INTRODUCTION TO LEONARDO POLO´S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVATION

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The purpose of this article is to give a brief bird’s eye view of L. Polo highlighting the motivation and originality of his philosophy. We do not intend to assess how original he was and whether his claims are accurate or not. That will require a longer and deeper study which goes beyond the limits of this article.

There are many good articles explaining the origin and development of Leonardo Polo’s philosophy: "(Selles Dauder, n.d.)", "(Corazón González, 2011)", "(Cruz-Cruz, 1992)", "(Yepes Stork, 2005)", "(Falgueras Salinas, n.d.)", "(Falgueras Salinas, García González, Padial, & Universidad de Málaga, 2003)"), "(Piá Tarazona, n.d.)" to quote but a few. This article does not add much to the previous ones. It is mainly intended for a non-Spanish audience, who probably know little about L. Polo’s philosophy. It’s main value is that it based on Leonardo Polo’s explanation of his own thought. In the prologue to the first volume of ‘Antropología Transcendental’ Polo looks over his shoulder after his retirement. He considers the two volumes of ‘Antropología Transcendental to be the apex and last stone of his philosophical undertaking. We include translation done by Derrick Esclanda of this prologue at the end of the article. The translation of the texts in the body of the article are mine.

The article has two distinctive parts, the first one gives his historical background, the second is a quick analysis of his own autobiography as he gives it in the prologue to the first volume of ‘Antropología Transcendental´.
Historical sketch

In order to understand L. Polo better it is fitting to present a short sketch of his life and the thematic development of his thought. I found it pedagogical to classify his life in six stages; childhood, university studies and discovery, first works, years of silence, mature works and retirement. Polo himself values personal history to understand a philosopher as he states in ‘Lecciones de Ética’:

“Memory is very important for man, because man depends of his past and his present way of understanding todays reality is impossible if one does not take into account the past. What has happened to me has improved or deprived me.” (Polo, 2013)

**Childhood (1926 to 1945)**

In this stage the intellectual development was forged first in Madrid where he studied in, the Lycée Française, in Madrid which initiated him into foreign languages when he was still a child. He had to move with his family in 1937 to in Albacete due to the strenuous war circumstances in Madrid. After the war in 1939 the family moved back to Madrid where he studied in the Instituto Cardinal Cisneros. He had to repeat one year, so he had plenty of time to read on his own. He finished with an award for Extraordinary Performance. When he was 14 he was initiated to philosophy by reading the book of a clear and deep philosopher of the previous century, Jaime Balmes. From them on he continue reading avidly the philosophy books that were available both in the well-stocked library of his grandfather and from the equally well equipped library of the Instituto, at that time the best public school in Madrid.
From the vital point of view, the Civil War surely left profound marks in his life, seeing his family in danger –his maternal uncle who was a member of parliament for Melilla was killed, and his father who also held public positions during the republic had to seek refuge in South America and died abroad.

**University and Discovery (1945 to 1962)**

This second stage corresponds to his university studies. He did his undergraduate in Law which he studied to follow his family tradition. His father and two uncles were very good lawyers and his surviving uncle encouraged him to study law so that he could work in the family law firm. Leonardo was more inclined to study mathematics but he decided to follow his family tradition. Nevertheless, when he finished in 1949, and after working for a little while in the firm he realised that his heart was not for it, and decided to follow an academic life. He got a grant to do a PhD in Law.

While he was studying Law he continued delving on philosophical topics as he remembers from time to time in his books, as this quotation suggests:

“Here is an old idea I thought about when I was about 20 years old. It can be developed further, though. How many times man gets the opposite of what he wanted because he finds a legality that is not technical. The means have to be related to norms. This is a legality that if it is not respected, the opposite happens. It is almost certain that man is incoherent when he does not respect the legality; the relationship between the means and the good. From evil one cannot get good, because the good is spoiled.”

While he did law he continued reading avidly philosophy and in 1950 he had an answer to his many questions. It was his Aha! moment. It was like a sudden intuition that opened the door that made it possible to join the achievements of the modern and classic philosophies thanks to the discovery of a new method. At this time he was 24 years old.
“... it suddenly occurred to me, period. I was pondering about thinking and being, and about what being had to do with thinking; then I realized that we cannot arrive at being if one does not abandon the supposition of the object, because the supposition makes the object limited and a limited knowledge cannot be a knowledge of being if this is taken in the transcendental sense.” (Cruz-Cruz, 1992).

He called his discovery the discovery and abandonment of the mental limit.

“Many years ago I made the proposal to find a method to overcome the limits of the mental presence in man. This proposal brings the fact that human beings have knowledge powers superior to those “present-showing” and these are the habits. Certainly this proposal is not easily acceptable to thomistic philosophers. Nevertheless, among the many reasons to support it are the following. Firstly that habits cannot be limited to be a mere static repository of knowledge. Secondly that from long time ago —remember Plato- the knowledge of truth is something like a transcendental memory. But this transcendentality is not proper of the human mental presence, that in no way intrinsically penetrates into the remembrance of truth”. (Polo, Epistemologia, Creacion, Elevacion, unpublished).

This method will give access to the new transcendental fields of Anthropology maintaining the classic metaphysic but above it.

“In order to open the new area of what is transcendental is necessary to use the method that I call the abandonment of the mental limit. This is a proper name because the mental operations are the inferior acts of knowledge and therefore what is known through these operations has naturally to be limited. This limitation can be discovered from the intellectual habits that are superior powers of knowledge than the operations. Nevertheless the knowing operation is commesured with what it knows —what is called the object-. If one takes the limitation of the object, when one abandon the limit imposed by the operation, one reaches the trans-objective themes. If one takes the limitation of the operation, when one abandon the limit imposed by the operation, one reaches the trans-operational themes. The first corresponds to the metaphysics, the second to anthropology.” (Polo, 1999).
This intuition needed much work and this is why probably he concurrently to his phd studies he started and undergraduate degree in Philosophy. The phd grant allowed him to go to Rome, where he lived with St. Josemaria, a great source of inspiration for his life and his philosophy. There he read and wrote extensively, some 10 to 12 hours a day. During his stay in Rome he wrote the manuscript ‘The Real Distinction’ that contained his main discoveries and parts of which will eventually be the source of most of his works. He never finished his doctorate in Law. Once the grant was over, he started working at the recently started University of Navarre. The first year he taught in the Faculty of Law, and the following year 1955 in the Faculty of Philosophy which was just started. He finished his degree in Philosophy in 1959 and obtain a doctorate in Philosophy under the professor Millan Puelles in 1961. His doctoral dissertation, which won a prize, became his first published work “Evidencia y Realidad in Descartes” in 1963.

His reading during this period, and probably afterwards was so intense that he used to comment that he did not need the University to allocate funds for buying books for him, as the following anecdote corroborates:

It was commented that when he was helping Prof. Alvaro D’Ors in the organization of the Humanities Library, whenever faced with some problem he will joyfully say: “why do we need so many books if I have already read them all?” (Castilla de Cortazar, n.d.)

First published works (1963-1968)

This period corresponds with his first three published works and the appointment of the professorship to the new established seat of philosophy in the University of Granada in 1966, where he taught until 1968. He went back to the University of Navarre, this time as a professor.

The first published of his works ‘Evidencia y Realidad in Descartes’ is based on his doctoral thesis. In it he gives a rather new to Descartes motivation. He defends that Descartes rationalism
is actually hidden voluntarism. The second of his works ‘El acceso al ser’ was to be the first of a series of five explaining his method and main achievements. It develops the intuition of the method that opens the way to reach reality, the existent, the being. The new method, which he calls the ‘abandonment of the mental limit’ reaches the existence and essence of the world (‘extra-mental reality’ as he calls it, and then the existence and essence of the person. Each of these 4 topics will have been a new book. During this period he only managed to published the first one ‘El Ser-I, la Existencia Extramental’. The poor reception of the books and probably mental fatigue made him stop publishing for about 14 years.

Silent years (1968-1982)

During these years he continued lecturing in the University of Navarre. During the summer months he started traveling to some universities in South America where some of his past students, would invite him to assist in the training of faculty members. He would not be idle; he kept on working on his manuscripts in order to present his method in a better way. He was preparing the foundations of what would later become the five volumes of ‘Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento’ (Theory of Knowledge Course) –one of his master works- and later the two volumes of “Antropología Transcendental” which he considers the culmination of his work.

Mature works (1982-1996)

In 1982 one of his students, a nurse by profession, requested her classmates to record Polo’s classes which she could not attend because of her work shifts. The students realised that the transcription of the lectures could be easily published once the professor had corrected them. This gave a new impulse and confidence to the professor, who then started publishing
again. It was this students’ initiative that led to the publication of the five volumes of Theory of Knowledge and later the culmination of his work, and the two volumes of Transcendental Anthropology. The motivation and opinion L. Polo had on these books can be seen in the paragraphs 23 to 25 of the translated prologue in the Annex.

Retirement (1996 – 2013)

In Spain it is mandatory that professors retire at 70. D. Leonardo had to do so, but he continued having an office in the Faculty, where he went from time to time. Most of his time was spent at his home in the city where he continued receiving colleagues, disciples and friends. With the help of some of his past students he corrected the manuscripts of the books transcribed from his lectures and conferences. Following a suggestion of one of his disciples he prepared a new book in which he applies his philosophical findings to the theology of Christ, perfect man and perfect God. This book is in still unpublished to date.

Analysis of the Prologue to Transcendental Anthropology

There is no better account to the life of a philosopher than his own memories. Leonardo Polo does it in the Introduction to the first volume of his “Antropología Transcendental”.

We analyze it and give the complete translation as an annex in order to keep the integrity of his text for easy reading.

Structure of the prologue
The prologue has 27 paragraphs and its structure is as follows:

a) Purpose of the book # 1-2
b) The risks undertaken # 3-7
c) Core of his philosophy #8-9
d) His philosophy as continuation of the perpetual philosophy #10-14
e) Value of modern philosophy #15-20
f) The culmination and explanation of his main works #20-24
g) Style considerations regarding the book #25-26
h) Thanking his collaborators #27

Position of ‘Antropología Transcendental’ in his philosophical enterprise.

When L. Polo mentions that from the beginning of his career he was trying to see the proper relationship between metaphysics and anthropology he is probably recounting his first philosophical readings that started when he was 14 by reading the Fundamental Philosophy volumes of Jaime Balmes.

The fruit of his search was to discover the impossibility of dealing with the human being using classic Greek conceptual tools: the metaphysical transcendental. He himself used the
transcendental classic method of distinguishing categories and transcendentals but at a new level the personal level. This is why he named his way of doing anthropology, transcendental anthropology, and the new transcendentals ‘personal transcendentals’. In the same way that the metaphysical transcendentals, transcend the categories and therefore are found in all beings, the anthropological or personal transcendentals apply to all persons, as persons, not just as mere beings. The—personal-being— is different from the being of the non-persons, he indicates it is co-being or co-existence. This is the main topic of this first volume of his Antropología Transcendental.

**Looking over his shoulder regarding purpose and reception**

After two brief paragraphs Polo then switches to the difficulties he faced to reach this point of finishing his philosophical enterprise, which, as anything worthy, required vast efforts and some natural misunderstanding. He politely calls the obstacles he faced ‘risks’. The fourth risks Leonardo Polo highlights in his preface correspond somehow to the stages of his life discussed above.

The first one was strength. Such a grandiose work he envisaged in his years of Rome, required a revision of most of the modern and contemporary philosophy. He tried very hard while in Rome, but his body resented it and he had a serious bout of mental fatigue that took a long time to overcome, and that from time to time would recur.

Within the first risk he includes the risk of not being understood, which actually happened. If it is true that he has a number of followers who understand and value his contribution, they are few and mainly those he personally taught. It is clear that mental fatigue and being misunderstood are different type of risks, but probably the emotional weight of being rejected and isolated contributes to the lack of strength to continue struggling in a daunting task. This may explain why he comments that he tried to avoid discussions to minimize disputes.
The second risk has ethical connotations. If he was wrong, he would mislead people. Freedom is the key to understand transcendental anthropology and of its proper understanding depends the goodness of people of society and the good work in philosophy and theology. In passing he comments that he does not follow the Hegelian way of doing philosophy, which probably was one of the things that lead to some misunderstandings.

The third risk brings to light what was already suggested in the previous one, and he does not elaborate on it further.

And finally the fourth which has also some ethical connotation, he is trying to refute the claim that his philosophy is just a personal attempt to be singular, original, which may smack of vanity. On the intentions one cannot judge, so one has to trust the author and see his work. There is no doubt that Leonardo Polo is original, but as he said, most of his thoughts can be traced to philosophers he has read and assimilated. His new achievements put together with the new light of his method, what was already insinuated in many other authors, and he refers continuously to them in his works and acknowledges their achievements. He also clearly points out where he thinks they fall short and, from his new vantage point, suggest where they have to rectify. This seems to bear the mark of a great philosopher. What may give rise to the misunderstanding of thinking that Polo wants to be original is the use of new expressions, and the new meaning he gives to traditional philosophical and common terms. In this they have a point, because it is not easy to find which use he gives to each word and one has to be very careful on the context. One cannot read Polo in a hurry, or just once. Furthermore he takes gives many things for granted when he writes, expecting the reader to be as conversant with the classic philosophers as he was, or to have read as much as he did. The remembrance of one of his students can give weight to these statements.

"In 1975, while still an undergraduate and perhaps with some youth vehemence I went to D. Leonardo and told him that I had decided to make my doctoral dissertation on aspect of his thought. D. Leonardo looked at me over his glasses and warned me not to think of doing such a thing. I probably showed some kind of shock, because he found it necessary to explain that until I knew classical thought well I would do well to refrain from so great audacity. Although at
first my disappointment lead me to rebellion, I accepted to try to befriend Aristotle, who even today I still have as a master.

This personal anecdote serves to show something substantial in the work of D. Leonardo: to know more of the classics, to deepen on them, is really to go deep within yourself, because they are the source of philosophizing, a perennially renewed origin, with latencies, but without opacities.” (Yepes Stork, 2005).

Continuity with classical philosophy

After having a recount of the difficulties he makes a clear statement of the fundamental key to understand his philosophy, which stems from the highest point of classical philosophy.

Specifically, my approach stems from the real distinction between being and essence formulated by Thomas Aquinas, which is the last important finding of traditional philosophy. (Polo, 1999)

He sees his philosophy in continuity with classical philosophy and especially with Thomas Aquinas, which was present in his thought since he read Jaime Balmes at 14.

"Together with other thinkers of the XX centuries he worried about the formalism of the late Scholastic Philosophy. He managed to get to the root of the problem with the method of 'reaching the being', while other ten years later some neo-Thomistic philosophers in the 60s discover that the key to Thomas Aquinas thought is the distinction between essence and being. How many times he repeated that 'a thought cow does not give milk', or that the 'I thought does not think'! Proving that the idealism does not work and showing the importance of abandoning the mental limit to reach REALITY which is the proper place of BEING.” (Castilla de Cortazar, n.d.).
His continuity with classic philosophy is clearly indicated by one of his best disciples the late R. Yepes York in a short article he wrote for the general public after the Congress organized in Pamplona in honour of Leonardo Polo’s on his retirement in 1996.

"From here we can see that Polo knows the great philosophers well. Some like Parmenides, Eckhard o Descartes passionately occupy some period of his life. Others like Heidegger have inspired him. But he has thought deeply on three.

Firstly on Aristotle, with whom he has special affinity and who marks the lines of Polo’s theory of knowledge and ethics.

Secondly, Thomas Aquinas, from which he takes a great portion of his corpus and specially the distinction between being and essence which he takes to its limit.

And in third place Hegel, who is the apex of modernity. On him the modern ideal reaches its peak. ‘Hegel formulates his speculative ambition raising reason to its maximum height. But we have to note that mental presence of man is a limit. If one manages to abandon the limit, the Hegelian attempt is over and one has a new departure point. This is my proposal”. (Yepes, Aceprensa 1996 ?)

The problems of classical Thomism

Nevertheless he thinks that in order to progress the classical Thomism, including Thomas himself has to be redirected because it cannot progress unless it recognizes the mental limit and becomes transcendental in anthropology.

"The weakening of the historical Thomism is due to the fact that their understanding of 'being' is weakened by the mental limit. Thomism is a synthesis of Christian philosophy in which
limit has not yet been detected and that, therefore, it slowed down the impulse toward transcendental anthropology.

Thomistic philosophy still focuses on the study of man as nature and substance. Although Aquinas overcomes the Greek understanding in metaphysics, he does not apply it to the human being.” (Polo, 1999).

The solution is to overcome the limitations of the Greek metaphysics and go beyond them by abandoning the mental limit which will also achieve a new way of composition higher than the Aristotelian hylemorphic.

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The problems and value of modern philosophy

Nevertheless a continuation of the traditional philosophy cannot ignore the thought and developments of modern thinkers. They have something to contribute. There should be a positive dialogue so that what is not accurate can be discovered and what is missing in the classical philosophy can be incorporated. This is a necessary task for any philosopher.

"the proposed continuation of Thomism -which ignores the transcendental aspect of freedom-, cannot progress without a critique of modern philosophy.”

The contribution of modern philosophy, as Polo sees it, is to show clearly the limit, the impossibility of continuing doing philosophy in the classical way. The new method will show the limits of both ways of doing philosophy and open the door to continue doing classical philosophy in a new way.
Idealism brings out in a clear way the mental limit, whose detection is essential for the continuation of traditional philosophy. Again, the mental spotting of the limit is not independent of overcoming idealism. (Polo, 1999).

The culmination and explanation of his main works

In the following paragraphs L. Polo states the work he had given himself after he had the intuition of the new method, and how it changed over the years. He does it considering mainly the thematic approach, but we should take into account some of the points mentioned when considering the stages of the vital development, which no doubt, also influenced his works.

"I cite the book on which this method is exposed and the thematic plan for its development and the changes that the original plan suffered.” (Polo, 1999).

Rather than repeating his words, we include a simple sketch that summarizes the text.

El acceso al ser (1964):
- El ser I (Extra-mental Existence) (1965)
- El ser II (Extra-mental Essence)
  - Teoría del conocimiento, v. IV first part (1994)
  - Teoría del conocimiento, v. IV second part (1996)
- El ser IV (Human Essence) drafted 1972, Anthropologia Trascendental II (2003)

Style considerations
L. Polo was not a good writer. His mind was too fast, too elevated for writing or typing. He was a good speaker, thinking as he was speaking. His first books “El acceso al ser” y ‘El-ser-I’ are paradigmatic. The books and articles based on his lectures and conferences are easier to read. Aware of this in this late book he makes two interesting remarks; one that the book has many sources ‘plurality’. Some of his books are collections of notes from different times and lectures that he later put together, rather than going into the pain of writing again. It seems that his fear to the pen also motivated the second point he makes, that of citing himself frequently. In spite of these remarks the books flows well and what is more important, gives light to his previous works. This makes it advisable for those who want to read his main works to read then backwards, starting from the two volumes of ‘Antropología Transcendental’ followed by the five volumes of ‘Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento’ to finally try ‘El Ser-I’ y ‘El Acceso al Ser’.

“I must admit that together with formal defects due in large part to the plurality of its immediate sources, there are many references to my own books.” (Polo, 1999).

Gratitude to his collaborators

He finalizes acknowledging the work of his immediate collaborators and in a special way the Dean of the Faculty, who constantly encouraged him, even after his retirement, to finish writing his originally planned series of works. No wonder Professor Angel González is now in charge of Leonardo Polo’s intellectual legacy.

We hope that this brief introduction would generate some interest in reading and translating the works of this humble, innovative and generous philosopher and help to make his contributions better known in the English speaking world.

Bibliography


**Preface to Transcendental Anthropology Volume I**
1. This book is certainly the culmination of my philosophical inquiry. What I mean by this is that the method that has led up to it can no longer give more of itself. But, since this method makes access to abundant thematic fruits possible, this book is added to the harvest that is contained, but not exhausted in other writings. Because of its double value - methodological and thematic - the summit reopens the various thematic areas: it re-iterates them.

2. The task of the pages that follow is the development of the transcendental character of anthropology. As I see it, anthropology is not a regional ontology nor a chapter of metaphysics, because it deals with personal being, which cannot be reduced to the sense of being that metaphysics studies. One of the central chapters of first philosophy, especially in the Middle Ages, is the theory of the transcendentals; there are also transcendentals that correspond to

1. Seguramente este libro es el vértice de mi investigación filosófica. Quiero decir con esto que el método que la ha conducido no da más de sí. Pero como ese método permite acceder a frutos temáticos abundantes, este libro se añade a la cosecha contenida y no agotada en otros escritos. Por su doble valor –metódico y temático– la cima vuelve a abrir los diversos campos temáticos: los re-itera.

2. El cometido de las páginas que siguen es el desarrollo del carácter trascendental de la antropología. A mi modo de ver, la antropología no es una ontología regional ni un capítulo de la metafísica, porque trata del ser personal, el cual no se reduce al sentido del ser que estudia la metafísica. Uno de los capítulos centrales de la filosofía primera, sobre todo en la Edad Media, es la teoría de los trascendentales; al ser personal le corresponden también trascendentales, que se han de añadir a
personal being, which need to be added to those discovered by traditional philosophy. For this reason, the nucleus of the contents of the present book is what I call the expansion of the transcendental, that is, the presentation of the transcendental that do not appear on the classical list.

3. My interest in philosophy began many years ago. From the start I kept in mind the relationship between metaphysics and anthropology. And throughout all this time I have tried to uncover its various aspects. Coming after other writings, a compendium of my version of these relations is presented here. Fitting together such abundant yet diverse material together has not been easy. Therefore, in this preface, it is appropriate to refer to the inherent risks of such a long journey; nevertheless, I have always thought that facing them was worthwhile.

4. The first risk was that the research project would falter out of lack of strength, or, if it did move forward, that is would not be accepted by the community of philosophers. I was los descubiertos por la filosofía tradicional. Por eso, la parte nuclear del contenido del presente libro es lo que llamo ampliación de los trascendentales, es decir, la exposición de los trascendentales que no aparecen en el elenco clásico.

3. Empecé a ocuparme de la filosofía hace muchos años. Desde el inicio he tenido en cuenta las relaciones de la metafísica con la antropología. Y durante todo este tiempo he procurado desplegar sus diversos aspectos. Después de otros escritos, se expone aquí un compendio de mi versión de dichas relaciones. Encajar asuntos tan abundantes como dispare no ha sido fácil. Por eso, en este prólogo, es oportuno aludir a los riesgos inherentes a una andadura tan larga; sin embargo, siempre me ha parecido que valía la pena afrontarlos.

4. El primer riesgo era que el proyecto de investigación se detuviera por escasez de fuerzas, o bien, que si salía adelante, no fuese aceptado por la comunidad de filósofos. Me exponía de antemano a permanecer inédito o a publicar sin que nadie me entendiera. Aunque, por
especially in danger of remaining unpublished or to publish, but without anyone understanding me. Although, fortunately, some readers have understood the methodological and thematic dimensions that I have been proposing for over forty years, the circle of specialists that have paid attention to them has been few in number. As is clear, this circumstance is no cause for complaint. The situation of being a little known author is comfortable because it avoids the headaches that come after the publication of a doctrine whose elaboration has been too demanding. Moreover, entering into arguments with thinkers who already maintain established positions, or schools, rarely leads to a fruitful dialogue.

5. The second risk was that of falling into errors, that is, that my way of approaching philosophical questions might later oblige me to backtrack: not so much being a little read author, but to have to correct and retract my writings. Especially, upon understanding that freedom is a personal transcendental, this risk became much more serious, because the transcendental approach to

fortuna, algunos lectores han comprendido las dimensiones metódicas y temáticas que vengo proponiendo desde hace más de cuarenta años, el círculo de especialistas que le han prestado atención es reducido. Como es claro, esta circunstancia no es motivo de queja. La situación de autor minoritario es cómoda porque evita quebraderos de cabeza posteriores a la publicación de una doctrina cuya elaboración los ha exigido en demasía. Por otra parte, entrar en discusión con pensadores que mantienen posturas ya consolidadas, o de escuela, raramente conduce a un diálogo fructífero.

5. El segundo riesgo era incurrir en equivocaciones, es decir, que mi modo de plantear las cuestiones filosóficas me obligara después a recoger velas: no ya ser un autor poco leído, sino tener que rectificar o retractarme de mis escritos. Justamente, al entender que la libertad es un trascendental personal, este riesgo se agudizaba mucho, porque es patente que el enfoque trascendental de la libertad aparece en varios pensadores modernos; por ejemplo, en
freedom clearly appears in many modern thinkers; for example, in Kant and in Jaspers. Therefore, I was at risk of falling into errors or of being misinterpreted, because, in spite of the terminological similarity, my way of understanding freedom is different from that of modern speculations. Anecdotally, it can be mentioned that some persons have held that I depend on Hegel. However, although it is true that I have dealt with this author, I have never been Hegelian.

6. A third risk, related with the previous one, consisted in being misunderstood, that is, not that I would be mistaken, but that I might be the occasion of others not keeping in mind my disagreement with modern philosophy and thus falling into the error mentioned above. Luckily, so far, this has not come about.

7. A fourth danger, of no little import given that the risks mentioned above stem from it, consists in giving the impression of wanting to be an original thinker, or rather, of expounding upon a few peculiar notions. I must sincerely declare that such an intention is alien to me. The correctness of what I sustain depends on Kant y en Jaspers. Por consiguiente, me exponía a caer en equívocos o a ser mal interpretado, porque, a pesar de la coincidencia terminológica, mi modo de entender la libertad es distinto de las especulaciones modernas. Como anécdota, se puede comentar que algunas personas han sostenido que dependo de Hegel. Sin embargo, si bien es verdad que me he ocupado de ese autor, nunca he sido hegeliano.

6. Un tercer riesgo, concomitante con el anterior, consistía en ser mal entendido, es decir, no en equivocarme, sino en dar lugar a que otros no tuvieran en cuenta mi discordancia con la filosofía moderna, incurriendo así en el equívoco antes aludido. Por suerte, hasta el momento, ese acontecimiento no se ha dado.

7. Un cuarto peligro, y no de escasa importancia porque de él arrancan los riesgos antes apuntados, consistía en dar la impresión de pretender ser un pensador original, o bien, de exponer algunas ocurrencias particulares. He de declarar sinceramente que dicha pretensión me es extraña. El acierto de
the thematic richness and the validity of the methodology through which it is attained. I must insist on this point. To seek the truth entails attempting to advance in research. To the extent that one can, this must be done if one is a philosopher or scientist. Being original or not is a secondary question. Moreover, in these disciplines, it is not possible to propose novelties without finding a point of support in previous approaches, which merit commentary and continuation. Furthermore, I have always encouraged my disciples to not limit themselves to repeating me.

8. Specifically, my approach arises from the real distinction of being and essence formulated by Thomas Aquinas, which is the last significant discovery of traditional philosophy. In this sense, I do not consider myself a rebellious Thomist, as others have been, nor a commentator. It is noteworthy that in the 20th century, more than in other periods, attention has been directed to this aspect of Thomas Aquinas's thought. However, there are two issues that still have not been taken into account. First, that the real distinction of being and essence is not...
entirely compatible with other notions that Thomas Aquinas, as synthesizing philosopher, gathers from the philosophy before him. This being so, a task of purification seems necessary which, to a large extent, I have carried out in other publications and to which I will later return in this book. Second, the aforementioned Thomistic discovery can be expanded, or made better use of, if it is studied in recto in man, that is, if the act of human being, which is person, is really distinguished from the essence of man. Indeed, since man is a very special creature, and is sufficiently distinct from others, by investigating the sense that the real distinction in him is attained one avoids treating it in general terms. By generalizing it, the real distinction losses its explanatory value of created reality.

9. In summary, the meaning of my proposal is clear: to capitalize on the central thesis of Thomism. In this way, it is not a question of retreating back to the 13th century, but rather of making it possible to confront what modern philosophy has tried to bring to light and to understand it in the right way, that is, to proceed with the expansion of the primer lugar, que la distinción real de ser y esencia no es enteramente compatible con otras nociones que Tomás de Aquino, como filósofo sintetizador, recoge de la filosofía anterior a él. De ser así, parece necesaria una tarea de depuración que, en gran medida, he llevado a cabo en otras publicaciones y sobre la que volveré en este libro. En segundo lugar, la aludida averiguación tomista puede ampliarse, o aprovecharse mejor, si se estudia in recto en el hombre, esto es, si se distingue realmente el acto de ser humano, que es persona, de la esencia del hombre. En efecto, como el hombre es una criatura muy especial, suficientemente distinta de otras, al investigar el sentido que en él alcanza la distinción real se evita tratarla en términos generales. Al generalizarla, la distinción real pierde su valor explicativo de la realidad creada.

9. En suma, el sentido de mi propuesta es claro: se trata de sacar partido a la tesis nuclear del tomismo. Con esto no se retrocede al siglo XIII, sino que es posible enfrentarse con lo que la filosofía moderna ha intentado sacar a
transcendentals without diminishing metaphysics.

10. Traditional philosophy lends itself to be continued. This means that it is an open philosophy or that it knows that it has not thought everything. In contrast, modern philosophy refuses to be continued, precisely because it is systematic and, therefore, closed. The great modern philosophers confuse philosophy with absolute knowledge. Interestingly, however, for some, classical philosophy is a finished philosophy. If Thomas Aquinas has thought everything that can be thought, then later philosophers can only repeat him. But this falls into the same error that systematic philosophy invites, but perhaps for other reasons, such as the criterion of authority or a certain mental laziness. I often speak of the historical situation, which is something like the emplacement in which one finds oneself and from which one can orientate oneself with respect to the philosophical discoveries that have been achieved up until the present day, starting with the conviction that philosophy is never finished. Far from being moved by the fancy for originality,
it is a question of doing philosophy while taking into account our historical position. The way to advance is also indicated by the historical moment, and lies primarily in insisting upon anthropology, because human being has not been studied sufficiently. According to my proposal, it is appropriate to call human being co-being or co-existence.

11. Human co-existence as a theme capable of being attained does not appear in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. This is not due to some distraction on the part of this great metaphysician and Christian theologian; nor is it a mere omission that can be remedied by simply adding a new chapter to his work, because the reason for this omission is much deeper: that is, the impulse that nourishes Thomistic philosophy does not reach the theme; what I mean is that it falls short, or better, that it is hampered by its Aristotelian heritage and by the influence of Averroes. For this reason, it must be said that human co-existence is only virtually contained within Thomism, which therefore must be continued in accordance to some kind of reorganization. In order to study co-

logrados hasta hoy, a partir del convencimiento de que la filosofía nunca está terminada. Más que ser llevado por el prurito de originalidad, se trata de filosofar teniendo en cuenta la altura histórica. La vía de avance está indicada también por la coyuntura, y estriba sobre todo en insistir en la antropología, porque el ser humano no ha sido suficientemente estudiado. Según mi propuesta, conviene llamar al ser humano co-ser o co-existencia.

11. La co-existencia humana como tema susceptible de ser alcanzado, no aparece en la filosofía de Tomás de Aquino. Ello no obedece a una distracción de este gran metafísico y teólogo cristiano; no es tampoco una mera omisión que pueda subsanarse con sólo añadir un capítulo nuevo a su obra, porque la razón de esa omisión es más profunda: se trata de que el impulso que alimenta la filosofía tomista no llega al tema; quiero decir que se queda corto, o mejor, que está frenado por la herencia aristotélica y el influjo de Averroes. Por eso se ha de decir que la co-existencia humana sólo virtualmente está contenida en el
existence, it is not enough to superimpose it on top of the themes that Thomas Aquinas dealt with because it is not aligned with them.

12. Thomism in its totality cannot be regarded as something separated from some concrete historical situation with which we today have nothing important in common. That would be historicism and a misunderstanding of the value of tradition in Christian philosophy. Thomism is not a philosophy that can be superseded, but rather one that can be continued and one which, in anthropology, does not contain superficial confusions, but rather valid theses that are open to deeper and continued research, that is, truths that are not exhausted and are thus open to revision. The exhaustion of historical Thomism lies, concretely, in that the understanding of being is weakened by the mental limit. Thomism is a synthesis of Christian philosophy in which the mental limit has not yet been detected and in which, therefore, the impulse toward transcendental anthropology has been hindered.

tomismo, que por ello se ha de continuar de acuerdo con cierta reorganización. Para investigar la coexistencia, no basta con superponerla a los temas de que se ocupa Tomás de Aquino, porque no es alineable con ellos.

12. No cabe considerar el tomismo en su totalidad como un segregado de una cierta situación histórica concreta, con la cual no tenemos hoy nada medular común. Esto sería historicismo, y una incomprensión del valor de la tradición en la filosofía cristiana. El tomismo no es una filosofía superable, sino continuable, que en antropología no contiene confusiones superficiales, sino tesis válidas susceptibles de profundización, de insistencia, es decir, verdades no agotadas y así abiertas a una revisión. El agotamiento del tomismo histórico se cifra, concretamente, en que la comprensión del ser está debilitada por el límite mental. El tomismo es una síntesis de filosofía cristiana en que el límite mental todavía no ha sido detectado y en que,
13. Thomistic philosophy is still focuses on the study of man as substance and nature. Although Thomas Aquinas goes beyond the Greek perspective in metaphysics, he does not extend his discoveries to human being. For this reason he sees the passage from the natural to the supernatural as a shift of attention. The substance as the foundation of natural operations is not unified with the consideration of man as elevated creature.

14. On the other hand, modern philosophy can be surpassable. Here I understand surpassing as giving an account for the senseless identification of the human subject with the objectivity of thought. Understanding identity as a nexus of subject and object involves, on the one hand, that the object is constructed and, on the other, that the subject recognizes herself in it, that is, that she recovers herself in the mode of coming to be once again as object. This version of identity can only be explained if the exigency of self is raised to an absolute postulate.

15. Transcending idealism means opposing the distortion of freedom that the
exigency of self entails. To the extent that the exigency of self advances, freedom becomes ever more submerged into thought. The imprisonment of freedom in the construction of the identity of the subject with the object is a philosophical deviation that occurs at the expense of freedom. Therefore, to surpass modern philosophy is to rescue freedom. Similarly, the proposed continuation of Thomism (which ignores the transcendental extent of freedom) cannot ignore the critique of modern philosophy. Having laid out the question in this way, the follow questions are posed: What is the objective value of the intuition of the subject? Although, in principle, the object is not in itself taken as the subject, is the intuition of the subject objective? Is there any objective correspondence to the subject? The answer must be negative: idealism does not achieve its purpose. The object is simply, and nothing more than, the mental limit.

16. Idealism marks the loss of the transcendental value of the human person for the very reason that it constitutes itself as exigency of self. The

15. La superación del idealismo significa una oposición a la desvirtuación de la libertad que la pretensión de sí conlleva. A medida que la pretensión de sí avanza, la libertad va siendo sumergida en el pensamiento. El aprisionamiento de la libertad en la construcción de la identidad del sujeto con el objeto es una desviación filosófica que tiene lugar a expensas de la libertad. Por eso, superar la filosofía moderna es rescatar la libertad. Paralelamente, la propuesta continuación del tomismo —que ignora el alcance trascendental de la libertad— no puede desentenderse de la crítica a la filosofía moderna. Formulada así la cuestión, se plantean las siguientes preguntas: ¿cuál es el valor objetivo de la intuición del sujeto? Aunque, en principio, el objeto no se vea de suyo como sujeto, ¿la intuición del sujeto es objetiva? ¿Se da alguna correspondencia objetiva del sujeto? La respuesta ha de ser negativa: el idealismo no logra su propósito. El objeto es simplemente, y nada más, el límite mental.

16. El idealismo marca la pérdida del valor trascendental de la persona humana,
binomial subject-object is the negating of human co-existence in thought, not the authentic openness of transcendental anthropology. The centering of attention on having [haber] in order to interpret it as identical to the person is arbitrary. Idealism is not simply a thematic error, but rather a deterioration of human co-existence as freedom.

17. But precisely therein lies the usefulness of idealism for the detection [detectación] of the mental limit and its abandonment in anthropology. This usefulness remains untapped in the fear-filled rejection of the idealist approach because of fear of losing reality - or faith. Taking advantage of this requires putting aside the fear of getting ensnared in the intuition of the self when studying it. Idealism lays out on the table, in the way just mentioned, the question of the mental limit, whose detection is indispensable for the continuation of traditional philosophy. I insist, the detection of the mental limit is not independent from the task of overcoming idealism.

por lo mismo que se constituye como pretensión de sí. El binomio sujeto-objeto es el anegamiento de la co-existencia humana en el pensamiento, no la auténtica apertura de la antropología trascendental. Centrar la atención en el haber para interpretarlo como idéntico a la persona es una arbitrariedad. El idealismo no es simplemente un error temático, sino una decaída de la co-existencia humana como libertad.

17. Pero precisamente en ello reside la utilidad del idealismo para la detectación del límite mental y su abandono en antropología. Tal utilidad permanece sin aprovechar en el horrorizado rechazo del planteamiento idealista por temor a perder la realidad –o la fe–. Dicho aprovechamiento exige desear el temor a quedar prendido en la intuición de sí mismo al estudiarla. El idealismo pone sobre el tapete, de señalada manera, la cuestión del límite mental, cuya detectación es imprescindible para la continuación de la filosofía tradicional. Insisto, la detectación del límite mental no es
18. The detection of the mental limit has a methodological value. One of the dimension of this method is the character of additionally [además]: the person is not in the object.

19. The character of additionally is the method required for attaining human co-existence; naturalist anthropology is incapable of this. In turn, post-christian anthropocentric philosophy disrupts and misdirects anthropological research. Attaining human co-existence requires giving up the exigency of thinking it, that is, of finding it in the object or as an object.

20. Furthermore, the exigency to intuit the subject in the object entails the elimination of the intentional value of the latter. This is unavoidable because, by interpreting it as identical with the subject, the object is absolutized as itself and is deprived of its intentional value, reduced to the representation in which the subject recognizes itself. Intentionality is a certain openness, a clarity obtained by the cognitive operations, which does not illuminate the subject, but rather the forms of extra-individual de la tarea de superar el idealismo.

18. La detectación del límite mental posee valor metódico. Una de las dimensiones de ese método es el carácter de además: en el objeto no está la persona. El carácter de además es el método requerido para alcanzar la co-existencia humana; la antropología naturalista es incapaz de ello. A su vez, la filosofía antropocéntrica postcristiana desbarata y descamina la investigación antropológica. Alcanzar la co-existencia humana exige la renuncia a la pretensión de pensarla, es decir, de encontrarla en el objeto o como objeto.

19. Por otra parte, la pretensión de intuir el sujeto en el objeto comporta la eliminación del valor intencional de este ultimo. Ello es inevitable, por cuanto, al interpretarlo como idéntico al sujeto, el objeto se absolutiza como sí mismo y es privado de su valor intencional, reduciéndose a la representación en la que el sujeto se reconoce. La intencionalidad es una cierta apertura, una claridad obtenida por las operaciones cognoscitivas, que no
mental reality. In short, the appearance of the subject in thought is a loss both for the person's character of additionally as well as for objective intentionality.

21. In this way the motives that were present when I first started doing philosophy and which matured though many years are made clear. I must now mention the method in accordance with which the corrections mentioned have been made and by which new themes have been accessed. I call this method the abandonment of the mental limit. So as to avoid repetition, I will now mention the book in which this method is presented and the plan set out for the development of its thematic as well as the twists and turns that this plan has suffered.

22. Access to Being (a book published in 1964) described the mental limit and presented the four major theme that are made accessible by abandoning it. Four books were to cover these themes. Being, volume I, published in 1965 (2nd ed. 1997), deals with the first principles, that is, with extra-mental existence. In it, I argue that the first principles are three, ilumina al sujeto, sino a las formas de la realidad extramental. En suma, la aparición del sujeto en el pensamiento es la pérdida tanto del carácter de además de la persona como de la intencionalidad objetiva.

20. De esta manera quedan expuestos los motivos actantes desde que empecé a filosofar y que han ido madurando a lo largo de muchos años. He de aludir ahora al método de acuerdo con el cual las rectificaciones señaladas se han llevado a cabo y se ha accedido a una nueva temática. Denomino a ese método abandono del límite mental. Para no incurrir en repeticiones, citaré a continuación el libro en que ese método se expone y el plan previsto para su desarrollo temático, así como los avatares que ese plan ha sufrido.

and that it is necessary to distinguish them. Metaphysics focuses on the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction, and the principle of transcendental causality. Being, volume II, would have studied extra-mental essence, which is dependent principality, that is the four predicamental causes insofar as con-causal. Being, volume III, would have dealt with the human person; and Being, volume IV, with the human essence.

23. Volume II of Being was not published, but its content is contained in Volume IV of the Course on a Theory of Knowledge (1994-1996), which presents how the mental limit is abandoned in such a way so as to explicitate the predicamental causes. For the last two volumes of the original plan, I have chosen to title them Transcendental Anthropology, and their publication begins with this book. The first volume of Transcendental Anthropology is dedicated to the person, the act of human being. The second volume, to the human essence. The first volume is divided into three parts. The first is the approach; the second deals with the method; and the third part of

extramental. En él sostengo que los primeros principios son tres y que es menester distinguirlos. La metafísica versa sobre el principio de identidad, el principio de no contradicción y el principio de causalidad trascendental. El ser, tomo II, habría de estudiar la esencia extramental, que es la principalidad dependiente, es decir, las cuatro causas predicamentales en tanto que concausales. El ser, tomo III, trataría de la persona humana; y El ser, tomo IV, de la esencia del hombre.

22. El tomo II de El ser no se ha publicado, pero su contenido está recogido en el tomo IV del Curso de teoría del conocimiento (1994-1996), donde se expone de qué manera se abandona el límite mental para explicitar las causas predicamentales. A los dos últimos tomos del plan original he preferido titularlos Antropología trascendental, y su publicación se inicia con el presente libro. El primer tomo de la Antropología trascendental está dedicado a la persona, al acto de ser humano. El segundo tomo, a la esencia del hombre. El primer tomo está dividido en tres partes. La primera es el planteamiento;
the subject matter itself, that is, of the personal transcendental. It is, nevertheless, necessary to mention these last in earlier parts.

24. These changes of titles are explained by the following reasons. After a some of expository essays, it was realized that the knowledge of con-causality corresponds above all to judgment. This made the study of human knowing necessary, since judgment is preceded by abstraction. It was therefore necessary to proceed with the study of the first intellectual operation and of the habits and operations that follow it in order to determine the mode of abandoning the mental limit when continuing the activity of the intelligence; this amounted to writing a course on the theory of human knowledge. Thus, it is clear why the second dimension of the abandonment of the mental limit was presented much later than expected.

25. In turn, volumes III and IV of Being were written between 1970 and 1972. I decided not to publish them because I soon realized that the draft was excessively schematic and contained...
gaps. For that reason, I spent a considerable amount of time to deepening and completing this draft, especially through doctoral courses taught since that time at the University of Navarre and in some American universities. It became clear that in order to attain the human person, by following the abandonment of the mental limit, a new formulation of the theory of the transcendentals was necessary. Thus the title of this book.

26. I must admit that among the formal defects of the present text, due largely to the plurality of its immediate sources, the excess of self-citations stands out. As much as such a procedure is unadvisable because it affects the clarity of the presentation, it has not been possible to do away with it, since the thematic of the third dimension of the abandonment of the mental limit is closely related to those that are accessible by following the other dimensions of this method, which have already been extensively covered in other places and are impossible to reproduce in full.

No me decidí a publicarlos porque pronto comprobé que dicha redacción era excesivamente esquemática y ofrecía lagunas. Por eso, he dedicado bastante tiempo a profundizar y completar dicha redacción, sobre todo, a través de los cursos de doctorado dictados desde entonces en la Universidad de Navarra y en algunas universidades americanas. Se ha hecho patente que para alcanzar la persona humana, siguiendo el abandono del límite mental, es necesaria una nueva formulación de la teoría de los trascendentales. De aquí el título de este libro.

25. Debo reconocer que entre los defectos formales del presente texto, debidos en buena parte a la pluralidad de sus fuentes inmediatas, destaca el exceso de autocitas. Por más que se trate de un procedimiento desaconsejable por afectar a la limpieza de la exposición, no ha sido posible prescindir de él, pues la temática de la tercera dimensión del abandono del límite mental guarda estrecha relación con las que son accesibles siguiendo otras dimensiones de ese método, ya expuestas...
27. Moreover, since the third dimension of the abandonment of the mental limit attains the highest themes, the internal citations are not mere repetitions because the themes accessible through the other dimensions of the proposed method acquire a greater precision upon attaining human co-existence. This will be especially noticeable in the exposition of the innate habits, which in the Course on a Theory of Knowledge is treated very briefly. It is also desirable to distinguish with sufficient clarity the first principles, studied in volume I of Being, from the human person.

28. Without the assistance of Salvador Piá Tarazona in the drafting of the text and without the help of Mª Jose Franquet, who transcribed its immediate antecedents, the publication of this book would have been long postponed. I must extend my gratitude to professors Ignacio Falgueras and Jorge Mario Posada, with whom I have had long conversations in which perspectives of great interest have arisen. To my colleagues and friends Ricardo Yepes, whose premature death I lament, and Angel Luis Gonzalez, chairman of this

extensamente en otros lugares y que es imposible reproducir por entero.

26. Por otra parte, como la tercera dimensión del abandono del límite mental alcanza los temas más altos, las citas internas no son meras repeticiones, porque los temas accesibles con las otras dimensiones del método propuesto adquieren una mayor precisión al alcanzar la co-existencia humana. Ello se notará especialmente en la exposición de los hábitos innatos, que en el Curso de teoría del conocimiento se tratan de una manera muy escueta. También es conveniente distinguir con suficiente nitidez los primeros principios, estudiados en el tomo I de El ser, de la persona humana.

27. Sin la colaboración de Salvador Piá Tarazona en la redacción del texto y sin la ayuda de Mª José Franquet, que ha transcrito sus antecedentes inmediatos, la publicación de este libro se habría retrasado mucho. He de extender mi agradecimiento a los profesores Ignacio Falgueras y Jorge Mario Posada, con los que he mantenido largas
Department, I am indebted to their attentive and enthusiastic support, and to the encouragement that they have always given me in the publication of my works.

colorbox{conversaciones en las que han surgido perspectivas de sumo interés. A mis colegas y amigos Ricardo Yepes, cuya prematura muerte tanto deploro, y Ángel Luis González, Decano de esta Facultad, debo el solícito y entusiasta apoyo, el impulso que siempre me han prestado en la pu