogenous Factors that determine a think tank's roles in economic policy**

Crewe and Young’s RAPID (2002) framework shows that exogenous contexts could determine the interaction between think tank PAS products and policy maker PAD needs. They conceptualize exogenous factors to include the factors whose variables cannot be controlled within the think. The exogenous factors that affect Kenyan economic policy think tanks are discussed in this section.

**4.5.2.1 Donors Multi-lateral Institutions and IFIs**

The analysis of secondary data and interviews with key informants revealed that donors and their activities have an effect on how think tanks effectively participate in the economic policy environment. The donor influence can be grouped into two broad
categories; the micro level effects, meaning the effects donors have on individual think tanks, and the macro-level effects, meaning the effects donors have on the knowledge environment, and particularly the interaction of PAS and PAD.

4.5.2.2 Micro level effects of Donors and their Activities

Scholars in policy concur that donors can either build the capacity of think tanks or destroy them. In Kenya, one of the programmes that donors have used to increase the capacity of think tanks includes the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). The ACBF was for example was established "in response to the severity of Africa's capacity needs, and the challenges of investing in indigenous human capital and institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. ACBF interventions are premised on four principles: the centrality of capacity to the development process in Africa; the critical role of a partnership and demand-driven approach in tackling capacity challenges; African ownership and leadership in the capacity development process; and a systematic, sequenced and coordinated approach to the capacity development process ("Frequently Asked Questions", 2018)." Since its establishment in 1991, the ACBF has invested over 700 US$ million in 321 capacity development projects in Africa (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2016)

Secondary data accessed in this study indicates that ACBF is able to achieve the above through funding support by World Bank, United Nations Development Programme UNDP and the African Development Bank (AfDB) among others. In Kenya, the ACBF has supported KIPPPRA to increase the uptake of its outputs as inputs is the policy-making process; funded IPAR’s operational and capital activities; and financed AERC’s Collaborative PhD Programme.

While the ACBF provides funding specifically to improve the capacity of think tanks in technical aspects of their work, for example, help think tanks produce quality research papers and policy advice, the ACBF also supports think tanks to improve their administrative capacity, for example, helping think tanks have “better procurement systems.” This support leads to all-round institutional strengthening of think tanks.
In spite of the positive effects that donors have on the capacity of think tanks, there is evidence that donor activities could have negative effects as well. In this study, some think tank key informants pointed out the practice of donors providing, “project funding” rather than “tied” “restricted” “core funding” to the think tanks creates an environment of unsustainability within the think tank. For example, in 2016, out of IEA-Kenya’s total revenue of KES 50,343,059, restricted donor funds constituted KES 41,158,298 (see Figure 4.2).

![Figure 4.2: Breakdown of IEA-Kenya's Revenue](image)

From Figure 4.2, restricted donor revenue constitutes 81.7% of all revenue at IEA-Kenya, while unrestricted donor funding constitutes only 18.3% of all revenue. This funding structure and donor funding policies poses challenges for thin tanks, one think tanks have problem of sustainability, because donor funding can be withdrawn often at short notice; and second, the question of independence arises since restricted donor funds often dictates the projects think tanks carry out, and thus diminish their independence.

Key informants from think tanks also pointed out that the incessant practice of donors to hire consultants from think tanks instead of contracting think tanks for research projects withers the institutional capacity of thinks.
The key informant at the IEA-Kenya said that “*these days donors prefer to hire individual consultants rather than outsource policy research to us, at times some of these consultants hired by donor organizations are former IEA staff.*”

The direct engagement of think tank staff is done despite the fact that think tanks are best suited to carry out these research projects. A good example that fits into this scenario is the task of developing a long-term implementation framework for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that was given to an individual consultant by UNDP although this is a task that would have been ideal for a think tank.

### 4.5.2.3 Macro level effects of Donors and Their Activities

The macro level effects of donors and their activities emanate from the effect that donor policies, practices, and activities have on the knowledge environment. This study found that the activities of donors and other international organizations have macro level effects on how think tanks operate in the environment. These observations mirror findings by Stone (2005) in "*Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Transition, 2005*".

For example, a shift by the World Bank from supporting higher education to basic education had immediate consequences for the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Nairobi. Contributing to this, a key informant said that, “*Development assistance agencies, particularly the World Bank, switched support basic to education, arguing that higher education was no longer a national development priority. The World Bank had a strong sway in Western donor countries resulting in their stand having a ripple effect.*"

Furthermore, key informants also pointed out that donor particularly International Financial Institutions (IFIs) also play in the economic policy space by competing with think tanks to offer policy advice to the government. In this connection, a key informant observed, “*donors and particularly the World Bank compete with think tanks to offer policy advice to the government.*” The same Key informant also observed that “*the ability of donors to influence economic policy relative to think tanks is higher, which poses a conundrum for the country as their policy advice is often vested and out of context as opposed to policy advice coming from local Kenyan think tanks.*”
Findings from this study indicate that the mandate of think tanks and their categorization also influence a think tank’s ability to play in the economic policy space. For example, technocrats in the ministry of National Treasury and Planning and Industry, Trade and Cooperatives mentioned they were more aware of KIPPRA’s work because of its role in the MTP sectorial working groups and taskforces. Thus, as a government-affiliated think tank, the institute has relatively more influence in the economic policy space than other think tanks. This finding is in line with Brown, et. Al, (2014), who reported similar findings in Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa, this has also been pointed out by Mackenzie, Pellini and Sutiyo (2015).

In addition, the categorization of think tanks pre-disposes them to their own specific set of challenges. The IDS-UoNBI as a university-affiliated think tank is affected by the organizational politics within the wider University. This was clearly articulated by the respondent from IDS-UoNBI who averred that “researchers were affected by the University’s policy of using student number outputs for promotions rather than research outputs thus career progression stagnated relative other academic staff within the University of Nairobi.”

The respondent continued to point out that, “At inception, IDS-UoNBI, was supposed to be a core research institute affiliated to the University of Nairobi. In the beginning, researchers at the institute did not have lecturing duties, however, and particularly due to budget cuts in higher education, the University of Nairobi’s administration insisted that the institute needed to establish revenue generating academic programmes rather than being a cost center. Consequently, the institute developed masters’ programmes in development studies as well as doctorate programmes in development studies. This ultimately affected the research output of the institute.”

The foregoing suggests that mandates and categorization dictate what a think tank can do in the economic policy space. For, this reason the mandate and category of a think tank dictates the very environment within which think tank researchers and leaders operate. Think tank professionals in government-affiliated think tanks, university-affiliated think tanks, and other non-independent non-autonomous think tanks generally tend to have little room for maneuver in the policy space. For example, KIPPRA can only operate
within the statutes set out in its constituting act; which means that the researchers at KIPPRA cannot explicitly employ approaches like advocacy to play in that economic policy space the same way like independent and autonomous institutions like the IEA-Kenya. On the other hand, researchers at IDS-UoNBI can only act within the wider academic environment, within which the institute is located.

4.5.2.5 Political Environment

Regarding the impact of politics, a Key informant pointed out that the visibility of think tanks and their ability to influence policy making in Kenya accelerated after the election of President Mwai Kibaki and the NARC government in the year 2002 (Refer to section 4.4.2).

This is attested by the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) 2003-2007 which was developed soon after the accession of the NARC government to power in 2002, “which was prepared under the auspices of the Ministry of Planning and National Development embodied the views and aspirations of Kenyans, which were collected through a process of consultative workshops with a wide cross section of stakeholders,” (Ministry of Planning and National Development, 2003).

Anecdotal evidence shows that the NARC government heralded a new era of consultative policy making in Kenya as opposed to the previous non-consultative practice that insulated technocrats from external policy advice. This new era deconstructed the idea that policy technocrats could not be faulted and could not borrow expertise and advice from other sectors, particularly the private sector and the civil society sector.

The ERS sought to decentralize and devolve power for the benefit of the Kenyan people and its communities. One of the strategies stated "the equivalent of the NESC will be established at district levels to assist in effecting the actions outlined in the Recovery Strategy at the district, constituency and community levels."
At the local level, the Council will take the form of a restructured District Development Committees that brings together the private sector, NGOs, the government departments and civil society. A devolved monitoring and evaluation will be set up and will provide mechanisms for tracking progress,” (Ministry of Planning and National Development, 2003).

These findings from secondary sources are augmented by a key informant at National Treasury and Ministry of Planning who said that, “politicians in the stature of Hon Mwai Kibaki (President of Kenya 2003 to 2012) demanded interaction with private sector and civil society; policy expertise ceased from being seen as preserve of policy technocrats in government alone.”

These observations suggest that the NARC government ushered in a political culture that was consultative, and participatory. These values of consultation were later codified in Kenya’s 2010 constitution by making it compulsory to undertake consultations in policymaking and public affairs.

However, Key informants from think tanks, particularly autonomous and independent think tanks, acknowledge that even though positive strides have been made to increase pluralism in the country, challenges remain that impinge on think tanks’ ability to find space in the economic policy environment. A case in point is the lack of a distinct regulatory framework for think tanks where in a Key informants lamented that think tanks fall within the ambit of civil society organizations. Therefore, legislative and executive action directed at the operations of civil societies in general tends to affect the ability of think tanks to operate.

Citing recent happenings, several Key informants pointed out those independent and autonomous think tanks were affected by the recent legislative and administrative crackdown on civil society organization in Kenya. Contributing to the same agenda, one Key informant pointed out that these crackdowns, “affect the perception of a think tanks impartiality and non-partisanship.” This particularly happens when the think tank in question is in advocacy coalitions or networks that supposedly take political stances and agitate politically.
The findings documented in this section show that the political environment and the character of political leaders, as well as the political culture, have an effect on the ability of think tanks to play an effective role in policy advice supply.

4.6 Discussions

The general research objective of this study was to examine the contribution of think tanks to Kenya’s economic policy in Kenya which is situated within two main frameworks: Vision 2030 for long-term development planning and the Kenyan Constitution, which provides the legal structure upon which all public policy in the country is implemented. In this study, economic policy comprises fiscal, investment, trade and industrial policy.

Within these broad planning and legal frameworks various actors participate in the public policy making space. Whereas government MDA’s dominate the demand side and constitute policy advise demand, think tanks operate on the supply side and constitute elements of the policy advice supply. The need to examine the interaction between PAD and PAS stems from the fact that policy making is an important component and input in the development planning process which takes place in a complex, uncertain and changing socio-economic and political environment both locally and globally.

Think tanks are among many actors that purpose to play different roles in the policy making space. Think tanks’ participation is mainly though their research and membership in policy taskforces. Other key actors in the policy advice space include multilateral agencies, private sector players through their business member's organizations (BMOs) and independent financial institutions.

Informed by the foregoing, this study employed an exploratory qualitative research design with an inductive approach to achieve three objectives, namely: to ascertain the role that think tanks play in Kenya’s economic policy; determine the gaps that exist between economic policy advice demand in Kenya and the policy advise outputs of think tanks; and establish the factors that determine think tank influence on Kenya’s economic policy.
The findings in this study show that in Kenya, think tanks play some role in economic policy making process. This is done through four main approaches comprising: capacity building; economic policy research and analysis; advocacy and policy engagement, and through consultancies. The approach a think tank uses draws from its mandate and the broader category of the think tank.

The contribution of think tanks is somewhat diluted by policy advice supply from the government's own technocrats, International Financial Institutions and multi-lateral agencies that seem to have more sway than think tanks. Also, policy advice from think tanks faces resistance from particular interests, like the private sector if their recommendations are perceived to be adverse to the interests of these interest groups.

Amongst the think tanks sampled, KIPPRA, the only government-affiliated think tanks in the study, seems to play a much more pronounced role in providing policy advice than other think tanks sampled. In addition, technocrats in government seem to refer to KIPPRA as their primary source of policy advice.

The study also found that think tanks role in agenda setting seems to be subdued because economic policy ideas in the public sector tend to originate either from the government's own experts or multilateral agencies. In most cases, think tanks are called in when policy ideas have already been conceptualised. In such cases, think tanks are brought in to carry research within the scope of policy ideas already under consideration or that have been rolled out already. IFIs, multilateral agencies and donors have also used think tanks to validate and popularize their policy ideas. Think tanks also play a pronounced role in monitoring and impact evaluation, especially for projects happening within the purview of Vision 2030 Planning Framework. Specific cases are impact studies to track how effective government policy is towards the achievement of Vision 2030. These studies are used to validate government policy as well as inform policy tweaks.

With regard to the interaction between PAD and PAS, the study established that most PAS products of think tanks are supply driven. As such, although these products may be of high quality as was acknowledged by PAD actors in MDAs, they have difficulty becoming inputs into the policy process.
Also, communication buffers between think tanks and technocrats in MDAs prevent both economic policy actors from benefitting from each other's unique placement in the policy cycle. Think tanks were also seen to lack technical tools to provide highly specialized economic policy advice. It was also noted that government policy experts do not communicate opportunities for think tanks to provide policy advice. The convergence of PAD and PAS were found to be when government MDAs communicated their policy advice clearly and unambiguously and think tanks had the technical capacity to provide the policy advice.

The study established that the factors that determine a think tank’s influence on economic policy can be categorised into two: endogenous and exogenous. The endogenous factors comprise the approach a think chooses to play in the economic policy environment; the technical abilities and capacities of a think tank; a think tank’s reputation, its corporate governance, and its communication and social capital. The exogenous factors include donors and their activities; think tank mandates and categorization; as well as political actors such as political leaders/political culture and political freedoms.

When evaluated against the Sabatier and Jenkin’s smith ACF model, it appears that the relative power of think tanks amongst other organizations in the economic policy process is weak. In this study, the Crewe and Young’s RAPID framework was found to be instrumental in highlighting the exogenous and endogenous factors that contribute to the influence of think tanks in economic policy formulation.

4.7 Incidental Observations

The researcher observed that the distinction between a think tank and the leaders who run the think tank is not always clear. For example, at times it is not clear whether the think tank’s chief executive officer and the researchers provide policy advice in their own personal capacity or within the think tank's institutionalized framework. In addition, the role of leadership as a driver of influence in a think tank’s quest for relevance in economic policy participation was observed. Another incidental observation involves the relationship between think tanks and the private sector. Think tanks were shown to have weak linkages with the private sector, and were characterized as being oblivious to the interests of the private sector.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter contains the conclusion, recommendations and suggestions for further study. The sections that follow below are arranged in this sequence.

5.2 Conclusions
This study found that Kenyan think tanks participate in economic policy processes through: capacity building, advocacy, research and analysis, and through the use of consultancies. It was also noted that think tanks eschew the advocacy approach and have an affinity for capacity building and research and policy analysis approaches. However, think tanks that were categorized as “independent,” had a preference for the advocacy approach. The study established that think tanks are involved in agenda setting, participation in economic policy formulation, thereby leading to contribution to policy content.

With regard to the direction of policy advice, this study found that most economic PAS is supply driven. There are instances of demand driven PAS where government technocrats in MDAs specifically demand for policy advice from think tanks. Towards this end KIPPRA as the only government – affiliated think tank in the study is the only think tank that provides more demand drive PAS than other think tanks. The direction of policy advice is also a function of the legal environment and the nature and characteristics of politicians and technocrats within MDAs.

Both exogenous and exogenous factors affected think tanks Kenya’s economic policy making processes. The endogenous factors that were found to affect think tanks were: the approach each think tank uses, the technical capacity of each think tank, the corporate governance of each think tank, the social capital and the communication capital of think tanks. The exogenous factors that were found to affect think tanks were donors, as well as their practices policies, which were noted to have both macro-level and micro level effects on think tanks, the political environment and, a think tank’s categorization.
5.3 Recommendations

Think tanks that primarily use capacity building as their predominant participation model in the economic policy environment should conduct tracer studies to identify the roles the beneficiaries of their capacity building take up after training. Also, additional skills on how to navigate the politics of policy formulation and implementation should be added to technical skills provided in capacity building.

Policy research institutes also seem to employ different approaches in order to play an active role in the economic policy environment. As they do so, they should cultivate synergies between and amongst themselves. Organizations that do not have advocacy programmes should collaborate and forward their outputs in a formally structured manner as inputs in the advocacy processes. For better results, organizations in policy advice should cultivate deeper collaborative relationships with others, as well as actors in the policy space.

Think tanks that use advocacy should also temper their approach to reduce the negative connotation associated with advocacy. Also, think tanks should develop long-term relationships with policy makers, rather than engaging policy makers within their purview of programmatic work.

For institutes that use consultancies as a way of participating in the economic policy environment, it is critical to guard against mission drifts. It is therefore advisable that for this reason, such these think tanks should avoid playing bit-part roles in the economic policy environment through consultancies.

Policy research institutions also need to have policy advice products that are well suited to the needs of the policy makers. Policy advice products should be non-voluminous and contain a language that does not only appeal to other think tanks and academics.

Regarding corporate governance, it is important for research institutions to have diverse boards of directors and corporate structures that are forward-looking, adaptable, which inspire confidence and can read the direction of policy environments both locally and within a global context. Corporate governance within think tanks should be innovative so as to strategically provide for current and future resources to improve institutional sustainability.
As for social capital, think tanks should cultivate more collaboration amongst themselves. Think tanks should also increase their public visibility and have more public education about their work and its potential benefits to the entire Kenyan society.

Policy research institutes should also consider short exchanges and placements of their researchers in government MDA's. Although there are many programmes offered by research that place policy professionals in MDAs in think tanks, there are few and hardly any programmes that put think tank researchers and professionals in active policy implementation environments within MDAs. A programme that policy research professionals in MDAs would allow them to appreciate important aspects gather he nuances of policy formulation and thus get the skills necessary to structure their policy advice products in a way that is most likely to influence policy.

For policy technocrats in MDAs and legislators, it is also recommended that they strive to provide adequate information on government programmes so that they could offer think tanks with opportunities to offer appropriate policy advice in the economic policy cycle.

For politicians and policy technocrats, the study establishes the need to create a political culture that is pluralistic. A political culture that is characterized by intellectual freedoms and exchange of ideas would allow the government to benefit from the diversity that think tanks hold. However, research institutes that operate in the ideas environment need to navigate with utmost care and avoid alignment that might be seen as compromising their independence and objectivity. Thus, the line between think tank and other organizations within the ambit of civil society is not clear; this is particularly so for think tanks that use advocacy as an approach to play a role in economic policy.

To help reduce donors’ negative micro-level effect on think tanks, it is recommended that donors should avoid using individual consultants, particularly those drawn from think tanks and instead use institutional relationships with think tanks. Doing so would improve the institutional capacities of think tanks rather than wither them. It is further recommended that donors, multi-lateral institutions, and Independent Financial Institutions should consider collaborating with think tanks rather than competing with them when providing policy advice.
5.4 Limitations of the Study
The main limitations of the study relate to lack of access to some of the key informants in the study. Think tanks categorized in the "consultancy group," did not provide access to the collection of primary data. Two organizations classified as "development partners," could not be interviewed, as they did not avail key respondents for the study. To cure the above challenge, secondary data from one of the development partners were available.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Study
Some of the suggestions in further study include examining the role of leadership, particularly the role of the attributes of a think tank’s leader in influencing its role in economic policy. Key among the things to be studied includes the distinction between the think tank and its influence (a think tank’s institutional influence) and the personal influence of its top leadership. Another related study can be ascertaining the policy implications of attributes of top policy technocrats in the public sector as well as that of political leaders in executive and legislative positions.

Since the focus of this study was the relationship between think tanks, their policy advice and MDAs and their policy demand at the national level, in Kenya's devolved context, it is recommended that a similar study be carried out on how county governments acquire policy advice for evidence-based policy making at the county level. Anchored on accountability, another related study can be done to examine the role that think tanks play in influencing the oversight capacity of legislators.

It is also recommended that the relationship between the private sector and think tanks and the effects this has on economic policy formation be interrogated further.


Appendices

Appendix 1: Think Tank Category Definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous And Independent</td>
<td>Significant independence from any one interest group or donor and autonomous in its operation and funding from the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi Independent</td>
<td>Autonomous from government but controlled by an interest group, donor, or contracting agency that provides a majority of the funding and has significant influence over operations of the think tank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Affiliated</td>
<td>A part of the formal structure of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-Governmental</td>
<td>Funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but not a part of the formal structure of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Affiliated</td>
<td>A policy research center at a university.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Affiliated</td>
<td>Formally affiliated with a political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate (For Profit)</td>
<td>A for-profit public policy research organization, affiliated with a corporation or merely operating on a for-profit basis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (McGann, 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, 2016)
### Appendix 2: Operationalization of Independent and Dependent Variables

The following Table shows the variables that will be used in the study and how they will be operationalized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Operationalization of the Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Fiscal Policy</td>
<td>Change in government spending, taxation or borrowing as captured in official government documents and the extent to which this is influenced by think tank policy advice.(^{14})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Monetary Policy</td>
<td>Change of policy regarding the supply of money as captured by official government documents and the extent to which this change is influenced by think tank policy advice.(^{15})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Trade Policy</td>
<td>Policy regarding the cross-border exchange of goods and services as expressed in official government documents as influenced by policy advice.(^{16})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Industrial Policy</td>
<td>Change of an economy’s industrial policy defined as “Governments’ attempt to shape the sectorial allocation of resources in the economy.” Due to think tank policy advice.(^{17})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Regulation Policy</td>
<td>Change in Policy relating to a government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, as influenced by think tank policy advice.(^{18})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Microeconomics of development</td>
<td>Issues that constrain and support development: risks and shocks, labor and human capital; risk and vulnerability; social networks, learning and technology adoption; human capital (education and health), markets (including land, labor, credit and information); and institutions and conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Advice Demand (PAD)</td>
<td>Expressed need for context-specific knowledge and information in a particular economic policy area from government and directed to think tanks as communicated through formal and informal channels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Advice Supply (PAS)</td>
<td>Dissemination of context-specific knowledge and information directed at consumption by the government for the formulation of economic policy and communicated through formal and informal channels by think tanks, development partners and BMOs. For think tanks, the internal characteristic variables include the following: credibility, communication capacity, resource capacity, and social capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderating Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | Social political and economic variables that enable or enfeeble the ability of think tanks to produce policy advice. They include:  
  a) Political-Economic Environment  
  b) Influence by donors  
  c) The Intellectual Environment  
  d) The Civil Society Environment |

\(^{14}\) Fiscal Policy as defined by the IMF (Hornton & El-Ganainy, 2009) and the World Bank (Bank, 2007)  
\(^{15}\) Monetary Policy as defined by the IMF (Mathai, 2009)  
\(^{16}\) Trade Policy as defined by the World Trade Organization (World Trade Organization, 2016)  
\(^{17}\) Industrialization Policy as defined by the World Bank (Stiglitz, Lin, Monga, & Patel, 2013)  
\(^{18}\) Regulation Policy as defined by the World Bank (World Bank)
### Appendix 3(a): Think Tank Population for the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank</th>
<th>Policy Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Economic Research Consortium</td>
<td>Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Centre for Technology Studies</td>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi</td>
<td>Development Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis</td>
<td>Economic and Social Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa Policy Centre</td>
<td>Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Development Studies – University of Nairobi (IDS-UoNbi)</td>
<td>Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Policy Analysis and Research</td>
<td>Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
<td>Environmental Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley Institute</td>
<td>Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Technology Policy Studies Network</td>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Wildlife Foundation</td>
<td>Nature and Conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegemeo Institute</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Economic Affairs</td>
<td>Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Population Health Research Centre</td>
<td>Population and Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership for African Social &amp; Governance Research</td>
<td>Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Centre for Economic Growth</td>
<td>Economic Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Research and Technology Development</td>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Region Economic Network</td>
<td>Economic policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrobarometer</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uwezo (Kenya)</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGR</td>
<td>Economic and social Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: GGTTTI (2017)*
### Appendix 3(b): Ministries Population of the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Ministry of Devolution and ASAL</td>
<td>12. Public Service Youth and Gender Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Presidency (2018)
Appendix 4: Summary Characteristics of Sampled Think Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank</th>
<th>Most Recent annual Budget In KES&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Years in Existence</th>
<th>Economic Policy Focus</th>
<th>Research Staff Size</th>
<th>Economic Policy Approach</th>
<th>Think Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>386,557,000</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Micro and Macroeconomics</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Capacity Building, Research and analysis</td>
<td>Quasi-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>14,836,551,000</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Macro-economic and micro-economics</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Autonomous and Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS – UoNBI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Development Economics</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Research – consultancy</td>
<td>University Affiliated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGAR</td>
<td>260,483,900</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Development Economics</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Quasi – independent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>19</sup> It should be noted that AERC and PASGR run multi-country programs and their annual budgets cover for operations and activities across all countries.
Appendix 5: Data Collection Tools

Appendix 5 (a): Key Informant Interview Guide: Think Tank Executive

1. Think Tank Profile;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a). Year founded:</th>
<th>(b). Geographic focus: i.e. national, regional, continental, international</th>
<th>(c). Broad Policy Focus:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td>(e). Staff Size and Profile:</td>
<td>(f). Yearly budget</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What role does your organization play in Kenya’s economic policy?
   Consider the economic policies (finance, trade and industry) that the Kenya Government has formulated in the last 10 years and answer the three questions indicated below.

   (a) **Origination:** Please indicate your best estimate of the approximate % of these policies that your institution has originated

   (b) **Participation:** Please supply your estimate of your institutions’ participation rate (in % terms) in the formulation of the policies indicated above

   (c) **Content:** What is your best estimate (in %) of the content of the policies that can be attributed to your institution both directly and indirectly?

3. How does your organization decide the economic policy issues it pursues in Kenya

4. How does your organization evaluate success in influencing economic policies, and what successes has the organization had in past?

5. What does your organization consider the most important tool or asset in economic policy advice and why?

6. How do policy makers communicate their policy advice needs? How do you respond?

7. How well do policy makers in government understand policy issues? How agile are they in responding to new policy developments?
8. Does your organization belong to formal and nonformal groupings with other think tanks; other international, multilateral and bilateral organizations are these groupings help for influencing policy change?

9. What factors influences your ability to influence policy change?

10. What could be done to improve the relationship between think tanks and policy makers
Appendix 5 (b): Key Informant Interview Guide: Government policy maker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Ministry</th>
<th>Government Department</th>
<th>Mandate of government department</th>
<th>Policy Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. How does your department formulate policy?
Consider the economic policies (finance, trade and industry) that the Kenya Government has formulated in the last 10 years and answer the three questions indicated below.

   a. **Origination**: Please indicate your best estimate of the approximate % of these policies that think tanks have originated

   b. **Participation**: Please supply your estimate of think tanks’ participation rate (in % terms) in the formulation of the policies indicated above

   c. **Content**: What is your best estimate (in %) of the content of these policies that can be attributed to think both directly and indirectly?

2. What role do think tanks play in economic policy advice? Does policy advice from think tanks meet your department’s needs?

3. Does policy advice from think tanks compete with advice coming the government’s own officials in economic policy? If so how are this conflicts in policy advice dealt with?

4. What determines what policy advice from government becomes policy?

5. Which think tanks have over time contributed to economic policy in your department? How have they contributed?

6. What is the relationship between think tanks and your department and how often does your department interact with think tank professionals (formal/informal)?

7. What specific products from think tanks are particularly useful for policy advice?

8. How do you get know the range of policy options you have, novel policy solutions out there?

9. Has the relationship between think tanks changed through changes in government regimes?

10. What should be done to improve the contribution of think tanks in economic policy?
Appendix 5 (c): Key Informant Interview Guide: Business Member Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. How often does your organization interact with think tanks?
   i. What policy issues has your organization worked on with think tanks in the past?
2. What relationship does your organization have with think tanks?
3. Between organizations such as yours and think tanks, which one would you rate as having more influence on the formulation of economic policy and which why?
4. Do you believe government demand for policy advice exists? What is the nature of this demand and how is this communicated?
5. Does your organization instigate demand for policy advice? How does it do so?
6. How does your organization deal with conflicts of interests in economic policy making between yourselves, think tanks and government?
7. Policy formulation relationships: What would be the ideal axis of relationships between the government, think tanks and business member organizations (BMOs)?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Nature of Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. Has your organization interacted with Kenya think tanks, and how have you interacted with them?

2. In your own assessment, what is the relative contribution of the following actors in economic policy processes in Kenya?

3. What is your assessment of the capacity of Kenyan think tanks in their quest to offer policy advice?

4. Over time what has the relationship between your organization and the government been?

5. Has your organization supported economic policy development programmes within the government of Kenya?

6. How would you access the government’s affinity for evidence-based policy making?

7. What do you think is the main source of policy advice for economic policy making in Kenya?

8. What is the reception of policy advice emanating from your organization to the government?

9. How does your organization support Kenyan Think Tanks?

10. How do you think the government perceives policy advice emanating from think tanks?

11. What would be done to optimize the relationship between the government, think tanks and organizations such as yours in economic policy formulation?
### Appendix 5 (e): Data Collection Tool for Secondary Data Sources (Think-Tank)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization:</th>
<th>Year Founded:</th>
<th>Mission:</th>
<th>Think Tank Category:</th>
<th>Average Annual Organizational Budget:</th>
<th>Vision:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Staff Size</td>
<td>Organizational objectives:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Secondary Data Source</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ascertain the role played by think tanks in economic policy making in Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish the factors that determine the influence of think tanks on economic policy making in Kenya.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine the gaps that exist between economic policy advice demand in Kenya and the outputs by local think tanks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 6: Sources of Secondary Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>(Kenya Institute for Policy Research and Analysis, 2016)</td>
<td>Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2018)</td>
<td>Website</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Development Studies – Nairobi University of Nairobi</td>
<td>(Institute for Development Studies, 2015)</td>
<td>Commemorative Publication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Development Studies – Nairobi University of Nairobi</td>
<td>(Institute of Development Studies – Nairobi University of Nairobi, 2015)</td>
<td>Website</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Appendix 7: Letter of Introduction for Data Collection

09 Feb. 2018

To whom it may concern

FACILITATION OF RESEARCH – ALEX NJERU

This is to introduce Alex Njeru, who is an MPPM student at Strathmore Business School. As part of our Masters Programme, Alex is expected to do applied research and to undertake a project. This is in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master in Public Policy and Management. The outcome would be of immediate benefit to the organizations he is researching on. To this effect, he would like to request for appropriate data from your organisation.

Alex is undertaking a research paper on The Role of Think Tanks in Economic Policy Making in Kenya. The information obtained from your organisation shall be treated confidentially and shall be used for academic purposes only.

Our MPPM seeks to establish links with industry, and one of these ways is by directing our research to areas that would be of direct usefulness to industry. We would be glad to share our findings with you after the research, and we trust that you will find them of great interest, if not of practical value to your organization.

We very much appreciate your support and we shall be willing to provide any further information if required.

Yours sincerely,

Biktad Nyongesa
Manager - Master in Public Policy and Management
Strathmore Business School
Appendix 8: NACOSTI Research Licence

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. ALEX NDUNGU NJERU
of STRATHMORE BUSINESS SCHOOL,
29177-100 Nairobi, has been permitted
to conduct research in Nairobi County.

on the topic: THE ROLE OF THINK
TANKS IN ECONOMIC POLICY IN KENYA

for the period ending:
26th February, 2019

Permit No : NACOSTI/F/18/59555/21438
Date Of Issue : 27th February, 2018
Fee Received : Ksh 2000

........................................
Applicant's
Signature

........................................
Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation

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